Jervis - Hypothesis On Misperception

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Hypotheses on Misperception
Author(s): Robert Jervis
Source: World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Apr., 1968), pp. 454-479
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION
By ROBERT JERVIS*
I N determining
howothers
how he will behave,an actormusttryto predict
willactandhowtheiractions hisvalues.The
willaffect
actormustthereforedevelopan imageofothers andoftheirintentions.
Thisimagemay,however, turnouttobe an inaccurate one; theactor
may,fora number misperceive
ofreasons, bothothers' andtheir
actions
In thisresearch
intentions. noteI wishto discussthetypesofmisper-
whichstatestendto make.The
ceptionsof otherstates'intentions
conceptof intentionis complex,butherewe can consider it to com-
prisethewaysin whichthestatefeelsit will actin a widerangeof
future Thesewaysofactingusuallyarenotspecific
contingencies. and
well-developedplans.For manyreasonsa nationalor individual actor
may not knowhow he will act undergivenconditions, but this
problem cannotbe dealtwithhere.
I. PREVious TREATMENTS OF PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Although diplomatic havediscussed

historians in their
misperception
treatments events,
of specific students relations
of international have
ignored
generally twosetsofscholars
thistopic.However, haveapplied
contentanalysisto thedocuments thatflowedwithinand between
governments in thesixweekspreceding WorldWar I. But thedata
havebeenputintoquantitative formin a waythatdoesnotproduce
accuratemeasuresof perceptions and thatmakesit
and intentions
to
impossible gather useful on
evidence misperception.1
The secondgroupoftheorists whohaveexplicitly
dealtwithgeneral
questionsofmisperceptionin international
relations of those,
consists
likeCharlesOsgood,AmitaiEtzioni,and,to a lesserextent,
Kenneth
Bouldingand J.David Singer,who have analyzedthe cold war in
* I am grateful to theHarvardCenterforInternational Affairsforresearchsupport.
An earlierversionof this researchnote was presentedat the International Studies
Associationpanel of the New England PoliticalScience Associationin April i967.
I have benefited fromcommentsby RobertArt,AlexanderGeorge,Paul Kecskemeti,
Paul Leary, Thomas Schelling,JamesSchlesinger,Morton Schwartz,and Aaron
Wildavskv.
1 See, forexample,Ole Holsti,RobertNorth,and RichardBrody,"Perception and
Politics
International
Actionin the I9I4 Crisis,"in J. David Singer,ed., Quantitative
(New York i968). For a fullerdiscussionof theStanfordcontentanalysisstudiesand
thegeneralproblemsof quantification, Studyof
see my "The Costsof theQuantitative
InternationalRelations,"in Klaus Knorrand JamesN. Rosenau,eds., Contending Ap-
proachesto InternationalPolitics(forthcoming).
HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION 455
termsof a spiralof misperception.2 This approachgrowspartlyout of
themathematical theoriesof L. F. Richardson3and partlyout of find-
ings of social and cognitivepsychology, many of which will be dis-
cussedin thisresearchnote.
These authorsstatetheircase in general,if not universal,terms,but
do not providemanyhistoricalcases thatare satisfactorily explained
by theirtheories.Furthermore, they do not deal with any of the
numerousinstancesthatcontradicttheirnotionof the self-defeating
aspectsof the use of power.They ignorethe factthatstatesare not
individualsand that the findingsof psychologycan be applied to
organizations onlywith greatcare. Most important, theirtheoretical
analysisis forthemostpartofreducedvaluebecauseit seemslargelyto
be a productof theirassumptionthatthe SovietUnion is a basically
status-quo powerwhoseapparently behavioris a productof
aggressive
fearof theWest.Yet theysupplylittleor no evidenceto supportthis
view. Indeed,the explanationforthe differences of opinionbetween
thespiraltheoristsand theproponents ofdeterrenceliesnotin differing
generalviewsof international relations, valuesand morality,4
differing
or differingmethodsof analysis,5 but in differing
perceptions of Soviet
intentions.
II. THEORIES-NECESSARY AND DANGEROUS
Despitethelimitations of theirapproach,thesewritershave touched

on a vitalproblemthathas not been given systematic treatmentby
ofinternational
theorists relations.The evidencefrombothpsychology
and history overwhelmingly supportstheview (which maybe labeled
Hypothesis i) thatdecision-makers tend to fitincominginformation
into theirexistingtheoriesand images. Indeed, theirtheoriesand
imagesplay a large part in determining what theynotice.In other
words,actorstend to perceivewhat theyexpect.Furthermore(Hy-
pothesisia), a theorywill have greaterimpacton an actor'sinterpreta-
tionof data (a) the greaterthe ambiguityof the data and (b) the
2See, for example,Osgood,An Alternative to War or Surrender(Urbana i962);
Etzioni,The Hard Wayto Peace (New York i962); Boulding,"NationalImagesand
International Systems,"Journalof ConflictResolution,iii (June I959), I20-3I; and
Singer,Deterrence, ArmsControl,and Disarmament(Columbusi962).
3 Statistics
of Deadly Quarrels(Pittsburghi960) and Armsand Insecurity (Chicago
i960). For nonmathematicians a finesummaryof Richardson's workis AnatolRapo-
port's"L. F. Richardson's Mathematical Theoryof War," journal of ConflictReso-
lution,I (SeptemberI957), 249-99.
4 See PhilipGreen,Deadly Logic (Columbusi966); Green,"Methodand Substance
in theArmsDebate,"WorldPolitics,xvi (Julyi964), 642-67;and RobertA. Levine,
"Fact and Moralsin theArmsDebate,"WorldPolitics,xiv (Januaryi962), 239-58.
5 See AnatolRapoport, Strategy and Conscience(New York i964).
456 WORLD POLITICS
higher thedegreeofconfidence withwhichtheactorholdsthetheory.6
Formanypurposes we canusetheconcept ofdiffering levelsofper-
ceptualthresholds to deal withthefactthatit takesmore,and more
unambiguous, information foran actorto recognizean unexpected
phenomenon thanan expectedone. An experiment by Brunerand
Postmandetermined "thattherecognition threshold for. . . incon-
gruousplayingcards(thosewithsuitsand colorreversed)is sig-
nificantlyhigherthanthethreshold fornormalcards."7 Not onlyare
peopleable to identify normal(and therefore expected)cardsmore
quicklyandeasilythanincongruous (and therefore unexpected) ones,
butalsotheymayat first takeincongruous cardsfornormalones.
However, we shouldnotassume, as thespiraltheorists oftendo,that
it is necessarilyirrational
foractorsto adjustincoming information to
fitmorecloselytheirexisting beliefsand images.("Irrational" here
describes actingunderpressures thatthe actorwouldnot admitas
legitimate ifhewereconscious ofthem.)AbelsonandRosenberg label
as "psycho-logic" thepressure to createa "balanced"cognitive struc-
ture-i.e.,onein which"all relations among'goodelements' [in one's
attitude structure] are positive(or null), all relationsamong'bad
elements' are positive(or null), and all relations betweengood and
bad elements are negative(or null)." Theycorrectly showthatthe
"reasoning [thisinvolves] wouldmortify a logician."'Butthosewho
havetriedto applythisand similarcognitive theories to international
relationshaveusuallyoverlooked thefactthatin manycasesthereare
important logicallinksbetweentheelements and theprocesses they
describe whichcannotbe called"psycho-logic." (I am hereusingthe
term"logical"not in thenarrowsenseof drawingonlythosecon-
clusionsthatfollownecessarily fromthepremises, butratherin the
senseofconforming to generallyagreed-upon rulesforthetreating of
evidence.) For example, Osgoodclaimsthatpsycho-logic is displayed
whentheSovietspraisea manor a proposaland peoplein theWest
reactbydistrusting theobjectof thispraise.'Butif a personbelieves
thattheRussiansareaggressive, it is logicalforhimto be suspicious
oftheirmoves.Whenwe saythata decision-maker "dislikes"another
6 Floyd Allport,Theoriesof Perceptionand the Conceptof Structure(New York
1955), 382; Ole Holsti, "CognitiveDynamicsand Images of the Enemy,"in David
Finlay,Ole Holsti,and RichardFagen,Enemiesin Politics(Chicago i967), 70.
Brunerand Leo Postman,"On thePerceptions
7 Jerome A Paradigm,"
ofIncongruity:
(Durham,N.C.,
in JeromeBrunerand David Krech,eds.,Perceptionand Personality
I949), 2IO.
8 RobertAbelsonand MiltonRosenberg, BehavioralScience,
"SymbolicPsycho-logic,"
iII (JanuaryI958), 4-5.
9 P. 27.
statethisusuallymeansthathebelieves thatthatotherstatehaspolicies
conflictingwiththoseofhisnation.Reasoning andexperience indicate
tothedecision-maker thatthe"disliked" stateis apttoharmhisstate's
interests.Thus in thesecases thereis no need to invoke"psycho-
logic,"andit cannotbe claimedthatthecasesdemonstrate thesubsti-
tution of"emotional consistencyforrational consistency.'"10
The question oftherelations amongparticular beliefs andcognitions
canoften beseenas partofthegeneral topicoftherelation ofincoming
bitsof information to thereceivers' alreadyestablished images.The
needtofitdataintoa widerframework ofbeliefs, evenifdoingso does
notseemtodo justicetoindividual facts,is not,or at leastis notonly,
a psychologicaldrivethatdecreases theaccuracy ofourperceptions of
theworld,butis "essential to thelogicofinquiry."1 Factscan be in-
terpreted,and indeedidentified, onlywiththeaid ofhypotheses and
theories.Pureempiricism is impossible, and it wouldbe unwiseto
revisetheoriesin thelightof everybitof information thatdoesnot
easilyconform tothem.12 No hypothesis canbe expected toaccount for
all theevidence,
andifa prevailing viewis supported bymanytheories
andbya largepoolof findings it shouldnotbe quicklyaltered. Too
canbe as bad as toomuch.13
littlerigidity
Thisis as truein thebuildingofsocialand physical scienceas it is
10ibid., 26.
11I haveborrowedthisphrasefromAbrahamKaplan,who uses it in a different but
relatedcontextin The Conductof Inquiry(San Franciscoi964), 86.
12 The spiraltheorists
are not theonlyonesto ignorethelimitsof empiricism. Roger
Hilsmanfoundthatmostconsumers and producers of intelligence feltthatintelligence
shouldnot deal withhypotheses, but shouldonlyprovidethe policy-makers with "all
the facts"(StrategicIntelligenceand National Decisions [Glencoe I956], 46). The
closeinterdependence betweenhypotheses and factsis overlookedpartlybecauseof the
tendency to identify"hypotheses" with "policypreferences."
13 Karl Deutschinterestinglydiscussesa relatedquestionwhenhe argues,"Autonomy
. requiresbothintakefromthe presentand recallfrommemory,and selfhoodcan
be seenin just thiscontinuous balancingof a limitedpresentand a limitedpast....
No further is possibleif eitheropennessor memoryis lost.. . . To
self-determination
theextentthat[systems ceaseto be able to takein new information], theyapproachthe
behaviorof a bulletor torpedo:theirfutureactionbecomesalmostcompletely de-
termined by theirpast.On theotherhand,a personwithoutmemory, an organization
withoutvaluesor policy. . . -all theseno longersteer,but drift:theirbehaviorde-
pends littleon theirpast and almostwhollyon theirpresent.Driftwoodand the
bulletare thuseach theepitomeof anotherkindof loss of self-control . . ." (National-
ism and Social Communication [Cambridge, Mass., I954], i67-68). Also see Deutsch's
The Nervesof Government (New York i963), 98-I09, 200-256. A physicist makes a
similarargument:"It is clearthatif one is too attachedto one's preconceived model,
one will miss all radicaldiscoveries.It is amazing to what degreeone may fail to
registermentally an observationwhichdoes notfittheinitialimage.... On theother
hand,if one is too open-minded and pursueseveryhithertounknownphenomenon,
one is almostcertainto lose oneselfin trivia" (MartinDeutsch,"Evidenceand In-
ferencein NuclearResearch,"in Daniel Lerner,ed., Evidenceand Inference[Glencoe
I958], I02).
458 WORLD POLITICS
inpolicy-making.14 Whileitis terribly difficult
toknowwhena finding
throws seriousdoubton accepted theories and shouldbe followed up
and wheninsteadit was causedby experimental mistakesor minor
errors in thetheory,it is clearthatscientistswouldmakeno progress
iftheyfollowed ThomasHuxley'sinjunction to "sitdownbeforefact
as a merechild,be preparedto giveup everypreconceived notion,
followhumbly wherever natureleads,oryouwilllearnnothing."1
As MichaelPolanyiexplains, "Itistrueenoughthatthescientist must
be prepared to submitat anymoment to theadverseverdict of obser-
vationalevidence. Butnotblindly.... Thereis alwaysthepossibility
that,as in [thecasesoftheperiodic system ofelements and thequan-
tumtheory oflight],a deviation maynotaffect theessentialcorrectness
of a proposition....The processof explaining awaydeviations is in
factquiteindispensable to thedailyroutine ofresearch," eventhough
thismaylead to themissingof a greatdiscovery.16 For example,in
i795, theastronomer Lalandedidnotfollowup observations thatcon-
tradicted theprevailing hypotheses andcouldhaveledhimto discover
theplanetNeptune."7
Yet we shouldnot be too quick to condemnsuchbehavior.As
ThomasKuhnhasnoted,"Thereis no suchthingas research without
counter-instances."'8
If a setofbasictheories-what Kuhncallsa para-
digm-hasbeenable to accountfora massof data,it shouldnotbe
lightly with.As Kuhnputsit: "Lifelong
trifled resistance,
particularly
fromthosewhoseproductive careershavecommitted themtoan older
tradition ofnormalscience[i.e.,science within theaccepted paradigm],
is nota violation ofscientific standardsbutan indexto thenatureof
scientificresearchitself.The sourceofresistance is theassurance that
theolderparadigm willultimately solveall itsproblems, thatnature
14 Raymond Bauer,"Problemsof Perceptionand theRelationsBetweenthe U.S. and
theSovietUnion,"Journalof ConflictResolution,v (Septemberi96i), 223-29.
15 Quotedin W. L. B. Beveridge,
The ArtofScientific
Investigation,
3rd ed. (London
1957), 50.
16 Science,Faith,and Society(Chicago i964), 31. For a further discussionof this
problem,see ibid., i6, 26-41,90-94; Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London 1958), 8-I5,
30, 143-68, 269-98, 3Io-II; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution
(Chicago i964); Kuhn, "The Functionof Dogma in Scientific Research,"in A. C.
Crombie,ed., ScientificChange (New York 1963), 344-69;the commentson Kuhn's
paperby Hall, Polanyi,and Toulmin,and Kuhn's reply,ibid.,370-95.For a related
discussionof thesepointsfroma different perspective,see NormanStorer,The Social
Systemof Science(New York i960), ii6-22.
17 "He foundthattheposition of one starrelativeto others. . . had shifted.
Lalande
was a good astronomer and knew thatsucha shiftwas unreasonable. He crossedout
put a questionmarknextto the secondobservation,
his firstobservation, and let the
mattergo" (JeromeBruner,JacquelineGoodnow,and George Austin,A Study of
Thinking[New York i962], o05).
18 The Structureof Scientific
Revolution, 79.
canbe shovedintotheboxtheparadigm provides. at times
Inevitably,
ofrevolution, thatassurance seemsstubborn andpig-headed as indeed
itsometimes becomes. Butitis alsosomething more.Thatsameassur-
anceiswhatmakesnormalscience orpuzzle-solving sciencepossible."1
Thusitis important toseethatthedilemmaofhow"open"tobe to
newinformation is onethatinevitably plaguesanyattempt at under-
standing in anyfield.Instances in whichevidence seemstobe ignored
or twistedto fittheexisting theorycan oftenbe explainedby this
dilemmainsteadofby illogicalor nonlogical psychologicalpressures
toward consistency. Thisis especially trueofdecision-makers' attempts
toestimate theintentions ofotherstates, sincetheymustconstantly take
accountofthedangerthattheotherstateis trying to deceivethem.
The theoretical framework discussedthusfar,together with an
examination of manycases,suggests Hypothesis 2: scholars and de-
cision-makers areapttoerrbybeingtooweddedtotheestablished view
andtooclosedtonewinformation, as opposedto beingtoowillingto
altertheirtheories.20Another wayofmakingthispointis toarguethat
actorstendtoestablish theirtheories andexpectations prematurely. In
politics,
ofcourse, thisis often necessary becauseoftheneedforaction.
Butexperimental evidence indicates thatthesametendency alsooccurs
ontheunconscious level.Bruner andPostman foundthat"perhaps the
greatestsinglebarrier to therecognition ofincongruous stimuliis the
tendency forperceptual hypotheses tofixate after
receiving a minimum
ofconfirmation.... Once there had occurred in thesecasesa partial
confirmation ofthehypothesis ... itseemedthatnothing couldchange
thesubject's report."21
9lIbid.,150-5I.
20 Requirements of effectivepoliticalleadershipmay lead decision-makers to voice
fewerdoubtsthantheyhave aboutexistingpoliciesand images,but thisconstraint can
onlypartiallyexplainthisphenomenon. Similarcalculationsof politicalstrategymay
contribute to severalof the hypotheses discussedbelow.
21 P. 221. Similarly, in experiments dealingwith his subjects'perceptionof other
people,CharlesDailey foundthat "premature judgmentappearsto make new data
harderto assimilatethan when the observerwithholdsjudgmentuntil all data are
seen.It seemsprobable. . . thatthe observermistakeshis own inferences for facts"
("The Effects of PrematureConclusionUpon the Acquisitionof Understanding of a
Person,"Journalof Psychology, xxx [January1952], I49-50). For othertheoryand
evidenceon thispoint,see Bruner,"On PerceptualReadiness,"Psychological Review,
LXIV (March I957), 123-52; Gerald Davidson, "The NegativeEffectsof Early Ex-
posureto SuboptimalVisual Stimuli,"Journalof Personality, xxxii (Junei964), 278-
95; AlbertMyers,"An ExperimentalAnalysisof a Tactical Blunder,"Journalof
Abnormaland SocialPsychology, LXIX (Novemberi964), 493-98;and Dale Wyattand
Donald Campbell,"On theLiabilityof Stereotype or Hypothesis,"Journalof Abnormal
and Social Psychology, XLIV (October 1950), 496-500. It should be noted that this
tendencymakes "incremental" decision-making more likely(David Braybrookeand
CharlesLindblom,A Strategyof Decision [New York i963]), but the resultsof this
processmaylead theactorfurther fromhis goals.
460 WORLD POLITICS
However,when we apply theseand otherfindingsto politicsand

discusskindsof misperception, we shouldnot quicklyapplythe label
of cognitivedistortion. We shouldproceedcautiouslyfortwo related
reasons.The firstis that the evidenceavailable to decision-makers
almostalwayspermitsseveralinterpretations. It shouldbe notedthat
thereare casesof visualperceptionin whichdifferent stimulican pro-
duce exactlythe same patternon an observer'sretina.Thus, for an
observer usingoneeyethesamepatternwouldbe producedby a sphere
thesize of a golfball whichwas quite closeto theobserver, by a base-
ball-sizedspherethatwas further away,or by a basketball-sized sphere
stillfurtheraway. Withoutotherclues,the observercannotpossibly
determinewhichof thesestimulihe is presentedwith,and we would
notwantto call his incorrect perceptions examplesof distortion. Such
cases,relativelyrarein visualperception, are frequentin international
relations.The evidenceavailableto decision-makers is almostalways
veryambiguoussinceaccuratecluesto others'intentions are surround-
ed bynoise22 and deception.In mostcases,no matterhow long,deeply,
and "objectively" the evidenceis analyzed,people can differin their
interpretations,and there are no general rules to indicatewho is
correct.
The secondreasonto avoid the label of cognitivedistortion is that
the distinctionbetweenperceptionand judgment,obscureenoughin
individualpsychology, is almostabsentin the makingof inferences in
international politics.Decision-makerswho reject informationthat
contradictstheirviews-or who developcomplexinterpretations ofit-
oftendo so consciouslyand explicitly.Since the evidenceavailable
containscontradictory information, to make any inferencesrequires
thatmuch information be ignoredor given interpretations thatwill
seemtortuousto thosewho hold a different position.
Indeed,ifwe consideronlytheevidenceavailableto a decision-maker
at the timeof decision,the view laterprovedincorrectmay be sup-
portedby as much evidenceas the correctone-or even by more.
Scholarshave oftenbeen too unsympathetic withthepeoplewho were
provedwrong.On closerexamination, it is frequentlydifficultto point
todifferences betweenthosewho wererightand thosewho werewrong
withrespectto theiropennessto new information and willingnessto
modifytheirviews.WinstonChurchill,for example,did not open-
mindedlyvieweach Nazi actionto see if theexplanations providedby
theappeasersaccountedforthedatabetterthanhis ownbeliefs.Instead,
22 For a use of this conceptin politicalcommunication,
see RobertaWohlstetter,
Pearl Harbor (Stanfordi962).
likeChamberlain, he fitted eachbitofambiguous information intohis

ownhypotheses. Thathewascorrect shouldnotleadus tooverlook the
factthathismethods ofanalysis anduseoftheory toproducecognitive
consistencydidnotbasically differfromthoseoftheappeasers.23
A consideration of the importance of expectations in influencing
perceptionalsoindicates thatthewidespread beliefin theprevalence of
"wishful thinking"maybe incorrect, or at leastmaybe basedon in-
adequatedata.The psychological literatureon theinteraction between
affectand perception is immenseand cannotbe treatedhere,butit
shouldbe notedthatphenomena thatat first wereconsidered strong
evidencefortheimpactof affect on perception oftencan be better
treatedas demonstrating the influence of expectations.24 Thus, in
relations,
international casesliketheUnitedStates'misestimation ofthe
climate
political in CubainAprili96i, whichmayseemat first glance
tohavebeeninstances ofwishful thinking, mayinsteadbe moreade-
quatelyexplainedby thetheories heldby thedecision-makers (e.g.,
Communist governments areunpopular). Of course, desiresmayhave
an impactonperception byinfluencing expectations,butsinceso many
otherfactors affect
expectations, thenetinfluence desiresmaynot
of
begreat.
Thereis evidence frombothpsychology25 andinternational relations
thatwhenexpectations anddesires clash,expectations seemtobe more
important.TheUnitedStateswouldliketobelievethatNorthVietnam
is aboutto negotiate or thattheUSSR is readyto giveup whatthe
UnitedStatesbelieves is itsgoalofworlddomination, butambiguous
RobertCoulondre,theFrenchambassadorto Berlinin 1939, was one of
23 Similarly,
thefewdiplomatsto appreciatetheNazi threat.Partlybecauseof his earlierservicein
theUSSR, "he was painfully sensitiveto thethreatof a Berlin-Moscow agreement. He
notedwithforeboding thatHitlerhad not attackedRussia in his Reichstagaddress
of April28.... So it wentall springand summer,the ambassadorrelayingeach new
evidenceof the impendingdiplomaticrevolutionand adding to his admonitionshis
pleasfordecisivecounteraction"(FranklinFord and Carl Schorske,"The Voice in the
Wilderness:RobertCoulondre,"in GordonCraig and Felix Gilbert,eds., The Diplo-
mats,Vol. III [New York i963] 573-74).His hypotheses werecorrect,but it is difficult
betweenthe way he and thoseambassadorswho were incorrect,
to detectdifferences
likeNevilleHenderson,selectivelynotedand interpreted However,to the
information.
extentthatthefearof war influenced of Hitler'sintentions,
the appeasers'perceptions
theappeasers'viewsdid have an elementof psycho-logic thatwas not presentin their
opponents' position.
24See, for example,Donald Campbell,"SystematicError on the Part of Human
Links in Communications Information
Systems," and Control,i (1958), 346-50; and
Leo Postman,"The Experimental in
Analysisof MotivationalFactorsin Perception,"
JudsonS. Brown,ed., CurrentTheoryand Researchin Motivation(Lincoln,Neb.,
I953), 59-I08.
25Dale Wyattand Donald Campbell,"A Studyof Interviewer Bias as Relatedto
Expectations
Interviewer's Journalof Opinionand
and Own Opinions,"International
AttitudeResearch,iv (SpringI950), 77-83.
462 WORLD POLITICS
evidenceis seento confirm theoppositeconclusion,

whichconforms
totheUnitedStates'expectations. sensi-
Actorsareapttobe especially
tiveto evidenceofgravedangeriftheythinktheycan takeactionto
protectthemselvesagainstthemenaceonceithasbeendetected.
III. SAFEGUARDS
Can anything thenbe said to scholarsand decision-makers other
than"Avoidbeingeither tooopenortooclosed, butbe especially aware
ofthelatterdanger"?Although decision-makers willalwaysbe faced
and
withambiguous confusing evidenceand will be forcedto make
inferences aboutotherswhichwill oftenbe inaccurate, a numberof
safeguards maybe suggested whichcouldenablethemto minimize
theirerrors.First,andmostobvious, decision-makers shouldbe aware
thattheydo notmake"unbiased" interpretationsof eachnewbitof
incoming information, butrather areinevitably heavilyinfluenced by
thetheories theyexpectto be verified. Theyshouldknowthatwhat
mayappeartothemas a self-evident andunambiguous inference often
seemsso onlybecauseoftheirpreexisting beliefs.To someonewitha
differenttheory thesamedata mayappearto be unimportant or to
supportanotherexplanation. Thus manyeventsprovideless inde-
pendent support forthedecision-makers' imagesthantheymayat first
realize.Knowledgeof thisshouldlead decision-makers to examine
morecloselyevidence thatothers believecontradictstheirviews.
Second,decision-makers shouldsee if theirattitudes containcon-
sistentorsupporting beliefsthatarenotlogically linked.Thesemaybe
examples oftruepsycho-logic. Whileit is notlogically surprising nor
is itevidenceofpsychological pressurestofindthatpeoplewhobelieve
thatRussiais aggressive areverysuspicious ofanySovietmove,other
kindsofconsistency aremoresuspect. For example, mostpeoplewho
feelthatitisimportant fortheUnitedStatestowinthewarinVietnam
alsofeelthata meaningful victoryis possible.
And mostpeoplewho
feeldefeatwouldneither endanger U.S. nationalsecurity norbe costly
in termsofothervaluesalsofeelthatwe cannotwin.Although there
areimportant logicallinkages between thetwopartsofeachofthese
views(especially through theoriesof guerrilla
warfare), theydo not
seemstrong enoughto explainthedegreeto whichtheopinionsare
correlated.Similarly, in Finlandin thewinterof 1939,thosewhofelt
thatgraveconsequences wouldfollowFinnishagreement togiveRussia
a military base also believedthatthe Sovietswouldwithdraw their
demandif Finlandstoodfirm.And thosewho feltthatconcessions
wouldnotleadtolossofmajorvaluesalsobelievedthatRussiawould
fightifneedbe.26In thiscountry, thosewhofavored a nucleartestban

tendedto arguethatfalloutwas veryharmful, thatonlylimitedim-
provements in technology wouldflowfromfurther andthata
testing,
testbanwouldincrease thechancesforpeaceandsecurity. Thosewho
opposedthetestbanwereapttodisagree on all threepoints.Thisdoes
notmean,of course,thatthepeopleholdingsuchsetsof supporting
viewswerenecessarily wrongin anyone element.The Finnswho
wantedtomakeconcessions totheUSSR wereprobably correctinboth
partsof theirargument. Butdecision-makers shouldbe suspicious if
theyholda position in whichelements thatarenotlogically connected
support thesameconclusion. This condition is psychologicallycom-
fortableandmakesdecisions easiertoreach(sincecompeting valuesdo
nothavetobe balancedoffagainsteachother).The chancesarethus
considerable thatatleastpartofthereasonwhya personholdssomeof
theseviewsis relatedto psychology and notto thesubstance of the
evidence.
Decision-makers shouldalsobe awarethatactorswhosuddenly find
themselves havingan important sharedinterest withotheractors havea
tendency tooverestimate thedegreeofcommon interest
involved. This
tendency is especiallystrongforthoseactors(e.g.,theUnitedStates,
at leastbeforei950) whosebeliefsaboutinternational relations and
morality implythattheycan cooperate onlywith"good"statesand
thatwiththosestatestherewillbe no majorconflicts. On theother
hand,statesthathaveeithera tradition of limitedcooperation with
others(e.g.,Britain)or a strongly heldtheory thatdifferentiatesoc-
casionalfrompermanent allies27
(e.g.,theSovietUnion)findit easier
toresistthistendency andneednotdevotespecialefforts tocombating
itsdanger.
A thirdsafeguard fordecision-makers wouldbe to maketheiras-
sumptions, andthepredictions
beliefs, thatfollowfromthemas explicit
as possible.An actorshouldtrytodetermine, before eventsoccur,what
evidence wouldcountforand againsthistheories. By knowingwhat
to expecthe wouldknowwhattobe surprised by,and surprise could
indicate to thatactorthathisbeliefsneededreevaluation.28
A fourth safeguard is morecomplex. The decision-maker shouldtry
The Diplomacyof the WinterWar (Cambridge,Mass., i96i),
26Max Jacobson,
I36-39.
27RaymondAron,Peace and War (GardenCityi966), 29.
28
Cf. Kuhn, The Structureof ScientificRevolution,65. A fairlyhigh degree of
knowledgeis neededbeforeone can statepreciseexpectations. One indicationof the
relationstheoryis thatmostof us are not sure what "naturally"
lack of international
flowsfromour theoriesand what constitutes either"puzzles" to be furtherexplored
withtheparadigmor "anomalies"thatcastdoubton thebasictheories.
464 WORLD POLITICS
toprevent individuals
and organizations
fromlettingtheirmaintask,
political
future,andidentitybecometiedtospecific andimages
theories
of otheractors.29
If thisoccurs,subgoalsoriginally
soughtfortheir
contribution to higherendswill takeon value of theirown,and infor-
mationindicatingpossiblealternative routesto the originalgoals will
not be carefully considered.For example,the U.S. ForestServicewas
unableto carryout itsoriginalpurposeas effectively when it began to
seeitsdistinctive competence notin promoting thebestuse oflandsand
forests but ratherin preventing all typesof forestfires.30
Organizationsthatclaim to be unbiasedmay not realizethe extent
to whichtheirdefinition oftheirrolehas becomeinvolvedwithcertain
beliefsabouttheworld.Allen Dulles is a victimof thislack of under-
standingwhenhe says,"I grantthatwe are all creaturesof prejudice,
includingCIA officials, but by entrusting intelligencecoordinationto
our centralintelligence service,whichis excludedfrompolicy-making
and is marriedto no particularmilitaryhardware,we can avoid, to
the greatestpossibleextent,the bending of factsobtainedthrough
intelligence to suit a particularoccupationalviewpoint."31 This state-
mentoverlooksthe factthatthe CIA has developeda certainview of
international relationsand of the cold war whichmaximizesthe im-
portanceof its information-gathering, espionage,and subversive activ-
ities.SincetheCIA would lose itsuniqueplace in thegovernment if it
were decidedthatthe "back alleys"of worldpoliticswere no longer
vitalto U.S. security,it is notsurprisingthattheorganization interprets
information in a waythatstresses thecontinuedneedforitstechniques.
Fifth,decision-makers should realize the validityand implications
of RobertaWohlstetter's argumentthat "a willingnessto play with
materialfromdifferent anglesand in thecontextof unpopularas well
as popularhypotheses is an essentialingredientof a good detective,
whethertheend is thesolutionofa crimeor an intelligence estimate."32
However,it is oftendifficult, psychologicallyand politically,for any
one personto do this.Since a decision-maker usuallycannotget "un-
biased" treatments of data, he should insteadseek to structurecon-
flictingbiasesintothedecision-making process.The decision-maker, in
otherwords,shouldhave devil'sadvocatesaround.Justas, as Neustadt
pointsout,33 thedecision-maker will wantto createconflictsamonghis
29 See PhilipSelznick,Leadershipin Administration (EvanstonI957).
30 AshleySchiff, Fire and Water:Scientific
Heresyin theForestService(Cambridge,
Mass.,i962). Despiteits title,thisbook is a fascinatingand valuablestudy.
31 The Craftof Intelligence (New York i963), 53.
32 P. 302. See Beveridge,
93,fora discussionof theidea thatthescientist
shouldkeep
in mind as manyhypotheses as possiblewhen conductingand analyzingexperiments.
33Presidential Power (New York i960).
subordinatesin ordertomakeappropriate so he willalsowant
choices,
toensurethatincoming informationis examined frommanydifferent
withmanydifferent
perspectives hypotheses in mind.To someextent
thiskindof examination willbe doneautomatically through thedi-
vergenceofgoals,training, experience,and information thatexistsin
anylargeorganization. Butin manycasesthisdivergence willnotbe
sufficient.
The viewsof thoseanalyzingthe data will stillbe too
homogeneous, and thedecision-maker willhaveto go outofhisway
notonlytocultivate buttocreatediffering viewpoints.
Whileall thatwouldbe neededwouldbe tohavesomepeopleexam-
iningthedatatrying tovalidateunpopular hypotheses,it wouldprob-
ablybe moreeffective iftheyactuallybelievedandhad a stakein the
views theywere tryingto support.If in I94I someonehad had the
task of provingthe view thatJapanwould attackPearl Harbor,the
government mighthave been less surprisedby the attack.And onlya
personwho was out to show thatRussiawould take objectively great
riskswould have been apt to note thatseveralships with especially
largehatchesgoingto Cuba wereridinghigh in thewater,indicating
thepresenceof a bulkybut lightcargothatwas not likelyto be any-
thingotherthanstrategicmissiles.And manypeople who doubtthe
wisdomof the administration's Vietnampolicywould be somewhat
reassuredif therewere people in the government who searchedthe
statements and actionsof both sidesin an effortto provethatNorth
Vietnamwas willingto negotiateand thattheofficial of
interpretation
such movesas the Communistactivitiesduringthe Tet truceof i967
was incorrect.
Of courseall thesesafeguardsinvolvecosts.They would divertre-
sourcesfromothertasksand would increaseinternaldissension.De-
termining whetherthesecostswouldbe worththegainswould depend
on a detailedanalysisofhow thesuggestedsafeguards mightbe imple-
mented.Even if theywere adoptedby a government, of course,they
would not eliminatethe chanceof misperception. However,the safe-
guardswouldmakeit morelikelythatnationaldecision-makers would
makeconsciouschoicesaboutthewaydatawereinterpreted ratherthan
merelyassumingthattheycan be seenin onlyone way and can mean
only one thing.Statesmenwould thus be remindedof alternative
imagesof othersjust as theyare constantly remindedof alternative
policies.
These safeguards are partlybased on Hypothesis3: actorscan more
easilyassimilateintotheirestablishedimageof anotheractorinforma-
tion contradictingthatimage if the information is transmitted and
466 WORLD POLITICS
bitbybitthanif it comesall at once.In theformer
considered case,
eachpieceofdiscrepantdatacanbe copedwithas it arrivesand each
of theconflicts
withtheprevailing viewwillbe smallenoughto go
unnoticed,
tobe dismissedas unimportant, at mosta
or to necessitate
of theimage(e.g.,additionof exceptions
slightmodification to the
rule).Whentheinformation in a block,thecontradiction
arrives be-
tweenit and theprevailingviewis apt to be muchclearerand the
probability
of majorcognitive willbe higher.
reorganization
IV. SOURCES OF CONCEPTS
An actor'sperceptual thresholds-and thusthe imagesthatam-

biguousinformationis apttoproduce-areinfluenced bywhathe has
experiencedandlearned about.34Ifoneactoris toperceivethatanother
in he
fits a givencategory mustfirst have,or develop,
a conceptfor
thatcategory.We can usefully distinguishthreelevelsat whicha
conceptcanbe present or absent.First,theconceptcanbe completely
missing.
The actor'scognitivestructure maynotincludeanything cor-
respondingto thephenomenon This situation
he is encountering. can
occurnotonlyin sciencefiction, butalsoin a worldofrapidchange
orin themeetingoftwodissimilar systems. ThusChina'simageofthe
Western worldwasextremely inaccurate inthemid-nineteenth century,
herlearningwasveryslow,andherresponses werewoefully inadequate.
The Westwasspareda similar struggle onlybecauseithad thepower
to reshapethesystem it encountered. Once theactorclearlyseesone
instanceofthenewphenomenon, he is apttorecognizeit muchmore
quicklyin thefuture.35Second,theactorcan knowabouta concept
butnotbelievethatitreflects
an actualphenomenon. ThusCommunist
andWestern decision-makersareeachawareoftheother's explanation
ofhow his system functions, butdo notthinkthattheconceptcor-
34Most psychologists argue that thisinfluencealso holds for perceptionof shapes.
For data showingthatpeoplein different societiesdifferin respectto theirpredispo-
sitionto experiencecertainopticalillusionsand for a convincingargumentthatthis
difference can be explainedby the societies'different physicalenvironments, which
have led theirpeople to developdifferent patternsof drawinginferences fromam-
biguousvisual cues, see MarshallSegall,Donald Campbell,and MelvilleHerskovits,
The Influence of Culture on Visual Perceptions (Indianapolisi966).
35Thus when Brunerand Postman'ssubjectsfirstwere presented withincongruous
playingcards (i.e., cardsin whichsymbolsand colorsof the suitswerenot matching,
producingred spades or black diamonds),long exposuretimeswere necessaryfor
correctidentification.But once a subjectcorrectlyperceivedthe card and added this
typeof card to his repertoire he was able to identify
of categories, otherincongruous
cards much more quickly.For an analogousexample-in this case, changesin the
analysisof aerial reconnaissance photographsof an enemy'ssecretweapons-testing
producedby thebeliefthata previously
facilities unknownobjectmaybe present-see
David Irving,The Mare's Nest (Bostoni964), 66-67, 274-75.
responds toreality. Communist elites,furthermore, denythatanything

couldcorrespond to thedemocracies' description ofthemselves. Third,
theactormayholda concept, butnotbelievethatanother actorfillsit
at thepresent moment. ThustheBritish and Frenchstatesmen ofthe
I930's helda concept ofstates withunlimited ambitions. Theyrealized
thatNapoleons werepossible, buttheydidnotthinkHitlerbelonged in
thatcategory. Hypothesis 4 distinguishesthesethreecases:mispercep-
tionismostdifficult tocorrect inthecaseofa missing concept andleast
difficultto correct in thecaseofa recognized butpresumably unfilled
concept. All otherthingsbeingequal (e.g.,thedegreeto whichthe
concept is centralto theactor'scognitive structure), thefirstcasere-
quiresmorecognitive reorganization thandoes thesecond,and the
secondrequires morereorganization thanthethird.
However, thishypothesis doesnotmeanthatlearning willnecessarily
be slowestin thefirst case,forif thephenomena newthe
are totally
actormaymake suchgrosslyinappropriate responses thathe will
quicklyacquireinformation clearlyindicating thathe is facedwith
something he doesnotunderstand. And thesoonertheactorrealizes
thatthings arenot-or maynotbe-whattheyseem,thesoonerhe is
apttocorrect hisimage.36
Threemainsources contribute to decision-makers' conceptsofinter-
nationalrelations and of otherstatesand influence thelevelof their
perceptual thresholds forvariousphenomena. First,an actor'sbeliefs
abouthis owndomestic politicalsystem are apt to be important. In
somecases,likethatoftheUSSR,thedecision-makers' conceptsaretied
toan ideology thatexplicitly provides a frameofreference forviewing
foreign affairs.Evenwherethisisnotthecase,experience withhisown
system willpartly determine whattheactoris familiar withandwhat
he is aptto perceive in others. LouisHartzclaims,"It is theabsence
oftheexperience ofsocialrevolution whichis attheheartofthewhole
American dilemma....In a wholeseriesofspecific waysitenters into
ourdifficulty ofcommunication withtherestoftheworld.We findit
difficultto understand Europe's'socialquestion'.. . . We are notfa-
miliarwiththedeepersocialstruggles ofAsia and hencetendto in-
terpret evenreactionary regimes as 'democratic.' "3 Similarly,George
Kennanarguesthatin WorldWarI theAlliedpowers, andespecially
America, couldnotunderstand thebitterness and violenceof others'
internal conflicts:". . . The inabilityoftheAlliedstatesmen topicture
tothemselves thepassions oftheRussiancivilwar [waspartlycaused
86 Brunerand Postman,220.
37 The LiberalTradition
in America(New York I955), 306.
468 WORLD POLITICS
bythefactthat]we represent ... a societyin whichthemanifestations
ofevilhavebeencarefully buriedandsublimated in thesocialbehavior
of people,as in theirveryconsciousness. For thisreason,probably,
despiteour widelytraveledand outwardly cosmopolitan lives,the
mainsprings ofpoliticalbehavior in sucha country as Russiatendto
remainconcealed fromourvision."38
Second,concepts willbe supplied bytheactor'sprevious experiences.
An experiment fromanother fieldillustrates
this.Dearborn andSimon
presented businessexecutivesfromvariousdivisions(e.g., sales,ac-
counting,production) withthesamehypothetical dataandaskedthem
foran analysisand recommendations fromthe standpoint of what
wouldbe bestforthecompany as a whole.The executives'viewsheav-
ilyreflected theirdepartmental perspectives.39
WilliamW. Kaufmann
showshowtheperceptions ofAmbassador Joseph Kennedywereaf-
fectedbyhispast:"As befitted a former chairman of theSecurities
Exchangeand MaritimeCommissions, his primary interestlay in
economic matters....The revolutionary character oftheNazi regime
wasnota phenomenon thathecouldeasilygrasp.... Itwasfarsimpler,
andmorein accordwithhisownpremises, toexplainGermanaggres-
sivenessin economic terms.The ThirdReichwas dissatisfied, authori-
tarian,and expansive largelybecauseher economywas unsound.""0
Similarly it hasbeenarguedthatChamberlain was slowto recognize
Hitler'sintentions partly
becauseofthelimiting natureofhispersonal
background andbusiness experiences.41
The impactoftraining andex-
38 Russiaand the WestUnderLenin and Stalin (New York i962), I42-43.
9 DeWittDearbornand HerbertSimon,"SelectivePerception:A Note on the De-
partmental Identificationof Executives,"Sociometry, xxi (June I958), 140-44.
40 "Two American Ambassadors: Bullittand Kennedy,"in Craigand Gilbert,358-59.
41 Hugh Trevor-Roper putsthispointwell: "Broughtup as a businessman,successful
in municipalpolitics,[Chamberlain's]outlookwas entirelyparochial.EducatedCon-
servativearistocratslike Churchill,Eden, and Cranborne,whose familieshad long
been used to politicalresponsibility,
had seen revolutionand revolutionary leaders
before,in theirown history, and understoodthemcorrectly; but the Chamberlains,
who had runfromradicalimperialism to timidconservatism in a generation of lifein
Birmingham, had no such understanding of historyor the world: to themthe scope
of humanpoliticswas limitedby theirown parochialhorizons,and NevilleChamber-
lain couldnot believethatHitlerwas fundamentally differentfromhimself.If Cham-
berlainwantedpeace,so mustHitler" ("Munich-Its LessonsTen Years Later," in
Francis Loewenheim,ed., Peace or Appeasement?[Boston i965], 152-53). For a
similarview see A. L. Rowse,Appeasement(New York i963), 117.
But Donald Lammerspointsout thatthe viewsof manyprominent Britishpublic
figuresin theI930's do notfitthisgeneralization (ExplainingMunich[Stanfordi966],
13-140). Furthermore, argumentsthat stressthe importanceof the experiencesand
views of the actors'ancestorsdo not explainthe linksby which theseinfluencethe
actorsthemselves. Presumably Churchilland Chamberlain read the same history books
in schooland had the same basic information about Britain'spast role in the world.
Thus what has to be demonstrated is thatin theirhomes aristocrats like Churchill
learneddifferent thingsaboutpoliticsand humannaturethandid middle-class people
perience seemsto be demonstrated whenthebackground of theap-
peasersis compared to thatoftheiropponents. One difference stands
out:"A substantially higher percentage oftheanti-appeasers (irrespec-
tiveof classorigins)had thekindof knowledge whichcomesfrom
closeacquaintance, mainlyprofessional, withforeign affairs."42
Since
members ofthediplomatic corpsareresponsible formeeting threatsto
thenation'ssecurity before thesegrowto majorproportions and since
theyhavelearned aboutcasesinwhichaggressive stateswerenotrecog-
nizedas suchuntilverylate,theymaybe pronetointerpret ambiguous
dataas showingthatothersare aggressive. It shouldbe stressed that
we cannotsaythattheprofessionals of the I930'S weremoreapt to
makeaccurate judgments ofotherstates. Rather, theymayhavebeen
moresensitive to thechancethatothers wereaggressive. Theywould
thenrarely takean aggressor fora status-quo power,butwouldmore
oftenmaketheopposite error.43
Thusin theyearsbefore WorldWarI
the permanent officials
in the BritishForeignOfficeoverestimated
Germanaggressiveness.44
A paralleldemonstration in psychology oftheimpactoftraining on
perception is presented
byan experiment in whichambiguous pictures
wereshownto bothadvancedand beginning police-administration
students.The advanced groupperceived moreviolence in thepictures
thandid thebeginners. The probableexplanation is that"thelaw
enforcermaycometo acceptcrimeas a familiar personalexperience,
onewhichhe himself is notsurprised to encounter. The acceptance of
crimeas a familiar experience in turnincreasestheability orreadiness
toperceive violencewherecluesto it arepotentially available."45This
like Chamberlain and thattheseexperiences had a significant impact.Alternatively, it
could be argued that the patternsof child-rearing prevalentamong the aristocracy
influenced the children'spersonalities in a way thatmade themmore likelyto see
othersas aggressive.
42lbid.,i5.
43Duringa debateon appeasementin the House of Commons,Harold Nicolson
declared,"I knowthatthoseof us who believein thetraditions of our policy. . . who
believethatone greatfunction of thiscountryis to maintainmoralstandardsin Europe,
to maintaina settledpatternof international relations,not to makefriendswithpeople
who are demonstrably evil . . . -I knowthatthosewho hold suchbeliefsare accused
of possessing the ForeignOfficemind.I thankGod thatI possessthe ForeignOffice
mind"(quotedin MartinGilbert,The Rootsof Appeasement[New York i966], i87).
But thequalitiesNicolsonmentionsand applaudsmay be relatedto a morebasicattri-
buteof "theForeignOfficemind"-suspiciousness.
44GeorgeMonger,The End ofIsolation(London I963). I am also indebtedto Fred-
erickCollignonforhisunpublished manuscript and severalconversations on thispoint.
45Hans Toch and RichardSchulte,"Readinessto PerceiveViolenceas a Resultof
Police Training,"BritishJournalof Psychology, LII (Novemberi96i), 392 (original
italicsomitted).It shouldbe stressedthatone cannotsaywhetheror not theadvanced
policestudents perceivedthepictures"accurately." The pointis thattheirtrainingpre-
470 WORLD POLITICS
experiment lendsweightto theviewthattheBritish diplomats' sensi-
tivityto aggressivestateswas nottotally a product ofpersonnel selec-
tionprocedures.
A thirdsourceof concepts, whichfrequently will be themostdi-
rectlyrelevant to a decision-maker's perceptionof international rela-
tions,is international history. As HenryKissingerpointsout,one
reasonwhystatesmen wereso slowto recognize thethreatposedby
Napoleonwas thatpreviouseventshad accustomed themonlyto
actorswhowantedto modify theexistingsystem, notoverthrow it.46
The othersideofthecoinis evenmorestriking: historicaltraumas can
heavily influence futureperceptions.Theycaneitherestablish a state's
imageof theotherstateinvolvedor can be used as analogies.An
exampleoftheformer caseis provided bythefactthatforat leastten
yearsaftertheFranco-Prussian War mostof Europe'sstatesmen felt
thatBismarck had aggressive planswhenin facthismain goalwas to
protect thestatusquo. Of coursetheevidencewas ambiguous. The
pOst-187i Bismarckian maneuvers, whichweredesigned tokeeppeace,
lookednotunlikethepre-I871 maneuvers designed tosetthestagefor
war. But thatthepOst-187I maneuvers wereseen as indicating ag-
gressive plansis largelyattributabletotheimpactofBismarck's earlier
actions on thestatesmen's imageofhim.
A state'spreviousunfortunate experiencewitha typeofdangercan
sensitizeittootherexamples ofthatdanger. Whilethissensitivity may
leadthestatetoavoidthemistake itcommitted in thepast,itmayalso
lead it mistakenly to believethatthepresent situation is likethepast
one.Santayana's maximcouldbe turned around:"Thosewhoremem-
berthepastarecondemned to maketheopposite mistakes." As Paul
Kecskemeti shows,bothdefenders and criticsof the unconditional
surrender planoftheSecondWorldWarthought in termsofthecon-
ditionsofWorldWar L"47 Annette BakerFox foundthattheScandi-
naviancountries' policiesin WorldWarII werestrongly
neutrality in-
fluenced by theirexperiences in theprevious war,eventhoughvital
aspectsof thetwosituations weredifferent.Thus "Norway'ssuccess
[duringtheFirstWorldWar] in remaining non-belligerent though
Whetheron balancetheywould
disposedthemto see violencein ambiguoussituations.
make fewerperceptualerrorsand betterdecisionsis veryhard to determine.For an
experimentshowingthattrainingcan lead peopleto "recognize"an expectedstimulus
even when thatstimulusis in factnot shown,see IsraelGoldiamondand WilliamF.
Hawkins,"Vexierversuch: BetweenWord-Frequency
The Log Relationship and Recog-
nitionObtainedin the Absenceof StimulusWords,"Journalof ExperimentalPsy-
chology, LVI (December1958), 457-63.
46, WorldRestored(New York i964), 2-3.
47Strategic (New Yorki964),
Surrender 215-41.
pro-Alliedgave the Norwegiansconfidencethat theircountrycould
again stayout of war."48And the lessondrawnfromthe unfortunate
resultsof thispolicywas an important factorin Norway'sdecisionto
join NATO.
The applicationof the Munich analogy to variouscontemporary
eventshas been muchcommentedon, and I do not wish to arguethe
substantive pointsat stake.But it seemsclearthattheprobabilities that
any stateis facingan aggressorwho has to be met by forceare not
alteredby thecareerof Hitlerand thehistoryof the 1930's. Similarly
theprobability of an aggressor'sannouncinghis plans is not increased
(if anything,itis decreased)bythefactthatHitlerwroteMein Kampf.
Yet decision-makers are moresensitiveto thesepossibilities,and thus
moreapt to perceiveambiguousevidenceas indicatingtheyapply to
a given case, than theywould have been had therebeen no Nazi
Germany.
Historicalanalogies oftenprecede,ratherthan follow,a careful
analysisof a situation(e.g., Truman'sinitialreactionto the news of
theinvasionof SouthKorea was to thinkof the Japaneseinvasionof
Manchuria).Notingthisprecedence, however,does notshowus which
of many analogieswill come to a decision-maker's mind. Truman
couldhave thoughtof nineteenth-century Europeanwars thatwere of
no interest to the United States.Severalfactorshavingnothingto do
withtheeventunderconsideration influence whatanalogiesa decision-
makeris apt to make.One factoris thenumberof cases similarto the
analogywithwhichthedecision-maker is familiar.Anotheris theim-
portanceofthepast event to thepoliticalsystemofwhichthedecision-
makeris a part.The moretimessuchan eventoccurredand thegreater
its consequenceswere,the morea decision-maker will be sensitiveto
the particulardanger involvedand the more he will be apt to see
ambiguousstimulias indicatinganotherinstanceof thiskind of event.
A thirdfactoris the degreeof the decision-maker's personalinvolve-
mentin the past case-in time,energy,ego, and position.The last-
mentionedvariablewill affectnot onlythe event'simpacton the de-
cision-maker's cognitivestructure, but also the way he perceivesthe
eventand thelessonhe draws.Someonewho was involvedin getting
troopsinto South Korea afterthe attackwill rememberthe Korean
War differently fromsomeonewho was involvedin consideringthe
possibleuse of nuclearweaponsor in decidingwhat messagesshould
be sentto theChinese.Greaterpersonalinvolvement will usuallygive
theeventgreaterimpact,especiallyif the decision-maker's own views
48 The PowerofSmallStates(Chicago 1959), 8i.
472 WORLD POLITICS
werevalidated bytheevent.One neednotaccepta totalapplication of

learning theory tonations tobelievethat"nothing failslikesuccess."49
It also seemslikelythatif manycriticsarguedat thetimethatthe
decision-maker waswrong, hewillbe evenmoreapttoseeothersitua-
tionsin termsof theoriginalevent.For example,becauseAnthony
Edenleftthegovernment on accountofhisviewsandwaslatershown
tohavebeencorrect, he probably wasmoreaptto see as Hitlersother
leaderswithwhomhe had conflicts (e.g.,Nasser).A fourth factoris
thedegreeto whichtheanalogyis compatible withtherestof his
beliefsystem. A fifth is theabsenceofalternative concepts and analo-
gies.Individuals and statesvaryin theamountof director indirect
politicalexperience theyhavehad whichcan providedifferent ways
ofinterpreting data.Decision-makers who areawareofmultiple pos-
of
sibilities states'
intentions maybe lesslikelyto seizeon an analogy
prematurely. The perception of citizensof nationslike the United
Stateswhichhaverelatively littlehistoryofinternational politicsmay
be moreaptto be heavilyinfluenced by thefew major international
events thathavebeenimportant to theircountry.
The firstthreefactors indicatethatan eventis moreapt to shape
present perceptions ifit occurred in therecentrather thantheremote
past.If it occurred recently,the statesman will thenknowaboutit at
firsthandevenifhe was notinvolved in themakingofpolicyat the
time.Thusifgenerals areprepared tofight thelastwar,diplomats may
be prepared toavoidthelastwar.PartoftheAnglo-French reactionto
can
Hitler be explained the
by prevailing beliefsthattheFirstWorld
War was to a largeextentcausedby misunderstandings and could
havebeenavoidedbyfarsighted and nonbelligerent diplomacy. And
partoftheWestern perception ofRussiaand Chinacan be explained
bytheviewthatappeasement wasan inappropriate response toHitler.50
V. THE EVOKED SET

The waypeopleperceivedatais influenced
notonlybytheircogni-
andtheories
tivestructure aboutotheractorsbutalsobywhattheyare
concernedwithat thetimetheyreceivetheinformation.
Information
49WilliamInge, OutspokenEssays,FirstSeries (London I923), 88.
50 Of course,analogiesthemselvesare not "unmovedmovers."The interpretation
of pasteventsis not automaticand is informed by generalviewsof international rela-
tionsand complexjudgments. And just as beliefsaboutthe pastinfluence the present,
viewsaboutthe presentinfluence interpretationsof history.It is difficult
to determine
thedegreeto whichtheUnitedStates'interpretation of the reasonsit wentto war in
I9I7 influenced Americanforeignpolicyin the i920's and i930's and how much the
isolationismof thatperiodinfluencedthehistories of the war.
is evaluated in lightofthesmallpartoftheperson'smemory thatis

presently active-the"evokedset."Myperceptions of thedarkstreets
I passwalkinghomefromthemovieswillbe different if thefilmI
sawhaddealtwithspiesthanifithadbeena comedy. IfI amworking
on aidinga country's education system and I hearsomeonetalkabout
the need for economic development in thatstate,I am aptto thinkhe
is concerned witheducation, whereasif I had beenworkingon,say,
trying toachieve politicalstabilityin thatcountry, I wouldhaveplaced
hisremarks inthatframework.5'
ThusHypothesis 5 statesthatwhenmessages aresentfroma differ-
entbackground ofconcerns and information thanis possessed bythe
receiver,misunderstanding is likely.PersonA andpersonB willread
thesamemessagequitedifferently ifA has seenseveralrelatedmes-
sagesthatB doesnotknowabout.Thisdifference willbe compounded
if,as isfrequently thecase,A andB eachassumethattheotherhasthe
samebackground he does.This meansthatmisperception can occur
evenwhendeception is neither intended norexpected. Thus Roberta
Wohlstetter foundnotonlythatdifferent partsof theUnitedStates
government had different perceptions ofdataaboutJapan's intentions
and messages partlybecausetheysaw theincominginformation in
verydifferent contexts,butalsothatofficers in thefieldmisunderstood
warnings fromWashington: "Washington advisedGeneralShort[in
PearlHarbor]on November 27 to expect'hostileaction'at anymo-
ment,bywhichit meant'attackon American possessions fromwith-
out,'butGeneralShortunderstood thisphraseto mean'sabotage.' "52
Washington did notrealizetheextentto whichPearlHarborcon-

sideredthe dangerof sabotageto be primary, and furthermore it
incorrectlybelievedthatGeneralShorthad received theintercepts of
thesecret Japanese diplomatic messages availableinWashington which
indicated thatsurprise attackwas a distinct possibility.Another impli-
cationofthishypothesis is thatifimportant information is knownto
onlypartofthegovernment ofstateA andpartofthegovernment of
stateB,international messages may be misunderstood by those parts of
51For some psychological experiments on this subject,see JeromeBrunerand A.
Leigh Minturn,"PerceptualIdentification and PerceptualOrganization"Journalof
GeneralPsychology, LIII (JulyI955), 22-28; SeymourFeshbachand RobertSinger,
"The Effectsof Fear Arousaland Suppression of Fear Upon SocialPerception,"
journal
of Abnormaland Social Psychology, LV (NovemberI957), 283-88;and Elsa Sippoal,
"A GroupStudyof Some Effectsof Preparatory Sets,"PsychologyMonographs, XLVI,
No. 2IO (1935), 27-28. For a generaldiscussionof the importance of the perceiver's
evokedset,see Postman,87.
52 Pp. 73-74.
474 WORLD POLITICS
thereceiver's government thatdo notmatch,in theinformation they
have,thepartofthesender's government thatdispatchedthemessage.53
Two additional hypotheses canbe drawnfromtheproblems ofthose
sending messages. Hypothesis 6 statesthatwhenpeoplespenda great
dealoftimedrawing up a planormakinga decision, theytendtothink
thatthemessageaboutit theywishto conveywillbe clearto there-
ceiver.54
Sincetheyareawareofwhatis tothemtheimportant pattern
in theiractions,theyoftenfeelthatthepattern willbe equallyobvious
toothers, andtheyoverlook thedegreetowhichthemessageis appar-
enttothemonlybecausetheyknowwhattolookfor.Thosewhohave
not participated in the endlessmeetings maynot understand what
information thesenderis trying toconvey. GeorgeQuesterhas shown
howtheGermanand,to a lesserextent, theBritish desireto maintain
targetlimitson bombing in thefirsteighteen months ofWorldWar
II wasundermined partlybythefactthateachsideknewthelimitsit
was seekingand itsownreasonsforanyapparent "exceptions" (e.g.,
theGermanattackonRotterdam) andincorrectlyfeltthattheselimits
andreasons wereequallycleartotheotherside.55
Hypothesis 7 holdsthatactorsoftendo notrealizethatactionsin-
tendedtoproject a givenimagemaynothavethedesired effectbecause
theactionsthemselves do notturnoutas planned.Thusevenwithout
appreciable impactof different cognitivestructuresand backgrounds,
an actionmayconvey an unwanted message. Forexample, a country's
representativesmaynotfollowinstructions and so maygive others
impressions contrary tothosethehomegovernment wishedto convey.
The effortsofWashington andBerlintosettle theirdisputeoverSamoa
in thelatei88o'swerecomplicated bytheprovocative behavior oftheir
agentson thespot.Theseagentsnotonlyincreased theintensityofthe
localconflict,butled thedecision-makers to becomemoresuspicious
oftheotherstatebecausetheytendedto assumethattheiragentswere
obeying instructions andthattheactionsoftheothersiderepresented
policy.In suchcasesbothsideswill believethattheotheris
official
readinghostility intoa policyof theirswhichis friendly. Similarly,
53For example,Roger Hilsman pointsout, "Those who knew of the peripheral
reconnaissanceflightsthatprobedSovietair defensesduringthe Eisenhoweradmin-
istration
and theU-2 flightsovertheSovietUnion itself. . . werebetterable to under-
standsomeof the thingsthe Sovietswere sayingand doing thanpeoplewho did not
know of theseactivities"(To Move a Nation [GardenCity i9671, 66). But it is also
possiblethat thosewho knew about the U-2 flightsat timesmisinterpreted Soviet
messagesbyincorrectly believingthatthesenderwas influenced by,or at leastknewof,
theseflights.
54I am gratefulto ThomasSchellingfordiscussionon thispoint.
5DeterrenceBeforeHiroshima(New York i966), I05-22.
Quester'sstudyshowsthattheattempt to limitbombingreferred
to
abovefailedpartly sidewasabletobombas accurately
becauseneither
as itthoughtitcouldandthusdidnotrealizethephysical ofits
effects
actions.56
VI. FURTHER HYPOTHESES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PERCEIVER
Fromtheperspective oftheperceiver severalotherhypotheses seem

tohold.Hypothesis 8 is thatthereis an overalltendency fordecision-
makersto seeotherstatesas morehostilethantheyare.57 Thereseem
tobe morecasesofstatesmen incorrectly believingothers areplanning
majoractsagainsttheirinterest thanof statesmen beinglulledby a
potential aggressor.Thereare manyreasonsforthiswhichare too
complex to be treatedhere(e.g.,somepartsofthebureaucracy feelit
is theirresponsibility to be suspicious of all otherstates;decision-
makers often feeltheyare"playing itsafe"tobelieveandactas though
theotherstatewerehostilein questionable cases; and often,when
peopledo notfeeltheyare a threatto others, theyfindit difficult to
believethatothers mayseethemas a threat).It shouldbe noted,how-
ever,thatdecision-makers whoseperceptions are described by this
hypothesis would not necessarilyfurther theirown values bytrying to
correctforthistendency. The valuesof possibleoutcomes as well as
theirprobabilitiesmustbe considered, and it maybe thattheproba-
bilityof an unnecessary arms-tension cyclearisingout of mispercep-
tions,multiplied bythecostsof such a cycle,mayseemlesstodecision-
makersthantheprobability of incorrectly believinganotherstateis
friendly,multiplied bythecostsofthiseventuality.
Hypothesis 9 statesthatactorstendto see thebehavior of othersas
morecentralized, disciplined,andcoordinated thanitis.Thishypothe-
sisholdstrueinrelated ways.Frequently, toomanycomplex eventsare
squeezedintoa perceived Actorsarehesitant
pattern. to admitoreven
see thatparticular incidents cannotbe explainedby theirtheories.58
Thoseevents notcausedbyfactors thatareimportant partsoftheper-
ceiver'simageareoftenseenas thoughtheywere.Further, actorssee
othersas moreinternally unitedthantheyin factare and generally
overestimatethedegreetowhichothers arefollowing a coherent policy.
Thedegreetowhichtheotherside'spoliciesaretheproduct ofinternal
56Ibid.
57 different
For a slightly formulationof thisview,see Holsti,27.
58The Sovietsconsciouslyhold an extremeversionof thisview and seemto believe
See thediscussionin NathanLeites,A Studyof Bolshevism
thatnothingis accidental.
(GlencoeI953), 67-73.
476 WORLD POLITICS
bargaining,59internal misunderstandings, or subordinates' notfollow-

inginstructions isunderestimated. Thisis thecasepartly becauseactors
tendtobe unfamiliar withthedetailsofanother state'spolicy-making
processes.
Seeingonlythefinished product, theyfindit simpler to try
to constructa rationalexplanation forthepolicies, eventhoughthey
knowthatsuchan analysis couldnotexplaintheirownpolicies.60
Familiarityalsoaccounts forHypothesis io: becausea stategetsmost
ofitsinformation abouttheotherstate'spoliciesfromtheother's for-
ittendstotaketheforeign
eignoffice, office's positionforthestandof
theothergovernment as a whole.In manycasesthisperception will
be an accurateone,butwhentheothergovernment is dividedorwhen
theotherforeign is actingwithout
office specific authorization,misper-
ception mayresult. Forexample, partofthereasonwhyin i9i8 Allied
governments incorrectly thought "thattheJapanese werepreparing to
takeaction[in Siberia],if needbe,withagreement withtheBritish
and Frenchalone,disregarding theabsenceof Americanconsent,"6
wasthatAlliedambassadors had talkedmostly withForeignMinister
Motono,whowas amongtheminority of theJapanesle favoring this
policy.Similarly, America'sNATO alliesmayhavegainedan inac-
curatepicture ofthedegreeto whichtheAmerican government was
committed to theMLF becausethey had greatestcontactwithparts
ofthegovernment thatstronglyfavored theMLF. Andstates thattried
togetinformation aboutNazi foreign policyfromGermandiplomats
wereoftenmisledbecausetheseofficials weregenerally ignorant ofor
outofsympathy withHitler'splans.The Germansand theJapanese
sometimes purposely misinformed theirownambassadors in orderto
deceivetheirenemies moreeffectively.
Hypothesis ii states thatactorstendto overestimate thedegreeto
whichothers areactingin response to whattheythemselves do when
theothers behavein accordance withtheactor'sdesires;butwhenthe
behavior of theotheris undesired, it is usuallyseenas derivedfrom
internalforces. If theefectofanother's actionis to injureor threaten
59A. W. MarshallcriticizesWesternexplanationsof Soviet militaryposturefor
failingto take thisinto account.See his "Problemsof EstimatingMilitaryPower,"a
paper presentedat the i966 AnnualMeetingof the AmericanPoliticalScienceAsso-
ciation, i6.
60 It has also been notedthatin labor-management disputesboth sides may be apt
to believeincorrectly thatthe otheris controlledfromabove,eitherfromthe inter-
nationalunionoffice or fromthecompany's centralheadquarters (RobertBlake,Herbert
Shepard,and JaneMouton,ManagingIntergroup Conflict in Industry[Houstoni964],
i82). It has been furthernotedthatbothDemocraticand Republicanmembersof the
House tend to see the otherpartyas the one that is more disciplinedand united
(CharlesClapp,The Congressman [Washingtoni9631, I7-I9).
61GeorgeKennan,RussiaLeaves the War (New York i967), 484.
thefirstside,thefirst sideis aptto believethatsuchwas theother's

purpose.An exampleofthefirst partofthehypothesis is providedby
Kennan'saccountof theactivities of official
and unofficial
American
representatives who protested to the new Bolshevikgovernment
againstseveral ofitsactions. WhentheSovietschangedtheirposition,
theserepresentatives feltitwaslargely becauseoftheirinfluence.62
This
sortofinterpretation can be explained notonlyby thefactthatit is
gratifyingto theindividual makingit,butalso,takingtheotherside
ofthecoinmentioned inHypothesis 9,bythefactthattheactoris most
familiarwithhis own inputintothe other'sdecisionand has less
knowledge of otherinfluences. The secondpartof Hypothesis ii is
illustrated
bythetendency ofactorstobelievethatthehostilebehavior
ofothers is to be explained bytheotherside'smotives and notbyits
reactionto thefirst side.Thus Chamberlain did notsee thatHitler's
behavior was relatedin partto hisbeliefthattheBritish wereweak.
Morecommon is thefailure toseethattheothersideis reactingoutof
fearofthefirst side,whichcan lead to self-fulfillingprophecies and
of
spirals misperception andhostility.
Thisdifficultyis oftencompounded byan implication ofHypothesis
12: whenactors haveintentions thattheydo nottryto concealfrom
others,theytendto assumethatothersaccurately perceivethesein-
tentions.Onlyrarely do theybelievethatothersmaybe reacting to a
muchlessfavorable imageof themselves thantheythinktheyare
projecting.63
ForstateA to understand howstateB perceives A's policyis often
becausesuchunderstanding
difficult mayinvolvea conflict withA's
imageofitself. RaymondSontagarguesthatAnglo-German relations
before WorldWar I deteriorated partlybecause"theBritish did not
liketo think of themselves
as selfish,
or unwillingto tolerate
'legiti-
mate'German The Germans
expansion. didnotliketothinkofthem-
selvesas aggressive,
orunwillingtorecognize'legitimate'
Britishvested
interest."64
62 Ibid., 404, 408,500.
63HerbertButterfield notesthat theseassumptions can contribute
to the spiralof
"Hobbesianfear.. . . You yourselfmayvividlyfeelthe terriblefearthatyou have of
theotherparty, butyoucannotenterintotheotherman'scounter-fear, or evenunder-
standwhyhe shouldbe particularly nervous.For you know thatyou yourself mean
him no harm,and thatyou want nothingfromhim save guaranteesfor yourown
safety;and it is neverpossibleforyou to realizeor remember properlythatsincehe
cannotsee the insideof yourmind,he can neverhave the same assuranceof your
thatyou have" (History and Human Conflict [London I95I], 20).
intentions
64European Diplomatic History 187I-1932 (New York I933), I25. It takes great
mentaleffort to realizethatactionswhichseem only the naturalconsequenceof de-
fendingyourvitalinterests can look to othersas thoughyou are refusingthemany
478 WORLD POLITICS
Hypothesisi3 suggeststhatif it is hard foran actorto believethat
theothercan see him as a menace,it is oftenevenharderforhim to
see thatissuesimportant to him are not important to others.While he
mayknowthatanotheractoris on an opposingteam,it maybe more
forhimto realizethattheotheris playingan entirely
difficult different
game.This is especiallytruewhenthegamehe is playingseemsvitalto
him.65
The finalhypothesis, HypothesisI4, is as follows: actorstend to
overlookthefactthatevidenceconsistent withtheirtheoriesmay also
be consistent withotherviews.When choosingbetweentwo theories
we have to pay attention onlyto data thatcannotbe accountedforby
one of thetheories.But it is commonto findpeople claimingas proof
of theirtheoriesdata thatcould also supportalternativeviews.This
phenomenonis relatedto thepointmade earlierthatany singlebit of
information can be interpretedonlywithina framework ofhypotheses
and theories.And while it is truethat"we maywithouta viciouscir-
cularityacceptsome datumas a factbecauseit conformsto the very
law forwhichit countsas anotherconfirming instance,and rejectan
allegationoffactbecauseit is alreadyexcludedby law,"66we shouldbe
carefullestwe forgetthata piece of information seemsin manycases
a
to confirm certainhypothesis only because we alreadybelievethat
hypothesis to be correctand thatthe information can with as much
validitysupporta different For example,one of thereasons
hypothesis.
whytheGermanattackon Norwaytookboththatcountryand Eng-
land by surprise,eventhoughtheyhad detectedGermanshipsmoving
towardNorway,was thattheyexpectednot an attackbut an attempt
by the Germansto breakthroughthe Britishblockadeand reachthe
chanceof increasing theirinfluence.
In rebuttingthefamousCrowe"balanceof power"
memorandumof I907, which justifieda policyof "containing"Germanyon the
groundsthatshe was a threatto Britishnationalsecurity, Sanderson,a formerperma-
nentundersecretary in theForeignOffice, wrote,"It has sometimes seemedto me that
to a foreignerreadingour pressthe BritishEmpiremustappearin the lightof some
huge giant sprawlingall over the globe,with goutyfingersand toes stretching in
everydirection,whichcannotbe approachedwithoutelicitinga scream"(quoted in
Monger,3I5). But few otherEnglishmencould be convincedthatothersmightsee
themthisway.
65 GeorgeKennan makes clear that in i9i8 this kind of difficulty was partlyre-
sponsiblefor the inabilityof eitherthe Allies or the new Bolshevikgovernment to
understandthe motivations of the otherside: "Thereis . . . nothingin naturemore
egocentricalthan the embattleddemocracy.... It . . . tends to attach to its own cause
an absolutevalue whichdistortsits own visionof everything
else. . . It will readily
be seenthatpeoplewho havegot themselves intothisframeof mindhave littleunder-
standingforthe issuesof any contestotherthanthe one in whichtheyare involved.
The idea of peoplewastingtimeand substanceon any otherissue seemsto thempre-
posterous"(Russia and the West,II-I2).
66Kaplan, 89.
The initialcourseoftheshipswasconsistent
Atlantic. witheitherplan,
buttheBritish and Norwegians tookthiscourseto meanthattheir
predictionswerebeingborneout.67 Thisis nottoimplythattheinter-
pretationmadewas foolish, butonlythatthedecision-makers should
havebeenawarethattheevidence wasalsoconsistent withan invasion
andshouldhavehada bitlessconfidence in theirviews.
The longertheshipswouldhaveto travelthesameroutewhether
theyweregoingtooneoranother oftwodestinations, themoreinfor-
mationwouldbe neededto determine theirplans.Takenas a meta-
phor,thisincident tothetreatment
appliesgenerally ofevidence.Thus
as longas Hitlermadedemands forcontrol onlyofethnically German
areas,his actionscouldbe explainedeitherby thehypothesis thathe
hadunlimited ambitions orbythehypothesis thathe wantedto unite
all theGermans. Butactionsagainstnon-Germans (e.g.,thetakeover
ofCzechoslovakia in Marchi938) couldnotbe accounted forbythe
latterhypothesis.And it was thisactionthatconvinced theappeasers
thatHitlerhad to be stopped.It is interesting to speculateon what
theBritish reactionwouldhavebeenhad HitlerleftCzechoslovakia
alonefora whileand insteadmadedemandson Polandsimilarto
thoseheeventually madein thesummer ofI939. The twopathswould
thenstillnot have diverged, and further misperception couldhave
occurred.
67 JohanJorgen Holst, "Surprise,Signals,and Reaction:The Attackon Norway,"
Cooperation and Conflict,
No. i (i966), 34. The Germansmade a similarmistakein
November1942 when theyinterpreted the presenceof an Allied convoyin the Med-
iterraneanas confirmingtheirbeliefthatMalta would be resupplied.They thuswere
takenby surprisewhen landingstook place in NorthAfrica(William Langer,Our
VichyGamble[New York i966], 365).

Jervis - Hypothesis On Misperception

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Trustees of Princeton University

I. PREVious TREATMENTS OF PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Although diplomatic havediscussed

II. THEORIES-NECESSARY AND DANGEROUS

Despitethelimitations of theirapproach,thesewritershave touched

However,when we apply theseand otherfindingsto politicsand

likeChamberlain, he fitted eachbitofambiguous information intohis

evidenceis seento confirm theoppositeconclusion,

fightifneedbe.26In thiscountry, thosewhofavored a nucleartestban

IV. SOURCES OF CONCEPTS

An actor'sperceptual thresholds-and thusthe imagesthatam-

responds toreality. Communist elites,furthermore, denythatanything

werevalidated bytheevent.One neednotaccepta totalapplication of

V. THE EVOKED SET

is evaluated in lightofthesmallpartoftheperson'smemory thatis

Washington did notrealizetheextentto whichPearlHarborcon-

VI. FURTHER HYPOTHESES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PERCEIVER

Fromtheperspective oftheperceiver severalotherhypotheses seem

bargaining,59internal misunderstandings, or subordinates' notfollow-

thefirstside,thefirst sideis aptto believethatsuchwas theother's

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