The Secretary of Justice Serafin R. Cuevas v. Atty. Josefina G.

Bacal
G.R. No. 139382, December 6, 2000
Mendoza, J.:

Doctrine:

Within the Career Executive Service, personnel can be shifted from one office or position to
another without violation of their right to security of tenure because their status and salaries are
based on their ranks and not on their jobs.

Facts:

Respondent Bacal, who holds the rank of CESO III, was appointed as Acting Chief Public
Attorney by then President Ramos. Then President Estrada appointed petitioner Demaisip as
Chief Public Defender while respondent was appointed "Regional Director, Public Defender’s
Office". Respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the CA questioning her replacement
as Chief Public Attorney. The appellate court ruled in her favor holding that her appointment as
Regional Director was in effect a removal in the guise of transfer without her consent. Having
been validly appointed Chief Public Defender by the President, would naturally entitle her to
security of tenure since on the basis of the appointment, she was appointed, not merely
assigned, to a particular station. The petitioners argued that respondent, as a CESO, can be
reassigned from one CES position to another and from one department, bureau or office to
another and can even be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade.

Issue:

Was the transfer of respondent Bacal from the position of Chief Public Attorney to Regional
Director valid?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was
merely temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional
Director of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a
demotion, much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution. Within
the Career Executive Service, personnel can be shifted from one office or position to another
without violation of their right to security of tenure because their status and salaries are based
on their ranks and not on their jobs. In the instant case, respondent, who holds a CES Rank III,
was correctly and properly appointed by the appointing authority to the position of Regional
Director, a position which has a corresponding CES Rank Level III. The position of Chief Public
Attorney has a CES Rank Level I and a Salary Grade 30, while that of Regional Director of the
PAO has a CES Rank Level III and a Salary Grade 28. As respondent does not have the rank
appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be
considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Civil Service Commission v. Minerva M.P.
Pacheco
G.R. No. 178021, January 25, 2012
Mendoza, J.:

Doctrine:

A detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a
movement within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail
is immediately executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately
effective.

Facts:

Pacheco was a Revenue Attorney IV, Assistant Chief of the BIR in Revenue Region No. 7
(RR7), Quezon City. Pursuant to an Order, she was reassigned as Assistant Chief, Legal
Division from RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in Pampanga. Pacheco questioned her reassignment
alleging that it was merely intended to harass and force her out of the BIR in the guise of
exigencies of the revenue service. Her complaint before the CSC was granted. However,
Pacheco moved for reconsideration arguing that that the CSC erred in not finding that she was
constructively dismissed and, therefore, entitled to back salary. The CSC argued that the order
was immediately executory. It was, therefore, incumbent on Pacheco to have reported to her
new place of assignment and then appealed her case to the CSC.

Issue:

Was Pacheco correct in questioning her reassignment without first reporting to her new place of
assignment?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that a detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a
reassignment requires a movement within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the
CSC, an order to detail is immediately executory, whereas a reassignment order does not
become immediately effective. In this case, the lateral movement of Pacheco as Assistant Chief,
Legal Division from Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga within the same agency is
undeniably a reassignment. It is clear from E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5,
Section 26 (7) that there is no such duty to first report to the new place of assignment prior to
questioning an alleged invalid reassignment imposed upon an employee. Pacheco was well
within her right not to report immediately to RR4, San Fernando, Pampanga, and to question
her reassignment.
Remedios Pastor v. City of Pasig
G.R. No. 146873, May 9, 2002
Mendoza, J.:

Doctrine:

A reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect
a constructive removal from the service.

Facts:

Petitioner was a Budget Officer of the Municipality of Pasig. She was reassigned to the Office of
the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of reports against her concerning the issuance
of Advice of Allotments by her. Alleging that since her relief as Budget Officer, no investigation
had been conducted regarding the charge, petitioner filed a complaint with the CSC praying for
her reinstatement. The CSC ruled in favor of Pastor. The respondent, apparently in compliance
with the order, designated petitioner head of the Pasig City Hall Annex. The CSC found
petitioner's reassignment to the Pasig City Hall Annex to be not in compliance with its decision.
The CSC ordered further reassignments of petitioner to other offices be stopped "since [she]
has been out of her official station as Budget Officer for such a long time." Respondent filed a
petition before the Court of Appeals which ruled in its favor holding that there was no reduction
of [petitioner's] rank, status, or salary.

Issue:

Was there a reduction in rank, status, or salary of petitioner’s reassignments?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank,
status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service. In this case, petitioner's
reassignment to different offices in the local government of Pasig City is indefinite. Petitioner
has been on virtual floating assignments which cannot but amount to a diminution of her rank,
hence impermissible under the law. her reassignment began in 1992 with her detail to the Office
of the (now) City Administrator pending investigation of reports that she had issued Advice of
Allotments without sufficient cash collections. However, no investigation appears to have ever
been conducted on the said charge. To justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City
Mayor claimed that the same was "due to petitioner's long years of experience in finance" which
especially fitted her for studies regarding the city's revenues.
Government Service Insurance System v. Albert M. Velasco
G.R. No. 196564, August 07, 2017
Leonardo-de Castro, J.:

Doctrine:

An employee who reports for work cannot be summarily dropped from the rolls for being
"continuously absent without approved leave for at least 30 calendar days."

Facts:

Velasco, who held the position of Attorney V in the GSIS, was administratively charged for
Insubordination in connection with the two conflicting memoranda wherein Velasco sought
clarification one declaring him ineligible to remain as GSIS Attorney during his term as union
president and another reassigning him as GSIS Attorney to the GSIS Mindanao offices. Despite
having been perpetually restrained by the CA, Velasco was dropped from the rolls for being
absent without approved leave for more than thirty (30) days despite his reporting for work in the
Head Office instead of the Zamboanga, Iligan and Cotabato field offices.

Issue:

Is Velasco entitled to reinstatement and payment of back salaries?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that Velasco is entitled to reinstatement and payment of back salaries. An
employee who reports for work cannot be summarily dropped from the rolls for being
"continuously absent without approved leave for at least 30 calendar days." BSU held that
ignoring said employee instead of summoning him to explain his alleged absences does not
only show bad faith, but is itself a violation of the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure
and due process. In this case, the records are bereft of proof that the GSIS in good faith gave
notice to Velasco that he would be considered absent without authorized leave for his failure to
report for duty in the Mindanao field offices. Therefore, Velasco is entitled to reinstatement and
payment of back salaries.
Julius B. Campol v. Mayor Ronald S. Balao-as and Vice-Mayor Dominador I. Sianen
G.R. No. 197634, November 28, 2016
Jardeleza, J.:

Doctrine:

Any employee of the civil service illegally dismissed from office is entitled to reinstatement. Any
other employment he or she obtains while the case challenging his or her dismissal is pending
does not bar his or her right to be reinstated. Similarly, he or she is entitled to the payment of his
or her backwages from the time of his or her dismissal until his or her actual reinstatement.

Facts:

Campol served the Municipality of Boliney, Abra as Secretary to the Sangguniang Bayan. He
held the position in a permanent capacity. The Sangguniang Bayan passed a Resolution
terminating Campolas SB Secretary on the ground that he was absent without approved leave
from August 1, 2004 to September 30, 2004. Campol challenged this memorandum before the
CSC-CAR, which ruled in his favor. Sianen, in tum, elevated the matter before the CSC. The
CSC granted his appeal and ruled that Campol was properly dropped from the rolls. Campol
filed a petition for review before the CA which ruled in his favor. However, the CA refused to
order his reinstatement since Campol was already gainfully employed with the Public Attorney’s
Office and that Campol is entitled to backwages only from the time of his dismissal until October
2005, prior to his employment with another government agency.

Issue:

Is Campol is entitled to reinstatement and to the payment of his backwages from the time of his
dismissal until he is reinstated?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that Campol should be reinstated and must also be paid his backwages
from the time he was illegally dismissed until his reinstatement. An employee of the civil service
illegally dismissed from office has the right to reinstatement. Any other employment he or she
obtains while waiting for the court to rule on the propriety of his or her dismissal should not be
construed as an abandonment of his or her position. An illegally dismissed government
employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits
from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement.
Government Service Insurance System v. Kapisanan Ng Mga Mangagawa sa GSIS
G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006
Garcia, J.:

Doctrine:

Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of work. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of
unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

Facts:

A mass action was held in front of the GSIS main office. Among the participants was respondent
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG). The mass action's target appeared to have
been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style. The manager of the GSIS
Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show
cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally.
Administrative charges were filed against some KMG members for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. KMG filed a petition for prohibition.
Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges is, but a natural consequence of the
service-disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS
employees, there being appropriate issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action. On the
other hand, the CA, agreeing with the respondent's argument, assumed the view and held that
the organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than air their grievances in the
exercise of their "broader rights of free expression" and are, therefore, not amenable to
administrative sanctions.

Issue:

Is the right of the respondent to organize includes the right to strike?

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work. The right of government employees to organize
is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. adding
that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass
actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Government Service Insurance System v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 138381, November 10, 2004
Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Doctrine:

COA disallowances cannot be deducted from benefits under RA 8291.

Facts:

the Court promulgated a decision on these two consolidated cases partially granting the petition
in G.R. No. 138381 thereby reversing the COA’s disallowance of certain fringe benefits granted
to GSIS employees. As a result, the Court ordered the refund of amounts representing fringe
benefits corresponding to those allowed in the first petition in favor of the respondents in G.R.
No. 141625. The benefits which the Court ordered to be refunded included increases in
longevity pay, children’s allowance and management contribution to the Provident Fund as well
as premiums for group personal accident insurance. Amounts corresponding to these benefits
were previously deducted by GSIS from respondents’ retirement benefits in view of the COA
disallowance in the first petition.

Issue:

Were the deductions made by the GSIS from respondent’s retirement benefits valid?

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that that COA disallowances cannot be deducted from benefits under RA
8291, as the same are explicitly made exempt by law from such deductions. Retirement benefits
cannot be diminished by COA disallowances. That retirement pay accruing to a public officer
may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government
Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001
Vitug, J.:

Doctrine:

Sec. 13 of RA No. 3019 provides that Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

Facts:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation filed criminal

complaints against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for the alleged violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The prosecution filed a motion to suspend her which was
granted. The petitioner assailed the authority of Sandigabayan to decree a preventive
suspension.

Issue:

Was the suspension of petitioner from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines
and from any other government position valid?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that petitioner’s suspension was valid. Sec. 13 of RA No. 3019 provides
that Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to
decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Tomas A. Achacoso v. Catalino Macaraig
G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991
Cruz, J.:

Doctrine:

The acting appointee is separated by a method of terminating official relations known in the law
of public officers as expiration of the term. When required to relinquish his office, he cannot
complain that he is being removed in violation of his security of tenure because removal imports
the separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term.

Facts:

Petitioner was appointed Administrator of the POEA. In compliance with a request by the
President, he filed a courtesy resignation which was accepted by the President. In a letter dated
April 19, 1990, he protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office
because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President's
directive. Petitioner contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and
so enjoys security of tenure and that it was "beyond the prerogatives of the President" to require
them to submit courtesy resignations. He concludes that as his removal was illegal, there was
no vacancy in the disputed office to which respondent Sarmiento could have been validly
appointed. Respondents contend that petitioner is not a career executive service official entitled
to security as he is not a CES eligible.

Issue:

Was petitioner’s removal from office valid?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that petitioner was validly removed from office. the acting appointee is
separated by a method of terminating official relations known in the law of public officers as
expiration of the term. His term is understood at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at
the pleasure of the appointing authority. When required to relinquish his office, he cannot
complain that he is being removed in violation of his security of tenure because removal imports
the separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term. In this case, Achacoso’s
appointment is only temporary And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing
authority and "at a moment's notice," conformably to established jurisprudence.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Trade and Industry v. Winston T.
Singun
G.R. No. 149356, March 14, 2008
Carpio, J.:

Doctrine:

The final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance.

Facts:

Respondent was the former Chief Trade and Industry Development Specialist of DTI-RO2,
Cagayan Province.

Respondent filed an application for leave of absence from 16 November 1999 until 14 January
2000. Respondent signified his intention to resign "effective at the close of office hours on 14
January 2000." Director Hipolito approved the same in memorandum and notified the CSC of
his acceptance of respondent’s resignation. On 14 January 2000, the DTI-RO2 received a
Memorandum Order issued by Undersecretary Ernesto M. Ordoñez detailing respondent to the
Office of the Undersecretary for Regional Operations effective 17 January 2000. Director
Hipolito informed Undersecretary Ordoñez that respondent had resigned effective 14 January
2000 and, thus, the detail order was without effect. Respondent informed Undersecretary
Ordoñez that his resignation was ineffective because he was not notified of its acceptance for
he did not receive a copy of his approved resignation letter and Director Hipolito’s memorandum
accepting his application for resignation.

Issue:

Was respondent’s resignation incomplete and inoperative?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that respondent’s resignation was incomplete and inoperative. To
constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an
intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by
the proper authority. The final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of
acceptance. In this case, there was nothing in the records to show that respondent was duly
informed of the acceptance of his resignation. There was no indication that respondent received
a copy of his 12 November 1999 application for leave of absence and resignation as accepted
by Director Hipolito. Neither was there any indication that respondent received Director
Hipolito’s 12 November 1999 Memorandum informing him of the acceptance of his resignation.
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Magdangal B. Elma
G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.:

Doctrine:

Incompatibility exists between two offices where one office is subordinate to the other, in the
sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.

Facts:

A petition was filed by the petitioners seeking to declare as null and void the concurrent
appointments of respondent as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel for being contrary to Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible
offices. Respondent alleged that there exists a close relation between the two positions and
there is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would allow
respondent’s concurrent appointments to both positions.

Issue:

Is there an incompatibility between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman
and the CPLC. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices
was laid out in People v. Green - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense
that one office has the right to interfere with the other. In this case, the duties of the CPLC
include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various
executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive
departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without
question, an agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman
are subject to the review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his
legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman.
Alexis C. Canonizado v. Hon. Alexander P. Aguirre
G.R. No. 133132, February 15, 2001
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:

Doctrine:

There are, therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and
second, an overt or “external” act by which the intention is carried into effect.

Facts:

The respondents seek a reconsideration of the Court’s decision declaring section 8 RA 8551to
be violative of petitioner’s constitutionally mandated right to security of tenure. Respondents
insist that the Court should take judicial notice of then President Estrada’s appointment of
Canonizado to the position of Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP. By
accepting such position, respondents contend that Canonizado is deemed to have abandoned
his claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM since the offices of NAPOLCOM Commissioner
and Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible.

Issue:

Can Canonizado be deemed to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement to the
NAPOLCOM?

No. The Court ruled that Canonizado cannot be deemed to have abandoned his claim for
reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM. There are, therefore, two essential elements of
abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and second, an overt or “external” act by which the
intention is carried into effect. In this case, Canonizado did not voluntarily leave his post as
Commissioner, but was compelled to do so on the strength of section 8 of RA 8551.
Canonizado was compelled to leave his position as Commissioner, not by an erroneous
decision, but by an unconstitutional provision of law. By accepting the position of Inspector
General during the pendency of the case - brought precisely to assail the constitutionality of his
removal from the NAPOLCOM - Canonizado cannot be deemed to have abandoned his claim
for reinstatement to the latter position.
Conchita Caripio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

Doctrine:

Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.

Facts:

Binay, Jr., former Mayor of Makati City, was charged with 6 administrative cases in connection
to the anomalous activities attending the procurement and construction phases of the Makati
Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of
Makati
Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity
attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I
and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative
cases against him moot and academic.

Issue:

May Binay, Jr. be removed from public service?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that Binay, Jr. may be removed from public service. Election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense. It cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that
the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective
local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40
(b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is
meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a
direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the
RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an
accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Carpio-Morales, J.:

Doctrine:

The initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one-year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Facts:

On July 22, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was referred to the House Committee on
Justice. On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix Fuentebella against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. The petitioners contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year." The respondents argued that Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of
our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section
3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

Issue:

Is the second impeachment complaint valid?

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that is not valid. The initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one-year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In this case,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. on June 2, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Alexis C. Canonizado v. Hon. Alexander P. Aguirre
G.R. No. 133132, January 25, 2000
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:

Doctrine:

Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration' that that office is vacant.
While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it cannot be
conceded the power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove
the occupants or holders thereof from the civil service.

Facts:

Petitioners were members of the NAPOLCOM prior to the passage of RA 8551. Sec. 8 of said
law states that the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired which shall
constitute a bar to their reappointment or an extension of their terms in the Commission except
for current Commissioners who have served less than two (2) years of their terms of office who
may be appointed by the President for a maximum term of two (2) years. Petitioners argue that
their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their security of tenure.
Public respondents insist that the express declaration in section 8 of RA 8551 that the terms of
petitioners' offices are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish the
NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursuant to a bona fide reorganization.

Issue:

Did Sec. 8 of RA 8551 expressly abolish petitioners’ positions?

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that Sec. 8 of RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners' positions.
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration' that that office is vacant.
While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it cannot be
conceded the power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove
the occupants or holders thereof from the civil service. This is precisely what RA 8851 seeks to
do — declare the offices of petitioners vacant, by declaring that "the terms of office of the
current Commissioners are deemed expired," thereby removing petitioners herein from the civil
service. Congress may only be conceded this power if it is done pursuant to a bona fide
abolition of the NAPOLCOM. The NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same
administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.
Vicente Garcia v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993
Bellosillo, J.:

Doctrine:

The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse
effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his
separation from the service. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated
to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the
clemency.

Facts:

Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Petitioner was

summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty for the loss of several
telegraph poles which were located in Quezon Province telecom lines. Based on the same
facts, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the CFI of Quezon which
rendered a decision acquitting the petitioner. Consequently, petitioner sought reinstatement to
his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case, but petitioner’s request was
denied. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency. By
authority of the President, petitioner was granted executive clemency. Petitioner thereafter filed
with the COA a claim for payment of back salaries. However, the claim was denied on the
ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back
salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service.

Issue:

Is petitioner restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that petitioner is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the
clemency. The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the
adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered
his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself
exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement,
which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no
longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto
upon the issuance of the clemency.
Mayor Ricardo M. Angobung v. Commission on Elections En Banc
G.R. No. 126576, March 5, 1997
Hermosisima, Jr., J.:

Doctrine:

While the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total
number of registered voters, the petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the total
number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in the
meantime.

Facts:

Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local
elections of 1995. In 1996, private respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar of
Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall against petitioner. A Memorandum was submitted to the
COMELEC En Banc recommending approval of the petition for recall. Acting on the
Memorandum, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution which (1) approved the Petition for
Recall filed and signed by only one registered voter — herein private respondent Ma. Aurora
Siccuan de Alban, against petitioner — incumbent Mayor Ricardo Angobung; and (2) set the
further signing of said petition by the rest of the registered voters of Tumauini, Isabela.
Petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution on the ground that the petitioner was
signed by just one person in violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the
number of signatures supporting any petition for recall.

Issue:

Was the petition for recall validly initiated by private respondent?

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that the petition was not validly initiated by private respondent. Section 69
(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that "recall of any elective . . .
municipal . . . official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total
number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which
the local official sought to be recalled was elected". While the initiatory recall petition may not
yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, the petition
must contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf
only one person may sign the petition in the meantime. In this case, private respondent
proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in
her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the
leadership of petitioner. But the petition does not bear the names of all these other citizens of
Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 168079 July 17, 2007
Carpio, J.:

Doctrine:

The powers of the Office of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. Under RA 6770
and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from
government service an erring public official, other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary.

Facts:

Private respondent was the Local Treasury Operations Assistant of the City Treasurer’s Office
in Bacolod City. An examination conducted by the COA disclosed a shortage of ₱265,450. Upon
demand, private respondent failed to produce the missing amount. Consequently, the
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty and was meted the penalty of dismissal from
service. Private respondent filed a petition before the CA which ruled that the Ombudsman has
no power to impose directly sanctions against government officials and employees who are
subject of its investigation and it may only recommend, not impose, the appropriate sanctions.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari assailing its decision.

Issue:

Does the Ombudsman have the power to impose penalty of dismissal from the service?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the power to impose penalty of dismissal from
the service. The powers of the Office of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory.
Under RA 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to
directly remove from government service an erring public official, other than a member of
Congress and the Judiciary.
Romulo J. Marohomsalic v. Reynaldo D. Cole
G.R. No. 169918, February 27, 2008
Corona, J.:

Doctrine:

Corollary to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority is his authority to dismiss

Facts:

Petitioner Marohomsalic was employed as Special Land Investigator I of the Provincial

Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in Koronadal City. In 2001, Marohomsalic was caught in flagrante delicto receiving
bribe money of P2,700 from Cole. Consequently, an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct was filed against Marohomsalic in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The
Ombudsman found Marohomsalic guilty and dismissed him from the service.

Issue:

Does the Ombudsman have the power to order the dismissal of a public officer?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the power to order the dismissal of a public
officer. The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the
Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority,
including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the
Office of the Ombudsman to be "an activist watchman," not merely a passive one.