317 Phil.

635

ROMERO, J.:

This is an appeal from the March 30, 1989 Decision [1] in Criminal Case No. 86-CR-0345 which the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet, Branch 8 in La Trinidad, Benguet resolved as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the accused, Donald Ballagan y Binayan, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended; and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.

The dried marijuana leaves subject matter of this case is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
Government, and it is hereby directed that the same be forthwith turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for proper disposal.

SO ORDERED."

In the evening of August 20, 1986, Major Basilio Cablayan of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), acting on
the confidential information that Ballagan would be arriving with prohibited drugs, ordered the
installation of a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet. With Lt. Jerry Valeroso as the leader, the other
members of the team who manned the checkpoint were Sgts. Amado Ablang, Oscar Parajas and
Fontanilla.

From 6:30 o'clock in the evening when they started checking all vehicles passing the area, the team
flagged down 10 to 13 vehicles, some of which had passengers carrying marijuana, before they were
able to apprehend the object of the checkpoint.  At 1:45 o'clock in the morning of August 21, 1986, they
stopped an Isuzu Elf truck with plate No. 269, laden with vegetables on its way to Baguio City from
Buguais.  The truck had four passengers including the driver.

Sgt. Parajas climbed the cargo portion of the truck and found Ballagan, one of the passengers sleeping,
using a brown travelling bag as his pillow.  Near the sleeping passenger's back was a rattan bag locally
known as pasiking.  Sgt. Parajas woke him up and asked permission to check his baggage.  When
Ballagan turned them over to him, he found out that both the bag and the pasiking contained
marijuana.  Sgt. Parajas then handed them to Sgt. Ablang who, upon opening them, confirmed that
the pasiking had two bundles of marijuana while the bag had two or three bundles of the same
contraband.  Sgt. Ablang handed all the bundles to Lt. Valeroso.

The team questioned the driver and learned that Ballagan had hitched a ride with him.  Thereafter, they
brought Ballagan and the confiscated marijuana to the PC detachment at 51 General Luna Road, Baguio
City.  The marijuana was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet where, Capt. Carlos V. Figueroa, a forensic chemist, applying the Duguenois Levine Test and the
Thin Layer Chromatography on the submitted specimen, positively identified the same as "marijuana," a
prohibited drug.[2] He found as marijuana the 2.4 kilos dried flowering tops in two bundles wrapped in a
plastic container and in a pink straw sack inside the pasiking as well as the 1.7 kilos dried flowering tops
placed in transparent plastic bags inside the brown-colored bag marked "ADIDAS."

At the General Luna Road detachment, Ballagan executed a waiver of Article 125 [3] of the Revised Penal
Code[4] even as the Constabulary operatives tried to ferret out more information from him about drug-
trafficking.  On December 24, 1986, the following information charging Ballagan with violation of Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
was filed against Ballagan:

"That on or about the 20th day of August, 1986, along the Halsema Road at Acop, Municipality of
Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, without any authority of law, nor any permit from any government agency, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess, carry, transport and deliver from Bad-ayan, Buguias, Benguet
to Baguio City five (5) kilos of dried marijuana leaves which are sources of prohibited or dangerous drugs
which is in violation of the said law.

Contrary to Law."

The date of arraignment of the accused was set by the trial court but the prosecution filed a motion to
suspend proceedings in the case on the ground that the accused had filed a petition for review before
the then Ministry of Justice, as evidenced by the letter-request dated January 12, 1987 of counsel for the
accused.[5] After the trial judge granted the motion, [6] the prosecution manifested that the Department
of Justice had denied the accused's petition for review and prayed that the case be set for arraignment.
[7]
 The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge on March 31, 1987. [8] The prosecution then proceeded to
present its evidence to prove the commission of the crime.

A camote farmer who did not go beyond the fifth grade, Ballagan was 24 years old when he testified. 
On August 20, 1986, he was sent by his brother, Vice-Mayor Leon Ballagan, to his sister who was a
housegirl in Bekkel, La Trinidad, to inform her that their mother was seriously ill of TB at the Tinok
Emergency Hospital.  He left their house in Barrio Iheb, Tinok, Ifugao at around 11:00 o'clock in the
morning and hiked the 14 to 15-kilometer distance from Iheb to Bad-ayan from where he intended to
get a ride to Baguio City.

In Bad-ayan, he was able to hitch a ride at the back of the Elf truck of a vegetable dealer.  At that time
there were five passengers in the truck - three in front and two in the back.  Because he was rushing to
see his sister, he did not carry any baggage.

At around midnight, the group had dinner at Km. 32 and Ballagan paid fifty pesos of his P250 pocket
money for their food.[9] After eating, a man holding a brown bag and a pasiking asked their driver for
permission to hitch a ride at the back of the truck.

As the truck proceeded to Baguio City, Ballagan slept and was awakened by armed soldiers at Acop near
the toll gate.  As he was getting off the truck, he saw someone running away who was chased by the
soldiers while the rest of the truck passengers were ordered to lie face down on the ground.  The
soldiers who identified themselves as members of the NARCOM frisked all of them and then mauled
them.  The soldiers took them to a jeep and brought them with their truck to Baguio City. Since the jeep
had a flat tire before reaching the city, Ballagan's group were transferred to their Elf truck.

The group was investigated at the General Luna station of the PC.  The soldiers showed Ballagan
the pasiking and the bag with the marijuana and when he was asked who owned them, he told the
soldiers that the articles belonged to the man who ran away.  After the investigation, the soldiers once
again mauled them.  After four days, except for Ballagan, the rest of the apprehended persons were
released after each of them had handed over P5,000 to the NARCOM.  He, too, was asked to shell out
P5,000 but he could not produce the amount.  The P200 remaining of his pocket money was taken from
him by the NARCOM. His brother Leon visited him at the NARCOM office but when he told Leon about
the P5,000 demand of the NARCOM for his release, Leon told him that he had no money.  Ballagan
stayed at the NARCOM office for 21 days until he was transferred to the provincial jail.

Philip Tanawe, one of the vegetable dealers apprehended with Ballagan, testified that he was with
Genaro Tomayan, Teofilo Wanay and Tony Patian in the Elf truck driven by Rogelio Goyong.  While they
were in Badayan loading peppers into the truck at around 6:00 o'clock, a person who introduced himself
as Donald Ballagan, asked permission to ride with them.  He noticed that Ballagan had no baggage at all
and that he rode at the back of the truck.  Along the Halsema Road, they had supper at a place called
Guerilla Saddle.[10]

It was then between midnight and 1:00 o'clock in the morning.  After eating, a man approached them
and asked for a ride.  He was slender and in his mid-30's, had a travelling bag and a knapsack or rattan
bag and climbed in the front part of the truck where Tanawe was seated.  In Acop, soldiers ordered
them to alight from the truck and they were made to face the wall of a nearby house while the soldiers
frisked them with guns pointed.

Introducing themselves as NARCOM operatives, the soldiers boxed the members of the group after
finding the travelling bag and the knapsack with the marijuana.  The man who last hitched a ride with
them ran away and the soldiers tried to chase him but since only the tollgate was lighted, the soldiers
gave up.  The soldiers did not shoot the man who ran away because there were many trucks coming
along the road. The group was then asked to ride in a jeep which Tanawe failed to describe because it
was dark and raining. Since the jeep had a flat tire, they were transferred to the Elf truck which
proceeded to the General Luna station.

At the NARCOM office, they were asked to tell the truth about the marijuana while the soldiers boxed
them. The investigation lasted all night. He stayed in the office for two nights only while the others
stayed for four nights because his wife was able to produce the P5,000 demanded from each of them by
the NARCOM.  However, he did not report the matter to the proper authorities because he was afraid
that he might get "salvaged."

To fortify his claim that he had no baggage when he left home for Baguio City, Ballagan presented
Gabino Botatta, the barangay captain of Iheb (Eheb).  Botatta swore that when Ballagan dropped by his
house for a glass of water, Ballagan carried no baggage.

On March 30, 1989, the trial court rendered the aforementioned decision.  Ballagan now appeals the
same on the ground that in convicting him, the trial court erroneously gave full faith and credit to the
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies while disregarding the testimonies of the defense witnesses
which were the "true and accurate version" of the crime.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that the findings of facts of a trial judge, who
has seen the witnesses testify and who has observed their demeanor and conduct while on the witness
stand, should not be disturbed on appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value have been
overlooked which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case. [11] When the issue is one of
credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts will generally not disturb the trial court's findings. [12]

In its decision, the trial court unequivocally stated that it found "the testimonies of the two
eyewitnesses for the prosecution to be forthright and convincing enough to overcome the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused" and that it was "not convinced by the version of the defense." We
quote with approval the following findings of the trial court which sealed the culpability of the
appellant:

"The testimony of the defense's witness, in the person of Barangay Captain Gabino Botata, 36 years old,
is to the effect that the accused was not carrying anything when he (accused) was on his way to Baguio. 
Even assuming this to be true, that would not necessarily mean that along the way from the Barangay
Captain's house in Eheb, Tinoc, Ifugao, to Bad-ayan where he was to take his ride and which is
admittedly 10 to 11 kilometers away (TSN, March 14, 1988, pp. 4-5), he could not have picked up some
baggages.  The testimony of another defense witness, Philip Tanawe, a vegetable dealer who was then
one of the passengers of the same Isuzu Elf that the accused was then riding on, to the effect that he
saw the accused without any baggage in boarding the back portion of the truck cannot be believed.  Said
witness is admittedly seated in the front part of the truck along with the driver and another passenger,
and the truck is likewise admittedly fully loaded with 1,500 kilos of vegetables (TSN, Feb. 23, 1988, pp.
18-19).  How could he have seen the accused climb the rear part of the truck carrying no baggages?
Then, again, corroborating the testimony of the accused, he claims to have seen another person request
permission to hitch a ride at Guerilla Saddle; but unlike the accused who was introduced to him by
name, this witness did not know the second hitch-hiker's name, and even his description except that °I
think he is slender' and °mid-30's' (TSN, supra, pp. 26-27).  On the matter of the alleged extortion by the
NARCOM agents of P5,000.00 from each of the six of them who were brought to the NARCOM office,
the witness corroborates a similar claim of the accused.  However, this witness did not explain how his
wife came to know of his predicament such that she visited him ready with the amount for him (TSN,
supra, p. 28); and he was evasive and hazy about why, although he wanted to help the accused, he did
not give his statement that would exculpate said accused before the Fiscal's office, how he came out for
the first time to testify in court on February 8, 1988, for the accused, how the sickly mother of the
accused was able to get him to testify (TSN, supra, pp. 29-30).  That story about the alleged P5,000.00
extortion by the NARCOM agents appear to be a figment of the imagination of the accused and this
witness.  If it is true that they were afraid to report this matter to the authorities - such as the
investigating fiscal or the defense counsel - because of the threat that they would be salvaged, it is not
credibly explained why said accused and this witness are now no longer afraid." [13]

Moreover, if the arresting NARCOM agents indeed prevaricated, no reason therefor was volunteered by
the defense.[14] No improper motive was ever imputed to them who, as arresting officers, are presumed
to have regularly performed their official duty in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. [15] Neither
was there proof of an evil design on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against
appellant mendaciously implicate him.[16] The lack of any ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers to
testify falsely and impute to appellant a grave offense is of considerable evidentiary weight in assessing
the credibility of witnesses.[17]

Appellant's claims that the prosecution witnesses made "fantastic, unnatural and contradicting
statements"[18] are unfounded as the statements singled out by appellant are not really contradictory. 
He merely points to what he believes should have been presented by the prosecution.  Thus, he bewails
the fact that while the prosecution proved that the checkpoint was installed on account of a confidential
information that appellant would be transporting marijuana, it failed to show "how the information was
obtained or relayed."[19] We find such "lacking evidence" to be a peripheral one which would not add a
shred to the solid prosecution evidence. It should be remembered that the matter of what evidence to
present or who to present as witnesses is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor.  Such matter
is definitely not for the courts to dictate. [20] Moreover, the presentation of the informant in a drugs case
is not essential for conviction or indispensable to its successful prosecution. [21] His testimony would be
merely corroborative and cumulative.[22]

The other "fantastic story" which appellant underscores is the established fact that he was caught
sleeping by the soldiers at the checkpoint.  To his mind, a person engaged in an illegal activity would not
be so nonchalantly unconcerned as to sleep peacefully with the contraband as pillow.  It may now seem
strange to appellant but the fact is, that was how he was caught by the arresting officers. The situation
was not actually "fantastic" or outside the realm of reality - the truck was hailed at the checkpoint
during the wee hours of the morning when sleeping was not "unnatural." Be that as it may, the
"inconsistencies" marked by appellant are not major ones which may affect the result of this appeal. 
But, if taken into account, they may only be considered the understandable result of natural differences
in the perception of the same set of facts. [23]

The appellant claims that there was "unreasonable delay in forwarding the person of the accused and
the transmittal of the records to the proper authorities." [24] An explanation for this may be gleaned from
the records.  In the course of appellant's testimony, he was confronted with the document marked as
Exhibit "F" wherein he "waived" the effects of his detention vis-a-vis Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. 
Appellant admitted having signed it[25] and in the absence of any evidence rebutting it or showing that
appellant was under duress when he executed the "waiver," he cannot now complain about his
detention or the perceived delay in delivering him to the provincial jail.
Moreover, contrary to his contention, such delay does not in any way prove that he was maltreated
while in custody.[26] In fact, appellant himself admitted that while detained in the NARCOM office, he was
free to roam around even if he was not free to go out. [27] Appellant's claim is further handicapped by his
failure to have himself medically examined to prove his alleged mauling and maltreatment.  The
purported corroborative testimony of Philip Tanawe on the matter was discredited by the trial court.

The defense of denial interposed by the appellant cannot save him from conviction for denial, which is
self-serving negative evidence, cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[28]

Appellant has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, specifically for transporting marijuana. 
This law has been amended further by Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993. 
In People v. Simon,[29] the Court explicitly states that the beneficent provisions of the law shall be given
retrospective effect, specifically the provision which bases the penalties imposed upon the quantity of
the regulated drugs involved subject to certain exceptions particularized therein. Thus, the provisions
beneficial to the accused were applied in such cases as People v. Martinez,[30] People v. Basilgo,[31] People
v. Cañeja[32] and People v. David.[33]

As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizing transportation of
prohibited drugs now reads:

"SEC. 4.  Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.  - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act
as a broker in any of such transactions.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a
minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of
the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."

Section 20 of the Act, as amended also by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon a
violator of Section 4 if the marijuana involved is "750 grams or more." If the quantity is less than 750
grams, the penalty shall "range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity."

The marijuana transported in this case being more than 750 grams, the penalty imposable shall
be reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos.  Section 27 of the Revised Penal Code has also been amended by Republic Act No. 7659 such that
the duration of reclusion perpetua is now "from twenty years and one day to forty years" whereas
before its amendment, any person sentenced with the penalty "shall be pardoned after undergoing the
penalty of thirty years."

On the other hand, the penalty of life imprisonment, which was correctly imposed on herein appellant
because no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were proven, [34] has no definite extent or duration. 
Thus, in People v. Baguio,[35] the Court, through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, clarifies: "reclusion
perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for
pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc.  It is not
the same as °life imprisonment' which, for one thing, does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration." In People v. Gerona,[36] which is also a prohibited drugs case, the Court states:

"x x x.  The penalty prescribed by Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 for the commission of the
described offense is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos,
and not reclusion perpetua.  Life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are two distinct penalties and are
not interchangeable for the latter carries with it the accessory penalties enumerated in Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.  Furthermore, reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years
after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon; whereas life imprisonment does not appear to have
any definite extent or duration."

In all the drugs cases decided by this Court wherein the trial court erroneously interchanged "life
imprisonment" and reclusion perpetua, the Court invariably ruled that the former, being the penalty
prescribed by Republic Act No. 6425, should be imposed.  With the amendment of the law by Republic
Act No. 7659, however, the penalty is now reclusion perpetua which has a definite duration of twenty
years and one day to forty years. [37] Under these circumstances, which penalty is more favorable to the
appellant - life imprisonment which, not having a fixed duration, may, therefore, span the rest of the
natural life of the convict, or reclusion perpetua with a twenty-year minimum penalty?

First, the wealth of jurisprudence in cases wherein "life imprisonment" is imposed is to the effect that
said penalty, unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry accessory penalties.  In the event that Republic
Act No. 7659 is applied retrospectively to appellant, he has to suffer not only reclusion perpetua but also
the accessory penalties.

Second, the fine imposed upon appellant is the minimum imposable of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), whereas if he were penalized under the new law, he would have to bear the minimum fine
of P500,000.00.  Thus, retrospective application of Republic Act No. 7659, the "heinous crimes law", in
cases wherein the penalty of "life imprisonment" has been imposed by the trial court, would prove more
burdensome upon the appellant and would contradict the basic principle that all penal laws shall be
interpreted in favor of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant Donald Ballagan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and imposing on him the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.  Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., and Feliciano, J., on leave.

 
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82805 November 9, 1989

BRIAD AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE DIONISIO DELA CERNA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS)-WTFU
LOCAL CHAPTER NO. R01-005, ALFRED DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., * respondents.

G.R. No. 83225 November 9, 1989

L.M. CAMUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE HON. UNDERSECRETARY DIONISIO C. DELA SERNA, VICTORIANO
ATIENZA, JR., JOSNERI DIOCARES, REYNALDO PAREÑO, WINNIE ORTOSIT, NELEN SEVERINO, MARLON
RESONABLE, ROLANDO ALDANESE, ALICIO SEBIAO, CARLINTO PAQUERO, JULIAN GOSONA, ROLANDO
CASIMERO, ALFREDO DE LEON, VICTORIANO MACHANG, ARMANDO SALAZAR, ANITO DE JESUS,
FRANCISCO DELGADO, PAQUITO PITULAN, DANILO CENTINO, ROMEO DELOS SANTOS, RUBEN LARA,
ROGELIO MAGHUYOR, BEN ABDANI, RUDY PALASUGLO, WILLIAM BALDADO, ROMEO LABIGAN,
TANNY JANOLO, and EDGAR A. OREZ, respondents.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson and Bengzon for petitioner in 82805.

Corazon R. Paulino for petitioner in 82805.

Raoul B. Agrava & Associates for petitioner in 83225.

Alar, Comia, Manalo & Associates Law Offices for respondents in 82805.

Jesus F. Balicanta for respondents in 83225.

RESOLUTION

SARMIENTO, J.:

This refers to the motion for reconsideration filed in G.R. No. 82805. The Court reconsiders its Decision,
promulgated on June 29, 1989, dismissing the petition therein.

The pertinent portion of the said Decision, insofar as material to the motion to reconsider, is as follows:

The Court rules that, in view of the promulgation of Executive Order No. 111, Zambales Base Metals v.
Minister of Labor  is no longer good law. Executive Order
No. 111 is in the character of a curative law, that is to say, it was intended to remedy a defect that, in
the opinion of the legislature (the incumbent Chief Executive in this case, in the exercise of her
lawmaking powers under the Freedom Constitution) had attached to the provision subject of the
amendment. This is clear from the proviso: "The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding ... " Plainly, the amendment was meant to make both the Secretary of Labor (or the
various Regional Directors) and the Labor Arbiters share jurisdiction.

Curative statutes have long been considered valid in this jurisdiction. Their purpose is to give validity to
acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with.
They are, however, subject to exceptions. For one, they must not be against the Constitution and for
another, they cannot impair vested rights or the obligation of contracts. It has not been shown in this
case that these exceptions apply.

That Executive Order No. 111 intended to make the jurisdiction to pass upon money claims, among the
other cases mentioned by Article 217 of the Labor Code, concurrent between the Secretary of Labor (or
Regional Directors) and the Labor Arbiters is clear from its perambulatory clauses, to wit:

WHEREAS, the welfare of the workers is a primary concern of the government.

WHEREAS, it is necessary to amend or repeal provisions of laws that repress the rights of workers and of
their trade unions.

Executive Order No. 111, it is obvious, was enacted to widen workers' access to the Government for
redress of grievances.

The language of the provision is indeed broad enough to encompass cases over which Labor Arbiters
had hitherto exercised exclusive Jurisdiction. We quote, in part:

. . .the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to
order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of
this Code and other labor legislation

We can no longer accept the contention that the Regional Directors' singular concern, under the said
provision, is to ensure compliance with labor standards, such as industrial safety and similar concerns.
In Zambales Base Metals,  It was our reading of Section 128(b) of the Code that the aforesaid labor
officials' authority stopped there, but we have, in view of the amendment under Executive Order No.
111, since taken a second look. As we said, the Executive Order vests in Regional Directors jurisdiction,
"[t]he provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding"; it would have rendered
such a proviso — and the amendment itself — useless to say that they (Regional Directors) retained the
self-same restricted powers, despite such an amendment. It is fundamental that a statute is to be read
in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. At any rate, and as we have observed,
the language of Executive Order No. 111 is comprehensive enough to extend to the resolution of
employer-employee controversies covered by Article 217.

The Court finds that reconsideration is proper in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 6715,
approved on March 2, 1989. Under Section 9 of the statute:

Sec. 9. Article 217 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission — (a) Except as otherwise provided under
this code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension,
even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:

(1) Unfair labor practice cases;

(2) Termination disputes;

(3) If accompanied with a claim of reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relation;

(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality
of strikes and lockouts; and

(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all
other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not
accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and
those from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be
provided in said agreements.

Republic Act No. 6715, like its predecessors, Executive Order No. 111 and Article 217, as amended, has
retroactive application. Thus, when this new law divested Regional Directors of the power to hear
money claims, the divestment affected pending litigations. 1 It also affected this particular case. (Note
that under par. 6, where the claim does note exceed P5,000.00, regional directors have jurisdiction.)

In Garcia v. Martinez, 2 we categorically held that amendments relative to the jurisdiction of labor
arbiters (under Presidential Decree No. 1367, divesting the labor arbiter of jurisdiction) partake of the
nature of curative statutes, thus:

It now appears that at the time this case was decided the lower court had jurisdiction over Velasco's
complaint although at the time it was filed said court was not clothed with such jurisdiction. The lack of
jurisdiction was cured by the issuance of the amendatory decree which is in the nature of a curative
statute with retrospective application to a pending proceeding, like Civil Case No. 9657 (See 82 C.J.S.
1004). 3

Garcia  has since been uniformly applied in subsequent cases. Thus, in Calderon v. Court of
Appeals,4 reiterated that "PD No. 1367 [is] curative and retrospective in  nature." 5

The Decision of this case, finally, acknowledged the retrospective characteristics of Executive Order No.
111.

The Court hastens to state that it is not reversing itself, but merely applying the new law,
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated June 29, 1989 (G.R. No. 82805) is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REFERRED, if the respondents are so minded, to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J.,  concurring:

Mr. Justice Sarmiento adjudges it proper to reconsider his ponencia  "in view of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 6715, approved on March 2, 1989," which, "like its predecessors, Executive Order No.
111 and Article 217, as amended ' has retroactive application." I agree, but wish to state that I do so for
the reason that another review of the record of these two cases shows that it is not too certain that the
findings of the labor regulations officers may be deemed uncontested so as to bring said cases within
the competence of the Regional Director, as duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor, in
accordance with Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended. Hence, and in view of the fact that the
aggregate claims involve millions of pesos, it would appear more appropriate that the issue of the
employers' liability therefor be ventilated and determined. not in a summary proceeding before the
Regional Director under Article 123 of the Code, but in accordance with the more formal and
comprehensive proceeding before the Labor Arbiter.

I would also emphasize that neither the Resolution granting reconsideration nor- Republic Act No. 6715
should be construed as modifying the visitorial and enforcement powers conferred on the Secretary of
Labor and his representatives by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended,. Those powers include that
of directing — in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, and on the basis of
findings of labor regulations officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. and
after due notice and hearing — compliance by an employer with labor standards provisions, and the
issuance of writs of execution to the appropriate authority for enforcement thereof. It is noteworthy
that the amount of the employer's liability is not a factor in the determination of the Regional Director's
jurisdiction. However, the power to order compliance with labor standards provisions may not be
exercised where the employer concerned contests the findings of the labor regulation officers and raises
issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal
course of inspection.

I wish to point out, too, that R.A. 6715 gives the Regional Director or any of the duly authorized hearing
officers of the Department of Labor and Employment, jurisdiction to decide through summary
proceeding and after due notice, any case initiated by complaint of any interested party involving the
recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an
employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper ... arising from
employer — employee relations; provided that such complaint does not include a claim for
reinstatement, and provided further, that the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper
does not exceed P5,000.00.

In other words, as already pointed out in the first concurring opinion, the Regional Director now has
exclusive original jurisdiction over a claim for recovery of wages and other monetary claims and
benefits, including legal interest, if the following requisites concur to wit:

1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or

househelper under the Code;

2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and

3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00.

Where these requisites do not co-exist, it is the Labor Arbiters who have exclusive original jurisdiction of
all claims arising from employer-employee relations, other than those for employees' compensation,
social security, medicare and maternity benefits.

In the resolution, therefore, of any question of jurisdiction over a money claim arising from employer-
employee relations, the first inquiry should be into whether the employment relation does indeed still
exist between the claimant and the respondent.

If the relation no longer exists, and the claimant does not seek reinstatement, the case is cognizable by
the Labor Arbiter, not by the Regional Director. On the other hand, if the employment relation still
exists, or reinstatement is sought, the next inquiry should be into the amount involved.

If the amount involved does not exceed P5,000.00, the Regional Director undeniably has jurisdiction. But
even if the amount of the claim exceeds P5,000.00, the claim is not on that account necessarily removed
from the Regional Director's competence. In respect thereof, he may still exercise the visitorial and
enforcement powers  vested in him by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra; that is to say,
he may still direct his labor regulations officers or industrial safety engineers to inspect the employer's
premises and examine his records; and if the officers should find that there have been violations of labor
standards provisions, the Regional Director may, after due notice and hearing, order compliance by the
employer therewith and issue a writ of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement
thereof. However, this power may not, to repeat, be exercised by him where the employer contests the
labor regulation officers' findings and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In such an event, the case will have
to be referred to the corresponding Labor Arbiter for adjudication, since it falls within the latter's
exclusive original jurisdiction.

Fernan, C.J., and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J.,  concurring:

Mr. Justice Sarmiento adjudges it proper to reconsider his ponencia  "in view of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 6715, approved on March 2, 1989," which, "like its predecessors, Executive Order No.
111 and Article 217, as amended ' has retroactive application." I agree, but wish to state that I do so for
the reason that another review of the record of these two cases shows that it is not too certain that the
findings of the labor regulations officers may be deemed uncontested so as to bring said cases within
the competence of the Regional Director, as duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor, in
accordance with Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended. Hence, and in view of the fact that the
aggregate claims involve millions of pesos, it would appear more appropriate that the issue of the
employers' liability therefor be ventilated and determined. not in a summary proceeding before the
Regional Director under Article 123 of the Code, but in accordance with the more formal and
comprehensive proceeding before the Labor Arbiter.

I would also emphasize that neither the Resolution granting reconsideration nor- Republic Act No. 6715
should be construed as modifying the visitorial and enforcement powers conferred on the Secretary of
Labor and his representatives by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended,. Those powers include that
of directing — in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, and on the basis of
findings of labor regulations officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. and
after due notice and hearing — compliance by an employer with labor standards provisions, and the
issuance of writs of execution to the appropriate authority for enforcement thereof. It is noteworthy
that the amount of the employer's liability is not a factor in the determination of the Regional Director's
jurisdiction. However, the power to order compliance with labor standards provisions may not be
exercised where the employer concerned contests the findings of the labor regulation officers and raises
issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal
course of inspection.

I wish to point out, too, that R.A. 6715 gives the Regional Director or any of the duly authorized hearing
officers of the Department of Labor and Employment, jurisdiction to decide through summary
proceeding and after due notice, any case initiated by complaint of any interested party involving the
recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an
employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper ... arising from
employer — employee relations; provided that such complaint does not include a claim for
reinstatement, and provided further, that the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper
does not exceed P5,000.00.

In other words, as already pointed out in the first concurring opinion, the Regional Director now has
exclusive original jurisdiction over a claim for recovery of wages and other monetary claims and
benefits, including legal interest, if the following requisites concur to wit:

1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or

househelper under the Code;

2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and

3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00.
Where these requisites do not co-exist, it is the Labor Arbiters who have exclusive original jurisdiction of
all claims arising from employer-employee relations, other than those for employees' compensation,
social security, medicare and maternity benefits.

In the resolution, therefore, of any question of jurisdiction over a money claim arising from employer-
employee relations, the first inquiry should be into whether the employment relation does indeed still
exist between the claimant and the respondent.

If the relation no longer exists, and the claimant does not seek reinstatement, the case is cognizable by
the Labor Arbiter, not by the Regional Director. On the other hand, if the employment relation still
exists, or reinstatement is sought, the next inquiry should be into the amount involved.

If the amount involved does not exceed P5,000.00, the Regional Director undeniably has jurisdiction. But
even if the amount of the claim exceeds P5,000.00, the claim is not on that account necessarily removed
from the Regional Director's competence. In respect thereof, he may still exercise the visitorial and
enforcement powers  vested in him by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra; that is to say,
he may still direct his labor regulations officers or industrial safety engineers to inspect the employer's
premises and examine his records; and if the officers should find that there have been violations of labor
standards provisions, the Regional Director may, after due notice and hearing, order compliance by the
employer therewith and issue a writ of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement
thereof. However, this power may not, to repeat, be exercised by him where the employer contests the
labor regulation officers' findings and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In such an event, the case will have
to be referred to the corresponding Labor Arbiter for adjudication, since it falls within the latter's
exclusive original jurisdiction.

Fernan, C.J., and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR.

Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district
of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the
barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the Provincial
Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal
district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality
beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added
that “(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864
was approved by the House of Representatives.”
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC which petition sought
the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality
and that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec.
442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code
shall continue to exist and operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the
enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been
void ab initio.

ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation.

HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August
1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San
Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a
choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status
uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal
corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years
when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have
sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was
not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of
the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a
municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class
municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the
Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives,
appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of
the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant
is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.”

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now
be conceded.
WILSON DIU v. CA, GR No. 115213, 1995-12-19

Facts:

on... on several occasions from January 8, 1988 up to and until April 18, 1989, private respondent
Patricia Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store at Naval,
Biliran, all valued at P7,862.55, as... evidenced by receipts of goods marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of
petitioner's Manifestation filed in the trial court, dated August 9, 1991.  Private respondents failed to
pay despite repeated demands.

Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman of Naval and the latter set the case for
hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties
appeared but they failed to reach an amicable settlement.

Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman of Naval and the latter set the case for
hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties
appeared but they failed to reach an amicable settlement.

Accordingly, the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action.[3] Petitioners then filed their
complaint for a sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court of Naval.

the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action.[3] Petitioners then filed their complaint for a
sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court of Naval.

Private respondents, in their Answer,[4] while admitting the indebtedness to petitioner, interposed two
counterclaims, namely, (1) one for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the
boat belonging to petitioners, and (b) another for

P12,000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated.

Aside from petitioners claim and private respondents' counterclaims, the Municipal Trial Court of Naval
also resolved the issue on whether or not there was compliance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1508 on conciliation

Issues:

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant petition is whether or not the confrontations before the
Barangay Chairman of Naval satisfied the requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No. 1508.  This
Court finds for petitioners.

Ruling:

It must be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the Local
Government Code of 1991[12] which took effect on January 1, 1992.  The basic complaint was filed by
petitioners before the trial court on July 10, 1991... before the effectivity of the Local Government Code.
Nevertheless, Sections 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sections 410(b)
and 412, respectively, of the latter law. The pertinent provisions read as follows:

"SEC. 410.  PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT.  -- (b) x x x.  If he (lupon chairman) fails in his
mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall
forthwith set a date for the constitution of the... pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter."

SEC. 412. CONCILIATION.  (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court. n No complaint x x x shall be
filed or instituted in court x x x unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement... has been reached as certified by the
lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman x x x."

Respondent, Patricia Pagba admitted her indebtedness with complainant but she refused to pay
because according to her, complainant has also an unsettled accounts (sic) with her husband.  Hence no
settlement/conciliation was reached and therefore the corresponding complaint... for the dispute may
now be filed in court.

From the foregoing facts, it is undeniable that there was substantial compliance with Presidential Decree
No. 1508 which does not require strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements.  Under
the factual antecedents, it cannot be said that the failure of the... parties to appear before the pan...
pangkat caused any prejudice to the case for private respondents considering that they already refused
conci

The failure of private respondents to specifically allege that there was no compliance with the barangay
conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. All that they alleged in their Answer... r in
the trial court was that "the complaint states no cause of... action" without giving even the semblance of
any reason to support or explain that allegation.  On the other hand, they admitted the confrontations
before the barangay chairman in paragraph 13 of their Answer

Since private respondents failed to duly raise that issue, their defense founded thereon is deemed
waived, especially since they actually did not pursue the issue before the case was set for hearing.  Also,
the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is... not a jurisdictional requirement and
non-co... compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already
acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein... the instant petition is
GRANTED.  The judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 30962 is hereby SET ASIDE,
and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. B-0842 is
hereby REINSTATED, with... costs against private respondents.
CageDig: Jaime Tan Jr. vs CA

G.R. No. 136368; 16 Jan. 2002

Posted by: Diana Calipes Islo on July 19, 2018

FACTS:

On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the
execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan
was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the
property until his death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for
reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as
deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.

RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby declared
and reformed an equitable mortgage;

2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision
P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed,
until paid;

3)xxx.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the decision of the
appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in
the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment
which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day
period of redemption of the petitioner has expired.
On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day
redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13,
1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:

What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner?

HELD:

From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule
51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration
is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be
entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgments or final
resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the
dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate
that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion
thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the
proper court after its entry.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by
providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in
the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the
court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive
effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the
right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural
rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of
redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by
the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with
the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully
followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption. 
Teofilo Martinez vs. People of the Philippines Case Digest

FACTS:

Teofilo Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner
filed a motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper. However, this was denied by the trial court and
prompted petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleged
that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued
the assailed orders.

Later on, petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to litigate as pauper attaching thereto
affidavits by himself and two disinterested persons of his eligibility to avail this privilege. The appellate
court subsequently issued a resolution denying the motion and directing the petitioner to pay the
proper docketing fees within five (5) days from notice. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was also denied by the appellate court. Petitioner then filed a manifestation
through his counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required "under protest" and that the
money was advanced by his counsel. The transmittal was evidenced by two (2) postal money orders
attached to the motion to litigate as pauper.

In the assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner
failed to pay the required docket fees. Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with
the required docket fee. In the second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the latest motion
on the ground that it was short of 150.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion
to appeal as pauper litigant?

RULING:

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The Court held that a
motion to litigate as indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution
of appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil actions. It maintained that the interpretation of the
present rules is more in keeping with the Bill of Rights, which decrees that "free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty."

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with all the evidentiary requirements for
prosecuting a motion to appear in court as pauper. The affidavits executed by himself and two other
disinterested persons were enough to convince the court that petitioner is qualified to litigate as
indigent.

The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion. Accordingly, the case is remanded for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is
further ordered to allow the petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the docket fees he
paid.