Perez v LPG Refillers(2006)

Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:
 BP Blg. 33 was enacted to penalize illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration,
underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of
adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.
 The law sets a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000 as penalties.
 The Department of Energy issued Circular No. 2000-06-010 to implement the law.
 Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines asked the DOE to set aside the Circular
for being contrary to law but to no avail, hence they filed an action before the RTC to nullify the
circular.
 RTC granted the petition and nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses
not included in the statute.
o Moreover, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, there is a
possibility that the P50,000 maximum penalty might be exceeded.
o The Circular has a range of P1,000-5,000/cylinder for first offenses and a range of
P5,000-10k/cylinder for third offenses. For retails outlets, the max penalty is 20k.
o Aside from the monetary fines, some offenses also include the recommendation the
closure of the business to the proper LGU.
 Meanwhile, petitioner Sec. Perez of the DOE argues that DOE is empowered by the ff. provisions
to penalize the acts it enumerated in the circular:

o BP Blg. 33, as amended:

 “SEC. 3-A. Rules and Regulations; Administrative sanctions for violation
thereof. – The Bureau of Energy Utilization shall issue such rules and regulations
as are necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act, subject to the
approval of the Minister of Energy, after consultation with the affected industry
sectors.  Said rules and regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the
date of its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

        “The Bureau of Energy Utilization is empowered to impose in an

administrative proceeding, after due notice and hearing, upon any person who
violates any provision of such rules and regulations, a fine of not more than ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or to suspend or remove the license or permit of a
hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retail outlet: Provided, That
hearing in any administrative proceedings may be waived by
respondent. Provided, Further, That during the pendency of such administrative
proceeding, the Bureau may suspend the business operations of such hauler,
marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retailer or retail outlet operator when the
suspension is consistent with public interest. …
             x x x x
    “The administrative sanction that may be imposed shall be without prejudice
to the filing of a criminal action as the case may warrant.”

o §23 of RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998):

Section 23. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The DOE, in coordination
with the Board, the DENR, DFA, Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), Department of Health (DOH), DOF, DTI, National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) and TLRC, shall formulate and issue the
 necessary implementing rules and regulations within sixty (60) days after the
effectivity of this Act.

o §5(g) and §21 of RA 7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992):

(g) Formulate and implement programs, including a system of providing

incentives and penalties, for the judicious and efficient use of energy in all
energy-consuming sectors of the economy;

xxx

Subject to existing rules and regulations, the funds and monies collected or which
the otherwise come into the possession of the Department and its bureaus from
fees, surcharges, fines, and penalties which the Department and its bureaus may
impose and collect under this Act

ISSUES + RULING:

WoN the Circular is valid/legal. YES.

 For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the following must concur:
o the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating
statute itself; and
o the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself
 As for the first requirement:
o BP Blg 33 only states merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may
be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or
incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG
cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings
on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized
decanting of LPG cylinders. 
o The acts and omissions stated in the circular are well within the modes contemplated by
the law and serve the purpose of curbing pernicious practices of LPG dealers.
 As for the second requirement:
o The statute provides a minimum and maximum amount as penalties.
o The maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range
allowed by law.  While the circular is silent as to the max penalty for refillers, marketers,
and dealers, such does not amount to violation of the statutory maximum limit.  
o The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself
run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the
maximum limits of penalties.
 The law was intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with
which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving
petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. 

DISPOSITION:Petition granted.

Geotina v. CA
· “articles of prohibited importation” - used in Tariff and Customs Code embrace not only those
declared prohibited at time of adoption, but also goods and articles subject of activities undertaken in
subsequent laws.
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 10
G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918)
Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47
FACTS:
The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the
Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oils
which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was paid
under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 17 Par 72a
of Act No. 2432 provides that “no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on such
articles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have been disposed of to
consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers.” Said Act took
effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915.
ISSUE:
W/N a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under
Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and
gasoline which had been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915.
HELD:
No. The Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that
merchandise “dispose of” had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully
recognized that the phrase “disposed of” meant nothing more or less than a
contract whereby the vendor was bound to furnish an article, because in said Act it
provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the
absence of stipulations to the contrary. The phrase “disposed of” as used in Sec. 17 of
Act No. 2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical
interpretation.

Claudio v. COMELEC
Topic: Recall
Ponente: V.V. Mendoza, J.
Date: 4 May 2000
DOCTRINE: To what doctrine is the case related and how is it explained. Make sure that this is related
to the topic.
QUICK FACTS: One to two liner facts.
FACTS:
LGU concerned: Pasay City
Position of person/s involved: Mayor of Pasay City
Contested Law/Ordinance:
Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Sometime in May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered for the purpose of
convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) and to file a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio
for loss of confidence.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang
kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio as mayor for loss of
confidence. The petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999 and copies of the petition were in public
areas throughout the City.
Claudio filed an opposition against the petition alleging, among others, that the petition for recall was
filed within one year from his assumption into office and therefore prohibited. He argued that the PRA
was convened within the 1 year prohibited period as provided by Section 74 of the Local Government
Code. The COMELEC, however, granted the petition for recall ruling that recall is a process which starts
with the filing of the petition for recall and since the petition was filed exactly one year and a day after
Claudio's assumption of office, the petition was filed on time. Thereafter, COMELEC set the date of the
recall elections on April 15, 2000. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WoN the petition for recall was filed within the proper period provided for by Section 74 of the
Local Government Code
HELD: Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC
The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of recall (i.e. the recall election itself)
which is vested with the registered voters of the LGU. It does not apply to the preparatory processes to
such exercise of recall such as the proceedings of the PRA.
RATIO:
Recall as used in Section 74 refers to the election itself
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly
or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then
proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such
resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the
scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of § 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by
means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his
replacement.
Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power
vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official
into office, the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other
words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the
PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at
least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.
Anything steps prior to recall election itself are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a
recall. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the
registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall -
which paragraph (b) of §74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from
the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.
The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of recall
It is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. A
recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he
can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign
judgment, the official concerned remains in office. Thus, the preliminary proceedings of the PRA do not
produce a decision by the electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy the
confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one
year after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.
Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against the exercise of recall
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an
elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the
preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a
local official.
Including the convening of the PRA as part of recall restricts right of speech and assembly
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the
purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the
constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day
of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an
informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes
the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one
of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will
always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in
the incumbent.
The phrase regular local election does not include the campaign period
Claudio contends that the date April 15, 2000 also falls within the second prohibition under Section 74 of
the Local Government Code arguing that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not
only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election
period as well. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held.
The contention is untenable. First there is nothing in the law that shows the campaign period is included
for purposes of computing the prohibitory period. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely
limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be
held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30
following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the
middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To
construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period
to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall
which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable."

JULIAN SANTULAN VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. L-28021 December 15, 1977
Facts:
Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin were rival claimants with respect to the lease of a parcel of foreshore
land of public domain. The area is about 4 ½ hectares located at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit Cavite.
Santulan caused the survey of the land on December 5, 1942 and filed an application on Dec. 29, 1942 to
lease for five (5) years for agricultural purposes an area of 36, 120 sq. meters and including the
application for revocable permit to occupy the said land for planting of Bakawan which later develop to
fishpond seven years later after acquiring ordinary fishpond permit from BFAR. On the other hand,
private respondent Lusin was reported and was being summoned that he was illegally entered the area
covered by the petitioners fishpond permit and was refrain from introducing improvements.
However, Lusin filed applications in 1942 and 1945 for a revocable-permit and a lease of a foreshore for
the purpose of producing salt in the said land, contending that he had been in the continuous and
exclusive possession of the land since 1920 when it was still under water, and that he had used it as a site
of his fish corrals. He allegedly converted two hectares into fishpond enclosed with mud dikes and
provided with a concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood. On the northern part of the
land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at close intervals to serve as water breakers to protect
the mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. Lusin further claimed that he introduced
the alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953.
The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Petitioner Santulan and private respondent Lusin gave rise to
Bureau of Lands Conflict.
The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore land was subject "to reparian rights , hence rejected Lusin's
application for a foreshore lease and for a revocable permit and gave due course to Santulan's foreshore
lease application. The reconsideration was denied as well as the appeal to Acting Secretary of
Agriculture.
Lusin asked for reinvestigation but decision was reaffirmed. He then appealed to the President of the
Philippines. By authority of the President, Executive Secretary sustained Lusin's appeal and reversed the
orders of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in favor of
Santulan.
Santulan's motion for reconsideration was denied in the letter of the Acting Executive Secretary then
filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite a petition for certiorari wherein he alleged that the Executive
Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The lower court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Executive Secretary's decision. Santulan
appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution elevated the record to this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the riparian owner has preferential right over continuous possession.
Held:

Yes. In the Monzon case, the Office of the President, applying the oft-cited paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1 held that Monzon, the littoral owner of the registered land abutting upon
the foreshore land, has the preferential right to lease the foreshore land,

32. Preference of the Reparian Owner — The owner of the property adjoining foreshore
lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his
property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations
governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days
from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of
his preferential right.

Considering that the foreshore land abutting upon Santolan's lot is in the same situation as the foreshore
land abutting upon Monzon's lot, there is no reason why Santulan should not enjoy, with respect to the
disputed foreshore land, the rights given to Monzon over the foreshore land adjacent to his lot.

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which
provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the
sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or
for the coast guard service", shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owner of the
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof" (cited in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335,
338).

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to
paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea
(Ker & Co. vs. Cauden 6 Phil. 732, 736, 223 U.S. 268, 56 L. Ed. 432, 435; Jover vs. Insular Government,
10 Phil. 522, 40 Phil. 1094, 1100, 221 U.S. 623, 55 L. Ed. 884).

The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian
owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers
by reason of the destructive force of the waters (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). So, in the case
of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession (Banks vs.
Ogden 2 Wall. 57, 67, 17 L. Ed. 818, 821).

The lease application of Julian Santulan mentioned in the order of February 1, 1951 should be recorded in
the names of his heirs and the obligation to make reimbursement mentioned in the dispositive part of the
Undersecretary's order should now devolve upon the heirs of Santolan. The reimbursement should be
made to the heirs of the late Antonio Lusin The obligation to vacate the disputed land, as required in the
Director's order of October 19, 1951 devolves upon the heirs of Lusin Costs in both instances against
respondent heirs of Lusin (As amended by Resolution of February 17, 1977.

Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez

Case No. 67
G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961)
Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and
household remedies. Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is
among those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the Central
Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the
payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the
Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that:
“Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other
charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors …
shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.”
The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax
ISSUE:
W/N the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17%
transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law.
HELD:
No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument:
All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely:
food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The “stabilizers and
flavors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food
products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and
therefore not subject to exemption
Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund:
RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though “stabilizers and
flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following
which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate,
cattle, and industrial starch.
Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and
categorizations posited by the respondent.

Gonzales v. Comelec
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall
be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as
there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the
issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their
proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents
interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political
question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are
inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress
makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is
sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is
reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the
constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC
held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein
referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority
to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special
date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare
the original proposition with the amended proposition.

Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar

Case No. 45
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966)
Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211
FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants
have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense
during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be
paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the
contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications,
Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied
citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for
declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise”
which is banned by the Postal Law.
HELD:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” is defined as a
game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance,
and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal
Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind”
means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The intent of the
prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt
public morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of
the law is preserved.

Gotiaco v. Union Ins. Soc. Of Camilon

Case No. 114
G.R. No. 13983 (September 1, 1919)
Chapter V, Page 213, Footnote No. 141
FACTS:
The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. The
rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage
because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. Plaintiffs sought recovery from
Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: “Perils…
of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons,… barratry of
the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes…” The trial
court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable. Plaintiffs
appealed hence this action.
ISSUE:
W/N the insurer is liable for the loss.
HELD:
No, the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress
and not to the insurer. The words “all other perils, losses, and misfortunes” are to be
interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks which are
enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. A loss which, in the
ordinary course of events, results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea,
from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent failure of the ship’s
owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under the
ordinary condition is not a “peril of the sea.” The insurer undertakes to insure against
perils of the sea and similar perils, not against perils of the ship. It was found that the
cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with
negligence for failure to protect the pipe by putting a case over it. It was
appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy.

Murphy, Morris & Co. v. Collector of Customs

STATUTE: Dynamos, generators, exciters, and other machinery for the generation of electricity for
lighting or for power;
HELD: phrase “other machinery” would not include steam turbines, pumps, condensers, because not
same kind of machinery with dynamos, generators and exciters.

CIR v. American Express

Facts:
Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with servicing a
unit of AMEX-Hongkong Branch and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK receivables from card
members situated in the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines.
It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section 110B
of the 1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or
to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other
internal revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of Section 112.”
In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be informed
that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is remitted
inwardly to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Central
Bank of the Philippines, your service income is automatically zero rated xxx”
Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against the
claimant as they partake of the nature of tax exemption.
CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA
affirmed this decision and further held that respondent’s services were “services other than the
processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines”
and paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations
of BSP.
Issue:
W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund
Held:
Yes. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
Section 102B particularly provides for the services or transactions subject to 0% rate:
(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside the
Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP;
(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by hotels
and other service establishments, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency
and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP
Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the
processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines),
when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP, are
zero-rated. Respondent renders service falling under the category of zero rating.
As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of
the tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are
zero-rated, while imports are taxed.
In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is different from the utilization of
consumption of the outcome of such service. While the facilitation is done in the Philippines, the
consumption is not. The services rendered by respondent are performed upon its sending to its foreign
client the drafts and bulls it has gathered from service establishments here, and are therefore, services also
consumed in the Philippines. Under the destination principle, such service is subject to 10% VAT.
However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is 0% VAT rate for
services that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for
in accordance with the R&R of BSP.” The respondent meets the following requirements for exemption,
and thus should be zero-rated:
(1) Service be performed in the Philippines
(2) The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of the Tax Code
(3) It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP R&R.

[G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005]

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES

This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and prohibit the Executive Branch from
allowing, and the private respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and duty-free shops
located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), and
to declare Section 5 of EO No. 80, EO No. 97-A, and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-
034 as unconstitutional, illegal, and void.

FACTS:
 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark
and Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form
of special economic zones in order to promote the economic and social development of Central
Luzon in particular and the country in general. Among the salient provisions are as follows:
 “SECTION 12. x x x The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and
exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and
duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or
removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the
Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff
Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines; x x x”

 1993, President Ramos issued EO No. 80, which declared, that Clark shall have all the applicable
incentives granted to the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone under RA No. 7227.
  Pursuant to the directive under EO No. 80, the BCDA (Bases Conversion and Development
Authority) passed Resolution allowing the tax and duty-free sale at retail of consumer goods
imported via Clark for consumption outside the CSEZ.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed issuances are unconstitutional, illegal and void for being:
1. An exercise of executive lawmaking, contrary to RA No. 7227
2. Violation of the Constitutional provisions, particularly the equal protection clause;
3. Prohibition of unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade; and

HELD:
1. EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION - Invalid insofar as the CSEZ (Clark Special Economic Zone), as
RA 7227 provides for the grant of incentives to the SSEZ (Subic Special Economic Zone)

petitioners contend that the wording of RA No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to the
importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only. Hence, they claim that the assailed issuances
constitute executive legislation for invalidly granting tax incentives in the importation of consumer goods
such as those being sold in the duty-free shops, in violation of the letter and intent of RA No. 7227.

The Court held that Section 12 of RA No. 7227 clearly does not restrict the duty-free importation only to
'raw materials, capital and equipment. To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located
inside the special economic zone only to raw materials, capital and equipment clearly runs counter to the
intention of the Legislature to create a free port where the 'free flow of goods or capital within, into, and
out of the zones' is insured. The phrase 'tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the
zone.

On the other hand, insofar as the CSEZ is concerned, the case for an invalid exercise of executive
legislation is tenable.
While Section 12 of RA No. 7227 expressly provides for the grant of incentives to the SSEZ, it fails to
make any similar grant in favor of other economic zones, including the CSEZ. Tax and duty-free
incentives being in the nature of tax exemptions, the basis thereof should be categorically and
unmistakably expressed from the language of the statute. Consequently, in the absence of any express
grant of tax and duty-free privileges to the CSEZ in RA No. 7227, there would be no legal basis to uphold
the questioned portions of two issuances: Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of BCDA
Board Resolution No. 93-05-034, which both pertain to the CSEZ.

2. EQUAL PROTECTION - VALID (no violation of equal protection clause)

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the
law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

In this case, the Court found that there’s real and substantial distinction between residents within the
secured area and those living within the economic zone but outside the fenced-off area. A significant
distinction between the two groups is that enterprises outside the zones maintain their businesses within
Philippine customs territory, while private respondents and the other duly-registered zone enterprises
operate within the so-called 'separate customs territory.

The classification is also germane to the purpose of RA No. 7227 because its purpose is to convert the
lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such
objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to the establishments within the
zone to attract and encourage foreign and local investors.
3. UNFAIR COMPETITION - VALID (No unfair Competition)
Court held that the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the
exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition. Said
constitutional prohibition cannot hinder the Legislature from using tax incentives as a tool to pursue RA
No. 7227’s policies of developing the SSEZ into a self-sustaining entity that will generate employment
and attract foreign and local investment.

United States Supreme Court

CHUNG FOOK v. WHITE, (1924)
No. 299
Argued: February 26, 1924 Decided: April 7, 1924
[264 U.S. 443, 444] Mr. Assistant Attorney General Ottinger, for respondent.
Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
Chung Fook is a native-born citizen of the United States. Lee Shee, his wife, is an alien Chinese woman,
ineligible for naturalization. In 1922 she sought admission to the United States, but was refused and
detained at the immigration station, on the ground that she was an alien, afflicted with a dangerous
contagious disease. No question is raised as to her alienage or the effect and character of her disease; but
the contention is that, nevertheless, she is entitled to admission under the proviso found in section 22 of
the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 891, c. 29 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp.
1919, 4289 1/4 l). The section is copied in the margin. 1
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the federal District Court for the Northern District of
California, and upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the judgment was affirmed. 287 Fed. 533.
The pertinent words of the proviso are:
'That if the person sending for wife or minor child is naturalized, [264 U.S. 443, 445] a wife to whom
married or a minor child born subsequent to such husband or father's naturalization shall be admitted
without detention for treatment in hospital. ...'
The measure of the exemption is plainly stated and, in terms, extends to the wife of a naturalized citizen
only.
But it is argued that it cannot be supposed that Congress intended to accord to a naturalized citizen a right
and preference beyond that enjoyed by a native-born citizen. The court below thought that the exemption
from detention was meant to relate only to a wife who by marriage had acquired her husband's
citizenship, and not to one who, notwithstanding she was married to a citizen, remained an alien under
section 1994, Rev. Stats. ( Comp. St. 3948):
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.'
To the same effect, see Ex parte Leong Shee (D. C.) 275 Fed. 364. We are inclined to agree with this
view; but, in any event, the statute plainly relates only to the wife or children of a naturalized citizen and
we cannot interpolate the words 'native-born citizen' without usurping the legislative function. Corona
Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 537 , 44 Sup. Ct. 156, 66 L. Ed. --, decided January 7, 1924; United
States v. First National Bank, 234 U.S. 245 , 259-260, 34 Sup. Ct. 846; St. Louis, Iron Mountain, etc.,
Railway Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. [264 U.S. 443, 446] 281, 295, 28 Sup. Ct. 616; Amy v. Watertown,
130 U.S. 320, 327 , 9 S. Sup. Ct. 537. The words of the statute being clear, if it unjustly discriminates
against the native-born citizen, or is cruel and inhuman in its results, as forcefully contended, the remedy
lies with Congress and not with the courts. Their duty is simply to enforce the law as it is written, unless
clearly unconstitutional.
Affirmed.

Escribano v. Avila
Case No. 101
G.R. No. L-30375 (September 12, 1978)
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 205
FACTS:
Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, filed a complaint for libel
against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now the
RTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned Judge Avila’s authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fiscal of
Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation,
pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of
First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an
amendment made for Art 360.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged
exclusively in the city attorney of that city.
HELD:
Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations
because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. The enumeration in
the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary
investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but
not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. The power of the CFT to
conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power
for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and
search warrants. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by
the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule.

People v. Manantan
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However,
Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said
section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview
of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee
of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified
civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a
election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code
wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take
part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was
omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.
Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?
Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First
Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include
justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and
broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed
with judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while
acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected
in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-
appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the
peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered
the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under
the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at
bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just
called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of
terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered
as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges
of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute,
are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts
because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of
peace".

Roldan v Villaroman
Case No. 262
G.R. No. 46825 (October 18, 1939)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 229
FACTS:
Respondents were charged of murder. During the trial, Respondent Cuevas
became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the Petitioner,
denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of
Cuevas. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence
and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Respondents then instituted a
certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner, impugning the
decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. The
CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing
with the trial.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
No. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely
principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. CFI of Laguna, which
held that the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” only refers to its proximate
antecedent and to “all other auxiliary writs and process.” This ruling is in conjunction
with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as
referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in the interpretation applied is
in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional phrases found
in a law, but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is
to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision, the same
should be made extensive to the whole.

People of the Philippines v. Teodoro Tamani

Case No. 227
G.R. No. L-22160 and G.R. No. L-22161 (January 21, 1974)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 232
FACTS:
Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court
on February 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subsequently
filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was denied. The lower
court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July 13,
1963 through the counsel’s wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10, 1963,
forty-eight days from July 24th, which is the reglementary fifteen-day period for
appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the
appeal was forty-eight days late. They invoked Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.
ISSUE:
W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation
of the decision.
HELD:
Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word “promulgation”
should be construed as referring to “judgment”, while “notice” should be construed
as referring to “order”. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late, not 47, as Appellees
contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 13.
Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand “to obviate any
possible miscarriage of justice”.

ALDECOA v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank

Case No. 126
30 Phil. 228, (March 23, 1915)
Chapter V, Page 245, Footnote No. 272
FACTS:
The mother of the Plaintiffs, Isabel Palet, was a general partner in the firm,
Aldecoa & Company. The said firm, however, was heavily indebted to the
Defendant corporation. Isabel’s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and
obligations to the Defendant Corporation, and to mortgage certain real properties of
her sons. In order to mortgage these properties, she emancipated her sons and
mortgaged their properties with her consent. The Petitioners now seek to cancel the
instruments of mortgage executed by them.
ISSUE:
W/N Isabel Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force
in this country in 1903, and in so doing, confer upon them the capacity to execute a
valid mortgage on their real property with her consent.
HELD:
We must look at the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (American)
relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish)
relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their minor
children. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old
Spanish code. According to the Code of Civil Procedure, there is no longer a need to
be formally emancipated by the parents after attaining the age of majority. At the
time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents, Joaqin was already
of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid, while Zoilo’s mortgage was not
valid even if he signed it with his mother because he was a minor when he executed
the mortgage.