ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS.

ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Automatic release of IRA
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of
expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National
Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA
8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under
the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the IRA for local government units
shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that an amount
of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to
fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the
President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain
committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the
Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a
separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount
to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the
petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining
Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the
Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED
FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA
allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”.
Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to
resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue
that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its
release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted
by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole
amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA
contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the
President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above
constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does
not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of
the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the
executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This essentially means that the
President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of
statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local
governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the
executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the
Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers
intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic,
then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified
by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress
is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the
IRA is, as held in Batangas:
…if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the
collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall
be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be
made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the
quarter of the current fiscal year.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable
intent to “lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The pronouncement in
Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be
carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA
are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10
Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012
FACTS: We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al.
in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No.
197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari
Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo
Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi
Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f)
the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g)
the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still
existing and effective.

These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of
Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were
scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and
recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

Issues: (a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national
and local elections?

(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?

(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?

(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?

(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature
of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?

(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory powers
over autonomous regions?

Held: YES. Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections

The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and
local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national
and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes
shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the
heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous
regions as one of the forms of local governments.
NO. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM
elections;11 it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for
the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No.
9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the
ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap
left in RA No. 9054.

We reiterate our previous observations:

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM
elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First
Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix
the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were
all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or
modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law.
Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the
first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to
approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the
ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date
of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No.
9054.12 (emphases supplied)

YES. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of
the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can
occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials;
they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term
limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.

Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One
significant difference between the present case and these past cases is that while these past cases all
refer to electivebarangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials – the ARMM Governor,
the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall
within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.

Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to
suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no
authority to question the wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the
vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature complying with the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.

NO. COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections

Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is
sufficiently empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has
merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa
Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power
is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls
within the narrow confines of the following provisions:

Section 5.  Postponement of election. –  When for any serious cause such as  violence,  terrorism,  loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia  or records,  force majeure, and  other analogous causes  of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission,  motu proprio  or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after
due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shall  postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect  but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. – If, on account of  force majeure,  violence,  terrorism,  fraud, or  other
analogous causes  the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed,  or  had been
suspended  before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,   such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases
and underscoring ours]

YES. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:

YES. We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but within
the context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the
constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national and local
elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving
it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period, between
the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one
(21) months away – of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
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In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address
the problem created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the
expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the
terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c)
recognize that the President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of
supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM
regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already established the
unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.
 In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that
synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of
reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the national and local elections. In other words, “given the plain unconstitutionality of providing
for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the
term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and
specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
– an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?

II.   THE ISSUES:

1.    Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2.    Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3.    Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?  

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.

10153 in toto.]

1.    YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to
hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.

2.    NO,  the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement
in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following
manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill
can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in
its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
 In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement. 

3.    YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;
(2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in
the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their
respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1.    1st  option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.  This
provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year
term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
                                                                      
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress,
the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This
view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do
indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws
would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the
position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way
it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis
for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.

3.2.    2nd  option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority  to
order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be
held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local
officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to
 whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in
the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011
elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections.  By so doing, Congress itself has made  a policy
decision  in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that  it shall not call special elections  as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by
ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC.  This Court, particularly, cannot make this
call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating.  To be sure, the Court
is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for
having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion.  But our power rests on very narrow ground and is
merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. 

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years
that the Constitution itself commands.  This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call
for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 
  
3.3.    3rd  option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make.  This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;  and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. 
 If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and
legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement
indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of
OICs constitutionally defective. 

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged  constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that
changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions.  RA No. 10153, however, does not
in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance.  What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”   This power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in
the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054.  RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail.  And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms.  Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires. 
GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE v. JESSE M. ROBREDO, GR No. 195390, 2014-12-10

Facts:

In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the manner the local
government units (LGUs) utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 1993-
1994. The examination yielded an official report, showing that a substantial... portion of the 20%
development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to
expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark
violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known... as the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC).

December 14, 1995, the DILG issued MC No. 95-216,[5] enumerating the policies and guidelines on the
utilization of the development fund component of the IRA. It likewise carried a reminder to LGUs of
the... strict mandate to ensure that public funds, like the 20% development fund, "shall be spent
judiciously and only for the very purpose or purposes for which such funds are intended."

On September 20, 2005, then DILG Secretary Angelo T. Reyes and Department of Budget and
Management Secretary Romulo L. Neri issued Joint MC No. 1, series of 2005,[7] pertaining to the
guidelines on the appropriation and utilization of the 20% of the IRA for... development projects, which
aims to enhance accountability of the LGUs in undertaking development projects. The said
memorandum circular underscored that the 20% of the IRA intended for development projects should
be utilized for social development, economic development and... environmental management.[8]

On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed MC No. 2010-
83,[9] entitled "Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings," which aims
to promote good governance through enhanced... transparency and accountability of LGUs.

Issues:

Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.

Ruling:

The assailed memorandum circulars... do not transgress the local and fiscal... autonomy granted to
LGUs.

The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of LGUs.[35] To highlight its
significance, the entire Article X of the Constitution was devoted to laying down the bedrock upon which
this policy is anchored.

It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution of enhancing local autonomy that the LGC was
enacted. Section 2 thereof was a reiteration of the state policy. It reads, thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant... communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall... be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process
of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units.

Verily, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization.

In Limbona v. Mangelin,[37] the Court elaborated on the concept of decentralization,... thus:

[A]utonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power... and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the... central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. x x x.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is
free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum... intervention from central authorities.
x x x.[38] (Citations omitted)

To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the President
over LGUs to mere supervision.[39] "The President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to
'ensure that local affairs are administered... according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own."[

At any rate, LGUs must be reminded that the local autonomy granted to them does not completely
severe them from the national government or turn them into impenetrable states. Autonomy does not
make local governments sovereign within the state.

Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the
supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing laws.
"Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline... and ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act
or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires."

A scrutiny of the contents of the mentioned issuances shows that they do not, in any manner, violate
the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. To be clear, "[f]iscal autonomy means that local governments have the
power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable... share in the national taxes
released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with
their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to
work within the constraints... thereof."

It is inconceivable, however, how the publication of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans and
procurement plans of LGUs required in the assailed issuances could have infringed on the local fiscal
autonomy of LGUs. Firstly, the issuances do not interfere with the... discretion of the LGUs in the
specification of their priority projects and the allocation of their budgets. The posting requirements are
mere transparency measures which do not at all hurt the manner by which LGUs decide the utilization
and allocation of their funds.

Principles:

Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the
supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing laws.
"Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline... and ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act
or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires."
MARK ANTHONY V. ZABAL v. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, GR No. 238467, 2019-02-12

Facts:

aradise is a place of bliss, felicity, and delight.[1] For Filipinos and foreign nationals alike, Boracay - a
small island in Malay, Aklan, with its palm-fringed, pristine white sand beaches, azure waters, coral
reefs, rare seashells,[2] and a lot more to offer,[3] - is indeed a piece of paradise. Unsurprisingly, Boracay
is one of the country's prime tourist destinations. However, this island-paradise has been disrespected,
abused, degraded, over-used, and taken advantage of by both locals and tourists. Hence, the
government gave Boracay its much-needed respite and rehabilitation. However, the process by which
the rehabilitation was to be implemented did not sit well with petitioners, hence, the present petition.

Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary
Injunction, and/or Status Quo Ante Order filed by petitioners Mark Anthony V. Zabal (Zabal), Thiting
Estoso Jacosalem (Jacosalem), and Odon S. Bandiola (Bandiola) against respondents President Rodrigo R.
Duterte (President Duterte), Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, and Secretary

Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who, at the time of the filing of the petition, were
earning a living from the tourist activities therein. Zabal claims to build sandcastles for tourists while
Jacosalem drives for tourists and workers in the island. While not a resident, Bandiola, for his part,
claims to occasionally visit Boracay for business and pleasure. The three base their locus standi on direct
injury and also from the transcendental importance doctrine.[4] Respondents, on the other hand, are
being sued in their capacity as officials of the government.

This was followed by several speeches and news releases stating that he would place Boracay under a
state of calamity. True to his words, President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a
cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson Harry L.
Roque, Jr. in a press briefing the following day wherein he formally announced that the total closure of
Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26, 2018.[6] Following this
pronouncement, petitioners contend that around 630 police and military personnel were readily
deployed to Boracay including personnel for crowd dispersal management.[7] They also allege that the
DILG had already released guidelines for the closure.[8]... fewer tourists had been engaging the services
of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely enough to feed their families. They fear that
if the closure pushes through, they would suffer grave and irreparable damage. Hence, despite the fact
that the government was then yet to release a formal issuance on the matter,[9] petitioners filed the
petition on April 25, 2018 praying that:... ection 6, Article III of the Constitution explicitly allows the
impairment of the right to travel, two conditions, however, must concur to wit: (1) there is a law
restricting the said right, and (2) the restriction is based on national security, public safety or public
health. For petitioners, neither of these conditions have been complied with. For one, Proclamation No.
475 does not refer to any specific law restricting the right to travel. Second, it has not been shown that
the presence of tourists in the island poses any threat or danger to national security, public safety or
public health.

As to the right to due process, petitioners aver that the same covers property rights and these include
the right to work and earn a living. Since the government, through Proclamation No. 475, restricted the
entry of tourists and non-residents into the island, petitioners claim that they, as well as all others who
work, do business, or earn a living in the island, were deprived of the source of their

Petitioners likewise argue that the closure of Boracay could not be anchored on police power. For one,
police power must be exercised not by the executive but by legislative bodies through the creation of
statutes and ordinances that aim to promote the health, moral, peace, education, safety, and general
welfare of the people. For another, the measure is unreasonably unnecessary and unduly o

Respondents moreover maintain that the petition is in the nature of a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation (SLAPP) under Rule 6 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, or a legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any
person, institution or the government has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws,
protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights. Respondents thus assert that the
petition must be dismissed since it was filed for the said sole purpose.
Further, respondents dispute petitioners' allegation that Proclamation No. 475 infringes upon the rights
to travel and to due process. They emphasize that the right to travel is not an absolute right. It may be
impaired or restricted in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health. In fact, there
are already several existing laws which serve as statutory limitations to the right to travel.

Anent the alleged violation of the right to due process, respondents challenge petitioners' claim that
they were deprived of their livelihood without due process. Respondents call attention to the fact that
Zabal as sandcastle maker and Jacosalem as driver are freelancers and thus belong to the informal
economy sector. This means that their source of livelihood is never guaranteed and is susceptible to
changes in regulations and the over-all business climate. In any case, petitioners' contentions must yield
to the State's exercise of police power. As held in Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association,
Inc. v. The Hon. City Mayor of Manila,[19] the mere fact that some individuals in the community may be
deprived of their present business or of a particular mode of living cannot prevent the exercise of the
police power of the State. Indeed, to respondents, private interests should yield to the reasonable
prerogatives of the State for the public good and welfare, which precisely are the primary objectives of
the government measure herein q

Issues:

hether the measures implemented infringe upon the constitutional rights to travel and to due process of
petitioners as well as of tourists and non-residents of the island; and, (2) Pre

Likewise, petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 475 is unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional rights to travel and to due process.

Suffice it to state that while this case touches on the environmental issues in Boracay, the ultimate issue
for resolution is the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 475. The procedure in the treatment of a
defense of SLAPP provided for under Rule 6 of the Rules

Ruling:

As correctly pointed out by respondents, President Duterte must be dropped as respondent in this case.
The Court's pronouncement in Professor David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo[20] on the non-suability
of an incumbent President cannot be any clearer, viz.: x x x Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to
enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative
and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness
in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.[21] Accordingly, President Duterte is dropped as
respondent in this case.

Here, as mentioned, Zabal is a sandcastle maker and Jacosalem, a driver. The nature of their livelihood is
one wherein earnings are not guaranteed. As correctly pointed out by respondents, their earnings are
not fixed and may vary depending on the business climate in that while they can earn much on peak
seasons, it is also possible for them not to earn anything on lean seasons, especially when the rainy days
set in. Zabal and Jacosalem could not have been oblivious to this kind of situation, they having been in
the practice of their trade for a considerable length of time. Clearly, therefore, what Zabal and
Jacosalem could lose in this case are mere projected earnings which are in no way guaranteed, and are
sheer expectancies characterized as contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest, just like in
Galicto. Concomitantly, an assertion of direct injury on the basis of loss of income does not clothe Zabal
and Jacosalem with legal

As to Bandiola, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to his substantial interest in the case and as to
how he sustained direct injury as a result of the issuance of Proclamation No. 475. While the allegation
that he is a non-resident who occasionally goes to Boracay for business and pleasure may suggest that
he is claiming direct injury on the premise that his right to travel was affected by the proclamation, the
petition fails to expressly provide specifics as to how. "It has been held that a party who assails the
constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. [He] must show not only that the
law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that [he] sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that [he] suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. [He] must show that [he] has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege
to which [he] is lawfully entitled or that [he] is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of."[35] Indeed, the petition utterly fails to demonstrate that
Bandiola possesses the requisite legal standing to sue.

In fine, this case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense contrary to what
petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to travel is
merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom which
were necessary incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that Proclamation
No. 475 deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. The questioned proclamation is clearly focused
on its purpose of rehabilitating Boracay and any intention to directly restrict the right cannot, in any
manner, be deduced from its import. This is contrary to the import of several laws recognized as
constituting an impairment on the right to travel which directly impose restriction on the right, viz.:

In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Drilon,[39] the Court held that the
consequence on the right to travel of the deployment ban implemented by virtue of Department Order
No. 1, Series of 1998 of the Department of Labor and Employment does not impair the right.

Hence, if at all, the impact of Proclamation No. 475 on the right to travel is not direct but merely
consequential; and, the same is only for a reasonably short period of time or merely temporary.

In this light, a discussion on whether President Duterte exercised a power legislative in nature loses its
significance. Since Proclamation No. 475 does not actually impose a restriction on the right to travel, its
issuance did not result to any substantial alteration of the relationship between the State and the
people. The proclamation is therefore not a law and conversely, the President did not usurp the law-
making power of the legislature.

hus, police power constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.[46] After all, "the Bill of Rights
itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties. 'Even liberty itself,
the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will.' It is subject to the far
more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number."[47]

Expansive and extensive as its reach may be, police power is not a force without limits."[48] "It has to be
exercised within bounds – lawful ends through lawful means, i.e., that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, require its exercise, and that the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose while not being unduly
oppressive upon individuals."[49]

That the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the scope of police power cannot be
disputed. Verily, the statutes[50] from which the said measure draws authority and the constitutional
provisions[51] which serve as its framework are primarily concerned with the environment and health,
safety, and well-being of the people, the promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate
objectives of governmental efforts and regulations. The motivating factor in the issuance of
Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the interest of the public in general. The only question now is
whether the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Was the temporary closure of Boracay as a tourist destination for six months reasonably necessary
under the circumstances? The answer is in the affirmative.

Was the temporary closure of Boracay as a tourist destination for six months reasonably necessary
under the circumstances? The answer is in the affirmative.

For one, its beach waters could not be said to be totally safe for swimming. In any case, the closure, to
emphasize, was only for a definite period of six months, i.e., from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. To
the mind of the Court, this period constitutes a reasonable time frame, if not to complete, but to at least
put in place the necessary rehabilitation works to be done in the island. Indeed, the temporary closure
of Boracay, although unprecedented and radical as it may seem, was reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive under the circumstances. It was the most practical and realistic means of ensuring
that rehabilitation works in the island are started and carried out in the most efficacious and expeditious
way. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or
oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb the executive determination that the closure of Boracay was
necessitated by the foregoing circumstances. As earlier noted, petitioners totally failed to counter the
factual bases of, and justification for the challenged executive action. Undoubtedly, Proclamation No.
475 is a valid police power measure. To repeat, police power constitutes an implied limitation to the Bill
of Rights, and that even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is subject to the far more overriding
demands and requirements of the greater number.

t must be stressed, though, that "when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare."[58] Otherwise, police power as an attribute to promote the
common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss
of earnings and capital, government measures implemented pursuant to the said state power would be
stymied or invalidated.[... particularly Zabal and Jacosalem, cannot be said to have already acquired
vested rights to their sources of income in Boracay. As heretofore mentioned, they are part of the
informal sector of the economy where earnings are not guaranteed. In Southern Luzon Drug
Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[60] the Court elucidated on vested
rights, as follows:

Here, Zabal and Jacosalem's asserted right to whatever they may earn from tourist arrivals in Boracay is
merely an inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and therefore cannot be claimed as one's
own. An inchoate right is a mere expectation, which may or may not come into fruition. "It is contingent
as it only comes 'into existence on an event or condition which may not happen or be performed until
some other event may prevent their vesting."'[62] Clearly, said petitioners' earnings are contingent in
that, even assuming tourists... are still allowed in the island, they will still earn nothing if no one avails of
their services. Certainly, they do not possess any vested right on their sources of income, and under this
context, their claim of lack of due process collapses. To stress, only rights which have completely and
definitely accrued and settled are entitled protection under the due process clause.

Besides, Proclamation No. 475 does not strip Zabal and Jacosalem of their right to work and earn a
living. They are free to work and practice their trade elsewhere. That they were not able to do so in
Boracay, at least for the duration of its closure, is a necessary consequence of the police power measure
to close and rehabilitate the island.

The temporary closure does not erase the environmental violations committed; hence, the liabilities of
the violators remain and only they alone shall suffer the same. The temporary inconvenience that
petitioners or other persons may have experienced or are experiencing is but the consequence of the
police measure intended to attain a much higher purpose, that is, to protect the environment, the
health of the people, and the general welfare. Indeed, any and all persons may be burdened by
measures intended for the common good or to serve some important governmental interest.[63]

As a final note, the Court in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay,[66] called out the concerned government agencies for their cavalier attitude towards
solving environmental destruction despite hard evidence and clear signs of climate crisis. It equated the
failure to put environmental protection on a plane of high national priority to the then lacking level of
bureaucratic efficiency and commitment. Hence, the Court therein took it upon itself to put the heads of
concerned department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice and to
enjoin them to perform their mandates and duties towards the clean-up and/or restoration of Manila
Bay, through a "continuing mandamus." It likewise took the occasion to state, viz.:... here is an obvious
similarity in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority and in the present case in that both involve
the restoration of key areas in the country which were once glowing with radiance and vitality but are
now in shambles due to abuses and exploitation. What sets these two cases apart is that in the former,
those mandated to act still needed to be enjoined in order to act. In this case, the bold and urgent
action demanded by the Court in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is now in the roll out.
Still, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators heard during times of inaction can still be
heard during this time of full action – demonstrating a classic case of "damn if you do, damn if you
don't". Thus, in order for the now staunch commitment to save the environment not to fade, it
behooves upon the courts to be extra cautious in invalidating government measures meant towards

Principles:

In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos,[28] an actual case or controversy was
characterized as a "case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not
extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal question and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities."[29] T

Police power, amongst the three fundamental and inherent powers of the state, is the most pervasive
and comprehensive.[40] "It has been defined as the 'state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare."[41] "As defined, it
consists of (1) imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It
is not c

An inchoate right is a mere expectation, which may or may not come into fruition. "It is contingent as it
only comes 'into existence on an event or condition which may not happen or be performed until some
other event may prevent their vesting.
Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597, (2008)

6/20/2020

0 COMMENTS

ISSUE:  Whether or not the Congress can delegate to the Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces 

FACTS:  On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution 7902 renaming the legislative
district combining the said provice with Cotabato as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City."
Sema, here petitioner, questioned the Resolution combining the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty
into a single legislative district. 

DECISION:  Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional

Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.
Thus, SC declares VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is VALID. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities, is void. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.  

BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 177597 • July 16, 2008 • En Banc

Constitutional Law | Legislative Department | Apportionment of legislative districts

FACTS:

Congress enacted RA 9054, the Section 19, Article VI of which delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

Pursuant to such delegation, the ARMM Regional Assembly enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities
in the first district of Maguindanao.

ISSUES:

(1)
Whether or not Congress validly delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
legislative districts for the House of Representatives;

(2)

Whether or not RA 9054 is constitutional;

(3)

Whether or not MMA Act 201 is void.

RULING:

(1)

No. The power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the
power to create a legislative district.

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested
exclusively in Congress.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to
reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law
that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact.

(2)

RA 9054 is unconstitutional. (See above ruling.)

(3)

MMA Act 201 is void. (See above ruling.)

G.R. No. 176951 : February 15, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas;
CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREÑAS, in his
personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of
the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood
Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and
struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the
equal protection clause.

In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the
Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws

First issue:

The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power.  Legislative
power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The
Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.  Congress has the power to alter or
modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009.  Such power of amendment of laws was again
exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws.  When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it
provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—
income, population, and land area.

However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed
modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very
intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for
these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC.  But the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption
clauses found therein.  Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from
the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.

Second Issue: 

Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces.  Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized
this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit
for cityhood up to the present.

The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
NAVARRO V. ERMITA (G.R. NO. 180050; MAY 12, 2010)

CASE DIGEST: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al.

FACTS: Before us are two Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10, 2010 − one
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of public respondents, and the other filed by
respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo Villaroman, representing the Province of Dinagat Islands.

The arguments of the movants are similar. The grounds for reconsideration of Governor Villaroman can
be subsumed under the grounds for reconsideration of the OSG, which are as follows:

I. The Province of Dinagat Islands was created in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991. Article 9 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations is merely
interpretative of Section 461 of the Local Government Code.

II. The power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature.The acts of the Legislature
and Executive in enacting into law RA 9355 should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption of validity or constitutionality.

III. Recent and prevailing jurisprudence considers the operative fact doctrine as a reason for upholding
the validity and constitutionality of laws involving the creation of a new local government unit as in the
instant case.

As regards the first ground, the movantsreiterate the same arguments in their respective Comments
that aside from the undisputed compliance with the income requirement, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355,
creating the Province ofDinagat Islands,has also complied with the population and land area
requirements.

The arguments are unmeritorious and have already been passed upon by the Court in its Decision, ruling
that R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional, since it failed to comply with either the territorial or population
requirement contained in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as theLocal Government Code
of 1991.

When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province onDecember 3,2006, it had an official
population of only 106,951based on the2000 Census ofPopulation conducted by the National Statistics
Office (NSO), which population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.

Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population
inDinagatIslandsin 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the
NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the
population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (motherProvinceofSurigao del Norte)
would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation of the new province.

Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the2007Census of
Population. The NSO certified that as ofAugust 1, 2007,DinagatIslandshad a total population of
only120,813,which wasstill below theminimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.

Based on the foregoing, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the population requirement of 250,000
inhabitants as certified by the NSO.
Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of2,000 square
kilometers.R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate
land area of802.12 square kilometers. This was not disputed by the respondent Governor of the
Province of Dinagat Islands in her Comment.She and the other respondents instead asserted that the
province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted from theland area requirementbased
on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR),
specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9which states that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.The certificate of compliance issued by
the LandsManagement Bureau was also based on the exemption under paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR.

However, the Court held thatparagraph 2 of Article 9 of the IRRis null and void, because the exemption
is not found in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of
discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic
law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law.

The movants now argue that the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local Government Code is
the one stated in the Dissenting Opinion ofAssociate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.

In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the population
requirement.However, he contends that the Province ofDinagat Islands did not fail to comply with the
territorial requirementbecause it is composed ofa group of islands; hence, it is exempt from compliance
not only with the territorial contiguity requirement, but also with the 2,000-square-kilometer land area
criterion inSection 461 of the Local Government Code.

He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and land area in paragraph (a) (i) above is the one
being referred to in the exemption from the territorial requirement in paragraph (b). Thus, he contends
that if the province to be created is composed of islands, like the one in this case, then, its territory need
not be contiguous and need not have an area of at least 2,000 square kilometers. He asserts that this is
because as the law is worded, contiguity and land area are not two distinct and separate requirements,
but they qualify each other. An exemption from one of the two component requirements in paragraph
(a) (i) allegedly necessitates an exemption from the other component requirement, because the non-
attendance of one results in the absence of a reason for the other component requirement to effect a
qualification.

ISSUE: Is the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local Government Code the one stated in the
Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura?

HELD: Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units) of the
Local Government Code provides:

SEC. 7.Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and
projected capacity to provide services,to wit:

(a)Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;
(b)Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government unit concerned; and

(c)Land area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a
local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with
technical descriptions;andsufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the
National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

xxx

It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the general rule in the creation of a local
government unit, states in paragraph (c)thereof that the land area must be contiguous and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Therefore, there are two requirements for land area:(1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the
land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of
its populace.A sufficient land area in the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as
provided by Section 461 of the Local Government Code .

Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the requisites for the creation of a province,
specifically states the requirement of a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers.

Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of a contiguous territory and the
requirement of a land area of at least 2,000square kilometers aredistinctand separate requirements for
landarea under paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.

xxx

However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from the requirement of
territorial contiguity, thus:

(b)The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two(2)or more islands,or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

Contrary to the contention of the movants, the exemption above pertains only to the requirement of
territorial contiguity.It clearly states that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with
in the case of a province comprisingtwo or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province.

Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a province is composed of
two or more islands, or when theterritory of a province is separated by a chartered city or cities, such
province need not comply with the land area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or the
requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of the Local Government Code.

Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions where none
is provided from considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither
may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated, nor construe its provisions by taking into
account questions of expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax
non-compliance therewith. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, but only for application.

Moreover, the OSG contends that since the power to create a local government unit is vested with the
Legislature, the acts of the Legislature and the Executive branch in enacting into law R.A. No. 9355
should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or constitutionality.

The contention lacks merit. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution States: SEC. 10.No province, city,
municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government codeand subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that imposed the criteria for
the creation of a province as contained in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.No law has yet
been passed amending Section 461 of the Local Government Code, so only the criteria stated therein are
the bases for the creation of a province.The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local
Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province; hence, any derogation of or deviation
from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.

Contrary to the contention of the movants, the evidence on record proved that R.A. No. 9355 failed to
comply with either the population or territorial requirements prescribed in Section 461 of the Local
Government Code for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, the Court declared R.A. No.
9355 unconstitutional. DENIED.
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent
component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA
No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago
from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA
No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a
proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified
the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not
involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also
questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political
question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition
because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could
decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is
mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of
Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were
all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city
through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives
them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.
MOISES S. SAMSON v. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, GR No. 133076, 1999-09-22

Facts:

President

President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535,... of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of
Quezon City.

Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the

Court challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.

also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation of R.A. 8535, the
COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches, and the Department of
Budget and Management from disbursing funds for said plebiscite.

prays for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, through a motion we
duly noted.

R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government Code... as to the
requirements of income, population and land area... seat of government;... no adverse effect to being a
city of Quezon

City, respectively... its Implementing Rules... as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of
barangay resolution... law will in effect amend the Constitution.

certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to Congress during the
deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. No. 8535... petitioner points out that there is no
certification attesting to the fact that the mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not be
adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of income, population, and land
area.

respondents... claimed he failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof.

argued that petitioner had the burden of proof... to overcome the legal presumption that Congress
considered all the legal requirements under the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A. 8535.

petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document supporting petitioner's claim that R.A.

8535 is unconstitutional.

Issues:

whether or not petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity accorded R.A.
No. 8535.

Ruling:

Petitioner did not present any proof, but only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to the

House Committee on Local Government

Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by
Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites... therefor.

The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would comprise the
proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310... more than the 150,000 required by the
Implementing Rules.
no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local Government Code, the
proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and population... or land area.

Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may also be
taken that Novaliches is now highly... urbanized.

Principles:

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union

All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality... one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt;... courts are not concerned with
the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of... the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted."

Every statute is presumed valid.

Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7... creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and
projected capacity to provide services, to wit

Income

Population

Land Area

Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in Article 11

Requisites for creation A city

Income an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos... immediately preceding two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,... shall include the income accruing to... the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;

Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand...
inhabitants... territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more... islands.

creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs
at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements
G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P.
GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S.
ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as
Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUFAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON.
ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON.
CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR.
RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his
capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents.

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of
Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author.  The enrolled bill, submitted to
the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No.
7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters
of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

Issue:

Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the
average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component
city.

Ruling:

The court held that petitioners’ asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form
part of the income of Local Government Units. Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides
that "the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of
income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a
technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally
makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support
from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled
corporations".
Juanito Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995 (Digested Case)

Re: Based on verifiable indicators of viability/projected capacity

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the Municipality of
Makati to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. Petitioners contend that the special
law did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction
of Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials; that it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law; that the increase in
legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with the population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and
the LGC.

HELD:

(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions.

(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials.

(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed
by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census.

(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill.

(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.

HELD:

(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by
an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. In language that cannot be any
clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality." The court take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the
metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary
dispute.
(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again
in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek
re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may
not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over
which this Court has no jurisdiction.

(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted
to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of
time.

(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.

Mariano vs COMELEC GR No 118577 07 March 1995

Facts: Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing
unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Petitioners contend that (1) Section 2 Article I of RA
7854 failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by metes and bounds with technical descriptions, (2)
Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with Section 8 Article X and Section 7 Article VI of the
Constitution, that the new corporate existence of the new city will restart the term of the present
municipal elective making it favourable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay, and (3) Section 52 Article X
of RA 7854 for adding a legislative district is unconstitutional and cannot be made by special law.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The said delineation did not change even by an inch the
land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated
that, the city’s land area “shall comprise the  present territory of the municipality.”

The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements before
a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet
to ripen to an actual case or controversy.

In Tobias vs Abalos, Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793.htm

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated
from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October
2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000)
for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province.

HELD:
NO. The second sentence of  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative,
there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

CASE DIGEST: AQUINO III VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 189793; APRIL 7, 2010)
CASE DIGEST: SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners,
RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.

FACTS: Republic Act No. 9716 was signed into law by President Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect
on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation. In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts.

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
minimum population standard.

ISSUE: Is the population of 250,000 an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province?

HELD: Yes, it is an indispensable constitutional requirement. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. DISMISSED.

Tan vs COMELEC GR No 73155 11 July 1986

09 Monday Mar 2015

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

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Facts: Batas Pambansa Bilang 885 was enacted creating a new province in the Island of Negros to be
known as the province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on 03 December 1985. Patricio Tan filed a
case for prohibition to stop COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite and implementing the same. Due to
Christmas holiday, this was not acted upon and the plebiscite was held and ratified only to inhabitants of
Negros del Norte excluding the rest of Negros Occidental province. Petitioner move to stop the
implementation of the said law.

Issue: Whether or not the creation of the new province, Negros del Norte was constitutional?

Decision: BP Bilang 885 declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province Negros del
Norte and the appointment of its officials were declared null and void. Pursuant to Article 11 Section 3,
it si imperative to obtain approval of majority of votes in a plebiscite in the units affected whenever a
province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. The
boundary of Negros Occidental would be altered by the division of its exiting boundaries to create the
new province. There is no way to reconcile in holding a plebiscite that eliminates the participation of the
two component political units.

TAN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code

Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province
in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of
Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986.
Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional
and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of
the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56
sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which
states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected”? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries,
“the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and
alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the
parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other
affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent.
Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more
municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of
the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer,
eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.