Northeastern Political Science Association: Palgrave Macmillan Journals

Northeastern Political Science Association
What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation
in the Social Sciences
Author(s): John Gerring
Source: Polity, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Spring, 1999), pp. 357-393
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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WhatMakesa ConceptGood?
A CriterialFrameworkfor Understanding
ConceptFormationin the SocialSciences*
JohnGerring
Boston University
Nowhere in the broad and heterogeneouswork on conceptformation has the

question of conceptual utilitybeen satisfactorilyaddressed.Goodness in
conceptformation, I argue, cannot be reducedto 'clarity,'to empirical or
theoreticalrelevance, to a set of rules, or to the methodologyparticular to a
given study.Rather,I argue that conceptual adequacyshould be perceived
as an attemptto respond to a standardset of criteria, whose demandsare
felt in theformation and use of all social science concepts: () familiarity,
(2) resonance, (3) parsimony,(4) coherence, (5) differentiation,(6) depth,
(7) theoreticalutility,and (8)field utility.The significance of this study is to
be found not simply in answering this importantquestion,but also in pro-
viding a complete and reasonably conciseframeworkfor explaining the
process of conceptformation within the social sciences. Rather than con-
ceiving of conceptformation as a method(with a fixed set of rules and a
definite outcome),I view it as a highly variableprocess involvingtrade-offs
among these eight demands.
John Gerring is assistantprofessor in the Departmentof Political Science at

Boston University,232 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215.
As we are ... prisonersof the wordswe pick,we hadbetterpick them

well.
GiovanniSartori'
"Conceptformation"conventionallyrefers to three aspects of a concept: (a)

the events or phenomenato be defined (the extension, denotation,or definien-
*I thank Andrew Gould, Hanna Pitkin, Arun Swamy and Craig Thomas for their helpful
comments and suggestions. I am particularlygrateful to David Collier and David Waldnerfor
their work, their support,and their ongoing inputto debate on mattersmethodological.
1. Giovanni Sartori,"Guidelinesfor ConceptAnalysis," Social Science Concepts:A Sys-
tematicAnalysis, ed. Giovanni Sartori(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), 60.
Polity XXXI,Number33 Spring1999

Polity Volume Spring1999

358 What Makes a Concept Good?
dum), (b) the propertiesor attributesthatdefine them (the intension,connota-

tion, definiens, or definition),and (c) a label covering both a and b (the term).
Concept formation is thus a triangularoperation; good concepts attain a
properalignmentbetween a, b, and c.2
If this notion seems unfamiliarto readersit is doubtless because so little
attention has been devoted to the subject of concept formation within the
social sciences. To be sure, concepts are a central concern for philosophers,
political theorists,sociological theorists,intellectualhistorians,linguists, and
cognitive psychologists.3However, these scholars are primarilyinterestedin
concepts as they functionin ordinaryor philosophicalcontexts, not in the spe-
cialized realm of social science. I take as my point of departurethe assump-
2. The tripartiteanalysis of concept formation is derived from C. K. Ogden and I. A.

Richards,TheMeaningof Meaning [1923] (San Diego: HarcourtBrace, 1989) and,more directly,
from Sartori,"Guidelines...," 22.
3. On the phenomenonof contested concepts, see BarryClarke,"EccentricallyContested
Concepts,"British Journal of Political Science 9 (January1979), 122-28; William E. Connolly,
The Termsof Political Discourse, 2d ed. (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1983); W. B.
Gallie, "EssentiallyContestedConcepts,"[1956], reprintedin The Importanceof Language, ed.
Max Black (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 121-46; John N. Gray, "On the Con-
testability of Social and Political Concepts,"Political Theory5 (August 1977), 331-48. On con-
ceptual change through history, see Terence Ball, TransformingPolitical Discourse: Political
Theory and Critical ConceptualHistory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Political Innovation
and ConceptualChange, ed. TerenceBall, JamesFarrand Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge:Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989); Reinhart Kosselleck, "Linguistic Change and the History of
Events,"Journal of Modern History 61 (December 1989), 649-66. On the differences between
researchers'and subjects' definitions of key concepts, see Steven R. Brown and Richard W.
Taylor, "Perspectivein Concept Formation,"Social Science Quarterly52 (1972), 852-60. On
epistemological issues pertainingto concept formation, see J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers
(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1961); VirginiaHeld, "TheTermsof Political Discourse:A Comment
on Oppenheim,"Political Theory 1 (February1973), 69-75; ArthurL. Kalleberg,"ConceptFor-
mation in Normativeand EmpiricalStudies:TowardReconciliationin Political Theory,"Ameri-
can Political Science Review 63:1 (March 1969), 26-39; Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A
Reader,ed. MauriceNatanson(New York:RandomHouse, 1963);AnthonyPalmer,Conceptand
Object:The Unityof the Propositionin Logic and Psychology (London:Routledge, 1988); Hanna
Fenichel Pitkin, Wittgensteinand Justice: On the Significance of LudwigWittgensteinfor Social
and Political Thought(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1972). On the influence of cog-
nitive and linguistic behavioron concept formation,see Riley W. Gardnerand RobertA. Schoen,
"Differentiationand Abstractionin Concept Formation,"Psychological Monographs: General
and Applied 76 (1962), 1-21; George Lakoff, Women,Fire, and Dangerous Things: WhatCate-
gories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Knowledge, Con-
cepts, and Categories, ed. Koen Lambertsand David Shanks (Cambridge:MIT Press, 1997);
Eleanor Rosch, Carolyn Mervis, WayneGray,David Johnson, and Penny Boyes-Braem,"Basic
Objects in NaturalCategories,"CognitivePsychology 8 (1976), 382-439; JohnTaylor,Linguistic
Categorization, 2d. ed. (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1995). On the definition of 'concept,' see
RobertAdcock, "Whatis a 'Concept,"'presentedat the annualmeetings of the AmericanPoliti-
cal Science Association, Boston, MA (September1998).

JohnGerring359
tionthatconceptsfunctiondifferentlyin politicalscience,sociology,anthro-
pology,history,andpsychologythantheydo in otherlanguageregions.Tothe
extentthatthisis true,we mayjustifytherestrictedambitof thepresentpaper.
Inanycase,conceptsarecriticalto thefunctioningandevolutionof social
science.Webernotesthattheprogressof theculturalsciencesoccursthrough
conflictsovertermsanddefinitions.
Its result is the perpetualreconstructionof those conceptsthrough

whichwe seekto comprehend reality.Thehistoryof the socialsciences
is andremainsa continuousprocesspassingfromthe attemptto order
realityanalyticallythroughthe constructionof concepts-the dissolu-
throughthe expansion
tion of the analyticalconstructsso constructed
andshiftof the scientifichorizon-andthereformulation anewof con-
cepts on the foundationsthustransformed.... The greatestadvancesin
the sphereof the socialsciencesaresubstantivelytiedup withtheshift
in practicalculturalproblemsandtaketheguiseof a critiqueof concept-
construction.4
All authorsmakelexicalandsemanticchoicesas theywriteandthuspartici-

pate,wittinglyor unwittingly,in an ongoinginterpretive battle.This is so
becauselanguageis the toolkitwithwhichwe conductourwork,as well as
thesubstanceuponwhichwe work.Indeed,conceptformation lies attheheart
of all socialscienceendeavor.It is impossibleto conductworkwithoutusing
concepts.It is impossibleevento conceptualize a topic,as thetermsuggests,
withoutputting a labelon it. Anysignificantwork on a subjectwill involvea
reconceptualization of thatsubject.Any work on thenation-state,forexample
our
-if at all persuasive-alters understanding of the nation-state.No use of
languageis semantically neutral.
Theimportance of conceptformationto theconductof socialsciencemay
be glimpsedby the familiarobservation thatone'sresultsareheavilycolored
by one'sdefinitionof key terms.If I say "Somozawas a fascist,"the hearer
is aptto respond,"Define'fascist."'It is commonlysaid thatone can prove
practicallyanythingsimplyby definingtermsin a convenientway.Thisis no
doubtwhatpromptscertaincommentators to say thatwe oughtto pay less
attentionto the termswe use, andmoreto the thingsoutthere(in the world)
4. Max Weber,TheMethodologyof the Social Sciences (New York:Free Press, 1949), 105-
06. Weber'sremarkson social science are usefully contrastedwith Wittgenstein'scomments on
the practiceof philosophy."Philosophymay in no way interferewith the actualuse of language;
it can in the end only describe it... it leaves everythingas it is" (Logical Investigations41: para
124); quoted in Gordon Graham,Historical Explanation Reconsidered (Aberdeen:Aberdeen
University Press, 1983), 2. Some approachesto ordinarilylanguage philosophy approachthis
neutralideal. Most, however, do not even pretendto.

that we are talking about.5Yet, it will become clear in the course of this dis-
cussion thatwe cannot dispense with high-orderconcepts like fascism, ideol-
ogy, democracy,justice, and so forth. If we conductedsocial science business
only with directly-observableor countable concepts (deaths, votes, and the
like) we would have very little of importanceto say, and we would have no
way of putting these small-orderconcepts together into a coherent whole.
Knowledge would no longer cumulate. Indeed, social science would be
stopped in its tracks.If we cannot,then, get language out of the way, we had
best learn to deal more effectively with words. We had best learn, in other
words, what differentiatesa good concept from one that is less good, or less
useful.
This brings us to a considerationof what, precisely,is the matterwith the
way we use language (and in particular,key concepts) in social science. For
many years it has been a standardcomplaintthatthe terminologyof social sci-
ence lacks the clarityand constancyof the naturalscience lexicon. 'Ideology,'
for example-a concept we shall employ repeatedlyin the following discus-
sion-has been found to contain at least thirty-fivepossible attributes,form-
ing a conceptualapparatuswith 235definitionalpossibilities.6Otherconcepts,
like justice, democracy,the state,and power,are similarly(thoughperhapsnot
so extremely) fraught.Truly,it might be said, we do not know what it is we
are talking about when we use these terms: for when A says 'ideology' she
may mean something quite different than B. Concepts are employed differ-
ently in differentfields and sub-fields, and within differentintellectualtradi-
tions (e.g., marxist,weberian,behavioral,rationalchoice).
But the confusion does not end there, for even within single subfields or
intellectual traditions there is a good deal of ambiguity surroundingsuch
terms. Concepts are routinely stretchedto cover instances that lie quite a bit
outside their normalrange of use.7Or they are scrunchedto cover only a few
instances (ignoring others). Older concepts are redeployed, leaving etymo-
5. Popper,for example, writes "Never let yourself be goaded into taking seriously prob-
lems about words and their meanings. What must be taken seriously are questions of fact, and
assertionsabout facts, theories and hypotheses;the problemsthey solve; and the problemsthey
raise." Karl Popper, Unended Quest: An IntellectualAutobiography(LaSalle, IL: Open Court,
1976), 19; quoted in David Collier, "PuttingConcepts to Work:Towarda Frameworkfor Ana-
lyzing ConceptualInnovationin ComparativeResearch,"presentedat the annualmeetings of the
AmericanPolitical Science Association, Boston, MA (September1998).
6. See John Gerring,"Ideology:A DefinitionalAnalysis,"Political Research Quarterly50
(December 1997): 957-94.
7. On conceptual stretching, see David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual
'Stretching'Revisited: Adapting Categories in ComparativeAnalysis,"AmericanPolitical Sci-
ence Review 87 (December 1993), 845-55; Giovanni Sartori,"Concept Misformationin Com-
parativePolitics,"AmericanPolitical Science Review 64:4 (December 1970), 1033-46; Sartori,
"Guidelines."

John Gerring 361
logical trailsthatconfuse the unwittingreader.New words are createdto refer

to things thatwere perhapspoorly articulatedthroughexisting concepts, leav-
ing a highly complex lexical terrain(for the old concepts continue to circu-
late). Wordswith similarmeanings crowd aroundeach other,vying for atten-
tion and stealing each others' attributes (e.g., ideology, political culture,
belief-system, value-system). Thus we play "musical chairs with words," in
Sartori'smemorablephrase.8
This sort of semantic confusion throws a wrench into the work of social
science. Argumentsemploying such terms have a tendency to fly past each
other;work on these subjectsdoes not cumulate.Conceptsseem to "get in the
way" of a clear understandingof things. Our conceptual apparatusseems
defective.
Approachesto the Problem
A variety of approaches(some more self-conscious than others) may be dis-

cerned on the vexed question of concept formation. Let us begin with the
familiaradmonitionto carefullydefine our termsand to maintaina reasonable
level of consistency in our use of those termswithin a given work. This is cer-
tainly sound advice, and a good point of departurefor this discussion.
The real problem arises when one considers the antecedent question:
which terms,and which definitionsfor those terms,should we choose? Purely
stipulativedefinitions(derivingsolely from the authorityof the author)can be
difficult to comprehendand-equally important-to remember.We are likely
to object to such definitions as arbitraryif they do not fit with our intuitive
understandingsof the term or the subjectmatter.For these reasons, such def-
initions are less likely to permanentlyreshape scholarly understandings,or
even to make sense. If, as Galileo said, all definitions are arbitrary,then it
must be observed that some definitions are a great deal more arbitrarythan
others.9Humpty Dumpty's rules of concept formationwill not do very well
for social science. It matters,in other words, how we define our terms, not
merely thatwe define them.
8. Giovanni Sartori, "The Tower of Babble," in Towerof Babel: On the Definition and
Analysis of Concepts in the Social Sciences, ed. Giovanni Sartori,Fred W. Riggs, and Henry
Teune(International 38, 52-53.
Studies,occasionalpaperno.6), 9. See alsoSartori,"Guidelines,"
9. Galileois paraphrased in RichardRobinson,Definition(Oxford:ClarendonPress,
1954),63. Robinsondiscussesthe problemscausedfor Lockeby his arbitrary redefinition
of
'idea.'"Incommonuse in Locke'scenturytheword'idea'meant,as it doesin ours,something
essentiallypartof thethinkerorperceiverandnotof theobjectshe surveys.Toredefineit, there-
fore,as anyobjectof thinkingwaseitherto makea mostviolentdeparture fromusageorto imply
thatno mancaneverthinkaboutanythingthatis not a partof himself.Thelatteris whathap-
penedto Locke,withouthis intendingit"(74).

Perhapsthe oldest solution to the age-old problemof concept formationis

to rely upon norms of establishedusage (as defined by dictionarylexicons or
more extended etymological study). This, broadly speaking, is the ordinary-
language approachto concept definition.'?Yet, as philosophersand linguists
are quick to point out, norms of ordinaryusage generally provide a range of
terminologicaland definitionaloptions, ratherthan a single definition; most
concepts, perhapsall key social science concepts, are multivalent.Semantic
complicationsmultiply when a concept's meaning is consideredhistorically,
in differentlanguages, in differentlanguageregions of the same language, in
differentgrammaticalforms (e.g., as noun, adjective, or verb), and in differ-
ent speech acts. Occasionally, we find ourselves constructingconcepts that
are, for most intents and purposes,new. Thus, althoughordinaryusage may
be an appropriateplace to begin, it is not usually an appropriateplace to end
the task of concept formation.Given the diversity of meanings implied by
ordinaryusage there is rarely a single definition one might appeal to in set-
tling semanticdisputes.
Nor is there any good reasonto suppose that social science should restrict
itself to ordinary meanings when defining terms for social-scientific use.
Social science concepts, as Durkheimpointed out, "do not always, or even
generally,tally with that of the layman."
It is not our aim simply to discover a method for identifying with suff-
icent accuracythe facts to which the words of ordinarylanguage refer
and the ideas they convey. We need, rather,to formulateentirely new
concepts, appropriateto the requirementsof science andexpressedin an
appropriateterminology."
Social scientists, like all sub-communities-e.g., like doctors, lawyers, foot-

ball players-require a somewhatspecializedvocabulary.This does not mean,
of course, thata premiumshouldbe placed on "scientific,"as opposedto ordi-
nary, usage. Indeed, I shall argue that all departuresfrom naturallanguage
impose costs, and should not be adoptedlightly. However, it seems virtually
10. For work in the ordinary-languagetradition(I employ the term loosely), see John L.
Austin, Philosophical Papers; Philosophy and Ordinary Language, ed. Charles E. Caton
(Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1963); OrdinaryLanguage, ed. V.C. Chappell(Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Pitkin, Wittgenstein; Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New
York: Barnes & Noble, 1949); Paul Ziff, SemanticAnalysis (Ithaca:Cornell University Press,
1960). See also work by G.E.M. Anscombe, Stanley Cavell, Jerry Fodor, Jerrold Katz,
Norman Malcolm, and John Wisdom-all loosely inspired by Wittgenstein's later work.
11. Emile Durkheim,The Rules of Sociological Method [1895] (New York:The Free Press,
1964), 36-7.

John Gerring 363
indisputablethat such departuresmust, and should, be taken on some occa-

sions.'2Social science cannot accept words simply as they presentthemselves
in ordinary speech, or a natural-languagedictionary. Some fiddling with
words and definitions is incumbentupon the researcher.
A second traditionin concept formationequatessuccessful definitionwith
the identificationof attributesthatprovidenecessaryand sufficientconditions
for locating examples of the term (i.e., the phenomenonitself). "Indefining a
name," writes Mill, "it is not usual to specify its entire connotation,but so
much only as is sufficient to markout the objects usually denoted by it from
all other known objects. And sometimes a merely accidental property,not
involved in the meaning of the name, answers this purpose equally well."'3
Following this general tack, a later logician writes: "A class must be defined
by the invariable presence of certain common properties.If we include an
individualin which one of these propertiesdoes not appear,we eitherfall into
a logical contradiction,or else we form a new class with a new definition.
Even a single exception constitutesa new class by itself."'4To define human
as an animal that is (a) featherlessand (b) bipedal, for example, is to offer a
definition that successfully picks out one species from other species. This
approachprivileges one desideratum(which I call 'differentiation')over all
others. Like the approachof ordinarylanguage, this approachis not so much
wrong as insufficient. Humansare indeed featherlessand bipedal, but this is
not whatwe usually mean when we use the word 'human.'(Considerthe qual-
ities that we consider distinctively 'human'; featherlessness and bipedality
would probablyranklow on such lists.) Althoughdefinitionsin social science
are called upon to performa referentialfunction, their purposeis not merely
referential(see below).
Moreover,even if we were to privilege differentiationover all other con-
ceptual desiderata,achieving the goal of the 'classical' concept (whose attrib-
12. Richardson,Definition (73) and Sartori,"Guidelines,"offer furtherreflections on this

point.
13. John StuartMill, Systemof Logic [1843] 8th ed. (London:Longmans,Green, 1872), 73.
14. W. Stanley Jevons, The Principles of Science (London: 1892), 723; quoted in Abraham
Kaplan, The Conductof Inquiry:Methodologyfor Behavioral Science (San Francisco:Chandler
Publishing, 1964), 68. See also Paul F. Lazarsfeld,"ConceptFormationand Measurementin the
Behavioral Sciences: Some Historical Observations,"in Concepts, Theory,and Explanation in
the Behavioral Sciences, ed. GordonJ. DiRenzo (New York:Random House, 1966), 144-204;
Felix E. Oppenheim, Political Concepts: A Reconstruction(Chicago: University of Chicago,
1981). Although Sartori's work is too wide-ranging to fit into any single model, his repeated
injunction to "seize the object" ("Guidelines,"26), to "identify the referent and establish its
boundaries"(33) puts him closer to the classical camp than to any other."The defining proper-
ties are those that bound the concept extensionally.... Confine your defining to the necessary
properties,"writes Sartori (55). For further discussion of the classical concept, see Adcock,
"Whatis a 'Concept,"'and Taylor,Linguistic Categorization.

364 WhatMakesa ConceptGood?
utes alwaysidentifyits referents,and no others)mightnot be possiblein

manyinstances.Considerthe concept'mother.'If definedas the personwho
gives birthto a childwe wouldappearto satisfythe always-and-only crite-
rion.Buthow arewe to referto fostermothersandadoptivemothers,or sur-
rogatemothers(whodo notprovidegeneticmaterialforthechild)?Arethese
not also, in some basic sense, 'mothers'?Eventhe "featherlessandbiped"
definitionbreaksdownin thefaceof accidentvictimsandbirthdefects.Prob-
lems multiply when one begins to consider social science concepts. Which
attributesof 'democracy,' for example,shouldbe considerednecessaryand
sufficientto identifyinstancesof democracy-contestation,participation,
accountability, protectionof basicrights,or somecombination thereof?The
classicalnotionof a conceptis an idealrarelysatisfiedin social science,as
manywritershavepointedout.5
A thirdtraditionarguesthatconceptformationis rightfullysubservient to
theoryformation.Conceptsare the hand-maidens of theories,and conse-
quentlymaybejudgedonly so goodas thetheoriestheyserve.'6Indeed,con-
cepts are the building-blocks of all inferences,andthe formationof many
conceptsis clearly,and legitimately,theory-driven. "Theoryformationand
conceptformationgo handin hand,"Hempelstresses;"neithercanbe carried
on successfullyin isolationfromthe other."'7
My only dissentfromthis line of reasoning-andit is one with which
mostscholarswouldprobablyconcur-is to pointoutthatconceptformation
is notmerelya matterof theoryformation. Thiswill becomeabundantly clear
as we progress.Forthe momentone mightconsiderthe fact thata concept's
utilityin facilitatingtheory-formation is influencedby the degreeto whichit
can be differentiated fromneighboringconcepts.If, let us say, 'ideology'is
definedin sucha wayas to encroachuponwhatwe normallythinkof as polit-
ical culture,thenthe theorywithinwhichthisconcepttakesits placeis seri-
ouslyimpaired. A roseby anothername-say, 'politicalculture'-may smell
15. See Collier and Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching'"; Kaplan, Logic of Inquiry (68);
Lakoff, Women,Fire.
16. See, e.g., Russell Faeges, "Theory-DrivenConcept Definition and ClassificatoryPer-
versity,"unpublishedmanuscript,n.d.; Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation:And
OtherEssays in the Philosophyof Science (New York:The Free Press, 1965), 139. A slightly dif-
ferentversion of the theoreticalapproachis offered by MurrayG. Murphey,Philosophical Foun-
dations of Historical Knowledge(Albany:SUNY Press, 1994). Ratherthan seeing concepts per-
formingfunctionswithin theories,Murpheyproposesthat"theoriesthatexplain the behaviorand
propertiesof instances of the concept are the meanings of concepts" (23-24; emphasis added).
Thus, the best definition of gold is "the element whose atomic numberis 79."
17. Hempel,Aspects, 113 (see also 139). Kaplancalls this the paradoxof conceptualization:
"Theproperconcepts are needed to formulatea good theory,but we need a good theoryto arrive
at the properconcepts"(Logic of Inquiry,53).

John Gerring 365
more sweet. A greattheory,with poorly craftedconcepts is at best a greatidea,

poorly implemented.Concept formationand theory formationare intimately
conjoined;the formeris not reducibleto the latter.
Otherwork on the subject of concept formationis more difficult to sum-
marize (mainly because the field of concept formationis so poorly defined).
A fourthapproachsuggests thatconcept formationis particularto the concept-
type-e.g., circular,classical, classificatory,comparative,connotative, con-
textual, core, deductive, denotative, disposition, empirical, essential, essen-
tially-contested, experiential, family-resemblance, functional, genus et
differentia,ideal-type, inductive, lexical, metrical,minimal, nominal, object,
observable, operational, ostensive, persuasive, polar, precising, property,
radial,real, residual,stipulative,technical,theoretical,and so forth.'8Accord-
ing to this line of reasoning,differentconcept-typesimpose differentdefini-
tional demands on the conceptualizer. Each is appropriatefor different
(largely context-driven)tasks.
Finally, as I have suggested, a good deal of work on concept formationin
the social sciences (includingsome of the workjust cited) does not fall neatly
18. See, e.g., KazimierzAdjdukiewicz,"ThreeConcepts of Definition,"in Problems in the

Philosophy of Language, ed. Thomas M. Olshewsky (New York:Holt, Rinehartand Winston,
1969); PeterA. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy (New York:Barnesand Noble, 1981), 56-58;
RobertBierstedt,"Nominaland Real Definitions in Sociological Theory,"in Symposiumon Soci-
ological Theory,ed. Llewellyn Gross (Evanston,IL: Row, Peterson, 1959); Thomas Burger,Max
Weber'sTheoryof ConceptFormation:History,Laws, and Ideal Types(Durham:Duke Univer-
sity, 1976); F. StuartChapin,"Definitionof Definitions of Concepts"Social Forces 18 (Decem-
ber 1939), 153- 60; BernardP. Cohen, Developing Sociological Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Chicago:
Nelson-Hall, Inc, 1989); Collier and Mahon, "Conceptual'Stretching"';Gordon J. DiRenzo,
"ConceptualDefinition in the BehavioralSciences," in Concepts,Theory,and Explanationin the
Behavioral Sciences, ed. GordonJ. DiRenzo (New York:RandomHouse, 1966), 6-18; Richard
G. Dumontand WilliamJ. Wilson,"Aspectsof ConceptFormation,Explication,and TheoryCon-
structionin Sociology," AmericanSociological Review 32 (December 1967), 985-95; George J.
Graham,Jr., MethodologicalFoundationsfor Political Analysis (Waltham,MA: Xerox College
Publishing, 1971); CarlG. Hempel, "Fundamentalsof ConceptFormationin EmpiricalScience,"
Foundations of the Unity of Science 2 (1952); Kaplan,Logic of Inquiry;Lakoff, Women,Fire;
Leonard Linsky, "Reference and Referents,"in Problems in the Philosophy of Language, ed.
Thomas M. Olshewsky (New York:Holt, Rinehartand Winston, 1969); JohnWilliam Miller, The
Definition of a Thing, with Some Notes on Language (New York:W.W. Norton, 1980); Arthur
Pap, "Theory of Definition," in Problems in the Philosophy of Language, ed. Thomas M.
Olshewsky (New York: Holt, Rinehartand Winston, 1969); Hilary Putnam,"The Meaning of
'Meaning',"in Mind,Language and Reality,Philosophical Papers, Volume2 (Cambridge:Cam-
bridge University Press, 1975), 215-71; Robinson, Definition; BertrandRussell,"OnDenoting,"
in Olshewsky,Problems in the Philosophy of Language;Sartori,"Towerof Babble,"28-30; Sar-
tori, "Guidelines,"72-85; ArthurL. Stinchcombe,ConstructingSocial Theories(New York:Har-
court, Brace, 1968); P.F.Strawson,"OnReferring,"in Olshewsky,Problemsin the Philosophy of
Language.

into any of the foregoing schools.'9Indeed, social science is replete with folk
wisdom on the matterof concept formation.We applaudthe virtuesof clarity,
making sense, seizing the object, relevance,rigor, standardization,systemati-
cization, theoreticalyield, utility,and parsimony,and decry the evils of ambi-
guity, vagueness, indefiniteness,triviality,and idiosyncrasy.Yet, these famil-
iar admonitions are themselves rather vague, and perhaps contradictory,
suggesting the need for furtherresearch.20 We should like very much to follow
Locke's advice to "stripall... termsof ambiguityand obscurity."2' The ques-
tion is, how shall we do so?
TheArgument
Though concept formation is not reducible to any of the foregoing criteria,

that does not mean that we should toss up our hands and conclude that con-
cept formationis a matterof 'context,' or that it is infinite (or unspecifiable)
in its diversity.22
To be sure, it is a highly contextualprocess. But this opens
19. See, e.g., MartinBulmerand RobertG. Burgess, "Do Concepts,Variablesand Indicators

Interrelate?"in Key Variablesin Social Investigation,ed. RobertG. Burgess (London:Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1986); David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracywith Adjectives: Con-
ceptual Innovationin ComparativeResearch,"WorldPolitics 49 (April 1997): 430-51; Carl G.
Hempel, "TypologicalMethods in the Social Sciences," in Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A
Reader, ed. MauriceNatanson(New York;RandomHouse, 1963); Hempel, Philosophy of Nat-
ural Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Kaplan, Logic of Inquiry;John C.
McKinney,ConstructiveTypologyand Social Theory(Appleton-Century-Crofts,1966); Eugene
J. Meehan, The Foundations of Political Analysis: Empirical and Normative (Homewood, IL:
Dorsey Press, 1971); Mill, System of Logic; Tadeusz Pawlowski, Concept Formation in the
Humanitiesand the Social Sciences (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980). See also the extensive bibliogra-
phy in David Collier and Henry Brady, "Studies of Major Concepts in Political Analysis: An
IllustrativeInventory,"unpublishedmanuscript(Berkeley:Departmentof Political Science, Uni-
versity of Californiaat Berkeley).
20. Consider,for example, Sartori's("Guidelines,"63) Rule 1: "Of any empiricalconcept
always, and separately,check 1) whetherit is ambiguous,that is how the meaning relates to the
term;and 2) whetherit is vague, that is how the meaning relatesto the referent."
21. Quoted in Richardson,Definition, 70.
22. "Words,"wrote Virginia Woolf, "are the wildest, freest, most irresponsible, most
unteachableof all things. Of course, you can catch them and sort them and place them in alpha-
betical orderin dictionaries.But words do not live in dictionaries;they live in the mind.... Thus
to lay down any laws for such irreclaimablevagabondsis worse thanuseless. A few triflingrules
of grammarand spelling are all the constraintwe can put on them.All we can say aboutthem, as
we peer at them over the edge of that deep, dark and only fitfully illuminatedcavern in which
they live - the mind - all we can say about them is that they seem to like people to think and
to feel before they use them, but to think and to feel not about them, but about somethingdiffer-
ent. They are highly sensitive, easily made self-conscious. They do not like to have their purity
or theirimpuritydiscussed.... Nor do they like being lifted out on the point of a pen and exam-
ined separately.They hang together,in sentences, in paragraphs,sometimes for whole pages at a

John Gerring 367
Table 1. Criteriaof ConceptualGoodness
1. Familiarity How familiaris the concept (to a lay or academicaudience)?

2. Resonance Does the chosen term ring (resonate)?
3. Parsimony How short is a) the term and b) its list of defining attributes(the
intension)?
4. Coherence How internallyconsistent (logically related)are the instancesand
attributes?
5. Differentiation How differentiatedare the instancesand the attributes(from other
most-similarconcepts)? How bounded,how operationalizable,is the
concept?
6. Depth How many accompanyingpropertiesare sharedby the instances
underdefinition?
7. TheoreticalUtility How useful is the concept within a wider field of inferences?
8. Field Utility How useful is the concept within a field of relatedinstances and
attributes?
furtherquestions: which contexts matter(or should matter),and under what

circumstances?Despite the complexities these questions introduce,I believe
that it is possible to arriveat a single accountof concept formationwithin the
social sciences that is at once comprehensiveand reasonablyconcise. Good-
ness in concept formationis most fruitfullyunderstoodas an attemptto medi-
ate among eight criteria:familiarity,resonance,parsimony,coherence,differ-
entiation,depth, theoreticalutility, and field utility (see Table 1).
The common-senseconclusion from this eight-partlist is to say that con-
cepts may be formed with a wide variety of purposesand may fulfill a wide
varietyof attendantfunctionsin social science research.I wish to carrythe argu-
ment one step further.Of course differentlyconstructedconcepts will empha-
size and deemphasizedifferentdemands.In this sense, they each "do theirown
thing"(as work on concept-typesimplies). But the suppressionof one or more
demandsdoes not go unnoticedby othersocial scientists.A concept with high
theoreticalutilitythatoffendsnormsof establishedusage (or vice-versa)is less
serviceablefor this fact. Thus, althoughparticularcriterialdemandsare often
ignored,they are ignoredat a cost. This points to the notion of concept forma-
tion as a set of tradeoffs-a tug of war among these eight desiderata.Concept
formationis a fraughtexercise-a set of choices which may have no single
'best' solution, but rathera range of more-or-lessacceptablealternatives.This
eight-partcriterialframeworkprovidesa quick and readyschemaby which the
time. They hate being useful; they hate making money; they hate being lecturedabout in public.
In short, they hate anythingthat stamps them with one meaningor confines them to one attitude,
for it is their natureto change"(The Death of the Moth, quoted in Richardson,Definition, 65).

368 WhatMakesa ConceptGood?
strengths andweaknessesof alternative conceptualizationscanbe assessed,and

theprocessof conceptformation movedforward.
Theargument of thepaperproceedsin twostages.InthefirstsectionI set
forththe eightcriterialdemands,showingwhy eachis important and,at the
sametime,why conceptformationis not reducibleto thatcriterionalone.In
thefollowingsection,I discusssomebroaderimplications of thisframework
for the conductof socialscienceresearch.Specifically,I argue(a) thatother
normsthatmightbe supposedto guidethe processof conceptformationcan
be subsumedwithintheforegoingcriteria,or arenotworthpursuing;(b) that
differentsorts of social-scienceconcepts(e.g., 'theoretical'and 'observa-
tional'terms)nonethelessrespondto a commonset of definitionaldemands;
(c) thatthe notionof tradeoffs,ratherthenspecificrules(a la Sartori),best
guidesanddescribesthe complexprocessof conceptformation; and(d) that
standards of conceptualadequacyarenotentirelyillusory,so longas theyare
understood as relative-relative,thatis, to alternative
formulationsthatmight
be constructed foranyparticular concept.
I. Criteria
Familiarity
Thedegreeto whicha newdefinition"makessense,"or is intuitively"clear,"
dependscriticallyupon the degreeto which it conforms,or clashes,with
establishedusage-within everydaylanguageandwithina specializedlan-
guagecommunity.If a termis definedin a highly idiosyncraticway it is
unlikelyto be understood,or retained."Thesupremerule of stipulation,"
writes RichardRobinson, "is surely to stipulate as little as possible. Do not
changereceiveddefinitionswhenyouhavenothingto complainof in them."23
Thus,the criterionof familiaritymustbe understood, like othercriteria,as a
matterof degrees.Thereshouldbe, in any case, a demonstrable fit between
new andold meaningsof a giventerm.
Familiarityin the definitionof a giventermis achievedby incorporating
as manyof its standard meaningsin thenewdefinitionas possible,or at least
by avoidinganyglaringcontradiction of thosemeanings.Hereit is oftenhelp-
ful to distinguishbetweenthe 'core'featuresof a term-those whicharegen-
erallyagreed-upon andwhichhavea secureetymologicalstandingin thehis-
tory of the term-and those which are peripheral.Droppinga peripheral
featurewill imposea smallerloss in familiaritythanthejettisoningof a core
feature.
Familiarityin the termis achievedby findingthatwordwithinthe exist-
23. Robinson,Definition, 80.

JohnGerring369
inglexiconwhich,as currently
understood, mostaccurately
describesthephe-
nomenonunderdefinition.Whereseveralexistingtermscapturethephenom-
ena in questionwith equal facility-as, for example,the near-synonyms
worldview and weltanschauung-achieving familiaritybecomes a matterof
findingthe termwiththe greatestcommoncurrency.Simple,everydayterms
of a researcher's
nativelanguageare,by definition,morefamiliarthanterms
drawnfromlanguageswhicharedead,foreign,or highlyspecialized.Where
no termswithinthe existinggeneralor social-sciencelexicon adequately
describethephenomena in questionthewriteris pressedto inventa newterm.
Yet, neologism is the greatestviolationof the familiaritycriterion,for it
involvesthecreationof anentirelynewtermwithno meaningat all in normal
usage.All otherthingsbeingequal,a writershouldturnto thisexpedientonly
whenno othersemanticoptionspresentthemselves."Letus notstipulateuntil
we have good reason to believe that there is no namefor the thing we wish to
name,"notesRobinsonemphatically.4
Durkheim'scommentson the matter
arealsopertinent.
In actualpractice,one alwaysstartswith the lay conceptand the lay

term.Oneinquireswhether,amongthe thingswhichthiswordconfus-
edly connotes,therearesomewhichpresentcommonexternalcharac-
teristics.If thisis thecase,andif theconceptformedby thegroupingof
thefactsthusbroughttogethercoincides,if nottotally(whichis rare),at
leastto a largeextent,withthelayconcept,it willbe possibleto continue
to designatetheformerby thesametermas thelatter,thatis, to retainin
sciencethe expressionusedin everydaylanguage.Butif the gapis too
considerable, if thecommonnotionconfusesa pluralityof distinctideas,
thecreationof new anddistinctivetermsbecomesnecessary.2
At the sametime,we oughtnot visualizethe inventionof new termsas

qualitatively removedfromthe redefinitionof old terms.Neologisms,while
rejectingordinarylanguage,striveat thesametimeto re-entertheuniverseof
Theyareneversimplynonsensewords;theyare,instead,new
intelligibility.
combinationsof existing words (e.g., bureaucratic-authoritarianism)
or roots
ortermsborrowedfromothertime-periods
(e.g.,polyarchy,heresthetic), (e.g.,
corporatism),otherlanguagecommunities(e.g., equilibrium), or otherlan-
guages(e.g.,laissezfaire).By farthemostfertilegroundsforneologismhave

25. Durkheim,Rules of Sociological Method, 37. Mill (System of Logic, 24) advises that
since "the introductionof a new technical language as the vehicle of speculations on subjects
belonging to the domainof daily discussion, is extremelydifficult to effect, and would not be free
from inconvenienceeven if effected, the problemfor the philosopher... is, in retainingthe exist-
ing phraseology,how best to alleviate its imperfections."

370 What Makes a ConceptGood?
been Classical (e.g., Id, communitas,polis), religious (e.g., hermeneutics),

and personal(e.g., Marxism,Reaganism).26In all these cases, words, or word-
roots, are importedfrom their normal contexts to a ratherdifferent context
where theirdefinitiontakes on a new meaning,or additionalsenses. However
severe the semantic stretch, at least some of the original propertiesof such
terms remainintact.27
Resonance
Why do some termsstick while others, with virtuallyidenticalmeanings,dis-

appear?Why are some efforts successful at reformulatinga field or a prob-
lem, and others (with the same general argument)often overlooked? One
factor in the knowledge game which relates directly to concept formationis
the "cognitive click" of a given term, which I shall call resonance.
"Makers,breakers,and takers,""exit, voice, and loyalty,"and "civic cul-
ture"are all examples of resonanceat work.28As is apparent,the demandfor
resonanceis often fulfilled by referenceto nearbyterms,which may form part
of a largertypology. If two of threetermsin a typology end in the same suffix
(-tion, -ity, . . .) it may be desirable to find a third with the same suffix.
Rhyming schemes are wonderfulmnemonic devices.
To be sure, the search for resonance is often at odds with the satisfaction
of other criteria.The search for a catchy label tempts writers to violate the
familiarity criterion, making up new words to replace existing words or
choosing exotic options over plain ones. There are enough cases of abuse that
within social science circles snazzy labels are often regardedas terminologi-
26. On polyarchy, see Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1971). On heresthetic,see William H. Riker, The Art of Political
Manipulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). On corporatism,see David Collier,
"Trajectoryof a Concept:'Corporatism'in the Study of LatinAmericanPolitics,"in LatinAmer-
ica in ComparativePerspective, ed. Peter Smith (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 135-62;
Philippe SchmitterC., "Still the Centuryof Corporatism?"in TheNew Corporatism,ed. Freder-
ick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch(Notre Dame: Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1974).
27. Robinson (Definition, 55) notes: "Men will always be finding themselves with a new
thing to express and no wordfor it, and usually they will meet the problemby applyingwhichever
old word seems nearest,and thus the old word will acquireanothermeaningor a stretchedmean-
ing. Very rarelywill they do what A. E. Housmanbade them do, invent a new noise to mean the
new thing."
28. See Stephen D. Krasner,Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1978); Albert O. Hirschman,
Exit, Voice,Loyalty:Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations,and States (Cambridge:Har-
vard UniversityPress, 1970); GabrielA. Almond and Sidney Verba,Civic Culture:Political Atti-
tudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity, 1963). See also discus-
sion in Collier and Levitsky,"Democracywith Adjectives,"450.

John Gerring 371
cal tinsel-rhetorical covers for poor research.Yet, before we dismiss the cri-
terion of resonance as frivolously aesthetic and obfuscatory,we should con-
sider the reasons why scholars continue to search for words which are not
only clear, but also captivating.
Effective phrase-makingcan no more be separatedfrom the task of con-
cept formationthan good writing can be separatedfrom the task of research.
It seems fairly obvious that 'ideology' resonatesin a way that 'belief-system'
does not, which may explain somethingaboutthe persistenceof the formerin
the face of a fairly concerted academic onslaught over the past several
decades. One might also considerMarx'schoice of proletariatover 'working
classes.' Wouldhis workhave had the same impacthad he stayedwith the ter-
minological statusquo?
If resonanceis importantin reconceptualizingold ideas, as well as in coin-
ing new terms,how does one achieve this quality?This is a very difficultques-
tion to answer, or to predict, since there are so many nonsemantic(auditory,
visual, and perhapseven olfactory)cues to which readerscommonlyrespond.
Resonance,for example, might be derivedfrom a word's metaphoric,synech-
dotic, alliterative, or onomatopoetic value, its rhyming scheme or rhythm
(numberof syllables, stress, . . .). These are mattersthat we need not pursue
here. The point is, concepts aspirenot simply to claritybut also to power, and
power is carriedby a term'sresonanceas well as its meaning.
Parsimony
Good concepts do not have endless definitions. It should be possible to say

what it is one is talkingaboutwithoutlisting a half-dozenattributes.This goes
almost withoutsaying.29At the same time, it should be pointedout thatthe dis-
tinction between the formal 'definition'-the intension-and 'accompanying
properties'is rarely hard and fast. On this head, many hairs have been split.
About all that one can say in general aboutthis problemis that the benefits a
prospective attributemay bring to a concept must be weighed against the
desideratumof parsimony.A long intension, even if composed of closely
related attributes,will create a cumbersomeand unappealingsemantic vehi-
cle. 'Ideology,' as we shall have occasion to observe, is so overloaded with
definitional baggage that it barely manages to shuffle across the page. All
reconceptualizationsof the term jettison some of this baggage; indeed, the
term means almost nothing at all if all of its possible attributesare included.
Less often noted, the goal of parsimonyalso properlyapplies to the term
itself. Considerthe options for ideology-like phenomena.One mightcall them
29. See, e.g., Sartori,"Guidelines,"40, 54-55; FredW. Riggs, "TheDefinition of Concepts"

in Sartoriet al., Towerof Babel, 39-76.

'belief-system,' 'symbol-system,' or 'value-system,'but none of these possi-

ble replacementsis as short and to-the-pointas that old standby,ideology. If
qualified by the adjective 'political' (e.g., 'political belief-system'), these
alternatetermsbecome clumsier still. Arguably,ideology's endurance-in the
face of repeated criticism from the academic establishment-is due to its
admirablecompactness.I have argued,for example, that we should preserve
a broad definition for ideology-one encompassing all relatively coherent
sets of attitudes,values, and beliefs aboutpolitics-because we need a way to
talk about these phenomenaand there is no other eligible (parsimoniousand
reasonablyfamiliar) alternative.30 If a more restrictivedefinition is adopted,
we lose the capacity to capturethese phenomenain a single term, and must
foreversay "relativelycoherentsets of attitudes,values, andbeliefs aboutpol-
itics" (insteadof the more parsimonious'ideology').
A concept is an abbreviation,just as sequences of words (sentences,
phrases,books) are abbreviationsof things. "By the stipulativesubstitutionof
a word for a phrase,languageis abbreviated,"notes Robinson.
What can now be said could also have been said previously, without
using the new rule or the new name; but it can now be said in fewer
words, because the thing can now be indicated by a single name,
whereas formerlya descriptivephrasewas required.The value of such
timesavingdoes not lie merely or mainly in leaving more time for other
activities.Abbreviationnot merely shortensdiscourse;it also increases
understanding.We grasp betterwhat we can hold in one span of atten-
tion, and how much we can thus hold dependson the length of the sym-
bols we have to use in orderto state it. Abbreviationsoften immensely
increaseour ability to understandand deal with a subject.3'
The Chinese languagetakesthis quest for abbreviationto what we in the west-

ern world would consider to be an extreme, substitutingsingle charactersfor
whole English sentences. Logical and mathematicallanguages also prize
brevity. The point is, natural languages (of any sort) also seek to reduce
humanexperience.Reduction,of course, is not the only task of language,just
as it is not the only task of concepts in social science. But consider:key con-
cepts are likely to be employed repeatedlyand insistentlyin a given work. To
say 'political belief-system' once in a paragraphis enough; to say it thrice in
a paragraphis awkwardand tendentious.Single-word concepts, particularly
those that trip easily off the tongue, can be used unobtrusively.All other
30. Proposed substitutesviolate the parsimonycriterion(e.g., 'political belief-system'), or

the intelligibility/familiaritycriterion(e.g., 'weltanschaaung').See Gerring,"Ideology."

John Gerring 373
things being equal, 'worldview' is preferableto 'weltanschaaung,''walking'

preferableto 'perambulation,'and concepts with fewer definitionalpredicates
preferableto those with a multitude(e.g., ideology).32
Bentham'swords on this matterare amusing, and equally instructive:
Blessed be he forevermore,in whateverrobe arrayed,to whose creative

genius we are indebtedfor the first conception of those too short-lived
vehicles which convey to us as in a nutshell the essential characterof
those awful volumes which at the touch of the sceptrebecome the rules
of our conduct and the arbitersof our destiny: 'The Alien Act,' 'The
TurnpikeAct,' 'The Middlesex WaterworksBill,' and so on.
How much better they serve than those authoritativemasses of words
called titles, by which so large a proportionof sound and so small a pro-
portionof instructionare at so large an expense of attentiongrantedto
us, such as-'An Act to explain and amend an act entitled An Act to
explain and amend ...' Coinages of commodious titles are thus issued
day by day throughoutthe session from an invisible though not unli-
censed mint. But no sooner has the last newspaperof the last day of the
session made its way to the most distant of its readers, than all this
learning,all this circulatingmedium, is as completely buried in obliv-
ion as a French assignat. So many yearly strings of words, not one of
which is to be found in the works of Dryden,with whom the artof coin-
ing words fit to be used became numberedamong the lost arts, and the
art of giving birthto new ideas among the prohibitedones!33
Coining words fit to be used entails finding words, or combinationsof words,

that are parsimonious. 'An Act to explain and amend. . .' cannot be remem-
bered-nor, if it could, would it facilitate communication.A long neologism
is an unseemly neologism.
Coherence
Arguably,the most importantcriterionof a good concept is its internalcoher-

ence-the sense in which the attributesthatdefine the concept, as well as the
characteristicsthat actuallycharacterizethe phenomenain question,"belong"
to one another.Theremust be some sense of coherenceto the grouping,rather
32. It may be observed that parsimonyin a term occasionally conflicts with parsimonyin a
definition. 'Ideology,' for example, scores well on the first and poorly on the second. 'Belief-
system' scores poorly on the first, but well on the second.
33. Jeremy Bentham, Bentham's Handbook of Political Fallacies [1834] ed. Harold A.
Larrabee(New York:ThomasY. Crowell, 1952), 10-11.

than simply a coincidence in time and physical space.

Ideology provides a particularlyglaring case of inconsistency, having
been defined by some authorsas a system of ideas which "promote[s]social
change," and by others as a system of ideas which "prevent[s]change." It
"makes use of and seeks to base itself upon philosophical ideas, arguments
and theories," yet also "advocates action or impels to action." It "contains
statementsof fact," yet also expresses "morals,values, etc." It is "associated
with the whole society or community,"yet "placessupremesignificanceupon
one particularclass or group."It "promotes,serves or reflects interests,"yet
is "unconsciouslymotivated."34 The coherence criterioncalls for the analyst
to make choices among each of these contrdictoryattributes,and-if possi-
ble-to consolidate those attributesarounda single core principle.
The problem of coherence is usually more subtle, involving attributes
which are not mutuallycontradictory,but which bear no obvious relationship
to one another.Attributesmay be logically or functionallyrelated.The hypo-
theticalconcept 'curly head-of-state'fails on both counts, since the two attrib-
utes curly-headed and head-of-state bear no apparentrelationship to one
another.If the concept identifies phenomenawhose sharedpropertiesare not
relatedin some manner-regardless of theirlevel of differentiation-they are
not likely to make sense. More precisely,they will generateseveral senses. In
each case it is the degree of similarity (i.e., internalcoherence) among the
items in the set that is at issue.
The most coherentdefinitions are those identifying a 'core' or 'essential'
meaning.35 RobertDahl, in his first influentialworkon 'power,'sets out to dis-
cover "thecentralintuitivelyunderstoodmeaningof the word,""theprimitive
notion [of power] that seems to lie behind all [previous] concepts."36This
essentializingapproachto definitionis common (and, indeed, often justified).
The core meaning of democracy,for example, is often thoughtto be rule by
the people. This may be viewed as the single principlebehind all other defi-
nitional characteristics,associated characteristics,and usages of the term.
When one says democracy, what one is really talking about is rule by the
people. To the extent that this reductionistview is successful-to the extent,
34. All these examples are drawn from Malcolm B. Hamilton,"The Elements of the Con-
cept of Ideology"Political Studies 35 (1987): 20-21.
35. An 'essential' or 'real' definition is defined as: "Giving the essence of a thing. From
among the characteristicspossessed by a thing, one is uniqueand hierarchicallysuperiorin that
it states (a) the most importantcharacteristicof the thing, and/or (b) that characteristicupon
which the others depend for their existence" (Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy, 57). See also
Mill, Systemof Logic, 71.
36. RobertA. Dahl, "TheConceptof Power,"[1957] in Political Power:A Readerin Theory
and Research, ed. Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards,and R. HarrisonWagner(New York:Free
Press, 1969), 79-80.

John Gerring 375
that is, thata single principleis able to subsumevarioususes and instancesof

the concept-the highest possible level of coherencehas been achieved in that
concept. (It will be noted that 'core' conceptualizationsare also, conveniently,
parsimoniousones.)
Each of the proposedcore definitions for ideology is an attemptto restore
coherence to the tangled set of attributesassociated with this concept by
pointingto a fundamentalattributethatsuccessfully explains, or resolves con-
tradictionsamong, other attributes.37 It should be obvious that coherence in a
term is usually fairly easy to achieve if one or more of the term's traditional
meaningsare overlooked.Thus, one may specify a core attributefor ideology
and include in the concept only those peripheralcharacteristicsthat mesh
nicely with the chosen core meaning (ignoring all other attributesevoked by
ordinaryusage of the term).Again, we have a situationin which concept for-
mation involves trade-offsbetween differentcriteria.
Differentiation
The flip side of internalcoherence is externaldifferentiation,or boundedness.

Indeed, it is hardly possible to have one without the other, as the carving-
nature-at-the-jointsmetaphorsuggests. "We call a substance silver," writes
NormanCampbell,in his pathbreakingFoundationsof Science,
so long as it is distinguishedfrom other substancesand we call all sub-

stances silver which are indistinguishablefrom each other. The test
whethera propertyis a defining or a non-definingpropertyrests simply
on the distinction between those propertieswhich serve to distinguish
the substancefrom others and those which it possesses in common with
others. Any set of propertieswhich serve to distinguishsilver from all
other substanceswill serve to define it.38
Similarly,with social-science concepts like 'state,' we want to be able to

distinguishit from state-likeentities (tribes,provinces,empires,and so forth).39
What is at issue is the way in which a given concept relates to most-similar
concepts.A definitionof 'car,'for instance,will probablynot botherto tell us
thatit is greasy-not because it isn't true,but becauseit does not help us in dif-
ferentiatingcar from 'truck' or 'bicycle.' A concept's differentiationderives
37. See Gerring,"Ideology."

38. NormanRobertCampbell,Physics: The Elements [1919]. Reprintedas Foundationsof
Science (New York:Dover, 1957), 49.
39. The accuracy of a given attributein distinguishingone concept from a field of related
concepts has been given the name 'cue validity' in Rosch, et al. "Basic Objects"(discussed in
Lakoff, Women,Fire, 52).

from the clarityof its borderswithin a field of similarterms.A poorly bounded

concept has definitionalborderswhich overlapneighboringconcepts.
The importanceof differentiationis broughtout nicely in the OED's def-
inition of 'definition,' which (among other things) asserts that defining an
object is "theact or productof markingout, or delimiting,the outlines or char-
acteristicsof any conceptionor thing."40 The two terms (definitionand differ-
entiation) are very close in meaning. Pitkin explains, "the meaning of an
As
expression is delimited by what might have been said instead, but wasn't.
Green leaves off where yellow and blue begin, so the meaning of 'green' is
delimited by the meanings of 'yellow' and 'blue."'4'
Ideology is an excellent example of a concept withoutclear borders.It is
difficult, one finds, to use the concept of ideology without trippingover the
neighboring concepts of belief-system, worldview, value-system, symbol-
system, myth, public philosophy,political philosophy,political culture,public
opinion, policy agenda,political rhetoric,and political discourse.If, however,
we can clarify, by adjustingthe attributesof the intension,how ideology dif-
fers from these other terms then we have increasedthe differentiationof the
concept. For purposesof maximumdifferentiation(ignoring the demandsof
other conceptual criteria), one might define ideology as: (a) composed of
values, beliefs, and attitudes,but not issue-positions and policy results (dif-
ferentiatingit from programs,policies, agendas, and actions); (b) coherent,
but not rigorouslyand systematicallyso (differentiatingit from philosophical
systems); (c) directly concernedwith politics, and acting as a guide to politi-
cal action (in contrastwith those many near-synonymswhich imply only a
minimalconnectionto the real world of politics); (d) 'partisan'(oppositional,
engaged); (e) persistentthroughtime (as distinguishedfrom public opinion
and policy agendas);and (f) manifestedin speech or in writtenform but not
reducibleto language (as distinguishedfrom forms of discourse). With these
defining characteristics,the concept of ideology comes about as close as one
can come, given the sheer numberof its near-synonyms,to fulfilling the cri-
terion of differentiation.Without such differentiatingcharacteristics,readers
are likely to wonder how-or whether-ideology differs from related con-
40. Reprintedin Chapin,"Definitionof Definitions," 153. Angeles (Dictionary of Philoso-

phy, 56) finds the Latin origins of the term in the verb definire,which is translatedas 'to limit,'
'to end,' 'to be concernedwith the boundariesof something.'We can rightly substitutephenom-
ena for 'objects' and 'things' in the foregoing definitions, since for our purposesit matterslittle
whetherthe extension is composed of thing-likephenomenaor not. Thus, my use of operational-
ization is not equivalentto operationism,by which "the meaningof every scientific termmust be
specifiable by indicatinga definite testing operationthat providesa criterionfor its application"
(Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, 88). See also P. W. Bridgman,The Logic of Modern
Physics (New York:Macmillan, 1927).
41. Pitkin, Wittgenstein,11.

John Gerring 377
cepts, and why none of these other terms were chosen to label the concept
underdefinition.
Some years ago, HannahArendt bemoaned the general lack of attention
paid by political scientiststo distinctionsbetween 'power,''force,' 'authority,'
and 'violence.'42In the interim, this lack of attentionhas been followed by
what some might call a surfeit of attention.43 But Arendt'spoint is still good:
useful definitionsdefine a termagainst relatedterms,telling us not only what
a concept is, but also what it is not.44Internalcoherence is inseparablefrom
externaldifferentiation.
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that differentiationrefers
not only to semantic space (the degree to which a concept's definitionalbor-
ders are clear) but also to physical space (the degree to which a concept's bor-
ders in time and space are clearly demarcated).45 Whatwe wish to know about
a social science concept is not merely what it is, but also where it is-which
is to say, where it isn't. In orderto performthis task effectively a concept must
be sufficiently bounded.
Differentiation,like all criterialdemands,is a matterof degrees. Contrary
to the classical view of concepts-where defining attributesare to be found
always-and-onlyin the extension-most social science concepts must take a
pragmaticapproachto the goal of establishingdifferentiation(for the simple
reasonthatthereare no always- and-onlyattributes).Table2 lays out the pos-
sibilities. Where unique properties are present (category 1), all others are
superfluous (for purposes of establishing differentiation).It hardly matters
whether the propertyin question is invariablypresent, or invariablyabsent,
although in the latter case the definitional attributewill be residual. Where
uniquepropertiesdo not exist, we are forced to rely on the less perfect expe-
dient of sometimes-differentiatingattributesin order to establish the bound-
aries of a concept. In such cases-including the vast majorityof abstractcon-
cepts-the "minimaldefinitionstrategy"thatSartoriadvises simply makesno
sense.46One is compelled in the case of ideology, for example, to place quite
42. HannahArendt,On Violence(New York:Harcourt,Brace, 1970), 43.

43. Steven Lukes, Power (New York:New YorkUniversityPress, 1986) and Peter Morriss,
Power: A PhilosophicalAnalysis (New York:St. Martin'sPress. 1987) review this literature.
44. There may be circumstanceswhen a scholarjustifiably conflates the definitions of sev-
eral relatedterms, as Dahl and others appearto do with power, force, influence, et al. (see Dahl,
"Conceptof Power").Yet, as many writershave noticed, there is no such thing in ordinaryusage
as a pure synonym-i.e., two words that may be exchanged for one anotherwith absolutely no
change of meaning or import.Thus, the effort to combine the meaningsof one or more words in
a single concept, while doubtlessuseful for certainpurposes,always involves some loss of famil-
iarityin the resultingconcept.
45. All key social science concepts, I argue (below), performa referentialfunction.
46. See Sartori,"Towerof Babble,"35.

Table 2. Differentiation:A Relative Matter
ATTRIBUTESFOUND IN ATTRIBUTESFOUND NEAR

THE EXTENSION THE EXTENSION
1. Always differentiating Always Never

Never Always
2. Sometimes differentiating Always Sometimes
Sometimes Always
Sometimes Never
Never Sometimes
3. Non- differentiating Always Always
Sometimes Sometimes
Never Never
a multitudeof propertiesinto the intensionin orderto distinguishthis concept

from its many near-synonyms.We may as well acknowledgethe fact that the
bordersof most concepts are establishedin a ratherpiecemeal fashion:Prop-
erty X may be invoked to distinguishthe concept from one neighboringcon-
cept, and Property Y to distinguish it from another-even though neither
propertyresides exclusively within the extension.
An importantdistinctionmust be drawnhere between differentiationand
operationalization.A differentiatedconcept is a concept that is operationaliz-
able-its referentscan be located in physical space. However,the actualoper-
ationalizationof a concept is a task separatefrom concept formation.Concept
formationrefers to the choice of terms, attributes,and entities to be defined,
not to the indicators used to find them. As Jevons remarks,"it will often
happenthatthe so-called importantpoints of an object arenot those which can
most readily be observed."In this situationit is the importantpoints-what-
ever they may be-not the observables (indicators),that rightly define the
object.47
Yet, to say thatoperationalizabilityis inseparablefrom differentiationis to
say a good deal aboutthe sort of concepts we are likely to favor in social sci-
ence research.Alienation, anomie, charisma,collective conscience, dogma-
tism, equality,false consciousness, hegemony, ideology, legitimacy, margin-
alization, mass society, nationalcharacter,patternvariables,petty bourgeois,
rationalization,sovereignty, status anxiety, and other fuzzy concepts have a
pox on them. It is the pox of insufficientdifferentiation(or, if you prefer,non-
operationalizability).If you don't know it when you see it, then you can't tell
it (the concept) from other things. Such a concept is (ceteris paribus) less
47. W. Stanley Jevons, The Principles of Science [1877] (New York:Dover, 1958), 708.

John Gerring 379
useful. BarbaraGeddes notes thatstate autonomyis generally "inferredfrom

its effects ratherthan directly observed.
No one, it seems, is quite sure what 'it' actuallyconsists of. State auton-
omy seems at times to refer to the independenceof the state itself, the
regime, a particulargovernment,some segmentsor agencies of the gov-
ernment,or even specific leaders. It seems the phrase can refer to any
independentforce based in the centralgovernment.48
With respect to democracy-another poxed term-Dahl claims "The gap

between the concept and operationaldefinition is generally very great, so
great, indeed, that it is not always possible to see what relation there is
between the operationsand the abstractdefinition."49 This does not mean, of
course, that we should immediatelyjettison these fuzzy terms. (Indeed,jetti-
soning 'democracy'is likely to cause more problemsthanit solves.) It means,
very simply, thatdifferentiationis a problem.Any study employing these cat-
egories will have to work hard to develop definitions that are sufficiently
boundedto do real work.5
Ratherthanviewing operationalizationas simply an afterthought-tacked
on afterthe act of concept formationis alreadycomplete-I would arguethat
it is integralto concept formation.Concepts that cannotbe effectively opera-
tionalized, or can be operationalizedin too many different ways, cannot be
differentiated.
Depth
The largerpurpose of concept formationis not simply to enhance the clarity

of communication(by showing where, precisely, the bordersbetween con-
cepts are located), but also the efficiency of communication.We are looking
for a way to groupinstances/characteristics thatare commonly found together
48. Barbara Geddes, Politicians' Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America
(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1996), 5.
49. RobertDahl, "Power,"in InternationalEncyclopediaof the Social Science 12, ed. David
L. Sills (New York:Macmillan,1968), 414. Quotedin Geoffrey Debnam,TheAnalysis of Power:
Core Elementsand Structure(New York:St. Martin'sPress, 1984), 2.
50. Generally,the quest for bounded concepts leads one to concrete, 'observational'con-
cepts. This, it might be said, is the virtue of small concepts (their specificity, and hence clear bor-
ders). Indeed,it is difficult to imagine a largerconcept being more boundedthanthe smallercon-
cepts within its purview.'State'is unlikely to be more boundedthan 'executive,' 'parliament,'and
'bureaucracy.'However, this does not mean that all observationalconcepts are bounded,and all
'abstract'terms fuzzy. Consider the various terms used to describe parts of river-e.g., 'delta,'
'source,' 'beach,' and so forth.These, too, are shifty.

so that we can use the concept's label as shorthandfor those instances/char-

acteristics.The utility of a concept is enhancedby its ability to 'bundle'char-
acteristics.The greaterthe numberof propertiessharedby the phenomenain
the extension, the greaterthe depth of a concept.5'
Withinthe U.S., the geographicconcept of the West is vulnerableto the
charge that these states do not share many featuresin common; the concept,
in otherwords, is not meaning-full.Meaning,in this case, refersto the number
of sharedattributesthat the term calls forth. The deeper or richer a concept,
the more convincing the claim that it defines a class of common entities,
which are thereforedeserving of being called by a single name. The term, in
this sense, carriesmore of a punch-it is, descriptivelyspeaking, more pow-
erful, allowing us to infer many things-the common characteristicsof the
concept-from one thing, the concept's label. The concept of the South, fol-
lowing the opinion of most historians,would have to be considered deeper
than the West, since a much longer list of accompanying attributescan be
constructed.
One of the rationalesbehindthe familiarinjunctionnot to define concepts
residually(by what they aren't) is rooted in the problemthat in doing so we
violate the criterionof depth.Not-X attributesmay be useful for establishing
differentiation,but they are not productiveof depth. Residual concepts merit
the appellation 'shallow'; indeed, in the case of a purely residual concept
thereis no waterat all in the bathtub.Ceterisparibus, deep concepts are supe-
rior to shallow ones. While for the task of boundinga phenomenona single
reliable trait may be sufficient, the task of describing it demands plenitude.
Good concepts identify fecund categories.
This is not to say, however, thatparsimonyand depth are directly at odds
with one another.Depth refers to propertiesthat may be defining or accom-
panying (non-definitional).To define 'human'as a rationalanimal in no way
compromises the depth of this category. Indeed, if one considers the sheer
numberof things that can be said to differentiatehumansfrom other animals,
this must be consideredan extraordinarilydeep concept.
51. Althoughrarelyacknowledgedas a desideratumof concepts at-large (but see ArthurL.

Stinchcombe,TheoreticalMethodsin Social History,[New York:AcademicPress, 1978], 21, 29),
the notion of depth is implicit in virtuallyall descriptionsof classificatorymethodsof definition.
Mill (Systemof Logic, 460) defines a Kind, for example, as a class of things "distinguishedfrom
all othersnot by one or a few definite properties,but by an unknownmultitudeof them;the com-
binationof propertieson which the class is groundedbeing a mere index to an indefinitenumber
of other distinctive attributes."The argumenthere put forth may be viewed, therefore, as an
attemptto generalize from classificatory methods of concept formationto concept formationat
large. What is true for one, I would argue,is true for the other.

John Gerring 381
TheoreticalUtility
The classic scientific goal of a social science concept is to aid in the formula-
tion of theories, as discussed above.5 Concepts are the building-blocksof all
theoretical structuresand the formation of many concepts is legitimately
theory-driven.Anomie, libido, mode of production, and charisma owe their
endurance,at least in part, to the theories of Durkheim,Freud, Marx, and
Weber.Indeed, these terms have little meaningin the social sciences without
these broadertheoreticalframeworks.
Classificatoryframeworks(which I shall consider a species of 'theory')
are particularlyimportantsince their effort is more explicitly conceptualthan
other sorts of inferences. A classification aims to carve up the universe into
comprehensive,mutuallyexclusive, and hierarchicalcategories. Within such
a schema, a given concept derives much of its utility from its position within
this broaderarrayof terms.Ideology, for example, within a generalcognitivist
framework,has often been used to refer to the highest (i.e., most sophisti-
cated) level of political understanding.3This brings with it an emphasis on
certaintraitslike abstraction,sophistication,and knowledge.Othercommonly
understoodfeaturesof the concept must be excluded or else the classificatory
schema will be violated. Although this involves some sacrifice of familiarity,
it may make more sense to appropriatethe generalterm 'ideology,' with all its
complications,than to resort to neologism (which of course has its own con-
ceptual costs, as we have discussed). One can think of concepts whose exis-
tence is almost wholly dependentupon their classificatoryutility. Thompson
et al.'s fatalism and Luebbert'straditional-authoritarianism have few exter-
nal referents.54Indeed, they are virtually empty categories, failing the depth
criterionmiserably.However,these concepts are redeemedto some degree by
their utility within broadertypologies, which they help to define and delimit.
These are extreme cases but they illustratethe more general point that con-
cepts often categorize.55
But theoreticalutility need not be so (shall we say) 'theoretical.'Consider,
once again, the concept of ideology. I have arguedthatwe oughtto define ide-
ology broadly-to refer to all minimally coherent political belief-systems-
52. See sources cited in note 16.

53. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, "The Natureof Belief Systems in Mass Publics,"in Ide-
ology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (London:Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 206-61.
54. See MichaelThompson,RichardEllis andAaronWildavsky,CulturalTheory(Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990) and Gregory M. Luebbert,Liberalism,Fascism, or Social Democracy:
Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in InterwarEurope (Berkeley:Universityof
CaliforniaPress, 1991).
55. Indeed,these two terms-concept and category-are often used synonymously(Collier
and Mahon,"Conceptual'Stretching,"'and Taylor,LinguisticCategorization).

ratherthan to adopt a more narrowdefinition (including,perhaps,only those

values and beliefs that are dogmatic) because we need a way to talk about
these things, and 'political belief-system' is too long and awkwarda term to
adequatelyperformthis function. Ideology, broadlydefined, has a theoretical
utility that ideology, narrowly defined, does not. Colloquially stated, "we
should possess a name whereverone is needed; whereverthere is anythingto
be designatedby it, which it is of importanceto express."56
Field Utility
To redefine a term, or to invent a new term, involves some resettlingof the

semanticfield in which the termis located. It is impossible, in otherwords, to
redefineone termwithoutredefiningothers,for the task of definitionconsists
of establishingrelationshipswith neighboringterms. Wordsare defined with
otherwords. Hence, any change in the originaldefinitioninvolves changes in
these relationships.Any redefinitionof 'corporatism'necessarilychanges our
understandingsof 'pluralism,'as a redefinitionof 'democracy'changes our
understandingsof 'authoritarianism.' One might supposethatthis only occurs
in semantically crowded fields, but not in those which are comparatively
devoid of competing terms. Not so. Even entirely new concepts-i.e., those
based upon discoveries of new entities-must be defined in termsof existing
concepts, and in that process must transformthose original concepts. This
observationholds afortiori in the world of social science, where thereis very
little that is truly new and where, consequently,conceptualizationgenerally
takes the form of reconceptualizingwhat we alreadyknow.
Insofaras neighboringterms are affected by the reconceptualizationof a
key term,it standsto reasonthatwe should apply the same set of standardsto
these peripheral,'spillover'redefinitionsas we have appliedto the originalcon-
cept. Reconceptualizationswhich enhance-or do as little damage as possi-
ble-to the utility of neighboringconcepts (their levels of familiarity,parsi-
mony,et al.) are,ceterisparibus,most desirable.I shallcall this goalfield utility.
The generalgoal of concept formationat thefield-level is a semantic/phe-
nomenalfield in which every distinctthing (referent)has a distinctname, and
every name a distinct referent-a one-to-one correspondencebetween words
and things. Of course, I am well awarethatcorrespondencesare rarelyso per-
fect. Yet, all social science conceptualizationsstrive for this ideal-which, as
Sartori points out, maximizes the efficiency and clarity of language in
describing the world aroundus.57One wishes, in other words, to avoid the
56. Mill, Systemof Logic, 436.

57. See Sartori,"Guidelines,"38-39. "So necessaryis it that,when a thing is talkedof, there
should be a name to call it by; so conducive, not to say necessary,to the prevalenceof reasonand

John Gerring 383
problem of the "homeless entity"-a phenomenon with all the extensional

characteristicsof a good concept (coherence, differentiation,depth, theoreti-
cal utility), but no name.58One wishes, at the same time, to avoid the problem
of the entity-less concept-a term without a correspondingreferent.
The latterproblemdemandsfurthercommentary.In redefiningconcepts it
is easy to steal referentsfrom neighboringterms,leaving these termsas empty
categories.59Considerthe question of Americanpolitical culture.Perhapsthe
easiest way to establish a name for oneself as a writerin this crampedfield is
to select one word amongst the field of terms competing to describeAmeri-
can political norms and folkways-e.g., liberalism, republicanism,protes-
tantism,individualism,equal opportunity,pragmatism,libertarianism,demo-
cratic capitalism, freedom, Algerism, Americanism, the frontier spirit
-championing its merits against all the previous terms, or showing how it,
really,is the key term aroundwhich all the othersrevolve. To be sure, thereis
nothing wrong with establishing coherence in a definition, but if all one is
doing is rearrangingthe same set of partsinto (essentially) the same whole-
with a new label-then not much has been accomplished.Alternatively,one
may promotea fundamentallynew term (e.g., 'Americanjeremiad'or 'Amer-
ican mission') to referto the same triedand truereferents.It all seems to make
sense; in fact, it makes sense much too easily. However, if one keeps in mind
the fact that one is reconceptualizingnot simply a single term, but rathera
field of terms, then it becomes apparentwhy this sort of terminologicalleg-
erdemain is illegitimate (or at least less useful): because other, neighboring
terms have been deprived of their referents (and hence of their familiarity,
coherence, differentiation,depth, and theoreticalutility).
The betterwe can "cover"a given phenomenaland terminologicalterrain
the betterare the individualconcepts thatinhabitthatterrain.It is here thatthe
criteriaof concept formation,and of classificatoryinferencedovetail. "What
makes a concept significant,"writes AbrahamKaplan,
is that the classification it institutes is one into which things fall, as it

were, of themselves. It carves at the joints, Plato said. Less metaphori-
cally, a significantconcept so groupsor divides its subject-matterthatit
can enter into many and importanttrue propositionsabout the subject-
common sense and moral honesty. ..," writes Bentham(Bentham'sHandbook, 11). "Not only,"
writes his intellectual godchild, "should every word perfectly express its meaning, but there
should be no importantmeaning without its word"(Mill, Systemof Logic, 456).
58. PatrickGardiner,from whom I steal this phrase,has a somewhatdifferentpoint in mind.
See Gardiner,The Nature of Historical Explanation [1952] (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1961), 55.
59. See Sartori,"Guidelines."

matterother than those which state the classification itself. Tradition-

ally, such a concept was said to identify a 'natural'class ratherthan an
'artificial' one. Its naturalnessconsists in this, that the attributesit
chooses as the basis of classification are significantly related to the
attributesconceptualizedelsewhere in our thinking.Things are grouped
togetherbecause they resemble one another.A naturalgrouping is one
which allows the discovery of many more, and more important,resem-
blances than those originally recognized. Every classification serves
some purposeor other...: it is artificialwhen we cannot do more with
it than we first intended.6
II. Explications and Implications
I have arguedthat concepts are liable to eight criteriaof adequacy-familiar-

ity, resonance,parsimony,coherence,differentiation,depth,theoreticalutility,
and field utility.Readersmay wonderwhetherthese criteriatrulyexhaust the
norms governing concept formationin the social sciences. Specifically, how
are we to accountfor norms like 'clarity,''power,' 'adequacy,''value-neutral-
ity,' and otherdesideratathat do not appearin the eight-partframework?
Most of the aforementioneddesiderataare, to be sure, beyond reproach.
(Who could argue with the notion that a definition "must not be ambigu-
ous"?6)Yet, these familiaradmonitionsare also highly ambiguous,referring
to several criterial demands at once. 'Clarity' and 'precision'-like their
antonyms, 'ambiguity,' 'vagueness,' and 'indefiniteness'-may refer to
coherence or differentiation.'Power' may refer to coherence, differentiation,
depth,or theoreticalutility. 'Adequacy'and 'utility'may referto any or all cri-
teria.62In short, it seems useful to disaggregatethe projectof concept forma-
60. Kaplan,Logic ofInquiry, 50-51. Hempel's observationsare similar."thefamiliarvague

distinctionbetween 'natural'and 'artificial'classificationsmay well be explicated as referringto
the difference between classifications that are scientifically fruitful and those that are not: in a
classification of the formerkind, those characteristicsof the elements which serve as criteriaof
membershipin a given class are associated ... with ... extensive clusters of other characteris-
tics. For example, the two sets of primarysex characteristicswhich determinethe division of
humansinto male and female are each associated ... with a large variety of concomitantphysi-
cal, physiological, and psychological traits.It is understandablethat a classification of this sort
should be viewed as somehow having objective existence in nature,as 'carving nature at the
joints,' in contradistinctionto 'artificial'classifications,in which the definingcharacteristicshave
few explanatoryor predictiveconnectionswith othertraits;as is the case, for example, in the divi-
sion of humansinto those weighing less thanone hundredpounds,andall others"(Aspectsof Sci-
entific Explanation,147) See also Jevons, Principles of Science, 679.
61. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy, 56.
62. I have thereforeused these last two terms to referto goodness in concept formationat-
large.

John Gerring 385
tion into narrower,more focused parts.

Some desiderataare simply not worthpursuing.The oft-expressedgoal of
'value-neutrality,'for example, is plainly impossible to achieve in many con-
texts.63Imagine trying to craft definitions of slavery,fascism, terrorism,or
genocide without recourseto 'pejorative'attributes,or humanrights, democ-
racy, or peace without 'valorizing' attributes.These are starkexamples, but
the same generalproblemconfrontsthe choice of definitionalattributesof all
social science concepts. Ideology, for example, has been defined as dogmatic
behavior and thought-patterns,64 a characteristicfew would aspire to. Some-
times the most offensive word or definitionis also the most appropriate,even
for social science purposes.At the same time, there is no reason to give pref-
erence to evaluative, over nonevaluative,connotationswhen defining a term,
or in choosing terms. Stripping notions of justice from 'democracy' may
indeed be preferablefor some purposes-not becausejustice is an evaluative
term, but because it is so difficult to operationalize,and hence differentiate.
More importantly,in moving justice into democracyone collapses the bound-
aries separatingthese two terms, thus diminishingfield utility. The point is,
the desirabilityof an attributeor term-labelis irrelevantto its utility in social-
science research.
Arguably,breadth (scope or range) in a concept is a good thing.65The
more instances a concept 'covers,' ceteris paribus, the more useful that con-
cept will be for social science purposes.However,I thinkit makes more sense
to view breadthas a criterionof inferences,ratherthan of concepts. Consider
'nuclearwar.'There is only one case of this-or none (since the U.S. deploy-
ment of nuclearweapons effectively ended WorldWarII). Does this make it
a poor concept? Should we broadenthe range of cases by changing the defi-
nition of the concept? (It is not clear how one would do this without utterly
violating the normal meanings of 'war' and 'nuclear.') Similarly, one can
imagine many concepts with huge extensions-e.g., 'world,' 'person,' 'inci-
dent'-which are not terriblyuseful to us. The numberof things a concept
refers to, by itself, says nothing about a concept's utility for social science
analysis.
63. See Connolly, Termsof Political Discourse; Lakoff, Women,Fire; Pitkin, Wittgenstein;
CharlesTaylor,"Neutralityin Political Science," in Readingsin the Philosophyof Social Science,
ed. Michael Martinand Lee C. McIntyre(Cambridge:MIT Press, 1994); Peter Winch, The Idea
of a Social Science, and its Relation to Philosophy (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
Finley's discussion of the word 'slave' is particularlyapt (M. I. Finley, "Generalizationsin
Ancient History,"in Generalization in the Writingof History, ed. Louis Gottschalk [Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1963] 22-3).
64. See Sartori,"ConceptMisformation."
65. This would appear to be the implication of Sartori's work on the tradeoffs between
extension and intension (see "ConceptMisformation,"and "Guidelines").

If I were investigating Britain,France and Germany,but also wanted to

say somethingaboutHungaryandPoland,it would not make sense to broaden
the definitionof "WesternEurope"to include these two additionalcases when
one has the handy moniker"Europe"to draw upon. This is a ratherobvious
example, but it illustratesthe absurdityof the assertionthat broaddefinitions
are, ceteris paribus, betterthan narrowones. The relevantquestion is where
the naturalboundarieslie, not how large the resultantcategories are.
Concept-Typesversus Concept-Criteria
Another objection to the criterialframeworkmight be that concepts are not
really, as claimed, partof a single enterprise.Rather,what we may have is a
set of widely-varyingconceptualexercises, each respondingto differentcri-
teria of adequacy.Indeed, consideringthe numberand diversity of concept-
types listed on page 365-ideal-typical, radial, classical, and so forth-my
claims for uniformity in concept formation within the social sciences may
appear to readers as an exemplary case of conceptual stretching (in the
derogatorysense of thatterm).
To be sure, concepts differ from one another.Yet I would arguethatthese
differencesare betterunderstoodas differencesof degree, ratherthanof kind.
Moreover,and more significantly,those differencesthat matter(to social sci-
ence work, that is) can be readily mappedacross the eight dimensionsof our
framework.Workon concept-typesis subsumablewithin the criterialframe-
work. 'Classical' concepts, for example, privilege differentiation;'ideal-type'
concepts emphasize coherence (generally at the expense of differentiation);
'radial'and 'family-resemblance'concepts emphasize coherence, depth, and
familiarity;'polar' concepts emphasize coherence and theoreticalutility; and
so forth.Each concept-typeemphasizesa differentconceptualtask or tasks-
but not to the total exclusion of other tasks. Ideal-type concepts have not
renouncedall claims to differentiation;classical concepts do not eschew all
ties to coherence, depth, or standardusage.66
66. Interestingly,the notion of an ideal-typeis pre-figuredin early work by Jevons (Princi-

ples of Science, 722-24). "Perplexedby the difficulties arising in naturalhistory from the dis-
covery of intermediateforms, naturalistshave resortedto what they call classification by types.
Instead of forming one distinct class defined by the invariablepossession of certain assigned
properties,and rigidly including or excluding objects accordingas they do or do not possess all
these properties,naturalistsselect a typical specimen, and they group aroundit all other speci-
mens which resemble this type more than any other selected type. 'The type of each genus,' we
are told, 'should be that species in which the charactersof its group are best exhibted and most
evenly balanced.' Yet Jevonspromptlydismisses this pragmaticeffort as "acertainlaxity of log-
ical method."
Of the connection between ideal-types and empirical reality, Weber (Methodology of the
Social Sciences, 97) writes:"All expositions for example of the 'essence' of Christianityare ideal

John Gerring 387
Anotherdivision which has attractedgreatattention(from philosophersof

science as well as from linguists) is the distinction between observational
(concrete or referential)terms and nonobservational(theoreticalor abstract)
terms. Useful though this distinctionmay be in otherrealms, I think it can be
shown that all key social science concepts (except, let us say, those which are
purely methodological) play a referential function. The reference may be
highly attenuated,but it is nonetheless always present.
Consider,as an example, the concept of 'justice.'If ever therewas a social
science concept of high-orderabstraction,this is surely it. Yet, even here, one
is at pains to find a social science discussion of the topic withoutan 'external'
(real-life,actual,physical, observational,....) referent.Contemporaryphiloso-
phers and political theoristsare also concernedwith questions of justice, and
routinelydebateconcreteinstancesand specific policies. JohnRawls's Theory
of Justice, the primaryfount of contemporarydebate, is an excellent case in
point. Rawls and his challengers (e.g., Michael Walzer,Robert Nozick, and
Ronald Dworkin), wish to know not only whatjustice is "in the abstract"but
also how it might enter into questions of taxing and spending.67 Whatjustice
means in the academy is not-or at least not rightly-separable from what it
means in the street.
In sum, although concept-types offer a useful shorthandway of talking
about certainissues in concept formation,they do not offer a comprehensive
explanationof that process. Particularconcept-typesare best understoodas a
matterof prioritization,a sacrifice of certainconceptualvirtues for the more
firm possession of others.There are, in short,no pure types.
types enjoying only a necessarily very relative and problematicvalidity when they are intended
to be regardedas the historicalportrayalof empiricallyexisting facts."However tenuousthe con-
nection to reality,it seems clear from Weber'sexposition thatideal-typeconcepts must bearsome
relationshipto empiricallyexisting phenomenain orderto be of use to social science. The rela-
tive natureof conceptualadequacy is also recognized (at least implicitly) in the following com-
ments by Hempel. "Cognitivesignificance in a system is a matterof degree: significant systems
rangefrom those whose entireextralogicalvocabularyconsists of observationterms,throughthe-
ories whose formulationrelies heavily on theoreticalconstructs,on to systems with hardly any
bearingon potentialempiricalfindings."Carl Hempel, "EmpiricistCriteriaof Cognitive Signif-
icance: Problemsand Changes,"in The Philosophy of Science, ed. RichardBoyd, Philip Gasper,
and J.D. Trout(Cambridge:MIT Press, 1991), 81.
67. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press, 1977); RobertNozick, Anarchy,State, and Utopia (New York:Basic Books, 1974); John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 1971); Michael Walzer,
Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York:Basic Books, 1983). For
explicitly empirical work on justice, see Justice: Viewsfrom the Social Sciences, ed. Ronald
Cohen (New York:Plenum Press, 1986); Norma Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer,Choosing
Justice (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1992); Karol EdwardSoltan,"EmpiricalStud-
ies of Distributive Justice." Ethics 92 (1982): 673-91; Soltan, The Causal Theory of Justice
(Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1987).

Rules versus Tradeoffs
Sartori and colleagues offer the most impressive synthesis to date on the
vexed questionof concept formation.6The primaryeffortof theirresearchhas
been to uncover a set of rules-a method-by which to guide the process of
concept formation in the social sciences.69Rules one and two in Sartori's
handbook,for example, read as follows:
Rule 1: Of any empirical concept always, and separately,check (a)

whether it is ambiguous,that is, how the meaning relates to the term;
and (b) whetherit is vague, that is, how the meaningrelates to the ref-
erent.
Rule 2a: Always check (a) whetherthe key terms (the designatorof the
concept and the entailed terms) are defined; (b) whether the meaning
declared by their definition is unambiguous; and (c) whether the
declared meaning remains, throughoutthe argument,unchanged,(i.e.,
consistent).
Rule 2b: Always check whetherthe key terms are used univocally and
consistently in the declaredmeaning.70
This list extends to ten, and offers a convenient summaryof what might be
called the "rulebook" approach to concept formation, an approach that
extends back to J. S. Mill.7'
The most obvious difficulty with this set of rules is that they are at pains
to rise above the commonsensical. (What allows us to determine whether
'ambiguity'or 'vagueness' is present in a definition?)More troublingis the
frequency of Sartori'scaveats-"awaiting contraryproof," "all other things
being equal,"and so forth.72 These difficulties suggest thatconcept formation
is a more dynamic and unpredictableprocess than can be managedwithin a
recipe-like approach. (As one wag has noted, when is ceteris ever really
paribus?)
68. See Riggs, "Definition of Concepts," Sartori, "Concept Misformation,""Tower of

Babble," "Guidelines";Social Science Concepts: A SystematicAnalysis, ed. Giovanni Sartori
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984); Towerof Babel.
69. Reflecting upon the experiences of the Committee on Conceptualand Terminological
Analysis (COCTA),which he chaired, Sartori("Guidelines,"11) writes: "We all came to share
the conviction thatconcept analysis required-in orderto be of generaland incrementalvalue-
a method"(emphasis added).
70. Sartori,"Guidelines,"63.
71. See Mill, Systemof Logic; Jevons, Principles of Science.
72. See, e.g., Sartori,"Guidelines,"53.

John Gerring 389
As we have seen, satisfying one criterionof conceptualadequacyis likely

to have ramificationsfor other criteria.We can, for example, cleanse a term
of a propertywhich overlaps inconvenientlywith the definition of neighbor-
ing terms, so as to increase its level of differentiation.However, the more
alterationswe make within the ordinaryunderstandingsof a group of terms,
the more tenuoustheir connectionto establishedusage becomes, compromis-
ing their familiarity.The oft-noted instability of terms like ideology arises
from the plural,and often contradictory,natureof the demandsto which such
concepts are expected to respond.
Moreover,since each element of a concept-the term, the intension, and
the extension-is interdependent,thereis no apparentplace to begin (or end).
Consequently,we cannot discern a common sequence to the process of con-
cept formation.Some would begin with the word, some with the phenome-
non, some with a theory, and so forth. In any case, the process of definition
quickly becomes one of mutualadjustment.To achieve a higherdegree of dif-
ferentiationin a concept one may do one or all of three things: (a) choose a
differentterm,(b) adjustthe propertiesof the intension,or (c) adjustthe mem-
bers of the extension. Concept formationthus offers an excellent illustration
of the so-called hermeneuticcircle, since a change in any one aspect of a con-
cept will normally affect the other two. For this reason, concept formation
must be viewed holistically; there is no way to separateout tasks which per-
tain only to the 'phenomenal'realm from those that pertainonly to 'linguis-
tic' or 'theoretical'realms, as some approachesto the problemimply.
Acknowledging the interdependentnatureof concept formationleads us
away from the static, rule-boundmodel of concept formation.Formingcon-
cepts in the social sciences (as elsewhere) is a dynamic process, as suggested
by the ubiquitousceteris paribus clause. The best we can do in analyzingand
guiding conceptualizationis to keep trackof the parameters.Tradeoffs,rather
thanrules, best make sense of this vexing enterprise.To be sure, the notion of
concept formationas a set of trade-offsis not new. Over a centuryago, Jevons
pointedout that when the definitionalattributesof a word are expanded(e.g.,
'war' becomes 'foreign war'), its breadthis generally narrowed.(Otherwise
put, more specific definitions generally refer to less phenomena.)Intension
and extension are thus inversely correlated.73 Whathas not been generallyrec-
ognized is that the number of demands placed upon a single concept-and
73. See Jevons, Principles of Science, 26. This point was amplified by Sartori,"Concept
Misformation,"1041. For otherwork highlightingthe role of tradeoffsand internalcontradictions
in concept formation,see Cohen, Developing Sociological Knowledge, 131-45; Collier, "Putting
Concepts to Work," Collier and Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching,"' Collier and Levitsky,
"Democracywith Adjectives,"andAndrewC. Gould, "ConflictingImperativesand ConceptFor-
mation,"unpublishedmanuscript(Notre Dame, IN: Departmentof Government,University of
Notre Dame, 1998).

hence the numberof possible trade-offs-reaches beyond two or three.A con-

cept that is difficult to distinguishfrom surroundingterms, cannot be easily
located in the physical world, sharesfew characteristicsin common, is com-
posed of apparentlyheterogeneouselements, covers only a small numberof
events, and does not build upon standardusage, is for any one of these sins
less useful in the world of social science. It will not make sense, or will make
less sense.
If concept formationis neithertype-boundnor rule-bound,but is instead
responsive to a large numberof criterialdemands,I would arguethat we are
betteroff thinkingof social science concepts not as fixed entities in semantic
space but ratheras pragmatic,and often temporary,expedients. The process
of concept formationowes more to art than to rote technique,involving one
in an ongoing set of choices. Definitive definitions,good for all times and all
situations,arerare.Recurringconfusion in concept formationis not due to the
limited methodologicalskills of the conceptualizer,but ratherto the trade-offs
entailed in conceptualization-a considerably more complex, multifaceted,
andjust plain messy process than Sartori'swork suggests.
A tradeoffsapproachto concept formationamountsto placing the ceteris
paribus caveat at the centerof our understanding.(To be sure, thereare initial
steps one takes to achieve what one might call Pareto optimality-a recon-
ceptualizationwhich enhances the performanceof a concept on one dimen-
sion without impairingits performanceon others. But once Paretooptimality
is achieved, all furtherchanges are costly. Ceteris is no longerparibus.)
Consider Geddes's choices in working out a definition for her key con-
cept, "administrativereform."She defines this concept largely in terms of
merit-basedhiringfor civil servants,a definitionwhich she defends in the fol-
lowing way.
This element of reform [merit-basedhiring practices] was selected for

emphasis because the many administrativereform packages that have
been proposedduringrecent decades nearlyalways include it; rules for
merit-basedhiring, unlike other kinds of reform,vary only moderately
from country to country;and the results of laws requiringrecruitment
by exam are relatively easy to assess. Meritocraticrecruitmentmay not
be the most importantaspect of administrativereform,but it is always
at least moderatelyimportant,and it is the easiest element of reformto
'measure'accurately.74
The concept of administrativereform, so defined, is reasonablycoherent (it

dovetails with connotationsof 'reform,'for example) and differentiated(one
74. Geddes, Politicians' Dilemmas, 104.

John Gerring 391
would not mistake it for some other concept). It is familiar,and it seems suf-
ficiently parsimonious. Most important,Geddes manages to attain a high
degree of differentiation.She has some doubts, however, aboutits theoretical
utility (it "may not be the most importantaspect of administrativereform").
No definitionalchoice, one imagines, would be perfect.
Towardsa Relative Standardof ConceptualAdequacy
It would be easy to conclude from this example, and from the generaldiscus-
sion thatpreceded,thatconcept formationis mostly a 'contextual'affair.Con-
texts differ, to be sure, and the task of concept formationwill vary consider-
ably according to the specific real-worldsituation that one is attemptingto
describe,specific semanticfields (fields of neighboringconcepts),specific ety-
mological histories (the traditional social-scientific or ordinary-language
understandingsof the term), and specific analytic tasks. At the same time, it
shouldbe noted thatin all contextsthe conceptualizerwill have to wrestlewith
the same eight demands.Concept formationthus retainsa certainuniformity
across the disciplines and subjectmattersthatcompose the social sciences.
Nor do we lack standardsin differentiatinggood concepts from bad ones.
I would argue, instead, that standardsare assessable in terms of the goals
achieved by a given concept relative to that which the concept might other-
wise attain with a different choice of words, properties, or phenomena. It
would be pointless, in other words, to complain that a certain definition of
'justice' was insufficiently differentiatedbecause it was more difficult to
locate in the empirical universe than a certaindefinition of 'chair.'The rele-
vant standardof comparison here is other definitions of justice, or other
neighboring terms which might more adequately identify the instances in
question. As any new theory must prove itself superiorto rival explanations,
any new definition must vie againstrival definitions and terms that might be
employed in thatparticularempiricaland theoreticalcontext.Thus, in the case
of Geddes's concept of administrativereform, the test of adequacy may be
operationalizedin the following question: is there a term, or anotherset of
attributes,which would better fulfill the eight tasks of concept formationin
this researchdesign? If the answer is yes, then Geddes may be faulted;if no,
then her concept stands.
This process of concept evaluation would be aided if all writerswere as
frankin setting forththe pros and cons of theirown termsas Geddes has been.
Indeed, such transparencyshould be considered on par with norms of open-
ness in otherfacets of research-e.g., in makingdataavailableto otherschol-
ars, in making clear possible biases in the data, and so forth.Writershave an
obligationto state explicitly why (on the basis of which criteria)certainprop-
erties and terms were chosen, or excluded. In the case of neologism, it should

be incumbentupon the writer to demonstratethat no suitable terms can be

found in the existing lexicon, a much hardercase. In this way, it would be
easier for readersto visualize alternativeformulationsof a given concept, and
therebyjudge the adequacyof the writer'sprofferedsolutions.
In any case-for the readerand the researcher-approaching the task of
concept formation in the social sciences from an integrated framework
reduces the uncertaintyof this process, specifying the various demands that
must be taken into considerationand, in so doing, allows us to make better
choices. Whereconcepts remainflawed-as, in a certainsense, all social con-
cepts are-we may at least profitfrom this frameworkin betterunderstanding
the natureof those flaws. "Whenit is impossible to obtaingood tools," writes
Mill, "the next best thing is to understandthoroughlythe defects of those we
have."75
Discussion
To many writers, the semantic confusion besetting the social sciences (as
describedin the opening section of this paper)is not a signal to clean house,
but rathera signal that we ought to investigatethe sources of these inner lin-
guistic tensions. Overlappingdefinitions,internalcontradictionsbetween def-
initionalproperties,and impreciseoperationalizations(to name only a few of
the most common sins) are, in this view, (a) naturalto ordinarylanguage, (b)
ineradicablefrom social-science discourse, and perhaps(c) desirable.To such
writers the present study no doubt exudes a strong and unpleasantodor of
'positivism,' since I am proposingthat there is a uniformset of criteriaguid-
ing concept formationwithin the social sciences, and that among such crite-
ria are normsof operationalizabilityand classificatoryutility.Indeed,even to
invoke the notion of social science is to suggest the applicabilityof a natural-
scientific model of endeavor.Since this is not really what I am proposing, it
seems worthwhileto explore some of the broaderepistemological questions
that lie behindthe claims of the presentstudy.
With the first of the foregoing propositions(that many of our conceptual
failures are normal to ordinarylanguage) I am in wholeheartedagreement.
The second proposition, however, is more problematic.Before proceeding
further,I should emphasize what should alreadybe apparent:I am not, in the
fashion of classical logic, proposingthe creationof a taxonomicsocial science
language in which "the meaning of a term [is] fixed by laying down a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for its application,"and in which each
term would be distinguishedfrom neighboringterms by one defining attrib-
75. Mill, Systemof Logic, 31-32.

JohnGerring393
ute,suchthatall conceptscouldbe arrayedon a singlehierarchical This

grid.76
wouldrequireagreeinguponstandard definitionsandenforcingthem-a for-
midabletask,oneimagines,andnotone necessarilyproductive of goodsocial
sciencework.Whethereventhenaturalsciencesactuallyoperatein thisfash-
ion maybe debated.7Inanycase,theobjectsof researchin thesocialsciences
refuseto lie stillin themannerof rocks,animals,cells,andatoms.If thesocial
sciences are scientificat all-and this, of course,hinges upon how one
choosesto definescience-they aresurelyscientificin a verydifferentway
thanthenaturalsciences.
Yet,the unworkability of logicalpositivismshouldnot obscurethe fact
thatthereis still a greatdeal separatingthe languageof socialsciencefrom
naturallanguage-as codified,let us say, in dictionariesof standardusage.
One may approachthe specialnessof socialscienceas a matterof methods
andof objectsof study;it is also, I wouldargue,a matterof concepts.Like
naturalscientists,Mennonites,Republicans-likevirtuallyany sub-groupof
thegeneralpopulation-socialscientistsusespecializedtermsanddefinitions
(oftenspecificto a field or subfield)and,conjointly,a specializedset of cri-
teriato guidethe processof conceptformation.Wecan debatethe extentof
this specialness,askingto whatdegreea technical/professional vocabulary
maybejustified.Indeed,froma broadepistemological angle,thisis whatthe
presentstudyseeksto establish:underwhatcircumstances, andfor whatrea-
sons,socialscienceshoulddeviatefromnormsof ordinaryusage.
76. Kaplan,Logic ofInquiry, 68. See also Jevons, Principles of Science, 73; Riggs, "Defin-
ition of Concepts."
77. See, e.g., BrunoLatourand Steve Woolgar,LaboratoryLife: The Social Constructionof
ScientificFacts (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).


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Nowhere in the broad and heterogeneouswork on conceptformation has the

John Gerring is assistantprofessor in the Departmentof Political Science at

As we are ... prisonersof the wordswe pick,we hadbetterpick them

"Conceptformation"conventionallyrefers to three aspects of a concept: (a)

Polity XXXI,Number33 Spring1999

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

dum), (b) the propertiesor attributesthatdefine them (the intension,connota-

2. The tripartiteanalysis of concept formation is derived from C. K. Ogden and I. A.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

Its result is the perpetualreconstructionof those conceptsthrough

All authorsmakelexicalandsemanticchoicesas theywriteandthuspartici-

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

logical trailsthatconfuse the unwittingreader.New words are createdto refer

Approachesto the Problem

A variety of approaches(some more self-conscious than others) may be dis-

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

Perhapsthe oldest solution to the age-old problemof concept formationis

Social scientists, like all sub-communities-e.g., like doctors, lawyers, foot-

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

indisputablethat such departuresmust, and should, be taken on some occa-

12. Richardson,Definition (73) and Sartori,"Guidelines,"offer furtherreflections on this

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utes alwaysidentifyits referents,and no others)mightnot be possiblein

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

more sweet. A greattheory,with poorly craftedconcepts is at best a greatidea,

18. See, e.g., KazimierzAdjdukiewicz,"ThreeConcepts of Definition,"in Problems in the

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

Though concept formation is not reducible to any of the foregoing criteria,

19. See, e.g., MartinBulmerand RobertG. Burgess, "Do Concepts,Variablesand Indicators

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Table 1. Criteriaof ConceptualGoodness

1. Familiarity How familiaris the concept (to a lay or academicaudience)?

furtherquestions: which contexts matter(or should matter),and under what

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

strengths andweaknessesof alternative conceptualizationscanbe assessed,and

23. Robinson,Definition, 80.

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In actualpractice,one alwaysstartswith the lay conceptand the lay

At the sametime,we oughtnot visualizethe inventionof new termsas

24. Robinson,Definition, 81.

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been Classical (e.g., Id, communitas,polis), religious (e.g., hermeneutics),

Why do some termsstick while others, with virtuallyidenticalmeanings,dis-

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Good concepts do not have endless definitions. It should be possible to say

29. See, e.g., Sartori,"Guidelines,"40, 54-55; FredW. Riggs, "TheDefinition of Concepts"

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'belief-system,' 'symbol-system,' or 'value-system,'but none of these possi-

The Chinese languagetakesthis quest for abbreviationto what we in the west-

30. Proposed substitutesviolate the parsimonycriterion(e.g., 'political belief-system'), or

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things being equal, 'worldview' is preferableto 'weltanschaaung,''walking'

Blessed be he forevermore,in whateverrobe arrayed,to whose creative

Coining words fit to be used entails finding words, or combinationsof words,

Arguably,the most importantcriterionof a good concept is its internalcoher-

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than simply a coincidence in time and physical space.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 16 Sep 2013 20:57:18 PM

that is, thata single principleis able to subsumevarioususes and instancesof

The flip side of internalcoherence is externaldifferentiation,or boundedness.