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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
DYLAN L. WATSON, ) Case No. ________________

)
Plaintiff, ) JURY DEMANDED
)
v. )
)
CITY OF COOKEVILE, TENNESSEEE; )
)
JAMAR MINTER, individually and in )
his official capacity; )
)
MARTIN GARCIA, individually and in )
his official capacity; )
)
Defendants. )
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Dylan L. Watson, by and through counsel, for cause of action
against the defendants, both jointly and severally, and would respectfully state unto this Honorable
Court as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This cause of action arises from early morning encounter between Dylan L. Watson and
police officers employed by City of Cookeville, Tennessee, Jamar Minter and Martin
Garcia.
2. This cause of action is brought by Plaintiff against the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for deprivation of civil rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and other claims which arise under color of state law.
1
Case 2:21-cv-00004 Document 1 Filed 02/12/21 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: 1
3. Plaintiff brings this action to recover all damages allowable under the law, including
compensatory and punitive damages.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), and § 1367(a).
This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims of violation of civil rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
5. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a).
6. Venue is proper in this Honorable Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 in that the factual
acts and omissions, which give rise to this cause of action occurred within this district and
within one year of the filing of this Complaint and this Honorable Court otherwise has
jurisdiction.
PARTIES
7. Plaintiff, Dylan L. Watson, is an adult citizen of the State of Tennessee, residing in
Cookeville, Putnam County, Tennessee.
8. Defendant City of Cookeville, Tennessee is a governmental entity organized under the laws
of the State of Tennessee located in Putnam County. Among its other functions, City of
Cookeville operates and maintains a law enforcement agency known as the City of
Cookeville Police Department.
9. Defendant Jamar Minter is an adult resident of the State of Tennessee. At all times material
hereto, Defendant Minter was a K9 handler officer with the City of Cookeville Police
Department and was acting by virtue of his position as an officer with the City of
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Cookeville Police Department and under the color of state law. He is sued in his individual
capacity as well as his official capacity as an officer of for the City of Cookeville.
10. Defendant Martin Garcia is an adult resident of the State of Tennessee. At all times
material hereto, Defendant Garcia was an officer with the City of Cookeville Police
Department and was acting by virtue of his position as an officer with the City of
Cookeville Police Department and under the color of state law. He is sued in his individual
capacity as well as his official capacity as an officer for the City of Cookeville.
FACTS
11. On the evening of February 14, 2020 and into the early morning hours of February 15,
2020, Dylan L. Watson was enjoying a rare night out with friends at Bar on the Green
located on East Broad Street in Cookeville, Tennessee.
12. At around 2:30 a.m., Mr. Watson observed his female friend being escorted outside the
building and into the parking lot by a few men he did not know.
13. Concerned for his friend’s safety, Mr. Watson attempted to make contact with the woman
to make sure she was not in distress.
14. One of the men threatened to physically harm Mr. Watson.
15. Mr. Watson got into his vehicle and locked the doors. He tried to contact his female friend
through her cell phone. While waiting on a response from his friend, Mr. Watson fell
asleep inside of his vehicle.
16. At 2:53 a.m. Martin Garcia and Jamar Minter, police officers for the City of Cookeville,
were dispatched to Bar on the Green to provide escort to a female employee while she
walked to her vehicle.
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17. When Garcia and Minter arrived at Bar on the Green, they saw Mr. Watson’s vehicle and
observed Mr. Watson asleep inside the vehicle.
18. Defendant Garcia knocked on the window to get Mr. Watson’s attention. Mr. Watson did
not initially wakeup.
19. Defendant Minter used to the two patrol cars on the scene to block in Mr. Watson’s vehicle
to prevent it from moving.
20. Mr. Watson awoke suddenly to someone banging on the car window and telling him to get
out of the vehicle.
21. After realizing the individuals were police officers, Mr. Watson repeatedly and calmly
asked the officers to explain to him why they were there, what he did wrong, what crime
he committed, and why he needed to get out of the vehicle.
22. Mr. Watson did not feel comfortable exiting the vehicle until he knew what was going on.
23. Defendants Minter and Garcia refused to give Mr. Watson any information or answer any
of his questions. Instead the officers continued to tell Mr. Watson to get out of the vehicle.
24. Defendant Minter opened the passenger door, which was unlocked, and shouted at Mr.
Watson to get out of the vehicle.
25. Mr. Watson again calmly questioned why they were there, what he did wrong, what crime
he committed, and why he needed to get out of the vehicle.
26. The defendants again and repeatedly refused give Mr. Watson any information or answer
any of his questions. The defendants continued to yell and scream at Mr. Watson while he
continued to calmly ask questions.
27. Mr. Watson had not committed a crime at the time the defendant officers encountered Mr.
Watson.
4
28. Mr. Watson did not make any threats of violence towards the officers throughout the entire
incident.
29. Mr. Watson was not an immediate threat to the safety to any of the officers or other
individuals at the scene.
30. Mr. Watson was not actively resisting.
31. Mr. Watson was not attempting to flee.
32. Defendant Minter, a K9 handler, began sarcastically taunting Mr. Watson with statements
such as, “Do you like dogs?”
33. Defendant Minter went to his vehicle, to retrieve his K9, Oryx, and returned to the
passenger side of Mr. Watson’s vehicle.
34. Defendant Minter made several threats to release the dog if Mr. Watson did not exit the
vehicle.
35. Defendant Minter then stepped aside and Defendant Garcia reached into the vehicle from
the passenger side and grabbed Mr. Watson by his wrist and then let him go.
36. Defendant Minter told Defendant Garcia to move and then Defendant Minter commanded
Oryx to go into the vehicle to bite and extract Mr. Watson.
37. K9 Oryx did not follow commands. K9 Oryx entered the vehicle, spun in a circle, and sat
down allowing Mr. Watson to pet him. K9 Oryx then exited the vehicle.
38. City of Cookeville Officer Mason Vaughn arrived on scene as the K9 was being deployed
into the vehicle.
39. Furious with the K9’s performance and visibly agitated, Defendant Minter handed the K9
over to Officer Vaughn, who had no K9 training at all, and stated, “Take the fucking leash.”
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40. Defendant Minter then gave Mr. Watson one warning, “Get out of the car or I’m going to
tase you.”
41. Within one to two seconds of that warning, Defendant Minter deployed his taser.
42. The taser barbs made contact with Mr. Watson’s neck and chest.
43. Defendant Minter then immediately sprayed a chemical spray into Mr. Watsons face and
eyes for about six seconds without any warning.
44. Defendant Garcia then took an ASP baton and broke out the back passenger side window,
behind the driver seat in which Mr. Watson was seated.
45. Defendant Garcia reached inside the vehicle and unlocked the driver side door.
46. When the driver side door was opened, Mr. Watson rolled out of the vehicle onto the
ground and was placed in handcuffs.
47. Mr. Watson stated to the officers, “I’m not resisting.” Defendant Minter replied, “Oh yes
you are!”
48. Mr. Watson did not use any force against the officers nor did he physically resist the
officers when they were handcuffing him.
49. No weapons were found on Mr. Watson or in his vehicle. Mr. Watson only had a cell
phone and a wallet on him.
50. Mr. Watson was transported to the Putnam County Jail by Officer Vaughn.
51. Mr. Watson was charged with resisting arrest and public intoxication, both misdemeanors.
52. A bond was set for Mr. Watson. He was able to bond out and was released after about
twelve hours in the Putnam County Jail.
53. Mr. Watson hired a private attorney to represent him on his criminal charges.
54. Mr. Watson’s charges were ultimately dismissed.
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55. Mr. Watson, an army veteran previously diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), experienced a significant increase in PTSD symptoms including depression,
stress, trouble sleeping, and flashbacks due to the tremendous emotional trauma he
experienced as a result of the actions of the defendant officers on February 15, 2020.
56. In addition to the emotional disturbances, Mr. Watson experienced severe dryness in his
eyes and trouble seeing at night after being pepper sprayed by Defendant Minter.
57. Mr. Watson sought medical treatment for his eyes and it was determined that the dryness
and vision issues were caused by chemical exposure from the pepper spray. Mr. Watson
has been receiving ongoing medical treatment for those issues.
58. City of Cookeville failed to properly train and supervise the defendant officers.
59. After the completion of an internal investigation into the incident, Captain Bobby Anderson
of the Cookeville Police Department found the force used to affect the arrest of Mr. Watson
was unreasonable.
60. Defendant Minter was suspended for three days, attended remedial training, and was placed
on six months of probation.
61. Defendant Minter had three to four use of force incidents in the weeks prior to the incident
with Mr. Watson.
62. Defendant Minter was inadequately trained on the use of force and as a result used
excessive force on Mr. Watson.
63. Defendant Minter did not use de-escalation techniques before resorting to the use of force
against Mr. Watson.
64. Defendant Minter was inadequately trained as a K9 handler.
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65. Due to Defendant Minter’s actions with his K9, policy violations during the incident with
Mr. Watson and another incident with his K9 a few weeks earlier, it was recommended
that Defendant Minter be terminated from his duties as a K9 handler.
FEDERAL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I
EXCESSIVE FORCE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendant Minter
66. The Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates, in their entirety, each and every paragraph
contained in this Complaint and by reference makes said paragraphs a part hereof as if fully
set forth herein.
67. In committing the acts complained of herein, Defendant Jamar Minter acted under color of
state law to violate Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America. Specifically,
Defendant Minter operated to violate Plaintiff’s right to not be subjected to excessive force.
68. Defendant Minter operated to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights as protected by the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
69. Defendant Minter used excessive force on Mr. Watson while Mr. Watson was seated inside
of a vehicle when Defendant Minter deployed a K9 into the vehicle, tased Mr. Watson
while he was seated in the vehicle, and lastly pepper sprayed Mr. Watson while he was
inside of the vehicle.
70. The amount of force used in this case was grossly disproportionate to the reasonable need
to apply force. Mr. Watson had not committed any crimes, he was unable to flee as his
vehicle was blocked in by police vehicles, and Mr. Watson did not pose an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or anyone else on the scene.
8
71. The force used here was not in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline in
circumstances under haste. Rather, Defendant Minter acted unnecessarily,
unprofessionally, and wantonly with intent or desire to cause harm and pain when he used
gratuitous an excessive force against Mr. Watson.
72. At the time of the events described herein, Plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional
right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to be
free from objectively unreasonable use of excessive force.
73. A reasonable person would have known that these constitutional rights were clearly
established at the time the alleged wrongful conduct occurred, and that such conduct
violated these rights.
74. As a direct and proximate result of the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free
from excessive force, Plaintiff suffered damages and is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
75. Defendant Minter’s conduct was intentional, willful, malicious, oppressive and/or reckless,
and was of such a nature that punitive damages should be imposed in an amount
commensurate with the wrongful acts alleged herein.
COUNT II
FAILURE TO INTERVENE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendant Garcia
set forth herein.
9
77. During the events described above, Defendant Martin Garcia stood by without intervening
to prevent Defendant Jamar Minter from violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using
excessive force.
78. As a result of Defendant Garcia’s failure to intervene to prevent the violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, Plaintiff suffered and is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
79. Defendant Garcia had a reasonable opportunity and means to prevent this harm, but failed
to do so.
80. Mr. Watson’s vehicle was blocked in, there were supervisors in route to the scene, and
there was no urgency to remove Mr. Watson from his vehicle. There was reasonable time
and opportunity for Defendant Garcia to step in to prevent Defendant Minter’s excessive
use of force.
81. Defendants Garcia’s conduct in failing to intervene to prevent the violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally with
willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
82. Defendant Garcia’s failure to intervene was intentional, willful, malicious, oppressive
and/or reckless, and was of such a nature that punitive damages should be imposed in an
amount commensurate with the wrongful acts alleged herein.
COUNT III
UNREASONABLE SEIZURE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
set forth herein.
10
84. In committing the acts complained of herein, the Defendants acted under color of state law
to violate Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America. Specifically, Defendants
operated to violate Plaintiff’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures without probable
cause.
85. Defendants by committing the acts complained of herein under color of state law caused
the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution of Dylan Watson.
86. Defendants operated to violate Mr. Watson’s civil rights as protected by the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
87. The Defendants unreasonably seized Mr. Watson. The unreasonable seizure continued
when Defendant Minter arrested and jailed Mr. Watson without probable cause for the
offenses of T.C.A. 39-17-310(a) public intoxication and T.C.A. 39-16-602 resisting arrest.
Mr. Watson was not a danger to himself or others while he was asleep inside of his vehicle.
Mr. Watson was not unreasonably annoying people in the vicinity. Mr. Watson did not use
any force against the officers during his arrest.
88. A reasonable person would have known that these constitutional rights were clearly
established at the time the alleged wrongful conduct occurred, and that such conduct
violated these rights.
89. As a direct and proximate result of the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free
from false arrest and false imprisonment, Plaintiff suffered damages and is entitled to relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
11
90. The conduct of Defendant was intentional, willful, malicious, oppressive and/or reckless,
and was of such a nature that punitive damages should be imposed in an amount
commensurate with the wrongful acts alleged herein.
COUNT IV
FAILURE TO TRAIN and SUPERVISE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendant City of Cookeville, Tennessee
set forth herein.
92. At all times material hereto, the individual defendants were acting in the course and scope
of their employment with the City of Cookeville and the City of Cookeville Police
Department and acting pursuant to the customs, practices, and policies of the CPD.
93. Plaintiff was deprived of rights and privileges secured to him by the United States
Constitution and by other laws of the United states when the City of Cookeville failed to
provide adequate training, supervision, or discipline in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
94. City of Cookeville was aware of issues with Defendant Jamar Minter. Defendant Minter
had several use of force incidents in the weeks prior to the incident with Mr. Watson.
Defendant Minter had training issues with his K9 in the weeks prior the incident with Mr.
Watson. Defendant Minter was not showing progress in his training with his K9 prior to
the incident with Mr. Watson.
95. City of Cookeville failed to adequately train, supervise, and discipline it’s officers in
regards to the use of excessive force and K9 handling.
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96. City of Cookeville was deliberately indifferent to the known consequences of its failure to
adequately train, supervise, and discipline it’s officers in regards to the use of excessive
force and K9 handling.
97. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing policies, practices, and customs of City
of Cookeville, Mr. Watson suffered damages and is entitled to relief.
STATE LAW CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT V
ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Defendant Minter
set forth herein.
99. Defendant Minter committed the torts of assault and battery against Mr. Watson
100. Defendant Minter did intentionally attempt to frighten and threaten Mr. Watson
101. Defendant Minter did have the present ability to carry out that harm.
102. Defendant Minter did intentionally cause harmful and offensive touching to the body of
Mr. Watson when he tased and pepper sprayed Mr. Watson.
103. As a direct result of the threats and the harmful and offensive touching, Mr. Watson
suffered physical and mental damages and is entitled to relief for the suffering and harm
he directly caused by the wrongful acts of Defendant Minter
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COUNT VI
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Defendants Minter and Garcia
set forth herein.
105. The acts and conduct of Defendants, as described hereinabove, were committed in an
intentional and reckless manner.
106. Defendant Minter’s conduct in using unreasonable use of excessive force by deploying a
K9, tasing, and pepper spraying an individual inside of a vehicle who was not a felon, not
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and was not actively resisting
or attempting to evade arrest by flight is outrageous, intolerable, and offensive to
generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
107. Defendant Garcia’s conduct in failing to intervene in the excessive force used on Mr.
Watson by Defendant Garcia is outrageous, intolerable, and offensive to generally
accepted standards of decency and morality.
108. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ intentional, reckless, and outrageous
conduct, Mr. Watson has suffered severe emotional distress and is entitled to damages.
COUNT VII
FALSE ARREST and FALSE IMPRISONMENT
set forth herein.
14
110. The defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned Dylan Watson without probable cause for
the offenses of T.C.A. 39-17-310(a) public intoxication and T.C.A. 39-16-602 resisting
arrest. Mr. Watson was not a danger to himself or others while he was asleep inside of his
vehicle. Mr. Watson was not unreasonably annoying people in the vicinity. Mr. Watson
did not use any force against the officers during his arrest.
111. Defendants, directly and/or indirectly causing the false arrest of Mr. Watson, imposed an
unlawful restraint upon Mr. Watson’s freedom of movement and liberty.
112. The actions of the Defendants directly and/or indirectly resulted in the intentional
detention, restraint, and confinement of Mr. Watson within fixed boundaries and against
Mr. Watson’s will.
113. The detention, restraint, and confinement of Mr. Watson were unlawful and without just
cause.
114. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the defendants, Mr. Watson has suffered
emotionally, financially, and Mr. Watson has otherwise been damaged by the acts of the
defendants.
COUNT VIII
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
set forth herein.
116. A judicial proceeding was brought against Mr. Watson without probable cause, with
malice, and was terminated in Mr. Watson’s favor.
117. This judicial proceeding was brought and perpetuated by Defendant Minter.
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118. Defendant Minter, angered by Mr. Watson and the poor performance of his police K9,
arrested and jailed Mr. Watson for public intoxication and resisting arrest without probable
cause resulting in the prosecution of Mr. Watson.
119. The charges against Mr. Watson were subsequently dismissed.
120. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing malicious prosecution, the Mr. Watson
has suffered emotionally; Mr. Watson had to pay legal fees and expenses to defend the
prosecution; and Mr. Watson has otherwise been damages by the intentional and malicious
acts of the defendant.
COUNT IX
NEGLIGENCE
T.C.A. § 29-20-101 et seq.
set forth herein.
122. Plaintiff avers that City of Cookeville is liable for their own negligence and is responsible
for the torts committed by the individual defendants.
123. At all times material hereto, the individual defendants were acting in the course and scope
of their employment with the City of Cookeville and the City of Cookeville Police
Department.
124. Defendant City of Cookeville through its agents, Defendants Minter and Garcia, owed a
duty of care to Mr. Watson to refrain from handling him in a negligent fashion that could,
would and ultimately did cause injury to him.
125. Defendant City of Cookeville through its agents breached said duty when said agents
engaged in the actions described hereinabove.
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126. Such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of Mr. Watson’s injuries.
DAMAGES
127. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts and/or omissions of the
Defendants, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages.
128. The injuries and damages for which the Plaintiff seeks compensation from Defendants,
both jointly and severally, under both state and federal law, include, but are not limited to
the following:
a. Physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering;
b. General and special damages;
c. punitive damages against the applicable defendants as allowed by the law in an
amount to be determined by a jury;
d. Pre- and post-judgment interest;
e. All costs, including statutory and discretionary costs;
f. Attorney fees and expenses as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and state law.
129. Plaintiff reserves the right to prove the amount of damages at trial.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows:
1. That proper process issue to Defendants and that they be required to answer under oath in
the time required by law;
2. That judgment be rendered in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendants, both jointly
and severally, on all causes of action asserted herein;
3. That declaratory judgment be rendered that the acts and conduct complained of herein was
unconstitutional;
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Case 2:21-cv-00004 Document 1-1 Filed 02/12/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 19

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

DYLAN L. WATSON, ) Case No. ________________

compensatory and punitive damages.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. Plaintiff, Dylan L. Watson, is an adult citizen of the State of Tennessee, residing in

Cookeville, Putnam County, Tennessee.

Cookeville Police Department.

located on East Broad Street in Cookeville, Tennessee.

to make sure she was not in distress.

14. One of the men threatened to physically harm Mr. Watson.

asleep inside of his vehicle.

walked to her vehicle.

observed Mr. Watson asleep inside the vehicle.

not initially wakeup.

to prevent it from moving.

out of the vehicle.

he committed, and why he needed to get out of the vehicle.

Watson to get out of the vehicle.

he committed, and why he needed to get out of the vehicle.

continued to calmly ask questions.

individuals at the scene.

30. Mr. Watson was not actively resisting.

31. Mr. Watson was not attempting to flee.

such as, “Do you like dogs?”

passenger side of Mr. Watson’s vehicle.

Oryx to go into the vehicle to bite and extract Mr. Watson.

into the vehicle.

eyes for about six seconds without any warning.

behind the driver seat in which Mr. Watson was seated.

ground and was placed in handcuffs.

officers when they were handcuffing him.

phone and a wallet on him.

twelve hours in the Putnam County Jail.

54. Mr. Watson’s charges were ultimately dismissed.

(PTSD), experienced a significant increase in PTSD symptoms including depression,

has been receiving ongoing medical treatment for those issues.

on six months of probation.

with Mr. Watson.

excessive force on Mr. Watson.

against Mr. Watson.

64. Defendant Minter was inadequately trained as a K9 handler.

that Defendant Minter be terminated from his duties as a K9 handler.

FEDERAL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

set forth herein.

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America. Specifically,

Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

inside of the vehicle.

threat to the safety of the officers or anyone else on the scene.

circumstances under haste. Rather, Defendant Minter acted unnecessarily,

gratuitous an excessive force against Mr. Watson.

free from objectively unreasonable use of excessive force.

violated these rights.

commensurate with the wrongful acts alleged herein.

set forth herein.

willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

amount commensurate with the wrongful acts alleged herein.

set forth herein.

Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America. Specifically, Defendants

Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

any force against the officers during his arrest.

violated these rights.

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.