Estrada v.

Desierto

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

Supreme Court
April 3, 2001
Motions for Reconsideration of a Decision of the Supreme Court

Facts
-Same fucks dafuq

Issues
1. Whether or not the decision of the Court was only based on newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences thus
the conclusion that petitioner has resigned should be changed.
2. Whether or not the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his
resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
3. Whether or not the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11 Article VII of the Consti in that congress can only
decide the issue of inability when there is variance of opinion between a majority of the cabinet and the president.
4. Whether or not the petitioner should be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally
prosecuted and does the case in the ombudsman constitute double jeopardy for the petitioner.
5. Whether or not the right to due process of the petitioner is prejudiced because of the presence of prejudicial
publicity.
6. Whether or not the judges who went to EDSA should be restrained from taking part in the judicial proceedings.

Holdings and Rationale

1. The decision of the court that petitioner has resigned is not biased and is based on the TOTALITY TEST.
(A totality test suggests that there is no single deciding factor that one must consider all the facts, the context, and
conclude from the whole picture whether there is probable cause, or whether an alleged detention is really a detention,
or whether a citizen acted under color of law)
-The court referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are well-established and cannot be refuted.
-All the events and facts are within judicial notice by this Court.
-The reference by the court to certain newspaper reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible
evidence for being hearsay.
-The news account only buttressed these facts as facts.
-For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false.
-Even though the Court relied on the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner, it is
emphasized that it is NOT UNUSUAL for the courts to distill a person’s subjective intent from the evidence before them.
-The use of the Diary is NOT prohibited by the hearsay rule (Hearsay is an out of court statement, made in court, to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. In other words, hearsay is evidence of a statement that was made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing in question and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.)
-Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived by the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but does
not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.
-We ruled that petitioner’s issuance of the press release and his abandonment of Malacanang Palace confirmed his
resignation. These overt facts which leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned.
-We also reject the contention that petitioner’s resignation was due to duress and an involuntary resignation is no
resignation at all.
-The three part test for such duress has been stated as involving the following elements:
 a. whether one side involuntarily accepted the other’s terms
b. whether circumstances permitted no other alternative
c. whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side
-In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation. He proposed to the holding of
snap elections.
-He could not claim he was forced to resign because immediately before he left Malacanang, he asked Secretary Angara
“Ed, aalis na ba ako?” which implies that he still had a choice of whether or not to leave.
-To be sure, pressure was exerted for petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that the pressure completely
vitiated (impair the legal validity of) the voluntariness of the petitioner’s resignation.
-Certainly, there was no tanks or coercive acts by the opposite side thus THERE WAS NO DURESS.
2. The Angara Diary is not an out of court statement and is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar.
-The said diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.
-In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply memorandum both the second and third part of the
diary
-It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments thus petitioner had all the
opportunity to contest the use of the diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
-Even assuming that the Angara diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule.
-There are 3 reasons for exclusing hearsay evidence:
a. absence of cross examination
b. absence of demeanor evidence
c. absence of the oath
-Not all hearsay evidence however is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has
been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.
-A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admission of a party and the
Angara diary belongs to this class. (Section 26 of Rule 130) It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible
even if they are hearsay.
-It is also argued that the Angara diary is NOT a diary of the petitioner hence NON-BINDING on him. The argument
overlooks the DOCTRINE OF ADOPTIVE ADMISSION. (An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action
by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by
the other person.
-Petitioner contends that the use of the diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta (is a law doctrine which
holds that a contract cannot adversely affect the rights of one who is not a party to the contract).
-The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions and one of them is admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive
Secretary Angara as such was an ALTER EGO of the petitioner. He was authorized to act for the petitioner in the critical
hours and days before he abandoned Malacanang Palace. Petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary
Angara.
-Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner).
-Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence were violated in our
decision.
-It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only a copy of the Angara Diary as published by the Philippines
Daily Inquirer. In doing so, the Court did not however, violate the best evidence rule. Again, there were no objections
made by the petitioner about the contents of the diary.
-In regard to the authentication of private writing, petitioner did not deny the genuineness of the diary in the earliest
opportunity so he may not anymore object that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in evidence.
-Petitioner has an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum. He was
therefore NOT denied due process. It is already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion after the
Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof.
3. The Court did not misinterpreted section 11 Article VII and that the Congress has power to determine the inability
of the President and such power cannot be corrected by this Court.
-Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by the
petitioner.
-The power is conceded by the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by
this Court.
-The recognition of respondent as our de jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a POLITICAL JUDGEMENT.
-This political judgement may be right or wrong but congress is answerable only to the people for its judgment.
-Petitioner cannot blur these specific ruling by the generalization that whether one is de jure or de facto president is a
judicial question.
-In the said section, there is no indication as to when the Congress should declare the inability of the President so it can
be before or after the Vice President assumes presidency.
-The declaration of presidential incapacity were not implied because of the resolutions of both the Senate and House
4. Since the impeachment proceeding is declared functus officio, petitioner can now be prosecuted criminally and this
does not constitute double jeopardy.
-Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors’ walk out should be considered failure to prosecute and the
termination of the case by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal.
-He also contends that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the
rule against double jeopardy.
-The Senate passed Resolution 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio.
-Petitioner CANNOT invoke double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attached only:
a. upon a valid complaint
b. before a competent court
c. after arraignment
d. when a valid plea has been entered
e. when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the consent of the accused
-Petitioner failed to satisfy fifth requirement for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed
without his express consent. Petitioner’s claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicted prior conviction for he was not
convicted by the impeachment court.
-We reiterate that the impeachment proceeding was closed only AFTER petitioner had resigned thereby rendering the
impeachment court functus officio.
-by resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination of the impeachment case against
him for he brought about the termination of the impeachment
-we have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused
there is no double jeopardy.
5. There is not enough evidence to sustain that the Office of the Ombudsman is infected by prejudicial publicity.
-same reasons as before
-what is important for the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are NOT violated in the process of investigation
6. NO. The judges should not be restrained just because they went to EDSA.
-As mere spectators of a historic event, said members of the Court did not prejudge the legal basis of the calim of
respondent Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her oath.
-It should be clear from the resolution that the Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered
the oath by Chief Justice Davide Jr. as a case but as an ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER.
-The court precisely treated the letter as an administrative matter and emphasized that it was without prejudice to the
disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party.
-A motion to inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect and is regarded with general disfavor.
Disposition
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.
Separate Opinions
Vitug J.
-If as Mr. Estrada would have it, the takeover of the Presidency could not be constitutionally justified, then, unavoidably,
one would have to hold that the Arroyo government already and firmly in control then and now would be nothing else
but revolutionary.
Mendoza J.
-Where the impeachment proceedings did not result in the former president’s conviction, there can be no objection to
his subsequent trial and conviction in a criminal case-the rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally
prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.