Election Law Midterms Reviewer

ELECTION
LAW MIDTERMS REVIEWER INA COJUANGCO GUINGONA

I. Election and Suffrage
a. Definition: It is the right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people and in the determination of
questions submitted to the people
b. Right created by law – not a natural right
c. Expression of the sovereign will of the people - It is a privilege
d. Election Period
i. 90 days before the election
ii. Ends 30 days thereafter
e. Campaign Period (shall not include the day before and the day of the election)
i. Presidential and Vice Presidential Election – 90 days
ii. Members of Congress and Local Election – 45 days
iii. Barangay Election – 15 days
iv. Special election – 45 days
f. Cases
i. Moya vs. Del Fierro
1. As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage – must
continue to be the means by which great reservoir of power must be emptied into the
receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good
government and common wealth.
ii. Badelles vs. Cabili
1. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly
expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not be
permitted to taint the electoral process.
iii. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno in Tolentino vs. COMELEC
1. In case of special elections, the need for notice and information is unmistakable. It is essential to
the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form. The electorate should have
been informed of the time, place and manner of conduct of the special election for the single
senatorial seat as all previous cases deepened the doctrine that a meaningful exercise of the
right of suffrage in a genuinely free, orderly and honest election is predicated upon an electorate
informed on the issues, the programs of government, the candidates running, and the time, place
and manner of conduct of election.
II. Commission on Elections

a. Composition
i. 1 Chairman, 6 Commissioners
b. Qualifications
i. Natural-born citizens
ii. At the time of their appointment, at least 35 years of age
iii. Holders of a college degree
iv. Must not have been candidates for any election position in the immediately preceding election
v. Majority (including the chairman) shall be a member of the Bar who has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least 10 years
c. Appointed by the president – consent of the Commission on Appointments – for 7 years and no
reappointment
d. Cannot appoint in temporary or acting capacity
e. Powers and Functions
i. Ensure free, honest, orderly, credible and peaceful elections
1. Power is preventive and not curative – cannot annul and election involving the President, VP, or
Congress
ii. Rule-making power
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ELECTION LAW MIDTERMS REVIEWER INA COJUANGCO GUINGONA

iii. Enforcement and administration of election laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall
iv. Exclusive control and supervision over the Automated Election System
v. Power to punish for contempt and issue subpoena
vi. Power to issue auxiliary writs and processes
vii. Quasi-legislative functions
viii. Quasi-judicial power
ix. To declare failure of elections
x. To call for special elections
xi. To postpone elections
xii. To correct manifest errors in election documents
xiii. To order re-canvass of votes
xiv. To annul or suspend proclamation of elected candidates
xv. To annul and illegal canvass
xvi. To transfer polling places
xvii. To Transfer venue of canvassing of votes
xviii. To order opening of ballot boxed
xix. To conduct initiative and plebiscite
xx. To investigate and prosecute election offenses
xxi. To deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
government
f. COMELEC CANNOT:
i. Decide questions involving the right to vote
ii. To resolve the issue regarding the right to vote (MTC)
iii. To include or exclude voters (MTC)
g. Cases
i. Purisima vs. Salanga
1. Interpretation of election laws should give e ect to the expressed will of the electorate. Patent
erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated in the election returns
strike at the reliability of said returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison with
the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only way to remove grave doubts
as to the correctness of said returns as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the
people.
ii. Cauton vs. COMELEC
1. In issuing the resolution in question the Commission on Elections simply performed a function as
authorized by the Constitution, that is, to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and ... exercise all other functions
which may be conferred upon it by law." The Commission has the power to decide all
administrative questions affecting elections, except the question involving the right to vote.
Commission on Election has the power to investigate and act on the propriety or legality of the
canvass of election returns made by the board of canvassers. The power of the Commission on
Elections in this respect is simply administrative and supervisory — intended to secure the
proclamation of the winning candidate based on the true count of the votes cast. Once the
Commission on Elections is convinced that the elections returns in the hands of the board of
canvassers do not constitute the proper basis in ascertaining the true result of the elections, it
should be its concern, nay its duty, to order the taking of such steps as may be necessary in
order that the proper basis for the canvass is obtained or made available.
2. The ballot boxed may be opened in case there is an election contest. They may also be opened
even if there is no election contest when their contents have to be used as evidence in the
prosecution of election frauds. Moreover, they may be opened when they are the subject of any
official investigation, which may be ordered by a competent court or other competent authority.
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The choice of means taken by the COMELEC, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave
abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.
iii. Roque vs. COMELEC
1. The COMELEC did not abdicate its mandate and responsibility under Sec. 26 of RA 8436 With
the view the SC takes of the automation contract, the role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is
basically to supply the goods necessary for the automation project, such as but not limited to the
PCOS machines, PCs, electronic transmission devices and related equipment, and the like.
2. Clearly, the COMELEC has abdicated control over the elections to the Provider, putting the
integrity and outcome of the 10 May 2010 elections solely in the hands of the Provider.
3. The COMELEC should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising
means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was
created – to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections
4. Separate Concurring Opinion
a. We are not unaware of the many doomsday scenarios peddled by doubting
Thomases if the coming May 2010 elections will be fully automated. To downgrade
these scenarios, let it be emphasized that the PCOS System procured by COMELEC
is a paper-based system. It has a provision for system auditability and a voter-verified
paper trail. The official ballots may be compared with their digital images stored in the
memory cards. All actions done on the machine are stored and can be printed out by
the BEI chairperson as an audit log, which includes time stamps. And in the event of
problems arising from non-functioning PCOS machines, the official ballots cast in the
precincts, which have previously been fed into the locked ballot box, could be used
for a manual recount. With these safeguards, the fear of automation failure should
not overwhelm us. For the first time, we shall be conducting our May 2010 elections
through full automation. To be sure, full automation will not completely cleanse the
dirt in our electoral system. But it is a big forward step, which can lead us to the
gateway of real democracy where the vote of the people is sacred and supreme
5. 2010 Resolution
a. Petitioners’ threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or may
not occur. Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if
any, probative value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.
b. Surely, a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to
prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract. The argument is untenable,
based as it is again on news reports. Surely, petitioners cannot expect the Court to
act on unverified reports foisted on it
iv. Arroyo vs. DOJ and COMELEC
1. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction"
authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction
to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no
prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited
is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as
the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and
the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The
subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed.
Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
v. Ongsiako Reyes vs. COMELEC
1. Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the House of
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Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2)
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
2. Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office
nd
yet. Also, the 2 requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1)
before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although
she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during
plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was
indeed complied.
III. Voters
a. Qualifications for suffrage
i. Citizenship – Filipino Citizen
1. The one who claims to be a citizen has the burden of proving it
ii. At least 18 years of age on the day of the election
iii. Resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year and of the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6
months
1. Synonymous with domicile
a. Animus manendi
b. Animus non revertendi
2. Transfer by reason of work, education, military, confinement or detention cannot be said to have
lost his original residence
iv. Not disqualified by law
1. Cannot impose qualifications as to literacy, property, education, sex, or taxpaying ability
2. Burned is in the voter to prove that he has none of the disqualifications provided by law
b. Disqualifications
i. Convicted by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than 1 year unless pardoned or granted
amnesty
1. Reacquired upon expiration of 5 years after service of sentence
ii. Adjudged by final judgment as having committed any crime involving disloyalty to government or any crime
against national security
1. Reacquired upon expiration of 5 years after service of sentence
iii. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority
c. Local and Overseas Absentee Voters
i. GR: A person must by physically present in the polling place where he is a registered voter to be able to
vote
1. Exceptions:
a. Members of the board of Election Inspectors
b. Government officials and employees, members of AFP and PNP, who by reason of
public functions and duties is not in his/her place of registration on election day, may
vote in the city/municipality where he/she is assigned on election day (must be a
registered voter)
c. Local Absentee voting for Media – members of media, media practitioners, technical
and support staff who are duly registered voters and who on election day may not be
able to vote due to the performance of their functions in covering and reporting on the
elections
i. Allowed to vote only for President, VP, Senators and Party-list
representatives
d. Overseas Voters – for President, VP, Senators and party List Representative, plus all
national referenda and plebiscites
ii. OVERSEAS VOTERS Requirements
1. A valid Philippine passport
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a. Absence – DFA certification that it has found the documents sufficient to warrant the
issuance of a passport or that the applicant is a holder of a valid passport but is
unable to produce the same for a valid reason
b. Seafarers – photocopy of seaman’s book or any other pertinent document
c. Citizen Retention and Reacquisition act – original or certified true copy of the order of
approval of their application to retain or reacquire the Filipino citizenship issued by
the Bureau of Immigration
2. Not otherwise disqualified by law
3. At least 18 years of age on the day of the elections
4. Accomplished registration form prescribed by the commission
iii. Disqualified
1. Lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws
2. Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged dual
allegiance to a Foreign country except dual citizens
3. Committed and convicted in a final judgment by a Philippine court or tribunal of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of not less than 1 year (not removed by pardon or amnesty)
a. Reacquired after 5 years after service of sentence
4. Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent
authority in the Philippines or abroad, verified by embassy, consulate, foreign service
establishments unless there is a subsequent certification that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent
5. An immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless upon
filing, he executes an application for registration declaring that:
a. He shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines
b. He has not applied for citizenship in another country
d. Detainees
i. May be availed of by any registered detainee whose registration record is not deactivated/cancelled.
ii. May be done either through the special polling place inside jails or escorted voting
iii. A detainee is any person:
1. Confined in jail, formally charged for any crime/s and awaiting/undergoing trial
2. Serving a sentence of imprisonment for less than 1 year
3. Whose conviction of a crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted gov’t such as rebellion,
sedition, violation of the firearms laws or any crime against national security or for any other crime
is on appeal
iv. 18 years of age on day or election, committed inside for at least 6 months immediately preceding may be
registered as a voter
v. Disqualifications
1. Convicted by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than 1 year unless pardoned or
granted amnesty
a. Reacquired 5 years after service of sentence
2. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority
3. Person adjudged by final judgment as having committed any crime involving disloyalty to
government or any crime against national security
a. Reacquired 5 years after service of sentence
e. PWDs or Illiterate Persons
i. One who cannot by himself prepare an application for registration because of his physical disability and/or
inability to read and write
ii. No voter shall be allowed to vote as an illiterate or PWD unless such fact is indicated in the Election Day
Computerized Voters List or the Voters Registration Record
iii. May register with the assistance of the Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizen’s arms
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iv. May be prepared by any relative within the 4 civil degree of consanguinity or affinity by the EO or any
member of an accredited citizen’s arms using the data supplied by the applicant
f. Cases
i. Macalintal vs. COMELEC
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election
laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile
(insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to
return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter
(absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged
in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
ii. People vs. Corral
1. The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been
convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right
is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by
conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the
privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere
disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and
not the denial of a personal right.
IV. Registration of Voters

a. The act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for the registration by a qualified voter before the
election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered
voters upon approval by the ERB
b. DOES NOT confer the right to vote. It is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. IT IS A
REGULATION, NOT A QUALIFICATION.
c. Election Registration Board (ERB)
i. Body constituted to act on all applications for registration
ii. In each city, municipality as many ERBs as there are election officers therein. Additional election officers
for populated cities or municipalities
iii. Composition:
1. Election officer as Chairman
2. Public school official most senior in rank
3. Local civil registrar or in his absence the city or municipal registrar
iv. Prepare and post a certified list of voters 90 days before regular election, 60 days before special election +
copies posted in the office of the EO and bulletin board of each city/municipal hall
v. Personal filing of application of registration of voters conducted daily
vi. No registration 120 days before regular election, 90 days before special election
d. Biometrics – RA 10367
i. New Voters and Registered Voters
ii. Beginning July 1, 2013
iii. Failure to submit for validation shall be deactivated
e. Deactivation
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i. Deactivating and removing from the registration records of certain persons from the precinct book of voters
and placing the same in the inactive file, properly marked deactivated and dated in indelible ink after
entering the causes of deactivation
ii. Grounds:
1. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than
one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided,
however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire
the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence as certified by the
clerks of courts of the Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan;
2. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having
caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as
rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against
national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law;
Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five (5) years after
service of sentence;
3. Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such
disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such
person is no longer insane or incompetent;
4. Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections as shown by
their voting records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) elections;
5. Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
6. Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
7. Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for
registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections
a. Reactivation
a. Any voter whose registration has been deactivated pursuant to the preceding Section may file with
the Election Officer a sworn application for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit
stating that the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist any time but not later than one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
b. The Election Officer shall submit said application to the Election Registration Board for appropriate
action.
c. In case the application is approved, the Election Officer shall retrieve the registration record from the
inactive file and include the same in the corresponding precinct book of voters. Local heads or
representatives of political parties shall be properly notified on approved applications.
b. Cancellation
a. The Board shall cancel the registration records of those who have died as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar. The Local Civil Registrar shall submit each month a certified list of persons who died during
the previous month to the Election Officer of the place where the deceased are registered. In the
absence of information concerning the place where the deceased is registered, the list shall be sent
to the Election Officer of the city or municipality of the deceased’s residence as appearing in his death
certificate. In any case, the Local Civil Registrar shall furnish a copy of this list to the national central
file and the proper provincial file.
b. The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a list of those persons who died
whose registrations were cancelled, and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of the political
parties, the national central file, and the provincial file.
c. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings

a. Section 34. Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the List. Any person whose application for registration
has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from the list may file with
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the court a petition to include his name in the permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time
except one hundred five (105) days prior to a regular election or seventy-five (75) days prior to a
special election. It shall be supported by a certificate of disapproval of his application and proof of
service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The petition shall be decided within fifteen (15) days
after its filing.
If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters, the Board shall place the
application for registration previously disapproved in the corresponding book of voters and indicate in
the application for registration the date of the order of inclusion and the court which issued the same.
b. Section 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List. Any registered voters, representative of a
political party or the Election Officer, may file with the court a sworn petition for the exclusion of a
voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address and the precinct of the challenged
voter at any time except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election or sixty-five (65) days
before a special election. The petition shall be accompanied by proof of notice to the Board and to the
challenged voter and shall be decided within ten (10) days from its filing.
If the decision is for the exclusion of the voter from the list, the Board shall, upon receipt of the final
decision, remove the voter’s registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the
order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file.
d. Cases
iii. Yra vs. Abano
1. No. One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is that he
must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term "qualified" when
applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To
become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that
he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications
prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the
municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for.
2. It was said that "The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the
elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One may be a qualified voter without
exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to
the exercise of the right."
3. The distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a registered
qualified elector and the respondent is such although not in his home municipality. Registration
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.It should not be
forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to be their local chief
executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be respected.
iv. Akbayan Youth vs. COMELEC
1. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA
8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the
regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters
registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet
generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far
removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA
8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it
to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
2. The COMELEC resolution denying the petition of certain youth sectors to conduct a two-day
special registration is valid. The exercise of suffrage is subject to substantive and procedural
requirements.
v. Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC
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1. The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily
during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90
days before a special election. The Court is bound to respect the determination of Congress that
the 120 day or 90 day period, as the case may be, was enough to make the necessary
preparations with respect to the coming elections and COMELEC's rule making power should be
exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
2. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration
under R.A. 8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for
pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by
law.
3. The COMELEC cannot change the registration period by mere resolution.
V. Candidates
a. Candidates – any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office who has filed a COC by himself or
through an accredited political party
i. Deemed to be an official candidate only upon the start of the campaign period
b. Qualifications
President/VP Senator
Citizenship Natural-born citizen Natural-born citizen
Voter Registration Registered voter Registered voter
Literacy Able to read and write Able to read and write
Age At least 40 years old on the day of At least 35 years old on the day of
election election
Residency Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 Resident of the Philippines for at least
years immediately preceding the day of 2 years immediately preceding the day
the election of the election
District Representatives Governor/Vice-Gov/Mayor/Vice-

Mayor/Punong Brgy/Sangguinian
Citizenship Natural-born citizen Citizen of the Philippines
Voter Registration Registered voter in the district in which Registered voter in the barangay,
he shall be elected municipality, city or province or in the
case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan,, panlungson or bayan
the district where he intends to be
elected
Literacy Able to read and write Able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect
Age At least 25 years old on the day of the 23 years old – Gov/vice-Gov/Member
election of sangguniang
panlalawigan/mayor/vice-
mayor/member of sangguniang
panlungson of HUC
21 years – mayor/vice mayor of ICC,

CC, or municipalities
18 years – member of the sangguiang
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panlungson or bayan or punong
barangay or member of the
sangguiang barangay
15 but not more than 21 –

Sangguniang Kabataan
Residency Resident of the same district for a Resident therein for at least 1 year
period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the election
immediately preceding the day of
election
c. Disqualifications - Local elective office and district representatives

i. Declared as incompetent or insane by competent authority
ii. Convicted by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months imprisonment before the expiration of a period of 5 years
from his service of sentence
iii. Convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude
iv. Any person who is a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country unless said person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided in the election laws
d. Local Elective officials ONLY
i. Insane of feeble minded
ii. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad
1. Fleeing from conviction, punishment, or prosecution
iii. Immigrants or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this code
iv. Those with dual citizenship (dual allegiance)
v. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic
vi. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case
vii. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence
e. Additional grounds for disqualification
viii. One who committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy
ix. One who spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law
x. One who has given money or other material consideration to influence voters or public officials
performing electoral functions
xi. One who has violated provisions on
1. Campaign period
2. Removal and destruction of lawful election propaganda
3. Prohibited forms of propaganda
4. Regulation of propaganda through mass media
xii. One who solicited or received or made any contribution prohibited by law
f. Certificate of Candidacy
i. Statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announce his candidacy for the
office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs if
he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated
ii. Sworn and within the period fixed by law
iii. Appointive officials’ automatic resignation upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy
1. Includes active members of ADP, officers of GOCCs
iv. Filing 2 certificates of candidacy makes that person ineligible for either position
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1. May withdraw one through a sworn declaration before the deadline for the filing of certificates of
candidacy
v. Cannot annul on the sole ground of formal defects in the COC
vi. If COC declared void – person was never a candidate
1. Candidate turned out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the position is awarded to the one
qualified next in rank
2. If the COC was valid to begin with but subsequently cancelled – the second placer cannot be
proclaimed the winner
vii. Withdrawal – may at any time before election day and subject to Sec. 15 file a Statement of Withdrawal
1. Withdrawal disqualifies the person from being a substitute candidate or for any other position
2. Revival of the cerficate of candidacy (withdrawing the withdrawal) must be made within the period
provided by law for the filing of certificates of candidacy
viii. Substitution
1. Certfied and from the same political party may file a COC to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew, disqualified not later than mid-day of the day of the election
2. If he is an independent candidate – cannot be substituted
3. The existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly
substituted
ix. COMELEC’s duty to receive COC’s is ministerial except
1. Authority over nuisance candidates
2. Power to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Sec. 78
a. Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
3. Filing of a disqualification case on any of the grounds enumerated under Sec. 68
a. Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he
is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having
b. given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions;
c.
d. committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
e.
f. spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
g.
h. solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97
and 104; or
i.
j. violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws.
g. Nuisance Candidates
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i. Those whose certificates of candidacy are presented and files to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the COC has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate
1. Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition
of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is
shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to
cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or
by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent
a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
ii. Period to file petition against a nuisance candidate - 5 days from the last day for filing of the COCs
iii. The decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of
five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not
be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
iv. Votes cast for a nuisance candidate should be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate
1. Two or more with same name and/or surname as the nuisance candidate – considered as stray
votes
h. Petition to deny due course to or to cancel a COC
i. Material representation contained therein as required under Sec. 74 is false
1. False representation pertains to material matters affecting substantive rights of a candidate
2. The false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible
i. Effect of disqualification
i. Before election – not be voted for, votes cast will not be counted
ii. After election – Court or Commission continue with trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, protest, may
order suspension of the proclamation of such candidate if the evidence of his guilt is strong
j. Cases
i. Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELC
1. Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
2. Poe, a foundling, a natural-born citizen? Yes, based on:
a. Circumstantial evidence
i. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
ii. She has typical Filipino features.
b. Legislation
i. Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. Likewise, domestic laws
on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the
adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
ii. Recent legislation all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
c. Generally accepted principles of international law
i. Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South
America and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as
citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in
which it is found.
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3. Poe’s repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.A natural born citizen
before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino
after repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).
4. She will have been a resident for 10 years and 11 months on the day of the election. [T]here
is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently
abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005. Poe presented
voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile and relocated
to the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US passport showing her arrival on
May 24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email
correspondences with freight company to arrange for the shipment of household items as well as
with the pet Bureau; school records of her children showing enrolment in the Philippine to the
Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was
for good.
ii. Maquiling vs. COMELEC
1. Such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using
his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is
fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for
an elective local position. The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one.
It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
2. We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office
but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
iii. Arnado vs. COMELEC
1. Election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements;
otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless.
2. COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified Arnado. Arnado failed to
comply with the requirements of RA 9225. Although he did swear allegiance to the Philippines
and renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his COC in November 2009, such acts were
deemed recanted or withdrawn when he again used his US passport. In fact, Arnado did not
controvert the allegations that he used his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010. As
such, he remained a US citizen and is therefore disqualified to run for public office. What Arnado
could have done, for the purposes of running in the 2013 elections, was to renounce again (for
the third time) his US citizenship. But he never did that hence he was rightfully disqualified in the
2013 elections too. Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his US passport in January
2010 and March 2010, he is still disqualified.
iv. Caballero vs. COMELEC
1. The court argued that the period from September 13, 2012 – when Caballero re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship – to May 12, 2013 "was even less than the one-year residency required by
law."
2. The court also did not agree with Caballero, who claimed that his 9-month actual stay in Uyugan
was substantially compliant with the residency requirement.
3. He even claimed that the requirement is not strictly based on the period of residence in the place
where he is seeking an elective office, but based on how familiar he is with the needs of his
constituents.
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4. The Comelec found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was able
to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May
13, 2013 elections.
v. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
1. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino.
He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his
US citizenship, that did not restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization
or repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his
Philippine citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he
owes allegiance to a foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does
not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to
the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice
of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship.
If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
vi. Mercado vs. Manzano
1. "Dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers
to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition.
Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
2. The filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines
and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
3. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
1. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
vii. Villaber vs. COMELEC
1. COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that any person who
has been sentenced by final judgment for any offense for which he has been sentenced for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office.
2. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
3. In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted.
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viii. Lonzanida vs. COMELEC
1. The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be considered a full term of office for two reasons, he
cannot be considered elected as the proclamation was void and he also did not voluntary
renounce office, but was an involuntary severance from office.
2. The petition is granted and the resolution of the COMELEC declaring petitioner Lonzanida
disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set aside.
ix. Abundo vs. COMELEC
1. During that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions
thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo
actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following
the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little
over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local
elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007.
2. The instances wherein such consecutive terms are not considered as having been “involuntarily
interrupted or broken” are as follows:
a. Assumption of Office by Operation of Law;
b. Recall Election;
c. Conversion of a Municipality into a City;
d. Period of Preventive Suspension; and
e. Election Protest
x. Marquez vs. COMELEC
1. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she
has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription
of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition
truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and
ordinary connotation of the term.
xi. Dela Cruz vs. COMELEC
1. A petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot be
treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did
when it applied the rule provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be
considered stray, to those registered candidates whose COC's had been cancelled or denied due
course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was
cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC.
2. Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a
final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the
legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier
discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should be
distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such
cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified
on grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government Code. Moreover, private respondent
admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio because
COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters'
constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is
then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the
legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names
of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or
eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who
mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide
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candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the
same.
xii. Atty Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC and Estrada
1. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
3. If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise
never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text
of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree
of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be
interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada.
xiii. Aratea vs. COMELEC
1. Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All
votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
2. A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes.
3. As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be
considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified
candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
4. Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to
run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the
very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified
candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest
number of votes.
xiv. Jalosjos vs. COMELEC
1. To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of
his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia)
would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
2. The Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there
even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate
own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters
is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making
it his domicile.
3. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay.
The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding
his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
xv. Quinto vs. COMELEC
1. 2009
a. The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they
have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are
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qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein,
affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials
b. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
c. The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is
not germane to the purpose of the law. Applying the four requisites to the instant
case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of
the law.
2. 2010
a. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of
the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and
may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority.
b. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite
term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed
resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other
words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be
served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In
contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
xvi. Mendoza vs. COMELEC
1. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely serves the
balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three--year term.
2. The law contemplates a continuous full three--year term before the proscription can apply,
providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If
involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish his
term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for
purposes of applying the three--term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term
assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be one
term in reckoning the three--term limit.
3. In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected
local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official following the
recall election could be considered to have served a full three--year term set by the Constitution.
4. A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would
in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his
constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the
need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received
97 percent of the votes cast.
xvii. Socrates vs. COMELEC
1. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
17

interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for
any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
2. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election,
is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
3. Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is
an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is
not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election
after the third term.
4. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any
other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is
a consecutive fourth term.
xviii. Pamatong vs. COMELEC
1. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations
apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated
2. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add
into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would
actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies, which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant
minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of
these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
3. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of
further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
xix. Timbol vs. COMELEC
1. Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy “to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate
that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate.”
2. To minimize logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their CoCs may be denied due
course or cancelled by COMELEC, through motu proprio or upon verified petition of an interested
party, subject to an opportunity to be heard.
3. COMELEC declared Timbol a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his
bona fide intention to run for office. It issued Resolution No. 9610 when Timbol appeared before
Valencia in a clarificatory hearing. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
4. Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the defect in the issuance of
Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had he been given an
opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution, COMELEC denied
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Timbol’s petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4,
2013.
5. Although reprinting of ballots would indeed be costly, COMELEC should balance its duty to
ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly and peaceful with the right of a
candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before he/she is declared
a nuisance candidate.
VI. Campaign, Election Propaganda, etc.

a. Election Campaign – an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
to a public office
i. Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges, or support for or against any candidate
ii. Holding political caucuses, meetings, rallies, or other similar assemblies
iii. Forming organizations or groups of persons
iv. Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda to support or oppose the election of any candidate
v. Making speeches or commentaries
vi. NOT CONSIDERED
1. Public expressions of opinions
2. Discussion of probable issues in a forthcoming election
3. Attributes or criticisms against a probabale candidate
4. Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates on blogs unless expressed by
government officials
vii. Prohibited campaign acts
1. Sec. 81. Intervention of foreigners. - It shall be unlawful for any foreigner, whether judicial
or natural person, to aid any candidate or political party, directly or indirectly, or take part in or
influence in any manner any election, or to contribute or make any expenditure in connection
with any election campaign or partisan political activity.
2. Sec. 83. Removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda prohibited.
- It shall be unlawful for any person during the campaign period to remove, destroy, obliterate,
or in any manner deface or tamper with, or prevent the distribution of lawful election
propaganda.
3. Sec. 89. Transportation, food and drinks. - It shall be unlawful for any candidate, political
party, organization, or any person to give or accept, free of charge, directly or indirectly,
transportation, food or drinks or things of value during the five hours before and after a public
meeting, on the day preceding the election, and on the day of the election; or to give or
contribute, directly or indirectly, money or things of value for such purpose.
b. Election Period
i. 90 days before the election
ii. Ends 30 days thereafter
c. Campaign Period (shall not include the day before and the day of the election)
i. Presidential and Vice Presidential Election – 90 days
ii. Members of Congress and Local Election – 45 days
iii. Barangay Election – 15 days
iv. Special election – 45 days
d. Lawful election propaganda
i. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials the size of which does
not exceed eight and one half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
ii. Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular political party or
candidate for public office;
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iii. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding 2 x 3 feet,
except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of
said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding 3 x 8 feet in size, shall be allowed:
1. Streamers may be displayed 5 days before the date of the meeting or rally and shall be
removed within 24 hours after said meeting or rally;
iv. Print advertisements – does not exceed ¼ page, in broad sheet and ½ page in tabloids thrice a week
per newspaper, magazine or other publications, during the campaign period.
v. Equal access to media time and space
1. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be
entitled to not more than 120 minutes of television advertisement and 180 minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
2. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be
entitled to not more than 60 minutes of television advertisement and 90 minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or donation
a. Two or more candidates or parties displayed/used together length of time will be
counted against the airtime allotment of the candidates, the cost will be
considered expenditures regardless of whoever paid/donated
b. Incidental appearances in newscasts, interviews, documentaries including but
not limited to events sanctioned by COMELEC, political conventions and similar
activities, shall not be deemed to be broadcast election propaganda
c. TEST if appearance is bona fide: (1) prior approval of COMELEC (2) equal
opportunities for all candidates to promote their candidacy
vi. All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may authorize
after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties were given an
equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be published in two
newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the
authorization has been granted.
e. Prohibited election propaganda
i. To print, publish, post or distribute any newspaper, newsletter, newsweekly, gazette or magazine
advertising, pamphlet, leaflet, card, decal, bumper sticker, poster, comic book, circular, handbill,
streamer, sample list of candidates or any published or printed political matter and to air or broadcast
any election propaganda or political advertisement by television or radio or on the internet for or
against a candidate or group of candidates to any public office, unless they bear and be identified by
the reasonably legible, or audible words “political advertisement paid for,” followed by the true and
correct name and address of the candidate or party for whose benefit the election propaganda was
printed or aired. It shall likewise be unlawful to publish, print or distribute said campaign materials
unless they bear, and are identified by, the reasonably legible, or audible words “political
advertisements paid by,” followed by the true and correct name and address of the payer.
ii. To print, publish, broadcast or exhibit any such election propaganda donated or given free of charge
by any person or publishing firm or broadcast entity to a candidate or party without the written
acceptance by the said candidate or party and unless they bear and be identified by the words "printed
free of charge,” or “airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by”, respectively, followed by
the true and correct name and address of the said publishing firm or broadcast entity;
iii. To show, display or exhibit publicly in a theatre, television station, or any public forum any movie,
cinematography or documentary portraying the life or biography of a candidate, or in which a character
is portrayed by an actor or media personality who is himself a candidate;
iv. For any newspaper or publication, radio, television or cable television station, or other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or election propaganda purposes to any candidate or party in excess of the size, duration or
frequency authorized by law or these rules;
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v. For any radio, television, cable television station, announcer or broadcaster to allow the scheduling of
any program, or permit any sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or party by unduly or
repeatedly referring to, or unnecessarily mentioning his name, or including therein said candidate or
party; and
vi. To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner
thereof.
vii. To erect, put up, make use of, attach, float or display any billboard, tinplate-poster, balloons and the
like, of whatever size, shape, form or kind, advertising for or against any candidate or political party;
viii. To purchase, manufacture, request, distribute or accept electoral propaganda gadgets, such as pens,
lighters, fans of whatever nature, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, shirts, hats, bandanas,
matches, cigarettes and the like, except that campaign supporters accompanying a candidate shall be
allowed to wear hats and/or shirts or T-shirts advertising a candidate.
f. NOTES:
i. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, reporter, on-air correspondent or personality
who is a candidate for any elective public office or is a campaign volunteer for or employed or retained
in any capacity by any candidate or political party shall be deemed resigned, if so required by their
employer, or shall take a leave of absence from his/her work as such during the campaign period:
ii. Any media practitioner who is an official of a political party or a member of the campaign staff of a
candidate or political party shall not use his/her time or space to favor any candidate or political party.
iii. COMELEC print space – 3 national newspapers of general circulation for national candidates allocated
st th th
equally and free of charge for 3 different calendar days. 1 , 5 , and 10 , week of the campaign period.
st th th
iv. COMELEC airtime – 3 national TV networks, 3 radio. 1 , 5 and 10 weeks.
g. Electoral contributions - a gift, donation, subscription, loan, advance or deposit of money or anything of value,
or a contract, promise or agreement to contribute, whether or not legally enforceable, made for the purpose of
influencing the results of the elections.. It shall also include the use of facilities voluntarily donated by other
persons, the money value of which can be assessed based on the rates prevailing in the area.
i. Contributions duly reported to the COMELEC not subject to payment of donor’s tax
ii. Shall not include services rendered without compensation by individuals volunteering a portion or all of
their time in behalf of a candidate or political party
iii. Unexpended balance – subject to income tax
h. Prohibited contributions – no c
i. Public or private financial institutions: however nothing herein shall prevent the making of any loan to
a candidate or political party by any such public or private financial institutions legally in the business
of lending money, and that the loan is made in accordance with laws and regulations and in the
ordinary course of business;
ii. Natural and juridical persons operating a public utility or in possession of or exploiting any natural
resources of the nation;
iii. Natural and juridical persons who hold contracts or sub-contracts to supply the government or any of
its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, with goods or services or to perform construction or
other works;
iv. Natural and juridical persons who have been granted franchises, incentives, exemptions, allocations or
similar privileges or concessions by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
v. Natural and juridical persons who, within one year prior to the date of the election, have been granted
loans or other accommodations in excess of P100,000 by the government or any of its divisions,
subdivisions or instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations;
vi. Educational institutions which have received grants of public funds amounting to no less than
P100,000.00;
vii. Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; and
viii. Foreigners and foreign corporations.
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1. Sec. 96. Soliciting or receiving contributions from foreign sources. - It shall be unlawful
for any person, including a political party or public or private entity to solicit or receive, directly
or indirectly, any aid or contribution of whatever form or nature from any foreign national,
government or entity for the purposes of influencing the results of the election.
ix. Raising of funds in the following cases:
1. Sec. 97. Prohibited raising of funds. - It shall be unlawful for any person to hold dances,
lotteries, cockfights, games, boxing bouts, bingo, beauty contests, entertainments, or
cinematographic, theatrical or other performances for the purpose of raising funds for an
election campaign or for the support of any candidate from the commencement of the
election period up to and including election day; or for any person or organization, whether
civic or religious, directly or indirectly, to solicit and/or accept from any candidate for public
office, or from his campaign manager, agent or representative, or any person acting in their
behalf, any gift, food, transportation, contribution or donation in cash or in kind from the
commencement of the election period up to and including election day;
a. EXCEPTION: That normal and customary religious stipends, tithes, or collections
on Sundays and/or other designated collection days, are excluded from this
prohibition.
i. Lawful expenditures - Includes the payment or delivery of money of anything of value, or a contract, promise
or agreement to make an expenditure, for the purpose of influencing the results of the election. It shall also
include the use of facilities personally owned by the candidate, the money value of the use of which can be
assessed based on the rates prevailing in the area.
i. Limitations on Expenses
1. For candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President; and for other
candidates Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency
where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That a candidate without any political
party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos
(P5.00) for every such voter; and
2. For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the
constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.
j. Statement of Contributions and Expenses
i. Not later than thirty (30) days after the clay of election, every candidate shall file in triplicate with the
offices of the Commission where he filed his certificate of candidacy (except for national positions
which should be filed with the Campaign Finance Unit) a full, true and itemized statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Within the same period, the treasurer
of every party that participated in the elections shall file with the Campaign Finance Unit of the
COMELEC the party's statement of election contributions and expenditures
1. Failure to file
a. Prohibited from entering upon the duties of his office
b. Administrative fines except candidates for elective barangay office
st
i. 1 offense – P 1,000 to P 30,000, discretion of COMELEC
1. To be paid 30 days from receipt of notice of failure
2. Non payment – Enforceable by writ of execution against
offender’s properties
nd
ii. 2 offense – P 2,000 to P 60,000 discretion of COMELEC
c. Perpetual disqualification to hold office for second or subsequent offense
k. Cases
i. Chavez vs. COMELEC
1. . One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use
his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public
office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the
described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No.
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6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given
period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature
campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
ii. Penera vs. COMELEC
1. September 2009 – disqualified for premature campaigning
a. Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a candidate (prior to
the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political
activity. However, it is only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the
beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her
disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
b. If the Court were to rule otherwise, “not only will the prohibited act of premature
campaigning be officially decriminalized, the significance of having a campaign
period before the elections would also be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with
the deepest of campaign war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to
promote his/her candidacy well ahead of everyone else, thus, undermine the conduct
of fair and credible elections. Such is the very evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our
lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an absurd situation.”
2. November 2009 – not guilty of premature campaigning
a. Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that
Congress stated that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” So, it is lawful if done before
the start of the campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be
construed further.
b. Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As what
was decided in the Lanot Case which says that prior to the campaign period, even if
the candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she is not yet considered
as a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be
guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk
about. What she did was an exercise of her freedom of expression.
3. THERE IS NO PROHIBITED PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING IN THE PHILIPPINES
a. Under the law “candidate” has been defined as “any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a COC” and that “any person who
files a COC within the filing period shall only be considered as a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his COC.
b. If there is no candidate whose interest is yet to be promoted or defeated there
can be no restriction.
c. Engaging in partisan political activity in favor of or against a person who has not
filed a COC is not prohibited
d. What the law says is “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” – the effective date when
partisan political acts become unlawful is when the campaign period starts.
iii. SWS vs. COMELEC
1. Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it
is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
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2. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions.”
iv. GMA Network Inc. vs. COMELEC
1. Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law.
“Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to
be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy.”
2. GMA came up with its analysis of the practical effects of such a regulation: Given the reduction of
a candidate’s airtime minutes in the New Rules, petitioner GMA estimates that a national
candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for his political advertisements in television during
the whole campaign period of 88 days, or will only have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure
allotment. If he chooses to place his political advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal
allocation, he will only have 27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely translates
to 1 advertisement spot on a 30-second spot basis in television.
3. The Court agrees. The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and
arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach
out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-
based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political
parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
4. Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the COMELEC in
ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits. There is absolutely
no duty on the broadcast stations to do monitoring, much less monitoring in real time. GMA
grossly exaggerates when it claims that the non-existent duty would require them to hire and train
an astounding additional 39,055 personnel working on eight-hour shifts all over the country.
v. ER Ejercito vs. COMELEC
1. R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not
be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the
advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising
contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized
representative of the political party. Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC
Resolution No. 9476 requires that election propaganda materials donated toa candidate shall not
be broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which shall
be in the form of an official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the description
of the items donated, their quantity and value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts,
media purchase orders or booking orders shall be signed by the candidate concerned or by the
duly authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation, should be accompanied by
a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their authorized representatives. COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states that it shall be unlawful to broadcast any election
propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate
without the written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the
words "airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed by the true and correct
name and address of the donor.
2. This Court cannot give weight to Ejercito’s representation that his signature on the advertising
contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only for the first time in this petition
for certiorari. It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor
raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the
Supreme Court. It would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow Ejercito to
raise an issue that was not brought up before the COMELEC. While it is true that litigation is not a
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game of technicalities, it is equally truethat elementary considerations of due process require that
a party be duly apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered.
3. Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and
consent, and whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual
challenge has no place in a Rule 65 petition. This Court is not a trier of facts and is not equipped
to receive evidence and determine the truth of factual allegations.
4. The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election
expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of
expression under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the
law’s concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular
candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those
with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no
more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of
opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art.
XIII of the Constitution.
5. Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political
advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the essence of a truly democratic
form of government.
vi. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC
1. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree
of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those
who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it
is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal
opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the tarpaulin
is a political speech
a. Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to
public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
2. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. The Court held that the
regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the
size of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this
court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
3. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains
the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the
laws. The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
vii. 1-UTAK vs. COMELEC
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1. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the ownership per
se of PUVs and transport terminals. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used
for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an
act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal.
2. A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the
supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs
and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained
in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the
same unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.
3. It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the
prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as the owners of PUVs and private transport
terminals to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their
property, and convince others to agree with them
4. The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not necessary to a
stated governmental interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on posting of election campaign
materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for therein. Second, there are more
than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would ensure equal time, space, and
opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a valid content-neutral
regulation was not satisfied.
VII. Political Party; Party-List Organizations

a. Definitions
i. Political Party – an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office
ii. Party-List Organization – mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives, from national, regional and sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions
thereof registered by the COMELEC. The party-list system was devised to replace the reserve seat system.
Representation by election.
b. Registration
i. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization, or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than 90 days before the election, a petition verified
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or
sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations.
ii. Manifestation to participate in the party-list system
1. Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the COMELEC need not register
anew
2. File with the commission, not later than 90 days before the election a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the party-list system
iii. Purposes of registration
1. Acquire juridical personality
2. Entitle it to rights and privileges granted to political parties
3. Participate in the party-list system
c. Refusal and/or cancellation of registration
i. Religious denomination or sect, organization or association, organized for religious purposes
ii. Advocated violence or unlawful means to seek its goal
iii. Violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, and regulations relating to elections
iv. Foreign party organization
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v. Receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes
vi. Declares untruthful statements in its petition
vii. Ceased to exist for at least 1 year
viii. Fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections or fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes case under
the party-list system in the 2 preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered
d. Nomination of party-list nominees
i. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than 45 days before
the election a list of names not less than 5 from which party list representatives shall be chosen in case it
obtains the required number of votes
ii. A person may be nominated in 1 list only
iii. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list
iv. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid in an
elective office in the immediately preceding election
v. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have
been submitted to the COMELEC except when the nominee
1. Dies
2. Withdraws in writing his nomination
3. Becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in
the list
vi. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the HOR who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned
e. Qualifications of party-list nominees
i. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines
ii. Able to read and write
iii. Registered voter
iv. A bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days
preceding the day of the election
v. At least 25 years of age on the day of the election
1. Nominee of the youth sector, at least 25 but not more than 30 on the day of the election
a. Attains the age of 30 during his terms hall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term
vi. Resident of the Philippines for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election
f. Manner of voting
i. Every voter shall be entitled to 2 votes
1. For candidate for member of the HOR in his legislative district
2. For the party, organization or coalition he wants represented in the HOR
a. A vote cast for a party, sectoral organization or coalition not entitled to be voted for
shall not be counted
ii. 20% allocation – maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations
1. automatically 1 party-list seat for every 4 existing legislative districts
iii. A guaranteed seat for a party-list organization garnering 2% of the total votes cast
1. Distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least 2% of the total party-list
votes
iv. Proportional Representation
1. Additional seats distributed to the party-list organizations garnering sufficient number of votes in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated
v. Three seat Cap
1. Each qualified party regardless of the number of votes it actually obtains is entitled only to a
maximum of 3 seats
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g. Who may participate in the party-list elections
i. National parties or organizations
ii. Regional parties or organizations
iii. Sectoral parties or organizations
iv. Notes
1. National and regional do not need to organized along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any marginalized and underrepresented sector
2. Political parties can participate provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district election
3. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized or underrepresented or lacking in
well defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector
4. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized
and underrepresented or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the respective sectors that they represent
a. The nominees either must belong to their respective sectors or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors
5. Parties shall not be disqualified if some of their nominee are disqualified provided that they have
at least 1 nominee who remains qualified
h. Cases
i. Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC
1. The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress
with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to
require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party
list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.
2. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent
of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation."
3. FORMULA FOR determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district
representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list
system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
additional seats for concerned party
ii. Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC
1. Respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they
are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House
of Representatives may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations
2. While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-
list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute
are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
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iii. BANAT vs. COMELEC
1. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative
districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using
the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may
deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted
for party-list representatives.
2. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of
party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower
house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
3. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered
less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to
attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
a. To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if
the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
4. It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
5. The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
a. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
c. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.
d. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
6. In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all
party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their
one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from
the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each.
There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
a. The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the
votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.
29

7. Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of
seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
8. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
a. Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either
from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that
even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major
political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno,
in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the
people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only
the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
9. The 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-
list system.
iv. Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC
1. The new guidelines are as follows:
a. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
i. 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.
b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
c. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented”
or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors
that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to
their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
30

sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
2. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided
that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
a. Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies.”
3. The party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for
parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It
is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have
the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list
system of elections.
4. If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house. As
explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others,
in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se
economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not
have well-defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.
5. The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record
of advocacy for the sector represented.
v. Palparan vs. HRET
1. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution identifies who the “members” of that House are:
a. Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
2. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins.
31

VIII. Automated Elections

a. Automated Election System - a system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the
voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other electoral process.
b. Paper-based Election System - a type of automated election system that use paper ballots, records and
counts votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count;"
c. "SECTION 6. Minimum System Capabilities. - "The automated election system must at least have the
following functional capabilities
i. Adequate security against unauthorized access;
ii. Accuracy in recording and reading of votes as well as in the tabulation, consolidation/canvassing,
electronic transmission, and storage of results;
iii. Error recovery in case of non-catastrophic failure of device;
iv. System integrity which ensures physical stability and functioning of the vote recording and counting
process;
v. Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;
vi. System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the correctness of reported
election results;
vii. An election management system for preparing ballots and programs for use in the casting and
counting of votes and to consolidate, report and display election results in the shortest time possible;
viii. Accessibility to illiterates and disabled voters;
ix. Vote tabulating program for election, referendum or plebiscite;
x. Accurate ballot counters;
xi. Data retention provision;
xii. Provide for the safekeeping, storing and archiving of physical or paper resource used in the election
process;
xiii. Utilize or generate official ballots as herein defined;
xiv. Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has registered his
choice; and
xv. Configure access control for sensitive system data and functions.
1. "In the procurement of this system, the Commission shall develop and adopt an evaluation
system to ascertain that the above minimum system capabilities are met. This evaluation
system shall be developed with the assistance of an advisory council." Continuity Plan
a. Advisory Council
a. Eight members who must be registered
b. Filipino voters, of known independence, competence and probity;
c. A person who is affiliated with any political party or candidate for any national position, or is related to
a candidate for any national position by affinity or consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, shall
not be eligible for appointment or designation to the Advisory Council. Should any such situation arise
at any time during the incumbency of a member, the designation or appointment of that member,
shall ipso facto be terminated
b. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
a. Composed of seven members each from the Senate and the House of Representatives o four of
whom shall come from the majority or three from the minority
b. To monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act.
c. National Board of Canvassers
a. "SECTION 27. National Board of Canvassers for Senators and Party-List Representatives. - The
chairman and members of the Commission on Elections sitting en banc, shall compose the national
board of canvassers for senators and party-list representatives. It shall canvass the results by
consolidating the certificates of canvass electronically transmitted. Thereafter, the national board shall
proclaim the winning candidates for senators and party-list representatives."
32

b. "SECTION 28. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for President and Vice-President.
- The Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session shall compose the national
board of canvassers for president and vice-president. The certificate of canvass for president and
vice-president duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
electronically transmitted to the Congress, directed to the president of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the day
of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session and the Congress upon determination of the authenticity and
the due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass all the results for president and
vice-president and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidates."
c. SECTION 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and
Vice President: The Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election
of senators: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. -
Congress and the Commission en banc shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificate of canvass for president and vice-president and senators, respectively, as accomplished
and transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that:
i. Each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and
members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to
Congress by them;
ii. Each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for president and vice-
president or senator, as the case may be, and their corresponding votes in words and their
corresponding votes in words and in figures;
iii. There [exists] no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or any of
its supporting documents such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by precinct or
discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate; and
iv. There exists no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the
certificate of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns
of precincts covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of
election returns or certificates of canvass may be used for the purpose of verifying the
existence of the discrepancy.
v. "When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvass of each province, city
[or] district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President or the Chairman of the
Commission, as the case may be, shall require the board of canvassers concerned to
transmit by personal delivery, the election returns from polling places that were not included
in the certificate of canvass and supporting statements. Said election returns shall be
submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
vi. "When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by
city/municipality or by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the
veracity of the number of votes stated herein and may affect the result of the election, upon
request of the presidential, vice-presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or his party,
Congress or the Commission en banc, as the case may be, shall, for the sole purpose of
verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-President or senator, count
the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
vii. "In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration as mentioned above, the
procedure on pre-proclamation controversies shall be adopted and applied as provided in
Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20.
a. "Any person who presents in evidence a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of
canvass or statement of votes, or a printed copy of an election return, certificate of canvass
or statement of votes bearing a simulated certification or a simulated image, shall be guilty of
an election offense and shall be penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
d. Cases
33

xvi. Roque vs. COMELEC
1. The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections,
administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be
stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser
responsibility. It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising
means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was
created--to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too
often, COMELEC has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen events
to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the
past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the COMELEC’s exercise of its power
which, by law and by the nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion on comelec’s part, as here, the Court should refrain from
utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.
2. This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and
enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards
successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The comelec is
laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly
and honest elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist comelec
personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the
Court would like and wish automated elections to succeed, credibly.
xvii. Capalla vs. COMELEC
1. The Rules of Court, defines digital signature as the first one it is electronic signature consisting of
a transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric
or public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic document
and the signers public key can accurately determine:
a. Whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the
signers public key; and
b. Whether the initial electronic document has been altered after the transformation was
made.
2. Digital signature requires private key and public key generated by an algorithm. There is another
algorithm (second) which, if you match if you put together the private key and the message, will
generate the signature. The third algorithm, that if you put together the public key and the
signature it will accept or reject the message
3. In the 2010 elections for example, the private key is embedded in the iButtons which are used to
start the PCOS machines. For authentication, all of the three BEIs are required. Each of them has
an 8-digit PIN given to them in a sealed envelope. The COMELEC on the other hand controls the
public key. Whoever in possession of the iButton and in possession of the set of PINs can send a
transmission. Whoever wants to send transmission, he will have to get the private key from the
BEI Chairman and the PIN numbers from the other members. If they can send an electronic
transmission that’s digitally signed and when received by the COMELEC and matched with the
public key will result with an official election return. Hence the statutory requirement of digital
signature is complied accordingly.
34

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ELECTION

LAW MIDTERMS REVIEWER INA COJUANGCO GUINGONA

II. Commission on Elections

IV. Registration of Voters

c. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings

District Representatives Governor/Vice-Gov/Mayor/Vice-

21 years – mayor/vice mayor of ICC,

18 years – member of the sangguiang

15 but not more than 21 –

c. Disqualifications - Local elective office and district representatives

VI. Campaign, Election Propaganda, etc.

VII. Political Party; Party-List Organizations

VIII. Automated Elections

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