ENRILE V.

VINUYA [Jongko]

January 30, 1971

FACTS:

- The then Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and

detention against the Cadillac car involved in this case, the owner-claimant being a certain Rodolfo

Ceza, as the taxes and duties had not been paid.

- It was moreover shown in the petition that the owner, Rodolfo Ceza, had sold such car to one

Francisco Dee from whom respondent Vinuya acquired the same.

- Vinuya filed a complaint for replevin in the sala of respondent Judge on the ground of

alleged illegality of the seizure which, in the opinion of respondents, did not confer

jurisdiction on the Collector of Customs.

- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that forfeiture proceedings had already

been instituted before the Collector of Customs who has the sole jurisdiction to

determine questions affecting the disposition of property under seizure as well as

the absence of a cause of action. This was denied for lack of merit. Thus this petition.

ISSUE WON the court of first instance is vested with jurisdiction to

entertain a complaint for replevin for the recovery of a Cadillac car, subject of a seizure and

forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs.

HELD: NO.

The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases

vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance from assuming cognizance

over such a matter. This has been so, as noted, since Pacis v. Averia.

Reasoning

a. The existence of the power and the regularity of the proceeding taken under it are distinct from

each other. The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with

exclusive authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive

competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can

be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred

may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a
court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions

the law has not seen fit to do so.l

b. "the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of

Customs. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in Republic Act 1937 which

took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. It is axiomatic that a

later law prevails over a prior statute.

c. Moreover, on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude that the

legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property

which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and

Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation of Customs laws

could easily be undermined by the simple devise of replevin."

d. Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code requires the Collector of Customs to

give to the owner of the property sought to be forfeited written notice of the seizure and to

give him the opportunity to be heard in his defense. This provision clearly

indicates the intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the

determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in a seizure

and forfeiture case. The judicial recourse of the property owner is not in the Court

of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative remedies

in the Bureau of Customs."e Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal lies to the

DISPOSITION

The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, respondent Judge being clearly without jurisdiction.

VIERNEZA V COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS [Jongko]

FACTS:

M/V "Legaspi" a coastwise vessel coming from Jolo docked at the port of Cebu on her way
to

Manila. Acting upon a confidential telegraphic report about smuggling of cigarettes from an

informer in Jolo, Customs authorities of the port of Cebu conducted a search of the vessel which
eventually led to the discovery of cases containing cigarettes without the required Internal Revenue

strip stamps. Upon investigation it was also discovered that the subject merchandise was covered by

Bill of Lading with "personal belongings" as its declaration and correspondingly entered into
the

manifest of the vessel likewise with "personal belongings" as the noted description, and
with Sultan

Pula of Jolo as the consignor and a certain Carlos Valdez as the consignee in Manila. Upon further

investigation, however, it was found that a woman passenger was accompanying the subject

merchandise appearing later to be Mrs. Felicidad Vierneza, the present claimant, who all the while

holds the bill of lading.

Believing that there is a strong evidence of violations of Customs laws, the Collector of Customs of

Cebu seized the merchandise and instituted the forfeiture proceedings for violation of Section 2530

(f), (g) and (m-4) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Section 174 of the Internal

Revenue Code.

Petitioner appealed in due time from the decision of the Collector of Customs of Cebu to the

Commissioner of Customs who affirmed the decision of the Collector.

Elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals, the decision of respondent Commissioner of Customs was

affirmed, the court "(f)inding that the Collector of Customs of Cebu had jurisdiction to order the

seizure and forfeiture of said cigarettes and that the forfeiture of the same is in accordance with

Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code".

ISSUE: W/N the Collector has the authority to enforce tariff and customs law?

Petitioner argues that the Collector of Customs of Jolo, who has "jurisdiction over all matters

arising from the enforcement of tariff and customs laws within his collection district", as provided

for in Section 703 of the Tariff and Customs Code, is exclusively authorized to proceed against the

cigarettes in question inasmuch as the smuggling was allegedly perpetrated in his collection district.

Hence, petitioner concludes that the seizure and forfeiture thereof by the Collector of Customs of

Cebu is irregular and illegal for lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: SC does not agree.

First, because Section 703, on which petitioner's conclusion is premised, is legally non-existent, the
same having been vetoed by the President. Secondly, the Tariff and Customs Code clearly empowers

the Bureau of Customs to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the Customs [Sec.

602 (b)] over all seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines and over all coasts, ports, airports,

harbors, bays, rivers and inland waters navigable from the sea and, in case of "hot pursuit",
even

beyond the maritime zone (Sec. 603). For the due enforcement of this function, a Collector, among

others, is authorized to search and seize (Sec. 2203), at any place within the jurisdiction of the said

Bureau (Sec. 2204, sec. par.), any vessel, aircraft, cargo, article, animal or other movable property

when the same is subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws

(Sec. 2205). It is of no moment where the introduction of the property subject to forfeiture took

place. For, to our mind, "(i)t is the right of an officer of the customs to seize goods which are

suspected to have been introduced into the country in violation of the revenue laws not only in his

own district, but also in any other district than his own.

Any other construction of the Tariff and Customs Code, such as the one proposed by petitioner,

would virtually place the Collector of Customs in a straitjacket and render inutile his police power of

search and seizure, thereby frustrating effective enforcement of the measures provided in the Code

to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the Customs. The Code, as a revenue law,

is to be construed to carry out the intention of Congress in enacting it and as would most effectually

accomplish its objects.

Petitioner also attacks the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs of Cebu on the ground that the

forfeiture of the cigarettes is not in accordance with Section 2531 of the Code, as the same were, at

the time of seizure, no longer in the custody and control of the Bureau of Customs nor in the hands,

or subject to control, of the importer, original owner, consignee, agent or person with knowledge

that the same were imported contrary to law.

Again, SC disagrees. The forfeiture is effected precisely in accordance with Section 2531 afore-cited,

which plainly provides "that forfeiture shall be effected when and while the article is in the
custody

or within the jurisdiction of the customs authority ... or in the hands or subject to the control of ... some
person who shall receive, conceal, buy, sell or transport the same ... with knowledge that the article was
imported ...

contrary to law" (Emphasis supplied). There can be no question that the cigarettes involved were
seized

and forfeited at the port of Cebu which is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and, as

will be shown later, while the cigarettes were subject to the control of petitioner, who bought,

concealed, and transported the same aboard the M/V "Legaspi" with knowledge that they
were

imported contrary to law. Besides, it is a settled jurisprudence that forfeiture proceedings are in the

nature of proceedings in rem wherein the jurisdiction to proceed against the res is vested in the

court of the district where the same is found or seized. Therefore, the Collector of Customs of

Cebu, who has the authority under the Tariff and Customs Code to institute forfeiture proceedings,

lawfully assumed jurisdiction to forfeit, in favor of the Government, the smuggled cigarettes found

and seized within his collection district.

RIGOR V. ROSALES [Leandro]

FACTS:

Collector Sabino Rigor issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the vessel LCT-759 and

its cargo, consisting of 103 pieces of logs for failure to present a manifest for the said logs within the

period prescribed. The parties who were duly notified and represented, voluntarily submitted to the

jurisdiction of the respondent Collector. After hearing, the Collector rendered a decision ordering

the seized logs forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed of according to law.

Instead of appealing the Collector’s decision to the Commissioner of Customs, the private

respondents filed an original petition for certiorari with the Davao CFI. Respondent alleged lack of

jurisdiction of the CFI.

ISSUE: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to review a decision of the Collector of Customs

HELD: The Supreme Court held in the negative.

Articles subject to seizure do not have to be goods imported from a foreign country. The provisions

of the Code refer to unmanifested articles found on vessels or aircraft engaged in the coastwise

trade. The customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of a court of first instance
that the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad

before they may exercise the power to effect customs’ searches, seizure, or arrests provided by law

and to continue with the administrative hearings on whether or not the law may have been violated.

Regarding the nature of the port of origin and the port of destination, it is enough if one of the

ports is a port of entry. The respondent court’s finding that “port of entry” must be limited to the

wharves of Sta. Ana and Sasa where the customs house is located and not extended to “every inch

of the City of Davao” would unduly hamper if not cripple the effective enforcement of customs and

tariff laws. Customs officials cannot stand by helplessly for want of jurisdiction simply because a

restrictive interpretation of “port of entry” would enable coastwise vessels to load or unload

unmanifested goods with impunity outside of the specific area where the wharves and the customs

house are located.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that the customs’ officials have authority under the law to

make the initial determination on the limits of their administrative jurisdiction, to act speedily and to

make decisions on the basis of that determination, and to have such act or decision reviewable only

in the manner provided by the Customs and Tariff Code. The Collector’s decisions are appealable to

the Commissioner of Customs, whose decisions, in cases involving seizure, detention or release of

property, may in turn be reviewed only by the CTA.

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, AS CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA; HON. JUAN PONCE

ENRILE, AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS; PEDRO PACIS, AS COLLECTOR OF

CUSTOMS OF THE PORT OF MANILA; AND MARTIN ALAGAO, AS PATROLMAN

OF THE MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT, PETITIONERS, V. REMEDIOS MAGO

AND HILARION U. JARENCIO, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 23, COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS. [nOch]

(G.R. No. L-27360 28 February 1968.) Ponente: ZALDIVAR, J.:

FACTS:

Original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction praying for the annulment

of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the CFI Manila, dated 7 March

1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods belonging to respondent Mago
which were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and

Customs Code, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding Civil Case.

Petitioner Martin Alagao (head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department)

acted upon reliable information about a certain shipment which were allegedly misdeclared and

undervalued, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa (Chief of Police of Manila and a duly

deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs) conducted surveillance. On November 4, 1966, elements

of the counter-intelligence unit intercepted the two (2) trucks containing the shipment after it exited

the port at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. Found were nine bales of goods, and the two trucks,

were seized.

Remedios Mago 9owner of the goods) and Valentin B. Lanopa (owner of the truck) filed with the

CFI Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction”, docketed

as

Civil Case No. 67496, alleging that that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police

Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that then Customs Commissioner

Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no

longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; and that the goods, even

assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under

Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Mago had bought them from another person

without knowledge that they were imported illegally.

On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the

respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners— from opening the nine bales in question,

and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16,

1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had

already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the

Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Mago.

Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the goods. On March 7, 1967, the

respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent Mago upon her filing of

a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the

corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for

reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the

Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to

hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.

Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they
had

no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the

present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court.

ISSUE: The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted

with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.

HELD:

BoC has jurisdiction over the goods, not CFI Manila

          The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess

and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and

penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and

other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. The goods in question

were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on

Informal Entry". As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain

under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the

payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of

entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes,

fees and other charges must be in full.

          The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement
and

Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the

Solicitor General    wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods

subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the

Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore,
a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, and the itemization of the articles

ordered by the CFI Manila shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to

avoid the payment of duties thereon.

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the

customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said

goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila

Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had

been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs,   the Bureau of Customs had regained

jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon

the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties,

taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same

according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of

the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was

filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of

Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and

detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been

issued by the Collector of Customs.

On Validity of Warrant and Search

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction

over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the

goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had

previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture

proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on

November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the

goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the

regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the

goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on

January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said
warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of

the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in

question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it

of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First

Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said

goods.

          Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure

without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not

require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under

Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, in closure,

warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine

any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and

search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or

prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a

search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said

"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of
the

peace. . . ." It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a

dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search

and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

          WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

          (a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;

          (b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of

respondent Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court

of First Instance of Manila;

          (c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967

restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7,

1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any

manner in said case;

          (d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;

and1äwphï1.ñët

          (e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.

          It is so ordered.

R.V. MARZAN FEIGHT V. CA AND SHIELA’S MANUFACTURING [Jaline]

FACTS:

Private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, against

the petitioner. The private respondent alleged, inter alia, that its goods were stored in the petitioner’s

bonded warehouse due to the problem it encountered at the Bureau of Customs; that the goods

were gutted by fire on July 26, 1990 while stored in said bonded warehouse; and, despite demands

for the release of the goods, the petitioner refused to release the same.

In its answer, petitioner alleged that the private respondent lost the right of action against it as it was

not the real party-in-interest in the case. The petitioner averred that the goods in question were

received not from the private respondent but from the Bureau of Customs covering Forfeited

Cargoes (FC), Abandoned Cargoes (AC) and Cargoes held under Warrant/Seizure and Detention

(CWSD). According to the petitioner, before the subject cargo was destroyed by accidental fire, the

private respondent had violated the Tariff and Customs Code and related laws, rules and regulations,

and failed to pay the corresponding taxes, duties and penalties for the importation. Furthermore, the

private respondent failed to make the corresponding claim for the release of the said cargo, until the

same was declared as "overstaying cargo," and later as "abandoned cargo." The
petitioner further

asserted that the government, and not the private respondent, was the owner thereof.

During the trial, the petitioner presented Atty. Leonardo S. Doctor, the Law Division Chief of the

Bureau of Customs, as one of its witnesses to prove that the cargo had already been declared by the

District Collector of Customs as "abandoned cargo" in Abandonment Proceedings No. 288-

89, and

that the cargo was destroyed by fire before it could be sold at public auction.

Thereafter, the private respondent filed its memorandum stating, inter alia, that it did not abandon
the goods because it did not receive the notice of abandonment of the cargo from the Bureau of

Customs. The petitioner insisted that upon the abandonment of the cargo under Section 1802 of the

Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), it became, ipso facto, the property of the

government; hence, the private respondent had no right to claim the value of the shipment.

The trial court rendered judgment founding defendant RV Marzan is held solely liable for the loss

suffered by the plaintiff and is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff.

According to the trial court, the Bureau of Customs’ subsequent declaration that the subject

shipment was "abandoned cargo" was ineffective, as the private respondent was not sent a
copy of

the September 29, 1989 Notice as required by Sec. 1801 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Under the

law, notice of the proceedings of abandonment should be given to the private respondent as the

consignee or its agent, to enable it to adduce evidence at a public hearing, conformably to the

requirement of due process. Since the private respondent was never notified of the abandonment

proceedings, it cannot, thus, be said that it impliedly abandoned the shipment and lost its ownership

over the same in favor of the government.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals and upheld the trial court’s ruling. The

appellate court held that the District Collector of Customs failed to give due notice of the

abandonment proceedings to the private respondent, and that the same constituted denial of due

process of law.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC is vested with jurisdiction to review and nullify a declaration made by the

District Collector of Customs that the shipment was abandoned cargo and, thus, ipso facto

belonged to the government.

RULING: THE PETITION IS GRANTED.

The decisions of the RTC and of the CA are set aside and reversed. The RTC is ordered to dismiss

the complaint of the private respondent against the petitioner, as well as the counterclaim of the

latter against the private respondent.

RV Marzan avers that at the time of the fire, the goods were already the property of the government.

Before the fire, RV Marzan received the cargo from the Bureau of Customs pursuant to a

Memorandum Order declaring it as "abandoned cargo." This Memorandum Order which is

in

accordance with Sec. 1801 of the Tariff and Customs Code, provides as follows:

SEC. 1801. Abandonment, Kinds and Effects of. – Abandonment is expressed when it is made

direct to the Collector by the interested party in writing, and is implied when, from the action or

omission of the interested party to file the import entry within five (5) days or an extension thereof

from the discharge of the vessel or aircraft, or having filed such entry, the interested party fails to

claim his importation within five (5) days thereafter or within an extension of not more than five (5)

days shall be deemed an implied abandonment. An implied abandonment shall not be effective until

the article shall be declared by the Collector to have been abandoned after notice thereof is given to

the interested party as in seizure cases.

Any person who abandons an article or who fails to claim his importation as provided for in the

preceding paragraph shall be deemed to have renounced all his interests and property rights therein.

SEC. 1802. Abandonment of Imported Articles.- The owner or importer of any articles may, within

ten days after filing of the import entry, abandon to the Government all or a part of the articles

included in an invoice, and, thereupon, he shall be relieved from the payment of duties, taxes and all

other charges and expenses due thereon: Provided, That the portion so abandoned is not less than

ten per cent of the total invoice and is not less than one package, except in cases of articles imported

for personal or family use. The articles so abandoned shall be delivered by the owner or importer at

such place within the port of arrival as the Collector shall designate, and upon his failure to so

comply, the owner or importer shall be liable for all expenses that may be incurred in connection

with the disposition of the articles.

An examination of the records reveal that the subject shipment was subsequently declared

abandoned by the Bureau of Customs as "abandoned cargo" for the plaintiff’s failure to file
the

import entry. Evidently, the resolution of the foregoing issues is within the exclusive competence of

the District Collector of Customs, the Commissioner of Customs and within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. The District Collector of Customs did not lose jurisdiction

over the abandonment proceedings. The loss of the cargo did not extinguish his incipient

jurisdiction in the said proceedings, nor render functus officio her declaration that the subject

shipment had been abandoned.

It must be stressed that the cargo arrived in the Philippines on April 12, 1989. The private

respondent failed to accomplish the required import entry declarations, pay the requisite taxes and

duties, if any, and take delivery of the cargo. It was only after the lapse of more than two years, or on

December 21, 1991, that the private respondent filed its complaint against the petitioner in the RTC.

By then, the cargo had been gutted by fire. The private respondent has not made any valid

justification for its silence thereon and its inaction. In can be said then that the private respondent

went to court with unclean hands.

The refusal of the Bureau of Customs to intervene in the trial court does not, in any way, fortify the

private respondent’s claim that it is the owner of the cargo. The government had no legal obligation

to intervene in the trial court considering that the latter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. It

was enough that then Bureau of Customs Law Division Chief Atty. Doctor testified that the cargo

was duly declared by the District Collector of Customs as abandoned property, that the said

declaration had become final, and that the government became ipso facto the owner of the cargo.

The government had every right to expect that the trial court would dismiss the complaint for lack

of jurisdiction over the issue raised therein.