Cases Chap 1 3 Statcon

CHAPTER I
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219
G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977)
Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3
FACTS:
Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy.
Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no
jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing
thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds
up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9
years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the
regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
HELD:
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special
and limited jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of
age at the time of the filing of the case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is
over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did
not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who
are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 148
G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967)
FACTS:
Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on
the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotabato,
violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution
in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections.
ISSUE:
W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional.
HELD:
Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao
del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the
members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These
are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act
4790.
Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

Case No. 133
G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957)
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA
1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a
violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty,
property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement
that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does
not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties
and Laws
ISSUE:
W/N RA 1180 is constitutional.
HELD:
RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been
pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one
subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the
title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and
consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one
department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily
the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the
law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this.
Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines

Case No. 181
G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966)
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant on
the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional.
Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because
according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the said
Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for
Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two
subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to
the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 1435 is constitutional.
HELD:
RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its
title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the
term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally
construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power
of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the
doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is
the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed
in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to
apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of
that particular law.
Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.

Case No. 33
G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970)
FACTS:
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act purportedly
encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to include
the phrase “TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.”
The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered
Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the
Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proportional
Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and
the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes.”
ISSUE:
W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject.
HELD:
No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because
the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 2
and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions No. 2 and 4 likewise
categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is
“to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines,” which phrase is
reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions.
The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call
for the convention itself, whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. It is
not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be
comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general
subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead
Congress or the people. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and
are comprehended by its title.
Salaria v. Buenviaje
Case No. 267
G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978)
Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193
FACTS:
Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said
land to Private Respondent Mendiola. A formal letter of demand to vacate the
premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. After the trial, the City Court
ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. On appeal, the CFI through
Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. Thus, a
petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot.
HELD:
No. Memorandum Circular No. 970 was issued by the President stating that
“except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees … bona fide tenants of
dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if the
only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their
families.” Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law
although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes
from that branch called upon to implement the law. The ground relied upon by the
lessor in this case, namely, personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their
families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees.
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation

Case No. 8
G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968)
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth
Act No. 121”. In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any
franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric
power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12%
annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to
renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given
effect.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further Amend
Commonwealth Act No. 121” does not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is
violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill, which may be enacted
into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its
title.”
HELD:
Section 3 is constitutional.
Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes
reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121).
Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every
ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesn’t need to be a
complete index of the contents of the act.
Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando

Case No. 81
G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962)
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by
Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic
Act No. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199.” Section
19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under
authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall
be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission.
ISSUE:
W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of
the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
HELD:
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional.
The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single
general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory
provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional
provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
Tobias v. Abalos
Case No. 291
G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994)
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article VIII,
Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/
Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts.
ISSUE:
W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A. No.
7675.
HELD:
RA 7675 is constitutional.
Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein.
Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal

Case No. 11
G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)
FACTS:
The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13, section
2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing,
with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos,’ before engaging in fishing in the bay
of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality, are
obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government,
after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three months.” The authority
for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative
Code.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid.
HELD:
Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of
the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in
the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local
bill.
The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, “An Act amending the
Administrative Code.” It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones Law,
which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill,” because
it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the
purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act.
People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa

Case No. 230
G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957)
Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55
FACTS:
Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of
Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to
quash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was “an Act to
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to
prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act,”
did not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the
constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
ISSUES:
1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule
2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution.
HELD:
No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the
one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only, and to bills to be
enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time
the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject
expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent
with the Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution.
People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos

Case No. 204
G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947)
FACTS:
The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked
the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained
provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its
title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;
(2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court
and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the
existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with
its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The
provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes
of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an
enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all
parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez

Case No. 48
G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963)
FACTS:
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought
the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law)
stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in
audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2,
par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin
established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the
manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use
of end-users.”
ISSUE:
W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the
margin fee.
HELD:
The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished
product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is
distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals
used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished
product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the
importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the
margin fee.
Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23
G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974)
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the
Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were
approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter
signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested
to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator
Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a
wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by
him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President
withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that
the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their
signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become a law.
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance
of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due
enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such.
“Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and
approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for
signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not
become a law.”
People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim

Case No. 210
G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960)
FACTS:
In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to
the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act) issued
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in
certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. 37–1.
Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on the
ground that FAO No. 37–1 was contrary to Act No. 4003, the former having no fixed
period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that prohibition
“was for any single period of time not exceeding five years’ duration.”
ISSUE:
W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was invalid.
HELD:
Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was valid. Although FAO No. 37–1 was defective
because it failed to specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of
discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law
prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. FAO
No. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any
single period of time, but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission.
KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr.
Case No. 68
G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994)
FACTS:
DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above
and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued Memorandum
Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed
fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB, availed of the
deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. Petitioner filed a
petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary restraining order to
prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase.
ISSUES:
1. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is
unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the
said increase.
2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating
the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court.
HELD:
1. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP.
2. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the
fare increase.
Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank

Case No. 57
G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)
FACTS:
Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX
ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate
value from July 1, 1972- June 30, 1973, as provided in the Act. The Central bank
released Monetary Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas
shipped during the period from January 1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the stabilization tax
shall be at the rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July
1, 1972 to June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For exports of
bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973- June 30, 1974; the stabilization
tax shall be at the rate of 2%.
ISSUE:
W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995.
HELD:
Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. In case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law,
the basic law prevails. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic
law.
China Banking Corp. v. CA

Case No. 59
G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996)
FACTS:
Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching, in
return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were additionally
executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans matured but
So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner to file for extra
judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The properties were to be
sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court ruled on the side of So
Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted; therefore the sale of
the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration
and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They were appealing that Act No.
3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of Administrative Order No. 3 as So
Ching was contending.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties.
2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure.
HELD:
1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties.
2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over
Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative
directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative
directive.
Santos v. Honorable Estenzo

Case No. 140
G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)
FACTS:
The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company, of which
Petitioners are manager and proprietor. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission
awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not
exceeding P200. After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the mother of the
decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s fees for
failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based
on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and
prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to
Sec.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R.A. No.
772 and as a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
2. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in
attorney’s fees.
HELD:
Petition was dismissed.
1. The Commission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of Congress.
Furthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had
acquired jurisdiction over the main case.
2. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the
said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court.
Grego v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 120
G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997)
FACTS:
One of the Respondents was elected for his 3rd and final term as councilor of the
2nd District of Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petitioner, who is
also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner brings into consideration
the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding
of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31, 1981. Petitioner
argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should
be applied retroactively.
ISSUE:
W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied
retroactively due to its wording.
HELD:
Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied
retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have
a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly
declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. The
fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a
candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court
from applying the law prospectively.
The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical
meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Since Respondent was reelected, this
does not fall under the scope of the term.
Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan

Case No. 141
G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)
FACTS:
Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the
municipality certain fees including “slaughterhouse fees,” “meat inspection fees,”
“corral fees,” “and internal organ fees,” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655.
Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent, in the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of its
jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655.
HELD:
Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. The
Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. When
Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped the limits of its
statutory grant. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or
sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, the court
ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of “slaughterhouse fees.”
One of the rules of statutory construction is that “certain sections or parts of sections of
an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains, if the
parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates
the others.”
National Housing Authority v. Reyes

Case No. 85
G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)
FACTS:
Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an
expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed
they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner
opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which
provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner
in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00,
but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government
shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or
the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower.
ISSUE:
W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just
compensation.
HELD:
Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative
enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x
x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation
cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the
price. The petition for Certiorari is granted.
Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy

Case No. 73
G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)
FACTS:
Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a
period of 3 years. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises,
and hence, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The case was
terminated by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1979 to
1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired;
and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. Petitioner
appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee?
2. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res
judicata?
HELD:
This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon
the will of the lessee. On the compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual
renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the
parties.
On the second issue, the compromise agreement does not apply because
the present case requires a different set of evidence. The compromise agreement
does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof,
and hence, res judicata does not apply.
Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;

Case No. 74
G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate Jai-
Alai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of
Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated
Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President Marcos
issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant
franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then President
Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and
cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.
In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusement Board
intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and
permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0.
No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to
regulate Jai-Alai.
2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is violative of equal
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the
power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of
local governments to issue license and permit.
All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or
amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the
local governments without exceptions.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

Case No. 169
G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)
FACTS:
Petitioner, an “Iglesia ni Cristo”, was a member of the Respondent Union
which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a
closed shop provision allowed under R.A. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be
required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers
covered by this Agreement “
RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which wrote a formal letter
to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service.
ISSUE:
1. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association?
2. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional?
3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that
the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee.
HELD:
The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a
labor organization. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well as Section 7
of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to
incur expenses to protect his interest” and “in any other case where the court deems
it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered”
Tanada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287
G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUE:
W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the
necessity of publication.
HELD:
No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non
excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the
court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette
immediately.
Gutierrez v. Carpio
Case No. 55
G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)
FACTS:
The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that if
within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain
land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintiffs duly
tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 13, 1928,
the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed period had already
elapsed.
ISSUE:
W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering.
HELD:
No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The
above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on
the day from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been
modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which “month” now
means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed
period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or
contract to be done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is
reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise
provided. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise.
Guzman v. Lichauco
Case No. 56
G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921)
FACTS:
Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain
properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The unsuccessful
Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the Court of First
Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. 88 of the CCP,
as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution
of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to deposit in court, “on or
before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”, the sums of money fixed by the
Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
property held by them. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they
failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. As a result,
the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. The court ordered the
immediate execution of the judgment.
ISSUE:
W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month.
HELD:
The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term “month”
must now be understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the
Administrative Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes
the length of a month at thirty days.
U.S. v. Paniaga
Case No. 161
G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting aside
the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on
February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof
their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited
and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount
thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. By
various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and finally
occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912, the
principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application of the sureties, set
aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale.
ISSUE:
W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court.
HELD:
Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially
provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be
computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if the last be a Sunday or
a legal holiday, it shall be excluded.” This section is only applicable if there is a
computation needed to be done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for such
computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also directed
that the sale should take place on a named future date. The sale here of the
property must stand.
PNB v. CA
Case No. 238
G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993)
FACTS:
To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to
Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale.
Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor of
the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party.
The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on
March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. The date
March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and
Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction
sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”.
ISSUE:
W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly
publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
HELD:
It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the
definition of what is “week”. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term “week” was
interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. The
Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication.
Chapter II
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124
G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970)
Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19
FACTS:
Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem
parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously
given to them by the vendor of the latter’s intention to sell the property and where
the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court dismissed
petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the same code is
only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy and
leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly
grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. Moreover, the court held that
if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tenants
through judicial legislation, the section would have expressly said so.
ISSUE:
W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform
Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants.
HELD:
Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing
“agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”. The purpose of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The policy of the
State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose
of the statute.
U.S. v. Navarro
Case No. 300
G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911)
FACTS:
They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in
proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909) that they
owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the Appellants,
except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property of the assessed
value of P500.
ISSUE:
W/N the said statute’s true test of property qualification to vote is the
actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof.
HELD:
It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the
immediate context of provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a
voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualification is an
alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both qualifications are
under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of
the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent in
the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This provision
was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all
other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure purity of
the ballot box. If the property qualification is actual/market value, it would be highly
improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult
to determine.
Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala

Case No. 149
G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977)
FACTS:
Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required
referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation
with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory
authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that
Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction.
HELD:
Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau
were within jurisdiction. Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear
concerning executive department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”.
Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255
G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935)
FACTS:
Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931,
Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. A
few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by
Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shortly
thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of
Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office.
ISSUE:
W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further
amended by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed
prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of
65.
HELD:
Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by
said amendment (Act No. 3899).
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA

Case No. 26
G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993)
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 27
FACTS:
On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela
against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in
said area. In her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by
PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect tenants from
unjust eviction.)
ISSUE:
W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee.
HELD:
PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. While
it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said provision still aims to protect the tenants
from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land, as well as
unjust eviction.
Araneta v. Dinglasan
Case No. 84
G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949)
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 29
FACTS:
Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency
Powers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention
of 1942
ISSUE:
W/N the proclamations are valid.
HELD:
These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during
the time of the inability of the Congress to function. That when Congress convened
again on Jan. 1, 1942, said proclamations were also terminated.
Endencia and Jugo v. David

Case No. 98
G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953)
FACTS:
RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be
considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be
a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution
states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA
590.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 590 unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in
compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office”, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a
task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his
salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his
independence of judicial thought and action.
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte

Case No. 84
G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988)
FACTS:
Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335
of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the
Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased
mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as
grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of
their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for
Agonoy.
ISSUE:
W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision.
HELD:
No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in
Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and,
do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no
grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included
would naturally exclude what is not included.
CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation

Case No. 77
G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970)
FACTS:
In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which
later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court
of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and
P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-28644)
respectively.
ISSUE:
W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of
surcharges and interests.
HELD:
The CTA’s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in
error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following- On Tax shown on the return, in
failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest upon
such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per
centum a month, from the date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that
the maximum amount for the interest doesn’t exceed the amount corresponding to
a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax
must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard
to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5
per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed
from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of
5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966,
the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge.
Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu

Case No. 53
G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968)
FACTS:
Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax
from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all
been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally
on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided
for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of
ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961,
defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining
100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal
license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who
acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public
auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized
to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961
but on January 30, 1962
ISSUE:
W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.
HELD:
Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The
remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any
municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal
treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or
any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in
question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the
expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room
for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be
deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which
upheld the validity of the auction.
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General

Case No. 260
G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968)
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it
was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND
FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The
specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product
which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues
his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration
of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner
would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor
General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous
resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the
importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the
purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid.
HELD:
The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not
“UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by
Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate
the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of
the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor
General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute.
Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines

Case No. 248
G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged
real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953.
Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954.
As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59.
Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation
out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised
Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not
incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved.
Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real
estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the
public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP.
ISSUE:
W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the
approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original
Back Pay Law.
W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not
subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953.
HELD:
RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which
back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time
RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April
30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation
therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an
obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.
KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company

Case No. 66
G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)
FACTS:
The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied.
Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the
Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels
employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the
debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already
granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the
payroll collection.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA
Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the
salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well
established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the
right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases
where the right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful
cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs

Case No. 29
G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)
FACTS:
Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and
maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On two
different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its facilities.
Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived by the
collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu)
pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power
and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be
granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another
company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise.
ISSUE:
W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner.
HELD:
No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be
granted to a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was
given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA
358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation is
never presumed, it is always explicitly stated.
Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 252
G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989)
FACTS:
The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its
74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Durian
and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the
municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to pay
them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqualify
said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to
hire a private counsel.
ISSUE:
W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case.
HELD:
No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial
fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any
court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal
attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and
exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality’s
interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. These
laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expense
of hiring a private lawyer.
Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation

Case No. 47
G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985)
FACTS:
Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent
Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining
operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accident showed
there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petitioners
filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and
wanton negligence.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker’s
right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the
Civil Code for higher damages.
HELD:
Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages. However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages
from the Workmen’s Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the
regular courts, the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the
instance of double recovery. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stated that it
did not legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional
guarantees of social justice.
Enrile v. Salazar
Case No. 40
G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)
FACTS:
Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that
does not exist in the statute books because technically, the crime of rebellion cannot
be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof.
ISSUE:
W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine.
HELD:
The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed
on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are
absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefore, charges against Petitioners in the
information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC.
Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled
that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion, then the
principle of non-retroactivity would be violated.
Manikad v. Tanodbayan
Case No. 162
G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984)
FACTS:
Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of Anti-
Graft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that the
power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA
and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: “The EPZA in
the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have
the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws
committed inside the zones owned and administered by the Authority…”
ISSUE:
W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating
complaints within the Export Processing Zone.
HELD:
No, the use of “sole” in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the
EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone, it is not the only
authority that may investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Senarillos v. Hermosisimo
Case No. 278
G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956)
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the
charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga
and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3 councilors created by
Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council.
The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by
the members of the council. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner
of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
ISSUE:
W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos.
HELD:
No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted
by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. Sibonga therefore had no
jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. RA No.557 has eliminated the
provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Hence, the decision
against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors.
The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the
decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee.
The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the
decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate
the proceeding.
People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang

Case No. 211
G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959)
FACTS:
Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in
Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and
ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor
Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and
evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by
previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been
appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the
“peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of
“peace officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section
879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant
acquitted.
People of the Philippines v. Mapa

Case No. 213
G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)
FACTS:
Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his
defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of
Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used
the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not
contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The
Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.
Co v. CA
Case No. 65
G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993)
FACTS:
Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check
drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT.” A criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of
a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is criminally liable.
HELD:
No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in
accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact
doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice
of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice.
People of the Philippines v. Ferrer

Case No. 208
G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972)
FACTS:
Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic
Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and
punishes any person who “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization “subversive” in
nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its
constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds
that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases were
dismissed, to which the Government appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles.
HELD:
Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents,
and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A
narrow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly
and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion act
fully satisfies these requirements.
Sumulong v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 149
G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)
FACTS:
On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad
Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first
congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner, the
minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Eleven
days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the
Popular Front Party of Abad Santos.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere
coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in the
board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by
any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall
have the discretion to choose the minority inspector.
Central Capiz v. Ramirez

Case No. 56
G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920)
FACTS:
Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30
years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be
converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an
encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The
Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No.
2874, “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain,
and for other purposes,” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the
corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land.
ISSUE:
W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine
Islands which are privately owned.
HELD:
The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to
limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership
are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby.
Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
Eugenio v. Drilon
Case No. 104
G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)
FACTS:
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots.
Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment
on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses
Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate
Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of
the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner
claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been
given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment
of the amortizations.
ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those
contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide
for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable
intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.”
Chapter III
People of the Philippines v. Purisima

Case No. 221
G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant
with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute
the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the
crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed,
pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts
need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities.
HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9,
it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can
be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions
stated therein.
People of the Philippines v. Echaves

Case No. 207
G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980)
FACTS:
The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts
applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that
agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same
kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. The
order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court, thus bringing
the case at hand.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands
HELD:
The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring
that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.” But the
Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis
because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem
Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative is uncertain.”
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu

Case No. 4
G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965)
FACTS:
The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent
should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue
by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers
located in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to
Respondent, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of
Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the
scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light
of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge
wharfage.
ISSUE:
W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge
wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government.
HELD:
The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence,
the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. The
Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the
ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are
owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that only
those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.

Case No. 80
G.R. No. 83736 (January 15, 1992)
FACTS:
Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as
provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a
two-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in
the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two
years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent contends,
on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment
Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period
and not the quarterly payment made.
ISSUE:
W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 292 of the National
Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax
was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment).
HELD:
The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. The Supreme
Court said that, “Sec. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other
provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid
an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. The
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and
every part of the act is to be taken into view.”
Feliciano v. Aquino
Case No. 105
G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957)
FACTS:
Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four
days after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings, challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that Respondent was
not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age requirement
refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the existence of a
semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code, does
not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but
rather at the time of the assumption of office, provided that he had fulfilled the first
two requirements.
ISSUE:
W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal.
HELD:
The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be
disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of low
degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. No
reason is shown why, after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of
other elective offices should possess the age qualification “at the time of the
election”, the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal
officers. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as
eligible or ineligible in the said section, taking part in the election is meant, not
capacity to assume office. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of
Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal.
US. v. Hart
Case No. 159
G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)
FACTS:
Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act
No. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means
of support”. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the
comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the
country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other
Defendants had “visible means of support”, it was under the first part of the portion of
law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase
“without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said
portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense.
ISSUE:
How should the provision be interpreted?
HELD:
The construction of a statute should be based upon something more
substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is
reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus
punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the
court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the
effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect
punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had,
“visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the
conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants
are acquitted.
Case No. 131
G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918)
FACTS:
Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure
states “Will made here by an alien—will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen
or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law
of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved,
allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed and
recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of these Islands.” The will of Johnson was probated and
allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Sec. 636 is applicable only to
wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is directed to the fact that the
epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further
fact that the word “state” in the body of the section is not capitalized.
ISSUE:
W/N the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S and therefore an alien, is
covered by Sec. 636.
HELD:
The fact that the words “state” and “country” are not capitalized does not
mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase “another state or country”. It
is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree
in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible
meaning of the written words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section being nothing
more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the
effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petitioner,
being a US citizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will duly probated.
People of the Philippines v. Yabut

Case No. 231
G.R. No. 85472 (September 27, 1993)
FACTS:
Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed
another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he was
punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.
HELD:
No. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English
translation of the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicable only
when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the
crime for which he is serving sentence. According to him, his conviction for murder is
not different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from the
text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or head
note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or
reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts.
People of the Philippines v. Mendoza

Case No.112
G.R. No. L-38076 (November 4, 1933)
FACTS:
Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative
Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots which they
prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. They were tried and
convicted.
ISSUE:
W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict.
HELD:
No. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election
case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the
criminal case. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly
shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a
ballot in the ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that
defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed.
People of the Philippines v. Manaba

Case No. 110
G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30, 1933)
FACTS:
Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of
Police. After trial, Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the
case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or the
subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by the offended party.
Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape.
Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it was denied
and he was convicted.
ISSUE:
W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy.
HELD:
No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on
whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334 of the
Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. As the first
complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in
accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction
over subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spanish equivalent of
the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling, because it was
the Spanish text approved by the legislature.
U.S. v. Quintanar
Case No. 162
G.R. No. 5654 (August 27, 1910)
FACTS:
Defendants, on the night of March 1, 1908 were caught in the act of smoking
opium, in violation of Sec. 32 of Act No. 1761, the “Opium Law”. On appeal,
Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the
Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect “despues del
primero de Marzo.” (after the first of March)
ISSUE:
W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes
effect “despues del primero de Marzo.”
HELD:
The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. The English and original text
says: “on and after March 1, 1908”. Where the Act was originally promulgated in
English, it shall prevail over its translation.
Employees’ Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation
Case No. 39
G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934)
FACTS:
Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the
register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192 so that
the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. They
argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds because
it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only real rights
can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a term
exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an express
covenant requiring the lease to be registered.
ISSUE:
W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be
registered.
HELD:
The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No.
496, or the Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that all interests
must be registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising
from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the law was
relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by the
Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail.
McMicking v. Lichauco
Case No. 175
G.R. No. 7896 (March 30, 1914)
FACTS:
This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against
Defendant Chu Chan Chac. However, there was another case pending in its
duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata – where judgment
execution is. And likewise, in the duration of Mata’s judgment, there was yet another
pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco
P17,666.60.
ISSUE:
With these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco.
HELD:
Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. The
preference on Mata was based on Art. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure,
which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the
sense that no appeal lies therefrom). Mata must have immediate recourse to the
property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. However, until the allotment of
time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken, the
judgment, strictly, is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology – where
it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor
(Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to.
One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments, orders
and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under
the new Code of Civil Procedure, drawn in part from American and English
precedents. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. The lien of a
judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply
suspended. Even if there was a new judgment, it is simply reversed, not destroyed.
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Case No. 11
G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987)
FACTS:
Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same
vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales,
2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their
portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a
complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this
complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days
from notice of the sales.
ISSUE:
1. W/N there was a valid notice.
2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly.
HELD:
Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the
sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were
unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While
Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners
claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge
of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the
lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and
to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although
no notice in writing was given to them.
Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970)
FACTS:
At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961,
which led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the
decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for
the past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully
wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumous
daughter of the deceased, Racquel.
ISSUE:
W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.
HELD:
Yes. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with the
deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if
under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or
not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. Although not
his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death, are still considered
dependents under the Act.
Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.

Case No. 290
G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955)
FACTS:
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved
in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a
patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his heirs,
represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead
to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the
deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover
the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.
ISSUE:
W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of
land was valid.
HELD:
No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants
do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the
Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could
not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the
conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was
null and void.
Home Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping Lines

Case No. 125
G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983)
FACTS:
Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against
Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with
regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by
the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two
cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacity
to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases.
HELD:
Yes. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff
Company, must, in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction, prove
legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint
was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to
transact in the Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of the
Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. In the case at bar, the
insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long
before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines. Therefore,
said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrary
to public policy.
Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad

Case No. 154
G.R. No. 18316 (September 23, 1922)
FACTS:
Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, doing business in the City of Manila. Engaging in a stevedoring business,
consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain rates of
charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant, the
Internal Revenue Collector, the sum of P2,422.81, which had been paid under
protest. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921, the Plaintiff was
engaged in business as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the said business
amounting to P242, 281.33. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711, the
percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business.
ISSUE:
W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. 1462 of Act No.
2711.
HELD:
A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an
independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of
his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. Plaintiff is not a
"contractor" based on Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. Therefore, the tax paid by the
Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid.
Go Chioco v. Martinez
Case No. 113
G.R. No. 19864 and 19685 (October 17, 1923)
FACTS:
Petitioner made a loan of P40,000 to Respondent. They executed a promissory
note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three
months. On the same day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note
and sent a check of P1,800 to Petitioner, which was cashed. After three months,
Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. He now executed a new
promissory note, again due within the next three months, and with this note,
Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1,800. Again, he could not pay so they
executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1,800. This cycle
was repeated a total of 7 times, with the third cycle's promissory note bring due only
a month later and with a check for only P600. Then Respondent Hermanos paid
P25,000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,000. Therefore,
Petitioner filed a complaint. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18% was in
violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 2992). Thus, he must give
back P11,850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,000.
ISSUE:
W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned
together with the interest.
HELD:
No, since only the interest is forfeited. Taking into consideration the history of
the Usury Law, the intent of the framers is clear. In a previous law RA 2073, the
principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. However, unlike the previous
law, the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for
violations. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal is also
forfeited. As a rule of construction, when the intent of a law is ambiguous, one may
consult the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent.
US v. De Guzman
Case No. 297
G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915)
FACTS:
Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of
asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged
before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a
witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness
stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying
anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him
were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge
of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice,
nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution.
ISSUE:
W/N Defendant should be discharged.
HELD:
Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the
Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the
legislative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is
necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the
case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness
and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead
his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an
acquittal since it was made prior to his trial.
Basiana v. Luna
Case no. 31
G.R. Nos. L-34135-36 (February 24, 1981)
FACTS:
Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect
with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 183
claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disregard of their
agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of
location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim
names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent. Consequently,
Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping
Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid, and were merely
abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner’s mining claims are valid.
HELD:
Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137) provides: “For the purpose of
this section, a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an
intersection of known roads; a junction of known rivers or creeks, a known public or
private structure; a corner of approved public, private or mineral land survey; a
kilometer post of public road; or location monument or triangulation station
established by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Mines, Army Corps of engineers,
Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, or other government agencies.” An initial post
is not enumerated as a valid tie point. Petitioner’s contention that the word MAY
suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator’s intent to
eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims.
Baga v. PNB
Case No. 27
G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956)
FACTS:
Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian
under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the
intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 provides that a guardianship
can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Petitioner alleges that
she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 399 of the New Civil Code
thus terminating the guardianship.
ISSUE:
W/N Art. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390.
HELD:
No. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was the clear intent of the legislator to
create a uniform law for material aid. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code would
result in discordance with intent. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be taken to
constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec. 23
applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and
discharge of guardians.
De Villa v. CA
Case No. 88
G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for
issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a
dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law.
ISSUE:
W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question.
HELD:
The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was
committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner’s
allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does
not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the
records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to
apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.
National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.

Case No. 185
G.R. No. 106724 (February 9, 1994)
FACTS:
RA 6975, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the PNP Under a
Reorganized Dept. of the Interior and Local Government,” laid down the compulsory
retirement age of PNP officers. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56) of
said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. 89 of the same
law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). In other words, Respondents
wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. Hence, they
contend that the term “INP” includes both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the
Integrated National Police (INP).
ISSUE:
W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the
local police force.
HELD:
The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is
applicable only to the local police force. The use of the term INP is not synonymous
with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform
reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the
INP. Indeed, the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that
“INP” as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC. The legislature did intend to
exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the
retirement age is concerned.
China Banking Corporation v. Ortega

Case No. 21
G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973)
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the
collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in default.
The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with current
Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and
served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. He refused to disclose
the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the disclosure
of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written
permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 1405 also imposes criminal liability on any
official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature of this
law.
ISSUE:
W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking RA 1405.
HELD:
No. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond
the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. The discussion of the conference
committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition
against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not
preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment.
Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR

Case No. 173
G.R. No. 15000 (March 29, 1961)
FACTS:
Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different
shipments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on
the automobiles. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and, this request having
been denied, it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. After the hearing, said court
modified Respondent’s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what
the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a
refund. Hence this appeal. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax court
and insists the court’s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statement
made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the
amendments for the Tax Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law, controlling in the
interpretation of the law.
HELD:
No. Courts are not bound by a legislator’s opinion expressed in congressional
debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed to be a
mere personal opinion of the legislator.
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato

Case No. 67
G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)
FACTS:
Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. The
Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the
case. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes,
lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other
party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding
paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42.
ISSUE:
W/N under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any
party in operating an on-line lottery.
HELD:
No. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location
of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been
the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase “by itself.” What the
PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes,
races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in
collaboration, association or joint venture” with others or “by itself.”
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union

Case No. 77
G.R. No. 9265 (April 29, 1957)
FACTS:
Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial
Relations ruling that the 20 minutes’ rest given to employees after mealtime should
not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. Employees of the company
are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am – 6:00 pm (12 hours of work, four hours
overtime), given three free meals a day and 20 minutes’ rest after mealtime.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land
laborers equally applicable to seamen.
2. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the
seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work
from that of a dry land laborer.
HELD:
The definition of “hours of work” equally applies to seamen and no need for a
different criterion. Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, provides
that “when the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not
working and can leave his working place and can reset completely, shall not be
counted” in the eight working hours. A laborer need not leave the premises of the
factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being
enough that he “cease to work,” and may rest completely.
Song Kiat v Central Bank

Provision to Note:
Sec. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that “the tax collected or foreign exchange used for the payment of costs transportation and/or
other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup... shall be
refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation...”
Facts:
● January 1953 to October 1953: Song Kiat Chocolate Factory imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign
exchange tax of 17% totalling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from the said tax under section 2 of the R.A. No. 601, it sued
Central Bank that had enacted payment, and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines.
● Song Kiat quotes from dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably using the words “chocolate”, “cacao”, and “cocoa”;
however the legal exemption refers to “chocolate”... not the bean, nor the nut nor the tree. Cocoa beans however, do not
become chocolate unless and until they have undergone the manufacturing processes above described.
Issue:
● Can cocoa beans be considered as chocolate for the purposes of exemption from foreign exchange tax? - NO
Ratio:
● Strict construction of statutes apply in exemption on taxations.
○ Principles of strict construction of statutes apply in exemption on taxations. Hence, the exemption for chocolate in
the above section 2 does not include “cocoa beans”. The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer
product; the latter is ready for human consumption, the former is not.
● Enrolled bill vs. Journal, Committee Hearings. Enrolled bill prevails.
○ Despite the committee hearing regarding Republic Act 1197 amending sec. 2 substituting cocoa beans for
chocolate; Courts, however do not give decisive weight to one legislator’s opinion expressed in Congressional
debates concerning application of existing laws. Moreover, in approving Republic Act 1197, Congress agreed to
exempt cocoa beans instead of chocolate.
● Prospectivity of laws
Despite the proclamation no. 62 on September 1954 specifying that exemption of cocoa beans from foreign exchange tax shall
operate from and after the date only, it is also a general rule that statutes operate prospectively.
People v. Manantan
G.R. No. 14129
July 31, 1962
Sec 54 of the Revised Election Code:
“No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national,
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in an election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a
peace officer.”
Facts:
● Manantan was charged with a violation of Sec 54 of the REC by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First
Instance
● Manantan pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss the information as the charge against him was on the ground
that as Justice of the Peace, he is one of the officers enumerated in Sec 54 of the REC
● Lower court denied the motion to dismiss saying that a Justice of the Peace is within the scope of Sec 54 of the REC
● A second motion was filed citing the CA decision in People v. Macaraeg, where it was held that a Justice of Peace is
excluded from Sec 54 of the REC
● The lower court granted the motion to dismiss upon the authority of the ruling in People v. Macaraeg
Issue: WON the Justice of the Peace is within the scope of Sec 54 of the REC
Held: YES
● There is no necessity to include Justices of the Peace in the enumeration because the legislature used the generic and
broad term “judge”. It was intended to include all kinds of judges.
● The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws,
it merely serves as an additional factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. A strict
construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute. The court may consider the reason
of a statute when the literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of
the law makers.
Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in
compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of
the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause
such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands represented by the
Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case is mandatory.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be
noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal
requisites shall have been duly complied with.
Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals

Case No. 71
G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993)
FACTS:
Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan City.
Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by
the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under
protest.
ISSUE:
W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged
berthing fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D.
34.
HELD:
No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec. 2901 of the
Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only.
Sec. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was
amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative
intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. Since the said law
limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it is obvious that the private ports are
not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular
33-73 or E.O. 72.
Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier

Case No. 40
G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993)
FACTS:
The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the
Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive
suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental
health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the
Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of
the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only
recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted
by his office.
ISSUE:
W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government
officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the
investigation of administrative complaints.
HELD:
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said
institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution
refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in
administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges.
This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient
investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a
punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc.

Case No. 47
G.R. No. L-46908 (May 17, 1980)
FACTS:
Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing,
carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. Within
three months, the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out without
his permission. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice
to prove such consent. Respondent now question the appellate court’s ruling on their
violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes are interpreted,
the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision.
ISSUE:
W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading.
HELD:
If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself, it is the
duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right
because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States.
Tamayo v. Gsell
Case No. 282
G. R. No 10765 (December 22, 1916)
FACTS:
This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries
suffered by Braulio Tamayo, 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was attributed to
the boy’s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time and
without prior instruction.
ISSUE:
W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer’s Liability
Act.
HELD:
Yes. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury
cases brought under the Employer’s Liability Act to be the same as that in the
country from which the Act was taken, being of American origin.
People v Yadao
Terms to Remember: R.A. 145, Section 1:
(1) “Any person assisting a claimant…who shall directly or indirectly…a fee exceeding twenty pesos.”; and
(2) “Any person assisting a claimant… who shall attempt to solicit… a fee exceeding twenty pesos.”
FACTS: People v. Yadao is a case regarding an appeal made by plaintiff-appellants regarding a decision quashing the indictment of
the defendant-appellees. The accused defendant-appellees were stated to have violated R.A. 145 by offering to assist one Florentino
Jazmin in the prosecution and expeditious approval of his legitimate claim of $2,207 for benefits under US laws administered in the
Philippines by the US Veterans Administration, charging a sum of Php 800, in violation of the twenty pesos limit.
ISSUE: Whether or not offering to assist the claimants constitute a violation of RA 145.
HELD: The court ruled that “offering to help” DOES NOT VIOLATE R.A. 145, therefore, AFFIRMING the previous decision quashing
the complaint.
RULING: R.A. 145 construes the violation with regards to the person committing the violation, and the manner in which he violates
it. The Act provides “who shall” after the clause “any person assisting the claimant”, and before the act, differentiated with “directly
or indirectly” or “attempt” to solicit a fee exceeding the limit of twenty pesos. It does not, however, provide that any person who
offers to assist. The law provides that a person must participate in the action of assisting first, before the construction of the
soliciting beyond the limit. An attempt may have been made, but the law does not punish the attempt in itself; and must be
understood as part of the whole of the law.

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CHAPTER I

Lidasan v. Commission on Elections

Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines

Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.

Alalayan v. National Power Corporation

Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando

Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal

People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa

People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez

People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim

Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank

China Banking Corp. v. CA

Santos v. Honorable Estenzo

Grego v. Commission on Elections

Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan

National Housing Authority v. Reyes

Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy

Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala

B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA

Endencia and Jugo v. David

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte

CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation

Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu

Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General

Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines

KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company

Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs

Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation

People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang

People of the Philippines v. Mapa

People of the Philippines v. Ferrer

Sumulong v. Commission on Elections

Central Capiz v. Ramirez

People of the Philippines v. Purisima

People of the Philippines v. Echaves

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.

People of the Philippines v. Yabut

People of the Philippines v. Mendoza

People of the Philippines v. Manaba

Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.

Home Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping Lines

Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad

National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.

China Banking Corporation v. Ortega

Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR

Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato

Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union

Song Kiat v Central Bank

Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]

YES. Petition was granted.

Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals

Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier

Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc.

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