G.R. No.

96189 July 14, 1992

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of
Labor and Employment, and THE ALL U.P. WORKERS' UNION, represented by its
President, Rosario del Rosario, respondent.

FACTS:

 In this special civil action of certiorari the University of the Philippines seeks the
nullification of the Order; that "professors, associate professors and assistant professors
are rank-and-file employees. Consequently, they should, together with the so-called non-
academic, non-teaching, and all other employees of the University, be represented by
only one labor organization.
 The case was initiated in the Bureau of Labor Relations by a petition filed on March 2,
3

1990 by a registered labor union, the "Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of UP"

(ONAPUP) constituting the non-academic personnel.
 ONAPUP sought the holding of a certification election among all said non-academic
employees of the University of the Philippines.
 On April 18, 1990, another registered labor union, the "All UP Workers' Union," filed a
5

comment, as intervenor in the certification election proceeding. Alleging that its

membership covers both academic and non-academic personnel, and that it aims to
unite all UP rank-and-file employees in one union.
 the University, through its General Counsel, made of record its view that there should be
6

two (2) unions: one for academic, the other for non-academic or administrative,
personnel considering the dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules governing these
employee groups.
 Director Calleja ruled on the matter on August 7, 1990. She declared that there was no
7

sufficient evidence "to justify the grouping of the non-academic or administrative

personnel into an organization unit apart and distinct from that of the academic or
teaching personnel.
 She declared that "the appropriate organizational unit should embrace all the regular
rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching.
 The Director thus commanded that a certification election be "conducted among rank-
and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching"
 University filed a Manifestation seeking the exclusion from the organizational unit of
those employees holding supervisory positions among non-academic personnel, and
those in teaching staff with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher.
o Certain "high-level employees" with policy-making, managerial, or confidential
functions, are ineligible to join rank-and-file employee organizations under
Section 3, EO 180.
 Sec. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as
policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential
nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and file
government employees

 The Director adjudged that said teachers are rank-and-file employees "qualified to join
unions and vote in certification elections. A careful perusal of the University Code shows
that the policy-making powers of the Council are limited to academic matters.
 The University seasonably moved for reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by Director Calleja.
ISSUE:

 whether or not professors, associate professors and assistant professors are "high-level
employees.
 whether or not, they, and other employees performing academic functions, should 12

comprise a collective bargaining unit distinct and different from that consisting of the non-
academic employees of the University, considering the dichotomy of interests, conditions
and rules existing between them.

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE:

In light of Executive Order No. 180 and its implementing rules, as well as the University's charter
and relevant regulations, the professors, associate professors and assistant professors cannot
be considered as exercising such managerial or highly confidential functions as would justify their
being categorized as "high-level employees" of the institution.

in National Merchandising Corp. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, that the power to recommend,
21

in order to qualify an employee as a supervisor or managerial employee "must not only

be effective but the exercise of such authority should not be merely of a routinary or clerical
nature but should require the use of independent judgment." Where such recommendatory
powers, as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department
heads and other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, are not effective
and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.

in National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, because "given
22

ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe for their execution, . . . they have
little freedom of action, as their main function is merely to carry out the company's orders, plans
and policies."

The power or prerogative pertaining to a high-level employee "to effectively recommend such
managerial actions, to formulate or execute management policies or decisions and/or to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline employees" is exercised to a
23

certain degree by the university academic personnel board/committees and ultimately by the
Board of Regents

Executive Order No. 180 is a law concerning public sector unionism. It must therefore be
construed within that context. Within that context, the University of the Philippines represents the
government as an employer. 'Policy-determining' refers to policy-determination in university
mattes that affect those same matters that may be the subject of negotiation between public
sector management and labor. The reason why 'policy-determining' has been laid down as a test
in segregating rank-and-file from management is to ensure that those who lay down policies in
areas that are still negotiable in public sector collective bargaining do not themselves become
part of those employees who seek to change these policies for their collective welfare."

The policy-determining functions of the University Council refer to academic matters, i.e. those
governing the relationship between the University and its students, and not the University as an
employer and the professors as employees. It is thus evident that no conflict of interest results in
the professors being members of the University Council and being classified as rank-and-file
employees.

SECOND ISSUE:
A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

the basic test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit, to be appropriate, must
affect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working
conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.

In the "community or mutuality of interests" test has provided the standard in determining the
proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit.

Company, et al. vs. Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU), 107 Phil. 23, the Court, noting
that the employees in the administrative, sales and dispensary departments of a cigar and
cigarette manufacturing firm perform work which have nothing to do with production and
maintenance, unlike those in the raw lead (malalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precintera) and
engineering and garage departments, authorized the formation of the former set of employees
into a separate collective bargaining unit. The ruling in the Democratic Labor
Association case, supra, was reiterated in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Unit vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 176, where casual employees were barred from joining the union
of the permanent and regular employees.

In the case at bar, the University employees may, as already suggested, quite easily be
categorized into two general classes: one, the group composed of employees whose functions
are non-academic, i.e., janitors, messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters,
electricians, grounds-keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers; and two, the group made up
32

of those performing academic functions, i.e., full professors, associate professors, assistant
professors, instructors — who may be judges or government executives. It would seem obvious
that teachers would find very little in common with the University clerks and other non-academic
employees as regards responsibilities and functions, working conditions, compensation rates,
social life and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc.

On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties
as well as in the compensation and working conditions of the academic and non-academic
personnel dictate the separation of these two categories of employees for purposes of collective
bargaining.
G.R. No. 93468 December 29, 1994

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK

SUPERVISORS CHAPTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and REPUBLIC
PLANTERS BANK, respondents.

FACTS:

 NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of respondent Bank's employees occupying supervisory positions.
 the Bank moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the supposed supervisory
employees were actually managerial and/or confidential employees thus ineligible to join,
assist or form a union, and that the petition lacked the 20% signatory requirement under
the Labor Code.
 Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz granted the petition for a certification election.
 Respondent Bank appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor on the main ground that
several of the employees sought to be included in the certification election, particularly
the Department Managers, Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers were
managerial and/or confidential employees and thus ineligible to join, assist or form a
union.
 Secretary of Labor partially granted the appeal.
o modified to the extent that Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch
Managers, Cashiers and Controllers are declared managerial employees.
Perforce, they cannot join the union of supervisors such as Division Chiefs,
Accounts Officers, Staff Assistants and OIC's (sic) unless the latter are regular
managerial employees.
 NATU filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential employees hence ineligible to
join or assist the union of petitioner.

HELD:

Respondent Bank has no legal personality to move for the dismissal of the petition for
certification election on the ground that its supervisory employees are in reality managerial
employees. An employer has no standing to question the process since this is the sole concern
of the workers. The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to
Art. 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively.

Republic Act No. 6715 Art. 212 (m) — Managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in
the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions, if the exercise of
such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-
file employees (emphasis supplied).
At first glance, pursuant to the above-definitions and based on their job descriptions as
guideposts, there would seem to be no difficulty in distinguishing a managerial employee from
that of a supervisor, or from that of a mere rank-and-file employee. Yet, this task takes on a
different dimension when applied to banks, particularly the branches thereof. This is so because
unlike ordinary corporations, a bank's organizational operation is governed and regulated by the
General Banking Act and the Central Bank Act, both special laws

As pointed out by the respondent, in the banking industry, a branch is the microcosm of a
banking institution, uniquely autonomous and self-governing. Bank policies are laid down and/or
executed through the collective action of the Branch Manager, Cashier and Controller at the
branch level.

The Branch Manager exercises over-all control and supervision over branch operation being on
the top of the branch's pyramid structure. However, both the controller and the cashier who are
called in banking parlance as "Financial Managers" due to their fiscal functions are given such a
share and sphere of responsibility in the operations of the bank.

Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are not managerial employees
but supervisory employees. The finding of public respondent that bank policies are laid down
and/or executed through the collective action of these employees is simply erroneous. His
discussion on the division of their duties and responsibilities does not logically lead to the
conclusion that they are managerial employees, as the term is defined in Art. 212, par. (m).

We analyzed the evidence submitted by respondent Bank in support of its claim that Department
Managers are managerial employees and concluded that they are not. Like Branch Managers,
21

Cashiers and Controllers, Department Managers do not possess the power to lay down policies
nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. They
occupy supervisory positions, charged with the duty among others to "recommend proposals to
improve and streamline operations." With respect to Assistant Managers, there is absolutely no
22

evidence.

As regards the other claim of respondent Bank that Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers are confidential employees, having control, custody and/or access to confidential
matters. e.g., the branch's cash position, statements of financial condition, vault combination,
cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and other negotiable instruments, pursuant
23

to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, this claim is not even
24

disputed by petitioner.

A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the
custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property

While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or
form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential
employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as
much a part thereof as that which is expressed, as elucidated in several cases the latest of
26

which is Chua v. Civil Service Commission where we said:

 No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at
the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide
for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication.

in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, thus: ". . . if these managerial employees would
28

belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union
in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the
presence of managerial employees in Union membership." Stated differently, in the collective
bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to
act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interests are well protected. The employer is not
assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. Collective
bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the same reason that impelled this
29

Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found
in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If
confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then
they could be governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover,
unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the
extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the
employers.

It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest
which they are duty-bound to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in Golden
Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja reiterated in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC, that
31 32

"confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who,
having access to confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said
employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement."
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants,
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

 Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect

known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958.
 As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter
referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement
containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
o Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.

 Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of RA No. 875, prior to its amendment by RA No. 3350,
the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is
the representative of the employees.
 Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
in any such labor organization".
 Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and
when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974.
 The Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee
from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.
 The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless
the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company
would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.
 This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction. in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee.
 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining
agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that
the Court had no jurisdiction over the case.
 judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing
the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action.
3

ISSUE:

 WON Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.

HELD:
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases;
that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and
that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should
be adopted.

Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the members
of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from
joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350

The constitution provides the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have
the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act
recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. It is, therefore, the employee
who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he
choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even
after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership
with said organization at any time. Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial
Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of
his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the
employee the duty to join associations.

Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No.
3350, provides provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not
precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees".

By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350,
if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of
said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.

Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed
shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of
said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions
have closed shop agreements with the employers.

Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
association. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional
provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members
of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty
and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions.

The Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of its contract, specifically, the
"union security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the
Company.”

The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a

government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause of the
Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in
appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the
people.

In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the obligations of
contracts has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the state involving public welfare.

Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the
promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end
are reasonable.

What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to
insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing
discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work,
the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and
the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.

It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is
superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.
Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a
preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom
of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to
the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified,
and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act
discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in violation of Section 1 (7) of
Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or
the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen
35

form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to
impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions,
is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the stage
37

regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and
effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden.

In Aglipay v. Ruiz , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be
39

precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would
be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand
the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious
or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be
dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a
modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.

It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly
advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit
those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions,
the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect.

Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be
required for the exercise of a civil right,"

The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association
membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require
affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition
or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union
requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious
affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is
not required to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is
exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious
objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union —
he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have
entered into. How then can there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no
right need be exercised?

Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the

members of certain religious sects undue advantages over other workers, thus violating
the Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the
laws.

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.

The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law
is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from
being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union
shop security agreements.

the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its provision.
The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself render
the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them their freedom
of association which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same plane
as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. The
circumstance, that the other employees, because they are differently situated, are not granted
the same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by
the Constitution by its nature involves inequality.

it has been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the
benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character ,
the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those
enjoyed by the general public.

Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision on social justice.

Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. Republic Act No. 3350
63

promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious
belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means
of livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not
necessary that the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of the state be
benefited thereby.

Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni
Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security in their employment,
notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with the
employer.

Social justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as
social relations depend on personal or subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal
equality because legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised on differentiations
based on personal or natural conditions. Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity ,
65 66

and this is precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives laborers,
irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.

the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for.

— in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has been
held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in
determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to
the necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question.
ROEL EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, GR No.
95770, 1993-03-01
Facts:
the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan
Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu... province. All minors, they are assisted
by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims
some 100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Philippines.
the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in
Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses.
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265... making the flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions.
Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning
except when it is raining, Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school
and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag.
The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school... the
assembly shall recite in unison the following patriotic pledge.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or
"religious devotion"... which they "cannot conscientiously give x x x to anyone... or anything
except God"
They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols
They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State
They think the action of the local authorities in... compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect
and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control... the DECS Regional Office in
Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and
enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national
anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the... patriotic pledge. Division Superintendent of
Schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS, and Dr./Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso,
Assistant Division Superintendent, recalling this Court's decision in Gerona, issued Division
Memorandum No. 108, dated November 17, 1989 (pp.
147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770) directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and
Heads of Private Educational Institutions a
Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of Jehovah's
Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were
asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano dialect promising to sing the national
anthem,... place their right hand on their breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of
allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770 and p. 48, Rollo of G.R. No.
95887), but they refused to sign the "Kasabutan" (p. 20, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770).
In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met with the
Jehovah's Witnesses' parents, as disclosed in his letter of October 17, 1990, excerpts from which
reveal the following:
"After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents on October
2, 1990 and yesterday due to their firm stand not to salute the flag of the Republic of the Philip -
pines during Flag Ceremony and other occasions, as mandated by law... specifically Republic
Act No. 1265, this Office hereby orders the dropping from the list in the School Register (BPS
Form I) of all teachers, all Jehovah Witness pupils from Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.
The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students... prompted some Jehovah's
Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of Education
Isidro Cariño but the latter did not answer their letter.
The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr.
Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would
not recall the expulsion orders of his predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion... of
some more children of Jehovah's Witnesses.
On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions for
Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion - (1) in ordering their... expulsion
without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free
public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo). The
petitioners pray that:
"c. Judgment be rendered:
"i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein petitioners from their
respective schools;
"ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from their classes or
otherwise implementing the expulsion ordered on petitioners; and
"iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission
of petitioners to their respective schools." (p. 41, Rollo.)
Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p. 98, Rollo) defending the
expulsion orders issued by the public respondents on the grounds that:
1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and anti-social
school children and consequently disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.
2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's Witnesses that
the DECS' rules and regulations on the flag salute ceremonies are violative of their freedom of
religion and worship.
3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates respect and love of
country, for which the flag stands.
4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations in question do
not warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute
ceremonies on the basis of their own self-perceived religious convictions.
5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.
6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified, besides having
scriptural basis.
7. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of Executive Order
No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987).
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe
in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They... quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings (Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and
Rollo of G.R. No. 95770, p. 48). Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior,... there is no
warrant for their expulsion.
Issues:
they raise essentially the same issue: whether school children who are members of a religious
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school.
(both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting
the Philippine flag, and reciting the patriotic pledge.
whether the children of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience of
R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised before this Court.
Ruling:
The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil.
2 (1959) and Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960). This Court in the
Gerona case upheld the expulsion of the students, thus:
"The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of... church and state
in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does
not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the
taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate... for admission to the bar."
"In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Educa -
tion is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely
enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike... whether Christian,
Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying out the duty imposed
upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all
educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate... system of public
education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other things, civic conscience and
teach the duties of citizenship."
"The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag
ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement
will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far...
constitutes the great majority."
Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section 28, Title VI,
Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which took effect on
September 21, 1988 (one year after its publication in the Official Gazette, Vol. 83,... No. 38 of
September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of Section 28 gives legislative cachet to the ruling in Gerona,
thus:
"5. Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be
dismissed after due investigation."
However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the above
provision of the new Administrative Code of 1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No.
1265 and the implementing orders of the DECS.
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing
the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly
comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up... our part of the globe and
suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the
flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of
Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only... is exemption from the flag
ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the
democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine
history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or... profession and be taught the
virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and
duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as
part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the... petitioners from Philippine schools will bring
about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group,
through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs,
will hardly be conducive to love... of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will
violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for
it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all... citizens to quality education x x
x and to make such education accessible to all"... exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's
Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious
beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the flag... ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this
should not be taken... to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they
should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their...
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge,
we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present
danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other... legitimate
public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (
Case Digest: Ebralinag vs The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu GR No 95770
95887 March 1, 1993

Facts:

The petitioners (Ebralinag, et al.) are elementary and high school students who were expelled
from their classes by public school authorities for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and Department Order No. 8 of
the DepEd.

Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or
"religious devotion” which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except
God". They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21".
They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the
action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the
Constitution protect against official control

Issue:

Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses
may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious
beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the
Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

Ruling:

No, they cannot be expelled for this reason. We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded
to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for
their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their
right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523,
535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion,
"this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they
should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge,
we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present
danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514,
517).