Module 5
The
1. Compania Maritima vs CA
Facts:
Concepcion, a civil engineer doing business under the name
Consolidated Construction, had a contract with the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) for the construction of the
airport in Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental.
Concepcion negotiated with petitioner for the shipment to
Cagayan de Oro City of his equipment: one (1) unit payloader,
four (4) units 6x6 Reo trucks and two (2) pieces of water tanks.
He was issued Bill of Lading 113.
Upon arrival to Cagayan De Oro City, the Reo trucks and water
tanks were safely unloaded. However, while unloading the
payloader, the swivel pin of the heel block of the port block of
Hatch No. 2 gave way, causing the payloader to fall.
Consolidated Construction, thru Concepcion demanded a
replacement of the payloader which it was considering as a
complete loss because of the extent of damage. Meanwhile,
petitioner shipped the payloader to Manila and found that the
payloader weighed 7.5 tons and not 2.5 tons as declared in
the Bill of Lading. Petitioner denied the claim for damages,
contending that had Concepcion declared the actual weight of
the payloader, damage to their ship as well as to his payloader
could have been prevented.
Concepcion filed an action for damages against petitioner.
CFI dismissed the complaint stating that the proximate cause
of the fall of the payloader was misrepresentation of the
weight of the payloader, intending to defraud petitioner of the
payment of freight charges and which likewise led to the use
of the heel block of hatch No. 2 in unloading the payloader.
CA reversed decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable.
Held:
Yes. The general rule under Articles 1735 and 1752 of the Civil
Code is that common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently in case the goods
transported by them are lost, destroyed or had deteriorated.
In the instant case, We are not persuaded by the proferred
explanation of petitioner alleged to be the proximate cause of
the fall of the payloader. The extraordinary diligence requires
common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and
foresight and "to use all reasonable means to ascertain the
nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and
to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including
such methods as their nature requires."
The weights stated in a bill of lading are prima facie evidence
of the amount received and the fact that the weighing was
done by another will not relieve the common carrier where it
accepted such weight and entered it on the bill of lading. Mr.
Mariano Gupana, assistant tra􀁆c manager of petitioner, was only 2.5 tons, he did not bother to use the "jumbo"
confirmed in his testimony that the company never checked anymore.
the information entered in the bill of lading. Worse, the
weight of the payloader as entered in the bill of lading was In that sense, therefore, private respondent's act of furnishing
assumed to be correct by Mr. Felix Pisang, Chief Officer of MV petitioner with an inaccurate weight of the payloader upon
Cebu. being asked by petitioner's collector, cannot be used by said
petitioner as an excuse to avoid liability for the damage
While petitioner has proven that private respondent caused, as the same could have been avoided had petitioner
Concepcion did furnish it with an inaccurate weight of the utilized the "jumbo" lifting apparatus which has a capacity of
payloader, petitioner is nonetheless liable, for the damage lifting 20 to 25 tons of heavy cargoes. It is a fact known to the
caused to the machinery could have been avoided by the Chief Officer of MV Cebu that the payloader was loaded
exercise of reasonable skill and attention on its part in aboard the MV Cebu at the Manila North Harbor on August
overseeing the unloading of such a heavy equipment. And 28, 1964 by means of a terminal crane.
circumstances clearly show that the fall of the payloader could
have been avoided by petitioner's crew. Evidence on record However, the petitioner’s act of furnishing inaccurate weight
sufficiently show that the crew of petitioner had been of the payloader constitutes a contributory circumstance to
negligent in the performance of its obligation by reason of the damage caused on the payloader, which mitigates the
their having failed to take the necessary precaution under the liability for damages of petitioner in accordance with Article
circumstances which usage has established among careful 1741 of the Civil Code.
persons, more particularly its Chief Officer, Mr. Felix Pisang,
who is tasked with the over-all supervision of loading and
unloading heavy cargoes and upon whom rests the burden of
deciding as to what particular winch the unloading of the
payloader should be undertaken. While it was his duty to
determine the weight of heavy cargoes before accepting
them. Mr. Felix Pisang took the bill of lading on its face value
and presumed the same to be correct by merely "seeing' it.
Acknowledging that there was a "jumbo" in the MV Cebu
which has the capacity of lifting 20 to 25 ton cargoes, Mr. Felix
Pisang chose not to use it, because according to him, since the
ordinary boom has a capacity of 5 tons while the payloader
 2. Isaac vs A.L. Ammen Transportation
Facts:
Defendant A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc, is a
corporation engaged in the business of transporting
passengers by land for compensation in the Bicol provinces
One of the buses which defendant was operating is Bus No.
31.
Plaintiff boarded said bus as a passenger paying the required
fare from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili, Camarines Sur, but
before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a pick-up
car coming from the opposite direction, as a result of which
plaintiff's left arm was completely severed and the severed
portion fell inside the bus. Plaintiff was rushed to a hospital in
Iriga, Camarines Sur where he was given blood transfusion to
save his life. He was then transferred and stayed in different
hospitals for operation and treatment. He incurred expenses
amounting to P623.40, excluding medical fees which were
paid by defendant.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant for damages
alleging that the collision which resulted in the loss of his left
arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and
recklessness of the driver of the bus operated by defendant
and that defendant incurred in culpa contractual arising from
its non-compliance with its obligation to transport plaintiff
safely to his destination.
Defendant set up as special defense that the injury suffered by
plaintiff was due entirely to the fault or negligence of the
driver of the pick-up car and to the contributory negligence of
plaintiff himself. Defendant further claims that the accident
which resulted in the injury of plaintiff is one which defendant
could not foresee or, though foreseen, was inevitable.
The court after trial found that the collision occurred due to
the negligence of the driver of the pick-up car and not to that
of the driver of the bus it appearing that the latter did
everything he could to avoid the same but that
notwithstanding his efforts, he was not able to avoid it. As a
consequence, the court dismissed the complaint, with costs
against plaintiff. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant observed extraordinary diligence in
avoiding collision.
Held:
Yes. From the above legal provisions (arts. 1733, 1755, 1756 of
NCC, and Code Commission), we can make the following
restatement of the principles governing the liability of a
common carrier: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and
arises upon breach of its obligation. There is breach if it fails to
exert extraordinary diligence according to all the
circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its
passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person,
having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is
presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of
death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove
that it exercised extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is
not an insurer against all risks of travel.
 does not establish lack of care and skill on his part which
After examining the evidence in connection with how the renders the company, liable.
collision occurred, the lower court found that Bus No. 31 was
running at a moderate speed while pickup car was at full A circumstance which militates against the stand of appellant
speed and was running outside of its proper lane. The driver of is the fact borne out by the evidence that when he boarded
the bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was the bus in question, he seated himself on the left side thereof
then running, swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow
road and could not move the bus farther right without outside the window, this being his position in the bus when
endangering the safety of his passengers. And the collision took place. It is for this reason that the collision
notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side of the bus resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of
was hit by the pick-up car. appellant thus doing him a great damage. It is therefore
apparent that appellant is guilty of contributory negligence.
According to appellant, the act of the driver of the bus in Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill with a
squeezing his way through between the oncoming pick-up and portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury would
the pile of gravel under the circumstances was considered have been avoided as is the case with the other passengers. It
negligent. One who is placed in a predicament where he is not is to be noted that appellant was the only victim of the
given enough time to take the proper course of action as he collision.
should under ordinary circumstances, cannot exercise such
coolness or accuracy of judgment as is required of him under
ordinary circumstances and he cannot therefore be expected
to observe the same judgment, care and precaution as in the
latter. Thus, it was held that "where a carrier's employee is
confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is
obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation
must be taken into account, and he is not held to the same
degree of care that he would otherwise be required to
exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise
only such care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise
under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his
part to exercise the best judgment the case renders possible
 3. PNR vs CA
Facts:
Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff Rosario Tupang,
boarded Train No. 516 of PNR at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as
a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical
defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for
repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume
its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at
Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting
in his death.
The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other
passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the
train conductor, Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at
Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the
information. Police authorities of Lucena City were dispatched
to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of
Winifredo Tupang.
Upon complaint, CFI held PNR liable for damages for breach of
contract of carriage. On appeal, Appellate Court sustained the
holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the
utmost diligence required by law of a common carrier.
PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the doctrine of
state immunity from suit. It alleged that it is a mere agency of
the Philippine government without distinct or separate
personality of its own, and that its funds are governmental in
character and, therefore, not subject to garnishment or
execution. The motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not PNR may raise the defense of state immunity.
Whether or not PNR exercised required diligence.
Held:
1. No. Under Sec. 4 of RA 4156 which created PNR, the
PNR has all the powers, the characteristics and
attributes of a corporation under the Corporation Law.
There can be no question then that the PNR may sue
and be sued and may be subjected to court processes
just like any other corporation.
As far back as 1941, this Court in the case of Manila
Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Co., 5 laid
down the rule that "when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation. [Bank of the U.S. v. Planters' Bank, 9
Waitch 904, 6 L. ed. 244]. By engaging in a particular
business through the instrumentality of a corporation,
the government divests itself pro hac vice of its
sovereign character, so as to render the corporation
subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations." Of Similar import is the pronouncement
in Prisco v. CIR, 6 that "when the government engages
in business, it abdicates part of its sovereign
prerogatives and descends to the level of a
citizen, . . . ." In 􀁃ne, the petitioner PNR cannot legally
set up the doctrine of non-suability as a bar to the
plaintiff's suit for damages.
2. No. The appellate court found, the petitioner does not
deny, that the train boarded by the deceased
Winifredo Tupang was so overcrowded that he and
many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the
open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is
likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow
down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was
under repair at the time. Neither did the train stop,
despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a
person had fallen off the train at Iyam Bridge.

The petitioner has the obligation to transport its

passengers to their destinations and to observe
extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury
suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the
presumption that it was negligent in the performance
of its obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as
correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner
failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence
with clear and convincing evidence.

But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary

diligence as required by law, it appears that the
deceased was chargeable with contributory
negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform
between the coaches of the train, he should have held
tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found
at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the
speeding train.