Election law Digests Compilation Held: No.
The election law has no justification
Topic II: Election and Suffrage
Moya v. Delfierro
69 Phil. 199 (1930)
Badelles vs. Cabili
27 SCRA 11, February 27, 1969
Facts: Mariano Badelles together with Bonifacio P.
Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon who along with the
five protestees were among those who were
registered candidates voted for in such election for
councilors in the City of Iligan, who contested the
election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office
of City Mayor of the said city. It was then alleged
that there are irregularities on the said election and
that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to
do so. Protestees moved to dismiss in different suits
the petition on the following grounds:
1. That the protest was filed beyond the
reglementary period allowed by the Revised
Election Code;
2. That the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the present case, the Commission
on Elections being the proper body to hear the
same;
3. That the complaint states no cause of action. On
march 23, 1968, in a single order, the election
protests were dismissed based on the lack of a
cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal issued by
COMELEC on March 23, 1968 is valid.
1|ELECTION LAW DIGESTS
except as a means for assuring a free, honest and
orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence
that corruption and irregularities should not be
permitted to taint the electoral process.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G.
RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the manner by which the
simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001
were conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners
contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and
a regular election must be distinguished in the
documentation as well as in the canvassing of their
results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the
said election with the 13th placer to serve that of
the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated
a seat in the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special
election and, consequently, the declaration of the
13th elected senator.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
(2) Whether or not the petition was moot.
(3) Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
(4) Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-
Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14
May 2001
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction
because what petitioners were questioning was the
validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in
which Honasan was elected and not to determine
Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as
Senator proper under a quo warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will
decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed
the requirement on standing and exercised our
discretion to give due course to voters’ suits
involving the right of suffrage, considering that the
issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again On
the VAlidity of the Election, the Court held that the
May 14, 2001 Election was valid.
The Court held that COMELEC’s Failure to Give
Notice of the Time of the Special Election as
required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy
in the Senate, the special election to fill such
vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. The law charges the
voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and
COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did
not negate the calling of such special election,
much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof
that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Office ROQUE V.COMELEC (2009)
to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the EN BANC
Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could [ G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009 ]
not be said that the voters were not informed since H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R.
there had been other accessible information BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T.
resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T.
had been a patent showing of grave abuse of MERCADO, FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA
discretion, the Court will not interfere P. MACEDA, AND ALVIN A. PETERS, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY HON.
Topic III: Commission of Election CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS
AND AWARDS COMMITTEE, REPRESENTED BY ITS
Purisima v. Salanga CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND RAFANAN,
15 SCRA 704 (1965) DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
REPRESENTED BY HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, TOTAL
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION AND
SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.
PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, PETITIONER-IN-
INTERVENTION.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MOVANT-
INTERVENOR.
VELASCO JR., J.:

Facts
On 23 January 2007, Congress passed RA 9369
amending the first automated election law, RA
8436.[2] Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, which amendment took effect on 10 February
2007, authorized the COMELEC to:

Use an automated election system or systems in the

same election in different provinces, whether
paper-based or a direct recording automated
election system as it may deem appropriate and
practical for the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing/consolidation and transmittal
of results of electoral exercises: Provided, that for
the regular national and local election, which shall
Cauton v. COMELEC be held immediately after effectivity of this Act, the
19 SCRA 911 AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized
cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao, to be chosen by the Commission x x x x
In succeeding regular national or local elections,
the AES shall be implemented nationwide.
(Emphasis supplied)

The COMELEC did not use any automated election

system in the 14 May 2007 elections, the national
and local elections held after RA 9369 took effect.
On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, on the one hand,
and TIM and Smartmatic (Provider), on the other,
signed the Contract for the automated tallying and
recording of votes cast nationwide in the 10 May
2010 elections. For P7,191,484,739.48, the COMELEC
leased for use in the 10 May 2010 elections 82,200
optical scanners (and related equipment) and
hired ancillary services of the Provider.

On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and

citizens, filed this petition[4]to enjoin the signing of
the Contract or its implementation and to compel
disclosure of the terms of the Contract and other
agreements between the Provider and its
subcontractors.[5] Petitioners sought the Contract's
invalidation for non-compliance with the
2|ELECTION LAW DIGESTS
requirement in Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended,
mandating the partial use of an automated
election system before deploying it nationwide. To
further support their claim on the Contract's
invalidity, petitioners alleged that (1) the optical
scanners leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the
minimum systems capabilities" under RA 8436, as
amended and (2) the Provider not only failed to
submit relevant documents during the bidding but
also failed to show "community of interest" among
its constituent corporations as required
inInformation Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. COMELEC(Infotech).
Issue
Whether or not, the COMELECgravely abuse its
discretion when it entered to contract with
Smartmatic TIM Corporation and assailing to an
automated election.
Ruling
Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution,
the enabling automation law, RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-
Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an
afterthought, the Court finds the project award to
have complied with legal prescriptions, and the
terms and conditions of the corresponding
automation contract in question to be valid. No
grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on
the doorsteps of respondent COMELEC. And surely,
the winning joint venture should not be faulted for
having a foreign company as partner.
The COMELEC is an independent constitutional
body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme
of government. In the discharge of its awesome
functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator
and lead implementor of laws relative to the
conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with
restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the
case of an organization of lesser responsibility.[103]
It should be afforded ample elbow room and
enough wherewithal in devising means and
initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the
great objective for which it was created--to
promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful
elections. This is as it should be for, too often,
COMELEC has to make decisions under difficult
conditions to address unforeseen events to
preserve the integrity of the election and in the
process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past,
the Court has steered away from interfering with
the COMELEC’s exercise of its power which, by law
and by the nature of its office properly pertain to it.
Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion on comelec’s part, as here, the Court
should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of
certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that
body.
There are no ready-made formulas for solving
public problems. Time and experience are
necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends
of good government. In the matter of the
administration of the laws relative to the conduct of
3|ELECTION LAW DIGESTS
elections, x x x we must not by any excessive zeal
take away from the comelec the initiative which by
constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs
to it. Due regard to the independent character of
the Commission x x x requires that the power of this
court to review the acts of that body should, as a
general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in
appropriate cases.
This independent constitutional commission, it is
true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a
considerable latitude in the discharge of its
functions. The road, however, towards successful
2010 automation elections would certainly be
rough and bumpy. The comelec is laboring under
very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the
help of all advocates of orderly and honest
elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to
smoothen the way and assist comelec personnel
address the fears expressed about the integrity of
the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like
and wish automated elections to succeed,
credibly.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
ROQUE VS COMELEC
Feb 10, 2010
Facts:
This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners of the September 10, 2009 ruling of the
Supreme Court, which denied the petition of H.
Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the
2010 Election Automation Project to the joint
venture of Total Information Management
Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic).
In this MR, petitioners Roque, et al. are again before
the Supreme Court asking that the contract award
be declared null and void on the stated ground
that it was made in violation of the Constitution,
statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening petitioner
also interposed a similar motion, but only to pray
that the Board of Election Inspectors be ordered to
manually count the ballots after the printing and
electronic transmission of the election returns.
Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein, seek a
reconsideration of the September 10, 2009 Decision
on the following issues or grounds:
1. The Comelec’s public pronouncements show
that there is a "high probability" that there will be
failure of automated elections;
2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions in
favor of Smartmatic;
3. There is no legal framework to guide the
Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in
case the PCOS machines fail;
4. Respondents cannot comply with the
requirements of RA 8436 for a source code review;
5. Certifications submitted by private respondents
as to the successful use of the machines in elections
abroad do not fulfill the requirement of Sec. 12 of
RA 8436;
6. Private respondents will not be able to provide
telecommunications facilities that will assure 100%
communications coverage at all times during the
conduct of the 2010 elections; and
7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS
machines to Quisdi violates the Comelec’s bidding
rules.
Note: (This digest would only deal with the
procedural aspect of the MR. Only those issues or
grounds wherein the Court made a ruling re:
procedure would be discussed here.)
Issue: Is the motion for reconsideration meritorious?
Ruling: No.
Upon taking a second hard look into the issues in
the case at bar and the arguments earnestly
pressed in the instant motions, the Court cannot
grant the desired reconsideration.
Petitioners’ threshold argument delves on
possibilities, on matters that may or may not occur.
The conjectural and speculative nature of the first
issue raised is reflected in the very manner of its
formulation and by statements, such as "the public
pronouncements of public respondent COMELEC x
x x clearly show that there is a high probability that
there will be automated failure of elections"; "there
is a high probability that the use of PCOS machines
in the May 2010 elections will result in failure of
elections"; "the unaddressed logistical nightmares—
and the lack of contingency plans that should have
been crafted as a result of a pilot test—make an
automated failure of elections very probable"; and
"COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it signed x x x the contract for full automation
x x x despite the likelihood of a failure of elections."
Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to
proof; they have little, if any, probative value and,
surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.
Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis-
à-vis the possibility of Comelec going manual, have
attributed certain statements to respondent
Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for the purpose a
news item on Inquirer.net, posted September 16,
2009.
Reacting to the attribution, however, respondents
TIM and Smartmatic, in their comment, described
the Melo pronouncements as made in the context
of Comelec’s contingency plan. Petitioners,
however, the same respondents added, put a
misleading spin to the Melo pronouncements by
reproducing part of the news item, but omitting to
make reference to his succeeding statements to
arrive at a clearer and true picture.
Private respondents’ observation is well-taken.
Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite portions of what
has been said, sometimes out of their proper
context, in order to assert a misleading conclusion.
The effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning
may be deliberately attached to innocent views or
even occasional crude comments by the simple
4|ELECTION LAW DIGESTS
expediency of lifting them out of context from any
publication.
Petitioners’ posture anent the third issue, i.e, there
no is legal framework to guide Comelec in the
appreciation of automated ballots or to govern
manual count should PCOS machines fail, cannot
be accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the
continuity and back-up plans that would be
implemented in case the PCOS machines falter
during the 2010 elections. The overall fallback
strategy and options to address even the worst-
case scenario—the wholesale breakdown of the
80,000 needed machines nationwide and of the
2,000 reserved units—have been discussed in some
detail in the Decision subject of this recourse. The
Court need not belabor them again.
While a motion for reconsideration may tend to
dwell on issues already resolved in the decision
sought to be reconsidered—and this should not be
an obstacle for a reconsideration—the hard reality
is that petitioners have failed to raise matters
substantially plausible or compellingly persuasive to
warrant the desired course of action.
Significantly, petitioners, in support of their position
on the lack-of-legal-framework issue, invoke the
opinion of Associate, later Chief, Justice Artemio
Panganiban in Loong v. Comelec, where he made
the following observations: "Resort to manual
appreciation of the ballots is precluded by the
basic features of the automated election system,"
and "the rules laid down in the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) for the appreciation and counting of
ballots cast in a manual election x x x are
inappropriate, if not downright useless, to the
proper appreciation and reading of the ballots
used in the automated system." Without delving on
its wisdom and validity, the view of Justice
Panganiban thus cited came by way of a
dissenting opinion. As such, it is without binding
effect, a dissenting opinion being a mere
expression of the individual view of a member of
the Court or other collegial adjudicating body,
while disagreeing with the conclusion held by the
majority.
And going to another but recycled issue, petitioners
would have the Court invalidate the automation
contract on the ground that the certifications
submitted by Smartmatic during the bidding,
showing that the PCOS technology has been used
in elections abroad, do not comply with Sec. 1222
of RA 8436. Presently, petitioners assert that the
system certified as having been used in New York
was the Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking
device.
Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage of
the case, an entirely new factual dimension to their
cause. This we cannot allow for compelling reasons.
For starters, the Court cannot plausibly validate this
factual assertion of petitioners. As it is, private
respondents have even questioned the reliability of
the website24 whence petitioners base their
assertion, albeit the former, citing the same website,
state that the Image Cast Precinct tabulation
device refers to the Dominion’s PCOS machines.
Moreover, as a matter of sound established
practice, points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not raised in the original proceedings
cannot be brought out on review. Basic
considerations of fair play impel this rule. The
imperatives of orderly, if not speedy, justice frown
on a piecemeal presentation of evidence and on
the practice of parties of going to trial haphazardly.
Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that
"there are very strong indications that Private
Respondents will not be able to provide for
telecommunication facilities for areas without these
facilities." This argument, being again highly
speculative, is without evidentiary value and hardly
provides a ground for the Court to nullify the
automation contract.Surely, a possible breach of a
contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to
prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract.
Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news
reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture has
entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a
Shanghai-based company, to manufacture on its
behalf the needed PCOS machines to fully
automate the 2010 elections.29 This arrangement,
petitioners aver, violates the bid rules proscribing
sub-contracting of significant components of the
automation project.
The argument is untenable, based as it is again on
news reports. Surely, petitioners cannot expect the
Court to act on unverified reports foisted on it.
Arroyo vs. DOJ
G.R. No. 199082 : September 18, 2012
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON.
LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission
on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-
FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving
the creation of a joint committee with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct
preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004
and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No.
001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and
2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases composed of officials from the
DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-
Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the
provinces of North and South Cotabato and
Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-
Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
5|ELECTION LAW DIGESTS
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en
banc adopted a resolution ordering that
information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage
be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges
against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the
creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint
Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ
Joint Panel is valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates
the equal protection clause?
HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.
FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint
Panel is valid.
POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates the powers and functions of the
Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power
to investigate and prosecute election offenses as
an adjunct to the enforcement and administration
of all election laws is intended to enable the
Comelec to effectively insure to the people the
free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The
constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the
Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to
conduct preliminary investigation is vested
exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however,
was given by the same provision of law the
authority to avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under
the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had
been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors
had been conducting preliminary investigations
pursuant to the continuing delegated authority
given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the
creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of
the constitutional bodys independence but as a
means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt
investigation and prosecution of election offenses
as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not
violate the equal protection clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection

Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because its sole purpose is the investigation and
prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They
insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only
the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials
linked to the Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those
subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there
were public officers who were investigated upon in
connection with their acts in the performance of
their official duties. Private individuals were also
subjected to the investigation by the Joint
Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent
undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, it does not demand absolute equality.
It merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.
DISMISSED
Arroyo v. DOJ and COMELEC
July 23, 2013
CASE 2013-0022: JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, -VERSUS-
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ET AL. (G .R. NO. 199082);
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. VS. HON. LEILA DE LIMA, IN
HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ET AL.
((G.R. NO. 199085); GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY
CHAIRPERSON SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., ET AL. (G.R.
NO. 199118); (23 JULY 2013, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT/S:
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER ELECTION CASES;
INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC; RIGHT TO EXAMINE
DOCUMENTS IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; RIGHT
TO EXTENSION OF TIME IN PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION (BRIEF TITLE: ARROYO ET AL VS. DOJ
ET AL).
NATURE:
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed
by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in G.R. No.
199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082
praying that the Court take a second look at our
September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their
petitions and supplemental petitions against
respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec),
the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino
M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-
Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint
Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team
(Fact-Finding Team), et al.
FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ
issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a
6|ELECTION LAW DIGESTS
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud
and manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in the
May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of
North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was
indeed perpetrated. It recommended that
Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike
Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation for
electoral sabotage and manipulating the election
results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court
separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the
assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October
20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of
Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary
Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the
2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared
INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having
been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the
preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel
undermines the decisional independence of the
Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct
preliminary investigation only when deputized by
the Comelec but not exercise concurrent
jurisdiction
HELD:
1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec
and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in
the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of
the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the
Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we
the the court cannot consider the creation of the
Joint Committee as an abdication of the
Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987
Constitution
2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not
repugnant to the concept of "concurrent
jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law The
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there
is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited
is the situation where one files a complaint against
a respondent initially with one office (such as the
Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-
filing of substantially the same complaint with
another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent
assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over
the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a
settled rule that the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
FALLO: petition is denied
DISPOSITIVE:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for
Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
DOES THE COMELEC HAS EXCLUSIVE POWER TO
INVESTIGATE ELECTION CASES?
YES, UNDER BP 881 OR THE COMELEC ELECTION
CODE. BUT NOT ANYMORE UNDER SECTION 43 OF
RA 9369.
“…… While recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive
power to investigate and prosecute cases under
Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election
Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the
1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This
exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can
very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369.
Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and
other prosecuting arms of the government, such as
the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses.”
THERE IS DISCREPANCY BETWEEN COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 3467 DATED 12 JANUARY 2001 AND
JOINT ORDER NO. 001-2011 DATED 15 AUGUST 2011.
THE FORMER MAINTAINED THE CONTINUING
DEPUTATION OF PROSECUTORS AND THE COMELEC
LAW DEPARTMENT WAS TASKED TO SUPERVISE THE
INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY FUNCTIONS OF
THE TASK FORCE PURSUANT TO THE MANDATE OF THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE. THE LATTER CREATED AND
CONSTITUTED A JOINT COMMITTEE AND FACT-
FINDING TEAM ON THE 2004 AND 2007 NATIONAL
ELECTIONS ELECTORAL FRAUD AND MANIPULATION
CASES. HOW WOULD THIS DISCREPANCY BE
EXPLAINED?
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 3467 WAS ISSUED PRIOR
TO THE AMENDMENT OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION
CODE BY SECTION 43 of RA 9369.
“Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a
discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No.
346741 dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No.
001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases. However,
GMA seemed to miss the date when these two
resolutions were promulgated by the Comelec. It is
7|ELECTION LAW DIGESTS
noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was
issued when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election
Code was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-
2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos. 873342
and 905743 mentioned in the assailed decision but
missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued
during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369,
giving the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of
the government the concurrent jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election offenses.”
IS THE CREATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE NOT
REPUGNANT TO THE CONCEPT OF “CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION”?
NO. IT IS AUTHORIZED BY THE AMENDATORY LAW.
THERE IS NO PROHIBITION ON SIMULTANEOUS
EXERCISE OF POWER BETWEEN TWO COORDINATE
BODIES.
BUT IS THE CREATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE NOT
AN ABDICATION OF COMELEC’S INDEPENDENCE
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION?
NO BECAUSE THE COMELEC HAS STILL TO APPROVE
THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE. JOINT
ORDER NO. 001-2011 DATED 15 AUGUST 2011
PROVIDES THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
ELECTION OFFENSES SHALL STILL BE APPROVED BY
THE COMELEC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.
“To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is
not repugnant to the concept of “concurrent
jurisdiction” authorized by the amendatory law. As
we explained in our September 18, 2012 Decision:
x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous
exercise of power between two coordinate bodies.
What is prohibited is the situation where one files a
complaint against a respondent initially with one
office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary
investigation which was immediately acted upon
by said office and the re-filing of substantially the
same complaint with another office (such as the
DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by
the second office over the cases filed will not be
allowed.
Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
None of these problems would likely arise in the
present case. The Comelec and the DOJ
themselves agreed that they would exercise their
concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the
preliminary investigation was conducted on the
basis of two complaints – the initial report of the
Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator
Pimentel – both complaints were filed with the Joint
Committee. Consequently, the complaints were
filed with and the preliminary investigation was
conducted by only one investigative body. Thus,
we find no reason to disallow the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such
authority. This is especially true in this case given the
magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by
petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also
serves to maximize the resources and manpower of
both the Comelec and the DOJ for the prompt
disposition of the cases.
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction,
the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a
provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the
resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable
cause for election offenses shall still be approved
by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec
Rules ofProcedure.45 With more reason, therefore,
that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint
Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s
independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.”
GMA ARGUES THAT SHE WAS NOT GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE DOCUMENTS BECAUSE
THE COMPLAINT OF SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL
HAS NO ANNEXES. IS HER CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO. SENATOR PIMENTEL WHEN DIRECTED TO FURNISH
GMA WITH ANNEXES MANIFESTED THAT HE WAS
ADOPTING THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO THE DOJ-
COMELEC JOINT RESOLUTION WHICH WAS
FURNISHED TO GMA. GMA THEREFORE HAS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE DOCUMENTS.
GMA CONTENDS THAT HER RIGHT WAS VIOLATED
WHEN HER MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN
WHICH TO SUBMIT HER COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT AND
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE WAS CONSEQUENTLY
DENIED. IS HER CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO. THE RULES USE THE TERM “SHALL” IN REQUIRING
THE RESPONDENT TO SUBMIT COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
AND OTHER COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE WITHIN TEN
(10) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE SUBPOENA. IT IS
SETTLED THAT THE USE OF THE WORD “SHALL” WHICH
IS A WORD OF COMMAND, UNDERSCORES THE
MANDATORY CHARACTER OF THE RULE.
“As in any other rule, though, liberality inthe
application may be allowed provided that the
party is able to present a compelling justification for
the non-observance of the mandatory rules. In the
2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, investigating
prosecutors allow or grant motions or requests for
extension of time to submit counter-affidavits when
the interest of justice demands that respondent be
given reasonable time or sufficient opportunity to
engage the services of counsel; examine
voluminous records submitted in support of the
complaint or undertake research on novel,
complicated or technical questions or issues of law
and facts of the case.
In this case, GMA claimed that she could not
submit her counteraffidavit within the prescribed
period because she needed to examine
documents mentioned in Senator Pimentel’s
complaint-affidavit. It appeared, however, that
said documents were not submitted to the Joint
Committee and the only supporting documents
available were those attached to the Initial Report
of the Fact-Finding Team. Admittedly, GMA was
furnished those documents. Thus, at the time she
8|ELECTION LAW DIGESTS
asked for the extension of time within which to file
her counter-affidavit, she very well knew that the
documents she was asking were not in the record
of the case. Obviously, she was not furnished those
documents because they were not submitted to
the Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to
examine said documents. We cannot, therefore,
fault the Joint Committee in consequently denying
her motion for extension to file counter-affidavit as
there was no compelling justification for the non-
observance of the period she was earlier required
to follow.
WAS THERE AN OVERZEALOUSNESS ON THE PART OF
THE JOINT COMMITTEE IN TERMINATING THE
INVESTIGATION, ENDORSING IT TO COMELECT FOR
APPROVAL AND IN FILING THE INFORMATION?
SPEED IN THE CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS BY A
JUDICIAL OR QUASIJUDICIAL OFFICER CANNOT PER
SE BE INSTANTLY ATTRIBUTED TO AN INJUDICIOUS
PERFORMANCE OF FUNCTIONS. THE ORDERLY
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REMAINS THE
PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION WITH PARTICULAR
REGARD TO THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF
EACH CASE. UNNECESSARY DELAYS SHALL BE
AVOIDED.
“And as we held in the assailed decision:
There might have been overzealousness on the part
of the Joint Committee in terminating the
investigation, endorsing the Joint Resolution to the
Comelec for approval, and in filing the information
in court.
However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by
a judicial or quasijudicial officer cannot per se be
instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions. The orderly administration of justice
remains the paramount consideration with
particular regard to the peculiar circumstances of
each case. To be sure, petitioners were given the
opportunity to present countervailing evidence.
Instead of complying with the Joint Committee’s
directive, several motions were filed but were
denied by the Joint Committee. Consequently,
petitioners’ right to submit counter-affidavit and
countervailing evidence was forfeited.
Taking into account the constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases and following the
procedures set forth in the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and the Comelec Rules of Procedure,
the Joint Committee finally reached its conclusion
and referred the case to the Comelec. The latter, in
turn, performed its task and filed the information in
court. Indeed, petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard. They even actively
participated in the proceedings and in fact filed
several motions before the Joint Committee.
Consistent with the constitutional mandate of
speedy disposition of cases, unnecessary delays
should be avoided.”
GMA PLEADED NOT GUILTY. SHE ALSO FILED A
MOTION FOR BAIL WHICH WAS GRANTED. HAVE
THESE ACTS AFFECTED HER RIGHT TO QUESTION HER
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?
YES. IN FILING THE MOTION BEFORE THE RTC AND
ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING THEREIN, SHE HAS CHOSEN
TO SEEK JUDICIAL REMEDY BEFORE THE RTC WHERE
THE ELECTORAL SABOTAGE CASE IS PENDING
INSTEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE REMEDY OF GOING
BACK TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE FOR THE
SUBMISSION OF HER COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT AND
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE.
“Finally, in our assailed decision, we already took
judicial notice that not only did GMA enter a plea
of “not guilty,” she also filed a Motion for bail and
after due hearing, it was granted. Apparently, she
benefited from the RTC Order giving her temporary
liberty. In filing the motion before the RTC and
actively participating therein, she has chosen to
seek judicial remedy before the RTC where the
electoral sabotage case is pending instead of the
executive remedy of going back to the Joint
Committee for the submission of her counter-
affidavit and countervailing evidence.
Besides, as thoroughly discussed in the assailed
decision, the irregularity or even the absence of
preliminary investigation does not impair the validity
of the information filed against her.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs. COMELEC and JOSEPH
SOCORRO B. TAN
G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013
Facts:
 Respondent Tan , a registered voter and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a
petition to cancel petitioner’s CoC as
Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque on the ground that it contained
material misrepresentations, specifically:
o that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac,
Boac, Marinduque when she is a
resident of Bauan, Batangas which is
the residence of her husband, and
at the same time, when she is also a
resident of Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon
City as admitted in the Directory of
Congressional Spouses of the House
of Representatives;
o that she is not a permanent resident
of another country when she is a
permanent resident or an immigrant
of the USA;
o that she is a Filipino citizen when she
is, in fact, an American citizen
 COMELEC’s Ruling:
o Not a citizen of the country because
of her failure to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225, i.e.
o to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; and
o to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath
9|ELECTION LAW DIGESTS
o Non-compliance oneyear residency
requirement under Section 6, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
claiming that:
o She is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and that she has not lost such status
by simply obtaining and using an
American passport
o Petitioner surmised that the
COMELEC First Division relied on the
fact of her marriage to an American
citizen in concluding that she is a
naturalized American citizen.
Petitioner averred, however, that
such marriage only resulted into dual
citizenship, thus there is no need for
her to fulfill the twin requirements
o As to her alleged lack of the one-
year residency requirement
prescribed by the Constitution, she
averred that, as she never became
a naturalized citizen, she never lost
her domicile of origin, which is Boac,
Marinduque
• The motion for reconsideration was denied.
• On June 5, 2013 petitioner was proclaimed
winner of the May 2013 elections. She also took her
oath of office, however, as yet to assume office,
the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June
2013
• However, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Certificate of finality of its resolution, considering
that more than 21 days have elapsed from the
date of promulgation with no order issued by the
Court restraining its execution, hence, this petition
Issue: Whether Respondent Comelec is without
jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of
office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of
Marinduque.
Held: No
• Petitioner’s contention: COMELEC was
ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
• HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over
the assailed COMELEC Resolution
o XPN: A petition is duly filed with said
tribunal.
• The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after
the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives
Q: When is a candidate considered a Member of
the House of Representatives?
• To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2)
a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
• In petitioner’s attempt to comply with the
second requirement, petitioner attached a
purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon.
Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this
is not the oath of office which confers membership
to the House of Representatives.
• Before there is a valid or official taking of the
oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.
(Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the
House of Representatives)
o Here, although she made the oath
before Speaker Belmonte, there is no
indication that it was made during
plenary or in open session and, thus, it
remains unclear whether the required
oath of office was indeed complied
with.
• Before proclamation of the petitioner, the
COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of
the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship
and residency via its Resolution
o Upon issuance of the same, there was,
before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner’s
qualifications to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representative.
o The Board of Canvasser which
proclaimed petitioner cannot by such
act be allowed to render nugatory a
decision of the COMELEC En Banc which
affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First
Division.
• The assailed resolution of the COMELEC en
banc became final and executory
o Petitioner should have filed a petition to
appeal before the court within the 5-day
period
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same
having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a
violation of her right to due process of law because
she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.
• COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to
the technical rules of procedure in the presentation
of evidence.
o Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall
be liberally construed in order x xx to
10 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the
Commission."
• No denial of due process in the case at bar
as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue
her case before the COMELEC
Issue: Whether Respondent Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that
Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet
the residency requirement for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives
Issue: Whether Respondent Commission on
Elections committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by
enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it
imposed additional qualifications to the
qualifications of a Member of the House of
Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
Held: No for both issues
• Respondent Tan was able to established the
fact that respondent is a holder of an American
passport which she continues to use until June 30,
2012. Her status thereof is a “balik-bayan”
• The burden now shifts to petitioner to
present substantial evidence to prove otherwise.
This, the petitioner utterly failed to do, leading to
the conclusion inevitable that she falsely
misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
Unless and until she can establish that she
had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by
becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen,
and thereafter, made a valid sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship,
she remains to be an American citizen and
is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines."
• Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted
that she is a holder of a US passport, but she
averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American
citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do
not apply to her.
However, she attached to the said
motion an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship, explaining that she
attached said Affidavit "if only to show her
desire and zeal to serve the people and to
comply with rules, even as a superfluity."
If petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only
to comply with the rules," then it is an
admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her.
• To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of
allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of
allegiance in connection with her appointment as
Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs. COMELEC and JOSEPH
deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural- SOCORRO B. TAN
born Filipino citizen. G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013
This is not in compliance with RA 9225

• These circumstances, taken together, show

that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner’s
citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such
doubt.
• As to the issue of residency:
 A Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile
of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still
show that he chose to establish his domicile
in the Philippines through positive acts, and
the period of his residency shall be counted
from the time he made it his domicile of
choice.
 In this case, there is no showing whatsoever
that petitioner had already re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as
to conclude that she has regained her
domicile in the Philippines. There being no
proof that petitioner had renounced her
American citizenship, it follows that she has
not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the USA.
 Proof presented by Petitioner: Her claim that
she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province from January 18, 2011 to July 13,
2011
 Not sufficient
 For, petitioner has never regained her
domicile in Marinduque as she remains to
be an American citizen. No amount of her
stay in the said locality can substitute the
fact that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.
•All in all, considering that the petition for denial
and cancellation of the COC is summary in nature,
the COMELEC is given much discretion in the
evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to
its principal objective of determining of whether or
not the COC should be cancelled.
• Anent the proposition of petitioner that the
act of the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications
of Members of the House of Representatives other
than those enumerated in the Constitution, is
unconstitutional
 The COMELEC did not impose additional
qualifications on candidates for the House
of Representatives who have acquired
foreign citizenship.
 It merely applied the qualifications
prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that the candidate must
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and must have one-year residency prior to
the date of elections.

11 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
 Topic IV: Voters
Topic V: Voter’s Registration
People vs Corral
YRA v ABANO
FACTS: Maximo Abano is a native of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. He transferred to Manila to complete his
studies there. While temporarily residing at Manila,
he registered as a voter there. After becoming a
member of the bar and death of his father, he
returned to Bulacan from May 10, 1927 up to the
present. When 1928 elections came, he tried to
cancel his registration at Manila, but failed to do so.
Nevertheless, he ran as a candidate for municipal
president (Mayor?) of Meycauayan and won the
elections. Petitioner now questions the qualifications
of Abano through a quo warranto proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether registration is a qualification to run

for a public office

HELD: NO, section 404 of the election law states that

to run for public office, one must be a qualified
elector. One of the requirement to be a qualified
elector is to be a qualified voter. Section 431 states
the requirements for a qualifications of a voter,
while section 432 states the disqualification. All of
these are needed in able to be register and vote.
However, registration and voting is NOT a
requirement in order to run for public office. What is
needed is to be a qualified elector and a qualified
voter, which Abano complied with. Registration
only regulates the exercise to vote.

AKBAYAN YOUTH v COMELEC

FACTS: Akbayan—Youth seek to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
special registration before the May 14, 2001
General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21.
According to petitioners, around four million youth
failed to register on or before the December 27,
2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC
under Republic Act No. 8189 (Voter's Registration
Act of 1996). COMELEC issued a resolution denying
the petition for a Special Registration of new voters.
COMELEC claims that Section 8 of R.A. 8189
explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and
that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC may be compelled

by Mandamus to hold a Special Registration
beyond the deadline.

HELD: NO. The right of a citizen to vote is necessarily

conditioned upon certain procedural requirements
he must undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to
the minimum requirements set by fundamental
charter, is obliged by law to register, at present,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189,
otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of
1996. The act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration
12 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus,
contrary to petitioners' argument, registration
cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly
stature of a mere statutory requirement.
Proceeding from the significance of registration as
a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and
regulate the act of voter's registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities
could be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from the
pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times
Topic VI: Candidates
Frivaldo vs Comelec
G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
FACTS: Petitioner Frivaldo filed his certificate for
Candidacy for Governor about 3 weeks before the
election. Private Respondent Lee, another
candidate for the said position, filed a petition to
disqualify Frivaldo by reason of not being a citizen
of the Philippines. A week before the election,
Second Division of COMELEC promulgated a
resolution granting the petition of Lee. A motion for
Reconsideration was filed by Frivaldo which
remained unacted until after the elections. Thus, his
candidacy continued and he was voted during the
elections. Few days after the Election, COMELEC En
Banc affirmed the promulgated resolution of the
Second Division. Frivaldo garnered the highest
number of votes in the said election. Lee filed a
petition praying for his proclamation as Governor.
Lee was then proclaimed as Governor. Frivaldo
filed a petition for annulment of the proclamation
of Lee and for his own proclamation alleging that
he had already taken his oath of allegiance as a
citizen of the Philippines which he filed a couple of
months ago before the election. Frivaldo’s motion
was recognized and was then proclaimed as
Governor. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by COMELEC En Banc.
ISSUES:
Private Respondent Lee filed this instant petition for
Certiorari, Preliminary Injunction, and Annulment of
the COMELEC decision and resolution.
W/N Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal. If it,
did was it able to cure his lack of citizenship. If not,
may it be given a retroactive effect?
DECISION: The Court dismissed the petition and
affirmed the decision of COMELEC. Under Sec. 39 of
the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local
official must be: A Citizen of the Philippines The
court held that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship. At the same time, literally
speaking, such qualification of citizenship should
13 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
thus be possessed when the “elective [elected]
official” begins to govern. In the instant case,
Frivaldo re -assumed his citizenship on the very day
the term of office of governor (and other elective
official) began; he was therefore already qualified
to be proclaimed, to hold the office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date
MERCADO v MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083, 26 May 1999
FACTS: Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral
candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. Manzano got the highest number votes
while Mercado was second place. However,
Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in view of
a pending petition for disqualification on the
ground that he is an American citizen.
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father
and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United
States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is
considered an American citizen under US laws (jus
soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an
American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship. The Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition and cancelled Manzano’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a
dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code
(sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified from running
for any position. The COMELEC en banc reversed
the division’s ruling. In its resolution, it said that
Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino
citizen. It further ruled that although he was
registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration and was using an American passport,
this did not result in the loss of his Philippine
citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance
to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that
when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as
such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no
longer had US citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether Manzano validly renounced his US
citizenship thereby qualified to run for and hold
elective office?
HELD: YES. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person,
ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers
and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’
country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latter’s country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may
be other situations in which a citizen of the
Philippines may, without performing any act, be
also a citizen of another state; but the above cases
are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the
other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition.
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be
understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws
of different states. By electing Philippine citizenship,
such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view
of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment.
The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s
act of registering himself as a voter was an effective
renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is
in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act
wherein it is provided that “a person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting
in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to
determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.”
But this provision was declared unconstitutional by
the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held
that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he
ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the
14 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of
allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he
will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen,
he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against
any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently
does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
---------------
Villaber v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326, 15 November
2001
Doctrine: Disqualification (Sec 40, LGC; “Moral
Turpitude”)
FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas
R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional
seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the
May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate
of candidacy for Congressman on February 19,
2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC Davao
del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber
and to cancel the latter’s certificate of candidacy
due to the fact that Villaber was convicted by the
RTC for violation of BP22 and was sentenced to
suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that
bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. Cagas
further alleged that this crime involves moral
turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any
public office. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA’s
Decision. However, in its Resolution of October 26,
1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the
petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution
became final and executory. Cagas also asserted
that Villaber made a false material representation
in his certificate of candidacy that he is “Eligible for
the office I seek to be elected” – which false
statement is a ground to deny due course or
cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber
countered mainly that his conviction has not
become final and executory because the affirmed
Decision was not remanded to the trial court for
promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if
the judgment of conviction was already final and
executory, it cannot be the basis for his
disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not involve moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their
respective position papers, the case was forwarded
to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in
Cagas’ petition, issued the challenged Resolution
declaring Villaber disqualified as “a candidate for
and from holding any elective public office” and
canceling his certificate of candidacy. The
COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P
Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling
of this Court en banc in the administrative case of
People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied by the
COMELEC en banc in a Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or
not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
HELD: The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying
petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for
Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
“Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has
been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
“The disqualifications to be a candidate herein
provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period
he again becomes disqualified.”
As to the meaning of “moral turpitude,” we have
consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law
Dictionary as “an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
In In re Vinzon,the term “moral turpitude” is
considered as encompassing “everything which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.”
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission
on Elections that “not every criminal act involves
moral turpitude,” and that “as to what crime
15 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to
determine.”We further pronounced therein that:
“…in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC,
the Court admitted that it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in
se or as malum prohibitum. In the final analysis,
whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is
ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on the circumstances surrounding the
case.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the
facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the
elements of the crime for which he was convicted.
At any rate, the question of whether or not the
crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by
analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre
which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a
special law.
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22
under the following Information:
“That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or
draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on
account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands
(Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated
February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the
amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing
that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check, when presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said
Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said
notice.” (Emphasis ours)
The elements of the offense under the above
provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to
apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it
would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment.[19]
The presence of the second element manifests
moral turpitude. We held that a conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 “imports deceit” and
“certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person….”Thus, paraphrasing Black’s
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check
deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes
his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 28 July
1999
Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and
served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995
elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran
for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation
was contested and resulted to declaring his
opponent winning the election and ordered
Lonzanida to vacate the office. In the May 11, 1998
elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for
disqualification on the grounds that it is a violation
of the three-term rule. COMELEC granted the
petition. Petitioner filed a petition challenging the
validity of the COMELEC resolution.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s assumption of office
from May 1995 to March 1, 1998 is considered full
term of office for the purpose of three-term rule
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be
considered a full term of office for two reasons, he
cannot be considered elected as the proclamation
was void and he also did not voluntary renounce
office, but was involuntary severance from office.
The petition is granted and the resolution of the
COMELEC declaring petitioner Lonzanida
disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral
elections are hereby set aside.
Abundo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716, 08 January
2013
FACTS: For four (4) successive regular elections,
namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and
local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr.
(Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor.
In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and
was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral
derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers
initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions
of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres
election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption
of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the
2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of
16 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
a little over one year and one month. Then came
the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and
Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo
filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty
seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought
the formers disqualification to run.
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the
three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for
the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its
Resolution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which
affirmed by COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively
served for three terms.
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of
Service
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have
been Abundos three successive, continuous
mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-
2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to,
and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy,
an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.
The declaration of being the winner in an election
protest grants the local elected official the right to
serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while
he was declared winner in the protest for the
mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full
term has been substantially reduced by the actual
service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence,
there was actual involuntary interruption in the term
of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have
served the full 2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo
did not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had
no legal right to said position. During the pendency
of the election protest, Abundo ceased from
exercising power or authority. Consequently, the
period during which Abundo was not serving as
mayor should be considered as a rest period or
break in his service because prior to the judgment
in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent,
Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of
the still then valid proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Marquez v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 538
Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, 13
November 2012
Facts: Marquez, a candidate for an elective
position in Quezon Province during the 1998
elections, filed a petition praying for the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under
section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section
40. Disqualification. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any local elective
position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad.)
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with
insurance fraud in the United States and that his
arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from
the country.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition.
Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of
Quezon.
Issues: WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his
certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive
from justice as provided for in section 40 of the
Local Government Code.
Held: “Fugitive from justice” does not mean a
person convicted by final judgment. It includes
those who after being charged flee to avoid
prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed
and settle the case in conformity of the given
clarification with the term “fugitive from justice”.
Atty. Risos-Vidal v. Comelec and Estrada, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015)
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan
convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the
crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558,
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, et al. On October 25, 2007, however,
former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former
President Arroyo) extended executive clemency,
by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. On
October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President
Estrada “received and accepted”6 the pardon by
affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation
thereon. On October 2, 2012, former President
Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for local
elective post of Mayor of the City of Manila. On
January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC.). Risos- Vidal anchored her
petition on the theory that “[Former President
Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office
because of his Conviction for Plunder by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled
‘People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada’ Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification. She relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that
“having taken judicial cognizance of the
consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and
SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc
resolution affirming it, this Commission will not
belabor the controversy further. Moreso, [Risos-
Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to
reverse the standing pronouncement of this
Commission declaring categorically that [former
17 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has
been effectively restored by the pardon vested
upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no
longer engage in disquisitions of a settled matter
lest indulged in wastage of government resources.”
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s
jurisdiction by filing the present petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President
Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in
public office as a result of the pardon granted to
him by former President Arroyo.
HELD:
The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former
President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon
that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that
the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code. Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way
that will give full effect to the executive clemency
granted by the President, instead of indulging in an
overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair
or diminish the import of the pardon which
emanated from the Office of the President and
duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself.
The said codal provisions must be construed to
harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes
and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the
power of the President to grant executive
clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that
the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry
with it the remission of the accessory penalties
unless the President expressly includes said
accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes
the Presidential prerogative to grant executive
clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon
the principal penalty while excluding its accessory
penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41
only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided
upon by the President on the penalties imposed in
accordance with law. A close scrutiny of the text of
the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are included
in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the
executive clemency extended to former President
Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan
of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty
pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed, which states that “(h)e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights,”
expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from
the text of the pardon that the accessory.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG
G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
Facts:
 This is a petition assailing the resolution
issued by COMELEC, finding that herein
respondent Arnado is solely a Filipino citizen
qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.
 Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
USA, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
 July 2008: Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
 April 2009: Subsequently, Arnado again took
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship
 November 2009: Arnado filed his CoC for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
 Consequently, herein respondent Balua iled
a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his CoC, contending that the latter s
not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau
of Immigration indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American."
 To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US
citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated
travel record ndicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport in entering and
departing the Philippines
 Failure of Arnado to answer the petition,
Balua moved to declare him in default and
to present evidence ex-parte, which was
remain unacted, having been overtaken by
the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor
 Only after proclamation that Arnado filed
his verified answer.
 COMELEC 1st Division: Granted petition for
disqualification
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is
a strong indication that Arnado had no real
intention to renounce his US citizenship and
that he only executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation to enable him to run for office.
We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
18 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
inconsistency between Arnado’s
unexplained use of a US passport six times
and his claim that he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship and renounced his US
citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court
in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an
official document of identity and nationality
issued to a person intending to travel or
sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who
truly divested himself of US citizenship would
not continue to avail of privileges reserved
solely for US nationals.
 Arenado filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration
 Subsequently, Petitioner Maquiling, another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number
of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in
the case
o Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable
in this case.
o He claimed that the cancellation of
Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest
number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
 COMELEC en banc: Granted Arnado’s MR.
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed
by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced
his Philippine citizenship as though he never
became a citizen of another country. The
use of a US passport … does not operate to
revert back his status as a dual citizen prior
to his renunciation as there is no law saying
such. More succinctly, the use of a US
passport does not operate to "un-renounce"
what he has earlier on renounced.
Dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Sarmiento: Arnado’s continued use of his US
passport and enjoyment of all the privileges
of a US citizen despite his previous
renunciation of the afore-mentioned
citizenship runs contrary to his declaration
that he chose to retain only his Philippine
citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the
twin requirements was obviously only for the
purpose of complying with the requirements
for running for the mayoralty post
Qualifications for elective office, such as
citizenship, are continuing requirements;
once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is
deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a
citizen at the time he ran for office or if he
lost his citizenship after his election to office,
he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither
does the fact that respondent obtained the
plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure
the latter’s failure to comply with the
 qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
 Hence, this petition
Issue: Whether the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s
qualifications to run for public office
Held: Yes
 Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps
to qualify to run for a public office. He took
the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his
foreign citizenship. There is no question that
after performing these twin requirements
required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible
to run for public office.
 By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was
deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation
under the laws of the foreign country.
 However, this legal presumption does not
operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a
foreign citizenship.
 Arnado himself subjected the issue of his
citizenship to attack when, after renouncing
his foreign citizenship, he continued to use
his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before filing his certificate of
candidacy
 By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself
as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all
attendant rights and privileges granted by
the USA
 The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not
a hollow oath that can simply be professed
at any time, only to be violated the next
day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a
full divestment of all civil and political rights
granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.
Issue: Whether he rule on succession in the Local
Government Code is applicable to this case
Held:
 Petitioner’s right to intervene: Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides: Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the
19 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong. Under this provision, intervention may
be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there
has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, 28 July 1999 370
PHIL 642-690)
Facts: Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent
mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate
of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the
synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Private
respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to
Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy. The petition was GRANTED by Comelec
and they further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose "Pempe"
Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing
a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G.
Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the
mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his
father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. During the May 11,
1998 elections, petitioner and private respondent
vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner
garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than
private respondent who got only 20, 336 votes.
Private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null
and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order. He prayed for the nullification of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void
ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of
Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was
supposed to substitute, had already been
cancelled and denied due course.
Issue: WON the petitioner, who was beyond the
deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, be
qualified to substitute a candidate whose COC was
cancelled and denied?
Held: NO.
In Bautista vs. Comelec the Court explicitly ruled
that "a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a
valid candidacy." A person without a valid
certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person
who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all
can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a
candidate at all.
The law clearly provides:
SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy -- No person shall
be eligible for any elective public office unless he
files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the
period fixed herein.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of
law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say
that any person who attempts to run for an elective
office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is
not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would
catapult him into office.
In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the
Court held that a certificate of candidacy filed
beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the
person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much
in the same manner as a person who filed no
certificate of candidacy at all and a person who
filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of
candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no
candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle
him to the elective office aspired for. The evident
purposes of the law in requiring the filing of
certificates of candidacy and in fixing the time limit
therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at
least sixty days before the regular election, the
candidates among whom they are to make the
choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and
inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast.
For if the law did not confine the choice or election
by the voters to the duly registered candidates,
there might be as many persons voted for as there
are voters, and votes might be cast even for
unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify
the votes in favor of a candidate for another office
in the same election.
After having considered the importance of a
certificate of candidacy, it can be readily
understood why in Bautista the Court ruled that a
person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate
at all.
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if
he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first
place because, if the disqualified candidate did
not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of
candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If
a person was not a candidate, he cannot be
substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-
called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original"
certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the
filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of
unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by
our Constitution.
Hence, Comelec ruling to ANNUL the election and
proclamation of petitioner was AFFIRMED.
Aratea vs. COMELEC, 683 SCRA 1 (2012)
FACTS:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D.
Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National
and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo)
filed apetition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny
due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was
elected, and had served, as mayorof San Antonio,
Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms
immediately prior to the term for the May
20 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
2010elections.Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida
made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified
under oath that he was eligible for the office he
sought election. Section 8, Article X of the1987
Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code both prohibit a local elective
official from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a
Resolution on 18 February 2010 cancelling
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the
May 2010elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel
Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of
votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and
Vice-Mayor. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting
Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of
Olongapo. On thesame date, Aratea wrote the
DILG and requested for an opinion on whether, as
Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the
Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s
disqualification.
DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold
office by reason of his criminal conviction, and as a
consequence, his office was deemed permanently
vacant, and thus, Aratea should assume the Office
of the Mayor in an acting capacity without
prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration .In another
letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the
DILG to allow him to take the oath of office
asMayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response,
then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to
take anoath of office as "the permanent Municipal
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice
however to theoutcome of the cases pending
before the COMELEC.On 11 August 2010, the
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying
Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010
elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was
based on two grounds:
first,Lonzanida had been elected and had served
as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms
withoutinterruption; and second, Lonzanida had
been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of
falsification underthe Revised Penal Code.
Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of
falsification to imprisonment of 4 yearsand 1 day of
prisión correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1
day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of
conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the
Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1
December 2009.The manner of filling up the
permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the
determination of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether
Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the same Code
that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being
void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or
Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
HELD:
Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be
proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate
of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida
was never a candidate at all. All votes for
Lonzanida were The grounds for disqualification for
a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code are specifically enumerated. A petition for
disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to
"the commission of prohibited acts andpossession of
a permanent resident status in a foreign country."
All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to
election offenses under the Omnibus Election
Code, not to violations of other penallaws. There is
absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68
that would justify including violation of the three-
term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of
the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal
Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered
under Section 68. On the other hand, Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate
of candidacy may bedenied or cancelled when
there is false material representation of the contents
of the certificate of candidacy :
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the
contents of the certificate of candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.
‒The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it isannouncing his candidacy for the
office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with
the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies
himperpetually from holding any public office, or
from being elected to any public office.
This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the
finality of the judgment of conviction, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The
penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with
it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special disqualification.
Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code,
temporary absolute disqualification produces the
effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office.
”The duration of temporary absolute disqualification
is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión
mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the
Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the
period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually.
Both temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
21 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
Sec. 68.
Disqualifications.
‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision by
a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and
261,paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, fromholding
the office. Any person who is a permanent resident
of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for anyelective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country inaccordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
2
Sec. 78.
Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy.
‒ A verified petition seeking to deny due course or
to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person
exclusively on the ground that any material
representation containedtherein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false
. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from thetime of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before theelection.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is
ineligible to run for elective public office,
andcommits a false material representation if he
states in his certificate of candidacy that he
iseligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void
ab initio
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes. As the Comelec stated in their
February 2011 Resolution:
Since Lonzanida was never a candidate for the
position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray
votes.Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who
remains as the sole qualified candidate for the
mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of
votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was
cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run forMayor.
Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled
before or after the elections is immaterial because
thecancellation on such ground means he was
never a candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void
ab initio.
There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor
in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore
received the highest number of votes.Petition
dismissed.
Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, 683 SCRA 1 (2012)
FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in
Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22,
2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and
lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village,
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then
renounced his Australian citizenship in September
2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived
and applied for registration as voter in the
Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by
the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan
Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the
voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the
MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then
appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower
court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel
said COC on the ground of failure to comply with
R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement
of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with
the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to show ample proof of a
bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.
COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to
present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING: The Local Government Code requires a
candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at
least one year before the election. For purposes of
22 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person
must not only intend to reside in a particular place
but must also have personal presence in such
place coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or
residence somewhere; (b) where once established,
that domicile remains until he acquires a new one;
and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a
time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the
precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the
place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that
he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon
City to Australia when he migrated there at the age
of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in
that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008
to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change
his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance
to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his
acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else
except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new
domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of
his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile
of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a
domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not
come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has
merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this
circumstance alone cannot support such
conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held
that a candidate is not required to have a house in
a community to establish his residence or domicile
in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should
live there even if it be in a rented house or in the
house of a friend or relative. To insist that the
candidate own the house where he lives would
make property a qualification for public office.
What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things:
actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of
making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a
residential lot in the same village where he lived
and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga
Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political
leaders, including local and national party-mates,
from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a
registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual
findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC,
this does not prevent it from exercising its review
powers to correct palpable misappreciation of
evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The
evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding
otherwise.
with the second requirement – that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is
to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate.
The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be motivated by
political considerations rather than the welfare of
the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the
electorate arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty
because they would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their office work.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the

2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay.
The Court will respect the decision of the people of
that province and resolve all doubts regarding his
qualification in his favor to breathe life to their
manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the

Resolution of the COMELEC.

Quinto vs. COMELEC, 606 SCRA 258, December 1,

2009

Facts: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.

Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a
resolution declaring appointive officials who filed
their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned
from their government offices because at such time
they are not yet treated by the law as candidates.
They should be considered resigned from their
respective offices only at the start of the campaign
period when they are, by law, already considered
candidates.

In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only

copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

Issue: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution

was valid.

Held: NO. In the Fariñas case, the petitioners

challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue
benefit to elective officials in comparison with
appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld
the substantial distinctions between the two and
pronounced that there was no violation of the
equal protection clause. However in the present
case, the Court held that the discussion on the
equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since
the issue raised therein was against the repealing
clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive

and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a
valid classification, the proviso does not comply
23 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
Quinto vs. COMELEC, 613 SCRA 385, Feb. 22, 2010
Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to
enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the
Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered
Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—
a) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position
shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto
resigned from their offices the moment they file their
CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming
elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition
and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-
quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null
and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13
of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC
resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These
must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to
both and to arrive at a declaration that they are
not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the
filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes. In considering persons holding
appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from
their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not
considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone
that there is substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and those occupying
elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification
so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass
the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
24 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the
class.
The first requirement means that there must be real
and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent
Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-
wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid
if it does not comply with the second requirement—
if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the
classification must be enforced not only for the
present but as long as the problem sought to be
corrected continues to exist. And, under the last
requirement, the classification would be regarded
as invalid if all the members of the class are not
treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant
case, the Court finds that the differential treatment
of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the
purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged
provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to
wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the
electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of
the public service by eliminating the danger that
the discharge of official duty would be motivated
by political considerations rather than the welfare
of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the
electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty
because they would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying
objectives of the law, then the assailed provision
cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground
of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the
requisite that the classification must be germane to
the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds
an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For
example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member
of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the
same influence as the Vice-President who at the
same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the
recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were
appointed to take charge of national housing,
social welfare development, interior and local
government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that
they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file
their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state
of our law, the Vice-President, in the example,
running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
position during the entire election period and can
still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or
partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true
and compelling. The public officer who files his
certificate of candidacy would be driven by a
greater impetus for excellent performance to show
his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat
appointive officials differently from the elective
ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test
that it should be germane to the purposes of the
law. The measure encapsulated in the second
proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the
equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by
the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to
question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court
declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The
resolution provides that, “Any person holding a
public appointive office or position including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and other officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369
provides that
“For this purpose, the Commission shall set the
deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to
participate in the election. Any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within this period shall only
be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person
holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and
officers and employees in government-owned or -
25 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of
his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
violative of the equal protection clause and
therefore unconstitutional
Held: No, To start with, the equal protection clause
does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What
it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. The
test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is
that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that
these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first,
third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It,
however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the
differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis
elected officials is not germane to the purpose of
the law, because "whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for
excluding elected officials from the operation of
the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will,
perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign
power of the people. It involves the choice or
selection of candidates to public office by popular
vote. Considering that elected officials are put in
office by their constituents for a definite term, it may
justifiably be said that they were excluded from the
ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost
respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In
other words, complete deference is accorded to
the will of the electorate that they be served by
such officials until the end of the term for which
they were elected. In contrast, there is no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and
elective officials is therefore germane to the
purposes of the law. For the law was made not
merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature,
whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of
deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT
the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition;
and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any
elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or
national official or employee, or those in the civil or
military service, including those in government-
owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered automatically resigned upon the filing
of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a
separate deemed resignation rule, under the
present state of law, there would be no occasion to
apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later
reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to
any election other than a partisan one. For this
reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also
fail.
Mendoza vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191084, March 25,
2010
FACTS: Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the
post of Governor of Bataan province a number of
times:
a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan
by former Pres. Aquino
and served up to 1988
b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to
1992
c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall
election in 1993, assumed
office on 28 June 1994 and served up to 1995
d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up
to1998
e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to
2001.
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a
certificate of candidacy for the same post in the 14
May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001,
Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Bataan.
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra
seek to declare respondent Roman’s election as
governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly
being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution
ISSUE: WON Private Respondent's incumbency to
the post of Governor following the recall elections
be included in determining the three--consecutive
term limit fixed by law
26 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
HELD: No. A winner who dislodges in a recall
election an incumbent elective local official merely
serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is
not a full three--year term.
The law contemplates a continuous full three--year
term before the proscription can apply, providing
for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent
voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary
severance from the service which results in the
incumbent’s being unable to finish his term of office
because of his ouster through valid recall
proceedings negates “one term” for purposes of
applying the three--‐term limit, it stands to reason
that the balance of the term assumed by the newly
elected local official in a recall election should not
also be held to be one term in reckoning the three-
-term limit.
In both situations, neither the elective local official
who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local
official who only assumes the balance of the term
of the ousted local official following the recall
election could be considered to have served a full
three--year term set by the Constitution.
The Constitution does not prohibit elective local
officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes
from the three-term limit interruptions in the
continuity of service, so long as such interruptions
are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the
office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from
June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which
respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor
of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993,
should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001
respondent had previously served as governor of
Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998
and 1998-2001), his election on that day was
actually only his third term for the same position.
A recall term should not be considered as one full
term, because a contrary interpretation would in
effect cut short the elected official’s service to less
than nine years and shortchange his constituents.
The desire to prevent monopoly of political power
should be balanced against the need to uphold
the voters’ obvious preference who, in the present
case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the
votes cast.
SOCRATES v COMELEC
FACTS: These contain consolidated petitions
seeking the reversal of COMELEC’s ruling on the
recall election for the mayor of Puerto Prinsesa City.
In Socrates’ petition, the he alleged that there were
legal infirmities that attended the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, and the issuance of
the resolution because of the following: not all
members of the PRA were notified of the assembly,
proof of service of notice was legally deficient and
members of the PRA were the ones seeking the
new electoral mandate. Sandoval’s petition seeked
to extend the 10-day campaign period initially set
by the COMELEC before the Recall Election was
held. The Court amended COMELEC’s resolution,
setting the campaign period to 15 days. Adovo,
Gilo and Ollave assailed COMELEC’s resolution
which stated that Hagedorn was qualified to run in
the Recall Election, despite the constitutional
prohibition against a 4th consecutive term for
elective local officials. The Court ordered COMELEC
to desist from proclaiming the winner in the recall
election until further orders from the Court.
Meanwhile, Hagedorn won the recall election with
20k votes, while Socrates had 17k, and Sandoval
had 13k. Hagedorn then asked the Court to lift the
restraining order on COMELEC so that he may be
declared the winning candidate, and assume
office.

ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse in its
descretion in scheduling the recall election and in
giving due course to the recall election?
Whether Hagedorn was qualified to run for mayor in
the recall election?

HELD:
1. NO. It is to be noted that on various dates in
June, proponents of the Incumbent Mayor Socrates
sent notices of the convening of the PRA to its
members. Proof of service of these notices were
also attached to this petition. In addition, notices
were also posted in a conspicuous place in the
Barangay Hall, plus a copy of this notice was sent to
COMELEC officials, Provincial officials, PNP officials,
Print and Media practitioners, and DILG officials.
Thus, where the expertise of COMELEC is in play in
the determination of the facts, the Court cannot
disturb its findings.

2. YES. Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor,

despite being elected for 3 consecutive terms in
’92, ’95 & ’98. His 3rd term ended in 2001, which is
why he did not run for mayor during the 2001
elections. However, the LGC implied that
involuntary interruption in the service of any length
of time interrupts the continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together as
consecutive or successive terms. When Hagedorn
did not run in the 2001 elections, he became a
private citizen, and his term was consequently
involuntarily interrupted because of the
constitutional prohibition. Socrates then won as
mayor. However, in the 2002 recall elections, when
Socrates was still the incumbent mayor, Hagedorn
became qualified because of the interruption in his
service, which was actually the time when Socrates
was holding office as mayor in 2001-2002. Lastly,
Hagedorn’s recall term cannot be made to
retroact to 2001, because factually, the recall term
is not a fourth consecutive term, as there was an
involuntary interruption, as mentioned earlier.
-----------------

27 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
 VII. Campaign, Election Propaganda, etc.
Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, 31 August
2007
Chavez vs. COMELEC , GR 162777, Aug 31, 2004
Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of
its Resolution No. 6520. He claims that said section in
the nature of an ex post facto law. He urges this
Court to believe that the assailed provision makes
an individual criminally liable for an election offense
for not removing such advertisement, even if at the
time the said advertisement was exhibited, the
same was clearly legal.
ISSUE: Is Sec. 32 of COMELEC Res. No. 6520 in the
nature of an ex post facto law?
HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature,
defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said
offense. Laws of this nature must operate
prospectively, except when they are favorable to
the accused. It should be noted, however, that the
offense defined in the assailed provision is not the
putting up of "propaganda materials such as
posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and
other materials showing the picture, image or name
of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio
or on television showing the image or mentioning
the name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement or display thereof becomes a
candidate for public office." Nor does it prohibit or
consider an offense the entering of contracts for
such propaganda materials by an individual who
subsequently becomes a candidate for public
office. One definitely does not commit an offense
by entering into a contract with private parties to
use his name and image to endorse certain
products prior to his becoming a candidate for
public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in
the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the
described propaganda materials three (3) days
after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No.
6520. If the candidate for public office fails to
remove such propaganda materials after the given
period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code for premature
campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the
assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively.
There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181614, 11 September
2009
Facts: The COMELEC disqualified petitioner
Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for
mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao
del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaign before the start of the campaign period
for the 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas
Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-
mates, after filing their Certificates of Candidacy
28 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
(CoCs), conducted a motorcade through Sta.
Monica and threw candies to onlookers, aboard
trucks festooned with balloons and banners bearing
their names and pictures and the municipal
positions for which they were seeking election, one
of which trucks had a sound system that broadcast
their intent to run in the 2007 elections.
COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento
dissented. He emphasized that under Section 15 of
Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system for
the process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national
and local elections), as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369, one is now considered a candidate only
at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before
the start of the campaign period, there can be no
election campaign or partisan political activity
because there is no candidate to speak of.
Accordingly, Penera could not be disqualified for
premature campaigning because the motorcade
took place outside the campaign period – when
Penera was not yet a “candidate.” Sarmiento
posited that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as
amended by R.A.9369, has practically made it
impossible to commit premature campaigning at
any time, and has, thus, effectively repealed
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Penera filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Supreme Court to nullify the disqualification. She
argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to
warrant the COMELEC’s ruling. She maintained that
the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned,
and the supporters merely joined her and the other
candidates.
Issue: Whether or not Penera should be disqualified
for engaging in election campaign or partisan
political activity outside the campaign period.
Holding: (A) The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed
Penera’s Petition and affirmed her disqualification
because:
(1) Penera raised a question of fact. The Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts, and the sole function of
a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and does
not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of
the evidence.
(2) The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion. Evidence presented to the COMELEC,
including Penera’s own evidence and admissions,
sufficiently established that “Penera and her
partymates, after filing their COCs x x, participated
in a motorcade which passed through the different
barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to
the public, and threw candies to the onlookers.”
With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand,
Penera can hardly persuade the Court that the
motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned.
“(T)he conduct of a motorcade is a form of
election campaign or partisan political activity,
falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2)
of the Omnibus Election Code, on ‘[h]olding
political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose
of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate[.]’ x x The obvious purpose of the
conduct of motorcades is to introduce the
candidates and the positions, to which they seek to
be elected, to the voting public; or to make them
more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and
recollection of their names in the minds of the
voters come election time. Unmistakably,
motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose
than to promote the election of a particular
candidate or candidates.”
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits
any person, whether a voter, a candidate or a
party, from engaging in any election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign
period (except that political parties may hold
political conventions or meetings to nominate their
official candidates within 30 days before the
campaign period and 45 days for Presidential and
Vice-Presidential election).
And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, a candidate declared by final decision to
have engaged in premature campaigning shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has been elected, from holding the office. Said
candidate may also face criminal prosecution for
an election offense under Section 262 of the same
Code.
Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta.
Monica before the COMELEC rendered its decision,
was disqualified from holding the said office. The
proclaimed Vice-Mayor was declared her rightful
successor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local
Government Code which provides that if the mayor
fails to qualify or is removed from office, the vice-
mayor shall become the mayor.
(B) The Supreme Court disagreed with COMELEC
Commissioner Sarmiento, saying that Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and
applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8436, as amended. The Court gave the following
reasons:
(1) Republic Act No. 9369, which amended
Republic Act No. 8436, did not expressly repeal
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An
express repeal may not be presumed. Implied
repeals are disfavored, absent a showing of
repugnance clear and convincing in character.
When confronted with apparently conflicting
statutes, courts should endeavor to reconcile the
same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of
one as against the other.
(2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable
incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits premature
29 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and
reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect
to both, to wit:
(a) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
prohibits “any person, whether or not a voter or
candidate” from engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign
period. Thus, premature campaigning may be
committed even by a person who is not a
candidate. Accordingly, the declaration in Lanot
vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16 November 2006)
that “(w)hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code prohibits is ‘an election campaign or partisan
political activity’ by a ‘candidate’ ‘outside’ of the
campaign period,” is erroneous.
(b) It is true that under Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended, a person is not yet officially
considered a candidate before the start of the
campaign period, even after the filing of his CoC.
Nonetheless, upon the filing of his COC, such person
already explicitly declares his intention to run as a
candidate. When the campaign period starts and
he proceeds with his candidacy, his intent turning
into actuality, act/s constituting election campaign
or partisan activity under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code (holding rallies or parades,
making speeches, etc.), which he may have
committed after filing his CoC and before the
campaign period, can already be considered as
the promotion of his election as a candidate,
constituting premature campaigning, for which he
may be disqualified. Conversely, if he withdraws his
CoC before the campaign period, his act can no
longer be viewed as for the promotion of his
election, and there can be no premature
campaigning as there is no candidate to begin
with.
Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to
his becoming a candidate (prior to the start of the
campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code as election campaign or partisan
political activity. However, it is only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of
the campaign period, can said acts be given
effect as premature campaigning under Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said
person officially becomes a candidate, at the start
of the campaign period, can his/her
disqualification be sought for acts constituting
premature campaigning.
(c) While a proviso in Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8436, as amended, provides that “any unlawful act
or omission applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period,”
this does not mean that the acts constituting
premature campaigning can only be committed
during the campaign period. Nowhere in the said
proviso was it stated that campaigning before the
start of the campaign period is lawful.
If the Court were to rule otherwise, “not only will the
prohibited act of premature campaigning be
officially decriminalized, the significance of having
a campaign period before the elections would also
be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the
deepest of campaign war chests could then afford
to spend his/her resources to promote his/her
candidacy well ahead of everyone else, thus,
undermine the conduct of fair and credible
elections. Such is the very evil that the law seeks to
prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended
to cause such an absurd situation.”
Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181614, 25 November
2009
Facts: On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court
affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to disqualify
petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty
candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for
engaging in election campaign outside the
campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she
was not yet a candidate at the time of the
supposed premature campaigning, since under
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law
authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system for the process of voting, counting
of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results
of the national and local elections), as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a
candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Issue: Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for
engaging in premature campaigning should be
reconsidered.
Held: Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration,
the Supreme Court En Banc held that Penera did
not engage in premature campaigning and should,
thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate.
The Court said –
(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the
assailed Decision”) considered a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a “candidate”
even before the start of the campaign period. This
is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section
15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states
that a person who files his certificate of candidacy
will only be considered a candidate at the start of
the campaign period, and unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts
become unlawful as to a candidate is when the
campaign period starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts
are lawful.
30 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an
election offense only for acts done during the
campaign period, not before. In other words,
election offenses can be committed by a
candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period,
such election offenses cannot be so committed.
Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but
to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of
the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the
Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of
R.A. 8436, as amended, does not provide that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before
the campaign period are unlawful, but may be
prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign
period. Neither does the law state that partisan
political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are temporarily lawful, but
becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign
period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the
Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails
freedom of expression and speech, would be void
for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly
state that campaigning before the start of the
campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision
asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of
law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared
unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does
not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that
the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress
to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan
political activities before the start of the campaign
period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state
that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period.” The only inescapable and
logical result is that the same acts, if done before
the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also
reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16
November 2006). Lanot was decided on the
ground that one who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the
deliberations of the legislators who explained that
the early deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford
time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and
they intended to preserve the existing election
periods, such that one who files his certificate of
candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not
be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress
decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot
doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of
R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of
candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at
the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted
to insure that no person filing a certificate of
candidacy under the early deadline required by
the automated election system would be GMA Network Inc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205357, 02
disqualified or penalized for any partisan political September 2014
act done before the start of the campaign period.
This provision cannot be annulled by the Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that
this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed
Decision considered the entire Section 15 good
law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory —
reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality
of the said provision.

Social Weather Stations, Inc v. COMELEC, G.R. No.

147571, 05 May 2001
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to
conduct an election survey throughout the period
of the elections and release to the media the results
of such survey as well as publish them directly.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint.

Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding
of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of
their results through mass media, valid and
constitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period,
and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences
or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other The Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No.
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such 205728, 21 January 2015
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.”

31 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S
Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito v. Comelec, G.R. No. 1-UTAK v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206020, 14 April 2015
212398, 25 November 2014

32 | E L E C T I O N L A W D I G E S T S