BORJAL VS CA

FACTS

 Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines
Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily
newspaper.
 Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer,
businessman, business consultant and journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a
technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of the House of
Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy
 On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent
Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous
solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference
 Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was
published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged
anomalous activities of an “organizer of a conference” without naming or identifying
private respondent
 Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned
o Described “him” as a “Self-proclaimed hero”, “a conference organizer associated
with shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked inside his closet”, "thick face," and
"a person with dubious ways."

ISSUE
W/N the subject article constitutes qualifiedly privileged communication
HELD

 The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of
the conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by
which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely
imbued with public interest.
 Borjal’s writing are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of RPC. However Art. 354 is not
an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications. The rule on privileged
communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 25 March 1996
and its Resolution of 12 September 1996 denying reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the complaint for damages against petitioners is DISMISSED. Petitioners counterclaim for
damages is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
LEDESMA VS CA

FACTS

Dr. Torres filed a complaint for libel against petitioner. Finding sufficient legal and factual basis,
the prosecutor filed an Information for libel against petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for
review before the DOJ. In a resolution, then Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon reversed the
Quezon City investigating prosecutor. In obedience to the above directive, the prosecutor filed
a Motion to Withdraw Information. The trial judge, however, denied this motion. This was
affirmed by the CA. WON the CA erred in affirming RTC’s denial of the Motion to Withdraw
Information, the SC ruled in the affirmative.

Issue:
WON CA committed any reversible error in affirming the trial court’s denial of the
prosecution’s Motion to Withdraw Information.

HELD
YES. CA is wrong in affirming the trial court’s denial of the prosecution’s ‘Motion to Withdraw
Information’.
In this case, the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to
withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial
court's order is inconsistent with the Court’s repetitive calls for an independent and competent
assessment of the issues presented in the motion to dismiss.

The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the absence of
probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled
to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary's
recommendation. Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have discovered that
there was, in fact, sufficient ground to grant the motion to withdraw the information. The
documents before the trial court judge clearly showed that there was no probable cause to
warrant a criminal prosecution for libel.
FLOR VS PEOPLE
FACTS

 It is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the Decision of the Court of
Appeals
 An information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the
petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent,
respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region.
 the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly
newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without
justifiable motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying
the honor, integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the
Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization and concurrently Governor of
the Province of Camarines Sur
 The information was later amended to include Jose Burgos, Jr., who was at that time the
publisher-editor of the Bicol Forum. 4 The trial court, however, never acquired
jurisdiction over his person as he did not surrender nor was he ever arrested by the
authorities
 The trial court found the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the
decision of the trial court. Unsatisfied with the findings of the trial court
 The petitioner and Ramos filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court through its decision.
 They thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
WON the complaints were libelous
HELS
NO.
Under the law, Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead
The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.
when confronted with libel cases involving publications which deal with public officials and the
discharge of their official functions, this Court is not confined within the wordings of the libel
statute; rather, the case should likewise be examined under the constitutional precept of
freedom of the press.