UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION Although this was stated within the context of collective

bargaining, it applies equally well to cases, such as the

US. NLRC (1993) present wherein the union, through its president, presented
its individual members' grievances through proper
FACTS: proceedings.

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION (The Union),
filed complaints against the University of Pangasinan
(University for brevity) before the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC in Dagupan City, for non payment of benefits under P.D.
No. 1713 and emergency cost of living allowance (ecola) to
part-time teachers, nonpayments of extra loads during
typhoons and for nonpayment of all ecolas to faculty
members who were also members of the union;
While the complaints might not have disclosed the identities
of the individual employees claiming monetary benefits, such
technical defect should not be taken against the claimants,
especially because the University appears to have failed to
demand a bill of particulars during the proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter.
Summary of facts:

IMPORTANT COMPLAINT IN THIS CASE RELEVANT TO THE The union filed a complaint against the university for
TOPIC is the April 27, 1981 complaint: for nonpayment of all nonpayment of ecolas to faculty members who were also
ecolas for April 1-15, 1981 to faculty members who were also members of the union.
members of the union;
However, when the la promulgated his decision, he only
LA: that since the salary paid to Consuelo Abad and other decided a decision affecting only consuelo abad (the president
faculty members for the April 1-15, 1981 period had been of union)
earned "as part of their salary for the ten-month period," she
was no longer entitled to an emergency cost of living Hence this appeal by the union..
allowance. He added that "payment of emergency cost of
living allowance is based on actual work performed except
when they (employees) are on leave with pay." Hence,
because classes ended in March 1981, the teachers who did
not report for work could not be considered on leave with
pay and, therefore, they were not entitled to an emergency
cost of living allowance.

NLRC: AFFIRMED LA RULING.

Hence, this petition.

CONTENTION OF UNION: they prayed to be declared as

possessed with capacity to represent its members in the
complaints it filed thru its president, Miss Consuelo Abad
against the university. That the cases filed by Consuelo Abad
as its president of union should affect, not only herself, but all
the other union members similarly situated as she was.

The petitioner is that it is the holder of Registration Certificate

No. 9865-C, having been registered with the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment As such, petitioner possessed the
legal personality to sue and be sued under its registered
name. Corollarily, its president, Consuelo Abad, correctly filed
the complaints even if some of them involved rights and
interest purely or exclusively appertaining to individual
employees, it appearing that she signed the complaints "for
and in behalf of the University of Pangasinan Faculty Union."

CONTENTION OF UNIVERSITY: the union had no legal

personality to institute and prosecute money claims must,
therefore, fail.

ISSUE: won the union president abad may institute complaint

to represent all the other members of the union similarly
situated as she was?

Or WON the union has legal personality to institute and

prosecute money claims?

RULING: YES.

To quote then Associate Justice Teehankee in Heirs of

Teodelo M. Cruz v. CIR, "[w]hat should be borne in mind is
that the interest of the individual worker can be better
protected on the whole by a strong union aware of its moral
and legal obligations to represent the rank and file faithfully
and secure for them the best wages and working terms and
conditions x x x."
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. LAGUESMA
Facts: ‘
Petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
(PICOP) is engaged in the manufacture of paper and timber
products in Tabon, Surigao Del Sur
It has over 9,000 employees, 944 of whom are supervisory
and technical staff employees. More or less 487 of these
supervisory and technical staff employees are signatory
members of the private respondent PICOP-Bislig Supervisory
and Technical Staff Employees Union (PBSTSEU).
PBSTSEU instituted a Petition for Certification Election to
determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP for
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) purposes.
The initial hearing of the petition was set on August 18, 1989
but it was reset to August 25, 1989 for PICOP to file
comment/position paper, which it failed. Meanwhile, private
respondents Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and
Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed their respective petitions
for intervention.
Med-Arbiter Arturo L. Gamolo granted FFW & ALU
interventions. Another order, set the holding of a certification
election among PICOP’s supervisory and technical staff
employees, with four (4) choices, namely: (1) PBSTSEU; (2)
FFW; (3) ALU; and (4) no union.
During the pre-election conference in 1990, PICOP
questioned and objected to the inclusion of some section
heads and supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it
averred were reclassified as managerial employees in the
light of the reorganization effected by it.
Under the Revised Organizational Structure of the PICOP, the
company was divided into four (4) main business groups,
namely: Paper Products Business, Timber Products Business,
Forest Resource Business and Support Services Business.
A vice-president or assistant vice-president heads each of
these business groups. A division manager heads the divisions
comprising each business group. A department manager
heads the departments comprising each division. Section
heads and supervisors, now called section managers and
unit managers, head the sections and independent units,
respectively, comprising each department.
PICOP advanced the view that considering the alleged
present authority of these section managers and unit
managers to hire and fire, they are classified as managerial
employees, and hence, ineligible to form or join any labor
organization.
Public respondent LAGUESMA, as the then Undersecretary of
of the Secretary, declared that the subject supervisors and
section heads are supervisory employees eligible to vote in
the certification election.
HENCE THIS APPEAL.
CONTENTION OF PICOP: the positions Section Heads and
Supervisors, who have been designated as Section Managers
and Unit Managers, as the case maybe, were converted to
managerial employees under the decentralization and
reorganization program it implemented in 1989. Being
managerial employees, with alleged authority to hire and fire
employees, they are ineligible for union membership under
Article 245 of the Labor Code. That no malice should be
imputed against it for implementing its decentralization
program only after the petition for certification election was
filed inasmuch as the same is a valid exercise of its
management prerogative, and that said program has long
been in the drawing boards of the company, which was
realized only in 1989 and fully implemented in 1991.
ISSUE: WON THE SECTION HEADS AND SUPERVISORS
DESIGNATED AS SECTION MANAGERS AND UNIT MANAGERS
ARE MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES INELIGIBLE FOR UNION
MEMBERSHIP?
RULING: NO. NOT INELIGIBLE.
First, In United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v.
Laguesma, we had occasion to elucidate on the term
“managerial employees.” Managerial employees are ranked
as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line Managers.
Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise,
implement and control strategic and operational policies
while the task of First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that
such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees
of an organization. Under this distinction, “managerial
employees” therefore fall in two (2) categories, namely, the
“managers” per se composed of Top and Middle Managers,
and the “supervisors” composed of First-Line Managers.
Thus, the mere fact that an employee is designated
“manager” does not ipso facto make him one. Designation
should be reconciled with the actual job description of the
employee, for it is the job description that determines the
nature of employment.
In the petition before us, a thorough dissection of the job
description of the concerned supervisory employees and
section heads indisputably show that they are not actually
managerial but only supervisory employees since they do
not lay down company policies. PICOP’s contention that the
subject section heads and unit managers exercise the
authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite misleading
for the reason that any authority they exercise is not
supreme but merely advisory in character. Theirs is not a
final determination of the company policies inasmuch as any
action taken by them on matters relative to hiring,
promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of
employees is still subject to confirmation and approval by
their respective superior. Thus, where such power, which is
in effect recommendatory in character, is subject to
evaluation, review and final action by the department heads
and other higher executives of the company, the same,
although present, is not effective and not an exercise of
independent judgment as required by law.

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. VS.
FERRER-CALLEJA
FACTS:
On June 21, 1985 Beneco Worker’s Labor Union-Association
of Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to as
BWLU- ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank
and file employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as BENECO) in Benguet alleging, that
BENECO has in its employ two hundred and fourteen (214)
rank and file employees; that one hundred and ninety-eight
(198) or 92.5% of these employees have supported the filing
of the petition; that no certification election has been
conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no existing
collective bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees sought to represented by BWLU-ADLO; and, that
there is no collective bargaining agreement in the
cooperative.
An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco
Employees Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as BELU)
contending that it was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the subject workers pursuant to
an order issued by the med-arbiter on October 20, 1980; that
pending resolution by the National Labor Relations
Commission are two cases it filed against BENECO involving
bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the
pendency of these cases bars any representation question.
BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the that
the employees sought to be represented by BWLUADLO are
not eligible to form, join or assist labor organizations of their
own choosing because they are members and joint owners of
the cooperative.
On September 2, 1985 the med-arbiter issued an order giving
due course to the petition for certification election. However,
the med- arbiter limited the election among the 37 rank and
file employees of petitioner who are non-members thereof
and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the
cooperative. With the following choices: 1. BENECO
WORKERS LABOR UNION-ADLO 2. BENECO EMPLOYEES
LABOR UNION
3. NO UNION
The ordered certification election was held on October 1,
1986. BENECO submitted a certification showing that only
four (4) employees are not members of BENECO and insisted
that only these employees are eligible to vote in the
certification election. Canvass of the votes showed that BELU
garnered 49 of the eighty-three 83 “valid” votes cast.
Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by
filing a Protest.
Med-arbiter dismissed the protest and Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) director Pura affirmed the med- arbiter’s
order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.
Hence this appeal.
CONTENTION OF BENECO: the certification election held on
October 1, 1986 was null and void since members-employees
of petitioner cooperative who are not eligible to form and
join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining were
allowed to vote therein.
RESPONDENT DIRECTOR & BELU: that members of a
cooperative who are also rank and file employees are eligible
to form, assist or join a labor union.
ISSUE: whether or not employees of a cooperative are
qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining?
RULING: NO.
The issue of whether or not employees of a cooperative are
qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining had already been resolved and clarified
in the case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v.
FerrerCalleja, et al. and reiterated in the cases of Batangas-I
Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al. and San Jose
City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and
Employment, et al. wherein the Court had stated that the
right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee
of a cooperative who at the same time is a member and co-
owner thereof. With respect, however, to employees who
are neither members nor co-owners of the cooperative they
are entitled to exercise the rights to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the
1987 Constitution and applicable statutes.
Respondent director argues that to deny the members of
petitioner cooperative the right to form, assist or join a labor
union of their own choice for purposes of collective
bargaining would amount to a patent violation of their right
to self-organization.
That ‘ “albeit a person assumes a dual capacity as rank and
file employee and as member of a certain cooperative does
not militate, as in the instant case, against his/her exercise of
the right to self-organization and to collective bargaining
guaranteed by the Constitution and Labor Code because,
while so doing, he/she is acting in his/her capacity as rank
and file employee thereof.’
BELU, claims that since membership in petitioner cooperative
is only nominal, the rank and file employees who are
members thereof should not be deprived of their right to self-
organization.
The above contentions are untenable. Contrary to
respondents’ claim, the fact that the members-employees of
petitioner do not participate in the actual management of
the cooperative does not make them eligible to form, assist
or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining with petitioner. The Court’s ruling in the Davao
City case that members of cooperative cannot join a labor
union for purposes of collective bargaining was based on the
fact that as members of the cooperative they are co-owners
thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective
bargaining for “certainly an owner cannot bargain with
himself or his co-owners.” [Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao
City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra.] It is the fact of
ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement in the
management thereof, which disqualifies a member from
joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus,
irrespective of the degree of their participation in the actual
management of the cooperative, all members thereof
cannot form, assist or join a labor organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining.
Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in
a cooperative is “enough to take away the constitutional
protections afforded to labor, then there would be no
hindrance for employers to grant, on a scheme of generous
profit sharing, stock bonuses to their employees and
thereafter claim that since their employees are not
stockholders [of the corporation], albeit in a minimal and
involuntary manner, they are now also co-owners and thus
disqualified to form unions.” To allow this, would be “to allow
the floodgates of destruction to be opened upon the rights of
labor which the Constitution endeavors to protect and which
welfare it promises to promote.”

The above contention of respondent union is based on the

erroneous presumption that membership in a cooperative is
the same as ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations.
While cooperatives may exercise some of the rights and
privileges given to ordinary corporations provided under
existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy other privileges not
granted to the latter [See Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8, Pres. Decree
No. 175; Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City v. Ferrer-
Calleja, supra.] Similarly, members of cooperatives have
rights and obligations different from those of stockholders
of ordinary corporations. It was precisely because of the
special nature of cooperatives, that the Court held in the
Davao City case that members-employees thereof cannot
form or join a labor union for purposes of collective
bargaining.

in the Davao City case The Court held that:

A cooperative ... is by its nature different from an

ordinary business concern being run either by
persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its owners
and/or members are the ones who run and operate
the business while the others are its employees.

It is important to note that, in her order dated September 2,

1985, medarbiter Elnora V. Balleras made a specific finding
that there are only thirty-seven (37) employees of petitioner
who are not members of the cooperative and who are,
therefore, the only employees of petitioner cooperative
eligible to form or join a labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining.

However, the minutes of the certification election show that

a total of eighty-three (83) employees were allowed to vote
and of these, forty-nine (49) voted for respondent union.
Thus, even if We agree with respondent union’s contention
that the thirty seven (37) employees who were originally non-
members of the cooperative can still vote in the certification
election since they were only “forced and compelled to join
the cooperative on pain of disciplinary action,” the
certification election held on October 1, 1986 is still null and
void since even those who were already members of the
cooperative at the time of the issuance of the med-arbiter’s
order, and therefore cannot claim that they were forced to
join the union, were allowed to vote in the election.

Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that:

To have a valid, election, at least a majority of all eligible

voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union
receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified
as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit . . .
[Italics supplied.]

In this case it cannot be determined whether or not

respondent union was duly elected by the eligible voters of
the bargaining unit since even employees who are ineligible
to join a labor union within the cooperative because of their
membership therein were allowed to vote in the
certification election. THEREFORE, CERTIFICATION ELECTION
SET ASIDE.

SAN JOSE CITY ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE,
INC. (SAJELCO) VS. MINISTRY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT
FACTS:
In 1986, private respondent Manggagawang Nagkakaisa ng
SAJELCO __ Association of Democratic Labor Organization
(MAGKAISA-ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification
election with the Regional Office No. 111 of the Department
of Labor and Employment in San Fernando, Pampanga. The
petition alleged that MAGKAISA-ADLO is a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment; that there are more or less fifty-four (54) rank
and file employees in SAJELCO; that almost 62% of the
employees sought to be represented have supported the
filing of the petition; that there has been no valid certification
election held in SAJELCO during the twelve (12) month period
prior to the filing of the petition and that there is no other
union in the bargaining unit.
In its answer, SAJELCO opposed the petition for direct
certification election contending, that the employees who
sought to be represented by private respondent are
members-consumers of the Cooperative itself and at the
same time composed the General Assembly which, pursuant
to the By-laws is also the final arbiter of any dispute arising in
the Cooperative.
MED ARBITER: granting the petition for direct certification
election. that while some of the members of petitioner union
are members of the cooperative, it cannot be denied that
they are also employees within the contemplation of the
Labor Code and are therefore entitled to enjoy all the
benefits of employees, including the right to self-
organization.
This Order was appealed by SAJELCO to the Bureau of Labor
Relations. Reiteration its position that: there is a merger of
the consumer-members that composed of the assembly and
that of the rank-and-file members of the petitioners __ into
one person or juridical status thus rendering the proposed
collective bargaining agent ineffective and/ or uncalled for.
Respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
dismissed the appeal and sustained the ruling of the Med-
Arbiter.
SAJELCO filed the instant petition that order be rendered
denying the holding or conduct of a certification election
among the rank and file employees of SAJELCO.
SOLICITOR GENERAL in its comment: (1) that the union-
members who seek to be represented by the union are the
very members of the cooperative, thereby resulting in a
fusion of two personalities. Thus, it will be inconsistent for
the union-members to bargain with themselves. (2) he said
that article 243 of the Labor Code requires that before one
can form, join or assist a labor union, he must first be
employed and to be an employee one must be under hire and
must have no involvement in the ownership of the firm. A
labor union is formed for purposes of collective bargaining.
The duty to bargain exists only between employer and
employees and not between an employer and his co-owners.
(3) he also said that under the National Electrification Decree
(P.D. No. 269, August 6, 1973) members of an electric
cooperative such as petitioner, besides contributing
financially to its establishments and maintenance, participate
in its management. In the latter aspect, they possess the
powers and prerogatives of managerial employees who are
not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization
Respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations filed a
comment: members of private respondent union fall under
the general provision of Article 244 of the Code on who are
qualified to form, join or assist in the formation of unions as
they are neither managerial employees nor persons
belonging to subversive organizations.
CONTENTION OF SAJELCO: that its employees are also
members of the cooperative. It cited Section 17(18) of its By-
laws which declares that:
“The Board shall also create positions for subordinate
employees and fix their duties and remunerations. Only
member-consumers or members of their immediate family
shall be employed by the cooperative” (Italics supplied).
ISSUE: whether or not the employees-members of an electric
cooperative can organize themselves for purposes of
collective bargaining?
RULING: Only the rank and file employees who are not its
members-consumers can.
The above-cited provision, however, mentions two types of
employees, namely:
1. the members-consumers; and
2. the members of their immediate families.
As regards employees of SAJELCO who are members-
consumers, the rule is settled that they are not qualified to
form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of
collective bargaining. The reason for withholding from
employees of a cooperative who are members-co-owners
the right to collective bargaining is clear: an owner cannot
bargain with himself.
However, employees who are not members-consumers may
form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of
collective bargaining notwithstanding the fact that employees
of SAJELCO who are not members-consumers were
employed ONLY because they are members of the
immediate family of members-consumers. The fact remains
that they are not themselves members-consumers, and as
such, they are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to
organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as
are enshrined in Section 8, Article III and Section 3, Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution, Labor Code of the Philippines and
other related laws.
The assailed Order of respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations is hereby MODIFIED to the
effect that only the rank and file employees of petitioner
who are not its members-consumers are entitled to self-
organization, collective bargaining, and negotiations, while
other employees who are members-consumers thereof
cannot enjoy such right. The direct certification election
conducted on April 13, 1987 is hereby set aside.

PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC. VS.
NLRC
FACTS:
PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing
and marketing of electronic products.
Since 1971, it had a total of six (6) collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) with private respondent Philips
Employees Organization-FFW (PEO- FFW), a registered labor
union and the certified bargaining agent of all the rank and
file employees of PIDI.
In the first CBA (1971- 1974), the supervisors referred to in
R.A. No. 875, confidential employees, security guards,
temporary employees and sales representatives were
excluded from the bargaining unit.
In the second to the fifth CBAs (1975-1977; 1978-1980; 1981-
1983; and 1984-1986), the sales force, confidential
employees and heads of small units, together with the
managerial employees, temporary employees and security
personnel, were specifically excluded from the bargaining
unit. The confidential employees are the division secretaries
of light/telecom/data and consumer electronics, marketing
managers, secretaries of the corporate planning and business
manager, fiscal and financial system manager and audit and
EDP manager, and the staff of both the General Management
and the Personnel Department.
In the sixth CBA covering the years 1987 to 1989, it was
agreed upon, among others, that the subject of inclusion or
exclusion of service engineers, sales personnel and
confidential employees in the coverage of the bargaining unit
would be submitted for arbitration.
Pursuant thereto, on June 1987, PEO-FFW filed a petition
before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) praying for an
order “directing the parties to select a voluntary arbitrator in
accordance with its rules and regulations.” and regulations.”
As the parties failed to agree on a voluntary arbitrator, the
BLR endorsed the petition to the Executive Labor Arbiter of
the National Capital Region for compulsory arbitration
pursuant to Article 228 of the Labor Code.
LA: rendered decision, ordering the respondent to conduct a
referendum to determine the will of the service engineers,
sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion in the
bargaining unit.
NLRC: declaring respondent company’s Service Engineers,
Sales Force, division secretaries, all Staff of General
Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations Department,
Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are included
within the rank and file bargaining unit. Anchored on Article
245 of the Labor Code, as amended:
“x x x all workers, except managerial employees and security
personnel, are qualified to join or be a part of the bargaining
unit. xxx”
ISSUE: won serrvice engineers, sales representatives and
confidential employees (division secretaries, staff of general
management, personnel and industrial relations department,
secretaries of audit, EDP and financial system) may be part of
the existing bargaining unit for the rank and file employees of
PIDI?
CONTENTION OF PETITIONER(PIDI): said employees should
not be absorbed by the existing bargaining unit.
(1)The inclusion of the group in the existing bargaining unit
would run counter to the history of the parties’ CBA. The
parties’ five (5) previous CBAs consistently excluded this
group of employees from the scope of the bargaining unit.
The relationale for such exclusion is that these employees
hold positions which are highly sensitive, confidential and of a
highly fiduciary nature; to include them in the bargaining unit
may subject the company to breaches in security and the
possible revelation of highly sensitive and confidential
matters. It would cripple the company’s bargaining position
and would give undue advantage to the union.
(2) The absence of mutuality of interests between this group
of employees and the regular rank and file militates against
such inclusion. (they have incentives that R&F employees do
not have like night shift differential pay stand-by call &
allowance. Sales commission, car loan, Precalculated
Kilometer allowance)
OSG: division secretaries; the staff members of General
Management, Personnel and the Industrial Relations
Department; and the secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial
Systems, are disqualified from joining the PEO-FFW as they
are confidentials employees. They cannot even form a union
of their own for, as held in Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-
Calleja, the rationale for the disqualification of managerial
employees from joining unions holds true also for confidential
employees. As regards the sales representatives and service
engineers, however, there is no doubt that they are entitled
to join or form a union, as they are not disqualified by law
from doing so. Considering that they have interests dissimilar
to those of the rank and file employees comprising the
existing bargaining unit.
RULING:
 As to security personnel
At the time Case was filed in 1987, security personnel were
no longer disqualified from joining or forming a union.
Section 6 of E.O. 111, enacted on 24 December 1986,
repealed the original provisions of Article 245 of the Labor
Code, reading as follows:
“ARTICLE 245. Ineligibility of security personnel to join any
labor organization.—Security guards and other personnel
employed for the protection and security of the person,
properties and premises of the employer shall not be
eligible for membership in any labor organization.”
and substituted it with the following provision:
“ARTICLE 245. Right of employees in the public service.—”
By virtue of such repeal and substitution, security guards
became eligible for membership in any labor organization.
 As to Managerial employees and secretaries may not
form or join a union..
In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of
the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are
confidential employees.
Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-
FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW
explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the
very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a
confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential
matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in
the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the
ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a
labor union equally applies to them.
 As to the service engineers and the sales
representatives..

Service engineers and salesmen may form their own

bargaining unit separate from rank-and-file employees.

Article 245 of the Labor Code which, as amended by R.A. No.

6715, now reads:

“ARTICLE 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join

any labor organization; right of supervisory employees.—
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-
and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own.” (emphasis supplied)

NON-TOPICAL: (BAKA ASK)

Two (2) points which respondent NLRC likewise arbitrarily and

erroneously ruled upon, need to be discussed. Firstly, in
holding that they are included in the bargaining unit for the
rank and file employees of PIDI, the NLRC practically forced
them to become members of PEO-FFW or to be subject to its
sphere of influence, it being the certified bargaining agent for
the subject bargaining unit. This violates, obstructs, impairs
and impedes the service engineers’ and the sales
representatives’ constitutional right to form unions or
associations and to self-organization.

The decision then of the Executive Labor Arbiter in merely

directing the holding of a referendum “to determine the will
of the service engineers, sales representatives as to their
inclusion or exclusion in (sic) the bargaining unit” is the most
appropriate procedure that conforms with their right
to form, assist or join a labor union or organization.