Estrada v.

Desierto
353 SCRA 452 (2001)

Nature:
Former President Joseph Estrada filed two petitions, first, a petition for
prohibition against the Ombudsman for its preliminary investigation on the information
filed for plunder, graft and corruption; and second, a petition for quo warranto against
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Facts:

Former President Joseph Estrada was elected during 1998 elections. Sometime in
October 2000, however, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson went on air and accused
President Joseph Estrada of receiving money from jueteng lords, resulting in Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr.'s privilege speech in the Senate accusing Estrada of the same. 

This led to the joint investigation of the Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on
Justice, and the call of some members of the House of Representatives to impeach
Estrada. Some Congressmen moved to impeach Estrada which caused several sectors,
former Presidents Aquino and Ramos to call for Estrada’s resignation. Some senior
advisers of Estrada as well as a number of his cabinet resigned from their positions.
Impeachment trial commenced with Chief Justice Davide presiding. 

The Senate opened the impeachment trial after receiving the signed Articles of
Impeachment from the House of Representatives. During the trial, a controversy
occurred when a 11-10 vote by the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the
second envelope allegedly containing the petitioner had a secret bank account. EDSA II
ensued, demanding Estrada's resignation. Negotiations in Malacañang occured to
peacefully transition power. 

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn into office. On the same day, Estrada signed a
vaguely worded letter stating that he is unable to exercise the powers of the presidency.
As a result, Arroyo discharged her power's as the President and the Senate terminated
the Impeachment Court. Soon after, several cases were filed against Estrada for plunder,
graft and corruption. 

Estrada then filed the petition for prohibition and petition for quo warranto. Alleging (1)
he did not resign from office, (2) he is only on leave and Arroyo is only an Acting
President, (3) he is inhibited from resigning due to the pending impeachment trial (4)
the President enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, and (5) Ombudsman should be
stopped from conducting the investigation due to public prejudice of guilt.
Issue:
1. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
2. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy,  whether petitioner
Estrada is a president on leave while respondent Arroyo is an acting president. 

Ruling:
 1. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. the legal
distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the
whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances
which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and
the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject
of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the
sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.

Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The
principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 
of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 11 of
Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's
in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.

2. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be

considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the
14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is
a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can
be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of
January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Summary of “Prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and

circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue”

1. The authoritative window on the “state of mind” of the petitioner which was
provided in the diary of his Executive Secretary, Ed Angara
 1. January 19: petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of
the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to
handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled
Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and
exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes)
2. January 19, 2:30PM: The petitioner decided to call for a snap
presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The
proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time.
3. January 29, 3PM: Secretary Angara asked Senator Pimentel to advise
petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."
Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.
4. January 19, 9:30PM: Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the
urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a
sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with
enough funds to support him and his family.Significantly, the petitioner
expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit
but said he would never leave the country.
5. January 19, 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed,
Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the
palace." This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality
that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day
grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
6. January 19, 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary
Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng
(let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."There
was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we
note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and
orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
7. 12:20 a.m. of January 20: first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power
8. 2:30 AM: "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't
want any more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the
bureaucracy, the intrigue.)I just want to clear my name, then I will
go."Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The
intent to resign is clear when he said "Ayoko na masyado nang masakit."
"Ayoko na" are words of resignation
9. 7:30 AM - Second round of Negotiations detailing the plan for the
peaceful transfer of power to VP Arroyo. 

 
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability
and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears:
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge
after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on
his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release
was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.

Estrada v. Desierto and companion case, G.R. No. 146710-15

Resolution on   Motion for Reconsideration, April 3, 2001

Nature:
For resolution are petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15
and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Court's Decision of March 2, 2001.
Doctrine:
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on
the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce it. Reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-
examination (2) absence of demeanor evidence (3) absence of the oath. The Angara
Diary contains direct statements from Estrada which can be categorized as
admissions of a party.
Facts: (essentially same facts with Case 1)
 Estrada was inaugurated as President of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President. `
 In October 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend the
President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from
jueteng and that such was hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a
grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy
across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker
Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit
was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty".
 The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd
continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-
wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as
 lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined
in the thousands of protesters.
 January 19: The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine.
o At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the
beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said
that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a
guilty verdict will remove him from office.
o At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap
presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
 January 20: The Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant,
saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
o At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an
obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang
Palace.
 A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered
by filing a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any
further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president
ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath
as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
 In the Court’s Decision on March 2, 2001, it used the totality test to arrive at the
conclusion that Estrada has resigned.  It referred to and analyzed events that
were prior, contemporaneous[1] and posterior[2] to the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo as president. All the events are facts that are well-established
and cannot be refuted.

Note that with regard to the events contemporaneous to the oath taking of
respondent Arroyo, the court used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on
the part of the petitioner. Specifically, the court analyzed the press release of petitioner
containing his final statement which was issued after the oath-taking. After analyzing
such, the Court ruled that petitioner’s issuance of the press release and his
abandonment of Malacañang confirmed his resignation. These are overt acts which
leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1. WON the Angara diary is inadmissible for being violative of the
following rules on evidence: hearsay, admissions, res inter alios acta,
best evidence, and authentication?
1. Estrada’s Argument: The Court improperly used the Angara Diary.  The
use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on
the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of
hearsay evidence.
2. Court’s Ruling: The Angara diary is not an out of court statement.  The
Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar.  Petitioner cannot
complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary.  Nor can he
feign surprise on its use.  To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred
to by the parties in their pleadings by attaching such as annexes. (In fact,
petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum
both the second and third part of the diary. It was also extensively used by
DOJ Sec Hernando Perez in his oral arguments.  Thus, petitioner had all
the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to
do so)
3. Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court
statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is
called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in
part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other
than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are
three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the
oath (Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Evidence under the Rules). Not at all
hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence.  Over the years, a
huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their
relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.
1. A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we
further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted
from the rules of exclusion.  An examination of our rules of
exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and
the Angara Diary belongs to this class.  
1. Sec 26 of Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.”[1] It has long been settled that these
admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay.
2. The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which
can be categorized as admissions of a party - his proposal for a snap
presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his
statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by
Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by
Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and
“Pagod na pagod na ako.  Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit.  Pagod
na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just want to clear my
name, then I will go.”  We noted that days before, petitioner had
repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing
 clamor for his resignation.  The reason for the meltdown is obvious
- his will not to resign has wilted.

2. Re: Doctrine of Adoptive Assumption

a. Estrada’s argument: The Angara Diary is not my diary! Hence, it is non-
binding on me.
b. Court’s Ruling: The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive
admission.  An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other
person. Jones explains that the “basis for admissibility of admissions
made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the
party of the statements which the other person had made.”

3. WON there is a violation of the rule on res inter alios acta (acts of
others, or transactions between others)
a. Estrada’s argument: The use of the Angara diary violated the rule on res
inter alios acta.  The rule is expressed in Sec 28 of Rule 130 ROC:  “The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided.”
b. Court’s Ruling: Again, petitioner errs in his contention.  The res inter alios
acta rule has several exceptions.  One of them is provided in Sec 29 of Rule
130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
i. Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the
petitioner.  He was the Little President.  Petitioner cannot deny that
Sec Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team
of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly
transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the
presidency.  The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by
Sec. Angara on the progress of their negotiations.  
ii. Sec. Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial
days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. 
Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of
Sec. Angara. Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent
(Sec. Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner).
b. Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently
relevant statements.  These are statements which are relevant
independently of whether they are true or not.  They belong to 2 classes: 
(1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those
statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.  The
second class includes the following:
 i. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental
condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
ii. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness
and the like;
iii. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to
the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive,
good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
iv. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in
question; and
v. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.

4. WON the rules on authentication of private writings and best

evidence were violated
a. Estrada’s argument: Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best
evidence of the Angara diary.  It is secondary evidence, of dubious
authenticity.  It was however used by SC without proof of the
unavailability of the original or duplicate original of the diary.  The “Best
Evidence Rule” should have been applied since the contents of the diary
are the subject of inquiry.
b. Court’s Decision: Petitioner’s contention is without merit.  It is true that
the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001.  In
doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule.
Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that: “Production of the original
may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case
in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the
document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production.”
i. Francisco’s opinion is of the same tenor: “Generally speaking, an
objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought
to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into
application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been
admitted, the rule of exclusion might have successfully been
invoked if proper and timely objection had been taken.  No general
rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the admission of
secondary evidence is set forth.  Suffice it to say here that the
objection should be made in proper season – that is, whenever it
appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and
before the secondary evidence has been admitted.  The objection
itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible question
for the court’s consideration.”
b. Estrada’s argument: The rule governing private documents as evidence
was violated.  The law provides that before any private writing offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
 be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written,
or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
c. Court’s Ruling: On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco
states that: “A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of
documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the
document must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its
admission. However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a
proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly identified
before it was admitted in evidence.

DISPOSITIVE: Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 

NOTES:

1. Admissions of a party should not be confused with declarations against interest,

judicial admission and confessions.
2. Admission distinguished from declaration against interest . – An
admission is distinguishable from a declaration against interest in several
respects.  The admission is primary evidence and is receivable, although the
declarant is available as a witness; it is competent only when the declarant, or
someone identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the action; and need
not have been considered by the declarant as opposed to his interest at the time
when it was made.  The declaration against interest is in the nature of secondary
evidence, receivable only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness; it is
competent in any action to which it is relevant, although the declarant is not a
party to, or in privity with, any party to the action; and it must have been, when
made, to the knowledge of the declarant, against his obvious and real interest. 
(Francisco, Evidence)
3. Admission distinguished from confession.-  The term admission is
distinguished from that of confession.  The former is applied to civil transactions
and to matters of fact in criminal cases not involving criminal intent, the latter to
acknowledgements of guilt in criminal cases.
4. Judicial and extra-judicial admission defined .- A judicial admission is one
so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the
introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of
practice necessary to be observed and complied with. Extra-judicial admission is
one made out of court. The most important distinction between judicial and other
admissions, is that strictly, judicial admissions are conclusive upon the party
making them, while other admissions are, as a rule and where the elements of
estoppel are not present, disputable. 
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents
NATURE: a petition for review on certiorari 
FACTS:
 Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc., arrived in Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the
loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Vasquez, an official pilot of
Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities to navigate the Philippine Roxas
through the Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11,
1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.
2 

 The master , Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot
(Vasquez), the vessel's third mate and a helmsman when the vessel left the port at 1:40
4 

a.m. on February 12, 1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under
5 

way.
 The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque
Channel at mile 172. Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some
vibrations. These occurred at 4:12 a.m. At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran
9 

aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a
16 

result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley
Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
 Subsequently, Wildvalley filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court against Philippine
President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of
Philippine Roxas) for damages
 The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner,
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd; the Court of Appeals rendered reversing the Decision of
the lower court
ISSUE: whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar.
RULING:
 The petition is without merit.
 It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.
 A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law.
The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the
entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be
proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed
and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
 The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence
like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.
 We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant Harbor
Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to testify on the existence of
28 

the pilotage law of Venezuela) and the rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco
29 

River.
 Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner
provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The pilotage law of Venezuela
was published in the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of
32 

the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of

Venezuela. The rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco River is published in a
book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of
33 

the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.

 Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public
documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.
 For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by
his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign
service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere
35 

technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness
of a document in a foreign country.
 It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon
attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a
certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal
custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in the
records of the case.
 At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before
the lower court. A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the
pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the
event or transaction in issue. A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never
38 39 

alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela. 
 under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or
state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is
known as processual presumption.
 Thus, applying the Civil Code, there being no contractual obligation, the master of the
Philippine Roxas is obliged to give only the diligence required of a good father of the
family. This was exercised by showing that the vessel sailed only after the “main engine,
machineries, and other auxiliaries” were checked and found to be in good running
condition; when the master left a competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge
with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master ordered
the inspection of the vessel’s double bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred anew.
 The Philippine rules on pilotage enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a master of a
vessel and its pilot, among other things. The law does provide that the master can
countermand or overrule the order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master
of the Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the
 vessel, mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they were navigating normally
47 

before the grounding of the vessel. Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on account of
48 

his experience he was very familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the
course headings, and that he does not even refer to river charts when navigating the
Orinoco River.
 Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master chose not to
regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited knowledge of the Orinoco River, Captain
Colon relied on the knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel
safely. 
 We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When the vibrations
were first felt the watch officer asked him what was going on, and pilot Vasquez replied
that "(they) were in the middle of the channel and that the vibration was as (sic) a result
of the shallowness of the channel. 
 Pilot Vasquez Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine Roxas as well as
other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge of the same. In his experience
as a pilot, he should have been aware of the portions which are shallow and which are
not. His failure to determine the depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his set
course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent
and liable for its grounding.
 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because the
circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence on the part of the
private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be met:
(1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the
person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. As has
already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the
master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, two of the
requisites necessary for the doctrine to apply, i.e., negligence and control, to render the
respondent liable, are absent.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELBERTO BASE, G.R. No. 109773, March 30,
2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Nature of the case:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

Facts:
Accused-appellant was among those indicted for Murder with Direct Assault Upon a Person
in Authority. He, along with others, was charged for the death of Julianito Luna Tagle, a
Barangay Captain. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial, the RTC found accused
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
based on his alleged extra-judicial confession of the crime. Hence, the present appeal.
Accused contends that his alleged Sworn Statement [extra-judicial confession], which was
taken during the custodial investigation, was inadmissible in evidence because it was
executed in violation of his constitutional rights, firstly his right to counsel of his own choice,
and that he was not adequately assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation. 

Issue:
Whether the Sworn Statement was admissible. [YES. Decision Appealed from is
Affirmed.]

Ratio:
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution embodies the mandatory safeguards afforded a
person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the concomitant duty of the
State and its agencies to enforce such mandate.

Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confessions; Requisites - Numerous

decisions  of this Court rule that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must
[29]

be: 1.] voluntary; 2.] made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3.]
express; and 4.] in writing.   [30]

Same2x; Exclusionary Rule; The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption

that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through
menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. - The mantle of protection afforded by
the above quoted constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is taken
into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime
or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although
not yet in custody.  The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
[31]

defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police

interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is
forcefully apparent.[32]

Same2x; Right to counsel; While the right to counsel is immutable, the option to
secure the services of counsel de parte  is not absolute - The rule is not intended as a
deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires
but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue.  It [33]

must be remembered in this regard that while the right to counsel is immutable, the option
to secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute.  Indeed x x the word
[34]

"preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If
the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the
charter.

“The foregoing testimonial excerpts vividly shows that Atty. Reyes

participation during the custodial investigation of accused was anything but
perfunctory. Much less could it be argued that he was remiss in his duties to
 assist the accused. On the contrary, they in fact underscore his active
participation in the proceedings. 

To support his claim that his sworn statement was irregularly taken, accused-
appellant further insists that the same was obtained through force and paints
a graphic picture of torture at the hands of fifteen persons who repeatedly
beat him up with gun barrels and butts[43] as a result of which he allegedly
lost a tooth and sustained contusions, a busted mouth and broken bones at
his back.[44]”

Indication of Voluntarines in the giving of statements - "bare assertions

of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the
accused are not sufficient in view of the standing rule enunciated in the cases
of People v. Mada-I Santalani;  People v. Balane;  and People v. Villanueva,
[52] [53]

 that where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or

[54]

duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the
officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these were considered by this Court as
factors indicating voluntariness." [ [55]

Same3x; A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the

accused where he never raised any objection against the formers appointment
during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. - While the initial choice in
cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he
may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection
against the formers appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.
[36]

Same3x; The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.
Verily, to be an effective counsel "[a] lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution
to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.  The
[37]

counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth."
[38]

Criminal law; Evidence; ExtraJudicial Confessions; Corpus Delicti; Elements - 

Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]n extrajudicial confession made
by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence
of corpus delicti." In this case the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two
elements of corpus delicti, to wit: a.] a certain result has been proven, i.e. a man has died;
and 2.] some person is criminally responsible. [66]

In this case, it is indubitable that a crime has been committed and that the
other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that accused-appellant had
 conspired with the other accused to commit the crime.  In fact, he was seen
[67]

by the prosecution witnesses in the company of his other co-accused.

Furthermore, Atty. Romeo T. Reyes and the interrogator, Sgt. Romulo
Mercado, testified to the voluntariness of his confession. In this regard, it
must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely requires that there
should be some other evidence "tending to show the commission of the crime
apart from the confession." [68]

Same; Words and Phrases; Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement conerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. -
Conspiracy is alleged in the information charging the accused-appellant of the crime.
Conspiracy "exists when two or more persons come to an agreement conerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the
incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of
interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of the conspirators for the act of
one of them is deemed the act of all." [69]

Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Evident Premeditation; Elements; The

one-week interval when accused-appellant and his co-conspirators first cased the
victims house up to the actual date of the killing underscores the presence of
evident premeditation. - The one-week interval when accused-appellant and his co-
conspirators first cased the victims house up to the actual date of the killing underscores the
presence of evident premeditation. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered,
there must be proof of the following elements thereof, i.e., 1.] the time the offenders
determined to commit the crime; 2.] an act manifestly indicating that they clung to their
determination; and 3.] a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to
allow reflection upon the consequences of the act. Sdjad
[77]

Same3x; Treachery; The essence of alevosia is the swift and unexected attack on
the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the victims part. The fact [79]

that treachery may be shown if the victim is attacked from behind does not mean
it can not also be appreciated if the attack is frontally launched. - Treachery is also
alleged in the information indicting the accused. There is treachery "[w]hen the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." The essence
[78]

of alevosia is the swift and unexected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest
provocation on the victims part. The fact that treachery may be shown if the victim is
[79]

attacked from behind does not mean it can not also be appreciated if the attack is frontally
launched.  Even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and the victim is
[80]

unarmed.  In this case, the suddenness of the shooting without the slightest provocation
[81]

from the victim who was unarmed and had no opportunity to defend himself, clearly
qualified the crime with treachery.[82]
PEOPLE VS CAMPUHAN, 329 SCRA 270 (2000)

“SC in its exercise for automatic review regarding the guilty verdict of statutory rape of Campuhan punishable by
death.”

FACTS:

On 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four year old
Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for
her two children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags
with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado
Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry,
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"  prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her
7 

children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees

According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina, However, physical examination of
the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-
legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.

RTC: Primo Campuhan was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court  a quo  to the extreme
penalty of death

NOTE: The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art.
335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty,
from reclusion perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being
below seven (7) years old

ISSUE:
WON Campuhan is guilty of consummated statutory rape?

RULING:

NO.

The court said that often enough, in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal
orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary.

Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely
for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or
touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any
showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by
the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.

A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving
that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. When the mother was asked what
she saw upon entering her children's room, Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis
on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and
sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was
done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief which the
prosecution failed in this respect. 

This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in
this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis penetrating her vagina,
however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration, obviously induced by a question
propounded to her who could not have been aware of the finer distinctions between touching and
penetration. Although she has shouted “ayoko ayoko”, it only pertained that she was not happy in the
advances of Primo and not that she felt intense pain being inflicted. Although a child's testimony must be
received with due consideration on account of her tender age, the Court endeavors at the same time to
harness only what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the
accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused
cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.

Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external
signs of physical injuries on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that
penetration had taken place. Although the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate
the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact
between the accused and the victim

In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects
complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the
manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results
PEOPLE VS CASTILLO, 325 SCRA 613 (2000)

NATURE OF THE CASE: On automatic review by this Court, appellant impugns solely his
conviction for illegal possession of firearm for which he was sentenced to the supreme penalty
of death.

FACTS:

On or about the 14th day of November, 1995 at about 8 a.m., in the on-going construction site
of Gaisano Building in Lapaz, Iloilo City, ROBERTO LUSTICA, a construction worker, was on the
last rung of the stairs on the third floor of the Gaisano building when he saw his co-
worker ROGELIO ABAWAG being closely pursued by accused JULIAN CASTILLO, a lead man in
the same construction site. During the chase, the accused pointed a gun at Abawag and shot
him. Abawag, then about a half meter away from the accused, fell on his knees beside a pile of
hollow blocks. 

FRANKLIN ACASO , a mason working on the third floor of the Gaisano building, heard the first
shot. Initially, he did not pay attention to it as he thought that the sound came from one of
their construction equipments. Seconds later, he heard a second shot and a person screaming:
"Ouch, that is enough!" When he looked towards the direction of the sound, he saw the
accused in front of Abawag, about a meter away, pointing a .38 caliber revolver at the latter.
Abawag was then leaning on a pile of hollow blocks, pleading for mercy. The accused shot
Abawag a third time despite the latter's imploration. The accused then fled, leaving Abawag
lifeless.

In the RTC, he was convicted of homicide, as the prosecution failed to prove the alleged
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and of Illegal Possession of
Firearm, aggravated by homicide.

NOTE: With the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on June 6, 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or
homicide is now considered, not as a separate crime, but merely a special aggravating circumstance.

ISSUE:
WON the accused was guilty of illegal possession of firearms beyond reasonable doubt

RULING:

NO.

Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the existence of
the subject firearm, and second, the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did
not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus
probandi (burden of proof) of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with
the prosecution.

The first element -- the existence of the firearm -- was indubitably established by the
prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant shoot the victim thrice with a .38
caliber revolver.  Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over the gun to the security
guards in the building after the shooting. The same gun was recovered from the appellant and
offered in evidence by the prosecution. However, no proof was adduced by the prosecution to
establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that the appellant was not licensed to possess
the firearm. This negative fact constitutes an essential element of the crime as mere
possession, by itself, is not an offense. The lack of a license or permit should have been proved
either by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the subject firearm or that the type of firearm
involved can be lawfully possessed only by certain military personnel. Indeed, if the means of
proving a negative fact is equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is on
the party averring said negative fact. As the Information alleged that the appellant possessed
an unlicensed gun, the prosecution is duty-bound to prove this allegation. It is the
prosecution who has the burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the crime charged, consistent with the basic principle that an accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty. Thus, if the non-existence of some fact is a constituent element of the
crime, the onus is upon the State to prove this negative allegation of non-existence.

Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself admitted that he had no license for
the gun recovered from his possession, his admission will not relieve the prosecution of its duty
to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit to possess the
gun. Additionally, as pointed out by both the appellant and the Solicitor General, the
extrajudicial admission was made without the benefit of counsel. Thus, we hold that the
appellant may only be held liable for the crime of simple homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. 138471. October 10, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN
PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.

NATURE:
On 27 January 1995, an information for rape was filed against accused-appellant Manuel
Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez (hereafter PRUNA).
FACTS:
On January 3, 1995, when 3-year old Lizette Gonzales was defacating at the river bank,
Pruna called the girl to come with him in a grassy portion near his house and there, he succeed
in raping the girl.
The prosecution presented several witnesses to prove the crime, namely:
1. Jacqueline Gonzales, mother of the victim – after fetching water in a nearby artesian
well, she went looking for her daughter whom she found red-faced, crying and very
frightened. When asked where she came from, she answered that a certain “Boy”
brought her to a grassy area near Gloria’s house and molested her. She then reported
the matter to the police and brought Lizette to the Bataan Provincial Hospital.
2. Lizette Gonzales herself – She pointed to Pruna and positively identified him as the
“Boy” she earlier referred to. She also said that Boy brought her to a grassy area and
inserted his penis into her vagina. When asked by the judge whether she knew that it is
a sin to tell a lie, she answered in the affirmative.
3. Dr. Emelita Quiroz, the OBGYN in Bataan Provincial Hospital – she conducted a complete
physical examination on Lizette and requested to urinalysis on the child. The Medico-
Legal report found no laceration was found on the victim’s organ but there was
hyperemia or reddening in the vaginal opening and there were also sperm cells found in
Lizette’s vaginal canal.
4. Teresita Magtagnob, the RMT who conducted the lab exams – she testified on the
presence of sperm cell in the smear specimen and urine taken from Lizette.
5. SPO2 Romeo Bunsoy – upon ocular visit in the alleged crime scene, he found that there
was an area where the grass is flattened.
The defense presented the following witnesses
 1. Carlito Bondoc – who said that there can be no rape since he saw Jacqueline and Lizette
both going home after fetching water from the well. He also said that Pruna was in his
house and is physically impossible to be on the grassy area.
2. Manuel or Erman Pruna himself – he denied the rape since according to him, he is in his
house preparing coffee for Carlito.
RTC RULING:
After trial, PRUNA was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape in its qualified
form and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the victim in the
sum of P50,000, plus costs.
ISSUES:
As culled from the arguments of the parties, the issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
(1) Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she was allegedly
only 3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and 5 years old when she testified;
(2) Whether Jacquelines testimony as to the declarations of LIZETTE is hearsay;
(3) Whether the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria Tolentino as a witness is fatal;
(4) Whether appellants guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(5) Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority has been duly proved as to justify the
imposition of the death penalty.
RULING:
1. Lizette’s competency and credibility as a witness
As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on
ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject
the witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency. The burden is,
therefore, upon the party objecting to the competency of a witness to establish
the ground of incompetency.
It is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if
he can perceive and, in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and
that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is examined.
In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must
consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that
he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation
of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly to the court at the time he is offered
as a witness.
In this case, the defense failed to discharge the burden of showing
Lizette’s mental immaturity.
2. The alleged hearsay testimony of Jaqueline Gonzales
The term hearsay as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence
which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it
 is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and
weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is
measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness
to that fact, and consequently not subject to cross-examination.
The hearsay evidence rule only holds water if the declarant does not
testify. The reason for the exclusion of the hearsay evidence rule is that the party
against whom the hearsay evidence is presented is deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine.
In the instant case, the declarant (LIZETTE) herself was sworn as a witness
to the fact testified to by Jacqueline. The appellant even cross-examined her
(LIZETTE). Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe her manner
of testifying. Hence, Jacqueline's testimony on the incident related to her by her
daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.
3. Non-presentation of Gloria Tolentino as Witness
Appellant harps on the prosecution's failure to put on the witness stand
Gloria Tolentino, who was listed as a witness that she saw the appellant carrying
and bringing LIZETTE to a grassy area at the back of her house.
It is undisputed that at the time the case was called for trial, Gloria had
already moved out of her residence in Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, and could not be
found anymore. In any event, her intended testimony could be dispensed with,
as it would only be corroborative of LIZETTEs testimony that Pruna brought her
to a grassy area.
4. Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s evidence against appellant
In a nutshell, the following overwhelmingly establish the truth of the
charge of rape: (a) the spontaneity of the identification by LIZETTE of PRUNA as
the rapist; (b) her immediate revelation to her mother of the dastard act
committed against her; (c) her act of leading her mother to appellants house
right after the incident; (d) the prompt filing of the complaint before the
authorities; (e) LIZETTEs submission to medical examination; (f) the hyperemia in
her private part; and (g) the presence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and
urine.
The court, however, is not oblivious in the absence of any laceration on
the victim’s organ. It is well-settled that rape is consummated by the slightest
penile penetration of the labia or pudendum of the female. Hence, the
hyperemia found in the vaginal opening of Lizette is sufficient to constitute rape.
5. Sufficiency of evidence of Lizette’s minority and propriety of the impositions of the
death penalty.
Article 335, seventh paragraph, no. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that the death penalty shall be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years
old. A person’s age is best proved by the birth certificate. But is the presentation
of the victim’s birth certificate a sine qua non requirement to prove her age for
the appreciation of minority either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance? Recent jurisprudence has conflicting pronouncements.
 Cases where no birth certificate was presented and the Court rules that
the age of the victim was NOT duly proved:
a. People vs Vargas
b. People vs Javier
c. People vs Brigildo
d. People vs Tipay
e. People vs Cula
f. People vs Veloso
g. People vs Pecayo
h. People vs Tundag
i. People vs Geraban
j. People vs Liban
k. People vs Llandelar
l. People vs Alvarado
Cases where no birth certificate was presented and the Court rules that
the age of the victim was sufficiently established:
a. People vs Rafales
b. People vs De la Cruz
c. People vs Bali-balita
d. People vs Velasco
e. People vs Remundo
f. People vs Llanita
g. People vs Agustin
h. People vs Esuela
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the
foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age,
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1.  The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such
as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of
the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
 1. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
2. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
3. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
b. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused. cräläwvirtualibräry
78

c. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.
In the present case, since the court only relied on the testimony of Jacqueline
as to the age of Lizette, and no corroborative evidence such as birth certificate,
baptismal, or other authentic docs were introduced, Pruna cannot be convicted
of qualified rape, and hence, death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing guidelines, the
testimony of LIZETTEs mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for
statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age. Under the second
paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the
first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of
age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on
PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.
As regards the civil liability of PRUNA, the indemnity in the amount of
P50,000 awarded by the trial court is not sufficient. In accordance with recent
jurisprudence, LIZETTE should also be awarded moral damages in the amount of
P50,000 without need of pleading or proof because the mental, physical and
psychological trauma suffered by her is too obvious

G.R. No. 119053 January 23, 1997

FLORENTINO ATILLO III, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, AMANCOR, INC. and MICHELL
LHUILLIER, Respondents.
(judicial admission)
NATURE:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 3677 promulgated on August 4, 1994 affirming in toto the decision of Branch 7 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-9801 entitled "Florentino L. Atillo III
versus Amancor, Inc. and Michell Lhuillier".
FACTS:
Respondent Amancor, a corporation owned and controlled by Atillo, contracted a loan
amounting to Php 1 million with Metrobank, secured by real estate properties owned by Atillo.
Before the loan could be paid, Atillo entered into the following MOA:
1. First MOA – entered with Lhuillier
Lhuillier bought shares of stock in Amancor. As a result, Atillo and Lhuillier each
became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of Amancor while the officers of the
corp owned the remaining 6%.
2. Second MOA – entered in view of the urgent need for fresh capital
Lhuillier undertook to invest additional capital to Amancor.
3. Third MOA – addendum to the second MOA (most relevant in this case)
“F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario St., Cebu City
which may involve pre-payment of AMANCOR'S mortgage loan to the bank
estimated at P300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet be in the position to
re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to
prevailing bank rate”
After offsetting the amount of P300,000.00 with some of the accounts that Atillo
had with Amancor, the amount which remained due was P199,888.99. However, Amancor
failed to pay Atillo with the remained which prompted him to file a complaint for collection of a
sum of money AGAINST AMANCOR AND LHUILLIER.
RULING OF THE RTC:
On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the written arguments of the parties, the trial
court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, ordering AMANCOR to pay petitioner the
amount of P199,888.89 with interest equivalent to the bank rate prevailing as of March 11,
1989. LHUILLIER was, however, absolved of any personal liability therefor. 
The RTC did not pierce the veil of corporate fiction as it can only be done when the
corporation is used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where
necessary to achieve equity or when necessary for the protection of the creditors, Otherwise, it
shall be maintained that the corporation and its members has separate and distinct personality
from one another.
RULING OF THE CA:
Atillo appealed to the CA saying that respondent shall be held liable as Lhuillier signed
the MOA and that Lhuillier shall be held jointly and severally liable with Amancor.
 The CA found no merit on Atillo’s contention. This prompted Atillo to elevate the case in
the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a court is allowed to rule against judicial admissions.
RULING OF THE SC:
Atillo claims that Lhuillier made a judicial admission of his personal liability in his Answer
wherein he stated that:
3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally without
the official participation of Amancor, Inc.
He also claims that the CA absolving Lhuillier of personal liability is contrary to Section 4
of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which says that: An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.
However, the SC begs to disagree.
The general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive and does not require proof
admits of two exceptions:
1. When it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake;
2. When it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. (Here, it allows one to
contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission or that he was
taken out of context.)
In this case, Lhuillier was taken out of context as Atillo is seemingly misleading the court
by singling out the aforementioned provision when it shall be interpreted and construed
together with the other provisions of the MOA. 
It is clear that in spite of the presence of a judicial admission of a party, the trial court is
still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. This rule should apply with more
reason when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the trial court on the
basis of the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts entered into
during the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's
liability shall be based on the Memoranda of Agreement designated as ANNEXES "A", "B" and
"C" of the Complaint. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the provisions contained in the
said Memoranda of Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of personal liability for the
obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED and this petition is DENIED.
 G.R. No. 124832           February 1, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANTE CEPEDA y SAPOTALO, accused-appellant.
NATURE:
Information for rape filed by Conchita Mahomoc against Dante Cepeda y Sapotalo.
FACTS:
On April 2, 1994 Dante went to the house of Conchita to ask her to go to his house and
massage his wife who was suffering from stomach ache. Regina Carba, was in her house that
time and was asked by Conchita to go with her. Upon arriving at Dante’s place, he told that
Regina had to leave as his wife would get angry if there are plenty of people in their house, to
which Gina obliged. When Conchita was led to the bedroom, Dante immediately placed his arm
around her shoulders and pointed a knife at the pit of her stomach. She elbowed him and
shouted for help but Dante covered his mouth. Inside the room, he threatened her with a knife
and ordered her to remove her panty and lie on the bed. He then placed himself on top of her
and inserted his penis inside her vagina.
During trial, Regina confirmed the narration of Conchita in the aspect of her being
shooed away by Dante. A certain Veronica Delmiguiz also affirmed that she heard a shout for
help from the house of Dante but she did not give it a second thought thinking that it was a
family trouble.
In his defense, Dante claims that he and Conchita are lovers and that they have already
had sexual intercourse previously. He said that Conchita only initiated the entire proceedings
after he turned down her proposal to elope. Also according to him, his request to massage his
wife is a pre-arranged lie between him and Conchita. 
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of Conchita and found Dante guilty of the crime of rape
beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave error in finding the accused-appellant
guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Guided by the three (3) principles in the review of rape cases, namely, that —
1.] An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent to disprove;
2.] In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution;
and
 3.] The evidence of the prosecution stands or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from weakness of the defense
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
In a prosecution for rape, the evaluation of evidence presented during trial ultimately
revolves around the credibility of the complaining witness. In scrutinizing the credibility of
witnesses, case law has established the following doctrinal guidelines: (ON JUDICIAL NOTICE)
a. first, the appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings of the lower court unless there is
a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case; 
b. second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect and even finality since it had the opportunity to examine their
demeanor as they testified on the witness stand; and 
c. third, a witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
Hence, the court finds no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, with the sole MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Dante y Sapotalo pay
complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity consistent with
controlling case law, aside from the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 6246 finding accused Dante
Cepeda y Sapotalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED in
all other respects.