J. Bernabe Case Digests - Taxation

CASES OF JUSTICE PERLAS-
BERNABE
TAXATION LAW
TAXATION LAW
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Power of taxation as distinguished from Police Power and Eminent Domain
B. Inherent and constitutional limitations of taxation
C. Requisites of a valid tax
D. Tax as distinguished from other forms of exactions
E. Kinds of taxes
F. Doctrines in taxation
1. Construction and interpretation of tax laws, rules, and regulations
2. Prospectivity of tax laws
3. Imprescriptibility of taxes
4. Double taxation
5. Escape from taxation
a. Shifting of tax burden
b. Tax avoidance
c. Tax evasion
6. Exemption from taxation
CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 193383-84, FIRST DIVISION, January 14, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of the Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 1-2000 which is reflected in the case Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR
wherein it held that the BIR should not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment
of the reliefs provided for under international agreements, especially since tax treaties do not provide
for any prerequisite at all for the availment of the benefits under said agreements.
It bears reiterating that the application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to
confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief. Since CBK Power had requested for confirmation
from the ITAD on June 8, 2001 and October 28, 2002 before it filed on April 14, 2003 its administrative
claim for refund of its excess final withholding taxes, the same should be deemed substantial compliance
with RMO No. 1-2000, as in Deutsche Bank. To rule otherwise would defeat the purpose of Section 229
of the NIRC in providing the taxpayer a remedy for erroneously paid tax solely on the ground of failure
to make prior application for tax treaty relief.
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FACTS:
CBK Power is a limited partnership duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
which is engaged in the development and operation of electric powerplants in the Luzon area. The
partnership obtained a loan from the Industrial Bank of Japan, Fortis – Netherlands, Raiffesen Bank,
Fortis – Beligum, and Mizuho Bank for which it remitted payments from May 2001 to May 2003. It
claimed to have withheld final taxes from said payments at differing rates with respective banks that
range from 15% – 20%.
The partnership however claims that under the relevant tax treaties between the Philippine
government and the respective host countries of the bank, the interest income derived by the said
institutions are subject only to a preferential tax rate of 10%. The partnership then subsequently filed
an administrative claim for refund or credit of its excess final withholding taxes allegedly erroneously
withheld and collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
The partnership eventually appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) Division for a judicial claim
of refund or credit due to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s inaction regarding their request.
All of the petition for refunds were originally granted by the CTA Division citing that an International
Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) ruling is not a prerequisite for the entitlement of a tax relief.
Upon reconsideration raised by the CIR however, one of the claims were disallowed and the total
refund was reduced to about one million due to the lack of a ITAD ruling which already allegedly
became a prerequisite under the ruling of the Court in Mirant Phils. v. CIR. This ruling was then later
affirmed under the CTA en banc.
ISSUES:
1. May the BIR add a requirement which is a prior application for an ITAD ruling – that is not
found in the income tax treaties signed by the Philippines before a taxpayer can avail of
preferential tax rates under the said treaties? (NO)
2. Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has been violated?
(NO)
RULING:
1.
The Court held that the obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective
of a Revenue Memorandum Order. Bearing in mind the purpose of tax treaties, the period of
application for the availment of tax treaty relief as required by the Revenue Memorandum should not
operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty required by
good faith in complying with a tax treaty.
The denial of the availment of tax relief for the failure of a taxpayer to apply within the prescribe
period under the administrative issuance would impair the value of the tax treaty. At most, the
application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of
the taxpayer to the relief.
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Logically, non-compliance with tax treaties has negative implications on international relations, and
unduly discourages foreign investors.
2.
Nowhere and in no wise does the law imply that the CIR must act upon the claim, or that the taxpayer
shall not go to court before he is notified of the CIR action. It is intended primarily as a notice of
warning that unless the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected erroneously or illegally is
refunded, court action will follow.
7. Equitable recoupment
8. Prohibition on compensation and set-off
9. Compromise and tax amnesty
II. NATIONAL TAXATION (National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by RA 10963
or the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion Law)
A. Taxing authority
1. Jurisdiction, power, and functions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
a. Interpreting tax laws and deciding tax cases
b. Non-retroactivity of rulings
2. Rule-making authority of the Secretary of Finance
B. Income tax
1. Definition, nature, and general principles
a. Criteria in imposing Philippine income tax
b. Types of Philippine income taxes
c. Taxable period d. Kinds of taxpayers
2. Income
a. Definition and nature
b. When income is taxable
i. Existence of income
ii. Realization and recognition of income
c. Tests in determining whether income is earned for tax purposes
i. Realization test
ii. Economic benefit test, doctrine of proprietary interest
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iii. Severance test
d. Tax-free exchanges
e. Situs of income taxation
3. Gross income
a. Definition
b. Concept of income from whatever source derived
c. Gross income vs. net income vs. taxable income
d. Classification of income subject to tax
i. Compensation income
ii. Fringe benefits
iii. Professional income
iv. Income from business
v. Income from dealings in property
vi. Passive investment income
vii. Annuities, proceeds from life insurance or other types of
insurance
viii. Prizes and awards
ix. Pensions, retirement benefit or separation pay
x. Income from any source
e. Exclusions and exemptions
i. Rationale
ii. Taxpayers who may avail
iii. Distinguished from deductions and tax credits
4. Deductions from gross income
a. Concept as return of capital
b. Itemized deductions vs. Optional Standard Deduction
c. Items not deductible
5. Income tax on individuals
a. Resident citizens, non-resident citizens, and resident aliens
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i. Inclusions and exclusions for taxation on compensation
income
ii. Taxation of business income/income from practice of
profession
iii. Taxation of passive income
iv. Taxation of capital gains
v. Capital asset vs. ordinary asset
b. Income tax on non-resident aliens engaged in trade or business
c. Income tax on non-resident aliens not engaged in trade or business
d. Individual taxpayers exempt from income tax
i. Senior citizens
ii. Minimum wage earners
iii. Exemptions granted under international agreements
6. Income tax on corporations
a. Income tax on domestic corporations and resident foreign
corporations
i. Minimum Corporate Income Tax
ii. Branch Profit Remittance Tax
iii. Itemized deductions vs. Optional Standard Deductions
iv. Taxation of passive income
v. Taxation of capital gains
b. Income tax on non-resident foreign corporations
c. Income tax on special corporations
i. Proprietary educational institutions and hospitals
ii. Non-profit hospitals
iii. Government-owned or controlled corporations, agencies, or
instrumentalities
iv. Domestic depository banks (foreign currency deposit units)
v. International carriers doing business in the Philippines
vi. Off-shore banking units
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vii. Resident foreign depository banks (foreign currency deposit
units)
viii. Regional or area headquarters and regional operating
headquarters of multinational companies
d. Improperly Accumulated Earnings Tax (IAET)
e. Exemptions from tax on corporations
f. Tax on other business entities: general partnerships, general
professional partnerships, co-ownerships, joint ventures, and consortia
7. Filing of returns and payment
a. Period within which to file income tax return of individuals and
corporations
b. Substituted filing
c. Failure to file returns
8. Withholding taxes
a. Concept
b. Creditable vs. withholding taxes
c. Duties of a withholding agent
C. Transfer taxes
1. Estate tax
a. Basic principles, concept, and definition
b. Classification of decedent
c. Determination of gross and net estate
d. Deductions and exclusions from estate
e. Exemption of certain acquisitions and transmissions
f. Period for filing estate tax returns
2. Donor’s tax
a. Basic principles, concept, and definition
b. Requisites of a valid donation
c. Transfers which may be constituted as donation
i. Transfer of property for insufficient consideration
ii. Condonation/remission of debt
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iii. Bona fide arms-length transfers
d. Determination of gross gift
e. Exemption of gifts from donor’s tax
D. Value-Added Tax (VAT)
1. Concept and elements of VATable transactions
2. Impact and incidence of tax
3. Destination Principle; Cross-Border Doctrine
4. Imposition of VAT on transfer of goods by tax exempt persons
5. Transactions deemed sale subject to VAT
6. Zero-rated and effectively zero-rated sales of goods or properties
7. VAT-exempt transactions
8. Input and output tax
9. Tax refund or tax credit
J. R. A. PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171307, SECOND DIVISION, August 28, 2013, PERLAS--BERNABE, J.
Tax Refund of the Unutilized Input VAT. – Case law dictates that in a claim for tax refund or tax credit,
the applicant must prove not only entitlement to the claim but also compliance with all the documentary
and evidentiary requirements therefor. Section 110(A)(1) of the NIRC provides that creditable input
taxes must be evidenced by a VAT invoice or official receipt, which must, in turn, comply with Sections
237 and 238 of the same law, as well as Section 4.108.1 of RR 7-95.
In this case, records show that all of the export sales invoices presented by petitioner not only lack the
word "zero-rated" but also failed to reflect its BIR Permit to Print as well as its TIN-V. Thus, it failed to
comply with the above-stated invoicing requirements, thereby rendering improper its claim for tax
refund. Clearly, compliance with all the VAT invoicing requirements is required to able to file a claim for
input taxes attributable to zero-rated sales.
FACTS:
Petitioner J.R.A. Philippines Inc., a VAT and Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) registered
corporation, claimed to have paid the sum of ₱7,786,614.04 as excess input VAT for the calendar year
1999, which amount was purportedly used to purchase domestic goods and services directly
attributable to its zero-rated export sales. Petitioner alleged that its input VAT remained unutilized
as it has not engaged in any business activity or transaction for which it may be liable for output VAT.
Thus, petitioner filed four separate applications for tax refund with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency
Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance.
The CTA denied petitioner’s claim for input VAT refund on the ground that all of its export sales
invoices: (a) have no BIR Permit to Print; (b) did not contain its Taxpayer’s Identification Number-
VAT (TIN-V); and (c) the word "zero-rated" was not imprinted thereon in violation of Section
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113(A)18 in relation to Section 238 of the NIRC and Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95. Having failed to
comply with the invoicing requirements, petitioner’s evidence was deemed insufficient to establish
its zero-rated export sales for input VAT refund purposes.
ISSUE:
1. Is the petitioner entitled to a tax refund of its unutilized input VAT? (NO)
RULING:
Case law dictates that in a claim for tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must prove not only
entitlement to the claim but also compliance with all the documentary and evidentiary requirements
therefor. Section 110(A)(1) of the NIRC provides that creditable input taxes must be evidenced by a
VAT invoice or official receipt, which must, in turn, comply with Sections 237 and 238 of the same
law, as well as Section 4.108.1 of RR 7-95. The foregoing provisions require that an invoice must
reflect: (a) the BIR Permit to Print; (b) the TIN-V of the purchaser; and (c) the word "zero-rated"
imprinted thereon. In this relation, failure to comply with the said invoicing requirements provides
sufficient ground to deny a claim for tax refund or tax credit.
In this case, records show that all of the export sales invoices presented by petitioner not only lack
the word "zero-rated" but also failed to reflect its BIR Permit to Print as well as its TIN-V. Thus, it
failed to comply with the above-stated invoicing requirements, thereby rendering improper its claim
for tax refund. Clearly, compliance with all the VAT invoicing requirements is required to able to file
a claim for input taxes attributable to zero-rated sales.
CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200841-42, FIRST DIVISION, August 26, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
As ruled upon in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR which reconciled the cases of Aichi and San Roque,
taxpayers need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess
input VAT before the Court of Tax Appeals until the promulgation of the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company
which spans from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010.
Before and after such ruling however, which may be any period before December 10, 2003 and after
October 6, 2010, the observance of the 120-day period is strictly observed and thus mandatory and
jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.
Here, records show that CE Luzon's administrative and judicial claims were filed on November 30, 2006
and January 3, 2007, respectively, or during the period of effectivity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 and,
thus, fell within the window period stated in San Roque, i.e., when taxpayer-claimants need not wait for
the expiration of the 120-day period before seeking judicial relief. Verily, the CTA En Banc erred when it
outrightly dismissed CE Luzon's petition on the ground of prematurity.
FACTS:
CE Luzon is a domestic corporation organized under Philippines laws engaged in the business of
power generation. It is a VAT-registered entity. It filed its quarterly VAT returns for the year 2005 on
April 25, 2005, July 25, 2005, October 25, 2005, and January 25, 2006. The overall VAT returns reflect
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an overpayment of almost twenty million pesos (20, 000, 000 php). CE reasoned that its overpayment
was due to its domestic purchase of non-capital goods and services, services rendered by non-
residents, and importation of non-capital goods.
CE Luzon filed an administrative claim for refund of its unutilized input VAT in the aforementioned
amount before the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). It subsequently filed a judicial claim for refund
by way of review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) wherein the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) claimed that the amount being refunded by the corporation was not properly
documented and hence the petition is premature and must be denied.
The CTA division ruled in favor of CE Luzon and ordered the CIR to issue a tax credit certificate in the
reduced amount of about fourteen million pesos (14,000,000 php) which represents its unutilized
input VAT which is attributable to its VAT zero-rated sales for the year 2005. While the corporation
timely filed its claims within the two-year prescriptive period, it failed to substantiate the same which
resulted to the partial denial. The corporation moved for reconsideration since it felt that it has
sufficiently proven that it is entitled to an additional input VAT and was duly granted by the CTA
division.
CIR appealed the case before the CTA en banc which set aside the ruling of the CTA division wherein
it ruled that the CE Luzon prematurely filed its claim which resulted to the divesting the CTA of its
jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that the judicial claim must be made within thirty (30) days to be
computed from either the receipt of the CIR’s decision or after the expiration of the 120-day period
for the CIR to act. As the corporation’s petition was filed on January 3, 2007, or after the lapse of 34
days from the time it filed its administrative claim with the BIR on November 30, 2006. As the
corporation hastily filed its petition, its judicial claim must be dismissed for being filed prematurely.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CTA en banc correctly ordered the outright dismissal of CE Luzon’s claims
for tax refund of unutilized input VAT on the ground of prematurity? (YES)
RULING:
The governing rule regarding taxpayer’s claim for refund of unutilized input VAT is in Section 112 of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which states that any VAT-registered person whose sales
are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may within two (2) year after the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made apply for issuance of tax credit or refund attributable to the sale, except
transitional input tax.
It also states that the CIR shall grant tax credit certificates within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of submission of complete documents in support of such claim wherein in case of full
or partial denial, the concerned taxpayer may within thirty (30) days from receipt of decision or after
expiration of one hundred twenty-day period, appeal the decision to the CTA.
The case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company states that the 120 day rule is mandatory and jurisdictional
which must be complied with before filing a judicial claim before the CTA. Non-observance thereof
would lead to lack of jurisdiction and warrants dismissal. The case of CIR v. San Roque Power
Corporation is however an exception wherein under a BIR Ruling it expressly declared that the
claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120 day rule before it could seek judicial relief with the
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CTA by way of Petition for Review – provided a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246
of the NIRC.
To reconcile the two conflicting rulings, the case of Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR states that
from December 10, 2003, to October 6, 2010, the taxpayer-claimant need not observe the mandatory
120-day period but before such period which is before December 10, 2003, and after October 6, 2010,
the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional which must be strictly complied with.
MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204745, FIRST DIVISION, December 8, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In this case, records disclose that petitioner filed its administrative and judicial claims for
refund/credit of its input VAT in CTA Case No. 8082 on December 28, 2009 and March 30, 2010,
respectively, or during the period when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e., from
December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it need not wait for the expiration of the 120-
day period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA, and hence, is deemed timely filed. In
view of the foregoing, both the CTA Division and the CTA En Bancerred in dismissing outright
petitioner’s claim on the ground of prematurity.
FACTS:
The petitioner is a partnership duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission which
is engaged in the generation and distribution of electricity. It entered into a Build-Operate-Transfer
contract with the Philippine National Oil Company – Energy Development Corporation (PNOC – EDC)
for the finance, engineering, and other pertinent works of a geothermal powerplant wherein the
latter shall supply and deliver steam to the partnership at no cost. As a consideration, the petitioner
shall convert the steam into electricity and energy to the PNOC-EDC and deliver it to the National
Power Corporation.
The partnership filed its quarterly VAT returns for the year 2008 in the aggregate amount of about
six million pesos as unutilized or excess input VAT. It then filed an administrative claim for
refund/credit before the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It also filed thereafter a judicial claim for
refund/credit of its unutilized/excess input VAT for the first quarter of 2008 before the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA). Two months later, it filed a judicial claim for the second to third quarters. The CIR
filed a Motion to Dismiss of the CTA case citing lack of jurisdiction and that it did not follow the
mandatory 120-day period to be observed as ruled upon in Aichi Forging Company v. CIR.
The CTA division and en banc gave merit to the Motion to Dismiss of the CIR on the ground that the
claim was prematurely filed and not following jurisprudence laid.
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ISSUE:
1. Is the judicial claim for tax credit or refund prematurely filed? (NO)
RULING:
of the NIRC.
PANAY POWER CORPORATION (FORMERLY AVON RIVER POWER HOLDINGS CORPORATION),

Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents
G.R. No. 203351, FIRST DIVISION, January 21, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In this case, records disclose that petitioner filed its administrative and judicial claims for refund/credit
of its input VAT on December 29, 2005 and January 20, 2006, respectively, or during the period when
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e., from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it need
not wait for the expiration of the 120-day period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA, and
hence, is deemed timely filed.
FACTS:
The petitioner is a partnership duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission which
is engaged in the generation and distribution of electricity. It is registered as a VAT-entity.
The partnership filed its quarterly VAT returns for the year 2003 which is subsequently amended
and thus reflect the aggregate amount of about fourteen million pesos. It claimed that the amount
pertains to the input VAT that it paid on its purchases of capital goods and services consisting of
power generation assets located in Iloilo City. It filed an administrative claim for refund or credit of
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its unutilized input VAT in the amount of about fourteen million pesos. It also filed thereafter a
judicial claim for refund/credit of its unutilized/excess input VAT reflecting the said amount. The CIR
filed a Motion to Dismiss of the CTA case citing that it is not properly documented.
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) division ruled against Panay Power wherein it ratiocinated that even
if there was substantiation of that the subject purchases were for capital goods and services which
were capitalized and reflected in the books as depreciable assets, there was failure to submit any
evidence that would corroborate the same since it did not submit books of accounts and audited
financial statements. Panay Power moved for leave of court to present supplemental evidence to be
entitled to tax credit or refund.
Upon presentment of supplemental evidence, it was still denied by the CTA Division since it was filed
prematurely and did not follow the ruling of Aichi Forging Corp. v. CIR that the observance of the
120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of a judicial claim for tax refund/credit.
The CTA en banc affirmed the decision of the CTA First Division ruling that it did not follow the 120-
day mandatory period as ruled upon in Aichi Forging Company v. CIR since it filed its judicial claim
merely twenty days after filing of its administrative claim.
ISSUES:
RULING:
of the NIRC.
CARGILL PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 203774, FIRST DIVISION, March 11, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
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In this case, records disclose that anent Cargill’s first refund claim, it filed its administrative claim with
the BIR on June 27, 2003, and its judicial claim before the CTA on June 30, 2003, or before the period
when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in effect, i.e., from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such,
it was incumbent upon Cargill to wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before seeking relief with the
CTA, and considering that its judicial claim was filed only after three (3) days later, the CTA En Banc,
thus, correctly dismissed Cargill’s petition in CTA Case No. 6714 for being prematurely filed.
FACTS:
The petitioner is a domestic corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission which is engaged in the production, operation, extraction, and manufacturing of coconut
oil, vegetable oil and similar by-products. It is registered as a VAT-entity.
The corporation filed its quarterly VAT returns for the years 2001 – 2003 which is subsequently
amended and thus reflect the aggregate amount and overpayment of about of about forty million
pesos for the first period and about thirty million pesos. It claimed that the overpayment was due to
its export sales of coconut oil, the proceeds of which were paid for in acceptable foreign currency and
accounted for in accordance with pertinent rules. It then filed respective administrative claims for
refund/credit for the two periods before the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It also filed thereafter
judicial claims for refund/credit of the two periods on its unutilized/excess input VAT reflecting the
said amount. The CIR filed a Motion to Dismiss of the CTA case citing that it is not properly
documented.
The CTA division ruled in favor of CBK partnership and gave a reduced amount of refund originally
on the ground that Cargill failed to substantiate the remainder of its claims. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and Cargill however moved for reconsideration wherein the CTA Division
eventually dismissed the petition, citing the case of Aichi Forging Corp. wherein it ruled that Cargill
did not follow the mandatory and jurisdictional 120-day period before filing a judicial claim for
refund or credit.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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of the NIRC.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER

COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 190198, FIRST DIVISION, September 17, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
While both claims for refund were filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period, CE Luzon failed
tocomply with the 120-day period as it filed its judicial claim in C.T.A. Case No. 6792 four (4) days after
the filing of the administrative claim, while in C.T.A. Case No. 6837, the judicial claim was filed a day
after the filing of the administrative claim. Proceeding from the aforementioned jurisprudence, only
C.T.A. Case No. 6792 should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for being prematurely
filed. In contrast, CE Luzon filed its administrative and judicial claims for refund in C.T.A. Case No. 6837
during the period, i.e., from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010, when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was
in place. As such, the aforementioned rule on equitable estoppel operates in its favor, thereby shielding
it from any supposed jurisdictional defect which would have attended the filing of its judicial claim
before the expiration of the 120-day period.
FACTS:
The petitioner is a domestic corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission which is engaged in the production, operation, extraction, and manufacturing of coconut
oil, vegetable oil and similar by-products. It is registered as a VAT-entity.
The corporation filed its quarterly VAT returns for the years 2001 – 2003 which is subsequently
amended and thus reflect the aggregate amount and overpayment of about of about forty million
pesos for the first period and about thirty million pesos. It claimed that the overpayment was due to
its export sales of coconut oil, the proceeds of which were paid for in acceptable foreign currency and
accounted for in accordance with pertinent rules. It then filed respective administrative claims for
refund/credit for the two periods before the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It also filed thereafter
judicial claims for refund/credit of the two periods on its unutilized/excess input VAT reflecting the
said amount. The CIR filed a Motion to Dismiss of the CTA case citing that it is not properly
documented.
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The CTA division ruled in favor of CBK partnership and gave a reduced amount of refund originally
on the ground that Cargill failed to substantiate the remainder of its claims. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and Cargill however moved for reconsideration wherein the CTA Division
eventually dismissed the petition, citing the case of Aichi Forging Corp. wherein it ruled that Cargill
did not follow the mandatory and jurisdictional 120-day period before filing a judicial claim for
refund or credit.
ISSUE:
RULING:
of the NIRC.
TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 197591, SECOND DIVISION, June 18, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
To reconcile the cases of Aichi and San Roque, taxpayers need not observe the 120-day period before it
could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the Court of Tax Appeals until the
promulgation of the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company which spans from December 10, 2003 to October 6,
2010.
In this case, records disclose that Taganito filed its administrative and judicial claims for refund on
December 28, 2005 and March 31, 2006, respectively – or during the period when BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 was in place. As such, it need not have waited for the expiration of the 120-day period before
filing its judicial claim for refund before the CTA. In view of the foregoing, the CTA En Banc, thus, erred
in dismissing Taganito's claim on the ground of prematurity.
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FACTS:
Taganito is a corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission which is
engaged in the exploration, extracting, mining, and selling of precious metals. It is registered as a
VAT-entity.
Taganito filed its quarterly VAT returns for the year 2004. It filed an administrative claim for refund
of its unutilized input VAT paid on its domestic purchases of taxable goods and services and
importation of goods in in the amount of about one million pesos. It also filed thereafter a judicial
claim for refund/credit of its unutilized/excess input VAT reflecting the said amount.
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) division in favor of Taganito in granting a partial refund wherein it
reasoned that the export sales qualifies as VAT zero-rated sales but the others are disallowed for
being based on non-VAT official receipts and due to insufficiency of evidence.
Upon presentment of supplemental evidence, it was still denied by the CTA Division since it was filed
prematurely and did not follow the ruling of Aichi Forging Corp. v. CIR that the observance of the
120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of a judicial claim for tax refund/credit.
The CTA en banc reversed the decision of the CTA First Division ruling that it did not follow the 120-
day mandatory period as ruled upon in CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia since it filed its judicial
claim merely ninety-three after filing of its administrative claim.
ISSUE:
RULING:
of the NIRC.
To reconcile the two conflicting rulings, from December 10, 2003, to October 6, 2010, the taxpayer-
claimant need not observe the mandatory 120-day period but before such period which is before
December 10, 2003, and after October 6, 2010, the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional
which must be strictly complied with.
a. San Roque doctrine

b. Enhanced VAT refund system
10. Filing of returns and payment
E. Tax remedies under the NIRC
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1. General concepts
a. Requisites of a valid assessment
b. Tax delinquency vs. tax deficiency
c. Prescriptive period for assessment
i. False returns vs. fraudulent returns vs. non-filing of returns
ii. Suspension of the running of statute of limitations
2. Civil penalties
a. New rule on delinquency interest and deficiency interest
b. Surcharge
c. Compromise penalty
3. Assessment process and reglementary periods
a. Letter of Authority
b. Notice of Informal Conference
c. Issuance of Preliminary Assessment Notice
d. Issuance of Formal Letter of Demand/ Final Assessment Notice
e. Disputed assessment
4. Collection
a. Requisites
b. Prescriptive periods
F. Taxpayer’s remedies
1. Protesting an assessment
a. Period to file protest
b. Submission of supporting documents
c. Effect of failure to file protest
d. Decision of the Commissioner on the protest filed
i. Period to act upon or decide on protest filed
ii. Remedies of the taxpayer in case the Commissioner denies
the protest or fails to act on the protest
iii. Effect of failure to appeal
2. Compromise and abatement of taxes
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3. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected
MITSUBISHI CORPORATION - MANILA BRANCH, Petitioner vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent
G.R. No. 175772, FIRST DIVISION, June 5, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Pursuant to Revenue Memorandum Order 32-99 as amended by RMC No. 42-99, Japanese contractors
and nationals engaged in Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund projects in the Philippines shall not be
required to shoulder the fiscal levies or taxes associated with the project.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue is the authorized government agency where the tax refund be claimed
under Sections 204[C] of the National Internal Revenue Code. Under the Code, it grants the
Commissioner the authority to credit or refund taxes which are erroneously collected by the government
wherein it is also reflected in Section 229 thereof.
The petitioner is entitled to a refund. The CIR subsequently affirmed Mitsubishi’s non-liability for taxes
and entitlement to tax refunds by issuing Revenue Memorandum Orders addressed to specified BIR
offices. Such Revenue Memorandum provides that Japanese contractors and nationals engaged in OECF
funded projects shall not be required to shoulder the fiscal levies or taxes associated with the project.
Pursuant thereto, the concerned contractors are entitled to claim for refund of all taxes paid and
shouldered by them relative to the Project.
FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the governments of Japan and the Philippines executed an Exchange of Notes
wherein the former agreed to extend a loan amounting to forty billion yen (40, 000, 000, 000) to the
latter through the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) for the implementation of the Calaca
Coal Power Plant. In consideration thereof, the Philippines, will assume all taxes imposed on Japanese
contractors engaged in the Project.
In pursuant thereof, the OECF and Philippines entered into a loan amounting to forty billion pesos
which subsequently required another funding of five billion pesos wherein another loan agreement
is also executed. The National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a contract with Mitsubishi
Corporation for the engineering and pertinent civil works for the project. Such contract between NPC
and Mitsubishi was funded by the OECF loans which specified NPC’s obligation to pay and all forms
of taxes that are directly imposable on the Contract.
Mitsubishi completed the project on December 1995 but NPC only accepted it on January 1998 as
illustrated in the Certificate of Completion and Final Acceptance. Mitsubishi filed its Income Tax
Return for the fiscal year with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It included the amount of almost 40
billion pesos which represents it income from the OECF-funded project. It also filed its Monthly
Remittance Return of Income Tax Withheld and remitted about 8 billion pesos as Branch Profit
Remittance Tax for profits remitted to its home office in Japan.
The Court of Tax Appeals granted the petition of Mitsubishi and ordered the BIR to refund the
amounts it erroneously paid as income tax and Branch Profit Remittance Tax. The CTA ratiocinated
that the Exchange of Notes manifests that the Philippines, through the NPC shall assume the tax
obligations of Mitsubishi, a Japanese contractor.
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A Motion for Reconsideration was duly applied but denied. But the CTA en banc reversed the Order
of the CTA Division wherein it declared that the petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Mitsubishi Corporation – Manila Branch is entitled to a refund? (YES)

2. Whether or not the BIR is the authorized government agency where tax refund should be
claimed? (YES)
RULING:
1.
The petitioner is entitled to a refund. The CIR subsequently affirmed Mitsubishi’s non-liability for
taxes and entitlement to tax refunds by issuing Revenue Memorandum Orders addressed to specified
BIR offices. Such Revenue Memorandum provides that Japanese contractors and nationals engaged
in OECF funded projects shall not be required to shoulder the fiscal levies or taxes associated with
the project. Pursuant thereto, the concerned contractors are entitled to claim for refund of all taxes
paid and shouldered by them relative to the Project.
2.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue is the authorized government agency where the tax refund should
be claimed under Sec. 204 [C] of the National Internal Revenue Code. Under Sec. 229, it also grants
the Commissioner power to credit or refund taxes which are erroneously collected by the
government.
a. Grounds, requisites, and period for filing a claim for refund or

issuance of a tax credit certificate
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182582, FIRST DIVISION, April 17, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. - No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any
court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously
or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or
of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for
refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
No such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment. Metrobank
insists that the filing of its administrative and judicial claims on December 27, 2002 and September 10,
2003, respectively, were well-within the two (2)-year prescriptive period.
FACTS:
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On June 5, 1997, Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) entered into an agreement with Luzon Hydro
Corporation (LHC), whereby the former extended to the latter a foreign currency denominated loan
in the principal amount of US$123,780,000.00 (Agreement). Pursuant to the Agreement, LHC is
bound to shoulder all the corresponding internal revenue taxes required by law to be deducted or
withheld on the said loan, as well as the filing of tax returns and remittance of the taxes withheld to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). On September 1, 2000, Metrobank acquired Solidbank, and
consequently, assumed the latter's rights and obligations under the aforesaid Agreement.
On March 2, 2001 and October 31, 2001, LHC paid Metro bank the total amounts of US$1,538,122.17
and US$1,333,268.31, respectively. Pursuant to the Agreement, LHC withheld, and eventually paid to
the BIR, the ten percent (10%) final tax on the interest portions of the aforesaid payments, on the
same months that the respective payments were made to petitioner. In sum, LHC remitted a total
ofUS$106,178.69, or its Philippine Peso equivalent of ₱5,296,773.05, as evidenced by LHC's
Schedules of Final Tax and Monthly Remittance Returns for the said months.
According to Metrobank, it mistakenly remitted the aforesaid amounts to the BIR as well when they
were inadvertently included in its own Monthly Remittance Returns of Final Income Taxes Withheld
for the months of March 2001 and October 2001. Thus, on December 27, 2002, it filed a letter to the
BIR requesting for the refund thereof. Thereafter and in view of respondent the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue's (CIR) inaction, Metrobank filed its judicial claim for refund via a petition for
review filed before the CTA on September 10, 2003.
In defense, the CIR averred that: Metro bank must prove that there was double payment of the tax
sought to be refunded.
The CTA Division also denied Metrobank's claim for refund relative to the October 2001 tax payment
for insufficiency of evidence.
The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Division's ruling. It held that since Metrobank's March 2001 final
tax is in the nature of a final withholding tax, the two (2)-year prescriptive period was correctly
reckoned by the CTA Division from the time the same was paid on April 25, 2001. As such, Metro
bank's claim for refund had already prescribed as it only filed its judicial claim on September 10,
2003.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Metrobank’s claim relative to its March 2001 final tax has already prescribed.
(NO)
RULING:
In this relation, Section 229 of the same Code provides for the proper procedure in order to claim for
such refunds, to wit:
Section 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. - No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
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wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but
such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.
No such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment.
Metrobank insists that the filing of its administrative and judicial claims on
December 27, 2002 and September 10, 2003, respectively, were well-within the two
(2)-year prescriptive period.
b. Proper party to file claim for refund or tax credit
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE, Respondent
G.R. No. 198759, SECOND DIVISION, July 1, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
If the law confers an exemption from both direct or indirect taxes, a claimant is entitled to a tax refund
even if it only bears the economic burden of the applicable tax. On the other hand, if the exemption
conferred only applies to direct taxes, then the statutory taxpayer is regarded as the proper
party to file the refund claim.
LOI 1483 amended PAL’s franchise by withdrawing the tax exemption privilege granted to PAL on its
purchase of domestic petroleum products for use in its domestic operations. The Court observes that the
phrase "purchase of domestic petroleum products for use in its domestic operations" refers only to PAL’s
tax exemptions on passed on excise tax costs due from the seller, manufacturer/producer of locally
manufactured/produced goods for domestic sale and does not pertain to any of PAL’s tax privileges
concerning imported goods. Evidently, the said petroleum products are in the nature of "things
imported" and thus, beyond the coverage of LOI 1483.
FACTS:
Caltex sold 804,370 liters of imported Jet A-1 fuel to PAL for the latter’s domestic
operations. Consequently, Caltex filed with the BIR its Excise Tax Returns for Petroleum Products,
declaring a total amount of ₱2,975,892.90, as excise taxes due thereon.
Caltex sent an Aviation Billing Invoice for the purchased aviation fuel to PAL indicating that: (a) the
excise taxes it paid on the imported petroleum products amounted to ₱2,952,037.90; (b) it passed
the foregoing excise tax payment to PAL; and (c) it did not file any claim for the refund of the said
excise tax with the BIR.
PAL sought a refund from the respondent CIR of the excise taxes passed on to it by Caltex. It hinged
its tax refund claim on its operating franchise, P.D. 1590 (PAL’s franchise), which conferred upon it
certain tax exemption privileges on its purchase and/or importation of aviation gas, fuel, and oil,
including those which are passed on to it by the seller and/or importer thereof. Further, PAL asserted
that it had the legal personality to file the aforesaid tax refund claim.
ISSUES:
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1. Does PAL have the legal personality to file a claim for refund of the passed-on excise taxes?
(YES)
2. Is the sale of imported aviation fuel by Caltex to PAL covered by LOI 1483 which withdrew
the tax exemption privileges of PAL on its purchases of domestic petroleum products for use
in its domestic operations? (YES)
RULING:
It may be observed that if the law confers an exemption from both direct or indirect taxes, a claimant
is entitled to a tax refund even if it only bears the economic burden of the applicable tax. On the other
hand, if the exemption conferred only applies to direct taxes, then the statutory taxpayer is regarded
as the proper party to file the refund claim. In this case, PAL’s franchise grants it an exemption from
both direct and indirect taxes on its purchase of petroleum products. Therefore, PAL has the legal
standing to file a tax refund claim, notwithstanding the fact that it is not the statutory taxpayer as
contemplated by law.
LOI 1483 amended PAL’s franchise by withdrawing the tax exemption privilege granted to PAL on its
purchase of domestic petroleum products for use in its domestic operations. The Court observes that
the phrase "purchase of domestic petroleum products for use in its domestic operations" refers only
to PAL’s tax exemptions on passed on excise tax costs due from the seller, manufacturer/producer of
locally manufactured/produced goods for domestic sale and does not pertain to any of PAL’s tax
privileges concerning imported goods. Evidently, the said petroleum products are in the nature of
"things imported" and thus, beyond the coverage of LOI 1483. As such, considering the subsistence
of PAL’s tax exemption privileges over imported goods, PAL is allowed to claim a tax refund on the
excise taxes imposed and due thereon.
G. Government remedies
1. Kinds
2. Judicial remedies
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER ALFREDO V. MISAJON, GROUP
SUPERVISOR ROLANDO M. BALBIDO, AND EXAMINER REYNANTE DP. MARTIREZ, Petitioners,
v. LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 224764, FIRST DIVISION, April 24, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Section 16 of RA 10142 provides, inter alia, that upon the issuance of a Commencement Order - which
includes a Stay or Suspension Order - all actions or proceedings, in court or otherwise, for the
enforcement of "claims" against the distressed company shall be suspended.26 Under the same law,
claim "shall refer to all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against the debtor or its
property, whether for money or otherwise, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, matured or
unmatured, disputed or undisputed, including, but not limited to; (1) all claims of the government,
whether national or local, including taxes, tariffs and customs duties; and (2) claims against
directors and officers of the debtor arising from acts done in the discharge of their functions falling
within the scope of their authority: Provided, That, this inclusion does not prohibit the creditors or third
parties from filing cases against the directors and officers acting in their personal capacities
To clarify, however, creditors of the distressed corporation are not without remedy as they may still
submit their claims to the rehabilitation court for proper consideration so that they may participate in
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the proceedings, keeping in mind the general policy of the law "to ensure or maintain certainty and
predictability in commercial affairs, preserve and maximize the value of the assets of these debtors,
recognize creditor rights and respect priority of claims, and ensure equitable treatment of creditors who
are similarly situated."28 In other words, the creditors must ventilate their claims before the
rehabilitation court, and any "[a]ttempts to seek legal or other resource against the distressed
corporation shall be sufficient to support a finding of indirect contempt of court.
FACTS:
Lepanto Ceramics filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation pursuant to Republic Act 10142. As
such, the Rehabilitation Court issued a Commencement Order which declared the corporation to be
under rehabilitation; suspended all actions or proceedings, in court of otherwise, for the enforcement
of claims against it. It prohibited it from making any payment of liabilities except as otherwise
mandated or permitted by the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act. It then directed the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to file and serve on Lepanto Ceramics its comment, opposition, and
claims against it.
Despite the issuance of the Commencement Order, Misajon, acting as Assitant Commissioner of the
BIR, sent Lepanto Ceramics a notice of informal conference, informing the latter of its tax liabilities.
Lepanto Ceramics replied that it is under corporate rehabilitation but it was not attended to by the
BIR when it sent a Formal Letter of Demand.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the issuance of Commencement Order for corporate rehabilitation under the
FRIA suspends the collection of taxes against the corporation? (YES)
RULING:
Section 16 of the FRIA provides that upon the issuance of a Commencement Order – which includes
a Stay or Suspension Order – all actions or proceedings, in court or otherwise, for the enforcement of
“claims” against the distressed company shall be suspended. A claim shall refer to all claims or
demands of whatever nature or character against the distressed company which shall also include
national or local taxes, tariffs, and customs duties, etc.
III. LOCAL TAXATION (Local Government Code of 1991 [RA 7160], as amended)
A. Local government taxation
1. Fundamental principles
ALLIANCE OF QUEZON CITY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner vs.
THE QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT, represented by HON. MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA,
QUEZON CITY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE, and QUEZON CITY TREASURER'S OFFICE, Respondents
G.R. No. 230651, EN BANC, September 18, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
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An unincorporated association cannot assail the constitutionality of an imposition of tax due to
lack of legal standing. Such action would only prosper if the unincorporated association is joined by
natural persons as co-petitioners.
A perusal of the petition readily shows that it was filed by Alliance, and not by the individual
members of its Board of Trustees in their personal capacities. As it is evident from the title and
"Parties" section of the petition, the same was filed solely in the name of "Alliance of Quezon City
Homeowners' Association, Inc.," as petitioner.
FACTS:
The factual antecedents of the case involve the issuance of the Department of Finance of a
Memorandum which ordered all Local Government Units (LGU) to implement Sec. 139 of the Local
Government Code which mandates the revision of the real property assessments every three years.
It also requires that the LGU order the owners of the real property to file sworn statements attesting
to the true value of their properties and comply with various instructions of the government.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City enacted an Ordinance that approved the revision of the
Fair Market Value of all lands and other structures whether for residential, commercial, and
industrial use and set new assessment levels for the corresponding classifications of real property
which shall be due and demandable at different periods provided for in the law.
Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners’ Association, a non-stock, non-profit incorporation assails the
constitutionality of the Ordinance for violating due process in imposing a tax that is confiscatory,
excessive, arbitrary, and unjust. It also averred that there was no prior consultation held as required
by law, no explanation as to how the figures were derived, and that the fast-tracking of its
implementation is to the prejudice of the owners since they had no adequate time to prepare for the
payment of the exorbitant amounts.
The defendants on the other hand aver that the Alliance failed to exhaust all the administrative
remedies provided for under the law and the principle of the hierarchy of courts. It also pointed out
the lack of legal standing of the petitioner by reason of the revocation of its Certification of
Registration and failure to register with the House and Land Use Regulatory Board.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Alliance have capacity to sue? (NO)

2. Did Alliance fail to follow the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies? (NO)
RULING:
1.
Jurisprudence and the Rules of Court clearly states that only natural or juridical persons may institute
an action in court. Non-compliance thereof will surely be a ground for dismissal on the ground of
legal capacity to sue. In case of juridical persons, an unregistered association, possessing no separate
juridical personality could not institute an action due to lack of capacity to sue in its own name. Even
if the petitioner contends that such is filed by a natural person, it can be gleaned from the facts that
24 of 35
such filing was executed by virtue of the juridical person with no legal capacity. Since the registration
was likewise revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the HLURB, petitioner has no
legal standing to sue.
2.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exception when the issue at of
transcendental importance wherein it will affect the interests of the public at large. As the imposition
of a tax applies to all owners of real property in Quezon City, it would only be proper that the action
is admitted.
CITY OF IRIGA v. CAMARINES SUR III ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CASURECO III),
G.R. 192945, SECOND DIVISION, May 10,2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Franchise tax shall be based on gross receipts precisely because it is a tax on business, rather than on
persons or property. Since it partakes of the nature of an excise tax‚ the situs of taxation is the place
where the privilege is exercised.
Also, to be liable for local franchise tax, the following requisites should concur: (1) that one
has a "franchise" in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising
its rights or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the pertinent local
government unit. There is a confluence of these requirements in the case at bar. By virtue of
PD 269, NEA granted CASURECO III a franchise to operate an electric light and power service
for a period of fifty (50) years from June 6, 1979, land it is undisputed that CASURECO III
operates within Iriga City and the Rinconada area.
FACTS:
Petitioner City of Iriga required CASURECO III to submit a report of its gross receipts for the period
1997-2002 to serve as the basis for the computation of franchise taxes, fees and other charges. The
latter compliedÏrÎ½lland was subsequently assessed taxes. On January 7, 2004, petitioner made a
final demand on CASURECO III to pay the franchise taxes due for the period 1998-2003 and real
property taxes due for the period 1995-2003.Î½llCASURECO III, however, refused to pay said taxes
on the ground that it is an electric cooperative provisionally registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA), rÎ½ll and therefore exempt from the payment of local taxes. On March
15, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of local taxes against CASURECO III before the
RTC, citing its power to tax under the Local Government Code (LGC) and the Revenue Code of Iriga
City.llIt alleged that as of December 31, 2003, CASURECO’s franchise and real property taxes
amounted to (P 17,037,936.89) and (P 916,536.50), respectively. In its Answer, CASURECO III denied
liability for the assessed taxes, asserting that the computation of the petitioner was erroneous
because it included 1) gross receipts from service areas beyond the latter’s territorial jurisdiction; 2)
taxes that had already prescribed; and 3) taxes during the period when it was still exempt from local
government tax by virtue of its then subsisting registration with the Cooperative Development
Authority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an electric cooperative registered under PD 269 but not under RA 6938 is
liable for the payment of local franchise taxes? (YES)
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2. Whether or not the situs of taxation is the place where the franchise holder exercises its
franchise regardless of the place where its services or products are delivered? (YES)
RULING:
1.
January 1, 1992, the LGC took effect, and Section 193 thereof withdrew tax exemptions or incentives
based from "Cooperative Code of the Philippines," and RA 6939Ïpreviously enjoyed by "all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local
water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals
and educational institutions." Therefore, CASURECO III can no longer invoke the CDA to evade
payment of local taxes. Moreover, its provisional registration with the CDA which granted it
exemption for the payment of local taxes was extended only until May 4, 1992. Thereafter, it can no
longer claim any exemption from the payment of local taxes, including the subject franchise tax. The
power of the local government units to impose and collect taxes is derived from the Constitution itself
which grants them "the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the Congress may provide."
Also, to be liable for local franchise tax, the following requisites should concur: (1) that one has a
"franchise" in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights or
privileges under this franchise within the territory of the pertinent local government unit. There is a
confluence of these requirements in the case at bar. By virtue of PD 269, NEA granted CASURECO III
a franchise to operate an electric light and power service for a period of fifty (50) years from June 6,
1979, land it is undisputed that CASURECO III operates within Iriga City and the Rinconada area.
2.
It should be stressed that what the petitioner seeks to collect from CASURECO III is a franchise tax,
which as defined, is a tax on the exercise of a privilege. As Section 137 of the LGC provides, franchise
tax shall be based on gross receipts precisely because it is a tax on business, rather than on persons
or property. Since it partakes of the nature of an excise taxll the situs of taxation is the place where
the privilege is exercised, in this case in the City of Iriga, where CASURECO III has its principal office
and from where it operates, regardless of the place where its services or products are delivered.
Hence, franchise tax covers all gross receipts from Iriga City and the Rinconada area.
2. Specific taxing powers of Local Government Units (exclude rates)

3. Common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs
4. Procedure for approval and effectivity of tax ordinances
5. Periods of assessment and collection of local taxes, fees, or charges
6. Taxpayer’s remedies
a. Protest of assessment
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b. Claim for refund of tax credit for erroneously or illegally collected
taxes, fees, or charges
7. Remedies of the LGUs for collection of revenues
a. Administrative action
b. Judicial action
B. Real property taxation
1. Fundamental principles
2. Exemption from real property taxes
3. Collection of real property tax
a. Date of accrual of real property taxes and special levies
b. Collection of taxes
c. Periods within which to collect real property taxes
4. Taxpayer’s remedies
a. Contesting an assessment
i. Payment under protest
ii. File protest with treasurer
iii. Refunds or credits of real property taxes
b. Contesting a valuation of real property
i. Appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA)
ii. Appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA)
iii. Effect of payment of tax
5. Remedies of LGUs for collection of real property taxes
IV. JUDICIAL REMEDIES (RA 1125, as amended, and the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax
Appeals)
A. Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
1. Exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction over civil cases
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND PETRON
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 207843, SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION, February 14, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
27 of 35
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes, appeals from the
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies (Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs,
Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-
related problems must be brought exclusively to the Court of Tax Appeals.
In other words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court of Tax Appeals to have
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of certiorari against the acts
and omissions of the said quasi-judicial agencies should thus be filed before the Court of Tax Appeals.
Republic Act No. 9282, a special and later law than Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides an exception to
the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over actions questioning the constitutionality or
validity of tax laws or regulations. Except for local tax cases, actions directly challenging the
constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance may be filed
directly before the Court of Tax Appeals.
Thus, in conjunction with the Banco De Oro ruling that the CTA has jurisdiction to resolve all tax
matters (which includes the validity of the CIR's interpretation and consequent imposition of
excise tax on alkylate), the Court finds it proper to reconsider its decision.
FACTS:
On June 29, 2012, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued a Letter interpreting
Section 148(e) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and thereby, opining that "alkylate,
which is a product of distillation similar to naphtha, is subject to tax." In implementation thereof, the
Commissioner of Customs (COC) issued Customs Memorandum Circular (CMC) No. 164-2012. Not
long after, and in compliance with CMC No. 164-2012, the Collector of Customs assessed excise tax
on Petron's importation of alkylate.
Petron filed a petition for review before the CTA, contesting the allegedly erroneous classification of
alkylate and the resultant imposition of excise tax arising from the CIR's interpretation of Section
148(e) of the NIRC.
On February 13, 2013, the CTA issued the first assailed Resolution, reversing its initial dismissal of
Petron's petition for review and giving due course thereto. It explained that the controversy was not
essentially about the constitutionality or legality of CMC No. 164-2012 but a question on the
propriety of the interpretation of Section 148(e) of the NIRC in reference to the tax treatment of
Petron's alkylate importation, which is within the CTA's jurisdiction to review. The CTA also held that
the substantial and grave damage and injury that would be suffered from the threatened collection
of excise tax warranted the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and justified Petron's
immediate resort to judicial action.
The CIR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CTA denied in the second assailed Resolution
dated May 8, 2013. Subsequently, the CIR elevated the matter to the Court through a petition for
certiorari, alleging that the CTA had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case involving the CIR's
exercise of interpretative or quasi-legislative functions and that there was yet no final decision by the
COC that was properly appealable to the CTA.
ISSUE:
Does CTA have the jurisdiction to hear and try the case? (YES)
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RULING:
The apparent conflicting jurisprudence on the matter involving the Court's 2008 En Banc ruling in
British American Tobacco and the Court's Third Division Ruling in Philamlife has been seemingly
settled in the 2016 En Banc case of Banco De Oro v. Republic of the Philippines (Banco De Oro)
wherein it was opined that:
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes, appeals
from the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies (Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-related problems must be brought exclusively to the
Court of Tax Appeals.
In other words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court of Tax Appeals to
have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of certiorari
against the acts and omissions of the said quasi-judicial agencies should thus be filed before
the Court of Tax Appeals.
Republic Act No. 9282, a special and later law than Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides an
exception to the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over actions questioning the
constitutionality or validity of tax laws or regulations. Except for local tax cases, actions
directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or
administrative issuance may be filed directly before the Court of Tax Appeals.
Furthermore, with respect to administrative issuances (revenue orders, revenue

memorandum circulars, or rulings), these are issued by the Commissioner under its power
to make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of
internal revenue laws. Tax rulings, on the other hand, are official positions of the Bureau on
inquiries of taxpayers who request clarification on certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, other tax laws, or their implementing regulations. Hence, the determination
of the validity of these issuances clearly falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals under Section 7(l) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, subject to prior
review by the Secretary of Finance, as required under Republic Act No. 8424.
The En Banc ruling in Banco De Oro has since not been overturned and thus, stands as the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter. Accordingly, the Court is prompted to reconsider its ruling in this case
with respect to the issue of jurisdiction.
TERESA R. IGNACIO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ROBERTO R. IGNACIO,

Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, VICTOR B. ENDRIGA,
OFFICE OF THE CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, ATTY. FELIXBERTO F. ABAD, AND ALEJANDRO RAMON AND RACQUEL DIMALANTA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 221620, SECOND DIVISION, September 11, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Before a case be raised on appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the action before the Regional Trial Court
must be in the nature of a tax case, or one which primarily involves a tax issue. These may involve, the
legality or validity of real property tax assessments, protests of assessments, disputed assessments,
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surcharges or penalties, legality or validity of a tax ordinance, claims for tax refund or credit, claims for
tax exemptions, actions to collect tax due, and even prescription of assessments.
Public respondent claims that Teresa Ignacio’s appeal to the Court of Appeals is erroneous since it should
be elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals which has jurisdiction over controversies involving tax cases.
This allegation however is unmeritorious since Ignacio’s appeal does not contemplate the invalidity
of the tax assessment which is vested within the CTA but rather the deprivation of due process
which is lodged in the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Teresa Ignacio filed a complaint against the City Treasurer of Quezon City which alleges first and
foremost that she is the registered co-owner of the property sold by the local government. She avers
that there has been malice and bad faith on part of the public respondent by not notifying her of the
levy and auction sale proceedings thereby depriving her of due process afforded to her by law. She
added that public respondents were also in. bad faith for not returning the difference between the
bid price paid by the Sps. Dimalanta and her alleged tax liability. She prays for the annulment and
cancellation of the levy, auction sale awarded to Sps. Dimalanta, and allow her to pay for the tax
delinquency assessed by the City Treasurer.
Public respondent replied that they had strictly complied with the requirements and procedure set
by law and claimed that they had faithfully sent the notice of auction sale to the address specified by
Teresa Ignacio which has been unchanged.
Spouses Dimalanta, the ones who were awarded the property due to the auction sale, moved to
dismiss the complaint by stating that it is already barred by final judgment as rendered by the
Regional Trial Court acting as a land registration court which confirmed the validity of the auction
sale and the ownership of the property, which issued a new title in their name. They further stated
the complaint states no cause of action and Teresa Ignacio failed to comply with the Section 267 of
the Local Government Code which requires the deposit with the court of the amount of real property
before she may be entertained.
Teresa Ignacio filed a motion for relief from judgment seeking that the decision of the land
registration court be set aside since she was deprived of her right to due process since she was not
notified thereof. The court granted said motion.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed with prejudice the annulment complaint of Teresa Ignacio
ratiocinating that it had become final and immutable due to the Certificate of Finality. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration which was duly denied. The Court of Appeals likewise ruled based on
the same grounds.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the case of Teresa Ignacio (YES)
2. Is the Court of Appeals erroneous in dismissing the case due to res judicata (YES)
RULING:
1.
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Public respondent claims that Teresa Ignacio’s appeal to the Court of Appeals is erroneous since it
should be elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals which has jurisdiction over controversies involving
tax cases. This allegation however is unmeritorious since Ignacio’s appeal does not contemplate the
invalidity of the tax assessment which is vested within the CTA but rather the deprivation of due
process which is lodged in the Court of Appeals.
Conversely speaking, Ignacio does not contest the tax assessment but rather the lack of due process
which deprived her the opportunity to participate in the delinquency sale proceedings. As this does
not aver the assessment of tax thereof, the appeal is rightly conferred in the Court of Appeals.
2.
For res judicata to bar a subsequent action, there must be: (a) a former judgment or order that must
be final; (b) the judgment or order must be based on the merits; (c) it must have been issued by a
court having proper jurisdiction; (d) there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action between the two actions.
The Cancellation and Annulment cases filed and contested between Teresa Ignacio and Sps.
Dimalanta have two varying causes of action. The Cancellation case concerns the enforcement due to
the expiry of the one-year redemption period which has already lapsed while the Annulment case
contemplates the illegality of the sale and deprivation of due process.
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 209830, FIRST DIVISION, June 17, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Under Section 7 of the National Internal Revenue Code, the CTA shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in tax collection cases and over appeals from the judgments, orders, and resolutions of the
Regional Trial Courts who has originally decided them.
In the instant case, the CA has no jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any
action on the same except to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5039 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, the act of the CA in referring respondent’s wrongful appeal before it to the CTA under the
guise of furthering the interests of substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and thus, stands to be
corrected. In Anderson v. Ho, the Court held that the invocation of substantial justice is not a magic
wand that would readily dispel the application of procedural rules.
FACTS:
A collection suit was filed by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) against Mitsubishi Motors for unpaid taxes
and custom duties in the aggregate amount of forty-six million (46, 000, 000 php). The BOC allege
that Mistubishi was able to secure tax credit certificates from various companies after which it made
several importations and utilized such certificates for payment of custom duties and taxes in the
amount aforementioned. The BOC relied that the certificates were authentic and allowed Mitsubishi
to use it to settle their tax and customs liabilities.
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The Department of Finance however posited in their post-audit investigation that the certificates
were fraudulently secured with fake commercial and bank documents making Mitsubishi liable for
its taxes in its importations. BOC then demanded the payment of Mitsubishi but the corporation
averred that they acquired the certificates in good faith and that they were authentic and the
remittance top BOC should be considered as proper settlement of its liabilities as to the said
importation.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the collection case ratiocinating that the BOC had not
shown any substantial evidence of fraud or conspiracy in the procurement of the certificates and thus
there is an insufficiency of evidence. The appeal to the Court of Appeals was elevated by the BOC but
instead of being dismissed outright, referred the case to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) for proper
disposition since it has no jurisdiction over the said case.
Mitsubishi filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the Court of Appeals, having no
jurisdiction over the case must dismiss instead of referring it to the CTA.
ISSUE:
1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in referring the matter to the CTA instead of dismissing it
outright? (NO)
RULING:
Under Section 7 of the National Internal Revenue Code, the CTA shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in tax collection cases and over appeals from the judgments, orders, and resolutions of
the Regional Trial Courts who has originally decided them.
It is further elucidated under Section 3, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA that the CTA division
shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals from judgments of the Regional Trial Courts
in tax collection cases.
It is always stressed that the CTA has the exclusive jurisdiction of tax collection cases originally
decided by the RTC. Hence, the CA has no jurisdiction over BOC’s appeal and cannot perform any
action on the same except to dismiss the case pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
2. Exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases

B. Procedures
1. Filing of an action for collection of taxes
a. Internal revenue taxes
b. Local taxes
2. Civil cases
a. Who may appeal, mode of appeal, and effect of appeal
b. Suspension of collection of taxes
32 of 35
c. Injunction not available to restrain collection
3. Criminal cases
a. Institution and prosecution of criminal actions
b. Institution of civil action in criminal action
c. Period to appeal
4. Appeal to the CTA en banc
5. Petition for review on certiorari to the SC
OTHER CASES
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
(SECOND DIVISION) AND KUTANGBATO CONVENTIONAL TRADING MULTI-PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168137, SECOND DIVISION, August 7, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Classification of Imports. – CB Circular No. 1389 classified imports into three (3) categories, namely: (a)
"freely importable commodities" or those commodities which are neither "regulated" nor "prohibited"
and the importation of which may be effected without any prior approval of or clearance from any
government agency; (b) "regulated commodities" or those commodities the importation of which
require clearances/permits from appropriate government agencies; and (c) "prohibited commodities"
or those commodities the importation of which are not allowed by law.
In any event, the Court finds that the CTA did not gravely abuse its discretion when it granted KCTMPC’s
motion to release since there lies cogent legal bases to support its conclusion that the subject goods were
merely "regulated" and not "prohibited" commodities.
FACTS:
On the strength of a Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs, 73 container
vans loaded with 29,796 bags of imported rice were seized and detained for alleged violation of
Section 2530 of R.A. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
Upon inspection, it was discovered that the shipment did not have the required import permit and
that the shipment was declared in the Coasting Manifest and Bill of Lading of the vessel as "corn grits,"
instead of rice, in violation of R.A. 1937. The CTA ruled that under CB Circular No. 289, rice and corn
products are mere "regulated" and not "prohibited" commodities.
ISSUE:
1. Are the subject goods considered as prohibited commodities? (NO)
RULING:
As cited by the CTA, CB Circular No. 1389 classified imports into three (3) categories, namely: (a)
"freely importable commodities" or those commodities which are neither "regulated" nor "prohibited"
33 of 35
and the importation of which may be effected without any prior approval of or clearance from any
government agency; (b) "regulated commodities" or those commodities the importation of which
require clearances/permits from appropriate government agencies; and (c) "prohibited
commodities" or those commodities the importation of which are not allowed by law. Under Annex 1
of the foregoing circular, rice and corn are enumerated as "regulated" commodities.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. NIPPON EXPRESS (PHILS.)

CORPORATION, Respondent
G.R. No. 212920, FIRST DIVISION, September 16, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In this relation, it deserves mentioning that the CIR is not estopped from assailing the validity of the July
27, 2011 Tax Credit Certificate which was issued by her subordinates in the BIR. In matters of taxation,
the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes, errors or omissions of its agents for upon
it depends the ability of the government to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected.
FACTS:
Nippon is a domestic corporation existing under Philippine law engaged in the business of freight
forwarding. It is a VAT-registered entity wherein it duly filed its quarterly VAT returns for the fiscal
year 2002-2003. It is stated that it incurred input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales in the
amount of about twenty eight million pesos (28, 000, 000 php) from which only about three million
was applied as tax credit. As such there is a refundable excess input VAT in the amount of about
twenty-four million pesos (24, 000, 000 php)
Nippon filed an administrative claim for refund before the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
subsequently filed a judicial claim for tax refund by way of petition for review before the Court of Tax
Appeals. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) claimed that since the claim was not properly
documented, the petition shall be denied.
The CTA division partially granted Nippon’s claim for refund in the reduced amount of about two
million pesos (2, 000, 000 php) ratiocinating that while Nippon filed its claims timely, it failed to
substantiate that the recipient of the services were non-residents doing business outside the
Philippines. Before receipt of the decision however, Nippon filed a motion to withdraw since BIR has
already and previously issued before the decision, a tax credit certificate in the amount of about
twenty-one million pesos.
The CIR moved for reconsideration alleging that the CTA already tried the factual and legal basis of
the case and that it is prejudicial for the State if the withdrawal be given due course. The CTA division
ruled in favor of Nippon and granted the motion for withdrawal in the case reasoning that Nippon
correctly applied the right remedy under Revenue Memorandum No. 49-03 and that it merely its
discretionary authority under Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court wherein the parties had already
arrived at a reasonable settlement, further costs would be avoided, and the court’s time and
resources would be saved.
The CIR appealed to the CTA en banc but it merely affirmed the ruling of the CTA division.
ISSUE:
34 of 35
1. Is the Court of Tax Appeals correct in granting Nippon’s motion to withdraw? (NO)
RULING:
The primary reason that militates against the granting of the motion to withdraw is that the CTA
Division had already determined that Nippon was only entitled to refund the reduced amount of
about two million pesos since it failed to prove that the recipients of its services were non-residents
“doing business outside the Philippines”. A massive discrepancy between the findings of the BIR and
the CTA should have already been a red flag to the CTA. Clearly, the interest of the government, and,
more significantly, the public, will be greatly prejudiced by the erroneous grant of refund - at a
substantial amount at that - in favor of Nippon. Hence, under these circumstances, the CTA Division
should not have granted the motion to withdraw.
Clearly, the interest of the government and the public will be greatly prejudiced by the erroneous
grant of refund that would only favor Nippon. In matters of taxation, the government cannot be
estopped by mistakes, errors, or omissions of its agents.
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J. Bernabe Case Digests - Taxation

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CASES OF JUSTICE PERLAS-

CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF

MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

PANAY POWER CORPORATION (FORMERLY AVON RIVER POWER HOLDINGS CORPORATION),

CARGILL PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER

TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

a. San Roque doctrine

1. Whether or not Mitsubishi Corporation – Manila Branch is entitled to a refund? (YES)

a. Grounds, requisites, and period for filing a claim for refund or

b. Proper party to file claim for refund or tax credit

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

1. Does the Alliance have capacity to sue? (NO)

2. Specific taxing powers of Local Government Units (exclude rates)

Furthermore, with respect to administrative issuances (revenue orders, revenue

TERESA R. IGNACIO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ROBERTO R. IGNACIO,

MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,

2. Exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases

1. Are the subject goods considered as prohibited commodities? (NO)

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. NIPPON EXPRESS (PHILS.)

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