REYNALDO V. TUANDA et al v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN et al.

G.R. No. 110544, 17 October, 1995, FIRST DIVISION, (KAPUNAN, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following: (1)
there must be a de jure office; (2) there must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and (3) there must be actual possession of the office
in good faith.

FACTS

Private respondents were appointed industrial labor sectoral representative and

agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Negros
Occidental. Petitioners filed a civil case stating that the designations of private
respondents should be declared void as it violates the LGC. However, private
respondents filed before the Sandiganbayan a criminal case against petitioners for
causing undue injury against them for refusing to pay their respective per diems,
salaries and other privileges. The civil case was granted and declared the designations
as null and void. However, the Sandiganbayan, in its decision, stated that private
respondents, having rendered such services under the assailed designations, they are
entitled to their salaries. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan stated that private
respondents are de facto officers acting as such on the basis of their valid
appointments.

ISSUE

WON the legality of private respondent’s designation as sectoral representatives

constitutes as a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case against petitioners?

RULING

YES. A prejudicial question consists of two elements: (1) a civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; (2) the
resolution of which determines whether or not the criminal action shall proceed. In the
case at bar, the civil case assailing the designation of the private respondents as
sectoral respondents constitutes a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension on the
arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case. The issue both on the civil
and criminal case are intimately related. The filing of the criminal case against the
petitioner was premised on their partiality to not grant the salaries of the private
respondents. On the other hand, the civil case assails the designation of private
respondents as sectoral representatives.

Moreover, the Court finds that private respondents are considered as de facto
officers, in that even if their designations are found invalid, they are still considered as
de facto officers who are entitled to compensation. In order to constitute de facto
officership, the following requirements must concur: (1) There must be a de jure office;
(2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and (3) there
must be actual possession of the office in good faith. In the case at bar, since there is
no de jure office, the private respondents are not considered as de facto officers. Thus,
they are not entitled to the salaries that they argue.
 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS v. ATTY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL

G.R. No. 139392, December 6, 2000, EN BANC, (Mendoza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A permanent appointment can only be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position of which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed. The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant
even if he does not possess the required qualifications

A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place, or only as an exception to the rule may
be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate
eligibles.

FACTS

Respondent Bacal, promoted to the rank of CESO III, was appointed first as the
Chief Public Attorney. However, the President subsequently appointed Dimaisip as
Chief Public Defender (Chief Public Attorney), while respondent was reappointed as
Regional Director Public Defender Officer. Respondent then filed a petition for quo
warranto assailing her replacement by Dimaisip. She further argues that she is lawfully
entitled to the office under security of tenure. She argues that her alleged appointment
is constitutes removal from the office lawfully entitled to her

ISSUE

WON respondent has acquired security of tenure as Chief Public Attorney?

RULING

NO. Citing Achacoso v. Macaraig, a permanent appointment can be issued only

to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. The mere fact that a position
belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the required position. In the case at bar,
respondent Bacal is only a CESO III, to which her appointment as Regional Director of
PAO, which corresponds to her CES Rank III. Hence, she has no ground to complain.
Furthermore, the Chief Public Attorney is a CES Rank, thus she does not qualify for the
position

Secondly, appointments, assignments, reassignments in the Career Executive

Service are based on rank and not on the position. Thus, security of tenure in the
executive service is thus acquired with respect to rank and not position. The guarantee
of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to particular positions to
which they may be appointed. In the case at bar, respondent Bacal, did not acquire
security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed as Chief Public Attorney
since she was not subsequently appointed as CESO I.

Lastly, the Court holds that the respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief
Public Attorney was merely temporary and her subsequent transfer to the position of
Regional Director of the same office cannot be considered as a demotion, much less a
violation of the security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution.
 DENNIS A. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 191672, 25 November, 2014, EN BANC, (Bersamin, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who in good

faith has had possession of the office and has discharged duties pertaining
thereto, is legally entitled to the emoulments of the office and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to
the office

FACTS

Pursuant to EO No. 864, CSC Chairman Duque was designated as member of

the Board of Directors of Trustees by the following GOCCs: GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC,
and HDMF. Petitioner argues that EO No. 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A Book
V of EO 292 violates the independence of the CSC, and further expands its role.
Respondent on the other hand argues that Duques membership in the governing
Boards of the GOCCs concerned is constitutional. The assailed laws preserve the
independence of the CSC since the concerned GOCCs are excluded from the
supervision and control that secretaries and heads exercise over the departments to
which the GOCCs are attached.

ISSUE

WON the EO No. 864 us unconstitutional?

RULING

YES. Pursuant to Section 7 of Article 9-B of the Constitution, unless otherwise

allowed by law or the primary function of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office in the Government or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality, including
GOCC. In decided cases it was also held that Section 7 of Article 9-B is the general
rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees while
Section 13 of Article 7 is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, VP, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistant. In the case
at bar, the general rule applies to Duque as long as the position it is allowed by law or
by the primary function of his position,

However, a close look at EO 292, it is clear that the CSC Chairman’s

membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the
government entity where he will sit as Board Member must affect the career
development, employment status, rights and privileges and welfare and development of
government officials and employees. Also, a closer look at the charter of the concerned
GOCCs, the Court states that while the powers and functions associated with
appointments, compensation and benefit affect the career development, employment
status, rights and privileges and welfare and development of government officials and
employees, the same GOCCs are tasked to perform other corporate powers and
functions that are not personnel related. All of these powers are carried out by the
Board Members of each respective GOCCs. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a
member of the Board, he may exercise the powers and functions which are not
anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Such goes against the principle of
being an ex officio, which is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office and
without further warrant or appointment.

Accordingly, Duque is not also considered as a de jure officer, but instead a de

facto officer. Pursuant to the De Facto Doctrine established in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who in
good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged duties pertaining
thereto, is legally entitled to the emoulments of the office and may in an appropriate
action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. In the
case at bar, all the official functions of Duque as Board Member of the concerned
GOCC are presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office