F.

POWERS AND DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Lamb vs. Phipps, G.R. No. 7806, July 12, 1912
Facts: Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on Dec. 31, 1911 due
to ill health. Before that he was assigned as provincial treasurer for Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. He
requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for
all property and funds under his custody) in order that Lamb may be allowed to leave the Philippines
without incurring criminal liability.
Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has settled his accounts,
refuses to issue the certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a civil suit against the government.
However the records also show that Fernandez signed the receipt acknowledging payment from the
government.
The petition for mandamus, asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the certificate was demurred to by
the auditor because it is a suit against the government and the petition states no cause of action.
The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did not do so hence the SC decided the
case upon the facts Lamb intended to make.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to issue the certificate of
clearance of Lamb.
Held: No, the certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded government employees and there is no
averment that Lamb is a bonded employee other than having custody of government property and funds,
however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a bonded officer.
We cannot believe that the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of this court in mandamus to the
cases where there was no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. It is our duty,
therefore, to give the statute a sensible construction; such as will effectuate the legislative intention and, if
possible, avoid an injustice or an absurd conclusion. Clerical errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected,
would render the statute unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, will
not vitiate the act; they will be corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided the true
meaning is obvious, and the real meaning of the legislature is apparent of the face of the whole
enactment.
It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to accept a mere paper
accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of Government employees and to issue a
clearance upon that alone. He may, it is true, if he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if
he has any doubt about the correctness of such accounts, make an actual examination of the funds and
property represented by such paper accounts or balances.
G. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICER
PEZA vs. COA, G.R. No. 189767, July 03, 2012
Facts: The PEZA Board of Directors is composed of 13 members which include the Undersecretaries of
the Department of Finance, the Department of Labor and Employment, the Department of the Interior and
Local Government, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Science and Technology
and the Department of Energy. Said Undersecretaries serve in ex officio capacity and were granted per
diems by PEZA for every attendance in a board meeting.

On 2007, the PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Españo issued Notice of Disallowance on the payments of per
diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board for the period 2001-2006. The disallowance was based
on the Court’s En Banc Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari in Cyril del Callar, et al.,
Members of the Board of Directors, Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. COA and Guillermo N.
Carague, Chairman, COA which assailed COA Decision No. 2006-009 dated January 31, 2006 affirming
the March 29, 2002 decision of the Director, then Corporate Audit Office II, disallowing the payment of
per diems of ex officio members of the PEZA Board of Directors.  Said disallowance was based on COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report No. 509
and this Court’s ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.

Issue: Whether or not the PEZA has a right to receive additional compensation for the ex officio position?

Held: No, a public official holding an ex officio position as provided by law has no right to receive
additional compensation for the ex officio position. Definitely, PEZA cannot claim that it was not aware
of circumstances pointing to the possible illegality of the disbursements of per diems to the ex officio
members of the Board. In Civil Liberties Union, this Court clarified the prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution and emphasized that a public official holding an ex officio position as
provided by law has no right to receive additional compensation for the ex officio position.
Abila vs. CSC, G.R. No. 92573, June 03, 1991
Facts: Quezon City Officer-in-Charge Brigido Simon, Jr. appointed petitioner Alex Abila as Villafuerte’s
successor. Petitioner Abila who had theretofore been the Acting Assistant Civil Security Officer, Civil
Intelligence and Security Department of the Quezon City Government, assumed the Administrative
Officer IV position on 2 December 1987.
Private respondent Florentina Eleria, Administrative Officer III of the Health Department, Quezon City
Government, filed a protest with the Merit System Protection Board (“Board”) in respect of Abila’s
appointment but it was dismissed.
The private respondent made an appeal. The Board revoked the appointment of Abila and directing the
appointment of private respondent. Both Abila and Eleria met the minimum eligibility but the latter have
more experience and higher in rank. Also, Eleria is next in rank to the vacant position.
Abila appeal to CSC. The latter affirmed the Board’s decision. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the respondent Commission has authority to substitute its own judgment for that of the
official authorized by law to make an appointment to the government service.
Held: No, the CSC has no authority.
In a long line of cases, the Court has held that respondent Commission has no such authority, the power
of appointment, which is essentially discretionary, being vested by law in the head of the office
concerned. The head of the office is the person on the spot. He occupies the ideal vantage point from
which to identify and designate the individual who can best fill the post and discharge its functions in the
government agency he heads. The choice of an appointee from among those who possess the required
qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience,
utility and the interests of service which can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the person
most familiar with the organizational structure and environmental circumstances within which the
appointee must function.
We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time, that the Civil Service Commission has no power
of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the
appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications
should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot
disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much less can it direct
the appointment of its own choice.
In the case at bar, the respondent Commission itself acknowledged that both petitioner Abila and
respondent Eleria are legally qualified for the position in question. Having made the determination, the
Commission had exhausted its powers and may not act any further except to affirm the validity of
petitioner’s appointment. More specifically, the Commission had no authority to revoke petitioner’s
appointment because the Commission believed that private respondent Eleria was better qualified for the
position involved; the Commission’s acts in this respect constituted an encroachment upon a discretionary
authority vested by law in the Quezon City Mayor and not in the Commission.
Santiago, Jr. v. CSC, G.R. No. 81467, Oct. 27, 1989

Facts: Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada appointed Santiago from Collector of Customs I to

Collector of Customs III. Respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems
Promotion Board against Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-
rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Board decided to revoke Santiago's appointment and
directed that Jose be appointed in his stead. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the Board
Resolution.  The Commission ruled that respondent Jose has far better qualifications in terms of
educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses taken. It added
that the Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the merit system as mandated by the
Constitution and to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service. Thus, Santiago appealed.

Issue: Whether or not Santiago's promotional appointment may be upheld?

Held:  Yes, it may be upheld.

There is no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Civil Service Law that persons next-in-rank are
entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to be
considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be
filled by transfer or other modes of appointment.
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it
does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested
right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to
the next higher position.

The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to
who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid
formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible,
the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for
appointment.

True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate
eligibility or required qualification. However, "all the commission is actually allowed to do
is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is
permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree says, "approves" or
"disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities. ...To be sure, it has no authority to revoke
the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that
would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority."

There is no reason to disturb Santiago's promotional appointment. The minimum qualifications and the
standard of merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as found by the appointing authority. The
latter has not been convincingly shown to have committed any grave abuse of discretion.

GSIS vs. CSC, G.R. Nos. 98395-102449, June 19, 1995

FACTS:

H. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Gatbonton vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 146779, Jan. 23, 2006
Facts: On November of1998, a civil engineering student of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology
(MIT) filed a letter-complaint against Renato S. Gatbonton, an associate professor of the Faculty of Civil
Engineering for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an
academician. Pending investigating, MIT, through its committee on Decorum and Investigation placed
him under a 30-day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999.
The committee believed that his continued stay during the investigation will affect his performance as a
faculty member, as well as the student’s learning and that the suspension will allow petitioner to “prepare
himself for the investigation and will prevent his influence to other members of the community.

He filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal suspension, damages and attorney’s fees questioning the
validity of the administrative proceedings with the RTC in a petition for certiorari but was terminated
since MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No.
7877 (R.A. No. 7877) and disregard the previous administrative proceedings
Labor Arbiter decided a 30-day preventive suspension is illegal and directed MIT to pay his wages during
the said period. The NLRC,set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision. CA on special civil action for certiorari
affirmed the NLRC.

Issues: Whether or not the 30-day preventive suspension have valid justification.

Held: No, there’s no valid justification under the Labor Code and MAPUA Rules and Regulations.

Employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment
poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers. When it
is determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employee’s preventive suspension, the latter is
entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive suspension.

Petitioner’s preventive suspension was based on respondent Mapua Institute of Technology’s (MIT’s)
Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 or R.A. No.
7877.— imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to “promulgate rules and regulations in
consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly
designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual harassment cases
and the administrative sanctions therefor.” Petitioner’s preventive suspension was based on respondent
MIT’s Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A.
No. 7877.

Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation, however, respondent published said rules and regulations
only on February 23, 1999. At the time of the imposition of petitioner’s preventive suspension on
January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no
legal basis.

Garcia vs. Mojica, G.R. No. 139043, Sept. 10, 1999

Facts: On 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the
supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence
on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.

Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt
by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.

Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was
assigned to conduct the inquiry. After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be
upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials
involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
recommendation.

Issues: Whether or not Garcia may be held administratively liable.

Held: No, Garcia is not administratively liable. Re-elected local official may not be held administratively
accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is
that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his
life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then
such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with
F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during
the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this
particular aspect of his life and character. For his part, petitioner contends that “the only conclusive
determining factor” as regards the people’s thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree
with petitioner. That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed,
precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an
undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing
or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the official’s reelection, except
that it must be prior to said date.”

The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the
contract was signed, during petitioner’s prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the
terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus,
any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract
was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made
months later.

While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig,
however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our
ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing,
if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to
the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable therefor, and it is our
considered view that he may not.
2.

Layno vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-65848, May 24, 1985

Facts: Petitioner Hernando C. Layno, Sr., the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur,
was accused “of grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith in the exercise of his official and/or
administrative duties” for “knowing fully well that he has no authority,” he suspended and prohibited
Vice-Mayor Bernardita Resus and three Sangguniang Bayan members from participating and exercising
their official functions” as such thus causing them injury “consisting of the salaries due to said officials
not [being] received by them.” Respondent Sandiganbayan suspended him on October 26, 1983,
notwithstanding petitioner’s opposition to the same.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s suspension pendente lite violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.

Held: Yes, the suspension violates the Constitution.

The suspension does not impair petitioner’s foregoing constitutional right since the same is not a penalty
or a criminal punishment, because it was not imposed by the court in a judgment of conviction or as a
result of judicial proceeding.” Further: “The suspension is merely a precautionary or preventive measure
issued even before the case is tried on its merits, purposely to ensure the fair and just trial of the case.

Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if
thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there
would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted
likewise on the people of Lianga.

In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

Petition is granted and the preventive suspension imposed on petitioner is set aside.

Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, G.R. No. L-30306, June 20, 1969
Facts: A petition for mandamus was filed by Jose C. Luciano, Councilor of Makati, Rizal, who received
the highest number of votes in the last general elections of 1967, to compel the Provincial Governor
and/or the Provincial Board of Rizal under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to
suspend Makati Mayor Maximo Estrella and others, soon branched out to include quo warranto to have
petitioner declared to be entitled to act as Mayor of Makati, Rizal and, thereafter further expanded to add
a prayer for injunction against newly named party respondents, Judges Delfin B. Flores and Herminio C.
Mariano, both of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the Court of Appeals, because said judges and
the Court of Appeals have restrained or enjoined the suspension of Mayor Estrella and others.
Issue: Whether or not a public official is bar for reelection for crimes he committed prior to the election.
Held: No, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, reelection of a public official does not bar
prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto because, first, said Act makes no time distinctions;
second, one of the penalties that attach thereunder is perpetual disqualification, which extends beyond a
particular term of office; and third, crimes under the Act prescribe in ten years. If reelection condones
previous criminal acts of an elective official punishable under it, then, after the reelection of an official no
crime committed by him prior thereto becomes repressible even if the time marked by the statute of
limitations has not yet run out. This is patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Act.

Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067, Mar. 27, 1998

Facts: Petitioners were designated by the NPC Board to compose the Contracts Committee for said
NPC’s “Mindanao Grid LDC & SCADA/EMS System Operation Control Center and Facilities Project.”
The Contracts Committee thus constituted conducted the pre-qualification and bidding procedures for the
project.
The Contracts Committee, however, declared the lowest bidder (Joint Venture) disqualified after
verification from the Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board that that group, as well as the second
lowest bidder (Urban) had been “downgraded,” thereby rendering both ineligible as bidders.
The Contracts Committee disclosed that the other bids had exceeded the Approved Agency Estimates and
the Allowable Government Estimates for Options A and B of the Project, it was needful for the NPC
Board to declare a failure of bidding and direct a re-bidding. The recommendation was unanimously
approved.
Feeling aggrieved by the turn of events, Urban filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against the Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors of NPC.
Urban alleged that before the bidding, Joint Venture had been disqualified, but the Contracts Committee,
without basis and in order to favor it, reconsidered its disqualification and thus enabled it to take part in
the bidding and in fact to submit the lowest bid; that the NPC was “already poised to award the contract
to Joint Venture” but because Urban protested, it was compelled to “post-disqualify” the former; that,
however, instead of awarding the contract for the project to Urban as the second lowest bidder, the
Committee and the NPC Board declared a failure of bidding and ultimately cancelled the project. These
acts, it is claimed, constituted a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The petitioners were prosecuted for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. A preventive suspension of 90 days was ordered against the petitioner in
accordance with Section 13 of said R.A. 3019.
Issue: Whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the Sandiganbayan to place under preventive
suspension public officers who stand accused before it, pursuant to said Section 13 of the law.
Held: Mandatory.
The Sandiganbayan did but adhere to the clear command of the law and what it calls a “mass of
jurisprudence” emanating from this Court, sustaining its authority to decree suspension of public officials
and employees indicted before it. Indeed, that the theory of “discretionary suspension” should still be
advocated at this late date, despite the “mass of jurisprudence” relevant to the issue, is little short of
amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard of the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the Highest
Court of the land.
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended—treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer—may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court. As
early as 1984, in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that such suspension was not penal in character
but merely a preventive measure before final judgment; hence, the suspension of a public officer charged
with one of the crimes listed in the amending law, committed before said amendment, does not violate the
constitutional provision against an ex post facto law. The purpose of suspension is to prevent the accused
public officer from frustrating or hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence, or from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer accused before it.
Imposition of suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. A pre-condition therefor is the
existence of a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a hearing is in accord with
the spirit of the law, considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a suspension of a public
official even before his conviction, and the demands of public interest for a speedy determination of the
issues involved in the case. The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is basically to determine the
validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or
correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. The accused should be given adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the criminal proceedings against him; e.g. that he has
not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that the acts imputed to him do not constitute
a specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the Revised Penal Code) warranting his mandatory suspension from
office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set
out in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. But once a proper determination of the validity of the information
has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue the order of preventive
suspension. The court has no discretion, for instance, to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused
official on the pretext that the order denying the latter’s motion to quash is pending review before the
appellate courts.
Preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with
Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of
1987.
Gabriel vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 87420, Sept. 17, 1990
Facts: On 1961, petitioner Maximo Gabriel joined the government service as an employee of the then
Motor Vehicles Office (now the Land Transportation Office). He started as a janitor and gradually moved
up to higher positions.

Meanwhile, by virtue of Executive Order No. 546 on 1979, a reorganization took place at the Land
Transportation Commission which was renamed Bureau of Land Transportation and its plantilla positions
including that of the petitioner.

Petitioner received a Memorandum from the Acting Regional Director, BLT-NCR informing him that he
will be appointed as Transportation District Supervisor III. However, this did not materialize. Others were
appointed in his stead. Believing that he was more qualified, petitioner filed a protest against the
appointees to the position in question with the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

Consequently, petitioner, filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan this time against Bureau of Land
Transportation Director Mariano R. Santiago. The same was referred to the Merit Systems Board of the
CSC.

The CSC, issued a resolution finding petitioner the more qualified candidate for the position of
Transportation District Supervisor III. The CSC ordered that petitioner be appointed to the position in
question.

Petitioner then filed a claim for backwages for illegal dismissal which was referred to the respondent
Commission on Audit (COA). The latter denied the claim of petitioner for lack of any factual or legal
basis. Respondent COA stressed that petitioner was not issued a valid appointment as of the time of his
termination. Petitioner never assumed office or rendered services during the period covered by his claim
and must not be given remuneration following the rule of "no work, no pay." Lastly, it noted that despite
the order of the Merit Systems Board for the Bureau of Land Transportation to appoint him to the position
of Transportation District Supervisor III as early as 1984, it was only on 1988 that he was reinstated and
to a different position that of a Mechanical Engineer, which according to respondent COA, is a post
petitioner earlier refused.

Hence, this petition

Issue: Whether or not an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is
entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to the time of
his reinstatement.
Held: Yes, he is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits.
As observed by the Merit Systems Board, the casual appointment extended to petitioner later on, which
led to his sudden and unexpected termination from the service, was made as a consequence of the protest
he filed against the appointment of the eleven appointees to the position of Transportation District
Supervisor III, and as such, it is illegal. This being the case, petitioner remained a permanent employee in
spite of the casual appointment belatedly extended to him following the rule that a permanent employee
remains a permanent employee unless he is validly terminated. The principle of non-dismissal except for
cause applies to him.
The court finds the pronouncement of the COA that the claim of petitioner is wanting in basis, whether
factual or legal, as erroneous. Indeed, to deny petitioner’s back salaries for the period of his illegal
dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for those in the civil
service. In Cristobal vs. Melchor, We held that an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally
dismissed is considered as not having left his office and should be given a comparable compensation at
the time of his reinstatement.library

Thus, petitioner must be paid his backwages by the Land Transportation Office just like all the others
who suffered the same fate as him and who were later ordered reinstated.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision of the respondent Commission on Audit dated January 10,
1989 is hereby annulled and set aside. It is hereby ordered that petitioner be paid back salaries based at
the rate prescribed for the position he held as a civil servant before his illegal dismissal, corresponding to
but not exceeding five (5) years, without qualification and deduction. No pronouncement as to costs.