Aristotle's Criticism of Platonic Doctrine concerning Goodness and the Good

Author(s): D. J. Allan
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 64 (1963 - 1964), pp. 273-286
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
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Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C.1,
on 25th May, 1964, at 7.30 p.m.

XV-ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATONIC

DOCTRINE CONCERNING GOODNESS AND
THE GOOD

By D. J. ALLAN

IN both versions of his Ethics Aristotle engages near the beginning

in a criticism both of a Platonic Idea of the Good (i.e., of a
transcendent instance and pattern of good, which actively infuses
goodness into other things) and of a universal concept of goodness;
both are dismissed as having no direct or indirect application to
political science, even if their existence should be granted
(Nicomachean Ethics I 6, 1096 a 11 foll.; Eudemian Ethics I 8,
1217 a 18 foll.) What, you may wish to know, can be secured
at this late date from a fresh examination of these passages?
and ifit is true that every enquiry aims at sorne good, I am obliged
to try to answer.
The gain will necessarily be one of historical understanding
rather than of insight into living philosophical problems; and
having made this admission I will try to define it further. So long
as E.E. was regarded as a work of Eudemus of Rhodes, it could
only have for the scholar the value of a commentary upon N.E.
by a personal disciple of the founder of the Peripatetic school,
one who sometimes took the liberty of developing in detail an
idea lightly sketched by his master. It is in this spirit that Monro
(1855), Sir A. Grant (1st edition of commentary, 1857), Jackson
(1878), and Burnet and Stewart after them, all used the E.E.
It can be added that the first three also agreed in assigning to
Eudemus the books handed down to us as common to both
versions, which are now usually printed as N.E. V-VII. They
showed convincingly that these books have a greater resemblance
in terminology and method of procedure to the Eudemian version;
to which later inquirers have added the observation that they are
bound to it by mutual cross-reference. On this ground, they
supposed that an equivalent Nicomachean passage had been los t,
or was never written at all. This explanation, however, ceased
to be plausible after Rassow (1874) and Cook Wilson (1879) had
2F

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274 D. J. ALLAN

shown that duplicate passages, placed side by side, are to be

found in bk. VII and to a less extent in bks. V and VI. We may
still reasonably ask to which version the disputed books have a
veater affinity, but not to which they belong, i.e., which has
an exclusive claim to them.
·Rather more than fifty years ago a change manifested itself,
and scholars both British and German turned to the view that
E.E. is an authentic work of Aristotle, probably so named
because Eudemus was the original editor. To record the studies
published since then, and review the fluctuations of opinion,
would evidently be a task for a complete paper. Here, therefore,
I shall only remind you that most of those who thus accept E.E.
as a production of Aristotle have also subscribed to the view
stated by Case, in 1911, and afterwards by Jaeger in 1923, that it is
Aristotle's earlier version or first draft of his Ethics, recognizable
by greater similarity to his early dialogues and lingering traces of
Platonism. Most of them, I repeat, have sought in this way to
account for anything distinctive either in its detail or in its
general plan and emphasis.
In thus setting out to establish the order of composition, and
at the same time expound an obscure and allusive text, they have
undertaken a formidable double task without, I suggest, being
entirely successful in either part of it. And it seems to me
advisable in the present state of research to give undivided
attention to exposition and comparison. So I shall here simply
compare the two passages of criticism, in the firm belief that both
come from Aristotle, and attempt to draw up a balance-sheet
showing what are the notable features peculiar to each and to
what extent they maintain a common doctrine and give similar
reasons in support ofit. The Nicomachean passage is clearer and
is better known; the Eudemian is potentially richer in the sense
that it might yield more information both about Aristotle's
general system of philosophy and about the views at which the
criticism is aimed. As regards the priority of E.E. my attitude
in this paper will be one of deliberate suspension of belief. I
make no claim to disprove this thesis, but am also prepared to
entertain the view that the existence of two versions, plus a
passage belonging equally to both, is not to be explained in terms
of development, but in sorne quite different manner.

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 ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE 275
CONCERNING GOODNESS AND THE GOOD

I propose to divide the comparison into two parts :-

(A) The function of the criticism in its context, i.e., in

the argument leading to the definition of happiness.
(B) Its content and internal structure.

(A) In the Nicomachean version the first mention of the

distinctive thesis of the Academy occurs at 1095 a 27, where the
variety of opinions concerning happiness is in question. " But
sorne have held that there is an absolute good, distinct and apart
from the many goods here, and the cause of goodness in all of
them." The noun loÉa is not used here, but we find it at 1096 b 32,
in what I take to be a backward glance at this statement. At
1096 a 11, a criticism of one aspee t of this opinion begins:
Aristotle says that he will examine the use of good as a universal
term, and methodically set out the problems arising therefrom.
His criticism is of rather wider range than this announcement
might lead one to expect. But it is true that " goodness as an
universal " is its principal theme. Goodness, it is argued,
presents itself in many shapes which are not reducible to a
common form. Even if we agree to isolate things intrinsically
good from those which are only instrumental in producing
goodness, it is still not true that ' good ' is the label of a definable
common nature in the things, or actions, so termed (1096 b
16-26). Yet, since these are plainly not mere homonyms, we
must look for sorne other way in which they might come to be
denoted by a single name. Aristotle then indicates two accounts
which might be given-first, that goods radiate from one point of
origin or converge towards a common focus; secondly, that they
have similarity of analogy. But he says that it belongs to another
department of philosophy, doubtless dialectic, to pursue the
subject (1096 b 26-31). Apart from this, neither goodness as a
non-ambiguous universal predicate, nor the Good as an Idea,
are achievable by man or capable of being possessed by him, even
if we grant their existence. And this objection cannot be
effectively met by saying that, although the absolute good may be
unachievable, the productive arts can profitably look to it as a
pattern (1097 a 1-12).
In giving a summary of E.E. to be placed side by side with
2F2

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276 D. J. ALLAN

this, I have first to explain my choice of English equivalents for

recurrent Greek terms, in which it is important to be consistent
beca use of the rigorous style of the reasoning. Absolute good =
avTo To dya0óv. The best = To ápiaTov. Idea of good =
loÉa TOV dya0óv. General concept of goodness = KOtVÓV n
aya0óv. Beautiful = Ka,\óv. Separate = xwpiaTÓv. Within
the range of action = 7rpaKTÓv. These coincide apart from
unimportant differences with those used by J. Solomon in Vol. IX
of the Oxford translation of Aristotle; and the useful analysis
which he gives at the opening of the treatise may be used as a
check on mine. 1
(1214 a 1): The question has been raised, and variously
answered, what is most beautiful, what is the best, and what is
most pleasant in human life? In this treatise it will be shown
that the three superlatives belong to a single object, happiness.
(1214 b 6): When a man sits down in a cool hour to ask what is
most desirable, he is faced with a great variety of prevailing
opinions. But (1216 b 26 foll.) men make many statements that
are true, without being accurately expressed. The area of
conflict is reduced, and it is not impossible to reach a result
confirmed by universal sentiment, if instead of accepting opinions
in their crude form we undertake to re-formulate them so as to
express more accurately the intention of those who propound
them.
(1217 a 18): Can an agreed definition of happiness be thus
reached? A common answer to the question, what is happiness?
is 'the greatest and best of human goods '. The word ' human '
is too loose, for there are goods which extend to man, but are not
affected by any action, or at least by his action. (This refers to
such things as the beauty of order, which is common to the world
of change and to the unchanging.) We must declare happiness
to be "the best thing within the range of human action ".
(1217 b 1): We must next, then, ask the double question,
what is in fact best of goods achieved by man? and, what does
the expression ' best ' itself mean? Three opinions present
themselves: (1) Sorne say that the best of all things is the absolute
1 The Greek text of H. Rackham in the Loeb Classical Libary (1935),

incorporates emendations made up to that time. A recent German version

by F. Dirlmeier, with notes, is available.

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 ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE 277
CONCERNING GOODNESS ANO THE GOOD

good; and by an absolute good they understand that which comes

first in order among goods, and causes goodness by its immanence
in other things. 2 They hold that these properties are combined
in an Idea of good. This is not the place for a thorough examina-
tion of the doctrine of Ideas; but, to speak concisely, the
assertion of Ideas generally is based on a faulty abstraction.
This result has been reached by us in previous writings and
lectures. Even bating this general objection, knowledge of an
Idea of good can surely contribute nothing towards a good life.
Detailed criticism follows.
(1218 b 1): (2) The second opinion is that of those who
identify the absolute good, defined as shown above, with a general
concept of goodness. Here, again, it may be replied that there
is no such thing, and that, if there were, human knowledge would
in no way benefit from it. Each art envisages, not good in general,
but good in sorne special form, e.g., health.
(1218 b 7): (3) Thus, the Idea is immovable, and therefore
necessarily outside the range of action. The general concept of
good, though at home among things movable, is still not within
the range of action. For our absolute good we must turn
elsewhere-to the good, conceived as an end for the sake of which
other action is undertaken. An ultimate end, besides being ' the
best ', is cause of goodness in subordinate actions or processes,
and is prior to these in the order of reality, though not in that of
genesis: the very characteristics supposed to be requisite in the
absolute good. This highest practica! end is that which is aimed
at by a dominant (KÚpw,) practical art, which takes three forms:
statesmanship, economics, and personal prudence. Later, the
difference of these species from one another will be defined (in
the common book VI, 1141 b 23-33).
(1218 b 17-24): That the end is the cause of goodness in the
subordinate actions (not of their existence), is plain from the

2 I think Coleridge had this in view when he said: " Every man is bom

an Aristotelian or a Platonist ... I believe that Aristotle never could get to

understand what Plato meant by an Idea. There is a passage, indeed, in
the Eudemian Ethics which looks like an exception, but I doubt not of its
being spurious, as that whole work is supposed by sorne to be. With Plato
the Ideas are constitutive in themselves."
Table Talk, edited by H. N. Coleridge, under July 2nd, 1830.

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278 D. J. ALLAN

procedure of instruction. It is from a definition of the end that

teachers proceed to show that other things (presumably processes,
instruments etc.) are good. Conversely, the means is the
efficient cause of the existence, not of the goodness, of the end.
That the end is good, is something which no one engaged in
an art would seek to prove. It would be a sophist, not a doctor,
who sought to show by argument that health is a good.
The enquiry which commenced at ch. 7 1217 b l, and which
grew out of the attempt to define happiness, has so far yielded
the result that " the best thing " must mean " the best within
the range of man's action ", and that this alone satisfies the
proposed criteria of an absolute good. New premisses are at this
point propounded in a rather Euclidean manner (Book 11,
1218 b 30-1219 a 18). From these it is deduced that the
sustained active use or display of excellence of soul-in other
words, a good life-is the best thing within the range of human
action. Therefore happiness and a good life can be identified,
since each has now been separately equated with the same middle
term. They can also be declared to be the absolute good in the
only tolerable sense of that expression. The vague, though not
incorrect, notion of happiness from which the analysis started
has been rendered precise. (1 have discussed this phase of
argument more fully in my contribution to Aristote et les
Problemes de Mhhode, Louvain 1961, and still adhere to the
opinion expressed there, that the formulation of hypotheses and
the use of To ápiaTov as a middle term indicate a special
interest in, though not a pedantic reproduction of, mathematical
deduction. There is a good deal of this kind of thing also in the
de Cae/o, normally regarded on that account asan early work.)
Let us now ask how far the criticism of the Academic views can
be said to fulfil the same function in both versions. In both
cases, it produces the assertion that the good·, with which our
inquiry must concern itself, is the supreme end or ends of human
action, and that political science has nothing to gain by studying
a higher good than this. Again, in both versions this is followed
by a substantially identical definition of happiness, based on
premisses derived from psychology and on the belief that man or
his soul has a function (Épyov av0pwrrov in N.E. 1098 a 7,
Épyov i/¡vxi¡, in E.E. 1219 a 24). But in the E.E. the criticism

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 ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE 279
CONCERNING GOODNESS AND THE GOOD

of the absolute good, and discussion of the meaning of ' the

best ', is an essential link in the demonstration by which that
definition is proved, and in the N.E. it is not so. It will have
been noticed in the summaries given above th~t there is one
striking difference in terminology. In N.E. Aristotle has treated
' absolute good ' simply as another description of the Idea, and
has consequently discarded it as part of the Platonic baggage.
In E.E., he has chosen to adopt for his own use the name and
notion of an absolute good; and this vitally affects both the
form and the content of his criticism. For (i) it gives to his
criticism the shape of an argument from elimination. Neither
the Idea, nor the general concept of goodness, can discharge
the duties of an absolute good, but a better qualified candidate is
waiting to be admitted. And (ii) he is thus committed to
maintaining, and <loes maintain in a passage which seems to
have no counterpart in N.E., that the good qua purpose of action
causes the goodness, though not the existence, ofthe means which
precede it and bring it about. lt is also obvious that the expression
-ro ápia-rov -rwv 1rpaK-rwv, " chief good within the range of
action," has not the same key position in the Nicomachean
proof as it has in the Eudemian. The superlative <loes, of course,
occur there, and two passages may be quoted to illustrate its use.
>~ , /\ > \ - - > e \ f:/ \
~ ~ 0 -\
Et or¡ Ti 'TEI\OS' EU'Ti 'TWV 1rpaKTWV o oi av-ro ¡-,OVI\Oj1,E a - - OTjl\OV
I ~

WS' 'TOV'T' av ELTJ -rdya0ov Kat, 'TO ápw-rov (1094 a 18-22). d,\,\'
LUWS' 'T'Y}V µ,Jv Ev8aiµ,ovlav 'TO ápia-rov AÉyEw óµ,o,\oyoÚµ,EvÓv n
<paÍvETai (1097 b 22).
So in N.E. the expression ' absolute good ' is used with sorne
degree of scorn, whereas in E.E. a cajoling tone is employed.
(Let me assist in this search for an absolute good; forgive me for
saying that I think you are not altogether clear what you are
looking for.) And in N.E. we advance to the definition of
happiness by a natural progressive movement, the touch of a
guiding hand being scarcely perceptible, whereas in E.E. we are
compelled to subscribe to it or else deny that things equal to the
same thing are equal to one another. What is the explanation of
these remarkable changes? It <loes not require much perspicacity
to suggest one. The criticism of the Ideas in the Eudemian version
is integrally connected not only with what follows, but with the
discourse on method which precedes. What Aristotle has been
2F 3

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280 D. J. ALLAN

seeking to do is to give a first exemplification of the principles

there laid down. Therefore to my first main question, whether
the function of the criticism in both versions is the same, I return
a negative answer.

(B) I now turn to the internal structure of the two passages, so

far as it has not already been discussed, and to a more detailed
comparison in respect of content. The Eudemian criticism opens
with the sentence: "We must then examine what is the best, and
in how many senses we use the word. The answer is principally
contained in three views." (Trans. J. Solomon. I follow him,
but not without sorne uncertainty, in his understanding of 1piai
oó(ais. Fritzsche thinks the allusion is to the three prevailing
lives distinguished by the Pythagoreans, and supposes an ellipsis:
" [but a fourth opinion must be added] for philosophers now
speak of an absolute good.") The reasoning thereafter takes the
form of an attempt to identify the absolute good by eliminating
two competitors and leaving the field open to a third. But the
space devoted to the good as an universal concept is relatively
short, perhaps because much of what Aristotle requires to say
under this head has already been said in criticizing the separate
Idea. Unless there is sorne lacuna in our text, he <loes not defend
at length the position that goodness is not a quality common
to the good things, but thinks it sufficient to appeal to the practice
of the arts in striving for a peculiar good (1218 a 37-18 b 5).
Still less <loes he put forward here the two constructive suggestions
about the meaning of good which catch the eye in the Nico-
machean version.
The criticism in N.E. opens with the sentence " We had
perhaps better consider the universal (good) and discuss
thoroughly what is meant by it" (trans. Ross). This is now
the central theme; the position that the intrinsically good things
have no definable common nature is defended by argument or
at least by the citation of instances, and thus to same extent our two
discussions are complementary, rather than parallel, to one
another. However, (i) in its criticism of goodness as a universal
N.E. employs two of the same arguments which are brought
in E.E. against the Idea of good (1096 a 23-24), and (ii) at
1096b31-35 we find at least an allusion to the tripartite division-

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 ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE 281
CONCERNING GOODNESS AND THE GOOD

Idea, common quality of goodness, achievable good-which

has governed the structure of the passage in E.E.
I pass on to the comparison of content. I propose to set
out sorne impressions, descending from the general towards
the particular, and to justify them so far as space permits; but
the treatment must be selective.
(1) In spite of the striking difference in terminology which
has been noted, E.E. I 8 and N.E. I 6 set aside the same Platonic
doctrines for much the same reasons, and leave the same path
open. A similar view is taken in both versions of the scope
and purpose of political science. But N.E. declares itself to be
designed for the guidance of the statesman, E.E. for that of the
individual having freedom of choice, but living within a given
social framework. Notice here especially 1214, b 6 (8eí:)
~
a1raVTa ' ovvaµ,evov
Tov " ' r~ KaTa' Tr¡V
<;,TJV ' eavTov
' ~ 1rpompeaiv
' 0'ea0m
nva UK01TOV TOV KaAws '-íJv. This difference is notable at the
beginning and end of both treatises and pervades the treatment
of many topics. lt might, I think, be exhibited that the
account of the voluntary and description of the particular
moral virtues in N.E. is coloured by a political tinge. The
Eudemian version is complete in itself; its work has been done
when it has been shown, as promised in the opening sentence, that
happiness combines the attributes of goodness, beauty and
pleasure raised to the highest degree. N.E., on the other hand,
ends with a transition to a further treatise devoted to legislation.
I hope I shall not be understood as maintaining that the ideal of
the good life is itself affected by this difference in the aim of the
treatises. The individual deliberating about his own welfare
may well come to the conclusion that he must regard himself as
a social being.
(2) The E.E. is throughout more demonstrative and didactic
in its tone, and assumes on the part ofthe hearers fuller knowledge
both of the Academic background and of Aristotle's system. lt
borrows more freely than N.E. <loes from other treatises in the
corpus. Any exceptions which seem to occur in the so-called
N.E. books V, VI and VII are no true exceptions if it is
remembered that these books are in fact common. Now
E.E. supports its denial of the Idea of good by an easily intelligible
criticism of that form of Academic doctrine in which the ethical

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282 D. J ALLAN

Ideas were equated with Ideal Numbers. This is not found in

N.E., nor is there any allusion there to the identification of
the One with the Good by Plato or Xenocrates, unless it is
hinted at in the statement (1096 b 5), that Speusippus argued
" more persuasively " when he declined to make the Good an
original principie. The E.E. is also characterized by an interest
on Aristotle's part in the connexion between the good and the
beautiful-very properly, since the choice of good actions Tov
KaAov ÉvEKa assumes sorne importance when he reaches the
description of the virtues, and he ends the treatise with a rather
fine-drawn distinction between KaAoKaya0ía and mere apETf
Possibly in N.E. Aristotle discarded the reference to To KaAÓv as
being no necessary part of his criticism of the Idea of good, and
as being too metaphysical for that treatise. If so, we must
charge him with a slip, since as it is the phrase Tov KaAov ÉvEKa
makes its appearance " out of the blue " at the point where he
distinguishes true courage from its imperfect varieties.
E.E. 1218 a 17-33 is a straightforward passage, which
requires no comment from me. By inverting a proof used by
members of the Academy, it might be shown that beauty exists
in an even higher degree in the sphere of the unchanging. In
the last book of E.E., Aristotle distinguishes the goods which
are ends from those which are means, and then defines as KaAá
those end-like goods which are ' commendable '. Health and
courage are both goods, but courage and the action that results
from it is KaAÓv, whereas health and the display of health are
not. In Metaph. B 996 a 21 foll., he enumerates among the
problems the objection that those sciences which <leal with the
invariable have nothing to show us about the good. In a
crucial passage of Metaph. M, 1078 a 31- b 6, he refutes this
claim. Good and beautiful are distinct: the former is co-
extensive with action, but the latter is found a/so among the
invariable (there is no pretence of relegating it to that sphere:
KaAÓv is required as a term of approval for human actions); its
supreme forms are order, symmetry and definition. He under-
takes to " speak more intelligibly " about this elsewhere, but
failed to fulfil his promise. In E.E. 1218 b 4-7 occurs another
reference to To KaAÓv which plainly presupposes, and would not
be intelligible without, the passage in Metaph. M.

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 ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE 283
CONCERNING GOODNESS AND THE GOOD

(3) The passage of criticism of the Ideas is prefaced in N.E.

by an expression of friendship for the authors of the doctrine; in
E.E. by a brusque reminder that it has been previously examined
from various points of view. Doubtless this refers to the de
/deis and de Philosophia, and to Metaph. A. chapter 9; sorne
might add to the de Bono. It would be most natural to take this
as an indication of the priority of N.E., if any such inference
is to be drawn. But Aristotle might have varied his tone accord-
ing to what he knew of the qualifications of his audience; and
we have seen in the last paragraph that the hearers of E.E. were
probably more accustomed to technical discussion.
(4) The doctrine of the categories of being is assumed in
both versions. It is shown by exarnples that good exhibits itself
in each of them. The immediate inference is that goods cannot
be reduced to one type, and this becomes, in both versions, the
foundation- of other inferences.
(5) The assertion that there is no "separable" common
element in things which form a graduated series is also common
to the versions, but plays a different part in each of them. E.N.
informs us that this principie is derived frorn the teaching of the
Academy. It is there used, in conjunction with the doctrine of
categories, to provide the first in the series of criticisms.
In E.E. 1218 a 1-14 a more elaborate argument occurs, which
does not seern to me to have been satisfactorily explained, but
can be put right by a simple ernendation. As the text stands,
Aristotle enunciates the principie above mentioned without
indicating what use he here intends to make of it. Then there
follows (line 10) El avµ,f3aívEt TO Koivov dvai TTJV l/5,fav, olov El
xwpiaTov TToÍr¡aEiÉ ns To Kowóv. This is unintelligible, since the
El clause makes no sense either as the preface to a new argument
or as a qualification tacked on to the previous one. Sorne editors
suggest that words have been lost. I propose simply to emend
El avµ,{JaÍvEi to ~ avµ,f3aívEi, 'or else the consequence follows ... '
This gives to the whole passage the form of a dilemma, which
may be paraphrased as follows :-
Where a group of things from a graduated sequence, there
is in them no common element which can be separated and
treated as real. For, were this to be done, it would become
prior to the first member of the series. It would be so, because

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284 D. J. ALLAN

its suppression would entail that of the first member. (An

illustration follows.) Either goods form such a series, and then
for this reason there is no separate Idea; or the consequence is
that an Idea is just the common element in things not arranged
in sequence, but situated on the same plane, and indeed this is
how Platonists normally reach the Ideas. " If justice is one
good, and bravery another, there is also an absolute good."
"Absolute," then, has been attached to the common defining
formula. What does it express, except that this formula has been
rendered eternal and endowed with independent reality? But
that which remains white for many days is not thereby whiter
than that which has only been white for one day, [whereas it
is claimed that the absolute good is best, i.e., better than specific
forms of virtue.]
It may be asked what could be the polemical value of the
criticism of Plato so reconstructed. It would seem to me that
its weakness líes in the watering down of To aZ8wv (eternal)
into To 1r0Avxp6vwv, rather than in its pressing unfair alterna-
tives upan Plato or giving a false picture of his doctrine. For
in the dialogues the Idea is viewed in the two ways here outlined,
as a supreme instance possessing in fullness that which particulars
strive with different degrees of success to obtain, and as a separated
universal.
(6) Both versions employ the argument that no single science
of goods is found in existence, whereas we should expect it to
exist if 'good' denotes a universal quality. But in E.E. this is
presented more incautiously, and in a form which exposes
Aristotle to a charge of inconsistency, unless we come to his
rescue with the explanation that his doctrine about the ambiguity
of TO ov underwent a change. In N.E. 1096 a 29-34, we have:
since things that fall under one Idea are objects of one science,
these ought to have been one science of all goods; but in fact
many sciences, or rather arts, provide for the good even in a
single category, e.g., ' right time '; (hence, goods do not fall
under one Idea). We may notice, first, that this is intended asan
argumentum ad hominem, the principie that things falling under
one Idea belong to one science being the part of the Academic
doctrine; secondly, that there is no pretence of showing that
there could not be a single science of goods, if sorne subtler

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 ARISTOTI E'S CRITICISM OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE 285
CONCERNING GOODNESS AND THE GOOD

analysis of ' good' were offered. The statement on which

Aristotle rests is that a plurality of arts in fact exists.
In E.E. (1217b 34-41) he proceeds as follows: Justas there is
no unitary Being over and above the categories elsewhere
enumerated, so there is no separate Good. Neither is there a
single science either of Being or of Good. Nay, it <loes not belong
to one science to consider all instances of goodness within a
single category, far instance the opportune or the moderate.
The position is rather that a single science or art (e.g., strategy or
physical training) considers with reference to its special activity
both the opportune and the right amount; no science considers
the good far all activities under one category; still less [is it] the
work of one science to consider the absolute good.
This explicit denial of a single science of being is not easily
squared with Metaph. I' and K, where we read that it "belongs
to one science " to consider not merely Ta Ka0' Ev AEyÓµ,Eva
(things to which a name applies synonymously), but Ta 7Tpos
~v AEyÓµEva (things linked by reference to a common focal
point), and Aristotle pronounces that it 'belongs to one science'
to consider being both in its primary form and in its sub-forms,
since these form a group of the latter kind.
The difficulty was indicated by Professor Cherniss (Arist's.
Criticism of Plato and the Academy, I 179 n. 102). Taking up
his challenge, Professor Owen (Aristotle and Plato in the mid-
Fourth Century, Goteborg 1960) has made out a strong case for
thinking that E.E has composed at a time when Aristotle had
not yet extended to ' being ' the concept of ' focal meaning ', and
therefore sincerely held that a general ontology is impossible
and that First Philosophy can only exist as a science of supreme
Being. The idea of ' focal meaning ' itself is clearly expounded
elsewhere in E.E. (1236 a 15 foll.): and perhaps dates back to a
time even prevíous to the formulation of the doctrine of categories.
Sorne use was already made of it by members of the Academy,
judging from the passages from Aristotle's de /deis which have
been preserved by Alexander.
No treatment of the criticism of the Ideas in E.E. could
omit reference to Professor Owen's instructive discussion. I
must decline here to embark on any examination of bis argument,
and will only say that I find difficulty in subscribing to it for two

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286 D. J. ALLAN

reasons: first, E.E. seems to me to presuppose in severa! details

the developed metaphysical doctrine of Aristotle, and therefore
presumably the later view of metaphysics as general ontology; to
settle this issue, a comprehensive survey of the relation between
E.E. and Metaph. would have to be undertaken. Secondly,
my impression of the text <loes not agree with Prof. Owen's
in this respect. He seems to me to sharpen unnecessarily the
antithesis between the Ethics on the one hand, and Metaph. I' on
the other, when he represents Aristotle as seeking to prove the
impossibility of a general science of goods-and, so far as E.E.
is concerned, of being-from the ambiguity of good and being.
I do not think there is an inference of this kind. In E.E.
Aristotle only states in succession the fact that good and being
have many senses, and that there <loes not in fact exist a single
science of either. He <loes not tie his own hands by asserting
roundly that this science could not come into existence. The
phrase " can hardly be the province of one science " occurs in
Solomon's version at 1217 b 41; but there is no verb in the Greek,
merely axo>..fl mh6 Y" TO dya0ov 0Ewpijaai µtfis, with which it
is legitima te to supply: is 011 their assumptions. In the
Nicomachean passage he unquestionably states merely the fact
that there exist many arts where, on the view under examination,
we ought to find only one.

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