REGALIAN DOCTRINE

a. Republic of the Philippines vs Santos

G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

Facts: 

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan
A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the
property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area
of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and
was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
(Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road,
and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio
Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant
because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed
through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.

Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.

Held: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks
of rivers.

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondent’s property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the
water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current.
In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents
as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the
clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only
to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to.
Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no
room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and fundamental duty of
courts is then to apply the law.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership.
Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public
dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to
belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that
provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not
need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that
instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner
from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no
applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion.
Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondent’s predecessor-in-
interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription
in relation to Lot 4998-B.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more
than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by
prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as
alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to
the State as part of its public dominion.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable,
therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that
are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to
the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the
adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the
owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their
value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable.
Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and
disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

b. Republic v. Espinosa
G.R. No. 186603, 5 April 2017

Facts:
Respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu an application for land registration covering a parcel of land, Espinosa
alleged that: (a) the property is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from his
mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), and the latter's other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and
(c) he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property in the concept of an
owner for more than thirty (30) years. Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey
Plan to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he
marked as evidence the annotation on the advance survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibañez, Chief
of the Map Projection Section.Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations. Petitioner
opposed Espinosa's application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosa's
predecessor-in-interest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax
declarations do not prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in interest are in the
character and for the length of time required by law. The MTC rendered a Judgment, granting
Espinosa's petition for registration.
According to petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in
possession for more than thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent proof that such possession
began on June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner also claimed that Espinosa's failure to present the
original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy thereof is fatal to his application.
Petitioner argued that the submission of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing the
identity of the land subject of the application. Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on
the advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible to prove that the subject land is alienable
and disposable.
The CA dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosa's application is anchored on Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted
in view of evidence supposedly showing his compliance with the requirements.
Issue: Whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy
of confirmation and registration.
Held:
Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession and that of his predecessor-
in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for thirty (30) years, or through prescription. Therefore,
the rule that should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply? The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives.
Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws. The confusion that attended the lower courts' disposition of this case stemmed
from their failure to apprise themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent
over the years. Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title was since July 26, 1894 or earlier.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section 48(b) of
the PLA filed after the promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove possession and
occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain on the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation,
it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947
and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.
However, there is nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and
occupation of the property for thirty (30) years.
On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in Isabel's name was for only twelve (12) years had
lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into possession.
c. Valiao v. Republic
G.R. No. 170757, 28 November 2011

 Facts:

          The petitioners (Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea)
filed with the RTC of Kabankalan an application of a parcel of land with an area of 504, 535
square meters in Barrio Galicia, Ilog, Negros Occidental under the conditions of PD 1529. They
claim that they have acquired the property in 1947 after the death of their uncle Basilio Milliarez
who purchased the land from Fermin Payogao through a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916,
entirely handwritten in Spanish. Upon their uncle’s death, they have possessed the land until
1966 when oppositor Macario Zafra disposed them of their property compelling them to file
complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against him. The petitioners submitted a Tax
Declaration No. 9562 dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision to grant the petitioner’s application for
registration.

Issues:

Whether Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Whether they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under a claim of ownership.

Held:

The petitioners failed to prove that the subject property was classified as part of the disposable
and alienable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and
not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.  To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. In addition, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government.

The petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. There is nothing in the records that would substantiate
petitioners’ claim that Basilio was in possession of the property during the period of possession
required by law. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property. As regards petitioners’
possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same
with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976.  At best, petitioners can only prove possession
since said date. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported for other evidence. It does not necessarily prove
ownership.

d. Republic vs Naguiat
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

Facts:

Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land
having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any
person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

 Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.

Issue: Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?

Held:

No, the said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or not respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the
parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The
classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like.

e. Secretary of DENR v. Yap, et al.

G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008

Facts:

The CA affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the petition for declaratory relief filed by
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a
tourist zone and marine reserve. Respondents claimed that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from
filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes.

RTC Kalibo’s granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al.
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public
forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code.

Respondents claimed that they themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945 or earlier and have been paying realty taxes.

The OSG maintained that respondents’ right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA
No. 141 (Public Land Act) and PD No. 705 and not PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82.
Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into ownership.

The CA affirmed respondents’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that
neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition and that the Circular itself recognized
private ownership of lands.
Issue: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural
land, therefore alienable and disposable.

Held:

No. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141 to which they are governed (not PD 1801). Neither do they have vested rights over
the occupied lands under the said law. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable
is required.

2 requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:

(1) CONE of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona
fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945 (absent); and

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. (absent)

Regarding the 1st requisite, the tax declarations are insufficient as the earliest tax declarations
under the name of Yap et al. were issued in 1993.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. Proclamation No. 1801 convert portions of Boracay
Island into an agricultural land. Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 (now
Public Land Act) does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State
property.

f. Republic v. Ocol
G.R. No. 208350, 14 November 2016

Facts:

On September 19, 2008, respondents, filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 266 an
application for land registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree. The application covers three (3) parcels of land described as
follows: a) Lot 2 under approved survey plan Ccs-00-000258 with an area of 3,731 square
meters; b) Lot 1672-A under approved subdivision plan Csd-00-001798 consisting of 1,583
square meters; c) a lot under approved survey plan Cvn-00-000194 consisting of 6,066 square
meters.[6] The total assessed value of the parcels of land is P288,970.00. On October 6, 2008, the
RTC issued a Notice of Initial Hearing, copy furnished the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
The notice was sent to the Official Gazette for publication and was served on all the adjoining
owners. It was likewise posted conspicuously on each parcel of land included in the application

At the ex-parte presentation of evidence on respondents Rosa Ocol, 72 years old, and Felipe

Ocol, 70 years old, testified that they are the children of the late Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio
Ocol (Exhibits "U" and "V"). They inherited the subject lots from their father and mother who
died on February 1, 1949 and March 22, 1999, respectively. When Felipe Ocol was only about
eight years old and Rosa was still in grade school, their parents developed and cultivated the
subject lots as rice fields. In the 1940's, there were only a few houses around their house. At
present, one of the lots is residential while the two remaining lots have become idle. Their
parents and grandparents had been in continuous, actual and physical possession of the lots
without any interruption for more than sixty-five (65) years. Felipe and Rosa have been in
possession of the land for more than fifty (50) years. There is n0 existing mortgage or
encumbrance over the said lots.

Respondents presented witness Antonia Marcelo who was 85 years old at the time she testified.
She is the neighbor of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol in Barangay Calzada where she has been
residing for more than fifty (50) years. She testified that during her childhood days, she used to
play on the subject lots and had seen the spouses Ocol cultivate the lots by planting vegetables,
rice and trees.[10]

On February 11, 2010, respondents formally offered their documentary evidence. The RTC set
the case for presentation of evidence of the government on April 16, 2010. On the date of the
hearing, there was no appearance from the government. Hence, the court, upon motion of
applicants, considered the case submitted for resolution.

Issues:
Whether or not the record is bereft of proof that the subject properties had been classified as
alienable and disposable.
Whether or not the record is bereft of proof that respondents have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject lots under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12,1945 or earlier.

Held:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable
public; domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.

Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply? The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.

To distinguish between registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 from the one filed
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, this Court held in the case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic:

Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession. Registration under Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that
time. The applicant needs only to show that the land had already been declared alienable and
disposable at any time prior to the filing of the application for registration.

Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. It is based on acquisitive

prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided by the Civil Code. In that
regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to the
Civil Code.

In the case at bar, the first requirement was not satisfied. To prove that the subject property
forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondents presented
three certifications.
However, the certifications presented by the respondents are insufficient. The applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.

This Court, therefore, stresses that there must be an official declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the
development of national wealth before it can be acquired by prescription; that a mere declaration
by government officials that a land of the public domain is already alienable and disposable
would not suffice for purposes of registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The period
of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the
development of national wealth

Evidently, there being no compliance, with either the first or second paragraph of Section 14 of
PD 1529, the Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced in this case.
 g. Heirs of Amunategui vs. Dir. of Forestry
125 SCRA 69, Gr. No. L-127873, November 29, 1983

Facts:

Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayedthat
the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters
beconfirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.The Director
ofForestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application
forregistration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified
asforest land and part of the public domain.The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot
No.885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
"mangroveswamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the
classification of forestland in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the petitioners arguethat no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and
third groups arefound on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it
is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had
been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already
"private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.

Issue: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names
of the private applicants.

Held:

The petition is without merit. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in
out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.We, therefore, affirm the
finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public
forest land.
 

h. Republic v Sin
G.R. No. 157485, March 16, 2014

Facts:

Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the
owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan on August 26,
1991, the respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against Aklan
National College of Fisheries (ANCF) for recovery of possession, quieting of title,
and declaration of ownership with damages claiming that the latter usurped their rights over the
property. ANCF countered that the subject land was the subject of proclamation No. 2074 of
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating the area of said property as civil reservation for
educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject
parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership. The respondents
presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother who acquired it
by virtue of a deed of sale. That in 1988 a portion thereof was occupied by ANCF and converted
into a fishpond for educational purposes. Respondent heirs asserted that they were previously in
possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. To prove possession, respondents
presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945. The MCTC, the
RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to the
disputed property by virtue of their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.

Issue: Whether or not the claim of the respondents amounts to judicial confirmation of imperfect
title

Held:

No, At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree.
Section 48(b) of the public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
provide the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect title: 1.) open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the sub0ect land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945. and 2.)the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

EXCEPTIONS OF REGALIAN DOCTRINE

a. Mateo Cariño vs. Insular Government

212 U.S 449, Law Ed., 594 

Facts:

Mateo Cariño is from the province of Benguet. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of
Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences
sufficient for the holding of cattle. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for
pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as
owners by the Igorot and he had inherited or received the land from his father, in accordance
with Igorot custom. He applied for the registration of a certain land. There was no document of
title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land
in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish
Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the
Crown. In 1893 -1894 and 1896 -1897; he made an application but with no avail. In 1901, the
plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were
registered to him, that process, however, establishing only possessory title. Even if the applicant
has title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of
1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation.

Issue:

Whether the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Whether Cariño has ownership and is entitled to registration.

Held

NO. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. The United
States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to
have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant
from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of (jura regalia) Regalian Doctrine.

YES. Petition Granted. a. Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not
always, public land. b. Spanish Law:"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough, for uncultivated, 30 years.
c. Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespass

b. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

Held:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same. 
 TORRENS TITLE

a. Alba v. De la Cruz
G.R. No. L-5246

Facts: 

The petitioners herein are the he only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey.
The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of
agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was accompanied by a plan and technical description
of the said lot. After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that described
in the petition be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.

On Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration
(CLR) asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the
absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land described in said motion and which he alleges to be
included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908 was
obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For
him, the petitioners deliberately omitted to include in their registration his name as one of the
occupants of the land so as to be given notice of registration. He further alleged having inherited
the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same (was duly
inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.)

He therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude
the two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the
case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov.
23, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels
of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.

From this decision and judgment, the petitioners appealed.

Issue: Whether or not, the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud.

Held: 

The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by
some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain, among other things, the names and
addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known.

The subject land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle Jose Grey and
this contract was duly executed in writing. (While the appellee admits that his father and brother
entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners’ land, nevertheless he
insists that the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts)

The subsequent State grant was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the petitioners’ parents
and while the petitioners were minors. So, it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the
appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their
application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when
they omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of
the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their
application the names of their tenants.

Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given
notice by registered mail. However, this did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified;
but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication “to all whom it
may concern.” Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only
to the [given] exceptions. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice, or citation, or included in the general description “to all whom it may concern.”

b. Legarda vs Saleeby
31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915

Facts:

A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip
of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906.
Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for
registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the
latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under
the name of two persons?

Held:

For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can
be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder
of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of
the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing
his land.

The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

c. Casimiro Development Corporation vs. Renato L. Mateo

G.R. No. 175485, July 17, 2011 

Facts:

In 1988, petitioner purchased from China Bank the land in question which was previously sold
by the mother of Mateo to Rodolfo Pe who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in
favor of China Bank as security for a loan. China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and consolidated
its ownership of the property after Rodolfo failed to redeem. A TCT was issued in the name of
China Bank. In 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer against the respondent’s
siblings. Respondent counters that CDC acquired the property from China Bank in bad faith
because it had actual knowledge of the possession of the property by the respondent and his
siblings.

Issue:

Whether or not CDC was an innocent purchaser for value.

Held:

One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the
certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. He is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. China Bank’s TCT’s was a clean title, that
is, it was free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the
property, solely upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank. The
respondent’s siblings’ possession did not translate to an adverse claim of ownership. They even
characterized their possession only as that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no law was
possession grounded on tenancy a status that might create a defect or inflict a law in the title of
the owner. CDC having paid the full and fair price of the land, was an innocent purchaser for
value. The TCT in the name of CDC was declared valid and subsisting.

d. Imperial v. CA
GR No. 112483, October 8, 1999

Facts:

In 1951, Leoncio sold his 32, 837m² parcel of land to his acknowledged natural son Eloy
Imperial. However, in 1953, Leoncio filed a copmplaint for annulment of the sale alleging that
he was deceived by his son. They entered into a compromise agreement that Leoncio will
recognize the validity and legality of the sale but Eloy has to sold the 1000m² to Leoncio. In
1962, Leoncio died and Victor, his adopted child, substituted him in the execution of the
compromise agreement. However, in 1977, Victor died single and without issue. After 4 years,
Ricardo, Victors’s natural father, died too. Cesar and Trasa, children of Ricardo, filed a
complaint for annulment of the donation. A motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of res
judicata. The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial
court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Cesar and Teresa filed an Amended
Complaint alleging that the conveyance impaired the legitime of Victor. The RTC ruled that the
donation is inofficiousimparing the legitime of Victor. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the
RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the action for inofficious donation has prescribed.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme court applied Article 1144 of the Civil Code which states that “actions upon
an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right accrues.
Here, the right accrues from the moment Leoncio died, but it took the respondents 24 years to
file the action.

Also, there is estoppel by laches on their part. First, Victor is a lawyer; he even substituted his
father in the execution of the compromise agreement regarding the contested conveyance of
parcel of land. Second, Richardo is the lessee of the contested land and it is expected that he was
aware of the sale of the land. And, the respondents only institute the complaint five years after
the death of Ricardo.

e. Gabriel Jr v Crisologo
G.R. No. 204626, 9 June 2014
Facts:

Carmeling Crisologo alleged that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land (TCT) Nos.
T-13935 and T-13936 (properties were covered by an assessment of real property and payment
of realty taxes were updated).
She discovered that petitioners unlawfully enteredand occupied her properties by stealth
by force and without her prior consent and, knowledge and constructed houses on the said lots.
Upon discovery Atty. Carmelita Crisologo (daughter of Carmeling Crisologo) demanded that
petitioners vacate the premises and remove their structures thereon. Petitioners promised to
buy the said properties but failed to do so.

Petitioners refused to vacate the said properties despite repeated demands made by Crisologo.
Crisologo filed a complaint for recovery of possession and/or ownership with damages against
petitioners. Petitioners countered that Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions provided in
Section 1 of PD. No. 1271 for the validation of said titles hence the titles were void and that
petitioners had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous
possession of the subject land in good faith, and that Crisologo was never in prior possession and
had no valid title over the subject land. MTCC ruled in favor of Crisologo. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners.CA reinstated the decision of the MTCC.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a better right of possession over the subject parcels of
land

Held:

In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land were registered on August
24, 1967. The titles are, thus, considered valid although subject to the conditions set. But whether
or not Crisologo complied with the said conditions would not matter because, this would be a
collateral attack on her registered titles.

At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are not the proper parties to question the status of
the respondent’s registered titles. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1271 expressly states that the "Solicitor
General shall institute such actions or suits as may be necessary to recover possession of lands
covered by all void titles not validated under this Decree."

The respondent’s certificates of title give her the better right to possess the subject parcels of
land

It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person
in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the
land described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property, including possession. Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab, this Court
declared that the "age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof."

The records show that TCT No. T-13935 and TCT No. T-13936 bear the name of Carmeling P.
Crisologo, as the registered owner. Petitioners do not dispute the fact that she has a Torrens title
over the subject parcels of land.

The respondent’s Torrens certificates of title are immune from a collateral attack.

As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on
the same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus:

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
This rule has been applied in innumerable cases, one of which was Francisco Madrid v. Spouses
Mapoy, where it was written:

Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it
indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from
collateral attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief
and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.

f. Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural

G.R. No. 14167, 14 August 1919

Facts:

Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran, Province of Occidental

Negros, upon an application of the Director of Lands, on June 16, 1916. Notice of the
proceedings were published in the Official Gazette as provided by law. The trial judge also
issued general notice to all interested parties. Among others, Victoriano Siguenza presented an,
answer asking for registration in his name of lot No. 1608. The instant petitioners, Antipas
Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, although said to reside in this municipality, and although said to
have participated in other cadastral cases, did not enter any opposition as to this lot. Hearing was
had during September, 1916. On November 23 of the same year, the court it declared final.

Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the issuance by the Land Registration
Office of the so-called technical decree, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, the latter as
guardian of the minor Estrella Vazquez, came into the case for the first time. The petitioners,
after setting forth their right of ownership in lot No. 1608, and that it was included in their
"Hacienda Santa Filomena," and after stating that they were in complete ignorance of the
proceedings, asked that the judgment of the court be annulled and that the case be reopened to
receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot. Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered by
countermotion, asking the court to dismiss the motion presented on behalf of Vazquez and
Gayares. The court denied the motion for a new trial on the theory that there being a decree
already rendered and no allegation of fraud having been made, the court lacked jurisdiction. It
may also be stated parenthetically that counsel for Vazquez and Gayares made an unsuccessful
attempt in the Supreme Court, through mandamus, to have the record completed by the taking of
evidence.

Issue:

When does the registration of title, under the Torrens System of Land Registration, especially
under the different Philippine laws establishing the Cadastral System, become final, conclusive,
and indisputable?

Held:
As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive and
indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of
receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any
step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the
judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud.

Counsel for appellants and appellees have favored the court with able arguments relative to the
applicability of sections 113 and 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure to cadastral proceedings.
The view we take of the case would make unprofitable any discussion of this question.

g. Wee v. Mardo
G.R. No. 202414, 4 June 2014

Facts:

Respondent Felicidad Mardo was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated April
26, 1979, covering the Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.

On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee, through a

Deed of Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a consideration of
P250,000.00 which was fully paid. Respondent however refused to vacate and turnover the
subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.

Petitioner file an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land claiming that she is the
owner of said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.

Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described in the
application was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was however,
denied. A motion for reconsideration and second urgent motion for reconsideration were
subsequently filed by respondent, but both were denied by the RTC.

Upon presentation of evidence by the parties, the RTC granted the application of the petitioner.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC, hence, respondent
appealed to the CA.

The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of
possession and occupation under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the subject
lot was not physically turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions to her title
suggested that she was not exercising any acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential
element in the requirement and occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.
Issue: Whether Petitioner is entitled to the subject property.

Held:
Based on the legal paramaters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must
sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Republic v. Manimtim, G.R.
No. 169599, March 16, 2011

The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she could not have
complied with the requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529 considering that she admitted that it was not physically turned over to her.

A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered under
OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, under the
name of respondent Felicidad Mardo.

MIRROR DOCTRINE

a. Dy v. Aldea
G.R. No. 219500, 9 August 2017

Facts:

Petitioner Mamerto Dy (Mamerto) Mamerto filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of deed
of sale and TCT No. T-134753, and recovery of real property with injunction and damages on
three ground that he never executed any deed of sale in favor of Maria Lourdes Rosell Aldea
(Lourdes) and that the signature appearing on the purported deed of sale was not his authentic
signature.

Lourdes contends that she is an innocent purchaser for value; that while it may be true that an
impostor had fraudulently acquired a void reconstituted title over the subject land, such
circumstance did not necessarily invalidate her own title; that a valid transfer could issue from a
void reconstituted title if an innocent purchaser for value intervenes; and that where innocent
third persons rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued and acquire rights over the
property, courts cannot disregard such right and order the total cancellation of the certificate of
title for that would impair public confidence in the certificate of title.

The RTC nullified Lourdes’ title as it was based on a void reconstituted title. It further opined
that the contract of sale between Lourdes and the impostor was null and void because the latter
did not have the right to transfer ownership of the subject land at the time it was delivered to
Lourdes. The trial court held that Lourdes could not be considered a buyer in good faith because
she should have been suspicious of the transaction which occurred at a hotel room and without
any lawyer present. It noted that Lourdes gave her money to the seller even if the owner's copy
of the certificate of title was not handed to her.

CA reversed and set aside  the RTC ruling. It declared that Lourdes was an innocent purchaser
for value. The appellate court ruled that a person dealing with registered land is only charged
with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. It observed that the only annotation at the back of the title was that it was
mortgaged to Audie C. Uy. Lourdes exercised ordinary prudence because during the signing of
the deed of sale, she asked for an identification card and she was given a senior citizen's I.D.,
showing that the person she was dealing with was "Mamerto Dy."

It stated that while it turned out that the I.D. exhibited by the seller was fake and that the person
claiming to be the owner of the land was a fraud, Lourdes could not be blamed for believing that
she was dealing with the real owner of the land. The appellate court held that the confirmation of
Fatima; Engracia Mondrel and Rena Canio, the overseers of the subject land; and Uy, the named
mortgagee led Lourdes to believe that she was dealing with the rightful owner.

Issue: Whether Lourdes is an innocent purchaser for value who is entitled to the application of
the mirror doctrine.

Held:

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land and to put a stop to
any question of legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of
title at the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto. As a consequence, the
mirror doctrine provides that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.

Every registered owner and every subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds the title to
the property free from all encumbrances except those noted in the certificate. As such, a
defective title, or one the procurement of which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation —
may be the source of a completely legal and valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent
third person who, in good faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent
purchaser for value.

In the case at bench, Lourdes was deficient in her vigilance as buyer of the subject land.

During cross-examination, Lourdes admitted that she did not conduct a thorough investigation
and that she merely instructed her uncle to check with the Register of Deeds whether the subject
land is free from any encumbrance. Further, it must be noted that Lourdes met the seller only
during the signing of the two deeds of sale. Yet, she did not call into question why the seller
refused to see her during the negotiation. For sure, an ordinary prudent buyer of real property
who would be relinquishing a significant amount of money would want to meet the seller of the
property and would exhaust all means to ensure that the seller is the real owner thereof.

Indeed, Lourdes conducted an ocular inspection of the subject land. When she asked Engracia
Mondrel, the overseer, if she knows the owner, Engracia affirmed that the property is owned by a
person named "Mamerto Dy." Noteworthy, however, is Lourdes' admission that the seller was
not present when she talked to Engracia such that there was no way for the latter to ascertain
whether she and Lourdes were talking about the same Mamerto Dy. Another circumstance
indicating that Lourdes was not an innocent purchaser for value was the gross undervaluation of
the property in the deeds of sale at the measly price of P1,684,500.00 when the true market value
was at least P5,390,400.00 for the entire property. Moreover, Lourdes initially decided to buy
only half of the subject land or 3,369 square meters. When the impostor, however, insisted that
she should buy the remaining half just because it would be difficult to divide the subject land,
Lourdes readily acceded without questioning why the seller was willing to sell at P200.00 per
square meter.

b. Locsin v. Hizon
G.R. No. 204369, 17 September 2014

Facts:

Petitioner Enriqueta M. Locsin (Locsin) was the registered owner of a 760-sq.m.lot covered
located at Quezon City. She filed an ejectment case against one Billy Aceron (Aceron) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City (MTC) to recover possession over the land in issue.
Eventually, the two entered into a compromise agreement, which the MTC approved. Locsin
later went to the United States without knowing whether Aceron has complied with his part of
the bargain under the compromise agreement.

In spite of her absence, however, she continued to pay the real property taxes on the subject lot.
She discovered that her copy of the title is missing, Locsin filed a petition for administrative
reconstruction in order to secure a new one. Sometime in early 2002, she then requested her
counsel to check the status of the subject lot. It was then that they discovered that the TCT has
been called by another person and secured a new one in her favor by registering a Deed of
Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Locsin with the Registry of Deeds.

The lot was also sold to one Bernardo Hizon for PhP 1.5 million, but it was titled under his son’s
name Carlos Hizon. Bernardo, claiming to be the owner of the property, filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the court-approved compromise agreement
between Locsin and Aceron. The property was already occupied and was, in fact, up for sale.
Locsin, through counsel, sent Carlos a letter requesting the return of the property since her
signature in the purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a forgery.

In a letter-reply dated May 20, 2002, Carlos denied Locsin’s request, claiming that he was
unaware of any defect or flaw in Bolos’ title and he is, thus, an innocent purchaser for value and
good faith. Later on, Locsin learned that Carlos had already sold the property for PhP 1.5 million
to his sister and her husband, herein respondents Lourdes and Jose Manuel Guevara (spouses
Guevara), respectively, who, as early as May 24, 2002, had a new certificate of title issued in
their names.

The spouses Guevara then immediately mortgaged the said property to secure a PhP 2.5 million
loan/credit facility with Damar Credit Corporation (DCC). It was against the foregoing backdrop
of events that Locsin filed an action for reconveyance, annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title
the cancellation of the mortgage lien annotated thereon, and damages, against Bolos, Bernardo,
Carlos, the Sps. Guevara, DCC, and the Register of Deeds, Quezon City which was tried by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 77 in Quezon City (RTC). The charges against DCC, however,
were dropped on joint motion of the parties.

The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint and finding for respondents, as
defendants thereat, holding that: (a) there is insufficient evidence to show that Locsin’s signature
in the Deed of Absolute Sale between her and Bolos is a forgery; (b) the questioned deed is a
public document, having been notarized; thus, it has, in its favor, the presumption of regularity;
(c) Locsin cannot simply rely on the apparent difference of the signatures in the deed and in the
documents presented by her to prove her allegation of forgery; (d) the transfers of title from
Bolos to Carlos and from Carlos to the spouses Guevara are valid and regular; (e) Bernardo,
Carlos, and the spouses Guevara are all buyers in good faith. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the
case to the CA.

The CA, in its assailed Decision, ruled that it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that Locsin
failed to prove that her signature was forged. In its appreciation of the evidence, the CA found
that, indeed, Locsin’s signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Bolos differs from her
signatures in the other documents offered as evidence. The CA, however, affirmed the RTC’s
finding that herein respondents are innocent purchasers for value. The appellate court held that
respondents, having dealt with property registered under the Torrens System, need not go beyond
the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the said certificate. Moreover, as the CA added, any
notice of defect or flaw in the title of the vendor should encompass facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in
order to amount to bad faith. Accordingly, the CA ruled that Locsin can no longer recover the
subject lot. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are innocent purchasers for value.

Held:
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of
the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim. As such, a defective title
or one the procurement of which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation may be the source of
a completely legal and valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in
good faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for value.

Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal rule that every person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. Court emphasized the need for prospective parties to a contract involving titled lands to
exercise the diligence of a reasonably prudent person in ensuring the legality of the title, and the
accuracy of the metes and bounds of the lot embraced therein, by undertaking precautionary
measures.

In the case at bar, Bolos’ certificate of title was concededly free from liens and encumbrances on
its face. However, the failure of Carlos and the spouses Guevara to exercise the necessary level
of caution in light of the factual milieu surrounding the sequence of transfers from Bolos to
respondents bars the application of the mirror doctrine and inspires the Court’s concurrence with
petitioner’s proposition. Consistent with the rule that the principal is chargeable and bound by
the knowledge of, or notice to, his agent received in that capacity, any information available and
known to Bernardo is deemed similarly available and known to Carlos.

Having knowledge of the foregoing facts, Bernardo and Carlos, to our mind, should have been
impelled to investigate the reason behind the arrangement. They should have been pressed to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation in order to protect Carlos’ interest.
It should have struck them as odd that it was Locsin, not Bolos, who sought the recovery of
possession by commencing an ejectment case against Aceron, and even entered into a
compromise agreement with the latter years after the purported sale in Bolos’ favor. Instead,
Bernardo and Carlos took inconsistent positions when they argued for the validity of the transfer
of the property in favor of Bolos, but in the same breath prayed for the enforcement of the
compromise agreement entered into by Locsin.

In the case at bar, this Court recognizes that petitioner was unduly deprived of her ownership
rights over the property, and was compelled to litigate for its recovery, for almost ten (10) years.
Clearly, this could have entitled her to actual or compensatory damages had she quantified and
proved, during trial, the amounts which could have accrued in her favor, including commercial
fruits such as reasonable rent covering the pendency of the case. Nonetheless, petitioner’s failure
to prove actual or compensatory damages does not erase the fact that her property rights were
unlawfully invaded by respondents, entitling her to nominal damages.
 CERTIFICATE OF TITLE VS. TITLE

a. Castillo v. Escutin
G.R. No. 171056, 13 March 2009

Facts:

Petitioner is a judgment creditor of Raquel K. Moratilla. Racquel, her 31 mother, Urbana Kalaw
and sister, Perla Moratilla, co-owned Lot 13713, 15,000 square-meter, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00449. When the petitioner verified the property, she found out that the
application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural
landholdings, including Lot 13713, to residential, commercial, and recreational uses was
approved and the property was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or
subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner then proceeded to levy on execution Lot
13713.

Before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the
Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation. She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to
meet with its Vice President, Orense.

However, she claimed that Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot
13713 by Summit Realty. Petitioner bought Raquel’s 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot and was then
issued Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, indicating that she owned 5,000 square meters of Lot
13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.

When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes, she was shocked to that, without giving her
notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed
in and overlapping with the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, both in the
name of Francisco Catigbac. The reverse side of TCT No. 129642 bore three entries, reflecting
the supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty. In the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of Summit Realty by Leonardo Yagin, as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, it did not express the desire
of Summit Realty to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of the
Deed. There were also missing information in the said Deed.

Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbac’s death, having
acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376, the 32 Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s
Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial
Court of Lipa City. During the ex parte presentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000, Orense
testified on behalf of Summit Realty that Catigbac’s property used to form part of a bigger parcel
of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975 square meters, covered by TCT No. 181 in
the name of Catigbac; after Catigbac’s death, Lot 1 was informally subdivided into several parts
among his heirs and/or successors-in-interest, some of whom again transferred their shares to
other persons; Summit Realty separately bought subdivided parts of Lot 181 from their
respective owners, with a consolidated area of 105,648 square meters, and identified as Lot 1-B
after survey; despite the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1, TCT No. 181 covering
the same was never cancelled; and the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of
such loss was annotated at the back of the original copy of TCT No. 181 with the Registry of
Deeds.

Subsequently, in an Order dated 3 January 2001, the RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No.
00-0376 and directed the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of
Catigbac, under the same terms and condition as in its original form.

The Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf
of Catigbac, yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had
no participation at all in said case.

Petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac
and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the
former cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioner’s Tax Declaration No.
00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still 33 issued in the name of Catigbac, instead
of Summit Realty. Summit Realty bought Lot 1-B measuring 105,648 square meters, specifically
covered by TCT No. 129642, both in the name of Catigbac.

As a result of such purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from Catigbac to Summit
Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to believe in good faith that said property was indeed
owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latter’s certificate of title over the same. Catigbac’s right
as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/No. 129642, was superior to petitioner’s,
which was based on a mere tax declaration.

Issues: Whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square meter property.

Held:

As between Catigbac’s title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner’s title, evidenced only
by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other
certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbac’s ownership
of Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent
public officers and even petitioner herself. The Court ruled that tax declarations and
corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or ownership of a real property
inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same. Petitioner acquired her title to the
5,000 square meter property from Raquel who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax
declaration to evidence her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals aptly observed that,
"curiously, as to how and when petitioner’s alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla
and her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No.
00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent."

A title is different from a certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or
ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of
property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just
34 cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property.
Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the
land itself. Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title,
which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title,
issued subsequent to the original registration.

SECTION 2- NATURE OF REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS; JURISDICTION OF

COURTS

a. Moscoso v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. L-46439, 24 April 1984

Facts:

The petitioner applied for land registration of a parcel of land which she alleged that the property
is her share in the estate of her late father in the partition she entered with her five other siblings.
The application was opposed by three alleged children of applicant’s father in a common law
union prior to his marriage to applicant’s mother. After the presentation of evidence, the Trial
Court rendered a decision finding that applicant is not the exclusive owner of the property and
directing the registration of the land in co-ownership with the applicant and the three oppositors.

Applicant filed a motion for reconsideration. After hearing, the Trial Court modified its decision
finding that of the three oppositors, only one was able to prove her being an acknowledged
natural child of applicant’s father by competent proof. Hence, the applicant’s share would be
13/14. CA affirmed the decision. Applicant contends that the Trial Court, acting as a land
registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether the oppositor is the
acknowledged natural child of his father.

Issue: Does the Court, acting in its limited jurisdiction as aland registration court, competent to
determine the right of the oppositor to inherit?

Held:

Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, being special
and limited in character and proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to cases
involving issues properly litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil actions, has time
and again been relaxed in special and exceptional circumstances. (See Government of P.I. v.
Serafica, 61 Phil. 93 (1934); Caoibes v. Sison, 102 Phil. 19 (1957); Luna v. Santos, 102 Phil. 588
(1957); Cruz v. Tan, 93 Phil. 348 (1953); Gurbax Singh Pabla and Co. v. Reyes, 92 Phil. 117
(1952)).

From these cases, it may be gleaned and gathered that the peculiarity of the exceptions is based
not alone on the fact that the Land Registration Courts are likewise the same Courts of First
Instance, but also the following premises: (1) Mutual consent of the parties or their acquiescence
in submitting the aforesaid issues for the determination by the court in the registration
proceedings; (2) Full opportunity given to the parties in the presentation of their respective sides
of the issues and of the evidence in support thereto; (3) Consideration by the court that the
evidence already of record is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon these issues.
(Aglipay v. De Los Reyes, L-12776, March 23, 1960).

SECTION 3
a. Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103727, 1 December 1996

Facts:

The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the
ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself. The petitioners contend on the
basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The
claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands, thus affecting in general lands
extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between
Dingalan Bayin the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. Considering the vastness of the land
claim, many suits have been filed all for the purpose of owning the lands. 60

Issue: Whether or not the heirs of Don Mariano have the legal claim over the properties
involved.

Held:

No, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise. While the petitioners contend that the lands are subject
of The Spanish Mortgage Law or the “Titulo Propriedad Numero 4136”, It is settled that by
virtue of Pd no 892 which took effect on February 16. 1976 the site of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause
their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within 6 months
from date of effectivity of the said decree. In this case the heirs have no legal claim over the said
lands because PD 892 invalidates any claim of title and must be first registered under the Torrens
system of titling.