CITY OF MANILA VS.

LAGUIO

FACTS:

MTDC (Malate Tourist Development Corporation) engaged in the business of operation

hotels, motels and lodging houses which also built with license, the Victoria Court in
Malate. On 1993, City Council of Manila approved by City Mayor (Ordinance 7783), an
ordinance named as an ordinance prohibiting the establishment or operation of
businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities
in the Ermita malate area with penalties prescribed on it. MTDC filed a petition in RTC
for writ of preliminary injunction against and temporary restraining order against the said
ordinance for the following reasons:

1. The City council has no power to prohibit operation of motels

2. The ordinance is void violating PD 499 which declared that portions in ermita
malate is a commercial zone w/ certain restrictions
3. The ordinance does not constitute proper exercise of police power
4. It is an ex post facto law by punishing one of MTDC’s property which is a
legitimate business before the enactment of ordinance
5. Ordinance violated the equal protection clause under the law

City of Manila answered, contending that they had the power to do so, stating sec 458
of Local gov’t code which provides that as a legislative body of the city shall enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and regulate activities
relative to use of lands and buildings within the city. RTC through Judge Laguio, ruled
in favor of MTDC, Ordinance 7783 is null and void. (WALA NG BINANGGIT ABOUT
SA CA, DINIRETSO NA SA SC). Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of
Appeal on manifesting that they are elevating the case to Supreme Court on pure
questions of law

Thus, the instant petition,

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE 7783 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

HELD:

AFFIRMATIVE, In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid
exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. A
long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable. In the case at bar, the ordinance contravenes the
Constitution. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that
its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. If the ordinance be applied it
will be resulting to taking property with unjust compensation. The ordinance violates due
process of law. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. The police power granted to local government units
must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law.

WHITE LIGHT CORP. VS LIM

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 7774 was approved by the City Mayor of Manila which prohibits short
time admission, and wash up rates in inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila. MTDC (Malate tourist dev. Corp) filed a complaint
in RTC for declaratory relief and TRO against the city of Manila represented by Mayor
Lim. PD 259 gives right to hotels to admit on a short time basis as well as to charge
customers on wash up rates. White light corp, Titanium corp and Sta mesa dev corp
filed a motion to intervene, contending that the ordinance is really affecting their
business. RTC granted the motion to intervene meanwhile MTDC filed a motion to
withdraw as plaintiff. RTC issued a TRO directing the city to cease and desist from the
enforcement of the ordinance. RTC declared Ordinance 7774 null and void. On appeal,
the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and affirmed constitutionality of the ordinance.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ORIDNANCE 7774 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

HELD:

AFFIRMATIVE:

Ordinance 7774 is unconstitutional. (test of valid ordinance should apply same in

the case of city of manila vs laguio), wherein in this case there is no reasonable
necessity in prohibiting such short time and wash up rates because the purpose of
those is not only for prostitutes and the like but there are certain families who always
avail that service for short time vacations. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution,
drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall
within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Lacking a concurrence of the
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State
police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.

BELTRAN VS.SECRETARY OF HEALTH

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law
on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country.
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of
Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks.
All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two years after the
effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two years by the Secretary.”
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides Process of Phasing Out. The
Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of
two years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A.
7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review
of the blood supply and demand and public safety.” Hence, petitioners were granted by
the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May
27, 1998. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners,
they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RA 7719 VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Held: No, the court deems the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following
reasons:

-One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely
humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit.
Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats
blood as a sale of commodity.

-Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate
supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This
necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that
they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid
blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown
by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.

-Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment
was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended
to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial
blood banks without exception.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE

BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass

demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged
abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass demonstration,
Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO.
During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in
fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. 

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal
course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up
with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed
through with the rally. 

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the
workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not
absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too
late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were
eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement Article twenty four, ARTICLE (24) making the
employees conducted an illegal strike.  The lower court decided in favor of the company
and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion
for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for
being filed two days late. 

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EMPLOYEES OF PHIL BLOOMING MILLS VIOLATES

THE CBA (COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT) (ART. 24)

HELD:

NO.

-Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarch or political, economic or otherwise.

- The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal
on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the
mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of
the eight petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of
grievances.

-The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was

against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein
private respondent firm. Said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of
their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.

TANADA VS. TUVERA

FACTS:

The petition is a motion for reconsideration following the decision of the supreme court
in the case of tanada vs tuvera in the year 1985 which clarifies the publication of
unpublished presidential decrees and issuances in the official gazette, unless they shall
have no binding force and effect. The present petition assails questions of publication,
law of public nature and general applicability, distinction between general applicability
and laws which are not.
ISSUE:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THERE SHOULD BE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN

GENERAL LAWS AND THOSE WHICH ARE NOT
II. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLICATION SHALL BE MADE IN GENERAL
CIRCULATION

HELD:

I. NO. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing
on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
II. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or
extended. The word "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.