FRANSDILLA v.

PEOPLE
FACTS
The lone appellant, seeks to reverse the decision promulgated whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her conviction and that of her co-accused for robbery on
the basis of conspiracy, with modifications as to the penalty imposed—an imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA is correct in fixing the IS

RULING
YES. As to the Court, the CA deemed it necessary to correct the indeterminate
sentence. Under Section 1, supra, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is a
penalty "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the [Revised
Penal] Code for the offense," and the maximum is "that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code."
Considering that the clear objective of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to have the
convict serve the minimum penalty before becoming eligible for release on parole
pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, both the minimum and the maximum
penalties must be definite, not ranging. This objective cannot be achieved otherwise, for
determining when the convict would be eligible for release on parole would be nearly
impossible if the minimum and the maximum were as indefinite as the RTC fixed the
indeterminate sentence. Indeed, that the sentence is an indeterminate one relates only
to the fact that such imposition would leave the period between the minimum and the
maximum penalties indeterminate "in the sense that he may, under the conditions set
out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part."
 ZAFRA v. PEOPLE
FACTS
Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union. Among his duties was
to receive tax payments for which the revenue official receipts (ROR) were issued. On
06 July 1995. An audit team was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities
of the appellant. The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax
for some RORs totalled Php114,887.78, while the MRCs and COA's copies of the
RORs submitted by appellant, the sum of the taxes collected was only Php227.00
Likewise, PNB's RORs show that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as
documentary stamp tax. Yet, appellant's MRCs yielded only the total sum of
Php1,115.00, for the same RORs, or a difference of Php499,491.15. The subject 18
RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly Reports of
Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form 16 (A). Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a
demand letter requiring him to restitute the total amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant
ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of
public funds through falsification of public document against him.

ISSUE
Whether or not the imposed penalties of RTC is correct

RULING
NO. The Court held that Indeterminate Sentence Law was applicable, except
where the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. Considering that each count was
a complex crime without any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the penalty
for each count is the maximum period, except for the count dealt with in Criminal Case
No. 4635 involving the misappropriated amount of ₱4,869.00, for which the
corresponding penalty the corresponding penalty for malversation was pris for
malversation was prision mayor in its ion mayor in its minimum minimum and medium
periods. and medium periods. However, because such penalty for malversation was
lower than the penalty of prision mayor imposable on falsification of a public document
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is the penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period that was applicable.
 PEOPLE v. LOPEZ
FACTS
Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165. A certain
barangay official went to the Baler Police Station reporting the peddling of illegal drugs
by appellant. A buy-bust operation was planned. Later on, finding Larry Lopez y Parinia
guilty reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the sale of
0.06 gram of shabu and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Life
Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposed penalties is correct

RULING
NO. In People v. Mateo, the Court held that the period of imprisonment imposed
on the accused should not be a straight penalty, but should be an indeterminate
penalty. Thus, the trial court erred in imposing the straight penalty of imprisonment of
fourteen (14) years. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when
the offense is punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, "the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same." Accordingly, the penalty that should be
imposed on appellant is imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day,
as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum. The Court a5rms the P300,000 fine
imposed by the trial court.
 PEOPLE v. LEONARDO
FACTS
Appellant Adriano Leonardo y Dantes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six
counts of rape, for five counts of sexual abuse as defined and penalized under Section
5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, The appellant was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and the indeterminate penalty of 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 15 years, 6 months and 20 days of
reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b),
Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.

ISSUE
Whether or not the imposed penalties is correct

RULING
NO. The Court similarly affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua 76 imposed by
the lower courts against the appellant for each count of rape, but modified the penalty
imposed by the lower courts against the appellant sexual abuse under Section 5 (b),
Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child
under Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, the penalty prescribed is
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that
Republic Act No. 7610 is a special law, the appellant may enjoy the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant shall be entitled to a
minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by Republic Act No. 7610. The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor medium to
reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years
and 8 months. On the other hand, the maximum term of the penalty should be taken
from the penalty prescribed under Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610,
which is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of
which is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum,
medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum — 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months; medium — 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years; and maximum — reclusion perpetua.
 PEOPLE v. MATIAS
FACTS
The RTC convicted appellant for "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610
and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC likewise directed him to pay
AAA the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P30,000 as moral damages. In
convicting appellant, the RTC gave full credence to AAA's testimony, which was
straightforward and positive.

ISSUE
Whether or not the imposed penalties is correct

RULING
NO. Appellant's conviction was clearly under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 or
sexual abuse and not for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC. AAA was born on April
23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be prosecuted and convicted either under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC,
except for rape under paragraph 1 (d).

There is a need to modify the penalty imposed upon appellant. Following the
pronouncement in the case of Malto v. People for sexual abuse, and in the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which has the range of 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, therefore, the
maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly
imposed under the law, which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, while the minimum term shall be within the range next lower in degree, which
is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or a
period ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.
 LEGRAMA v.SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
Herein, the petitioner guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
Considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, accused Legrama voluntary surrender and partial restitution
of the amount involved in the instant case, and being entitled to the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional , as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day
of prision mayor , as maximum. Further, she is ordered to pay the amount of
Php299,204.65, representing the balance of her incurred shortage after deducting
therein the restituted amount of Php832,390.40 and the Php200.00 covered by an
Official Receipt dated August 18, 1996 issued in the name of the Municipality of San
Antonio. She is also ordered to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed which is
Php1,131,595.05 and likewise suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification
and to pay costs.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to mitigating circumstances

RULING
YES. Voluntary surrender and restitution. As a result, the amount involved is
more than P22,000.00, pursuant to the provisions of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
However, as aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner enjoys the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and restitution. Although restitution is
akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13, in relation to
paragraph 10 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code, restitution should be
treated as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the two
circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to instances where voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty are both present even though the two mitigating
circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code. Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part
of the accused, it was proper for the Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate
mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner.
Taking into consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the
presence of two mitigating circumstance, i.e., petitioners voluntary surrender and partial
restitution of the amount malversed, the prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor
in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, which has a range of
ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. In
accordance with paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
 And considering that there are no other mitigating circumstance present, the
maximum term should now be the medium period of prision mayor maximum to
reclusion temporal medium, which is reclusion temporal minimum and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should be anywhere within the period
of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Hence, the penalty
imposed needs modification. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional , as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
 FLORDELIZ v. PEOPLE
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness, committed
against AAA, and nine (9) counts of Qualified Rape through Sexual Assault committed
against BBB. On appeal, the CA a:rmed petitioner's conviction with a modiAcation of the
amount of his civil liabilities.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming RTC’s judgment

RULING
NO. It is not uncommon in incestuous rape for the accused to claim that the case
is a mere fabrication, and that the victim was moved by familial discord and inJuence,
hostility, or revenge. There is nothing novel about such defense, and this Court had the
occasion to address it in the past. In People v. Ortoa, , no child would knowingly expose
herself and the rest of her family to the humiliation and strain that a public trial surely
entails unless she is so moved by her desire to see to it that the person who forcibly
robbed her of her cherished innocence is penalized for his dastardly act.
The prosecution also established that petitioner is the biological father of BBB
and that the latter was less than twelve (12) years old at the time of the commission of
the crimes. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape by sexual
assault, if attended by any of the aggravating circumstances under paragraph 1 38 of
Article 266-B, would carry the penalty of reclusion temporal, ranging from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the RPC.
Other than the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship (which
are already taken into account to raise the penalty from prision mayor to reclusion
temporal) , 39 no other aggravating circumstance was alleged and proven. Hence, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. On the other hand, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed by the Code which is prision mayor or six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
 IMBO v. PEOPLE
FACTS
The petioner was convicted of crime acts of lasciviousness on his daughter, 11
years old, a minor, after the trial court found victim's testimony credible and convincing.
He sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum in accordance with Section 5 of Republic Act No.
7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination.

ISSUE
Whether or not the imposed penalty by the RTC is correct

RULING
NO. There is a need to modify the penalty imposed by the lower court. Section 5
(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides the imposable penalty for Acts of
Lasciviousness when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, albeit the offense is
prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The range of the imposable penalty on petitioner of reclusion temporal in its medium
period is fourteen (14) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to prison sentence
both for an offense punished by the RPC and an offense punished "by any other law."
For an offense punished by the Code, the minimum shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. If the offense is
punished by any other law, the minimum shall not be less than the minimum specified
by said law. It is clear however that for the two kinds of offenses, separately punished
by the Code and by "any other law," the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
differ in the minimum terms of the sentence.
The correct application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law has long been
clarified in People v. Simon which ruled that the underscored portion of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, i.e., the "offense is punished by any other law,"
indubitably refers to an offense under a special law where the penalty imposed was not
taken from and is without reference to the RPC. In People v. Fragante, citing People v.
Velasquez, the Court imposed the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
In this case, the minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the RPC, i.e., reclusion temporal in its minimum period of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. As for
the maximum term of the imposable penalty on petitioner, the lower courts while correct,
should have mentioned Section 31 (c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610. The provision takes
into consideration the relationship between the parties, petitioner being AAA's father.
As a result, with the aggravating circumstance of relationship and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed by the lower courts of seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months of reclusion temporal correctly does not exceed the maximum of
the penalty range of reclusion temporal in its medium period.