IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U.

MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE

ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

A.M. No. 88-7-1861, 5, October, 1988, EN BANC, (Padilla, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Administrative functions are those which involve regulation and control

over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the

promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the

legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative by the organic law of

its existence.

FACTS

Judge Manzano wrote a letter before the Supreme Court stating that the

Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte designated him as a member of the Ilocos Norte

Provincial Committee on Justice. He seeks that the SC acknowledge his appointed as

not violative of the Independence of the Judiciary pursuant to Section 12, of Article 8 of

the Constitution and is in no way of abandonment of his duties as an RTC Judge

ISSUE

WON the appointment of Judge Manzano is not a violation of the independence

of the judiciary?

RULING

YES. Pursuant to EO No. 856 creating the Commission on Justice, the aim of its

establishment is to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly of

the poor and indigent through receiving complaints against any apprehending officer

who may have found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties, and to

recommend the revision of the law whenever it is prejudicial to the proper administration

of criminal justice. The designation of Judge Manzano is clearly to make him perform

administrative functions. Pursuant to Section 12, of Article 8 of the Constitution,

members of the SC and other courts shall not be designated to any agency performing

quasi-judicial and administrative functions. Hence, the Supreme Court cannot grant the

request of Judge Manzano.

 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK v. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT

BANK EMPLOYEES et al.

G.R. No. 120319, 6 October, 1995, EN BANC, (Romero, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms

governmental agency, or instrumentality are synonymous in the sense that either

of them is a means by which government acts, or by which a certain government

act or functioned is performed. The word instrumentality with respect to a state,

contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for

the performance of a state function.

FACTS

During a conference meeting, petitioner and respondent agreed to the

submission of their respective Position Papers. The Voluntary Arbiter received the

position paper only of the respondent. For failure of petitioner to submit its position

paper, the voluntary arbiter resolved the case by stating that petitioner has not adhered

to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

ISSUE

WON the remedy of certiorari before the Supreme Court was the appropriate

remedy against the decision of the Voluntary Arbiter?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Section 9 of BP 129, the Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction

over decisions of instrumentalities. In the case at bar, the Voluntary Arbitrator and it

functions fall within the category of quasi-judicial instrumentality which is within the

contemplation of Section of BP 129. Otherwise stated, the decisions of the Voluntary

Arbitrator is considered a quasi-judicial instrumentality function that falls within the

jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The Voluntary Arbitrator no less performs a state

function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions of the

Labor Code, and he falls within the contemplation of the term instrumentality in Section

9 of BP 129
 ELISEO A. SINON v. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al.

G.R. No. 101251, 5 November, 1992, EN BANC, (Campos, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The purpose of reorganization is that it is a process of restructuring the

bureaucracy’s organizational and functional set up, to make it more viable in

terms of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness and make it more responsive

to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by law. For as long as the CSC

confines itself within the limits set out by law and does not encroach upon the

prerogatives endowed to other authorities, the Court must sustain the

Commission.

FACTS

Petitioner was engaged as a Fisheries Extension Specialist in BFAR while Juana

Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) of the Ministry of Food

and Agriculture. When the reorganization of the MAF into the Department of Agriculture,

an evaluation of employees was conducted. The first list prepared by the Placement

Committee included petitioner as one of those persons who will be appointed as MAO.

Banan filed an appeal before the DARAB against the said list, and in a resolution of the

latter, petitioner’s position was displaced and replaced by Banan.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CSC and was granted. In the appeal of

Banan against the decision of the CSC, the latter’s decision granting petitioner’s appeal
was reversed, thus affirming Banan’s appointment. In the current case, petitioner

argues that CSC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reversed its resolution

and affirmed Banan’s appointment

ISSUE

WON the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reversed its

decision?

RULING

NO. Citing Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6656, the Placement Committee

exercised the same duty as the appointing authority itself in the judicious selection and

placement of personnel when the law empowered it to assist the appointing authority.

The same law created the Reorganization Appeals Board where people affected by the

appointment can file an appeal, which is what Banan did. The appointment that

petitioner received was not final as there is a pending appeal filed by Banan, and as

long as it is pending, petitioner cannot claim that the appointment was completed. The

fact that DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the Placement Committee

only to find that petitioner is not qualified should not be taken as grave abuse of

discretion.
 MAXIMO CALALANG v. A.D. WILLIAMS et al.

G.R. No. 47800, 2 December, 1940, FIRST DIVISION, (Laurel, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make

a law to delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a

power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or

intends to make its own action depend. To deny this, would be to stop the wheels

of the government.

FACTS

Petitioner filed against respondents who are public officers on the basis of the

unconstitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 548. The assailed Act empowers the

respondents as officials of the Department of Public Works to adopt measures to

prohibited animal drawn vehicles to pass through certain roads for one year. Petitioner

argues that such Act is unconstitutional for it amounts to undue delegation of legislative

powers.

ISSUE
 WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional for being an undue

delegation of legislative power?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548, it does not confer

legislative power upon the respondent public officers. The authority conferred upon

them, which authorized them to promulgate rules and regulations is not what public

policy demands, but merely to carry out the legislative policy down the National

Assembly. The authority delegated to the respondents is the authority to implement the

law created by the legislative branch.

 ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS et al. v. ABELARDO SUBIDO

G.R. No. L-26534, 28 November, 1969, EN BANC, (Fernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

If there be adherence to the concept that public office is a public trust, as

there ought to be, the criterion should be what public welfare demands, what

satisfies public interest. For it is axiomatic that public needs could be best

attended to by officials, about whose competency and ability there is no

question. To that overmastering requirement, personal ambition must be of

necessity yield. Discretion, if not plenary at the least sufficient, should thus be

granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the officers

concerned, primarily of department heads.

FACTS

The City of Manila Mayor Villegas picked the petitioners as commanders of the

three Manila police precincts. Respondent Commissioner expressed his disapproval of

the appointment since the petitioners do not occupy the position of Inspector First Class

which would have qualified them for the position. Hence, respondent ordered that they

should be removed from their positions.

ISSUE

WON the Commissioner is authorized to remove petitioners from their

appointments?

RULING

NO. In Villanueva v. Ballalo, it was held that when the appointee is qualified, the

Commissioner has no choice but to attest to the appointment. In the case at bar, there

is no prescribing that petitioners should be at the rank of inspector first class of first

major in order for their appointment to be valid. Moreover, there is no law that

authorizes the Commissioner from establishing the qualifications of appointees as to

their appointment to a higher position.

 JOSE A. ANGARA v. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION

G.R. No. 45081, 15 July, 1936, EN BANC, (Laurel, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an

independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election

turns, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of

partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the

National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations

regarding the manner of conducting said contests

FACTS

In 1935 petitioner and respondents ran as candidates for the position in the

National Assembly in the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner was declared as the winner as

took his oath. In December of 1935, respondent Pedro Ynsua a Motion of Protest before

the Electoral Commission against the proclamation of petitioner. Petitioner then filed a

Motion to Dismiss against Ynsuan pursuant to Resolution No. 8 issued by the National

Assembly which stated that protests against the election should be filed until December

3, and that respondent filed a protest way past the date provided.
 The Motion to Dismiss was not granted by the Electoral Commission, hence,

petitioner filed before this Court. Petitioner contends that the Electoral Commission’s

authority is limited only as to the merits of elections while excluding from its jurisdiction

the power to regulate the proceedings of said elections contests which is reserved to

the legislative department.

ISSUE

WON the Electoral Commission has no authority to regulate the proceedings of

said elections?

RULING

NO. Based on the historical background on the creation of the Electoral

Commission, the power over contests relating to elections returns, and qualifications of

its members originally belonged to the legislative branch of the government. The same

authority was transferred to the Electoral Commission, and such transfer implies that

the Electoral Commission has the power to prescribe rules and regulations as to the

time and manner of filing protest. Hence, the resolution of the Electoral Commission

was within its authority, and the resolution of the National Assembly limiting the filing of

any protests against election until December 3, 1935, cannot overrule the possible rules

that the Electoral Commission might file.

The purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent

constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election turns, returns and

qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or

consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain
the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said

contests.

HONORABLE CARLOS O. FORTICH et al. v. HONORABLE RENATO C. CORONA

et al.

G.R. No. 131457, 24 April, 1998, SECOND DIVISION, (Martinez J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The orderly administration of justice requires that the

judgements/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of

finality set by the law, rules and regulations.

FACTS

The Department of Agrarian Reform placed the land owned by Norberto

Quisumbing Management under compulsory acquisition, for its distribution to

beneficiary farmers pursuant to CARP. However, the DAR was ordered to desists from

pursuing any activities as ordered by DARAB.

The Provincial Development Council passed Resolution No. 6 which aimed to

convert the same land into an Agro-Industrial Zone to promote economic prosperity, to

which the Office of the President approved. DAR filed a motion for reconsideration

wherein the Office of the President stated that its decision to affirming the conversion is

already final and executory. This lead the DAR to file a second motion for

reconsideration. In some other time, farmers who claim to beneficiaries of the CARP in

the subject case staged a hunger strike wherein, it lead the Office of the President to
issue the subject “Win-Win” Resolution whereby only 44 hectares of the subject land will

be approved for conversion into an Agro-Industrial Zone, while the remaining 100

hectares shall be distributed to the farmer beneficiaries.

ISSUE

WON the Office of the President’s Resolution modifying its decision granting the

conversion of the land valid?

RULING

NO. Citing Section 7 Administrative Order No.18, when the Office of the

President promulgated its resolution that its first decision affirming the conversion to be

final and executory, and as no one filed a motion for reconsideration timely, the Office of

the President lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.

Having no jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the

second motion for reconsideration filed by DAR which was the source of the “Win-Win”

Resolution. The act of the President to re-open the case and modify its decision which

had already become final and executory, is a gross disregard of the rules and basic

legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

 GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO v. HONORABLE MANUEL C. DOMINGO et al.

G.R. No. 90591, 21 November, 1990, (Grino-Aquino, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman

as a special body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its

jurisdiction were confined with the investigation of minor and less grave offenses

arising from or related to the duties of public office, but would exclude those

grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and

prerogative, for it is in the investigation of the latter where the need of an

independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman is the

greatest.

FACTS

Petitioner Governor Deloso attended a pre-wedding celebration in Botolan

Zambales. On his way to the said event he was allegedly ambushed. Later in the

testimonies and eyewitnesses, it was stated that it was the Governor and his men who

ambushed those people whom he accused that ambushed them. The Governor was

then charged with multiple murder of those men and the Office of the Ombudsman took

cognizance of the case. Governor Deloso filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
grounds that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since the

case involved is not in relation with his office

ISSUE

WON the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction with the case against

Governor Deloso?

RULING

YES. Citing Sections 12 and 13 of Article 11 of the Constitution, the Court stated

that the Ombudsman has the function and power to act on cases filed in any for or

manner against public officials, and to investigate any act or omission of these officials

when such acts or omissions appear to be illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient. The

word “illegal” act or omission is broad enough to cover any crime committed by a public

official. The Constitution does not require that the act or omission be related to be or

connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty.