Calamba Medical vs.

NLRC

Petitioner thus failed to observe the two requirements,before dismissal can be effected ─ notice and hearing ─ which
constitute essential elements of the statutory process; the first to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought, and the second(hearing) to inform the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
him.43 Non-observance of these requirements runs afoul of the procedural mandate.

Under the "control test," an employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both
the means and the details of the process by which the physician is to accomplish his task.

Where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or
conditions of work, and is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, the element of
control is absent.

As priorly stated, private respondents maintained specific work-schedules, as determined by petitioner through its medical
director, which consisted of 24-hour shifts totaling forty-eight hours each week and which were strictly to be observed
under pain of administrative sanctions.

That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light from the undisputed fact that in the emergency room, the
operating room, or any department or ward for that matter, respondents' work is monitored through its nursing
supervisors, charge nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of petitioner or its medical director, no
operations can be undertaken in those areas. For control test to apply, it is not essential for the employer to actually
supervise the performance of duties of the employee, it being enough that it has the right to wield the power.

With respect to respondents' sharing in some hospital fees, this scheme does not sever the employment tie between them
and petitioner as this merely mirrors additional form or another form of compensation or incentive similar to what
commission-based employees receive as contemplated in Article 97 (f) of the Labor Code, thus:

"Wage" paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earning, however designated, capable of being expressed
in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of
calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of
employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable
value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer
to the employee. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

Tongko vs. Manulife

Guidelines indicative of labor law "control" should not merely relate to the mutually desirable result intended by the
contractual relationship; they must have the nature of dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining the
result, or of fixing the methodology and of binding or restricting the party hired to the use of these means. Absence of
such control, there is no employer-employee relationship (Tongko v. Manulife, G.R. No. 167622, June 29, 2010).

Inherent Labor control is not indicative of EER.

NOTE: However, in certain cases the control test is not sufficient to give a complete picture of the relationship between
the parties, owing to the complexity of such a relationship where several positions have been held by the worker. The
better approach is to adopt the two-tiered test (Francisco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 170087, August 31, 2006).

 The Labor Code concept of "control" has to be compared and distinguished with the "control" that must necessarily exist
in a principal-agent relationship. The principal cannot but also have his or her say in directing the course of the principal-
agent relationship, especially in cases where the company-representative relationship in the insurance industry is an
agency.

Generally, the determinative element is the control exercised over the one rendering service. The employer controls the
employee both in the results and in the means and manner of achieving this result. The principal in an agency
relationship, on the other hand, also has the prerogative to exercise control over the agent in undertaking the assigned
task based on the parameters outlined in the pertinent laws.

Significantly, evidence shows that Tongko’s role as an insurance agent never changed during his relationship with
Manulife. If changes occurred at all, the changes did not appear to be in the nature of their core relationship. Tongko
essentially remained an agent, but moved up in this role through Manulife’s recognition that he could use other agents
approved by Manulife, but operating under his guidance and in whose commissions he had a share. For want of a better
term, Tongko perhaps could be labeled as a "lead agent" who guided under his wing other Manulife agents similarly
tasked with the selling of Manulife insurance.

Evidence indicates that Tongko consistently clung to the view that he was an independent agent selling Manulife
insurance products since he invariably declared himself a business or self-employed person in his income tax
returns. This consistency with, and action made pursuant to the Agreement were pieces of evidence that were
never mentioned nor considered in our Decision of November 7, 2008. Had they been considered, they could, at the
very least, serve as Tongko’s admissions against his interest. Strictly speaking, Tongko’s tax returns cannot but be legally
significant because he certified under oath the amount he earned as gross business income, claimed business
deductions, leading to his net taxable income. This should be evidence of the first order that cannot be brushed aside by a
mere denial. Even on a layman’s view that is devoid of legal considerations, the extent of his annual income alone renders
his claimed employment status doubtful.

Hand in hand with the concept of admission against interest in considering the tax returns, the concept of estoppel – a
legal and equitable concept28 – necessarily must come into play. Tongko’s previous admissions in several years of tax
returns as an independent agent, as against his belated claim that he was all along an employee, are too diametrically
opposed to be simply dismissed or ignored. Interestingly, Justice Velasco’s dissenting opinion states that Tongko was
forced to declare himself a business or self-employed person by Manulife’s persistent refusal to recognize him as its
employee.

Article 4 applies only when a doubt exists in the "implementation and application" of the Labor Code and its implementing
rules; it does not apply where no doubt exists as in a situation where the claimant clearly failed to substantiate his claim of
employment relationship by the quantum of evidence the Labor Code requires.

The law likewise obligates the agent to render an account; in this sense, the principal may impose on the agent specific
instructions on how an account shall be made, particularly on the matter of expenses and reimbursements. To these
extents, control can be imposed through rules and regulations without intruding into the labor law concept of control for
purposes of employment (Gregorio Tongko v. ManuLife Insurance Company, G.R. No. 167622, June 29, 2010).