International Phenomenological Society

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Review: Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind

Author(s): Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith
Review by: Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Jun., 1985), pp. 627-644
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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CriticalNotices
Franz Brentanoon the Ontologyof Mind
Franz Brentano's 'philosophyof mind' still means, as far as most philoso-
phers are concerned,no more than a peculiarlyinfluentialaccount of inten-
tionality.In fact,in his Psychologyfroman EmpiricalStandpoint,Brentano
has providedan account of mentalphenomenawhich ranks with any to be
foundin the literatureof philosophy.It differsas much fromthe concept-cen-
teredKantian approaches to 'reason' or 'understanding'as frommore recent
approaches, centred on the language used to report or to express
'propositionalattitudes',in being an ontologyof mind, concernedwith the
descriptionof the entitieswhich are involvedin mentalexperienceand of the
relationsbetweenthem.
With the posthumouspublicationof a seriesof lecturesgivenin Vienna in
i890-9I' we now possess a clear account of the ontology,and of the meth-
ods, underlyingBrentano'snumerousand subtle descriptionsof mentalphe-
nomena, at least at one highlyfruitful stage in his career.What followsis a
detailed exposition of this work, togetherwith a briefcritical coda. It is
dividedinto the followingparts:
i. DescriptivePsychology
i.i Descriptivevs. GeneticPsychology
i.z Epistemologyof DescriptivePsychology
z. Noticing,or: The Method of DescriptivePsychology
3. Elements,Modes of Connectionand Types of Part
3.i The Unityof Consciousness
3.2 SeparableParts
3.3 DistinctiveParts
3.4 Logical Parts
3.5 ModificationalQuasi-Parts
4. On theNecessaryFeaturesof the Objects of Sensation
5. The Experienceof Time
6. CriticalRemarks
6.i The Fictionof 'Reality'
6.z Synchronic/Diachronic

Deskriptive Psychologie,ed. R. M. Chisholmand W. Baumgartner (Hamburg:

Meiner,i98z) pp. xxvi + i89. Thevolumealso contains fromtwoearlier
selections
versions together
of thesameseriesof lectures, witha usefulintroductionand notes
are to thisvolume,
suppliedbytheeditors(pp. ix-xxi,i62-77). All page references
unlessotherwiseindicated.

CRITICAL NOTICES 627

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?1. DescriptivePsychology

5I.i Descriptivevs. GeneticPsychology

Brentanobegins with a distinctionbetween descriptiveand geneticpsychol-

ogy. Since it is the developmentof this distinctionthat underpinsall Brenta-
no's work on mentalphenomena,and indeed that of all his pupils (and very
oftenof theirpupils, too), we shall set out in some detail just what, on the
evidenceof the DeskriptivePsychologie,it involves.
Descriptivepsychology'seeks as far as possible to determineexhaustively
the elementsof human consciousnessand theirmodes of connectionwithone
another'.Brentano'shope is that - as he himselfwas to put it in i895
descriptivepsychologywould
displayall theultimate fromwhosecombination
psychiccomponents one withanother
thetotality of psychicphenomena justas thetotality
wouldresult, of wordsis yielded
bytheletters ofthealphabet(quotedon pp. x-xi).

Thus the projectof describingthe ultimatepsychiccomponentsis to serveas

universalis,almostexactlyas thiswas envisaged
the basis fora characteristics
by Leibniz and by Descartes before him.' And this project, once realised,
would yieldthe basis not only of geneticpsychologybut also of logic, ethics,
aesthetics,political economy,politics and sociology,too (p. 76). Moreover,
descriptivepsychologywill introduceus to the structuresof our own selves,
and so to what is most 'noble' in all experience.
The laws of descriptivepsychologyare supposed to be exact and exception-
less (on theirepistemologicalstatuswe shall have somethingto say in Si.z).
Certainly,

theymayexhibita gap hereand there, doubt

as is indeedalso thecasein mathematics;
abouttheircorrectnessmaynotbe outofplace . . . buttheyallowand requirea pre-
as forexamplein thelaw: theappearanceof violetis identical
cise formulation, with
thatofred-blue.
(p. 4)
Geneticpsychology,on the otherhand, seeks 'to specifythe conditionswith
which the individualphenomena are bound up causally' (p. i). Because its
is the physiologicaland chemicalprocesses,the anatomicaland
subject-matter
other material conditionswith which mental phenomena are causally con-
nected,geneticpsychologycan onlyyieldlaws thatare inexact.

As Descartesformulatedit in a letterto Mersenneof zo November i6z9: "ifsome-

one wereto explaincorrectly whatare thesimpleideasin thehumanimagination
outofwhichall humanthoughts are compounded, and ifhisexplanation weregen-
I woulddareto hopefora universal
erallyreceived, languageveryeasyto learn,to
speak,and to write.The greatest advantage of sucha languagewouldbe theassis-
tanceit wouldgiveto men'sjudgment, all matters
representing so clearlythatit
would be almostimpossible to go wrong"(quotedon p. 77; Englishtranslation
fromDescartes, Philosophical Letters,A. Kenny,ed. [Oxford:Blackwell,1970], p.
6).

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 Brentanogives as an example of an inexactlaw the thesisthat the stimulus
of a point on the retina by a light-raywith vibrationsof a particularfre-
quency produces the appearance of somethingblue (p. 5). This law loses its
appearanceof absolute generalityonce we take into account the possibilityof
colour-blindness, or of the severing of a nerve, or the case where
hallucinationobtrudes,etc. The laws governingthe association, the causal
order and the coming-to-beand passing-awayof psychologicalphenomena
are never free of exceptions.Brentano's argumentfor this point resembles
argumentsbeing put forwardsimultaneouslyby ErnstMach,3 the difference
being that for Mach the realm of the inexact, of ineliminablevariability,
usurps the whole of psychology(indeed the whole of science), where for
Brentanothere remains a domain of exact and exceptionlesspsychological
laws.

5I.2 Epistemologyof DescriptivePsychology

The laws of descriptivepsychologyare fundamental,forBrentano,also in an

epistemologicalsense. They are not merelyexact and exceptionless,theyare
characterisedalso as havinga privilegedepistemologicalstatus: we can know
them immediately, or apodictically, or with absolute evidence. Our
knowledgeof the propositionsof geneticpsychology,in contrast,is always
lackingin evidence.Such propositionscan only be known (at best) presump-
tively.
Certainly,some knowledge of genetic psychologymay be of contingent
assistanceto the descriptivepsychologist.But the contributionsa knowledge
of descriptivelaws can make to geneticpsychologyare 'incomparablygreater'
(p. 9). Indeed such knowledgeis indispensable,and Brentanoreservessome of
his most scathingcriticismsfor those who attemptto do geneticpsychology
withoutfirstdoing the necessaryminimumof descriptivepsychology:
Whata lamentable stateof ignorance. . . one oftenfindsin scientists
who takeon
thetaskof research in geneticpsychology,an ignorancewhichhas as a resultthefail-
One findsforexamplesomeoneinquiring
ure of all theirefforts. intothecauses of
memory-phenomena who knowsnothing of themostcentralcharacteristicfeaturesof
memory (p. 9, ouremphasis).
One such characteristicfeature,says Brentano,is the peculiar modification
whereby'that which presenteditselfon an earlier occasion as present is
regarded(and judged) as past' (loc. cit.) - a featurewhose description,as we
shall see, involvesBrentanoin considerabletheoreticalcontortions.The igno-
rant geneticpsychologisttreats this as though he was concerned with the
explanationof a phenomenonwhich completelyresemblesthe earlierone, or
as if it were simplya somehow weaker, less intenseor less vivid model or
imageof the earlierphenomenon.
Yet anothergeneticpsychologist
withthegenesisoferroranddelusionbuthas notachievedanysortof
himself
concerns

The Analysisof Sensations(NewYork:Dover,1959), p. 3z9ff.

CRITICAL NOTICES 6z9

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 aboutwhata judgment,
clarity theevidenceof a judgment,
an inference,
its manifest
validity,
is (p. 9).
of an attitudetowards experi-
We see here perhaps the earliestmanifestation
mentalpsychologyon the part of philosopherswhichhas since been repeated
in various forms.As Wittgensteinputs it:
The confusionand barrenness is not to be explainedby callingit a
of psychology
"youngscience";its stateis not comparable
withthatof physics, forinstance,in its
beginnings
. . . For in psychology thereare experimentalmethodsand conceptual
confusions(PhilosophicalInvestigations[hereafter:
PI], p. 233).

But where, in the writingsof Wittgensteinand neo-Wittgensteinians, such

worries about experimentalpsychologyare associated with little, if any,
attemptto use 'grammaticalremarks' about the way the mind works as
buildingblocks of some properlytheoreticalenterprisein the foundationsof
psychology,Brentanoattemptsto develop an exact science of psychicphe-
nomena, seeingit as 'one of the most importantsteps towards openingup a
trulyscientific
geneticpsychology'(p. 9).

?2. Noticing,or: The Method of DescriptivePsychology

Brentanois quite clear about the way descriptivepsychologyshould be done
and sets it out in some detail.4The basis of the methodis firstof all inner
perception,i.e., the awareness we have of the acts of seeing,hearing,think-
ing,judging,hating,whichmake up our consciousexperience.This awareness
is present(as a constituentpart) in everyact, accordingto Brentano,since
otherwiseexperiencewould not be consciousexperience.
Everyact, then,has both a primaryobject (discussedin 54 below), and a
secondaryobject, the act itself.Now the awarenessof such secondaryobjects
which is granted by inner perceptionis distinguishedcrucially from that
access to acts which we can gain, e.g., in memory(or by readingthe confes-
sions of the innerlives of others): it possesses a differentorder of reliability.
The immediateproximityof perceptionand object in an innerperception-
an inner perceptionwhich is, remember,a part or the very act of seeing,
hearingor judgingwhich it is a perceptionof - makes possible a kind of
absolute evidence. Immediateproximityof this kind ought in principleto
leave no room forerror,though'in spite of thisevidence,innerperceptionis
oftenmisinterpreted in the crudestpossible fashion'(p. 8f.).
Innerperception,to serveas the basis fordescriptivepsychology,should be
as richand as varied as possible. But if he is to pick out the ultimatepsychic
components the descriptivepsychologistmust also take pains to notice
(bemerken)what is involvedin what he perceives.For there are many fea-

4That othergreatAustrianwriteron descriptive had a comparable

psychology
confidencethathe had at leastdiscovered therightmethod:"This materialI am
working at is as hardas granite
butI knowhowto go aboutit.)" (LudwigWittgen-
stein,PersonalRecollections,
ed. R. Rhees[Oxford:Blackwell,
i98i], p. 173 and cf.
p. Iz5.)

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tures of experience,even featureswhich are recurrentand by no means in
principleunnoticeable,which are hardly ever noticed. (We could perhaps
learnhow to minimisethisdangerif we knew underwhat conditionsnoticing
occurs,but thisis a problemthatbelongsto geneticpsychology.)
Noticing is importantbecause, as it will turnout, the psychicconstituents
which descriptivepsychologyseeks to describe come in a numberof subtly
different kinds and they stand to each other in relationswhich are by no
means simple.And whilstall of theseconstituentsare in a certainsense pres-
ent to us in experience(otherwisetheywould not be psychicconstituents),
not all of themare noticed.As Brentanohimselfputs it:

or recognition
is an acceptance
Perception Andifwhatis acceptedis a
(Anerkennung).
wholewhichhas parts,thenthepartsare in a certainsenseall co-recognised
together
withthewhole.Forwereone of themdeniedthiswouldconflict withtherecognition
ofthewhole.But partis notthereby
theindividual alreadyexpressly (p. 34).
recognised
Noticing,Brentanosays, is 'an explicit perceptionof what was implicitly
included in perception'(p. 33). He distinguishessharplybetween 'to notice'
and:
'to findconspicuous',
'to keep or bear in mind' (sich merken),
and
'to attendor pay heed to' (aufmerken).
Consider,firstof all 'to findconspicuous'. Unlike 'to notice',this refersto a
state of mind (Gemfitszustand)and should be compared to: 'to findsome-
thingodd or strange',differing fromthis only in degree(wherenoticingdoes
not admit of degreesat all). Attention,on the otherhand, is certainlyclosely
relatedto noticing:only what has been noticedcan attractour attention.But
somethingcan be noticedwithoutattractingour attention.And payingatten-
tion is not a necessarypreconditionfornoticing.
Brentano's account of the act of noticingexplicitlywhat had previously
been only implicitlyperceivedwould repay close comparisonwith Wittgen-
stein's account of noticingaspects. Brentanoproceeds in just the way Witt-
gensteincondemns: 'Do not try to analyse your own inner experience'.5
Brentanowrites: descriptivepsychologyis 'an analysingdescriptionof our
phenomena . . . To be a phenomenon something must be in one (in sich).
All phenomena should be called "inner" . . . ' (p. iz9).
In his discussionof noticingan aspect,Wittgenstein stressesthatthisexperi-
ence occupies an unusual position between simple seeing and thinking.But
Brentanois able to go furtherby providinga taxonomyof the different sorts
of judgment,predication [Prddizieren]or determination[Bestimmen]with
which acts of noticingare intimatelybound up (pp. 34, 37, 48). The most
basic sort of noticingis, as we have seen, an acceptanceor recognitionof a

'Versuche
nicht, zu analysieren!'
in dirselbstdas Erlebnis (PI,p. zo4).

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contentand is itself,in Brentano'sterms,a varietyof judgment(p. 34). More
complexcases would include,forexample,those involvingpredication,notic-
ing that somethingis or is not the same as somethingelse (positiveand neg-
ative predication:p. 37). As the editors point out, this taxonomybecomes
considerablyricherin Brentano'slater theoryof judgment(n. 14, p. i7if.).
Wittgenstein's conclusion with respectto the experienceof noticingaspects
was that such an experiencemust be foundedon custom,on upbringing,on
the masteryof a technique.In view of the huge differences betweenthe activi-
ties Brentano and Wittgensteintook themselvesto be engaged in, it is
remarkablethat Brentano,too, should have arrivedat a comparable result.
Brentanoargues that a range of different habits and trainingare necessary
preconditionsof noticing,in the contextboth of teachingothersto noticeand
of the acquisitionof the abilityto notice on one's own behalf.In an interest-
ing excursus into geneticpsychology(pp. 3i-65), he describesthe different
sorts of comparisonsthat must be made if someone is to learn to notice
something,comparisonsthatmustbe familiaras a resultof habit and training
if noticingis to occur at all. Indeed Brentanowritesthat it is comparisons,
amongstotherthings,that make up 'the processesin the lifeof everymature
individualthat must be called primordial'and by which 'we are firstled
explicitlyto notice certainindividualparts withinthe complex of our con-
sciousness'(p. 54f.).
Brentanodescribesalso the difficulties in the way of noticingcertainphe-
nomena (p. Iz4) - why were blind spots nevernoticedbeforeMariotte?
distinguishing fourdifferentcases where noticingcan fail (compare Wittgen-
stein'sremarkson aspect-blindness[PI, p. z13f. and elsewhere]).When Witt-
gensteinsays that a pupil can only see one part of a triangleas its apex if he
is thoroughlyconversantwith ways of using the figure,he adds that this
point is not an experientialproposition(PI, p. zo8). And now for Brentano,
too, it will be remembered, the factthatnoticinghas certaindeterminatepre-
conditions is a matter of descriptive psychology (even though the
investigationof these conditionsis a matterfor geneticpsychology).A big
difference remains:forBrentanothe activitiesthat formthe basis fornoticing
essentiallyinclude certainmental acts, albeit verysimple ones such as com-
parison.In Wittgenstein's work,in contrast,it seems thatthe techniquesto be
masteredare deliberatelycontrastedwith any sort of mental act. The latter
drop out as unimportant.

?3. Elements,Modes of Connectionand Types of Part

53.1I The Unityof Consciousness

In Brentano'sdefinitionof the subject-matter of descriptivepsychologythere

lies an explicit reference to the concept of a part. For if descriptive
psychologysearchesforthe elementsand modes of connectionof human con-
sciousnessthenthe lattermustconstitutea 'multiplicity of parts' (p. iO). This
point is introducedin the contextof a discussionof the claim thatconscious-
ness is unitary.With Hume, Brentano denies that the soul (mind, Seele) is

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simple. But Brentanois not so simplemindedas to conclude fromthis that
consciousnesslacks all unity.He has at his disposal a theoryof parts,wholes
and unitywhich is powerfulenough to recognisethat an entityor structure
can have parts withouttherebyfallingapart into the separate and individual
elementsof a mereheap. We do not have
but,in a mostunequivocal
of things,
a multiplicity the
way,one thingthatembraces
wholeofa realhumanconsciousness(p. i i).
What is thistheoryof parts,wholes and unity?

53.2 Separable Parts

Althoughthe partswhichare the elementsof consciousness

neverappearin theside-by-sidefashionof partsof a spatialcontinuum,it remains
true
ofmanyofthem,as itdoesofpartsofsucha continuum, thatone ofthemcan actually
fromanotherin thatthepartthatearlierexisted
be cutloose or separated[losgel6st]
withthesecondpartin thesamerealunitycontinues whenthatotherpart
in existence
hasceasedto exist(p. iz).
Examples givenby Brentanoof such separable parts co-existingtogetherare:
a seeingand a hearing,a seeingand a remembering that one has seen, a see-
ing and a noticing,presentationand desire,concept and judgment,premise
and inference(loc. cit.). As he pointsout, the notionexpressedby 'a can exist
withoutb', or 'a is separable fromb' may be one-sidedor two-sided.Seeing
and hearingare reciprocallyor mutuallyseparable,as are the partsof a con-
tinuumexistingside by side with each other in such a way that each can be
annihilatedwithoutdetrimentto the remainder.But concept and judgment,
seeing and noticing,premiseand inferencestand in the relationof one-sided
separabilityonly,and this impliesthat a certaintypeof unityobtains in each
of these cases, a typeof unitythat is absent where objects exist merelyside
by side.
In the lightof this we can see that mental acts fall into the categoriesof
(relatively)fundamentalor basic acts and what Brentanocalls superposedacts
(supraponierteAkte). The formerstand to the latterin a relationof one-sided
separability,'a relationwhich is similarto the relationboth have to the psy-
chic substrate'(p. 84). This is an extremelyimportantpoint. The relationship
betweenmy wish to take a tripmustbe based on a presentationor idea of a
trip: and the relationshipbetween wish and presentation,Brentanosays, is
like the relationboth have to the subjectwho has the wish and presentation.
And, Brentanogoes on to add, the chain of relationsmay well be even more
complex: fearor hope are based on presumption(Vermutung),thisin its turn
on a presentation,and all are based on a subject. More interestingly still,as
he points out in a sketchfromi90i, remorseand resolutionstand in a spe-
cial relationof dependenceto temporaldifferentia in the presentationsand
judgingson which theyare based (p. I5'; cf. also the discussionof motivated
loveon p. 150).
vs.unmotivated
Brentanomakes a furtherclaim about the nature of the (primary)objects
thatultimate,basic or fundamentalas opposed to superposedacts musthave.
These objects must,he claims,be sensiblephenomena.Acts of the givenkind

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must 'contain as theirprimaryrelationa presentationof a sensible concrete
content'(p. 85: see 54 below).

53.3 DistinctiveParts

The unityof one-sidedinseparabilityis not, however,the only kind of unity

recognisedby Brentano.For even if we continuepiecingthe parts of what is
composite (in particularin the domain of consciousness),i.e., separatingout
as much as is possible in such a way as to arriveat elementswhichare some-
how ultimatefromthispoint of view, we can 'in a certainsense stillspeak of
further
parts.'
If someonebelievesin atomshe believesin particles[Kdrperchen]thatcannotbe dis-
solvedintosmallerbodies,but evenin the case of suchparticleshe mayspeakof
halves,quarters,etc.: partswhich,althoughnot reallyseparable,are yetdistinguish-
able.We can calltheselatterdistinctive parts.In humanconsciousness,
[distinktionelle]
too,thereare also,apartfromseparableparts,meredistinctive parts.And,in so faras
thedistinguishingcontinues further
thanrealseparability,one mightspeakofparts(or
elements)ofelements (p. 13).
In orderto illustratehis notionof a distinctivepart,whichhas obvious par-
allels to the notion of distinctivefeaturein phonology,Brentanoconsidersat
some lengththe followingexample of the sort of 'reality'which externalper-
ception seems to presentus with. (We shall returnin ?6 to considerwhat
Brentanosays about the status of this example.) 'Out of what parts would
this realityshow itselfto be composed?' (p. I4). Clearlythisrealitywill con-
tain mutuallyseparable spatial parts, but also parts of a verydifferent sort.
Considera visual fieldcontainingtwo blue patches,one greypatch and a yel-
low patch. Betweenthe two blue patches we finda difference of spatial posi-
tion and an agreementof quality; betweenthe blue and the yellow patches
we findboth a spatial and a qualitativedifference.In the blue patch
a colour-determination and a spatialdetermination
[Besonderheit] are to be distin-
guished,and so are reallycontainedin it, are distinctive
parts . . . (Pi i5).

We may, too, Brentano argues, identifydifferences of brightness.Thus we

have space-, colour- (or, more generally:quality-)and brightness-determina-
tions.
Why are these not separable parts? Can the blue patch not be moved,
resultingin a change of spatial determination, withoutceasing to be blue?
And would it not thenlose its particularspatial determinationwhilstits qual-
itativedetermination would remainunchanged?Or alternatively: can the blue
patch not be transformed into a red patch whilstits spatial position remains
the same? In order to see the mistake here, Brentano warns his readers,
'carefulattentionis necessary'.He claims that when the position of an indi-
vidual blue patch is changed we have a new blue patch, i.e., a patch with a
new blueness-determination,
which is as differentfrom the firstas two spatially distinctbut simultaneousblue
patchesaredistinctfromoneanother(p. i6).6
6
(Blueand BrownBooks,p. 55): "We can usethephrase'two
CompareWittgenstein
wellsay: 'Theycan'thavethe
bookshavethesamecolour'butwe couldperfectly

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 One does indeedneedto pay attention theconceptof
here.To understand
partone has to graspa conceptofparts
distinctive
whichdo notoccurin a spatially
side-by-side fashion, in a quitedif-
butareconnected
way,whichso to speakreciprocally
ferent or mutually one another[sich
interpenetrate
durchdringen]
sozusagenwechselseitig (p. I 7).
It is notas ifa bluenessdetermination is simplyhangingaround,waitingfor
some spatialdetermination and some brightnessdetermination to join up
with it; or as if it could move on fromone spatial or brightness
determination to another,in sucha way thatit wouldremain(numerically)
thesame.Similarly, are hangingaround,
it is notas ifspatialdeterminations
waitingto be filledby colourand brightness (and perhapsby
determinations
determinations of othersorts):space is, just,whatgetsfilledby quality.A
spatialextension onlyexists,according to Brentano,to theextentthatthere
are space-fillingqualitieswhichthisextensionis theextensionof. A spatial
boundary onlyexiststo theextentthatthereis something qualitativewhichit
bounds.
If Brentanois rightthenthereare at leasttwo verydifferent sortsof ele-
mentsof consciousness, levels,and two different
at different modesof con-
nectionbetweenthem.Butouraccountof Brentano's taxonomy ofpartsis by
no meanscomplete.

j3.4 Logical Parts

If theblueand yellowpatchesin frontof me differ withrespectto theirspa-

tialdetermination, brightness thecase thatwith
and quality,it is nevertheless
respectto qualitythereis somesortof agreement betweenthem:theyagree
(e.g.) in thattheyare bothcolours.Brentano'saccountof thismysterious
relationof partialagreement is at its clearestin a contrasthe develops
betweenthiscase and the case of the relationbetweenqualityand spatial
determination. Givendeterminations of qualityand spacein a singlepatchof
colourare mutually penetratinginstancesof distinctspecies,specieswhich
have,as it were,nothing(exceptthis)in common.In the case of partial
agreement of twocolourpatches,in contrast, we havetwocolour-determina-
tionswhichare separate(non-interpenetrating) of specieswhichare
instances
distinct,butareyetspeciesof a singlecommongenus.We haveheretwodis-
tinctdeterminates of thesingledeterminable: colour.This is a case of what
Brentano callsa logicalpart-wholerelation.The two individual colourdeter-

same colour, because, afterall, thisbook has itsowncolour,andtheotherbookhas

its own colour too'. This . . . would be statinga grammaticalrule; a rule, inci-
dently,not in accordance with our ordinaryusage." Wittgenstein is here rejecting,
like Moore beforehim, the notion of an individualproperty,the 'accidents' of the
tradition- called Momente by Brentano and his heirs. Argumentson behalf of
these entitiesare presentedin Smith,ed., Parts and Moments(Munich: Philosophia,
I98z) and in Mulligan, Simons and Smith,"Truth-Makers,"Philosophyand Phe-
nomenological Research 44 (I984): 287-321.

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minations,which are instancesof the species blue and yellow, each contain
logical parts which are instancesof the common species colour (as if thereis
something,in addition to these logical parts, which would make individual
instancesof sheer colour into individualinstancesof blue or yellow, respec-
tively).
The relationof logical parts to theirwhole is, Brentanoclaims further, dis-
tinctfrom- thoughin different ways parallel to - the relationsmanifested
in cases of one-sidedseparabilityand of distinctive parts.
To see how it is distinguishedfromthe case of one-sidedseparabilitycon-
sider,forexample,the relationbetweena thinkingof a givenconceptand the
judgingthat thereis somethingwhich falls under this concept. That which
makes the thinkinginto a judgingcan be reallyseparatedout: a judgingcan
give way to a mere thinkingof a concept; the formermay cease to exist
althoughthe latterremainsin existence.But now consider,in contrast,the
relationbetweena thinkingof a conceptand that which makes it a thinking.
There is no way in which the latter(logical part) can be separatedout. Or
considerBrentano'sexample of the relationbetweenan occurrentdesire for
apples and the simultaneouspresentationor thinkingof apples. Clearly the
formercan be cut away fromthe latterin such a way that thereis simplya
presentationthatis no longerassociated witha desire.But thereis no way in
which that logical part which makes a presentationof apples a presentation
can be cut away fromthe mentalphenomenonin question to leave that ele-
mentin virtueof whichthe phenomenonis apple-directed.
Logical parts are distinguishedfrom distinctiveparts in the strictsense
('durchwohnendeTeile') by the fact that the logical part is an instanceof a
species which is superordinateto that of which its whole is an instance.This
is neverthe case in regardto distinctiveparts (a coloured patch which I see
has a givenspatial determination as one of its distinctivepartsbut it does not
itselfinstantiatethe speciesspatial determination).
Of course,relationssuch as thatwhichholds betweenthinkingand thinking
of a concept or betweendesiringand-desiringapples are 'logical' also in a
sense whichhas nothingat all to do withthe ontologyof part and whole, but
merelyreflectscertainpurely analyticrelationsbetween the given concepts.
This makes Brentano'stalk of 'parts' here somewhatdifficult to understand.
With a littleexerciseof the imagination,however,it is possible to consider
the given relationsas relationsbetween correspondingelementsin the phe-
nomena in question,and indeed to see theseelementsas the fundamentum in
re in virtueof whichit is appropriateto apply conceptslike thinkingor desir-
ing to the givenphenomenaat all.7

7Frege's 'marks' (Merkmale)are describedby him as 'logical parts' of the associated

concepts (cf. E.-H. W. Kluge, ed., On the Foundationsof Geometry[London and
New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1971], p. 35). The properlyontologicalconcep-
tion of logical parts is discussedbrieflyby Husserl in Si of his 3rd Logical Investi-
gation.

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53.5 ModificationalQuasi-Parts

Thereis a further phenomenon or elementof consciousnesswhichis distin-

guishedby Brentanofromthosewhichhave been listedso far in being
describedas his own discovery. We shall draw attention to it onlybriefly
here.
RecallBrentano's doctrineof theintentionalinexistenceof theobjectof a
mentalact. How is this intentionally objectto be understood?
inexistent
What,in particular,is therelationbetweenthisobjectand 'real'objects?Sup-
pose,moreparticularly, thatI see a colour.Whatis therelationbetweenthe
seencolouron theone handand anyrealcolour,on theother?WhatBren-
tanohas to sayis:
partin thepropersense,butonlyas a
colour,notas a distinctive
'seencolour'contains
partthatmaybe carvedoutbya modifyingdistinction(p. z7, ouremphasis).
Bya 'modifying Brentano
distinction' has in minda distinction whichis nota
carvingout real parts,at all: thereis no colourpresentin
real distinction,
seencolourexceptin a modifiedsense(something likethesensein whichwe
mightsay,e.g.,thatthenumberz is presentin thefraction-,or in which
we mightsaythat,whilstPierrehimself is notreallypresent, stillhisabsence
is present).Thus we can designate'parts' of the kind in questionas
Theyshallreceivea moreadequatediscussion
quasi-parts'.
'modificational in
ourtreatment ofBrentano'saccountoftheexperience oftime,below.

oftheObjectsofSensation
Features
54. On theNecessary
The primary exhibitvar-
objectsof basicacts,i.e.,of actsof sense-perception,
ious structuralfeatures,as do acts themselves,and thepresentvolumepro-
videsdetailedaccountsofthemoreimportant ofthese.8
WhatBrentano has to sayon thistopicis of thefirstimportance, bothhis-
toricallyand foritsownsake,although theinvestigationofthestructural fea-
turesof the objectsof basic acts has sunkintoalmostgreateroblivion,in
contemporary philosophy, thanhas theinvestigationofthestructures of men-
tal actsthemselves.
We have alreadyseensomething of whattheinvestigation involvesin our
discussionof distinctiveand logicalpartsabove.Brentano claimsthatevery
objectof sensation has a perceptualqualityand thisoccupies(fills)a perceiv-
able space. Quality(colour,tone . . . ) and spatiality are two distinctive
parts.(Thislaw was thesubjectof detailedinvestigation
('interpenetrating')
by Stumpfin his Uberden psychologiscben Ursprung der Raumvorstellung
[Leipzig: Hirzel, i873].) We shall concentratehere on the structuresof per-
ceptual quality (pp. 89ff., 115-zo).9

8Some of themare discussed

byBrentano also in theUntersuchungen zur Sinnespsy-
Meiner,1979), reprintedfromthe editionof 1907.
chologie(Hamburg:
9 On thestructure,
e.g.,thedimensional space- whichwill
of perceptual
structure,
sensorymodalities-
for different
clearlybe different cf. the compresseddiscussion

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 Qualities are internallycomplex. Every quality contains both a feature
belongingto the seriesbright/dark and a featurebelongingto the seriessatu-
rated-unsaturated, or to analogues of these.Beforewe look at this claim in a
littlemore detail,however,somethingshould be said about the natureof the
projectBrentanowas involvedin. The projectof settingout exact and neces-
sary truthsconcerningthe constituentsof sense-fieldshas become almost
totallyincomprehensible to philosophers.In part this is due to the victoryof
the dogma that 'contentis incommunicable'.'0Yet the project of a descrip-
tivepsychologyor 'phenomenology'of objects of sense perceptionthatwould
consist of necessary material truths was common to Brentano, Hering,
Marty," Stumpf,Kdhler,Selz, Meinong, and Husserl (whose contributionto
this 'phenomenology'in the narrower,descriptivesense, was unfortunately
overshadowed by his later metaphysics).The idea is even traceable in the
writingsof the middleWittgenstein.
The project is still verymuch alive in at least one sphereoutside philoso-
phy,however.Brentano'sbold generalization,formulatedwithinhis theoryof
parts and wholes,to the effectthateverysensiblequality(and not only visual
but also, e.g., auditoryqualities) exhibitsthe two dimensionsof brightness
and saturation,makes him an importantprecursorof modernphonology.For
it was this generalization,theoreticallyrefinedand placed on a secure experi-
mentalfootingby Stumpfand Kdhler,that was taken over by Roman Jakob-
son in his formulationof some of the most importantlaws and distinctionsin
the domainsof phonologyand acoustics."
Let us look in some detail about what Brentanosays about thesetwo neces-
sary featuresof the qualities of the objects of sensations.Everysensiblequal-
ity contains a momentof brightnessand darkness (Helligkeitund Dunkel-
heit). Brentanoemphasises(p. II5) thatthe difference betweenHelligkeitand
Dunkelheit in the sphere of colour perception makes its appearance in
relation to all sensorymodalities. It makes itselffelt,e.g., in the relation
between tones of higherand lower pitch and in regard to heat sensations
('what is cool is brighterthan what is warm': ibid.). It is of course not the
case that any colour is brighterthan any tone, or that a colour or tone is
brighteror less brightthan a warmthor a coldness.But while thereis no uni-
taryspecies forbrightnessand darkness,thereis always at least a relationof
similaritybetween the differences which hold between the various different

ofcontinuain generaland of spatialcontinuain particular

on pp. 104-15. Thisdis-
cussionusefullycomplements Brentano'sarguments in Philosophische Untersuch-
ungenzu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum(Hamburg:Meiner,1976).
I B. Harrison,Form and Content(Oxford:Blackwell,
1973) is an excellent of
critique
thisdogma,inspired workon universals
byrecent ofcolourperception.
I In Die Frage nach der geschichtlichenEntwicklungdes Farbensinness(Vienna:
Gerold, 1879), Martyuses Brentaniandistinctionsto criticisethe view thatour sense
of colour - as distinctfromour judgmentsand fromwhat we notice about colour
- is subjectto any sortof evolution.
"
Cf. C. Stumpf,Die Sprachlaute(Berlin: Springer,19z6), esp. pp. 98-103, z76-80,
and chap. I3; R. Jakobson,Child Language, Aphasia and Phonology(Paris and the
Hague:Mouton,i968 [translatedfromtheGermanof 1940/4z]), chap. 3, 5z5f.

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 kindsof brightness and darkness:therelationof brighter thanbetweentwo
coloursresemblesthe relationof brighter than betweentwo tones,even
thoughtheabsolutebrightnesses and darknesses do notresemble each other.
Brentanoquotesapprovingly Helmholtz'sremarkthatwe have to do here
withtwo degreesof difference - a difference of kindand a kindof differ-
ence,we mightsay.We can use thenumberof different kindsof brightness
and darknessthatthereare to determine the numberof different sensory
modalities(p. ii6).
Whatholdsof brightness holds,too,of saturation. ('Colouring'[Kolorit]is
anothertermsuggested by Brentanoforthisfeature.) Thus Brentanoargues
thatthisdistinction, familiarfromthe realmof colourperception, is mani-
festedin therealmof acousticphenomena in theoppositionbetweensound
(orwhatis Klanghaft) and merenoise(p. 89).
The relationship betweenthemoment of brightnessand themoment of sat-
urationor colouring is an exampleoftherelation we havealreadymetofdis-
tinctive(or mutually parts(cf.p. izo). Brentanonow con-
interpenetrating)
sidersthe possibility that the primaryobjectsof sense perceptionmight
exhibitother,additionaldistinctive features, forexample,intensity (p. go).
On thisquestionthe editorsusefully pointout thatBrentano'sconceptof
intensityis different fromthat of his contemporaries, most of whom
'identified
differences in thebrightness of a visualsensationwithdifferences
in theintensityofthissensation'(p. 174):

On Brentano's viewof thematter,theintensity of a givenqualityis a functionof the

quantityof perceivable
spacethatis filledwiththisquality.As soon as a qualityloses
in intensity
yetkeepsitsextension,unnoticed partsofthesense-fieldwithinthedomain
ofthisextensionhavelostin quality.Ifthequalitygainsin intensity,
thenseveralparts
ofthefieldofperceptionwithinthisdomainhavetakenon thisquality(ibid.).
Note theimportant rolethatis played,once again,by theconceptof notic-
ing:'whena qualitylosesin intensity we cease to noticetheplacesthatare
no longerfilledwiththisquality'(p. 175). Intensity,
on thisconception, can-
notbe an additionalfeatureof a sensory quality,sinceit is merelya 'derived
magnitude', ' a function
of thatquantity of space whichis filledwiththat
quality'.Similarly,
Brentanodeniesthatsense-qualities exhibita specialfea-
tureor momentfromthe series:pure-impure or mixed-unmixed (pp. gof.,
IZo).

S5. The Experience

ofTime
Brentano rejectstheidea thattemporal determination is, likespatialdetermi-
nation,a further featureof the primary objectsof basic acts. His positive
account,as herepresented, is thefirstof two detailedaccountsof temporal
modification thathe developedand is theviewagainstwhichHusserlreacted
in his lectureson thephenomenology of theconsciousness of innertimebut
to whichStumpf adheredand developedfurther.'3

'3 Further
detailsareprovided
in thepieceseditedbyOskarKrausas "Towarda Phe-

CRITICAL NOTICES 639

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 Brentanoissues warningsabout the difficulty of understanding his account
of the way temporaldimensionsare given.These warningsrelatenot merely
to the peculiar terminologyof 'Proterose','Proteraesthesis'('originalassocia-
tion' or 'originalintuitionof time'),whichhe introduces.Indeed his warnings
about the difficulty of understandingwhat he is gettingat (cf. the quotation
supplied by the editorson pp. xviii) resemblenothingso much as Husserl's
warnings to his readers about the difficulties of understanding his
'transcendental reductions',and theyraise the same suspicionsin the reader.
The source -ofour concept of time is, Brentanotells us, an experienceof
originalassociation which accompanies all perceptionbut is distinctfromit.
Not only when we hear a melodybut even when we look at a perfectlysta-
tionaryobject we experiencesuccession.We experience,forexample,thatone
and the same object remainspreciselywhere it was. 'This experienceshows
us a past temporalstretch'(p. 9z). Brentanoclaims that the great similarity
betweenthis experienceand correspondingsensations,and the close genetic
connectionbetween them, is responsiblefor the fact that sensations have
nearlyalways been confusedwithProteraestheses or originalassociations.
The phenomenonof perceivedsuccessionraises the followinggeneralprob-
lem. How can I perceiveanythingat all as being past? How can something
have the attributepastnessif it no longerexists?Here, as in so many other
places, Brentano'ssolutionbeginsby makinga logical or syntacticdistinction.
not a genuine,attribute(pp. 19, 94). It
'Past', he tells us, is a modifying,
belongs to the same categoryas 'so-called', 'former','alleged', 'pretended'.
This class of adjectiveswas studiedin detail by Brentanoand his pupils, and
in Husserl's Logical Investigationsthe theoryof modificationsis developed
and put to work in a systematicway. Modifyinguses of expressionsare not
arbitrary, Husserl argues; theyare governedby syntacticrules.But theserules
are not identicalwith the syntacticrules that governthe build-upof expres-
sions used in normal,i.e., non-modified ways.
When we hear a tone, what we hear endures (as we would normallysay)
for a certainperiod of time,howevershort.Thus we experiencenot merely
the sensationof a tone, but also a Proteraesthesis.But where the object of
hearingis a tone, the object of the Proteraesthesisis, Brentanotells us, not
the past (segmentsof the) tone but the (just) past sensing (Empfinden)of
these segments(p. 98). More precisely,the primaryobject of the Proter-
aesthesis is not the primaryobject of the sensation,but somethingwhich
belongs to the secondary object thereof,namely, 'the modified[i.e., past]
intentionalrelationto the primaryobject' (ibid.). Sensationhas as its secon-
dary object a presentsensing:Proteraesthesis has as its primaryobject a past
sensing(ibid.).

nomenognosy of Time Consciousness,"and in Stumpf's"Reminiscences

of Bren-
tano,"bothtranslated
in L. L. McAlister,
ed.,ThePhilosophyofBrentano
(London:
Duckworth,1976).

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 This does not, of course,get Brentanoout of his difficulty. For a past sensa-
tion or a past intentionaldirectednessare themselvesas much past and there-
fore(as one says) 'non-existent'as past tones or past kings.'4
Brentano'sview as expounded in these lecturesthereforeremainsobscure.
Brentanoappears to claim that a Proteraesthesis involvesas its object a non-
existingthingto which we attach modifyingattributes.But the point about
modifyingattributesis that they imply that somethingdoes exist, indeed
somethingrelatedin a quite determinateway to what the unmodifiedpredi-
cate normallyrelates to. A forgedbank-notehas to be made of paper; a
mock fighthas to involvebodilymovements,and so on. This point was made
by Twardowski. It seems to us to provide a strongerobjection to the
modificationtheorythan the objectionmentionedby the editorson p. i65f.,
who point out that sentencescontainingmodifiedexpressionscan be trans-
lated into sentenceswithoutthe modifyingexpression.Thus a sentenceabout
false gold can be translatedinto a sentenceabout an object that is not gold
but is such that it could be assumed to be gold. Chisholmand Baumgartner
point out that Brentanosaw that this sort of translationwill not work for
futureand past. It seems to us that this criticismoverlooks the fact that
modified referringexpressions always imply somethingquite determinate
about the make-upof an object. Brentanocannot be rightabout a past colour
when he says, in effect,that it is a non-existentobject, since therehas to be
somethingreallyin common betweena past colour and a presentcolour, if
the modificationinvolvedis to be understandableas a modification,just as
therehas to be somethingreally in common betweenthe forgedbank-note
and the real bank-note,or betweenthe ordinaryuse of a termto referto an
object and the modifieduse of the termin whichit refersto itself.
The appeal to the syntacticdevice of modificationplays an importantrole
in Brentano'sontology.In fact,the sort of modificationthat takes us from
'tone' to 'past tone' is a memberof a family,one othermemberof which,as
alreadynoted, takes us from'colour' to 'seen colour' - and thus lies at the
heartof Brentano'stheoryof intentionality or 'immanentexistence'.Another
memberof this same family,singledout for some attentionin the introduc-
tion to the presentvolume, lies at the heart of Brentano'slater reism.Bren-
tano was able to back up his absolute rejectionof an ontologythat distin-
guished between accidents and substances by appealing to the type of
modificationthat takes us from'Johnsees the horse' to 'Johnis a horse-seer'
- a typeof modification thatyieldswhat Chisholmhas nicelycalled a notion
of concretepredication.If 'Johnsees the horse' has the canonical form'John
is a horse-seer'then, or so Brentano argues, the temptationdisappears to
referto individualmentalaccidentssuch as John'sseeing.It is strikingthatin
most of the formulationsin the presentwork Brentanodoes not appeal to
this latter type of modification.He talks directlyabout relations between
mental accidents.Indeed he talks directlyabout relationsbetweena host of
different kinds of peculiar non-substantialparts. Evidence of his later reduc-
tionismis pleasantlysparse.

14 Cf.Kraus,op. cit.,p. zz7' n. 7.

CRITICAL NOTICES 641

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?6. CriticalRemarks

56.i The Fictionof 'Reality'

We have seen what the major structuralrelationswere that Brentano was

prepared to employ and what sorts of elementsthese relationsconnected.
And we have also said somethingabout how, in his view, the descriptivepsy-
chologistshould proceed in describingboth elementsand relations.We have
been silentabout a major limitationintroducedby Brentanowhich applies to
his entiredescriptiveproject.Brentanois an unreconstructed Cartesian.He is
not simplyan ontologistwho is interestedin describingthe realmof the men-
tal with his ontological tools - tools which could equally well have been
used to describe,say, the realm of physicalobjects,or the objects of linguis-
tics, or works of art, or human actions. Rather,his views about the type of
knowledgewe can have of the mental sharplyconstrainsthe scope of his
ontology.Thus in introducingthe distinctionbetweenseparable and insepara-
ble parts with respectto 'externalrelata', Brentanowarns his readersas fol-
lows:
Man has an inborntendency to trusthissenses.He believesin therealexistence
ofcol-
ours,tones,and whatever else a sensiblepresentation
maycontain.For thisreason
somepeoplehave spokenof externalperception and rankedthiswithrespectto its
on a levelwithinnerperception.
trustworthiness
Thosewithmoreexperience, and in particular
thescientifically no longer
enlightened,
havethistrust(p. 14).
But, Brentanosays, he is prepared to pretendthat externalperceptionpre-
sentsus with what is real, in order to answer the question,alreadydiscussed
in ?3.3 above: 'out of what parts would this realityshow itselfto be com-
posed' (ibid.).
Brentanois concernedin the presentwork simplyto introduceand illustrate
his basic ontological apparatus of parts, inseparabilityt,etc.; he gives no
argumentfor his restrictionon the scope of his ontology.Accordinglywe
shall contentourselves with the remarkthat, since this ontologyworks so
well on the assumptionof (a quite naive) realism,Brentano'sideas mightfind
convincingapplicationsalso in this direction- the directiontaken by early
realistpupils of Husserl such as Ingardenand Reinach, if not by the early
Husserlhimself.

56.2 Synchronic/Diachronic

A second, related flaw or one-sidednessin Brentano'sapproach is his insis-

tencethat descriptivepsychologyand the ontologyof wholes,parts and unity
which underliesit can apply only to what existssimultaneouslyin conscious-

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ness. For thereis no reason in principlewhy the structuralprincipleseluci-
dated by Brentanoin his Aufbau of human consciousnessshould not be put
to work also in relationto what is not simultaneous.And, indeed, the con-
ceptual pressureleading Brentanoto restricttheirapplication in this way is
responsiblefor many weaknessesin what he says. Let us begin with a small
but significant example. Brentanotalks frequently of a 'psychicact' which he
calls belief (Glaube). His favouriteillustrationof the relation between a
superposedand a basic act is indeed the relationbetweena beliefand a pre-
sentation(e.g., p. 84). He even speaks of 'assertoricbeliefs',as if the distinc-
tion betweenbeliefand assertionwere not as absolute as is the distinction,
e.g., betweenbeliefand presentation(p. 83). But beliefis a state: it can, for
example,die away; assertionsand presentations,in contrast,are events.And
clearly a philosopherwho attemptsto give an ontologyof the mental but
restrictshimselfto the make-upof synchronously existingmentaleventsmust
face the criticismthatontologicalrelationsbetweenmentaleventsand mental
states fall outside his purview. Yet it seems clear that an episodic assertion
standsin just that relationto an enduringbeliefthat an episodic wish stands
to an episodic presentation,that is to say, in each case we have a relationof
one-sidedseparability.'5
A furtherconsequence of Brentano's restrictionis that he cannot deal,
withinthe frameworkof descriptivepsychology,with any ontological rela-
tions betweenmentaleventsor mentalstates not existingsimultaneously:all
such relationshave to be downgradedto the level of the merelycausal or
empirical.In general terms,Brentanomust deny that the relationsbetween
distinctiveand detachable parts can ever be diachronic: all diachronicrela-
tions fall outside the scope of his a priori theoryof part, whole and unity.
Thus his frameworkis incapable of dealing adequately with the surelynot
merelycontingentrelationsbetween,say, the memoryof an eventin the past
and the presentation(perception)of that event as it occurred.And Brentano
is forcedto claim also, for example, that genuineremorsedepends not on a
past action,but on presentlyexperiencedtemporaldifferentia in certainpres-
entlyexistingpresentationsand judgmentson which the remorseis based (p.
'5').
Contortionsof this sort - and indeed the contortionwhich is Brentano's
entiretheoryof time as developed in this volume - could and should have
been avoided. And the workingout of a more adequate descriptivepsychol-
ogy of diachronicrelationsamongst mental elementswould have led to a
significant enrichment of Brentano'sbasic ontology.
Brentano'srestriction of the realmof exact and necessarytruthsof psychol-
ogy, and of ontology,to the realm of truthsabout instantaneousmentalepi-
sodes mesheswith his otherfundamentalassumptionof Cartesianism:neces-
sary truthsare truthsof which a subjectmust be capable of havingEvidenz,

I5 The ontologyof thementalstatesand eventsinvolvedin judgment is set forthin

greatdetail- alongsidecriticisms of Brentano's own approach- by Reinach,in
his masterly"Zur Theoriedes negativen in Smith,ed.,
Urteils"(Englishtranslation
PartsandMoments [Munich: Philosophia,198z], pp. 3 15-400).

CRITICAL NOTICES 643

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the subjectat thattime.But Brentano'scontribution to analyticontology
shouldnotstandor fallwithhisepistemology, andhisrecognition
of thepos-
sibilityof a descriptive
scienceof exact and necessarypsychologicallaws
shouldnotbe overlooked simplybecauseit is accompaniedby theinsistence
thattheselawsbe capableofbeinggraspedinfallibly.

KEVIN MULLIGAN
University
of Hamburg
BARRY SMITH
of Manchester
University

Reason, Truth and History. HILARY PUTNAM. Cambridge: Cambridge

University
Press,i98I. Pp. Xii, 222.
In a wide-rangingtext of importanceto all philosophers,yet suitable for use
in a sophisticatedundergraduateepistemologycourse,Hilary Putnamdefends
an account of referencethat,he admits,may appear trivial.He suggeststhat
in givinga positivedescriptionof what it is fora representation to be trueof
an object, what it is forthe object to be a referent of a sign,we can do little
more than offertautologousremarkswithina language or conceptualscheme
that we alreadyunderstandand that incorporatesthe givenword or thought
sign, e.g., we may say that the sign "rabbit" refersto rabbits. Proceeding
beyond such a commonplacedescription,however,Putnammaintainsthat a
buman's referring involves the manifestationof an abilityto use words or
thoughtsignsin situationallyappropriateor warrantedways that are describ-
able withinour developingconceptual scheme and involve not only factors
internalto a sign systembut also relationsto the person'ssocial group and in
some cases causal relationsto correspondingexternalreferents. This central
emphasison the exerciseof a thinker'sabilitiesin relationto the partlysocial
circumstancesof inquiryallows Putnam's general discussionof referenceto
remainimportantand challengingin spiteof certainobjectionsconcerningthe
largercontextin which he imbeds it, namely,a dispute betweentwo philo-
sophicalperspectivesconcerningrealismand truth.
For two thousand years, Putnam maintains, 'metaphysicalrealism' has
endured as a prominentbut erroneous philosophical position. It involves
threepositivetheses: (i) The world beyond the mind consistsin a totalityof
objects that are 'mind-independent' in the sense that at least some of their
characteristicsbear no 'intrinsic'or 'essential' relationto any mind, i.e., are
not relatedin every'possible world' to a particularset of minds or mental
contents.Putnam regardssuch a remarkabout possible worlds as meaning
merelythat the truthsof logic plus true statementsof the laws of natureare
not contraryto descriptionsof a universethat entail the presenceof objects
havingthose characteristics yetlackingrelationsto the membersof any given
set of minds or mental contents.So Putnam treatsmetaphysicalrealism as
maintaininga thesisabout an ideal languagepermitting descriptionsof actual
mind-independent characteristics:
(z) There is but one true,completedescrip-

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