CASE # 10

Quasi-judicial (Adjudicator) Power

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., et al. vs. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY

G.R. No. L-66683 23 April 1990

FACTS:

On January 4, 1984, private respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent Commission for the
Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities. The NTC and the Public Service
Commission granted the same provisionally for 30 days.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the NTC and the Public Service Commission can grant provisional rates without
informing herein petitioners.

RULING:
Yes. Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission now is empowered to approve
provisionally rates of utilities without the necessity of a prior hearing. Under the Public Service Act, as
amended (CA No. 146), the Board of Communications then, now the NTC, can fix a provisional amount
for the subscriber's investment to be effective immediately, without hearing (par. 3 of Sec. 16, CA 146, as
amended). Further, the Public Service Act makes no distinction between initial or revised rates. These
rates are necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission approves them. Moreover, the Commission
can hear and approve revised rates without published notices or hearing. The reason is easily discerned
from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity
with the definitive rates approved after final hearing 
CASE # 20
DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
Bagongahasa vs. Romualdez
646 SCRA 338
G.R. No. 179844 March 23, 2011
FACTS:

Petitioners Cesar Caguin, Cleofas Vitor, Teresita Vitor, Jose Levitico Dalay, Marcelo Dalay, Esperanza
Mario, Celestina Cosico, Ma. Ruth Pacurib, and Raquel San Juan, through the Legal Assistance Division
of the DAR, claim that findings of fact of the DARAB should have been respected by the CA; that the
CLOAs (Certificate of Land Ownership Award) covering the subject properties were registered in 1994
and 1995 but respondents only assailed the validity of the same in 2000; and that the said CLOAs are
already incontestable and indefeasible. Moreover, petitioners highlight the fact that the parties in this case
are not partners to any tenancy venture. Invoking this Court’s ruling in Heirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs
of Alberto Cruz,14 petitioners submit that the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction in this case, not the
DARAB.15
ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in undermining [the] ISSUE OF JURISDICTION as
this is cognizable by the Regional Director and not by the PARAD and/or the DARAB.

HELD: Yes.
While it is true that the PARAD and the DARAB lack jurisdiction in this case due to the absence of any
tenancy relations between the parties, lingering essential issues are yet to be resolved as to the alleged
lack of notice of coverage to respondents as landowners and their deprivation of just compensation.
Let it be stressed that while these issues were discussed by the PARAD in his decision, the latter was
precisely bereft of any jurisdiction to rule particularly in the absence of any notice of coverage for being
an ALI case. Let it also be stressed that these issues were not met head-on by petitioners. At this juncture,
the issues should not be left hanging at the expense and to the prejudice of respondents.
However, this Court refuses to rule on the validity of the CARP coverage of the subject properties and the
issuance of the assailed CLOAs.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction was initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not allow a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the particular issue of non-issuance of a
notice of coverage—an ALI case—being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the
matter. The power to determine such issue lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
CASE # 30
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Gloria vs. De Guzman
G.R. No. 116183 October 6, 1995
Art. 9 B Sec. 2, Constitution

FACTS:  

Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) by
virtue of temporary appointments. Cerillo, one of the respondents, was appointed as Board Secretary II of
PAFCA. However, she was removed from the position by reason of loss of confidence.
Subsequently, she was designated as “Coordinator for Extension Services”. Said appointments expired
when the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA (Philippine State College of Aeronautics).

Aggrieved, private respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus for reinstatement before the RTC of Pasay
Respondent Judge De Guzman rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of Cerillo as coordinator
for extension services.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement to the position
of Coordinator for Extension Services.

RULING: No.
Private respondent’s assignment as “Coordinator for Extension Services” was a mere designation.
Not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for
reinstatement.

The judgment of respondent Judge which orders the reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V. Cerillo to the
position of “Coordinator for Extension Services” is patently improper because it finds no support as to
facts and the law.

Respondent Cerillo, although temporarily extended an appointment as Board Secretary II, was dismissed
therefrom because of loss of confidence. This dismissal was neither contested nor appealed from by Ms.
Cerillo. There is no question, therefore, that her dismissal as Board Secretary II could not have been the
subject of the petition for mandamus and reinstatement filed before respondent Judge. The fact is that
private respondent’s assignment as “Coordinator for Extension Services” was a mere designation. Not
being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for
reinstatement.

MAIN POINT: The exercise of the discretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by
the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing authority. Thus, the order of the lower court
for the reinstatement of the private respondent amounts to an undue interference by the court in the
exercise of a discretionary power vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees.
CASE # 40
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Dimaandal v. COA, 291 SCRA 322 (1998)

Facts:
Petitioner Zosimo Dimaandal, then Supply Officer III in Batangas, was designated Acting
Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by the provincial governor. He was claiming for the
difference in salary and Representation and Transportation allowance for his Supply Officer III position
and his new designation for the whole year of 1993 but only the differences in allowances attached to the
designation and the position he occupied were allowed by the Provincial Auditor. This was
affirmed by the COA.

Petitioner was appointed Assistant Provincial Treasurer by the Secretary of Finance only in 1994.

Provincial Auditor as affirmed by COA: (1) the governor is not the proper appointing power to the
position of Assistant
Provincial Treasurer but rather the Secretary of Finance (Rev. Admin. Code, Sec. 2077); (2) he
was merely designated
Assistant Provincial Treasurer in addition to his regular duties.

Petitioner: as per Menzon vs. Petilla and Cui vs.Ortiz a de facto officer is entitled to payment for
services rendered in office where he was designated.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to the difference in salary and Representation and Transportation
allowance for his Supply
Officer III position and his new designation for the whole year of 1993

Held: No. He was not a de facto officer.

Ratio: The Secretary of Finance, and not the Governor of Batangas, has the power to either designate or
appoint the Assistant Provincial Treasurer as per Sec.471 of the Local Government Code. It is also the
appointing power which can order the payment of compensation to any designated or appointed employee
to a vacant position.

Further, there is difference between appointment and designation. Appointment is “the

selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a
given office” while designation is only the imposition of additional duties to a person already in
public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.

He also is not a de facto officer, his appointment being made without color of authority.

De facto officer: (a) one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if
the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face;
(b one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not
a mere volunteer; (c) one who is in possession of an office in the open exercise of its functions under
color of an election or an appointment, even though such election or appointment may be irregular.
To differentiate this case from Menzon, in that case, petitioner therein Menzon was appointed, not
designated, with color of authority. While in Cui, the appointing mayor still had the power to appoint and
only the approval of the President was wanting.

Further, retroactivity of petitioner’s appointment to his position, as he claimed, was not confirmed
and evident in the appointment itself

CASE # 50
ELECTION LAW
Domino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134015, July 19,1999
310 SCRA 546

Facts:

Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone
legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months.

Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that
Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a
registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.

Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-
year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on
his own Voter’s Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old
Balara, Quezon City.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the
May 11, 1998 elections

Held:

The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile”
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he
acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now
claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new
domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in
Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s
original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.

Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of
other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s
lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter
in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of
residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.