NORSOK-NORSOK-S-001 3rd 2000 Technical Safety

NORSOK STANDARD
TECHNICAL SAFETY
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
This NORSOK standard is developed by NTS with broad industry participation. Please note that
whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of this standard, neither OLF nor TBL or
any of their members will assume liability for any use thereof. NTS is responsible for the
administration and publication of this standard.
Norwegian Technology Standards Institution

Oscarsgt. 20, Postbox 7072 Majorstua
N-0306 Oslo, NORWAY
Telephone: + 47 22 59 01 00 Fax: + 47 22 59 01 29
Email: norsok@nts.no Website: http://www.nts.no/norsok
Technical Safety S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
CONTENTS
FOREWORD 3
INTRODUCTION 3
1 SCOPE 4
2 NORMATIVE REFERENCES 4
3 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 5
3.1 Definition 5
3.2 Abbreviations 8
4 SAFETY EVALUATION, MANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION 9
4.1 General 9
4.2 Risk reduction principles 9
4.3 Analyses and optimisation 9
4.4 Documentation 10
5 EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 11
5.1 Introduction 11
5.2 Evacuation 11
5.3 Rescue 12
6 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT 12
6.1 General requirements 12
6.2 Area Classification 13
6.3 Escape routes 13
6.4 HVAC 13
6.5 Helicopter deck 14
6.6 Emergency service areas 14
6.7 Process area 14
6.8 Riser area 15
6.9 Flare boom, flare tower, cold vent 15
6.10 Drilling and wellhead area 15
7 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN 16
7.1 Design accidental loads 16
8 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY FACILITIES 17
8.2 Safety shutdown systems 17
8.3 Process safety 17
9 REQUIREMENTS TO SAFETY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 18
9.2 Fire and Gas detection 18
9.3 Emergency shutdown 19
9.4 Ignition source control 22
9.5 Alarm and communication system 23
9.6 Emergency power 24
9.7 Communication through signs and markings 26
10 REQUIREMENTS TO EXPLOSION AND FIRE PROTECTION 26
NORSOK standard Page 1 of 66

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
10.1 Fire and Explosion strategy (FES) 26

10.2 General requirements to fireprotection. FES 26
10.3 Requirements for passive fire protection of equipment, piping and secondary structures. 27
10.4 Fire technical requirements relating to materials 27
10.5 Passive fire protection 27
10.6 Storage and handling of explosives 28
10.7 Active Fire Protection 28
10.8 Explosion protection. 31
11 SAFETY ASPECTS RELATED TO FLOATING PRODUCTION, DRILLING AND
STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 32
11.1 General 32
11.2 Crude storage 33
11.3 Layout 33
11.4 Turret 33
11.5 Drainage/Ballast water systems 34
11.6 Emergency re-positioning 34
11.7 Topside/floater interface 34
12 NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS 34
12.1 General 34
12.2 Safety evaluation, management and documentation. 35
12.3 Design principles 35
12.4 System requirements. 36
ANNEX A - INFORMATIVE REFERENCES (INFORMATIVE) 37
ANNEX B - EVACUATION (NORMATIVE) 38
ANNEX C - MISCELLANIOUS SAFETY EQUIPMENT (NORMATIVE) 39
ANNEX D - LAYOUT (NORMATIVE) 42
ANNEX E - PRESSURE RELIEF (NORMATIVE) 44
ANNEX F - FIRE AND GAS DETECTION (NORMATIVE) 48
ANNEX G - PROTECTION OF PRESSURE VESSELS AND PROCESS PIPING AGAINST
FIRE (NORMATIVE) 55
ANNEX H - FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM (NORMATIVE) 57
ANNEX I - LIVING QUARTERS (NORMATIVE) 62
ANNEX J - FIRE PROTECTION DATA SHEET (INFORMATIVE) 63
ANNEX K - NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS (INFORMATIVE) 64

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
FOREWORD
NORSOK (The competitive standing of the Norwegian offshore sector) is the industry initiative to
add value, reduce cost and lead time and eliminate unnecessary activities in offshore field
developments and operations.
The NORSOK standards are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry as a part of the
NORSOK initiative and supported by OLF (The Norwegian Oil Industry Association) and TBL
(Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Industries). NORSOK standards are administered and
issued by NTS (Norwegian Technology Standards Institution).
The purpose of NORSOK standards is to contribute to meet the NORSOK goals, e.g. to develop
standards that ensure adequate safety, value adding and cost effectiveness and thus are used in
existing and future petroleum industry developments.
The NORSOK standards make extensive references to international standards. Where relevant, the
contents of a NORSOK standard will be used to provide input to the international standardisation
process. Subject to implementation into international standards, the NORSOK standard will be
withdrawn.
Annexes B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I form a normat6ive part of this standard.

Annexes A, J, and K are for information only.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this standard is to present the principles and requirements for safety design of
offshore installations for production of petroleum.
ISO 13702 presents the general experiences and requirements from the International offshore industry
and NORSOK S-001 adds the specific requirements/experiences from the Norwegian operators.
Therefore ISO 13702 and NORSOK S-001 have to be read and understood in conjunction with each
other.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
1 SCOPE
This NORSOK standard for Technical Safety describes the principles and requirements for the
development of the safety design for offshore production installations; fixed platforms,
semisubmersibles and vessels. Where applicable this standard may also be used for Mobile Offshore
Drilling Units. Installations intended for short term exploration drilling, shuttle of crude to harbour
and general service are not covered by this standard.
This Standard together with ISO 13702 " Control and mitigation of fires and explosions-
requirements and guidelines" defines the required standard for implementation of technologies and
emergency preparedness to establish and maintain an adequate level of safety for personnel,
environment and material assets. This standard will further have to be applied together with
NORSOK standards for working environment and environmental care.
The principles and requirements for safety evaluation and safety management are described in ISO
13702 Chapter 4 while the objectives and functional requirements to installation layout are described
in chapter 5. These methodologies are clarified and detailed in S-001 chapter 4.
Requirements to Risk and Emergency Preparedness Analyses are described in NORSOK Z-013 and
are referenced concerning required input to the design process.
Requirements to Working environment are described in NORSOK S-002
2 NORMATIVE REFERENCES
The following standards include provisions, which, through references in this text, constitute
provisions of this NORSOK standard. Latest issue of the references shall be used unless otherwise
agreed. Other recognised standards may be used provided it can be shown that they meet or exceed
the requirements of the standards referenced below.
API 6FA Fire tests for valves

API RP 521 Guide for pressure-relieving and depressuring systems
BS 6755 Testing of valves. specification for fire type-testing requirements
E&P Forum Guidelines for the Development and Application of HSE Management
System.
ICAO BSL 5-1 International Civil Aviation Organisation
Bestemmelser for Sivil Luftfart 5-1, Forskrift om
kontinentalsokkelflygning – ervervsmessig luftfart til og fra
helikopterdekk på faste og flyttbare innretninger til havs.
IEC 60079-10 Electric apparatus for explosive gas atmosphere- Part 10 Classification of
hazardous areas.
IEC 60079-13 Electric apparatus for explosive gas atmosphere- Part 13 Construction and
use of rooms or buildings protected by pressurisation.
IEC 61892-7 Mobile and fixed offshore units- Electrical installations.
Part 7 area classification
IMO Resolution A653 Flame spread, surface materials and floorings
ISO 10418 Analysis, design, installation and testing of basic surface safety systems
for offshore production platforms.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
(Replaces API RP14 C).

ISO 13702 Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations-
Control and mitigation of fires and explosions — Requirements and
guidelines.
ISO 5660 Fire tests - Reaction to fire - Rate of heat release from building products.
NFPA 11A National Fire Protection Association part 11
Standard for medium- and high-expansion foam systems
NFPA 13 National Fire Protection Association part 13
Installation of sprinkler systems
Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems
Deluge Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems and Foam-Water Spray Systems
NFPA 20 Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps
National Fire Alarm Code
NORSOK C-001 Living quarters area
NORSOK C-002 Architectural components and equipment
NORSOK H-001 HVAC (Heating, ventilation and air conditioning)
NORSOK I-CR-002 Safety and Automation Systems (SAS)
NORSOK L-002 Piping Design, Layout and Stress Analysis
NORSOK M-501 Surface Preparation and Protective Coating.
NORSOK P-001 Process Design
NORSOK S-002 Working Environment
NORSOK S-003 Environmental Care
NORSOK S-011 Safety equipment data sheets
NORSOK T-100 Telecom Subsystems
NORSOK Z-013 Risk and emergency preparedness analysis.
NORSOK Z-016 Regularity, management & reliability technology
3 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
3.1 Definition
Acceptance Criteria for risk Criteria that are used to express a risk level that is considered
acceptable for the activity in question, limited to the high level
expressions of risk.
Accidental event Event or chain of events that may cause loss of life, health, or damage
to environment or assets.
Barrier A measure which reduces the probability of realising a hazards
potential for harm and of reducing its consequences. Barriers may be
physical, (materials, protective devices shields, segregation etc) or non
- physical (procedures, inspection, training, drills)
Can Verbal form used for statements of possibility and capability, whether
material, physical or casual.
Defined situations of A selection of possible events that the emergency preparedness in the
hazard and accident (DFU) activity should be able to handle, based on the activity’s dimensioning

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
accidental situations associated with a temporary increase of risk and

less extensive accidental events.
Dimensional explosion Explosion which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria
represents an unacceptable risk, and which consequently serves as a
basis for design and operation of installations and for the
implementation of the relevant activity in general.
Dimensional Fire A fire which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria
implementation of the relevant activity in general.
Dimensioning accidental Accidental events that serve as the basis for layout, dimensioning and
events (DUH) use of installations and the activity at large, in order to meet the
defined risk acceptance criteria.
Dimensioning accidental The most severe accidental load that the function or system shall be
load (DUL) able to withstand during a required period of time, in order to meet the
defined risk acceptance criteria
Dimensioning explosion Explosion, which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria
represents an unacceptable risk and which consequently, serves as a
implementation of relevant activity in general.
Dimensioning fire A fire which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria
implementation of relevant activity in general.
Emergency lighting Lighting which will ensure adequate light conditions on the
installation in the event of failure of the main power supply.
Emergency power system System to ensure continuos power supply to important equipment in
the event of failure of the main power supply. This includes
generators, control panels, hydraulic pumps, accumulators etc.
Emergency service areas Safe areas by location where the emergency equipment such as fire
pumps emergency generators are located.
Explosion load The pressure generated by violent combustion of a flammable gas or
mist which generates pressure effects due to confinement of the
combustion induced flow and/or the acceleration of the flame front by
obstacles in the flame front.
External communication Systems which ensure necessary communication to and from the
Systems installation.
Fire load The total quantity of heat released in the case of complete combustion
of all combustible materials in an area, including materials in walls,
decks and ceiling.
Fire pump system The total system, which supplies water for fire-fighting system, i.e.
water inlets with filters, fire pumps, risers, power sources, power
transmissions, fuel pipes/tanks and control systems.
Functional specification As defined in ISO 13879 and 13880:
Document that specifies the requirements expressed by features,
characteristics, process conditions, boundaries and exclusions defining
the performance of the product, process or service.
Hazard Potential for human injury, damage to the environment, damage to
property or a combination of these.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Hazard assessment Process whereby the results of hazard analyses are considered against
either judgement, standards, or criteria which have been developed as
basis for decision making.
Hazards Register A document providing a brief, but complete, overview of the identified
hazards and the measures necessary to manage them. The hazards
register also provides references to more detailed information relevant
to a particular hazard.
Informative references Shall mean informative in the application of NORSOK Standards.
Intermittently manned Work area or work place where inspection, maintenance or other work
is planned to last at least two hours a day for at least 50 per cent of the
installation’s operation time.
Internal communication Systems which ensure that messages can be communicated to and
Systems from various areas on the installation.
May Verbal form used to indicate a course of action permissible within the
limits of the standard.
Normally not manned Work area or work place that is not permanently or intermittently
manned.
Normative references Shall mean normative (a requirement) in the application of NORSOK
Standards.
NORSOK Norsk Sokkels Konkurranseposisjon, the Competitive standing of the
Norwegian Offshore Sector, the Norwegian initiative to reduce cost on
offshore projects.
Permanently manned Work area or work place manned at least 8 hours a day for at least 50
per cent of the installation’s operation time.
Recognised institution An institution which is internationally and/or nationally recognised
within a professional field, and which possesses adequate competence
and experience within that field.
Shall Verbal form used to indicate requirements strictly to be followed in
order to conform to the standard and from which no deviation is
permitted, unless accepted by all involved parties.
Should Verbal form used to indicate that among several possibilities one is
recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding
others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily
required.
Temporary Refuge (TR) A place provided where personnel can take refuge for a pre-
determined period whilst investigations, emergency response and
evacuation pre-planning are undertaken.
All terms and phrases within the scope of this standard shall be regarded as defined in the regulations
and international codes and standards referred to in this document. Where this is not unambiguous,
the definition in this standard shall be used.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
3.2 Abbreviations
AFFF Aqueous film forming foam
API American Petroleum Institute (US)
APS Abandon Platform Shutdown
ASC Area safety charts
BOP Blow Out Preventer
CCR Central Control Room
CFD Computerised flow dynamic
DAL Design Accidental Load
DHSV Down Hole Safety Valve
DUH Dimensioning Accidental Event
DUL Dimensioning Accidental Load
EERS Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Strategy (ISO 13702)
ESD Emergency Shut Down
ESDV Emergency Shut Down Valve
F&G Fire and Gas
FES Fire Explosion Strategy (ISO 13702)
FPDS Fire protection data sheet
HAZID Hazard identification
HAZOP Hzard and operability
HC Hydrocarbons
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IMO International maritime organisation
IP Institute of Petroleum (UK)
IR Infra Red
KO Knock Out
LEL Lower Explosion Limit
LQ Living Quarter
MOB Man Over Board
MSF Module support frame
NFPA National Fire Protection Association (US)
NNMI Normally Not Manned Installations
NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
PA Public Address
PCDA Process control and data acquisition
PCS Process Control System
PSD Process Shut Down
RAL Deutches Institut fur Gutesicherung und Kennzeichnung e.V., Bonn
RP Recommended practice
SAS Safety and Automation Systems
TR Temporary Refuge
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply
UV Ultra Violet
VDU Visual Display Unit

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
4 SAFETY EVALUATION, MANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION
4.1 General
A Health, Safety and Environmental Program (HSE) shall be developed according to the E&P forum
guideline: “Guidelines for the Development and Application of HSE Management Systems”. This
program shall among other issues address the follow up and closing of specific safety problem areas.
Safety objectives established by operator/project other than those specified by this NORSOK standard
and ISO 13702 shall be identified and expressed in the form of design objectivesand performance
standards (See 4.4). These shall be developed specifically for each development or modification
project.
The FES shall reflect the mitigating and consequence reduction measures to be implemented.
Ambient conditions (normal operations or emergencies) shall be clearly defined and included in
requirements to equipment and systems covered by this standard.
4.2 Risk reduction principles

The probability reducing measures shall be given priority over consequence reducing measures.
The incorporation of this overall principle in the design calls for consideration of the following, listed
in order of priority:
• Inherent safety
• Simplicity, comprehensibility, maintainability and recognisability e.g. by elimination of
complexity that may lead to human failure
• Failure mechanisms. E.g. leading to leaks and releases of hazardous substances, ignitions or
mechanisms reducing the reliability and survivability of barriers and safety systems.
• Escalation prevention, e.g. by safety barriers
• Experience retention from operational reliability and incident databases.
4.3 Analyses and optimisation

The design principles presented in clauses 5 to 12 reflect a normally adequate standard for safe
design, whereas the project risk acceptance criteria are reflecting the maximum risk level, not
necessarily achieved through a standard design. This is because the safety level depends on several
factors, partly outside the range of standardisation, e.g. detailed layout and arrangement, operational
aspects, environmental conditions, and new technology.
Therefore a fit for purpose approach shall be performed through consideration of possible Hazards
and Hazardous events in the design. The Hazards and Hazardous events shall be systematically
identified and updated regularly along with the development of the project. This process shall be
documented, e.g. in a Hazards Register.
Risk and emergency preparedness analysis shall be carried out with the objective to identify the
hazards, their frequency, causes and consequeces and to verify that the risk acceptance criteria are
met. Timing, scope and method of risk and emergency preparedness analysis shall allow for the
analysis to be both a tool for decision making as well as, when relevant, a verification of acceptance
criteria being met through implementation of technical and operational safety requirements.
NORSOK Z-013 states the requirements on the planning, execution and use of risk and emergency
preparedness analysis.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
A vulnerability/availability analysis shall be carried out to ensure that safety critical systems and
functions maintain their integrity and perform their duty during credible accident scenarios for the
time period their functions are required. The effects from fires and explosions on operation and
stability on ESD, Fire & Gas detection and PA/alarm systems are typical examples of targets for such
analysis. See NORSOK Z-013 Clause 5.3.8.
HAZOP according to ISO 10418 shall be used as a tool in the system optimisation process to achieve
system safety and operability.
Cost/benefit evaluation should be applied to study different design alternatives. See NORSOK Z-013
and NORSOK Z-016.
4.4 Documentation
The safety design shall be documented to present how the design fulfils regulations, standards and
norms as required by the internal control system and to document the basis and assumptions for Risk
and Emergency preparedness evaluations. Further, the project documentation provides the basis and
necessary information for safe operation, modifications and development of the facility.
Documentation should be produced as follows, but with the necessary additions where this is
considered necessary the particular needs of each project. The documentation may be one or several
documents.
1. HSE program
2. FES (Fire and Explosion Strategy).
3. EERS (Evacuation, Escape and Rescue strategy).
4. Performance Standard for Safety systems. See Note 1
5. Design accidental load requirements
6. Documented sectionalisation of the process plant including categorization and location of ESD
and PSD valves.
7. Fire and gas detection arrangements.
8. Fire Protection Data Sheets / Area Safety Charts
9. Reliability/sensitivity/availability/vulnerability analyses for safety systems
10. Safety arrangements drawings as follows:
- Passive fire and blast protection.
- Escape ways, muster areas, means of evacuation
- Area classification- schedule of sources
- Miscellaneous safety equipment.
- Active fire protection
Safety interface documents shall be produced where relevant to demonstrate how these safety
requirements are met, e.g. between:
- Fixed platform and mobile offshore units, e.g. drilling rig or accommodation rig.
- Fixed platform and storage units
- Different contractors.
Safety evaluations as required by this standard shall be documented.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Note 1 Performance standard for Safety systems shall define the functional and specific requirements
for the design of the ESD/PSD/F&G systems, firewater system, HVAC and isolation of ignition
sources. Further it will be presented how these systems is meant to work together to minimize
escalation and consequences of mishaps and accidents.
5 EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
5.1 Introduction
An EERS shall be developed for the installation based on ISO 13702 Chapter 4/Annex B 12 and
Emergency preparedness analyses as described in NORSOK Z-013. The EERS for the installation
will define and document the adequate strategy and requirements to escape evacuation and rescue
installations and equipment.
In addition to the requirements in the referred standards the following requirements shall apply:
- All evacuation equipment shall be type approved according to SOLAS and national maritime
regulatory requirements.
- The layout of presentation mimics and monitors in the Central Control Room shall consider
management of emergency situations.
- The design of the facilities shall consider and cater for an effective execution of the Emergency
Preparedness activities.
See Annex B for details relating to evacuation principles.
5.2 Evacuation
The requirements relating to safe evacuation will be met by using a combination of means of
evacuation according to current practice i.e.:
a) Helicopter.
b) Free fall lifeboats.
c) Escape chute with life raft.
d) Bridge to neighbouring installation
Number, size and location of evacuation means shall be established based on manning, risk analyses
(e.g. risk exposure of escape routes towards main shelter area), and emergency preparedness analysis.
The time for evacuation, together with the required search and rescue operations shall be established
and the escape routes and other facilities as firewalls, radiation shields etc. designed accordingly.
The minimum number of free fall lifeboats for fixed installations available during a dimensional
accidental event shall be corresponding to the maximum number of personnel (100%) on board plus
one additional boat. Latter is meant to provide escape for the damage control team. If there is an
additional lifeboat located in an area on the installation other than the main evacuation area, this
lifeboat shall not be counted, as the additional lifeboat required

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
The number of free fall lifeboats for floating installations shall correspond to the maximum number
of people onboard and be available in design weather conditions and with dimensional accidental heel
angels, plus the significant dynamic heel in the same weather and accidental condition.
The manning to be considered shall comprise all personnel on board, including day visitors.
The total life raft capacity at escape chutes shall as a minimum correspond to the total number of
personnel (100%) on board as documented in the EERS and according to the emergency preparedness
analyses. The life raft and boarding rafts shall be lowered together with the chute. By lowering the
chute, the boarding chute shall automatically inflate.
The distance between lifeboats and escape chute shall be large enough to ensure that a dropped boat
will not hit a lowered escape chute.
For detailed recommendations related to safety equipment see Annex C.
5.3 Rescue
Generally the installation shall be covered by one Man Overboard Boats (MOB`s). This one should
be evaluated for use together with the one on the stand by vessel. Other combinations will be
acceptable as proven by the emergency preparedness analyses.
The functional requirements for time from man overboard alaram until being seaborn shall be defined
by the emergency preparedness analyses. Utilisation of the deck crane to lift the MOB on to the
installation shall be evaluated.
6 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT
6.1 General requirements

Reference is given to clauses 5, 7 and 13 in ISO 13702 for layout, orientation and location of
equipment and functions. The main principles for layouts are listed below.
For further details see Annex D.
• The wellhead area should be located and designed so as to allow for external fire fighting
assistance.
• Allow for identification of the blowing well in a possible blow out situation.
• The utility area should serve as a barrier between hazardous areas and LQ/emergency service
areas. Good access to areas and equipment shall be ensured in order to achieve effective manual
fire fighting both from the installation and by external assistance.
• Routing of hydrocarbon piping to, or through, the utility area shall be minimised and flanges
avoided. One flange connection can be arranged in each fuel line to combustion engines in utility
the area.
• Routing of hydrocarbon piping is not allowed in the living quarter areas.
• Routing of liquid piping of any kind is not allowed through electrical, instrument and control room
• Routing of hydrocarbon piping within emergency service areas shall be limited to diesel fuel
supply lines for the emergency services themselves.
• The use of explosion panels and weather protection shields shall be kept to a minimum, with a
preference to open naturally ventilated areas. Where such arrangements are likely to cause an
unacceptable working environment special solutions such as erection of temporary shields for
maintenance operations should be considered.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
• Where explosions panels, walls or shields are provided, the possible utilisation of fire fighting
vessels during emergencies should be considered. 6.1.1 Area classification
6.2 Area Classification

The definition of hazardous areas shall be in accordance with IEC 60079-10 and IEC 61892-7.
For design principles related to pressurisation of rooms, alarms and disconnection upon loss of
pressurisation, ref. is made to IEC 60079-13.
Gases with molecular weight between 21 and 35 shall be regarded as both heavier and lighter than air
(molecular weight air = 29).
The classification of hazardous areas shall be based on events and situations associated with normal
platform operations, e.g. continuous or periodic venting, evaporation from open handling systems,
small leaks from flanges and gaskets, escape of flammable substances during maintenance and work-
over operations. See Annex D Layout.
All electrical equipment in naturally ventilated areas shall be certified safe type apparatus. Where
certified safe type apparatus is not available, the apparatus shall be electrically isolated on single gas
detection or confirmed gas detection dependent on the importance of the equipment.
6.3 Escape routes

The escape routes and the temporary refuge shall be in accordance with ISO 13702 clause 14.
Guidelines for the design of escape routes are listed in Annex B. For large manned installations the
escape route system and the temporary refuge (TR) shall be available for at least 1 hour, i.e. at least
one route of escape from each area not directly affected by the event shall be available.
Escape routes shall be well marked, including signs. Escape routes on decks shall be provided with a
non-skid, oil resistant coating in the “safety yellow colour” RAL 1023. On deck grating, two parallel
100mm wide yellow lines shall be painted indicating the width of the escape route. Marking shall
show the preferred direction of escape.
6.4 HVAC
Natural ventilation and open modules shall be preferred and the effect of natural ventilation shall be
assessed and documented.
A strategy for active control of possible smoke from fire in living quarters, TR and other
mechanically ventilated areas shall be developed and included in the design of HVAC system. Ref.
NORSOK H-001 HVAC.
All air inlets shall be located in non-hazardous areas, as far as practicable away from possible HC
leakage sources, and minimum 3 m from any zones 2 boundary. Simulation studies or wind tunnel
tests should be used for location of main HVAC air inlets to ensure operation of HVAC systems
serving quarters and emergency equipment rooms to be minimal affected by smoke and escaped gases
from incidents onboard.
For arrangement and protection of non-hazardous rooms with access to hazardous areas, ref. is made
to IEC 60079-13 and IEC-61892-7.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
6.5 Helicopter deck

The helicopter deck is subject to approval by the national civil aviation administration, ref. BSL D 5-
1.
The turbulence effects from wind across and around the installation as well as influence from turbine
exhausts and flare/vent shall be considered. Simulation studies or wind tunnel tests shall be
performed during design of new installations or modifications of existing ones.
The arrangement shall be evaluated with the assistance of an experienced helicopter pilot.
The helicopter deck should have 3 access ways, sufficiently separated from each other (one pr. 120
degrees).
A continuous walkway around the helicopter deck edge at a level below helicopter deck surface
should be provided. (Approximately 1500 to 1200 mm below the level of the helicopter deck)
The helicopter deck surface shall be self-draining type, suitable for use by trolleys. The friction
coefficient on a wet deck shall be minimum 0,65.
The helicopter deck should be provided with an AFFF system (Pop-up, Safedeck or similar). The
system shall be functioning according to specification within 20 seconds after activation. The system
shall be activated and deactivated from the helicopter deck control room. The system shall be
protected against unplanned activation.
Details regarding drain system on helicopter deck are covered in Annex D.7.
6.6 Emergency service areas

An emergency service area is defined, as an area containing equipment and systems required during
emergency conditions. This includes firewater systems, emergency generators and emergency power
distribution systems, safety and automation system, communication equipment, emergency
ventilation, ballast system and position keeping system. (Ref. ISO 13702).
The location and protection of these systems as well as system design shall secure operations during
and after an emergency condition. The equipment necessary during evacuation is of particular
importance.
6.7 Process area

Fire and explosion evaluations shall be made along with the development of the lay out to minimise
the built in escalation potential. This shall be ensured through the following principles:
1. Equipment and piping containing high-pressure gas should be located in the upper decks above the
Module Support Frame or main hull.
2. Liquid vessels should be located lower than gas equipment.
3. Low-pressure equipment containing large amount of liquids should be located and arranged so that
exposure to jet fires is minimised. If jet fire exposure can not be eliminated, the need for passive
fire protection shall be evaluated.
Process piping, pig launchers and receivers and equipment shall be protected from external impact,
e.g. from dropped objects or missiles due to disintegration of rotating machinery or as found required
through analysis.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
The flare system shall be protected from fire and explosion loads so that its integrity is maintained
until the process plant has been depressurised.
6.8 Riser area

For all hydrocarbon risers; protection from external impact such as ship collisions and drifting objects
shall be evaluated. Locating the risers behind main support structures or dedicated protection
structures may be required to mitigate the risk.
The following means of protection shall be considered:

• For two or more gas risers, or one gas riser together with several oil risers: passive fire protection.
• Pig launchers and receivers: location in open, naturally ventilated areas, at the periphery of the
platform, and with hatches directed away from equipment and structures.
• ESDV's: location in open naturally ventilated areas as close to the sea as practicable to minimise
exposure of the risers from topside accidental events.
• Flanges and instrument connections on the riser side of the ESDV shall not be used on fixed
risers. For flexible risers special considerations have to be made.
• Subsea barriers.
• Utilisation factor
6.9 Flare boom, flare tower, cold vent

Flare booms and flare towers shall be located and designed with due attention to all relevant flaring
rates and wind conditions to ensure that the heat radiation level (ref. Annex E, clause E.4 Flaring)
will be within acceptance limits in all areas of the installation, with due regard to exposure of
operators, structures such as cranes and towers, electrical and mechanical equipment and piping.
The flare flame or hot gases shall not represent a hazard due to increased surface temperature in
exposed areas. Particular attention should be paid to crane and drill tower wires/structures and
personnel in exposed areas. Further the design of the cold vent systems shall cater for heat loads
caused by a possible ignition of the discharge.
A flare/vent study is required, identifying the potential effects in all exposed areas.
6.10 Drilling and wellhead area

The drilling and well head areas shall be located with maximum distance to the living quarters and
areas with emergency equipment and functions, and be separated from utility and processing areas in
order to minimise the consequences from a blow out.
Possible collapse of the derrick shall be evaluated.
The well heads shall be located as high as practicable and above the main support frame or main hull
in order to minimise exposure from a well head fire, and to facilitate control of a blow out on the
installation.
Consideration shall be given to the protection of well and BOP equipment, such as control panels and
hydraulic systems and their related signal paths.
Simultaneous drilling, work over and/or production shall be evaluated in detail taking into account
operational procedures to ensure an acceptable safety level of the operation of the installation.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
7 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN
7.1 Design accidental loads

Accidental loads shall be identified and taken into account in the structural design. The probability,
magnitude and potential consequences of identified loads shall be assessed and analysed.
Relevant loads are:

• Impact loads caused by dropped object, ship collision or others.
• Dropped objects:
Protection of structure to be dimensioned for falling container, pipes etc. based on estimated
weight, probable drop height, vulnerability and criticality of the exposed areas.
• Ship collision:
The possibility of collisions caused by merchant vessels and the need for adequate sea traffic
surveillance system shall be evaluated. For supply vessels operating alongside the installation, a
collision load of 14MJ shall be assumed.
• Explosion loads:
- Explosion loads affecting main structures
- Explosion loads affecting secondary structures, e.g. walls acting as barriers between main areas.
- Explosion loads acting on support of pressure vessels, flare headers, fire ring main, ESD valves
etc. shall be considered.
- Explosion loads shall be established by use of recognized computer models, e.g. FLACS. See
clause 10.8.
• Heat loads caused by jet fires or pool fires on the installation or adjacent installation, from risers or
from the sea surface in case of large oil releases to the sea or in case of sub sea gas releases.
- Fire:
Installations that can be exposed to a dimensioning fire on the sea shall be able to withstand this
for a time period sufficient for safe evacuation of the installation. The endurance shall not be less
than 1 hour. Fixed installations shall be protected against fire on sea, as identified by risk
analyses. For blow-out/fire on sea concerning floating installations, see clause 11.6.
• Loads caused by extreme weather, earthquake, damage to structural elements (damaged condition)
or extreme temperatures.
• Design accidental loads shall be specified in the design accidental load specification.
• A weight control database shall be maintained to ensure that jacket or hull loads do not exceed
their design weight limit.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
8 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY

FACILITIES

Process and auxiliary systems shall be designed, manufactured, equipped and installed in such a way
that the installations can be operated and maintained safely.
Process and auxiliary facilities shall be designed such that no single failure during operations can lead
to unacceptable hazardous situations. This principle shall apply to operational errors as well as
equipment failure.
8.2 Safety shutdown systems

A safety shutdown system shall be independent of and in addition to other systems and equipment
used for normal operation, control and monitoring, and shall act as a safety barrier in case of
malfunction or maloperation of these systems and equipment.
The safety shutdown system shall be logically divided into three main levels of shutdown:
• Abandon platform shutdown (APS).
• Emergency shutdown (ESD).
• Process shutdown (PSD).
Basic system philosophy is that a signal on a certain level should never initiate shutdowns or actions
on higher levels, but shall always include shutdowns on lower levels.
The APS and ESD system shall be separate from the PSD - system
For more details reference is given to clause 9.3 Emergency shutdown.
8.3 Process safety

Two levels of protection according to ISO 10418 shall control abnormal operating conditions leading
to potential hydrocarbon release:
• Primary level of protection.
• Secondary level of protection.
As far as possible, the two levels of protection shall operate on functionally different basis.
Duplication of identical safety devices given different set points does not satisfy the requirement of
two levels of protection.
The PSD system shall automatically detect abnormal operating conditions within systems or
equipment and initiate actions so that uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons is prevented.
The systems shall be designed to avoid cascading effects due to partial shutdown within PSD, i.e.
shutdown signals should trip all affected systems so that a new abnormality is not developed as a
result of the initial trip action.
The system philosophy shall ensure that the fail safe principle is applied. I.e. components shall move
to, or stay in the predetermined safest position upon loss of signal or power.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
The degree and extent of a PSD situation will depend on type of abnormality, and may vary from
equipment shutdown with minimum effect on the production rate, to a total process shutdown.
Pressure relief and depressurising of hydrocarbon systems is covered in Annex E.
9 REQUIREMENTS TO SAFETY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

The general requirements to safety and communication systems shall be in accordance with ISO
13702 clause 10 and 14.
The line of actions performed by personnel and automatic safety system during emergencies shall be
automatically recorded to the extent it can ease investigations and experience retention after any
incident.
9.2 Fire and Gas detection
9.2.1 General
All F&G detection system display and information facilities shall be centralised, and located in a
continuously manned area, normally the central control room
Loop faults and -supervision shall be identified according to NFPA 72.
With the installation divided into fire areas the design of the F&G system shall presume that each fire
area shall be covered by a sufficient number of detectors suitable for detection of probable fires or
accidental releases of toxic or flammable gases in the area.
The gas detection system shall have detectors for hydrogen sulphide in relevant areas on installations
where such gas can occur. The alarm presentation in CCR should in addition to screens (VDUs) be
given on a simple fire and gas mimic. Further details regarding screen presentation is found in
NORSOK I-CR-002 Safety and Automation Systems (SAS).
Local F&G display and status facilities shall be provided in the drilling area incorporating F&G
monitoring of the drilling facilities.
The F&G system shall be designed so that maintenance, function testing etc. can be carried out
without disabling the system. The location of fire - and gas detectors shall be based on defined
scenarios, simulations and actual tests.
Detail requirements for F & G system is incorporated in Annex F.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
9.3 Emergency shutdown
9.3.1 General
References are given to ISO 13702 clause 6.
The installation shall be analysed to identify potential hazardous conditions and their consequences.
The critical operating parameters shall be selected and emergency shutdown logic developed. Due
consideration shall be given to the event sequence in relation to the overall installation safety. In the
detail assessments of ESD philosophy, actions associated with time delays in the achievement of a
state of no escalation potential shall be identified and the implications on ESD philosophy
determined. Consideration shall be given to interrelations between fields and installations
interconnected e.g. by pipelines or control systems.
The ESD hierarchy shall be kept simple with respect to sub-levels. This to ease understanding and
future updating. Three main shutdown levels shall be included, see clause 8.2.
The ESD principle hierarchy presented in figure 9.1 shall be applied for complex installations and
used as guidance for simpler installations. For drilling operations see clause 9.3.4.
9.3.2 ESD valves

ESD-valves shall be located and arranged in such a way that the exposure from fires and explosions
is minimised. Pneumatic and hydraulic tubing shall be capable of resisting loads from fire and
explosion until they have completed the shut down sequence.
Instrument tubing from accumulators and hydraulic oil return lines should be protected from
mechanical damage, which could adversely affect valve performance.
If hydraulic or pneumatic accumulators are used to move emergency shutdown valves to safe
position, they should be positioned as close to the valve as possible to ensure the best possible
availability. The accumulator capacity should be adequate for at least three operations (close-open-
close). Spring return type of valves shall be used when required size is available.
On installations that are normally manned, only manual, local to the valve resetting of emergency
shutdown valves shall be possible, as advised from the control centre.
If an emergency shutdown valve is used as process safety valve, the signal from the emergency
shutdown system shall be conducted to the actuator or to a hydraulic/pneumatic control valve for the
actuator separate from the process safety system. An evaluation shall be carried out to determine
which system design will represent the highest availability during an emergency shutdown.
If an ESD valve is connected to the PCS system, the process control function shall be performed
completely separate from the ESD functions.
Emergency shutdown valves that may be exposed to fire shall preferably have metal to metal seats. If
other seats are used, the valve shall be fire tested in accordance with API 6FA or BS 6755.
The location of ESD valves shall be determined based on the FES.
The design of the emergency shutdown system shall be such as to allow extensive function testing to
be carried out without interrupting the operations.
Valve leak testing procedures with acceptance criteria shall be developed.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Further the following functional requirements apply to ESD valves:
• Local position indicators shall be installed and end position indications presented in the control
room through the PSD system.
• The valve shall fail to safe position. Usually closed position.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Manual Push Button
APS
Activation of:
Manual Push ! DHSV s
Button ! Automatic depressurisation
Timerbased shutdown of:

Gas detected in ! F&G System
a non-hazarea ! PA System
! ESD and PSD Systems
! UPS System
! Radio/ext. communication
! Emergency generator
! Bilge/Ballast pumps
Gas detected at local

HVAC intake
ESD1
Shutdown of:
Manual Push Button ! Isolate non-Ex ! Main generator
equ. in area ! All non-ex equip.
Gas/Water heat ! Shutdown
exchanger tube fans/heaters
rupture and close Start of:
dampers ! Emergency generator
Fire detection
in a hazardous
Gas detected a hazardous area
area
ESD2
Manual Push button Isolate all ign. Sources

in nat. ventilated areas
K.O. Drum LAHH ind.
Activation of:
Low-low instrument air ! DHSV (upon riser- or wellhead fire)
pressure (PALL) ! Riser ESDV s
! Depressurisation (man. or automatic)
Low-low hydraulic
pressure (PALL) Shutdown of:
! Fuel gas supply
PSD
Figure 9.1 Emergency Shutdown Principle Hierarchy

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
9.3.3 Facilities for Manual Shutdown

Manual APS stations shall be located at a few strategic positions such as:
• Muster areas
• Lifeboat stations
• Helicopter deck
• CCR
• Bridge connections.
Manual ESD stations shall be located in essential areas such as:

• Exits from areas with hydrocarbon piping and equipment e.g. wellheads, drilling, process etc.
• The need for ESD stations in other rooms and areas shall be evaluated.
9.3.4 Shutdown of drilling and work-over operations

Shutdowns of drilling and work-over operations should only be manually activated. Fire or gas
detected in rooms critical for the drilling and work-over operations as well as loss of air flow into
these rooms shall not give an automatic shutdown, but give alarm to the responsible drilling
personnel.
The adverse effects of automatic shutdowns shall be thoroughly evaluated for each case of automatic
action that are accepted.
By any other ESD, the drilling and work-over operations shall not be automatically affected, except
for burning on the burner boom, which shall be stopped automatically. Supply of back-up power to
the drilling plant in case of main power generation shutdown shall be subject to evaluation.
9.4 Ignition source control

Equipment left live after initiation of APS shall be certified for operation in zone 1 areas. Only
equipment required for the safety operations, see figure 9.1, which is located in rooms continuously
manned or monitored in emergency situations, shall be left live after APS. Such equipment shall be
easily isolated manually from the manned area/room. A timer shall be provided to allow for systems
to remain in operation until evacuation is completed.
Equipment left live in the ESD I situation shall be certified for operation in zone 1 areas. Emergency
equipment in LQ and other areas may be left live subject to special considerations.
Examples of equipment that can be accepted without certification for zone 1 areas are the following
equipment located inside or in the vicinity of the Living Quarter.
• Emergency generator.
• Emergency switch gear.
• Equipment in CCR required for the control of the ESD I situation.
• Critical equipment for internal/external communication in the living quarter.
• Equipment in the living quarter connected to the main power supply.
"Low gas alarm" - detection anywhere on the installation shall isolate all high-risk ignition sources
located in naturally ventilated areas. This includes temporary equipment e.g. combustion engines and
electrical sockets including welding sockets, and non- Ex equipment operated under hot work permit.
(See figure 9.1)

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Confirmed gas detection at HVAC air intake to local electrical/instrument rooms or emergency
generator room shall close inlet dampers, shut down fan(s), shut down heater(s) and isolate all non-
Ex equipment inside the respective room.
For above mentioned circuits, no hot conductors shall be found outside their feeding switchboards
when isolated.
9.5 Alarm and communication system

The objective of the alarm and communication system is to warn and guide personnel as quickly as
possible in the event of a hazardous or emergency situation.
Location, number, type and effect from alarm systems/equipment/signal shall be easily recognised in
any area where distribution of the alarm is required. Alarm voice communication shall be heard in a
surrounding noise level up to 83 dB. In areas with noise levels of 85 dB and above the audible alarm
shall be supplemented by light signals.
Audible alarms and messages shall be recognisable in the muster areas even if initiation of the safety
systems or the accident itself increases the background noise level.
The alarm signals shall be in accordance with table 9.5.1.
An audible alarm signal shall always be followed by an announcement on the Public Address system.
For zoning of alarms, see table F.1 and F.2 found in Annex F.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Table 9.5.1 Alarm signals.
Alarm Type Signal Indicates

Muster Alarm Continuous audible signal of Prepare to abandon installation
variable frequency. Yellow
flashing light or rotating visual
lamp
General Alarm Intermittent audible signal of Fire or gas leak or other
constant frequency. serious situations
(1 sec. on, 1 sec. off). Yellow
flashing or rotating visual lamp
Toxic Gas Alarm Intermittent audible signal Toxic gas, e.g. H2S.
Note 1. (0,1 sec. on, 0,1 sec off). Yellow
flashing or rotating visual lamp
Local alarm in rooms Local red light at entrance. Gas released.
protected by CO2 or Local high freq. tone in room/area Note 2.
other gases with lethal and in adjacent room/area
concentrations. providing access.
Inert gas protected Local red light at entrance. Gas released.
rooms/areas. Note 3.
Alert Two level audible tone on PA Important announcement to
system. follow on PA system
Notes
1. At small local occurrences, local alarm may suffice.
2. Pre-warning signal shall be used in and at doors to rooms protected by gasses that could
be lethal.
3. Pre warning before release to be considered in inert gas protected rooms.
Note 1 Frequencies for the different alarms are found in NORSOK T-100 Telecom Subsystems.
The system shall be designed to give appropriate access priorities.
Radio signal transmission for internal communication shall be catered for allowing communication to
and from every location on the installation.
9.6 Emergency power

The emergency power shall be supplied from a diesel engine driven emergency generator, capable of
supplying the consumers with emergency power for at least 18 hours. The emergency generator shall
be exclusively dedicated for supply of emergency power during emergency mode of operation. The
emergency generator system shall be self-contained. Arrangements for black start shall be provided.
Start and monitoring of the emergency power system shall be possible from the CCR where a matrix
panel or dedicated VDU picture shall display the status of the generator.
In addition to automatic starting provisions a manual starting and testing device shall be provided.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
The prime mover for emergency generators can be stopped automatically in the event of:
1. gas detection in ventilation air inlet
2. overspeeding,
3. loss of lubricating oil pressure
4. Item 1 and 3 above do not apply to emergency generator(s) supplying firepump(s)
The following equipment/systems should be supplied from the emergency generators.
• Safety and Automation System (SAS)

• Diesel transfer systems.
• HVAC smoke ventilation system.
• Compressor for instrument air.
• Sea water utility pumps.
• Charging of UPS.
• Emergency lighting.
• Compressors for smoke diver bottles.
• De - icing systems.
• Bilge pumps.
• Lubrication oil pumps and ventilation fans required for run down of turbines and generators after a
shut down
• Drilling systems (often by separate drilling back-up generator).
• One deck crane.
• Purging systems.
• Fire waters and foams systems (when emergency generators supply fire water/foam pumps, the
requirements for such systems apply to emergency generators).
• Other active fire protection systems, as required by FES.
• Helicopter landing equipment.
• Communication systems.
• Process control system.
• PSD system.
An uninterrupted power supply (UPS) for emergency equipment and systems shall be installed.
Emergency batteries shall have a capacity to supply emergency power for a minimum period of 30
minutes, ref. ISO 13702, table C1.
The emergency power distribution system shall be sufficiently protected against fire and explosion to
operate during an emergency situation until safe evacuation has been performed. The emergency
power generation and distribution shall be separated from normal power generation and distribution
to the extent that a local fire cannot put both systems out of operation. The following principles shall
be the basis for arrangement/layout of emergency power systems
1. prime movers of emergency equipment with associated equipment shall be located in separate
rooms in non-hazardous areas,
2. equipment for emergency power supply is appropriately located and preferably in separate rooms,
3. emergency generators with distribution boards, chargers etc. shall be located in separate rooms in
non-hazardous areas,
4. emergency batteries shall be located in separate rooms in non-hazardous areas except for sealed
batteries can be located within emergency switchgear rooms,

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
5. combustion air for prime movers of emergency equipment is supplied from non-hazardous areas,
6. the combustion air inlet is separated from the ventilation air inlet of the room,
7. fuel for prime movers should not represent an explosion hazard under anticipated operating
conditions,
8. exhaust pipes from prime movers of emergency equipment should neither emit sparks nor have a
surface temperature which exceeds the ignition temperature of the gas mixture which is produced
or stored on the installation.
IMO MODU CODE, Chapter 5 provides additional useful guidance.
9.7 Communication through signs and markings

Means of communication through signs and markings shall include:
a. An emergency preparedness station bill, which shall be efficiently communicated to all personnel
on the installation.
b. Marking by painting, reflection materials/light surfaces that can be recognised visually or by
touching, e.g. a characteristic roughness.
c. Signs showing the way to or marking the location of the following:
1. Emergency preparedness equipment.
2. Safety and first aid equipment
3. Evacuation routes.
4. Safe areas.
5. Evacuation equipment.
6. Muster stations
Text on signs shall be both in English and Norwegian.
Recognised standard for the design of signs is to be found in Norsk Standard (Norwegian Standard)
NS-ISO 6309.
10 REQUIREMENTS TO EXPLOSION AND FIRE PROTECTION
10.1 Fire and Explosion strategy (FES)

The FES shall be established together with the lay out and later updated and detailed together with the
development of the installation concept. The requirements for the development of a FES are defined
below and in ISO 13702 clause 4.
The FES shall consider the fire and explosion hazards and describe how the installation will deal with
the consequences of these hazards. Further the FES will describe the optimisation of passive and
active fire protection on one hand and lay out considerations like location of equipment/valves and
separation distances on the other.
10.2 General requirements to fireprotection. FES

The specific requirements for fire protection are described in ISO 13702 clause 11 and Annex A and
Annex B 8.
Active and passive fire protection shall be arranged to ensure that a fire is prevented from spreading
to other areas within a specified period of time and to protect load carrying structure against critical

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
heat loads. Possible failure of the firewater systems and its effect shall be considered. For Major
Hazards like riser fires or burning blow outs, the required time period before impairment shall be
defined.
Shielding of escape-routes and evacuation stations shall be as required to ensure escape from all areas
and evacuation from the installation Necessary input will be provided by the risk and emergency
preparedness analyses)
The fire loads to be considered within an area may be limited through location of ESD or PSD valves.
An evaluation shall therefore be made regarding location and categorisation of these valves.
Other means to limit the consequences of liquid fires are bunds and drains.
Fire protection data sheets shall document the fire protection design / area safety charts see Annex J.
10.3 Requirements for passive fire protection of equipment, piping and secondary structures.
A procedure for evaluation of protection of pressure vessels and process piping is included in Annex
G.
Saddles and secondary structures supporting HC pressure vessels shall be passive fire protected to
avoid failure during the defined fire-scenarios.
10.4 Fire technical requirements relating to materials

Materials on the installation shall, as a rule be non-combustible. If it is justified from a safety point of
view to make use of materials that do not meet the requirements to non combustibility, such materials
shall have limited flame spread properties, low smoke development and heat generation.
An assessment shall be made of the toxicity of gases emitted in the event of a fire.
Documentation shall be available to support the basis for the decision regarding selection of
materials.
Materials used in the living quarters should to the extent possible be non-combustible. If surface
treatment of paint or other coating is used, the properties of the product with regard to flame spread
shall be considered. A corresponding evaluation shall also be carried out with regard to textiles.
Floor, wall and roof finishes shall pass the fire test requirements in IMO Resolution A 653 (flame
spread). In addition, the materials shall comply with the requirements of ISO 5660 (smoke and
ignition properties).
10.5 Passive fire protection

For separation between main fire areas reference is made to ISO 13702 table C.4. Fire partitions
exposed to hydrocarbon fires shall be rated according to an H-class.
Living quarters shall be designed and protected so as to ensure that the safety functions they are
designed for can be maintained during a dimensioning accidental event. See ISO 13702 Clause 12.
If fire technical calculations indicate that the outer surfaces of living quarters in the event of a
dimensioning fire may be subjected to a heat flux exceeding 100 kW/m2, they shall be fitted with fire
divisions of minimum class H-60.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Windows in H partitions shall be avoided.
Penetrations, e.g. for ventilation ducts, piping, cables, beams as well as windows and doors in fire
divisions, shall not reduce the strength or the fire integrity of such divisions.
Fire protection materials used in outdoor areas shall comply with NORSOK M-501 Surface
Preparation and Protective Coating.
See Annex I for details relating to Living Quarters.
10.6 Storage and handling of explosives

Explosive commodities shall be stored and handled such that the risk of fire or explosion is
minimised.
All explosives shall be separated from other goods. Storage locations shall be clearly marked and
located in areas free of ignition sources.
The storage location shall be easy accessible with deck cranes for dropping of explosives into the sea
if required.
Incompatible explosives shall be separately stored.
10.7 Active Fire Protection
10.7.1 General
Fixed fire-fighting systems shall be installed in areas representing a major fire risk, and particularly
cover equipment containing significant quantities of hydrocarbons. For definition of fire area see ISO
13702. Firefighting systems other than fire water systems are covered in ISO 13702.
The fire water system shall be operable at all times including periods of maintenance and shall ensure
adequate supply of water for fire fighting. The system shall be designed and calibrated such that
deluge nozzles will receive water not later than 30 seconds after a confirmed fire signal has been
given. For the fire water system the fail-safe principles shall apply. Design according to the latest
edition of NFPA is the minimum requirement if no requirements are given in this standard. See
Annex H.
The capacity and efficiency of the system shall be verified through realistic full scale testing during
commissioning.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM
DEDICATED
FIRE PUMPS
DEDI-
CATED
PRESSURE F&G /
MAINTAINANCE
Fig. 10.1
POWER
CONTROL
GENE- MANUAL DISTRIBUTION
RATION EQUIPMENT SYSTEM
SYSTEM
UNITS
FOAM /PUMP
DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATIC
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT
OVER BOARD DRAIN

DUMP/TEST LINE
Fig 10.1 Firewater system principles.
10.7.2 Prime Mover and FireWater Pumps.

Offshore installations shall be provided with two independent prime mover and firewater pump
systems. Each pump system shall have the capacity to supply 100% of the largest fire water demand.
The water application rates to the various areas and equipment shall be as follows:
- Wellhead area 20 l/min m2

- Manifolds located on FPSO turrets 20 l/min m2
- Area for circulation and treatment of mud 10 l/min m2
- Processing area 10 l/min m2
- Surface of pressure vessels and tanks containing combustibles 10 l/min m2
Other water application rates shall be according to ISO 13702 Annex H.

It is recommended that each pump system consist of 2x50% pump units, unless other solutions are
evaluated to present similar or increased safety level. Ref. clause 10.2.
The following principles shall be the basis for prime mover and firewater pump system design:
- NFPA 20 shall be followed

- Consideration shall be given to two separate modes, normal mode and maintenance mode
- In normal mode the minimum capacity for the system is two separate and independent
systems, each with 100% capacity
- Measures to compensate for possible shut downs in the system due to maintenance shall be
defined and documented as a part of the design. Compensating measures in

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
“light”(maximum 24 h limit of duration) maintenance mode will however, not generate

requirements to system design.
- . The system shall take into account fail to start of a fire pump. This may have implications on
system design.
Fire water pumps with a capacity above 2500 m3/h (each) shall be avoided.
Fire pump systems shall be independent of other systems.
If other system designs are chosen, the reliability of the firewater system shall be equal to an
independent system.
Automatic stop of diesel operated fire pumps shall normally only be permitted due to overspeeding.
Automatic stop can however be accepted if this is documented safer than if the pumps continue to
run. The combustion air inlet shall be equipped with a damper initiated by over speed due to entrance
of gas. Failure of the overspeed securing device should not cause the prime mover for fire pumps to
stop. Simple reset of the systems shall be possible.
All active fire protection field equipment shall be certified for operation in Zone 1, gas type IIA, and
temperature class T3. Exceptions from this are the diesel engines, electric generators and motors
which shall be located in rooms located safe by location and which are not likely to be affected by
accidental gas releases. It shall be possible to operate diesel engines when ventilation to the room has
been shut off.
Dimensioning flow of the fire water pump duty points (100 %) shall include a contingency margin
covering:
- Hydraulic imbalance.
- Overlap of spray zones of deluge and sprinkler nozzles.
- Shadow areas requiring additional nozzles
- Two hydrants.
- Freeze protection
- Cooling of the pump and other emergency units.
Provisions for testing of the fire pumps shall be part of the design, including measurement of
capacities and pressures.
CCR shall be provided with a fire water/foam pump panel with the following control and monitoring
capabilities:
• Selection of fire water/foam pumps for standby/duty.

• Manual start
• Start called for
• Common alarm.
• Firewater/foam pumps unavailable warning.
• Firewater/foam pump running
• Firewater/foam ring main pressure.
All fire water pumps and foam pumps on duty shall start upon confirmed fire detection.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
10.7.3 Fire Ring Main.

The following requirements apply:
a) Fire pump systems are connected to the fire main in such way that damage in one area will not
cause loss of all the fire water supply.
b) fire main and supply shall be routed outside areas where it could be exposed to damage, and be
protected against external forces, such as environment, falling loads, fire, explosion etc.;
c) Shut-off valves and cross connections on the fire main shall be included to enable isolation of
parts of the fire water ring main and to ensure supply to consumers from two different sections of
the ring main.
d) Firewater rings main with branch pipes are at all times filled with water.
e) Each fire water pump (related to100% capacity) shall be connected to the ring main by dedicated
headers with isolation valve between the headers.
10.7.4 Deluge systems

Deluge valves should be of a type which regulates the downstream pressure and which is not
sensitive to pressure surges in the ring main.
Deluge valves shall be provided with a dump line for full capacity testing without wetting the
protected area, i.e. an isolation valve shall be provided downstream the test branch-off point.
Deluge valves shall be provided with manual bypass including flow restriction to match flow through
the valve. The deluge valve skid shall include isolation valves down stream and upstream.
It shall be possible to manually activate deluge skids locally, from CCR or release stations located
along the escape ways outside the fire area itself.
10.7.5 Fireman’s equipment

For details regarding fireman’s equipment see Annex C.
10.8 Explosion protection.
10.8.1 General
An explosion protection strategy shall be established with the objective of minimising the explosion
risk through
-preventing explosions to occur
-minimising the explosion pressure.
-controlling the consequences of explosions
Mitigating measures to reduce possible explosion overpressures, such as start of deluge on confirmed
gasdetection, shall be evaluated and considered for implementation. (Annex H Fire fighting system
has not considered use of deluge for explosion suppression) Reference is given to ISO 13702, clause
13.
A procedure for the determination of the dimensioning explosion load is included in 10.8.2

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
10.8.2 Procedure for establishing the dimensioning explosion loads

The first step should be to establish a criterion for selecting the dimensioning explosion load.
Prior to assessing the explosion loads the consequences of an explosion considered unacceptable to
the installation shall be established. Such consequences may be:
- Global collapse of the structure
- Rupture or unacceptable deformation of explosion barriers
- Deformation of decks leading to unacceptable damage to equipment
- Deformation of hydrocarbon containing equipment leading to an unacceptable escalation of
the accident
- Unacceptable damage to safety equipment or systems that shall function after the explosion
The definition of the dimensioning explosion load shall describe the necessary dynamics in the load
with regard to pressure, time and area distribution. External blast effects outside of primary explosion
area shall be considered.
The explosion load shall be determined based on a conservative selection of a defined number of
scenarios. If this leads to unrealistically high loads, a probability distribution of explosion loads shall
be established based on a probabilistic selection of scenarios taking into account the factors that
influence the types and probabilities of scenarios like
-layout
-leak conditions
-cloud formation conditions
-ignition conditions.
Calculation of explosion overpressures related to the scenarios shall be performed with an advanced
explosion simulator e.g. FLACS.
11 SAFETY ASPECTS RELATED TO FLOATING PRODUCTION,

DRILLING AND STORAGE INSTALLATIONS
11.1 General
This clause contains additional safety design principles related to floating production/ drilling/storage
installations. The risk analysis, emergency preparedness analysis and fire risk analysis, ref. clause 4, 5
and 10 shall be performed, taking the special aspects related to the floating installation into
consideration. In particular the call for automatic shutdown upon detection of hazardous situations
needs to be considered in light of the possible adverse effects. Other issues covered by these standard,
clauses 1-10 shall be applied as relevant. Items covered by clauses 11.3 - 11.9 are related to special
design solutions and should be applied accordingly.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
11.2 Crude storage

Crude storage tanks, and in particular large tanks, shall be subject to special safety considerations in
light of their fire and explosion potential. Main principles for such tanks are described below:
• Large crude storage tanks shall be provided with an adequate and safe vent system, and gases shall
be routed to either cold vent, flare or reclaiming system.
• Location of crude pumps shall be made based on a hazard evaluation for operation and
maintenance of the pumps. Submersed pumps should be preferred.
11.3 Layout
The following additional requirements shall apply concerning the layout of floating installations:
• Vital control functions, e.g. maritime control/bridge, process control and special emergency
preparedness functions, should be arranged in one common control centre for the entire
installation.
• The turret shall be located and arranged to minimise probability and consequences of escalation of
fires/explosions to/from neighbouring areas.
• Hydrocarbon pressure vessels and heavy duty equipment shall not be located within main hull
structure unless it is verified that:
- The explosion venting is sufficient to prevent unacceptable overpressure.
- The fire loads do not cause structural collapse.
• Process decks and relevant parts of the floater deck shall be arranged with the aim of minimising
the risk of large pool fires on decks and tank tops.
• Process areas, turret areas and piping shall be designed to minimise the risk of jet fires towards
tank tops.
• On floating installation that will be turned up against the wind, equipment that can represent and
ignition source should be located as far as possible upwind of potensial leak sources.
• The effects of “green sea” on deck shall be carefully evaluated and means of protection arranged.
• When fire and gas detectors are located, considerations shall be made to environmental effects
caused by close location to the sea and necessary protection arranged.
• Crane coverage and lay down areas shall be arranged to promote safe operations of the cranes and
to minimise the risk of dropped objects.
11.4 Turret
The following design principles apply to turret design:
1. The turret arrangement design shall aim at achieving open naturally ventilated areas and
minimising explosion pressure. Enclosed mechanically ventilated areas shall be restricted to
containers or small rooms with control and special equipment that requires special protection or
cannot be located in outdoor environment. Such enclosed premises shall have over pressure
ventilation, with air taken from and exhausted to a non-hazardous area. Location of the premises
themselves as well as their ventilation intakes shall take into account the prevailing wind
directions. Equipment that can be ignition sources, e.g. electric equipment should not be arranged
in the moon pool area.
2. Anchor handling winches should be located in open areas or in an enclosed non-hazardous area. If
located in hazardous area, suitability for operation in hazardous area shall be ensured. Seawater
spraying (deluge) for spark suppression may be applied to equipment that is exposed to seawater
under normal operations. Where winches are arranged on the deck below Riser Termination and
ESD valves, the deck separating the areas shall be solid and gas tight.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
3. The use of flexible hose connections for well stream transfer, within the turret and between turret
and ship, should be minimised.
4. Fire protection of the turret can be arranged by fixed or oscillating fire monitors located on the
ship, e.g. on gantry structure.
5. Production or export/gas injection risers shall be protected against fires in the turret by passive
means. Routing of risers within conductors is one acceptable design principle. At riser termination
end, the riser connector and first ESD valve shall be protected by passive means. For protection of
other parts of the structure, refer to other relevant parts of this standard.
6. Risers shall be protected against damage from wires and chains used for mooring. Arrangements
that provide both protections against such loads as well as fire protection are preferred.
7. Decks above moon pool where hydrocarbons leaks may occur shall have an adequate drain routed
to a collection tank.
11.5 Drainage/Ballast water systems

These systems on floating installations shall be designed to operate satisfactorily for all sea states in
which the installation is intended to be operable. Drainage systems for the process systems shall be
designed to operate satisfactory for all sea states in which the process system is intended to be
operable.
Necessary pumps and valve control of the ballasting system shall be fed from the emergency power
system during shut down of main power.
11.6 Emergency re-positioning

The need for quick re-positioning of the installation in case of specific emergency situations shall be
evaluated. Important factors in this evaluation are number and types of risers, riser pressures, sub sea
ESDV and mooring arrangement.
Anchor moored or dynamically positioned installations located above well(s) shall be able to move
150 m from the normal position in 10 minutes, or as specified based on risk analyses.
11.7 Topside/floater interface

All interfaces between the typical maritime floater technology and offshore petroleum technology
shall be clarified at an early stage of the design process, and be monitored during the project to ensure
compatibility with lifetime operational requirements.
12 NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS
12.1 General
A "Normally Not Manned Installation" (NNMI) is an installation which can be left unmanned and
still maintain its intended principal function through remote control from a distant location.
This section outlines the safety design principles for the design of a NNMI and has been written for a
minimum wellhead platform, but the requirements apply in principle to other NNMI such as riser and
pipeline compressor platforms.
The need for well maintenance and reservoir stimulation has to be estimated for each location. These
operations are manned and will require people to be on board while performing the work.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Dependent on the hours to be spent onboard a decision have to be made regarding possible limited or
temporary facilities for personnel to remain onboard for a defined period of time.
This clause is limited to the specification of the principle requirements for NNMI, but Annex K lists
the minimum requirements for a simple NNMI, which is not designed for any overnight stay of
personnel. For installations allowing personnel to stay overnight careful evaluations have to be made
regarding the quartering and safety facilities. This will have to be done on a case by case basis.
Therefore this standard does not establish requirements for such installations.
The standard will focus on principle evaluations and decisions to be made to achieve an adequate
safety level and not on detailed design solutions.
Operations and maintenance philosophies for a NNMI are important to be able to establish the
required manning onboard and are necessary to be able to develop the safety requirements.
12.2 Safety evaluation, management and documentation.

The design of the NNMI shall be documented according to the principles laid down in this standard,
including standards referred to. The design decisions have to be documented based on these
methodologies and standards.
Risk acceptance criteria have to be established. The risk evaluations shall take into consideration
drilling and process data, environmental conditions, ship traffic, manning and helicopter shuttling.
Simple, reliable and sturdy concepts for the purpose of minimising maintenance activities on the
installation shall be emphasised through system design and reliability requirements.
The following activities related to manned operations onboard shall be established:
• Drilling/well operations onboard

• Simultaneous activities.
• Weather conditions for boarding and departing of the installation.
• Helicopter shuttling and need for personnel to stay overnight.
.
An emergency preparedness analyses has to be performed to identify the requirements for emergency
planning covering:
• Need for standby vessels when manned.

• Call for helicopter.
• Time to evacuate.
• Search and rescue
• Need for lifeboats.
• Means of evacuation
• Shelter.
12.3 Design principles

The NNMI wellhead installation will typically be designed with a well head area and manifolds on
the well head side of the installation and a utility/shelter area to the opposite side. A fire/explosion
wall will normally be required to protect the shelter area and the escape function adequately.
The installation may be equipped with christmas trees, a production manifold, a test manifold, a test
separator and a pig launcher. The installation will have a sheltered area with resting facilities.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
The main power source may be diesel generators onboard the NNMI or cables from neighbouring.
Emergency power may be by batteries only.
The auxiliary systems may further consist of a methanol system, a closed drain system, and a utility
drain system and seawater pump.
Requirements for possible quartering facilities have to identified based on the manning requirements
taking into account the following:
- Scheduled maintenance jobs.

- Well monitoring and maintenance.
- Start-up following shutdown.
The requirements to the support structure concerning resistance to impact from ship collisions shall
be developed based on an individual evaluation of each concept. This evaluation shall take into
consideration the types of vessel expected to be in the vicinity of the installation, boarding procedures
(boarding zone, weather restrictions, loading requirements, call frequency, anchoring philosophy etc.)
and the layout and arrangement of the installation.
Access to the installation will normally be by helicopter.
12.4 System requirements.

The safety system requirements for a NNMI shall be carefully developed based on the hazard
identification and risk analyses performed. The need for firewater shall be evaluated and installed if a
significant risk reducing effect can be documented.
To ensure simplicity, firewater may be provided by alternative means as long as an acceptable

reliability is proven.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX A - INFORMATIVE REFERENCES (INFORMATIVE)
1989 MODU CODE International Maritime Organization - Code for the construction and
equipment of mobile offshore drilling units, 1989
IEC 61508 Functional safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-
Related Systems. Until the International Standard becomes available the
Draft International Standard (FDIS) applies.
IMO Res. A.653 Recommendation on improved fire test procedures for surface flammability
of bulkhead, ceiling and deck finish materials.
IP Part 15 Institute of Petroleum: Model code of safe practice, Part 15, Area
Classification code for petroleum installations.
ISO 15544 Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations –
Requirements and guidelines for emergency response.
ISO 3008 Fire-resistance tests on door and shutter assemblies.
ISO 3009 Fire-resistance tests on glazed elements.
ISO 834 Fire-resistance tests- Elements of building construction.
Standard for water spray fixed systems for fire protection
NT Fire 021 Insulation of Steel Structures: Fire protection.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX B - EVACUATION (NORMATIVE)

An EERS covering the operational phase should be developed at an early stage of the conceptual
phase. The plan shall be in accordance with clause 14 in ISO 13702. The plan shall take into account
the following evacuation principles:
• The muster area and the access to the evacuation station should be arranged and protected in order
to evacuate the actual number of personnel in an organised and efficient way.
• Area allocation: 0.4 m2 per lifeboat seat.
• One additional evacuation system in the far end of the installation should be considered if escape
to the main evacuation area is impossible. For scenarios where the possibility for gas/smoke on
the helicopter deck is within acceptable limits, helicopter may be considered as the primary means
of evacuation.
• For installations connected by bridge to other installations and/or floating accommodation
installations, the primary means of evacuation should be the bridge. One additional evacuation
system in the opposite end of the installation should be considered if escape to the bridge is
impossible in dimensional accident scenarios.
• Escape chute with rafts should be used as a secondary mean of evacuation in the main evacuation
area.
• The emergency preparedness assessment shall be applied to identify any need for additional
evacuation means and the optimum location of these.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX C - MISCELLANIOUS SAFETY EQUIPMENT (NORMATIVE)
C.1 Lifeboats
-Should be designed for 10 minutes running in a gas cloud or fire on sea. The external equipment
including the engine exhaust system shall not act as ignition sources.
-Recovery from sea shall be possible in up to 2 m wave height. Winches for recovery should be fed
by main power.
-The hoisting speed for recovery should be minimum 3 m/min.
-Main power should be provided for charging of lifeboat batteries. The disconnection point should be
in the vicinity of the lifeboat and disconnection shall be automatic when dropping or lowering the
lifeboat.
-Access ways should be provided with anti-skid coating
-Cabinet housing should be arranged for winches and consoles
-Heaters should be provided for electric motors for the winches.
C.2 Escape chutes

-Shall be readily available and easy to operate with clear operating instructions located on the wall
inside the container.
-Winch for recovery should be fed by main power.
-Removal of life rafts for re-certification shall be possible without affecting the suspension system
including lifting wire.
C.3 Man overboard boat and personnel basket

The MOB shall have a fixed lifting frame with one point suspension for handling by cranes. It should
be possible to reach the MOB from two cranes. The MOB shall be visible from the crane cabins
during handling.
It should be possible to launch and recover the MOB in 5 meters significant wave height. The MOB
shall have a minimum speed of 25 knots in calm sea with 3 men onboard.
The installation shall be provided with a basket suitable for transport of personnel and another for
transport of injured personnel.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
C.4 Man overboard related equipment.

One watertight cabinet for storage of gear of the MOB crew should be installed in the vicinity of the
MOB.
The content of the cabinet should include:

- 4 swimsuits of wet suit type
- 6 survival suits
- 1 thermal protection blanket
- 1 VHF radio with suitable charger
- 3 life jackets
- 1 x 20 litres diesel can
- 2 bags, each containing
- 30 m lifeline
- 1 pair of flippers
- 1 divers knife
- 1 divers mask with breathing tube
- 1 standard size waterproof torch
- 1 mini size water proof torch and one 6 kg lead belt
- 1 pair of night glasses (for intallations with moon pool work)
C.5 Fireman's equipment

Fireman equipment should be stored in sets at not less than two locations separated from each other,
so that access to all equipment will not be blocked in the event of a fire in one area. The number of
sets of fireman equipment required and the contents of each set must be assessed.
The equipment shall be suitable for the tasks of the fire teams, including the need for internal
communication, during identified fire scenarios. Each set of fireman equipment should contain at
least 4 portable radio sets for internal communication. At least two of the breathing apparatus should
be equipped with radio sets. It is assumed that these radio sets shall not be able to become an ignition
source, and that they operate in the UHF frequency range in private channels assigned by the National
Telecommunications Authority with regard to application for use of private frequencies in the UHF
frequency range, or they operate in the international UHF frequency range for on board
communication. It should be ensured that the radio sets are suitable for the environmental loads to
which they may be subjected during an accidental event, e.g. water from a sprinkler- / deluge system,
without their functioning being impaired.
Installations should have suitable equipment for refilling breathing apparatus.
Replacement of the breathing air in all compressed air bottles shall be carried out at regular intervals
to ensure that the air is pure and has an oxygen content above 20 volume percent.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
C.6 Safety Showers and Eyebaths

Strategic locations shall be identified through a separate evaluation considering the chemicals
handled and spillage that may occur. The following list is considering typical areas and is not to be
interpreted as a complete list replacing the need for the evaluation.
-The following areas should be equipped with both Safety Showers and eyebaths
-methanol pump and injection area
-chemical injection pump and injection area
-production lab
-tote tank area
-process utility area
-The following areas should be provided with eyebaths

-workshops
-cementer room, shale shaker room, sack storage room
-drill floor
-mudpit area
-battery room, paint store, and mud lab
The following areas should be provided with safety showers:

-process areas
-drilling areas
C.7 Safety Stations and First aid kits

Safety Station Cabinets
An adequate number of cabinets shall be provided. They should contain:
- 4 vacuum wrapped blankets
- one scoop type stretcher
- one basket type stretcher
- one first aid kit
The cabinets shall be painted Green (RAL 6002).
First aid kits

An adequate number of first aid kits shall be provided at suitable locations, e.g. galley, workshops,
drill floor and other areas where cut injuries are likely to occur.
C.8 Lifebuoys
Life buoys shall be located at regular intervals along the periphery of the lower levels of the
installation.
C.9 Safety Equipment Data Sheets

Safety Equipment Data Sheets are included in NORSOK S-011.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX D - LAYOUT (NORMATIVE)

The following aspects to be checked and evaluated as a part of the layout design
D.1 Area classification

"Catastrophic" events such as pipe rupture or vessel burst, which may be a result of material
weakness, design error, falling loads, collision or sabotage, shall not be regarded as giving rise to a
higher classification. This as the area classification reflects normal conditions onboard.
"Catastrophic" events shall be reflected in the risk analysis, and may impose stricter requirements to
arrangements and equipment than defined by the area classification alone.
The area classification is an important part of the basis for layout, as it gives requirements to:
• Location of ventilation air inlets and outlets.
• Ventilation system requirements.
• Location of combustion air inlets and exhaust outlets for internal combustion engines and fired
units.
• Location and use of ignition sources.
• Location of emergency equipment.
• Location of vent points.
• Location and design of doors and other connections between areas.
• Operational- and maintenance procedures in hazardous areas.
• Selection of equipment.
• Drainage connections between areas
D.2 Escape routes

The dimension of escape routes shall be minimum 1m width (0.9 m for doors) and 2.3 m in height
(2050 mm for doors). Escape routes intended for use by more than 50 persons shall be extended to
1.5 m (1.2 m for doors) in width.
Required width of escape routes shall emphasise easy transport of injured personnel on stretcher in
addition to the no. off persons onboard during hook-up /installation and commissioning activities
offshore.
Other general principles are listed below.

• There shall be at least two exits to escape routes from permanently or intermittently manned area
outside quarters and offices, leading in different escape directions.
• The escape route network shall lead to safe areas and facilities as follows:
− Living quarters.
− Temporary refuge.
− Lifeboats and life rafts-stations.
− Boat landings (not normally manned installations)
− Helicopter deck.
− Flotel or other installations linked by bridge/walk way.
• The installation shall be equipped with at least one escape route running from far end and into
living quarter. The quality of this route shall be such that:
− Personnel shall be able to use this route for a period of time sufficiently long to perform a

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
complete evacuation of the installation plus a safety margin of 50%.

− Personnel shall be able to use this route without being subject neither to toxic fumes,
smoke, excessive hot air nor unacceptable heat flux.
− When personnel is moving along this route the possibility of being hit by falling objects or hot
liquids shall be well within the acceptable.
• Escape routes shall be part of the daily used transport- and passageways. Where appropriate, main
escape routes should be provided on the outside along the periphery of the installation.
• Doors should normally open in the escape direction, but shall not block the outside escape route.
Opening of doors should not require electric, hydraulic or pneumatic power. If such power is
required the power supply should be local.
• Any dining room, recreation room in L.Q. etc., where more than 15 persons may be assembled
should have at least 2 exit doors. Internal room arrangement should be evaluated for possible
blocking of exits following an accident as well as external blockage. For all areas where there is a
risk of congestion and panic, the doors shall be provided with panic bars.
• Escape routes leading to a higher or lower level should be provided by stairways. The number of
these stairways shall be assessed based on the platform size, configuration of areas and equipment
layout. Vertical ladders can be used in areas where the work is of such a nature that only a few
persons (max. 3) are in the area on short time basis.
• It shall be possible to escape from a drilling area without running through a well head area.
• A dead end corridor of more than 5 m length is not acceptable. Stairways included in escape routes
shall be designed to allow for transport of injured personnel on stretcher.
• Lifts shall not be considered as a part of escape ways. However, it shall be possible to escape from
the lift and the hoist way with the lift at any elevation. Escape from legs/shafts/columns of an
installation shall be considered separately. If use of lift is necessary to ensure adequate and
effective escape, the lift system shall satisfy special requirements, e.g. concerning transport of
injured personnel on stretchers, protection, ventilation, power supply.
• Escape routes and emergency stations shall be illuminated. Escape routes shall be provided with
adequate emergency lighting. Emergency stations shall have minimum 15 Lux., escape routes
minimum 5 Lux.
• Escape routes in all areas outside the living quarter shall be marked by yellow painting (RAL
1021).
• The escape routes within the living quarter should be provided with low level directional lighting,
showing correct escape direction. Other enclosed and regularly manned utility and process areas
should be considered separately.
• Escape routes shall be arranged from the drill floor to adjacent modules and also down the
substructure. Protection of these escape routes from radiation heat should be considered.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX E - PRESSURE RELIEF (NORMATIVE)
E.1 General
Installations for production of hydrocarbons will normally require a gas release system. If
inflammable and toxic gases can be conducted away from the installation safely without the use of
gas release system, such system may be omitted. Examples of such installations may be wellhead
platforms with small quantities of gas and subsea installations.
Inflammable, toxic or corrosive gases should preferably be burned in a flare to prevent the causing
damage or injury to people, the environment or to assets and financial interests.
A cold vent system may be permitted in cases when this cannot cause damage or injury to people, the
environment or to assets and financial interests.
Based on risk evaluations, a choice may be made between a centralised or local vent. The discharge
location must not represent any unacceptable risk. When necessary, the discharge point should be
fitted with a flame control device.
The design of the gas release system shall take into account low temperatures, vibrations and noise
that may occur as a result of gas expansion.
E.2 Depressurisation
Fast depressurisation shall be the mean of protection which should be utilised to its full potential for
the installation concept. Active and passive fire protection is to be considered to function as
supplement to depressurisation, if necessary to prevent any resulting unacceptable events (rupture or
explosion of pressure vessels/piping). All pressure vessels and piping segments, which during shut
down contains more than 1.0 ton of produced hydrocarbons (liquid and/or gaseous) or unprocessed
crude, should be equipped with a depressurising system. For gas segments, the maximum
containment should be set lower than 1.0 ton. Location of segment (enclosed or open area), risk of
segment being exposed to a fire, consequence of rupture, etc. should be considered.
Depressurisation systems are required in addition to pressure relief facilities because of the loss of
material strength during a fire.
Depressurisation systems may also be required for systems which are unable to contain flammable or
toxic materials by passive means alone. Loss of the active method of containment will require
depressurisation to prevent escape of the material concerned (e.g. centrifugal compressor's
dependence on seal oil systems).
The material properties at actual temperatures and pressures during depressurisation, steel thickness,
active or passive protective measures shall together ensure that a pressure vessel/piping segment does
not rupture at a stage where this may escalate the fire scenario beyond the control of the protective
systems and arrangement. This may call for a detailed study of each ESD segment in particular.
The design procedure is outlined in Annex G
The depressurising, manually or automatic, shall be applied the following way:

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
• Manual field depressurisation sequence is considered initiated after 3 minutes from detection of
initial fire or gas.
• Automatic depressurisation sequence is considered initiated immediately after detection of initial
fire or gas.
API RP 521 should be used as guidance in the design of depressurisation systems.
E.3 Relief and venting

The release of hydrocarbons from relief and depressurisation systems shall be routed through a closed
system terminating at a liquid's disengagement vessel and with the liquid free gas being safely flared.
Vents which are not suitable for routing to flare (e.g. due to backpressure) should be terminated
outside the platform perimeter in such a way that accumulation of gases due to "dead pockets" etc. is
avoided.
Local venting of hazardous gases shall not be permitted unless it can be done without hazard to the
personnel or the platform, e.g. for small and normally not manned installations local venting may be
found acceptable.
Flare K.O. drums shall be sized for two criteria:

• Disengagement of entrained liquid droplets.
• Containment of liquid carryover.
The criteria for droplet removal will depend on the flare concept. The objective is to avoid
condensate dropping from flare. The particle size should be less than 400 microns. In case of vertical
flare tower using subsonic flare burner the droplet size should be less than 300 microns.
The K.O. drum liquid containment capacity should be based on the largest foreseeable liquid
condensation rate for a period of at least 20 minutes. This period should provide realistic time to
identify a problem and allow for operator intervention. Longer periods may be required, e.g. for sub
sea flow lines and inter field pipelines. This should be evaluated for each case. In addition the knock-
out drum should provide capacity for 90 seconds of liquid carry over from the largest source
(assuming overfilled vessel).
Progressive release of inventories from process piping and pressure vessels that can cause significant
escalation of a fire shall be avoided. As a minimum, the piping system and the pressure vessels shall
maintain their integrity during depressurisation. The depressurising system itself (blow down valves,
branch piping and headers and K.O. drums) is of particular importance. The ability to maintain
integrity when exposed to the fire loads depends on selection of material, wall thickness, pressure
rating and applied fire protection.
E.4 Flaring
The need for flaring should be minimised from an environment point of view. Ref. NORSOK
S-003, Environmental care.
Calculations shall be performed to determine the levels of radiation on all areas of the platform for
critical flare conditions.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Flare radiation calculations should account for variations in flaring quantities and wind conditions.
Maximum heat loads from flares on open areas where personnel may be present and on locations
where structures and equipment are exposed should be as follows:
• Permissible radiation levels to personnel should follow radiation levels as given in API RP 521.
• The heat loads from planned continuous flaring conditions on areas where personnel are supposed
to perform work tasks lasting for two hours or more the working environment requirements for
exposed areas should be considered and ample protection provided as required.
• For long periods of flaring (continuous flaring), consideration should also be given to the radiation
level on the helicopter deck, i.e. the radiation/temperatures on the helicopter deck shall not become
intolerable to personnel or limit the necessary helicopter operations. Unless otherwise accepted by
2
the responsible for helicopter operations, max. 1.9 kW/m is allowed on helicopter deck.
• Max. heat loads from flare on structures and equipment not designed for high heat loads should be
limited to meet the requirements below. Higher exposure for short times, e.g. during emergency
flaring conditions, that will not harm the structure or equipment can be accepted. Such deviations
shall be documented.
Protection of exposed areas may be necessary to meet these requirements.

• Heat loads on steel- or aluminium structures shall not give temperatures that results in loss of
structural integrity.
• Heat loads on wires or limit switches in drill tower and cranes should be limited depending on type
of lubrication and inspection- /replacement frequency.
• Flare radiation shall not cause temperatures in areas classified as hazardous above 200oC or above
the ignition temperature of the actual gas, whichever is the lowest.
• Heat loads on Ex-rated electrical equipment and instrumentation should not give temperatures
exceeding 40oC.
Based on a case to case evaluation of protective clothing, provision of local radiation shields, etc., the
limits for acceptable heat loads can be adjusted as applicable. Such deviations shall be documented.
E.5 Cold Flare

In systems were the relieved gas during normal operation is routed back to the processing system, the
following principles should be adhered to:
• The diversion of relieved gas under emergency conditions, e.g. depressurization shall not
depend upon instrumentation and control valves. A rupture disk should be installed in parallel
with control valves.
• The loop including control valves should have rapid response. A 2/3 voting system may be
considered.
• It should be possible to test the entire control loop for both response time and set point
calibration without routing the gas to flare or isolate the rupture disk function.
• A reliable system for detection of “gas to flare “ should be provided. CCR should be alarmed.
• A pilot should be arranged.
• A robust and reliable system with back-up capacity should be provided for flare ignition.
• Radiation levels shall be calculated. For permissible radiation levels, see E4.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
E.6 Cold vent

The design of cold vents shall be based on dispersion calculations to prove that the foreseen gas rates
can be released without creating explosive air/gas mixtures on the installation or in its vicinity.
Further, the possibility of an unintended ignition shall be taken into account in the design and
dimensioning of the cold vent, i.e. ignition of foreseen gas rates should not give unacceptable heat
loads or other consequences on the installation. For permissible radiation levels, see E4
The need for extinguishing ignited cold vent should be considered.
E.7 Drainage systems

The platform should be equipped with the following drainage systems:
• One closed drainage system.
• One open drainage system from non-hazardous areas.
• One open drainage system from hazardous areas.
• Where applicable, a separate mud drainage system should be provided covering the drill floor and
mud treatment areas.
Open drainage systems from areas where there is no pollution, e.g. rain water drain from roofs and
helicopter deck could be routed directly to the sea.
The drainage system form helicopter deck shall be capable of draining helicopter fuel from a crashed
helicopter and AFFF from the fire fighting system and two monitors.
The drainage system together with the deck itself should be provided with de-icing facilities.
Reference to ISO 13702 clause 8.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX F - FIRE AND GAS DETECTION (NORMATIVE)

Only essential information shall be shown on the mimic, i.e. fire area status, except for areas or
equipment where more detailed alarm identification is appropriate, e.g.:
• In or at ventilation inlets/outlets.
• Inside critical equipment enclosures.
F.1 Gas detector layout and alarm initiation

The following principles shall apply concerning detector layout and alarm initiation:
• Location, type and number of gas detectors shall take into account:
- Leakage sources within the area.
- Borders between non-hazardous and hazardous areas.
- Gas density relative to air.
Detection principles.
Voting, if applied.
- Ventilation air flow patterns.
- Wind-direction and velocity.
- Critical reaction time/detector response time.
- Size of the area.
Criticality of the area with regard to safety.
Cloud size of the minimal leakage to be detected
• HVAC
- HVAC intakes or ducts shall be monitored by an adequate number of gas detectors. The size of
the intake, air flow patterns, voting philosophy, etc. should be evaluated when deciding number
of detectors. The use of line detectors is regarded as equal to the use of IR point detectors.
- Gas detectors in HVAC supply should be located at the air intake, alternatively in the duct as
close to the duct opening as possible. Detectors in ducts should be positioned as near as
practical to the centre of the duct where the air velocity is greatest and where the response time
to gas ingress is consequently most rapid. At large intakes, the flow patterns around the opening
should be determined to achieve an optimum position of the detectors, ensuring fast response
under various wind directions/orientations as well as for possible leak positions.
The total response time from gas at intake to shutdown of the intake shall be determined by the
transport time of gas from intake to location of shutoff dampers and HVAC units.
- If gas is detected at ventilation air inlets, the ventilation fan in question shall be stopped, all
intake dampers shall be closed and the heating element shut off. The surface temperature of the
heating element shall not exceed the auto. ignition temperature of any gas present in the area.
- On installations where the sources of leakage of flammable or toxic gases are concentrated in
a small area, e.g. on mobile installations, gas detection at air inlets of mechanically ventilated
areas may be omitted. In such cases it is however required that the ventilation systems are shut
down automatically in the event of gas detection, and that there are gas detectors located in all
areas classified as Zone 1 or Zone 2.
- Gas detectors should be located at HVAC outlets from hazardous areas.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
• One of the following two philosophies should be chosen:
- Voting philosophy: - “Confirmed gas” is activation of alarm from two detectors

- “Low alarm” is activation of alarm from one detector
- Initiation of automatic alarm is activated by alarm from one detector.
- With voting philosophy applied, a "2-out-of-n, n>2" logic shall be
applied.
- One alarm level shall be used.
- Single philosophy: - “Confirmed gas” is activation of high alarm from one detector.
- “Low alarm” is activation of low alarm from one detector.
- Initiation of automatic alarm is activated by low alarm from one
detector
- Two alarm levels shall be used, low alarm and high alarm.
Each project shall define alarm set point(s). Definition should be based upon whether a voting
philosophy has been applied, ventilation conditions within the area and the events to be detected
(minor or middle sized leakage or “catastrophic” events). In any case, high alarm level shall not be set
to values above 30% LEL.
For outdoor areas an alarm level of 20% LEL is recommended. For detection of internal leakage
within gas turbine hoods an alarm level of 5% LEL is recommended.
• Alarm on gas detection

- Alarms should be automatically initiated upon confirmed low level alarm according to
Table F.1.
Table F.1 Automatic hydrocarbon gas alarm in area.
Automatic alarm in area

CCR Living Non-haz. Process Drilling Drill control
Quarter utility area area area cabin/office
Confirmed gas
detected at:
HVAC intake LQ X X X X X X
Non-hazardous utility X X X X X X
area HVAC/air intakes
Process area incl. X X X X X
HVAC outlets
Drilling area incl. X X X X X
HVAC
Any single detector X X
low alarm level detector in
drilling area
Any gas alarm shall be presented in CCR. For alarms from detectors located in drilling areas the
information presented in CCR shall be mirrored in drilling contr. office and in drillers cabin.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
• Line gas detectors

- Line detectors are preferred where the layout enables good coverage by such detectors. Line
detectors could be used in combination with point detectors for limiting the total number of
detectors.
- Line detectors should be easily accessible via ladders and/or access platforms for maintenance,
adjustment and cleaning.
- It must be ensured that the control centre receives warning well in advance of the concentration
reaching dangerous levels. As a minimum, the line detector set point should be adjustable from
0.5 to 8 LEL meter. Recommended set point is between 1.0 and 2.0 LEL meter.
• Hydrogen sulphide gas

- Detectors should operate in the range of 0-50 PPM.
- An alarm (light and sound signal) should be activated both in CCR and locally in the event of
a concentration of hydrogen sulphide of 6 PPM.
F.2 Fire detector layout and alarm initiation

• Fire detector type:
The selection of fire detectors shall be based upon an evaluation of the nature of the fire to be
detected and the operational conditions that may exist.
Fire detection in Living Quarters and office areas shall be based on addressable optical smoke
detectors with alarm to CCR. Care should be taken when locating detectors to avoid interference
by for instance steam generated in bathrooms.
Early warning smoke detection systems, sensitive to small concentration of combustion products,
shall be considered in rooms containing live electrical equipment subject to manual intervention
and fire fighting. Such rooms will typically be:
- Central control room.
- Instrument room.
- Switch board and electrical rooms.
Early warning smoke detectors should be used together with optical smoke detectors of standard
sensitivity setting.
Location of all smoke detectors shall be verified by smoke tests. For smaller areas typical location
should be at HVAC extract.
Early warning smoke detectors should have a sensitivity of approx. 0,4 – 0,8 % obscuration per
meter.
For electrical rooms where all fire extinguishing is based on manual intervention, facilities for
total electrical isolation of any of these rooms shall be provided either outside the room and / or in
CCR.
As a minimum multi IR or dual IR/UV flame detectors should be used for fire detection in process
areas.
For areas containing alcoholic substances, flame detectors shall be able to detect alcohol fires in
addition to hydrocarbon fires.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Heat detectors should be used in enclosed areas where a significant and rapid temperature rise can
be expected, e.g. in combination with smoke detectors.
• Manual detection:
Manual fire alarm buttons shall be provided at strategic locations, e.g. exits from process areas,
escape routes, fire stations. Automatic start of fire pumps upon manual fire alarm may be
considered. These buttons may be used for other accidents or situations where the attention of
CCR is required in accordance with established operational procedures. In this case automatic start
of fire pumps may not be implemented. Manual fire alarm buttons should be mounted at a height
of 1.4 meter above floor level and there should not be more than 30 meter walking distance to a
manual fire alarm button from any point on the installation.
• One of the following two philosophies should be chosen:
- Voting philosophy: - Confirmed fire is alarm from two detectors of same type within
an area.
- With voting philosophy " 2-out-of-n n>2 logic shall be used.
- Single philosophy: - Confirmed fire is alarm from one detector within the area.
• Alarm on fire detection:

Alarms should be automatically initiated upon confirmed fire according to Table F.2.
Alarms in other areas to be manually initiated from CCR.
Table F.2 Automatic alarms upon fire detection.
Automatic alarm upon confirmed fire detection

CCR Living Non-haz. Process Drilling Drill control
Quarter utility area area area cabin/office
Confirmed fire
detected at:
LQ X X
Non-hazardous X X X X X
utility area
Well head area X X X X X
Single loop
Confirmed X X X X X
Wellhead or
Process area
Confirmed X X X X X
drilling area
Any single X X
Detector detector in
drilling area
Any fire alarm shall be presented in CCR. For alarms from detectors located in drilling areas the
information presented in CCR should be mirrored in drilling contr. office and in drillers cabin.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Table F.3 below presents normative examples of fire and gas detection in the various areas on
installations. Alarms are described in the text above, and are not repeated in the table. The solutions
presented in the table can be deviated upon an evaluation of the specific risks in an area.
Reference is also made to figure 9.1 regarding the emergency shutdown philosophy, and clause 10.6
regarding active fire fighting.
Table F.3 Fire and gas detection/shut down actions.
Fire and gas detection / shut down actions

Area/room Automatic fire Shutdown Automatic gas Shutdown Comments
detection action detection action
Well head area Flame or heat ESD II Area ESD II *) Not normally
(fusible plugs*) manned
installations
Manifold area Flame ESD II Area ESD II
Nat. vent./ Flame ESD II Area ESD II
outdoor H.C.
process area
Mech. vent. Flame ESD II Area + HVAC ESD II
process area extr. Duct
(separation/gas
compression)
Water injection Flame or smoke* ESD II HVAC intake* ESD I* Area assumed
treatment area None** non-hazardous
*) Mech. Vent.
Area
**) Nat.vent/
outdoor area
Gas compression Flame ESD II Area ESD II
area
Drill floor None Manual Area Manual* *) See 9.3.6
Driller’s cabin Smoke Manual HVAC intake Manual* *) See 9.3.4
Degasser room Flame Manual HVAC extract Manual* *) See 9.3.4
Driller’s Driller’s
cabin cabin
Shale shaker room Flame Manual Area, H2S* Manual *)If sour service
Driller’s Driller’s **) See 9.3.4
cabin cabin**
Active mud tank Flame Manual Area + HVAC Manual* *) See 9.3.4
room Driller’s extract Driller’s
cabin cabin
Sack/bulk storage Heat None HVAC intake* ESD II *) Mech. Vent
area None** non-haz. Area
**) Nat. vent.
Partly open area

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000

Mud lab Smoke None HVAC intake ESD II Assumes no
piped
connection to
mud system
Cementing unit Flame None HVAC intake Manual See 9.3.4
room from
Drillers
Cabin
Central control Smoke in Manual HVAC intake ESD I *Fire detection
room (CCR) cabinets* and/ or Early warning
at roof level system
Instrument room Smoke* Manual HVAC intake ESD I *) See F.2
adjacent to CCR Early warning
system
Central tele eq. Smoke* Manual HVAC intake ESD I *) See F.2
Room Early warning
system
Local equipment Smoke* Manual HVAC intake ESD II** *) See F.2
room (LER) **) Shut down
of internal
equipment to be
evaluated
Turbine hall Flame * Manual HVAC intake ESD I * Fuel system
Smoke ** **Electric
equipm.
Turbine hood Flame and heat* Unit Area (hood) Unit** *) Supplier to
shutdown shutdown confirm.
upon area upon area **) Continue
fire gas ventilation.
detection detection Block and bleed
fuel gas system
Turbine Combust. air ESD I
intake
Switch board and Smoke* El.** power HVAC intake ESD I *) See F.2
electrical room switch off Early warning
system
**Manual or
automatic with
timer to be
decided
Battery room Smoke* HVAC intake ESD I *) See F.2
(lead acid) H2 detector at Shutdown Early warning
extract boost system
charge

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000

Fire pump room Flame Manual HVAC intake ESD I, *) Running fire
and emergency Close firepump will be
generator room damper* shutdown only
with diesel engine on overspeed
Air compressor Smoke or heat Manual Air intake ESD I* *) Incl. unit
shutdown
Mechanical Smoke or heat Manual HVAC intake ESD I Separate
workshop welding HVAC
extract
Instrument Smoke or heat Manual HVAC intake ESD I
workshop
Paint storage Heat or flame HVAC intake ESD I
HVAC intake Smoke at intake HVAC shut Air intake ESD I
common for LQ. and in HVAC down
room
LQ, cabins/rooms/ Smoke Manual * *) Covered by
Areas gas detector in
HVAC intake
(see above line)
Vent extract from Heat Manual
galley
General galley Heat Manual
area
Crane engine Heat or smoke* Manual Combustion ESD** *) Smoke for
room air intake** Unit s.d. electrically
timer delay driven cranes.
30sec **) Depend on
crane location
Helicopter deck None None
Hangar Smoke and flame None
Chain locker None None
Turret area Flame ESD II Area ESD II
Pump room in Smoke, heat HVAC intake ESD I
column

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX G - PROTECTION OF PRESSURE VESSELS AND PROCESS PIPING

AGAINST FIRE (NORMATIVE)
The design procedure includes the following principal step:
Step 1. Identification of fire types and duration.
The initial step is to decide on the characteristics of fire the pressure vessel/piping can be exposed to
including the duration of the fire.
Fuel composition, mass, mass rate and duration as applicable and ventilation conditions should be
determined:
Types of fire:
• Pool fires in open or enclosed areas, fuel controlled.
• Pool fires in enclosed areas, ventilation controlled.
• Jet fires.
Step 2. Effect of firewater.
Water applied for controlling the fire and cooling of pressure vessels and piping is very effective
when evenly distributed over the exposed areas. The following should be considered for achieving the
efficiency of firewater:
• Spray of deluge water from nozzles from below, from both sides and from above.
• Spray nozzle location ensuring that water spray projection covers all surfaces of the protected
equipment/piping.
• Supply of deluge water to a module arranged so that accidents can not damage the supply.
• Coverage of fire detectors that ensures immediate detection of small fires in all parts of the fire
area.
• Operational procedures ensuring high availability of these systems.
Step 3. Heat flux values for the next step are then selected from the following table:
Table G.1 Heat flux values.
Type of fire Initial heat flux density Initial heat flux density
Max. point loads Average load
Pool fire (crude) open or
enclosed area fuel controlled 150 kW/m2 100 kW/m2
Note 1
Pool fire enclosed area
ventilation controlled 200 kW/m2 130 kW/m2
Note 1
Jet fire 250 kW/m2
Note 1. In areas with unprocessed crude or crude in the first or second stage of separation, the heat flux loads should be
considered comparable to jet fire loads. Special considerations should be done for heavy crude fields.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Alternatively, heat loads could be based on a detailed evaluation/simulation of the credible fire
scenarios.
Application of qualified predicting tools for calculation of heat loads may be an integral part of the
evaluation.
The average heat flux density shall be applied where the global load over an area is dimensioning,
e.g. for boil off in pressure vessels. The max. point loads shall be applied in cases where local
damage is critical, e.g. for the integrity of a pressure vessel shell or of critical structural elements.
Step 4. Depressurising / rupture calculations.
Perform depressurising calculations for each major pressure vessel and piping segment, establishing
internal pressure fluctuation, wall material temperature and residual strength, as a function of time.
Determine whether rupture will occur during depressurising, and identify time to rupture if this will
occur.
The effect of manual versus automatic initiation is specified in Annex E, clause E.2.
Step 5. Evaluation of failure mode.
If a rupture of pressure vessels and piping occurs as a result of a combination of excessive heat load
and internal pressure, an acceptance of the situation will have to be judged based on the risk analyses.
Residual quantities, escalation potentials both within the area and towards adjacent areas shall be
taken into account. Simplified evaluations can be made when the pressures are considered low
(< 4.5 barg) or the potential leakage of hydrocarbon is low (less than 1 ton) in the pressure vessels
and piping when the rupture occurs.
Where rupture can not be accepted, i.e. the risk acceptance criteria are not met, the provision of
additional protective systems and arrangements shall be implemented. This can be:
• Change from manual to automatic depressurising.

• Modifications to depressurising system (increase its capacity)
• Application of passive protection that will reduce the heat loads to the exposed pressure
vessels/piping.
• Modifications to pressure vessel /piping design (material, wall thickness etc.).
• Modifications to the general arrangements that have an impact on the time to rupture.
The procedure will then have to be repeated from step 1, 2 or 3 as applicable.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX H - FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM (NORMATIVE)
H.1 Fire Water Drivers and Pumps

Diesel Engines and generators
• Diesel engines providing power to more than 100% of the design firewater capacity shall not be
located within the same room.
• It shall be possible to start the fire water system even if no other systems on the platform are
operational.
• A manual isolation switch/valve between the starter motor and the start battery/air bank shall be
provided per starter motor. Each engine shall have two independent starting systems
• The start batteries for the fire water diesels and the batteries for the diesel control system shall be
located within the same room as the diesels.
• Stopping the fire water diesel engines shall only be possible local to the engines.
• In case of gas in air intake to the fire water engine room, the room shall be automatically closed
and the cooling air shall be taken from the engine room itself.
• Cooling of the engine room shall be by an air/fire water-cooling unit powered directly from the
diesel engine.
• The fire water diesel start batteries shall be charged by the fire diesel generator while running in
addition to the main power.
• Fire resistant cables shall be used between firewater generator and motor.
• Each diesel engine shall have its own dedicated day tank sufficient for 18 hours continuous full
power operation.
Fire Water and Jockey Pumps

The fire water pumps and up- and downstream piping shall be completely filled with water at all
times.
• The fire water system shall be pressurised in the standby mode. The pressure source shall have the
capacity of flow through frost protection bleed lines plus two hydrants.
Fire Water Pump Control

• Each fire water pump shall be fitted with a minimum flow control valve.
• A test valve for the fire water pumps shall be installed to enable checking of the fire pump curve
up to 150% of design flow rate. The valve shall be able to regulate from zero flow up to 150%
capacity and shall be of low noise design.
• Possible water hammer effects shall be considered.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
H.2 Fire Water Piping, Valves and Nozzles

General
• It shall be possible to start the fire water pump system without delay and without causing
unacceptable pressure surges. A pressure surge study shall be performed. Means that may be
considered for eliminating pressure surge problems are pressure vacuum valves, soft closing
minimum flow valves, pressurised overhead tanks, etc.
• The deluge and monitor skid cabinets shall have doors with sufficient stopper arrangements to
prevent a personnel risk associated with the cabinet doors in strong winds. The skids shall
withstand the applicable explosion loads.
• The deluge system shall comply with NFPA 16, Deluge Foam - Water System.
• The sprinkler system shall comply with NFPA 13, Sprinkler Systems.
• Deluge, monitor and sprinkler valves shall fail in last position upon loss of signal from F&G
logic.
• The system design shall allow for complete system flushing in commissioning and operation.
Fire Water Piping

• For general piping requirements, reference is made to NORSOK P-001, clause 8 and L-002 clause
4.7.
• There shall be a minimum of two pressure transmitters in the Fire Water Ring main providing the
low-pressure start signal to the firewater pump diesels.
• The FireWater Ring main shall be equipped with two points (min 6”) for connection to external
water supply for commissioning. (SOLAS international shore couplings should be used.)
• The fire water piping system shall be fitted with sufficient number of high point vents to achieve
the following:
• Efficient frost protection at all locations.
• Efficient removal of all entrained air pockets in the water.
• All low points in piping downstream deluge and monitor skids shall be equipped with 3 mm weep
wholes to prevent pockets of water to be entrained. The weep holes shall be considered in the
firewater demand calculations.
• Sprinkler systems shall have a test and flush connection in the far end of the piping system and at
the sprinkler valve(s). The connections shall be easy accessible from deck level and have one
drain box located below the connection.
• Adequate venting facilities with valves shall be provided for wet pipe sprinklers.
Valves
• Sprinkler valves shall be provided with full capacity manual by-pass
• The arrangement of the isolation valves shall be such that not more than 50% of the fire water to
water hoses and hydrants for one area, is effected if one segment of the fire water ring main is
taken out of service.
• All valves (> 1") shall be painted red and provided with a car-sealing system.
• Control valves for sprinkler and deluge systems shall be located outside the area they protect.
• Deluge control valves shall be automatically activated by the F&G logic.
• All deluge valves, monitors and sprinklers shall be fitted with a test line with 100 % capacity.
• For manned installations resetting of deluge, monitor and sprinkler control valves shall only be
possible local to the valves.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
• Activation of deluge, monitor and sprinkler systems shall trigger alarm in CCR. Pressure
transducers downstream deluge, monitor and sprinkler valves shall be fitted to provide confirmed
flow signal to CCR.
• Quick operating isolation valves shall be provided for each hydrant.
Nozzles and sprinklers.

• When arranging deluge nozzles, the vertical distance between nozzle and floor shall be
considered to ensure adequate cooling effect.
• All deluge and sprinkler nozzles shall have “Factory Mutual” approval.
• Nozzles for area coverage on fully open process and drilling areas shall only be the high velocity
types.
• The sprinkler heads should be of the frangible bulb type, set to burst at 68oC, in general areas.
However, a higher temperature limit should be selected for areas where high ambient
temperatures might be expected.
• The sprinkler heads should be located in positions which ensures an application rate of not less
than 6 l/min/m2 at all times over the nominal areas protected by the sprinklers. Due consideration
to overlap, obstructions, etc. should be given when positioning the sprinkler heads.
H.3 Monitors
• Automatic drain facilities shall be provided for each fire water monitor.
• All monitors shall be adjustable through 3600 in the horizontal plane and + 600, - 400 in the
vertical and it shall be possible to manually lock them in any position.
• Fixed firewater monitors with the possibility of foam mixing at predetermined ratio should in
general be used for areas with a high fire potential and which are not protected by fixed deluge
systems
• Water monitors shall be sized to discharge at least 120 m3/h at a nozzle pressure of 7 barg. The
monitor nozzles shall be of the constant flow type, i.e. same flow at fog and at jet spray. The
spray angle shall be easily adjusted when in operation and return to maximum spray angle after
use.
• When monitor valves are opened manually and local to the monitor, a signal shall automatically
be given to the F&G logic and to the starter logic for the fire water pumps. The fire water
monitors are flanged directly on the feed pipe. A considerable reaction force from the monitors
will normally require a pipe support immediately below the flange.
H.4 Hydrants and Hose Reels

General
• Hydrants and hose cabinets shall comply with NFPA 14, Standpipe and Hose System.
• The maximum reaction force on the hose nozzle where only one person is supposed to operate the
hose shall not be more than 25 KP.
• It shall be possible to reach any area where a fire may occur on the installation with at least two
water jets from monitors or hoses.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Hydrants and Hose Reels

• One cabinet shall be provided per hydrant.
• The cabinet incorporated in each hydrant shall consist of:
• 4 off 1 1/2 inch fire hoses of an approved fire-resistant type, 15 meter in length with
instantaneous connection joints to hydrants and nozzles.
• Two auto to fog nozzles with pistol grip. Capacity minimum 20 m3/hr with 2 hoses and a
nozzle hooked up.
• Two sets of connecting key.
• All hydrants shall have two outlets fitted with 1½" quick connections of a standard approved type
throughout all areas (NOR No. 1).
• The hydrants shall be located in weather resistant cabinets fitted with heating units where
required. The cabinets shall be designed for bolting to the deck.
• Non collapsible hose reels shall have:
• Within living quarter 25 meters of 1” bore hose with auto-to-fog nozzle, capacity approx.
8 m3/hr.
1
• within all other areas 25 meters of 1 /4" bore hose with auto-to-fog nozzle, capacity
approximately 15 m3/h
H.5 Foam System

General
• Foam supply shall be provided for all areas where hydrocarbon or alcohol pool fires are likely to
occur.
• The foam system shall comply with NFPA 11, Foam Extinguishing System.
• Filling of foam to the supply tanks shall be performed from tote tanks in the lay down area.
Foam Pumps
• For centralised foam systems there shall be 2x100% foam pumps. The pumps shall be powered
from the fire water diesel generators, but it shall also be possible to run the pumps from main
power through the emergency switchboard in order to run/test pump without starting the fire
water diesel generator.
• Both foam pumps shall be in stand-by mode and start simultaneously with the fire water diesel
drivers.
• In a centralised foam system a jockey pump shall be provided and powered from emergency
power
• Each of the foam pumps shall be connected to one foam supply tank, each having a capacity for
30 minutes supply to the largest fire area, alternatively to one tank with capacity for 60 minutes.
The foam pumps shall be equipped with minimum flow control and pump testing facilities.
• For the foam pumps all scenarios from minimum to maximum flow, is to be considered as normal
duty for the pumps.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Foam Control and Piping

• If a centralised foam system is selected, the foam ring main shall be provided with isolation
valves.
• For a centralised foam system a balanced foam proportioners shall be used.
• When in operation the foam supply shall have an operation pressure of at least 2 bar above the
firewater pressure to prevent reverse flow.
• Foam shall be injected downstream deluge and monitor control valves to prevent ingress of foam
into the fire water system.
• Monitors and hydrants on helicopter deck shall be equipped with foam for > 10 minutes
continuous service. Foam capacity shall correspond to 10 minutes operation at full monitor design
capacity.
• The pressure in the foam ring main shall be presented in CCR,
• To avoid foaming and contamination, draining of the foam concentrate tanks shall not be made to
the open deck drain.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX I - LIVING QUARTERS (NORMATIVE)

The living quarters shall be designed and protected so that:
a) each floor is separated by decks that meet the requirements of Class A-60. The main structures
supporting/stabilising the decks shall have a fire resistance of 60 minutes according to a standard
fire test or approved calculation. Joints between the deck and the outer wall shall have a
minimum fire resistance of 60 minutes;
b) all staircases meet the requirements of Class A-60. For stairs connecting two floors only, it is
sufficient that the walls of the staircase at one of the floors meet the requirements of Class A-60;
c) all shafts interconnecting floors are built to Class A-60;
d) kitchen and dining room are separated from the rest of the living quarters by Class A-60 fire
divisions;
e) work spaces, laboratories, rooms for electrical equipment such as major distribution panels,
transformers etc. and rooms for water heating are separated, individually or in sections, from the
rest of the living quarters by fire divisions of at least Class A-0;
f) all walls and doors where Class A fire division are not required meet the requirements of Class B-
15;
g) walls in corridors extend from deck to deck and meet the requirements of Class B-30.
If a suspended ceiling design is continuous between Class A division and meets the requirements
of Class B-15, walls in corridors may be terminated at the ceiling;
h) suspended ceilings meet the requirements of Class B-0;
i) draught stoppers are installed above suspended ceilings, which meet the requirements to Class
B-0. The distance between draught stoppers should not exceed 14 meters;
j) there are no windows in walls facing processing area etc;
k) fire doors are installed in corridors to the extent necessary.
l) additional principles and requirements relating to Living Quarters are included in NORSOK C-
001/002

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX J - FIRE PROTECTION DATA SHEET (INFORMATIVE)

SDS-001 Fire protection data sheet
NORSOK FIRE PROTECTION DATA SHEET / SDS-001

S-001 AREA SAFETY CHART Rev. 3, April 1999
Rev. 3, April 1999 Page 1 of 1
Package no. Doc. no. Rev.
WALLS / FLOOR /
CEILING N S E W FLOOR CEILING
NONE:
AREA CLASSIFICATIONS VENTILATION OCCUPANCY WIND SHIELD:
HEAT SHIELD:
ZONE 1 NATURAL PERMANENT STEEL WALLS:
ZONE 2 MECHANICAL INTERMITTENT FIRE PARTITIONS:
NON-HAZARDOUS BY LOCAT. OVERPRESSURE NORMALY NONE EXPL. PANELS:
NON-HAZARDOUS BY VENT. UNDERPRESSURE NONE
SUSPENDED:
FALSE:
HAZARDS FIRE AND GAS DETECTION FIRE & BLAST PROTECTION RATE
CRUDE OIL HC GAS IN AREA - POINT OR BEAM AREA DELUGE 10 l/min/m2

CONDENSATE LIQUID HC GAS IN HVAC INTAKE EQUIPMENT DELUGE 20 l/min/m2
LIGHTER HYDROCARBON GAS HC GAS IN COMBUSTION INTAKE AFFF 1 0/0
HEAVIER HYDROCARBON GAS HC GAS IN COMB./VENT. INTAKE SPRINKLER
TOXIC GAS H2S, CO2 HC GAS AT BOUNDARY - POINT OR BEAM WATERMIST
CHEMICALS TOXIC GAS IN AREA MONITORS 54 m3/hr
METHANOL SMOKE IN AREA HYDRANT 2 x 20 m3/hr
GLYCOL SMOKE IN HVAC INTAKE CO2
FUEL OIL / DIESEL EARLY SMOKE HOSE REEL (HIGH CAP.) 13 m3/hr
LUBRICANTS HEAT IN AREA HOSE REEL (LOW CAP.) 8 m3/hr
ELECTRICAL FLAME IN AREA DUAL AGENT HOSE REEL (DAHR)
OTHER COMBUSTIBLES MANUAL CALL POINT (MCP) WHEELED PORTABLE EXTINGUISHER BC CO2
RADIOACTIVE MANUAL CO 2 RELEASE CO2 PORTABLE
EXPLOSIVES MANUAL RELEASE WATER (MRW) POWDER PORTABLE
HYDROGEN GAS AREA RESET WATER PORTABLE
ESD PUSHBUTTON GASEOUS EXT.
MANUAL ELECTRICAL ISOLATION (MEI)
O
U
NOTES: T
P
U
T
S
I
G
N
A
L
INPUT SIGNALS S
FIRE ZONE: AREA SAFETY CHARTS FOR:

AREA: DESCRIPTION:

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
ANNEX K - NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS

(INFORMATIVE)
K.1 General requirements

This Annex outlines detailed recommendations to a simple NNMI, which is manned only during
daylight and under weather conditions that allow safe access and departure by boat or helicopter. No
facilities are provided for overnight stay.
For more complex installations, or where personnel will stay onboard for shorter periods, additional
recommendations should be considered to achieve an adequate level of safety.
A simple NNMI considered in this annex will typically be arranged with means of access from the
sea, an access deck for the christmas trees and a helicopter deck.
The process equipment typically includes christmas trees, production manifold and a removable spool
for pigging.
The main power source should be a battery pack with recharging by a small diesel generator or by a
power cable from the service installation.
When manned, manual shutdown of the installation should be possible locally as well as from remote
control point.
K.2 Production systems
K.2.1 Well head system

The well head system should be designed to withstand the highest load combination of pressure and
temperature occurring during operation, shutdown and maintenance of the wells.
In addition to local operation, wing control valves may be controlled from the remote control centre,
allowing remote shutdown and restart of the production. Blocking of remote start-up of production
should be possible while the installation is manned.
K.2.2 Piping systems and pressure vessels
Piping systems and pressure vessels should be designed to minimise the instrumentation and control
equipment.
Piping systems designed to withstand the highest load combination of pressure and temperature, to
which the systems are expected to be exposed, need not be provided with full flow pressure relief
valves.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
K.2.3 Drain and vent systems

Manual depressurisation of all pressurised systems should be possible from the platform when it is
manned.
Vent pipes from systems containing hydrocarbons should be terminated at a minimum of 3 m above
or outside decks. The location of vent pipe termination should take into account helicopter
operations.
The consequences of ignited vent pipes should be considered.
Vents on atmospheric vessels, which are not dimensioned to withstand a full inside explosion
pressure, should be provided with adequate flame arrestors.
K.2.4 Risers
Production and lift gas risers should be equipped with a riser emergency shutdown valve.
On risers for stable fluids, which may be depressurised from the main installation, omission of riser
emergency shutdown valves may be considered.
K.2.5 Auxiliary systems
Engines should be avoided, but if required, be certified for operation in hazardous areas.
K.3 Safety systems
Primary protection of personnel should be quick and effective evacuation.
K.3.1 Escape routes/Shelter
Escape routes to the shelter should be established. The shelter should provide for protection of
personnel until evacuation can be performed.
If the platform is provided with a boat landing for personnel transfer a secondary escape route to the
landing should be established if it makes a contribution to the evacuation options in an emergency
situation.
K.3.2 Life-saving appliances
Adequate life saving appliances for the crew that comes on board should be available. (Ref EERS)
Installation of at least one free fall lifeboat is recommended, but other arrangements such as a
combination of MOB /lifeboat may be used. This is to be decided based on the emergency
preparedness analyses.
An evacuations chute with rafts should be considered to achieve the required redundancy of the
evacuation means.
K.3.3 Emergency shut-down
Provisions should be made for emergency shutdown and operational shutdown of the installation to
be made both locally at the installation and at the remote control centre. Reset of the ESD valves
should be made at the valve itself, but may be done from the remote CCR when the NNMI is
unmanned if adequate means to evaluate the situation onboard from the CCR is provided.
The emergency shutdown signal from the remote control centre should be by a fail-safe signal (e.g. by
means of a radio link) which on disconnection shuts down the normally not manned installation. A
possible time delay in shutdown due to a link failure should not exceed 10 min.

Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Emergency shutdown of the remote control centre or plant should result in operational shutdown of
the not normally manned installation.
It should not be possible to inhibit a local emergency shutdown system from the remote control
centre.
The emergency shutdown system should be in operation when the installation is unmanned.
The emergency shut down system should be separate from PSD and PCDA.
K.3.4 Communication
Voice communication between the installation and the remote control centre and directly between the
installation and standby vessel should be possible when the installation is manned.
If voice communication is based on portable radios, a minimum of two radios should be available on
the satellite installation.
The reliability of the communication links for the emergency and control systems between the CCR
on the main installation and the NNMI should be documented.
K.3.5 Fire and gas detection
Fire detection should be provided and automatic shutdown initiated upon confirmed signal.
Gas detectors with shut down functions should be in operation when personnel is onboard the
installation.
If portable detectors with built-in alarm functions are used, the crew should place these in fixtures on
approved locations when ascending the installation.
K.3.6 Alarm systems
Upon gas detection an audible alarm should be activated. Portable gas detectors may provide the
alarm.
When the installation is manned, an APS signal should be operable, which can be perceived by all on
board.
K.3.7 Emergency power
An emergency power supply should be provided with a capacity of minimum four hours.
K.3.8 Helicopter deck
The helicopter deck should as a minimum be equipped with a dual agent extinguisher system based
on 250-kg dry powder and 250 l premixed foam.
On regularly operated decks (this means when shuttling have to be done for temporary periods.) a
built in fire fighting system is recommended.

NORSOK-NORSOK-S-001 3rd 2000 Technical Safety

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

NORSOK-NORSOK-S-001 3rd 2000 Technical Safety

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

NORSOK STANDARD

Norwegian Technology Standards Institution

NORSOK standard Page 1 of 66

10.1 Fire and Explosion strategy (FES) 26

NORSOK standard Page 2 of 66

Annexes B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I form a normat6ive part of this standard.

NORSOK standard Page 3 of 66

Requirements to Working environment are described in NORSOK S-002

API 6FA Fire tests for valves

NORSOK standard Page 4 of 66

(Replaces API RP14 C).

3 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

NORSOK standard Page 5 of 66

accidental situations associated with a temporary increase of risk and

NORSOK standard Page 6 of 66

NORSOK standard Page 7 of 66

NORSOK standard Page 8 of 66

4 SAFETY EVALUATION, MANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION

4.2 Risk reduction principles

4.3 Analyses and optimisation

NORSOK standard Page 9 of 66

Safety evaluations as required by this standard shall be documented.

NORSOK standard Page 10 of 66

5 EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

See Annex B for details relating to evacuation principles.

NORSOK standard Page 11 of 66

For detailed recommendations related to safety equipment see Annex C.

6 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT

6.1 General requirements

NORSOK standard Page 12 of 66

6.2 Area Classification

6.3 Escape routes

NORSOK standard Page 13 of 66

6.5 Helicopter deck

6.6 Emergency service areas

6.7 Process area

NORSOK standard Page 14 of 66

6.8 Riser area

The following means of protection shall be considered:

6.9 Flare boom, flare tower, cold vent

6.10 Drilling and wellhead area

NORSOK standard Page 15 of 66

7 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN

7.1 Design accidental loads

Relevant loads are:

NORSOK standard Page 16 of 66

8 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY

8.1 General requirements

8.2 Safety shutdown systems

8.3 Process safety

NORSOK standard Page 17 of 66

Pressure relief and depressurising of hydrocarbon systems is covered in Annex E.

9 REQUIREMENTS TO SAFETY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

9.1 General requirements

9.2 Fire and Gas detection

Detail requirements for F & G system is incorporated in Annex F.

NORSOK standard Page 18 of 66

9.3 Emergency shutdown

9.3.2 ESD valves

The location of ESD valves shall be determined based on the FES.

NORSOK standard Page 19 of 66

Further the following functional requirements apply to ESD valves:

NORSOK standard Page 20 of 66

Manual Push Button