Global Governance 14 (2008), 157– 178

North-South Cooperation
in the Refugee Regime:
The Role of Linkages
c
Alexander Betts

This article explores the role of issue linkage in North-South relations in the
global refugee regime between 1980 and 2005. It argues that North-South
cooperation has been crucial for overcoming collective action failure in the
regime. However, it suggests that because of the absence of a binding nor-
mative framework or overriding interest impelling Northern states to sup-
port refugee protection in the South, the prospects for overcoming North-
South impasse have depended upon the ability of states and the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to use issue
linkage to connect the “refugee issue” to states’ wider interests in other issue
areas of global governance—notably migration, security, development, and
peacebuilding. The article makes this argument by examining the four prin-
cipal case studies of UNHCR-led attempts to facilitate North-South coop-
eration in order to address mass influx or protracted refugee situations in
specific regional contexts: the International Conferences on Assistance to
Refugees in Africa of 1981 and 1984; the International Conference on Cen-
tral American Refugees of 1987–1994; the Comprehensive Plan of Action
for Indochinese Refugees of 1988–1996; and the Convention Plus initiative
of 2003–2005. KEYWORDS: refugees, North-South, issue linkage, UNHCR,
international cooperation.

T
here has been little attempt by academics to apply international rela-
tions theory to understand the refugee regime. 1 Nevertheless, the lim-
ited existing literature draws upon regime theory to argue that the
refugee regime is inevitably characterized by collective action failure be-
cause contributions to refugee protection represent a global public good.2
However, this literature has two central limitations: first, it fails to account
for the centrality of North-South relations in reference to refugee protec-
tion; second, it tends to see the refugee regime in isolation, divorced from
other issue areas of global governance. Yet exploring these dimensions is
crucial to understanding the prospects for multilateral cooperation on refu-
gee issues. Rather than being characterized by the game theoretical analogy
of Prisoner’s Dilemma, as the existing literature claims, collective action
failure has often been based on a specifically North-South impasse, more ap-
propriately represented by the analogy of a “suasion game” situation. Draw-
ing upon the international relations theory literature on issue linkages, this

157
158 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

article argues that the refugee regime has historically been embedded in
wider North-South relations and that the interconnections between the refu-
gee regime and these wider relations in other issue areas has been the basis
on which this impasse has historically been overcome. In particular, cooper-
ation has relied on the creation of a credible linkage by the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) between the “refugee issue” and states’
perceived interests in other related issue areas—notably in migration, secu-
rity, development, and peacebuilding.
To make this argument, I use a combination of archive research and inter-
views to analyze the main UNHCR-led initiatives to promote North-South coop-
eration in relation to regional mass influx or protracted refugee situations between
1980 and 2005. The discussion is divided into three sections. The first explains
briefly why North-South cooperation is an important issue worth considering at
all in relation to forced migration. The second part develops a theoretical argu-
ment, introducing the concept of issue linkages and its role in North-South rela-
tions. The third section, which is empirical, explores the relevance of the theo-
retical argument in relation to the four principal attempts by UNHCR to develop
initiatives to foster North-South cooperation to address mass influx or protracted
refugee situations: the International Conferences on Assistance to Refugees in
Africa (ICARA I and II) of 1981 and 1984, the Comprehensive Plan of Action
(CPA) for Indo-Chinese Refugees of 1988–1996, the International Conference
on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) of 1987–1994, and the Convention
Plus initiative of 2003–2005.

North-South Cooperation and the Refugee Regime

Clearly the world does not neatly divide into a North-South dichotomy. How-
ever, the dualism captures an important dynamic of the global refugee re-
gime. Mark Duffield defines North and South in socioeconomic terms ac-
cording to the degree and type of states’ integration into the global economic
system.3 In the refugee context, the North can be seen to comprise the indus-
trialized third-country asylum states, which are generally outside refugees’
regions of origin and exert a relative degree of border control and extraterri-
torial influence. Meanwhile, the South invariably comprises the refugee-
producing, transit, or first-asylum host states within refugees’ regions of ori-
gin. The issue of North-South cooperation has acquired growing contemporary
relevance with the emergence of a range of European initiatives focused on
the “externalization” of asylum policy through third-country partnerships
with Southern states.4 However, the issue is of more fundamental relevance
to the regime. There are two interrelated reasons why it is of central impor-
tance: first, the regime has been historically characterized by North-South
impasse; second, this impasse has had direct implications for the welfare of
refugees.
 Alexander Betts 159

In the first instance, the “accident of geography” of Southern states,

which generally have greater proximity to areas of conflict or human rights–
abusing regimes, means that the overwhelming majority of the world’s refu-
gees (currently some 72 percent) remain in Southern states. 5 Yet there is no
adequate normative or legal framework for responsibility sharing in the
global refugee regime. This contrasts with the extent to which the principle of
non-refoulement (or the obligation of states not to return refugees to a state
where they face a well-founded fear of persecution) is accepted as a funda-
mental legal and normative tenet of the refugee regime. This means that the
commitment of Northern states to support the majority of the world’s refu-
gees who remain in the South—through financial support or resettlement—is
discretionary, subject to their own priorities and political interests. The struc-
tural imbalance creates a perverse incentive for Northern states to allocate far
more resources toward exclusion and deterrence policies than toward support
for refugee protection in regions of origin.
This structural impasse is significant because it has had serious conse-
quences for access to refugee protection and durable solutions through its
impact on Southern states’ willingness to comply with their normative and
legal obligations and through the implications it has had for the long-term
confinement of refugees to enclosed camps. Throughout the past twenty-
five years, Southern states undergoing mass influx situations have used, and
implemented, the threat of abandoning the principle of first asylum where
Northern states have failed to provide adequate commitment to financial
support or resettlement. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Tanzania, for
example, represented prominent examples of where this threat has been car-
ried out over the last quarter-century. Meanwhile, the ongoing existence of
“protracted refugee situations,” defined by UNHCR as situations in which
refugees find themselves in “long-lasting and intractable limbo” for more
than five years, represents the clearest contemporary manifestation of the
North-South impasse. Globally, over 6 million refugees have been confined
to camps of closed settlements for more than five years.6 These long-term
refugee situations represent a failure of North-South cooperation insofar as
Southern states have justified long-term encampment on the grounds that
they have received insufficient Northern support to enable them to counte-
nance alternatives.7
Given the structural impasse and its consequences, debate within a
UNHCR framework has generally polarized along North-South lines. North-
ern states have had little incentive to contribute where this has not been di-
rectly related to their own perceived interests in other areas. Southern states
have consistently claimed that Northern states’ support for burden sharing
has been inadequate. This dynamic is present in UNHCR’s annual budget
negotiations, the debates in its annual Executive Committee discussions, and
deliberations concerning its special programs. It is partly because of this
160 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

general impasse that UNHCR has initiated a number of multilateral processes,

based in international conferences, which have attempted to address specific
regional mass influx or protracted refugee situations.8

Issue Linkages and North-South Relations

Astri Suhrke argues that global responsibility sharing in the refugee regime
is almost inevitably condemned to collective action failure. Drawing on
regime theory, she suggests that the reason for this is that the provision of
protection or durable solutions constitutes an international public good. As
with, say, the provision of street lighting at a domestic level or interstate ac-
tion against global warming, all actors will benefit from one state providing
refugee protection, and, in the absence of binding institutional mechanisms,
states will “free ride” on the provision of other states. This, she argues, means
that although all states would benefit from collective action, cooperation
will not take place so long as states are able to free ride on the provision of
others.9 According to Suhrke, the global provision of refugee protection and
durable solutions will therefore be suboptimal. However, even from within
a liberal institutionalist regime theoretical approach, Suhrke’s analysis is
problematic in two ways. The first relates to the prospects for cooperation
in general and the second to North-South cooperation in particular.
In the first instance, Suhrke’s argument that refugee protection and con-
tributions to durable solutions constitute a purely public good assumes that
states only perceive the refugee regime as a monolithic burden to be shirked.
Instead, empirical analysis suggests that states have contributed insofar as
doing so has yielded subsidiary benefits (joint products) that are perceived
to be of relative benefit to the specific providing state.10 In other words,
states have provided extraregional support for protection and solutions
where they have had a perceived interest. This underlying logic has been
pervasive throughout the history of the refugee regime. In the Cold War era,
as Gil Loescher highlights, states often contributed to protection and solu-
tions insofar as it aligned with their strategic interests either in discrediting
communism or supporting the parties to proxy wars.11 Meanwhile, in the
post–Cold War era, the selective use of earmarked contributions to UNHCR,
the selective use of in-country protection, and the selective use of asylum
based on criteria such as diaspora and colonial links all highlight how state-
specific interests have been the basis of a significant proportion of the pro-
vision of refugee protection by states.12
In the second instance, regime theory has identified the existence of other
situation structures, beyond Prisoner’s Dilemma, that may create different
collaboration or coordination problems, which better capture the dynamic of
North-South relations. One of these is the idea of suasion games, which has
been used to understand the power relations created by North-South relations.
 Alexander Betts 161

This situation will arise when, in a two-actor model, there is one player who
is privileged and must be persuaded to participate, while the other has little
choice but to cooperate.13 In other words, a suasion game situation may occur
when the stronger actor has little to gain and the weaker actor little to lose in
the specific area, undermining the prospects for cooperation. As John Cony-
beare’s analysis of the global trade regime illustrates, this problem is particu-
larly likely to occur in the context of North-South relations. He uses the ex-
ample of the prospects for a weak state using a retaliatory tariff against a strong
state. This, he suggests, would only make the small state worse off, highlight-
ing the extent to which a weaker actor or group of actors might be forced to ac-
cept only very small gains or reject the prospects for cooperation entirely.14
Given that the majority of the world’s refugees are in the South, one can im-
mediately see how the suasion games analogy fits with the refugee regime,
and Southern states are frequently faced with either accepting what is offered
or harming themselves by rejecting a relatively small contribution.
The concept of issue linkage has been recognized in regime theory as a
means to tackle this imbalance and overcome collective action failure. Arthur
Stein has defined issue linkage as “a state’s policy of making its course of ac-
tion concerning a given issue contingent upon another state’s behaviour in a
different issue-area.”15 Meanwhile, Ernst Haas defines issue linkage simply
as “bargaining that involves more than one issue,” where an issue is “a single
goal that has found its way onto a decision-making agenda.”16 The linkages
literature begins by asking how it is that issues subject to interstate negotia-
tion are grouped in packages called issue areas that potentially define the
boundaries of negotiations within a given regime. This is significant, because
the way in which different issues are clustered or nested within bargaining
can facilitate side payments across issue areas that may make cooperative
outcomes more likely.
There are broadly two forms of linkage identified in the existing regime
theory literature: tactical and substantive.17 The former focuses on the role
that power and interests play in allowing states to coerce or induce other
states to behave in certain ways by tying issues together in negotiations. It
sees linkages as side payments across issue areas in institutional bargaining
processes. The latter focuses on the role of knowledge in determining how
issue areas are grouped or understood to be interrelated. It identifies link-
ages as being based on the intersubjective perception of causal connections
between problems and solutions that determine how issues are packaged
within negotiations. Tactical and substantive linkages are, however, likely
to be mutually reinforcing within multilateral negotiations, because ideas
and knowledge relating to causal connections are likely to be mobilized in
bargaining on the basis of interests and power relations.
Lisa Martin has argued that linkages are particularly relevant in overcom-
ing suasion game situations, claiming that “private linked benefits contribute
162 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

to the supply of a public good in suasion games.”18 In a situation in which

there are asymmetrical interests or power relations between actors—like
North-South relations—such that a powerful actor wishes to induce a weaker
actor to comply, she suggests that tactical issue linkage can allow side pay-
ments to be used either as a threat or as a means of inducement. This can
enable win-win outcomes to emerge from negotiations despite the asymme-
try in interests and power relations in the given issue area. Martin further
argues that this creates a role for intergovernmental organizations such as
UNHCR: “One role for multilateral organizations in suasion games is to tie
together issues that have no substantive rationale for linkage” as a means to
facilitate cooperation.19

Empirical Application, 1980–2005

Empirically, the relevance of the issue-linkage concept can be explored by
turning to the main examples of attempts by UNHCR to facilitate North-
South cooperation during the last twenty-five years. In all four cases, bar-
gaining within the refugee regime has been broadly characterized by a sua-
sion game logic. In the two cases widely regarded as failures—ICARA I
and II and Convention Plus—Southern states were therefore put in a posi-
tion in which they were either forced to accept very limited contributions
from the North or reject cooperation entirely, harming themselves. In the
two cases that were more successful—CIREFCA and the CPA for Indo-
Chinese refugees—this suasion game logic was overcome by the creation
of issue linkages, expanding the scope for side payments from other areas,
which created a win-win situation for both North and South and a basis for
collective bargaining by Southern states, given a perceived Northern inter-
est in supporting refugee protection or durable solutions.
The first three case studies refer to UNHCR-led attempts to facilitate
North-South cooperation in order to address specific long-standing refugee
situations in specific regional contexts. In contrast, the Convention Plus ini-
tiative attempted to facilitate interstate agreement on a normative frame-
work for North-South responsibility sharing (which could then be applied
to specific regional contexts). Another distinction is that in the first three
cases, UNHCR’s use of issue linkage was largely unintended and implicit,
while in Convention Plus there was an emerging and increasingly explicit
awareness of its role. Yet, despite the differences, all four cases highlight
important aspects of the role of linkages in North-South cooperation. It is
important to include Convention Plus in the analysis because, while the three
regional cases demonstrate that the presence or absence of issue linkages is
important for determining the success or failure to promote cooperation, the
Convention Plus experience points to the conditions under which attempted
issue linkage may or may not be successful in promoting cooperation.
 Alexander Betts 163

ICARA I and II

Background
The ICARA process represented a collective initiative by African states to
seek assistance for asylum countries in the region and to compensate them
for the economic, social, and infrastructural impact of hosting large rural
refugee populations.20 It was based on two one-time Geneva-based pledg-
ing conferences in which a series of projects compiled by UNHCR and the
African host states was submitted to donors for consideration. ICARA I’s
key objective was to “aid countries of asylum in bearing the burden im-
posed upon them by the large number of refugees.”21 Reflecting the African
states’ emphasis on the need for greater burden sharing, it was primarily a
pledging conference, setting out few ideas, principles, or guidelines. ICARA
I (1981) failed to meet the host states’ expectations for additional resources.
Equally, however, it failed to satisfy Northern donor states because the finan-
cial commitments did not translate into durable solutions for refugees but
were largely spent on supporting basic needs.22 Although US$560 million
was pledged at the conference, it was only later that the extent to which these
pledges had been earmarked by states became increasingly apparent, leaving
UNHCR with an estimated $40 million available for the high-priority proj-
ects that did not fall into its regular or specific programs.23 When the UN
General Assembly reflected on the achievements of ICARA I, it regretted
“that, in spite of efforts made, the assistance provided to an increasing num-
ber of African refugees is still very inadequate,”24
ICARA II (1984) was a response to the failure of ICARA I. In the words
of the Austrian ambassador, it was conceived more as a “think tank” than a
“pledging conference.”25 It focused more on the conceptual areas of finding
durable solutions through developing the principle of refugee-related de-
velopment assistance. The central theme was “Time for Solutions.”26 It had
a strong focus on projects designed to promote the self-sufficiency and
local integration of refugees. Only $81 million of the $392 million sought
was pledged at the conference. Once again, the conference was a failure,
primarily because of North-South polarization in expectations and interests.
While the African states wished to focus on burden sharing, the donor states
wished to focus on the durable solutions focus suggested by the conference
theme. Although donors did not reject the notion of expanded burden shar-
ing per se, an increased economic commitment needed to be directly linked
to expanded access to durable solutions other than voluntary repatriation.
They wanted results rather than “an open-ended claim on their resources.”27
Consequently, the legacy of ICARA was that a relatively small amount of
money went into largely basic needs programs in areas in which Northern
states selectively earmarked their contributions based on their Cold War
interests.28
164 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

The Role of Linkages

The two conferences were therefore characterized by an archetypal suasion
game logic. Donor states had little incentive to offer funding to program-
matic areas that fell outside the scope of their own strategic interests.
Meanwhile, African states had little bargaining power other than to take
what was offered or to reject negotiations entirely. The reasons for the lim-
ited legacy of the ICARA conferences can be related back to the failure to
create credible linkage between Northern states’ interest in sustainable local
integration for refugees (durable solutions) and Southern states’ interest in at-
tracting additional development assistance (burden sharing). Northern states
valued durable solutions in the form of local integration for refugees because
they reduced the regional insecurity identified with temporary refugee camps
and settlements in the context of Cold War proxy conflicts and because per-
manent integration reduced the ongoing financial responsibility. Mean-
while, African states wanted additional money, largely to compensate them
for the past hosting of refugees and to build infrastructure. Interests were
therefore present on both sides. However, rather than appealing to and
channeling these interests, UNHCR’s programmatic logic of setting out a
list of project areas for donors to fund implicitly assumed that donor states
would altruistically contribute on a needs basis. The failure to establish a
clear connection between the Northern donors’ commitment to providing
increased assistance and African states’ provision of durable solutions un-
dermined the commitment of both North and South. In other words, there
was a need to create a link between burden sharing and durable solutions
through, for example, better monitoring, evaluation, and guidance. UNHCR
failed to create the perception of this link, and African states were forced to
take the limited funding that was offered.

CIREFCA

Background
Following a decade of civil conflict, approximately 2 million people were
estimated to have been displaced in Central America. Of these, about 150,000
were recognized as refugees, some 900,000 were undocumented “externally
displaced,” and around 900,000 were internally displaced persons (IDPs).
CIREFCA was convened by the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Following two years
of planning, the conference took place in Guatemala City on 29–31 May
1989. It adopted the Declaration and Concerted Plan of Action in Favour of
Central American Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons. This three-year
plan, which was eventually extended by an additional two years, was adopted
 Alexander Betts 165

by fifty-eight countries and represented a flexible strategy for the development

of each of the seven convening states’ own programs.29 The Concerted Plan of
Action (CPA) provided an initial portfolio of thirty-six projects, requiring
$375 million over a three-year period, which was later added to. The projects
used an integrated development approach to promote the reintegration of re-
turnees and the local integration or self-sufficiency of refugees who remained
in exile. The CPA also provided a set of Principles and Criteria for Protection
and Assistance, the adoption of which was implicitly posited by UNHCR as
a condition for states receiving financial support through CIREFCA. In total,
CIREFCA is estimated to have channeled $422.3 million in additional re-
sources to the region. This funding, most significantly provided by European
states, enabled the majority of the CPA projects and contributed significantly
to enhancing access to durable solutions for the region’s refugees.30

The Role of Linkages

The work of CIREFCA needs to be set in its wider context. The commitment
of both the states in the region and the European donor states to refugee pro-
tection was based on its connection to the peace process and its related post-
conflict development initiative.
As High Commissioner Sadako Ogata argued toward the end of the
process, “CIREFCA has been a key formative experience in many respects,
breaking new ground in . . . demonstrating the important linkages between
solutions, the consolidation of peace and development.”31 These relation-
ships were, for example, explicitly present throughout the Esquipulas II
peace agreement signed by the Central American states and the regional de-
velopment program of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), enabling
UNHCR to channel these prior commitments into a commitment to address
displacement.32 The way in which these wider linkages formed the basis of
the motives of both the North and South can be explored in turn.

Northern States’ Linked Interests

In the first instance, the achievements of CIREFCA were in large part attrib-
utable to the strong donor support of the European Community (EC). In fi-
nancial terms, the EC provided $110 million for CIREFCA projects between
1989 and 1993, representing 45 percent of the total mobilized during that
period. Of this, $30.4 million was for programs implemented by UNHCR,
constituting 47 percent of the total contributions channeled through the of-
fice. Yet this commitment stemmed from a broader interest than simply a
commitment to the displaced. As UNHCR noted, “The Community has re-
garded CIREFCA as an integral part of efforts towards peace, development
and democracy in Central America.”33 The EC’s commitment to Central
America had been evident since the 1984 Declaration of San José, which
166 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

established an annual forum for political and economic cooperation between

the EC and Central American states. The annual San José summit created a
basis for sustained dialogue between the region’s foreign ministers through-
out the CIREFCA process.34 Motivated by a combination of factors—in-
cluding a desire to build trade links, an ideological commitment to human
rights, solidarity with emerging Christian democratic governments, the de-
sire to offset the influence of the United States in the region, and a wish to
assert the EC’s growing global influence by promoting peace and devel-
opment—the European States ultimately provided nearly 50 percent of the
funding for CIREFCA.

Southern States’ Linked Interests

In the second instance, the Central American states had a strong commitment
to the peace process that could be channeled into CIREFCA. Sérgio Vieira de
Mello, in his role as “coordinator of the conference,” commented on the
dilemma of creating an explicit institutional linkage between CIREFCA and
the peace process. On the one hand, he was aware that this direct relation-
ship served to mobilize support and political momentum for CIREFCA,
particularly in terms of the buy-in of the Central American states, given
their prior commitment to the Esquipulas process. On the other hand, he
observed that too rigid a link would tie the prospects for CIREFCA to the
success of the outcome of a precarious peace process:

The apparent disadvantage of having such an initiative tributary of the

Esquipulas II Accord is off-set by the fact that the second option described
below, would undoubtedly weaken the explicit common political basis
which is considered essential for the success of the International Confer-
ence. . . . Conversely, the active participation of Mexico and the fact that
the recommendation for the convening of the conference preceded the
Esquipulus II Agreement, are an objective insurance against too formal an
institutional linkage of a humanitarian initiative to what is essentially a
risky . . . political process. A second option . . . would consist in having
the conference formally convened by UNHCR on the basis of the positive
consensus established through bilateral consultations. . . . It would obvi-
ously deprive the conference of a direct and tangible political commitment
on the part of the Central American countries themselves.35

He further noted that much of the commitment of Central American states to

CIREFCA was linked directly to the peace process: “The five governments
attach a special importance to having the Conference convened at the earli-
est possible date, if only to demonstrate that consensus is possible on the so-
cial and humanitarian components of the Esquipulas II Accord.”36 In that
sense, the linkage to the peace process proved significant not only for mobi-
lizing donor commitment but also for establishing political will among the
 Alexander Betts 167

states in the region. Indeed, UNHCR’s Juridical Committee of CIREFCA

noted the logic underpinning Central American states’ perception of an as-
sociation between the peace process and population displacement:

Massive flows of refugees might not only affect the domestic order and
stability of receiving states, but may also jeopardize the political and social
stability and economic development of entire regions, and thus endanger
international peace and security. The solution to the problems of displace-
ment is therefore a necessary part of the peace process in the region and
it is not conceivable to achieve peace while ignoring the problems of refu-
gees and other displaced persons.37

In setting out its preparatory activities, UNHCR identified the important

role that linking solutions for the displaced with development initiatives for
the local community can play in mobilizing host country support for local
integration, self-sufficiency, and reintegration. It argued that the linking of
refugee assistance and development

focuses on zones affected by the impact of refugees, returnees and dis-

placed persons and also naturally benefits the local population. By doing
so, CIREFCA ensures a sustained link with development efforts on a
larger scale, which otherwise would not be possible, and avoids the per-
petuation of emergency schemes isolated from local communities such as
closed or precarious refugee camps.38

This citation highlights UNHCR’s awareness of the role that the promise of
additional development resources directed toward the local host population
can play in promoting a commitment by host states toward solutions or
forms of protection that go beyond encampment. The strategic centrality of
ensuring that local populations also benefited from this approach was again
highlighted in the draft declaration prepared for CIREFCA:

All project proposals, whether aimed at refugees, returnees or displaced

persons, include a component geared at redressing the adverse effects felt
by the surrounding local population and . . . to improve their situation.
This integrated approach is a substantial part of the strategy of progres-
sively incorporating refugees or reintegrating returnees in the countries
and constitutes a key of the Plan of Action and of achieving the objectives
of CIREFCA.39

Decisive and early UNHCR leadership and the context of the optimism of
the end of the Cold War also played a part, as did the regional nature of the
approach, which allowed the Contadora Group to collectively mobilize.
However, the implicit use of issue linkages created the basis for a commit-
ment by states.
168 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees

Background
The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees (CPA,
1988–1996) represented a follow-up to the first international conference on
Indo-Chinese refugees in 1979, which had agreed that the United States,
along with other Northern states, would commit to resettle all the Indo-
Chinese refugees offered asylum in the region. However, by the late 1980s,
this agreement had largely broken down, the US commitment to resettle-
ment was dwindling, and the countries of first asylum were beginning to re-
vert to pushing back the arriving boats. Despite the resettlement of large
numbers of refugees since 1979, roughly 150,000 remained in camps in
Southeast Asia at the end of 1988.40
In contrast to the previous decade, a new dimension emerged in the
process, in which, for the first time, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV),
as part of its wider attempts to repair its ties with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), declared itself willing to engage in the process and
to repatriate without punishment or persecution those who voluntarily agreed
to return.41 The end of the Cold War and the general thaw in US-Vietnamese
relations therefore meant that the CPA introduced two significant new ele-
ments: the screening of asylum seekers in countries of first asylum, and the
possibility of return to Vietnam for nonrefugees. In the words of Vieira de
Mello, there was therefore a need for “a new solutions-oriented consensus in-
volving the co-operation of countries of origin, first asylum and resettle-
ment.”42 The CPA’s combination of consensus between host countries of first
asylum, the country of origin, and third countries beyond the region makes it
an important case study for North-South cooperation.
The CPA adopted in Geneva relied on a three-way commitment by
countries of first asylum in the region, countries of resettlement beyond the
region, and the main country of origin. For the CPA to be successful, each
group of stakeholders had to perceive that their own contribution directly
underpinned the overall aim of finding a comprehensive solution to the
problem of the Indo-Chinese boat people. The resettlement states, led by the
United States, agreed to resettle all those already in the asylum countries up
to a cutoff date and all those determined to be refugees by individual refu-
gee status determination (RSD) after the cutoff. The cutoffs varied from state
to state but began from as early as 14 March 1989. In return, the ASEAN
states and Hong Kong agreed to maintain the principle of first asylum and
cease engaging in “pushbacks.” Meanwhile, Vietnam committed to accept
the voluntary return of nonrefugees, to work to limit clandestine departures,
and to continue with the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) to allow people
to emigrate from Vietnam via an alternative migratory channel. By 1996,
the CPA had fulfilled its objective of ending the mass influx of Vietnamese
 Alexander Betts 169

refugees and also providing durable solutions for the refugees in camps in
the ASEAN region and Hong Kong.

Role of Linkages?
The role of UNHCR, and in particular Vieira de Mello, in facilitating agree-
ment cannot be underestimated. However, this leadership and facilitation
role was made possible against the backdrop of the perceived interests each
group of states had in the situation and in their own specific commitments.
In this regard, linkages to other issue areas played a crucial role for each of
the main stakeholder groups.

Northern States’ Linked Interests

The US government played a crucial hegemonic role in promoting resettle-
ment, making a sufficiently large and transparent contribution to make the
CPA viable. UNHCR noted even before the conference that

the delegation of the USA outlined plans to accept between 20 and 22

thousand of the pre-cut-off date population, representing some 40% of that
category; this, however was contingent upon participation by other coun-
tries in the overall resettlement effort. The same delegation also expressed
a very serious commitment to the resettlement of those screened-in under
the planned eligibility procedures.43

The US commitment to the region was clear from the report of the confer-
ence prepared for Congress.44 It was ultimately linked to the United States’
wider concerns with the promotion of democracy and security in the region
and needs to be set in the context of the government’s wider involvement in
the region during much of the Cold War.
First, the CPA was seen as a continuation of the first agreement of
1979. As Senator Edward Kennedy noted, “I am hopeful the United States
will assume its traditional leadership—as we did in 1979—and support
these new international efforts to address the root causes behind the continued
refugee flow.”45 Indeed, as the secretary-general made clear in his opening
statement to the conference, the CPA built on 1979, and 1979 was itself sig-
nificant because of its relationship to the Vietnam War: “In view of its rela-
tive proximity in time to the events that profoundly affected the three coun-
ties of Indochina, the July 1979 meeting considered that the fate of asylum
seekers in that region continued to be a matter of utmost concern to the in-
ternational community.”46
Second, this continuation from 1979 was given a great deal of impetus
by domestic politics precisely because of all those Indo-Chinese who had al-
ready been resettled and now constituted a significant diaspora in the United
States. The Council for Refugee Rights, for example, organized a conference
in Westminster, California, which resulted in the Indo-Chinese community
170 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

proclaiming: “More than one million Indochinese living in the United States
are deeply concerned with the present treatment and policies of the first
asylum countries for these freedom seekers.”47 Indeed this approach was
echoed by the US government’s position at the conference, noted by the re-
port to Congress: “If the friends of refugees had taken an unyielding stance
in Geneva against the demand by the ASEAN and other countries to start a
screening alternative to the lure of unending resettlement, then the countries
of first asylum would have ignored the U.S. and perhaps have closed their
doors.”48
Third, the United States was strongly motivated by the association it
identified between the CPA, given the SRV’s participation, and the prospects
for promoting democracy and capitalism within Vietnam and the wider re-
gion. The report to Congress noted, “It is time to take some concrete steps
towards normalizing relations—of talking more directly and frequently
with Hanoi. . . . There is ample precedence for establishing American ‘in-
terests’ sections in other countries where we do not have diplomatic rela-
tions, but with which we desire more regular diplomatic contact.”49 The di-
rector of the Indochina Policy Forum argued that the US national interest
lay in fostering regional stability:

The long-term policy goal of the United States is to help bring about a
peaceful and stable Vietnam that is fully integrated into the international
community and is not threatening to its neighbours. As this process occurs,
we shall encourage Vietnam to move increasingly towards establishing
democratic institutions. . . . The United States should encourage condi-
tions to help Vietnam reduce its reliance upon the Soviet Union, particu-
larly by improving its relationship with ASEAN.50

Engagement with Vietnam was also seen as a means to influence the pros-
pects for peace in Cambodia given that Vietnam had committed to with-
drawing its troops from the country by 1990 and supporting negotiations be-
tween the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and Prince Sihanouk,
who for a long time had been a US client.

Southern States’ Linked Interests

For the SRV, as the main country of origin, approaching the secretary-
general and signing a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR in 1988
was a means to rehabilitate itself in the region and build new partnerships
with ASEAN and the EEC. The decline of the USSR and China placed
Vietnam in a position in which it needed to seek new strategic and eco-
nomic alliances. Its commitment to withdraw its troops from Cambodia by
1990 was indicative of this aim. Indeed, throughout the CPA, its strategy
was to maximize the economic and diplomatic benefits that it could derive
from participating in the process. For example, its initial insistence on the
 Alexander Betts 171

“voluntary” nature of return was a means to both slow down the process
and to increase its bargaining power, so as to leverage greater financial
support. To a large extent this strategy worked, and the SRV received grow-
ing support for development assistance and reintegration as the process
evolved.
Meanwhile, for the countries of asylum—the ASEAN states and Hong
Kong—the primary motive for involvement was to resolve what had be-
come a significant migration issue, while averting criticism from the inter-
national community for refoulement through “pushbacks.” However, there
were also other less obvious interests involved. For example, Suharto used
compliance with the CPA as a means to prove his human rights credentials
to the international community. There were also many local dynamics and
substate interests at play, with local officials benefiting from the presence
of refugees, whether as a source of commerce, employment, development,
or corruption.

The Convention Plus Initiative

Background
UNHCR’s Convention Plus initiative (2003–2005) attempted to enhance
the search for durable solutions by developing a normative framework for
global responsibility sharing. Its aim was to facilitate North-South dialogue
based on a series of biannual multilateral forums, and to supplement the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees through generic agreements
in three main areas: the strategic use of resettlement, the targeting of devel-
opment assistance (TDA), and irregular secondary movements (ISM). These
generic agreements were then intended to be applied to situation-specific, re-
gional Comprehensive Plans of Action (CPAs), along the lines of CIREFCA
and the Indo-Chinese CPA. Although recent, Convention Plus had very little
success in attracting new commitments from Northern states to work toward
durable solutions. Although the resettlement strand culminated in a Multilat-
eral Framework of Understanding, the debates on the strands relating to ISM
and TDA polarized along North-South lines.51

Role of Linkages
In contrast to the other three initiatives, issue linkages were used more con-
sciously as a tool of political facilitation during Convention Plus. The ini-
tiative represents the idea that UNHCR can play an institutional role in fa-
cilitating North-South responsibility sharing through attempting to identify
compatibility between the interests of Northern donor states and Southern
host states, with the explicit aim being that facilitating this convergence of
interests may enhance the quality of protection for the majority of the world’s
172 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

refugees in the global South. To achieve this aim, generic agreements were
chosen precisely because the ISM strand, reflecting Northern interests in
“readmission” agreements and “managed migration,” was conceived as an
inducement for Northern states to contribute to targeted development assis-
tance and resettlement. Meanwhile, targeted development assistance and re-
settlement were the carrot for Southern states to consider ideas such as
local integration and the conclusion of readmission agreements with North-
ern states. The implicit linkages in the initiative can be explained insofar as
some relate to the North and others to the South.

Northern States’ Linked Interests

First, the principal means by which Convention Plus attempts to link in-
creasing protection capacity in regions of origin to Northern state interests
is by appealing to a migration control agenda. As the High Commissioner
for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, said at the opening of the first Convention Plus
forum,

The Convention Plus initiative is an attempt to bind what has in the past
been only an occasional and ad hoc comprehensive approach to solving
refugee crises into a more concerted and dynamic framework that pro-
duces measurable results that are in everyone’s interests. These would
include a reduction in the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers—not
by trying simply to deter them from arriving in a particular country or
region, but rather by solving the crises that caused them to move in the
first place.52

This appeal to an association between protection in regions of origin and

resolving the causes of onward movement has been particularly prevalent in
the relationship between the ISM strand and the TDA strand. Within the
ISM strand, building protection capacities has been identified with reducing
spontaneous arrival asylum claims. There is evidence, at a rhetorical level
at least, that states are buying into this association. In justifying the Dutch
approach to protection in the region, a government representative claimed,

At times, secondary movements are caused by the fact that there is not
effective protection in the country of first asylum. . . . Nationally, we’ve
been spending a lot of money on dealing with asylum claims—very often
for people who turn out to be genuine refugees. If in some way we can
free money from that pot for better protection in the region, we think that
in the end that would benefit many parties.53

However, there are risks to making the link in this way. It is contingent on
an uncertain empirical relationship between spontaneous arrival asylum and
protracted refugee situations. It may be that the two systems cater to differ-
ent groups of asylum applicants.54 Insofar as the perception is sustainable
 Alexander Betts 173

though, this may not matter. Yet, long-term commitment and funding might
ultimately be compromised if support were exclusively premised on a con-
tainment link and if capacity building did not in turn result in the antici-
pated decline in spontaneous arrivals.
Second, the link has been made on the basis of interests in security. In
the context of the war on terrorism, protracted refugee situations have been
argued to represent a potential breeding ground for international terrorism.
For example, the framework for the Comprehensive Plan of Action for So-
mali Refugees urged states to contribute to providing durable solutions for
Somali refugees in the Dadaab camps of Northern Kenya, “given the need
to address the root causes of terrorism.”55
A third, though less influential, linkage concerned the association with
development. In particular, locating TDA within the context of states’ pre-
existing commitments to the UN Millenium Development Goals may offer a
means to attract resources. High Commissioner Lubbers implicitly invoked
this association:

I would like to highlight the relevance of the Millenium Development

Goals (MDGs) to our work . . . the eighth goal of the MDGs, which calls
for a global partnership for development, is in line with the Convention
Plus process since it promotes the contributions of refugees to develop-
ment and the targeting of a fair share of development assistance to refu-
gees and refugee-hosting communities.56

Southern States’ Linked Interests

In relation to Southern states, the key linkage made by UNHCR has been
between self-sufficiency and local integration for refugees, on the one hand,
and the interest of host states in receiving increased levels of development
assistance, on the other. Jean-François Durieux, head of the Convention
Plus Unit (CPU), said that the CPU is “trying to convince states in the
South that local integration is in their interests . . . hence the linkage with
the development aid strand.”57 He claims that this appeal to interests rests
upon showing that refugees can be productive agents of development, that
increased levels of development aid can be attracted without undermining
humanitarian assistance, and that TDA may ultimately prepare refugees for
return. For example, at the fourth Convention Plus forum, in May 2005, the
Ugandan government explicitly drew attention for the need for donor sup-
port for its Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS), claiming that without such donor
support, other initiatives such as decentralization and the Poverty Eradica-
tion Action Plan (PEAP) might be jeopardized.58

A Paradox?
The fact that UNHCR explicitly used linkages throughout the Convention
Plus initiative and yet failed to yield a significant commitment by states
174 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

represents something of a paradox for understanding the conditions under

which linkages can be effective in overcoming the North-South impasse.
The presence and use of such linkages throughout Convention Plus, given
its limited practical output, suggests that appealing to linkages alone is not
a sufficient condition for facilitating North-South cooperation. A significant
problem in Convention Plus was that the linkages lacked credibility. For
example, Convention Plus appealed to the MDGs despite the MDGs having
no explicit reference to displacement, and UNHCR continued to use the
MDGs to promote the targeting of development assistance even when they
were dying and had ceased to have credibility in the eyes of the South. It
might also be noted that linking the initiative to the MDGs may also have
had a limited impact because of states’ ultimately limited commitment to
the MDGs. Similarly, with respect to migration, many states found the link
between durable solutions and irregular movement to be tenuous. Although
UNHCR commissioned a Swiss Forum for Migration survey to add epis-
temic weight to the link, the survey has failed to provide significant evi-
dence that durable solutions and improved protection capacity can directly
affect Europe’s migration concerns.59 This begs questions about the circum-
stances under which attempted linkages come to be perceived as credible,
which require further exploration.

Conclusion
North-South relations have been central to the refugee regime in a way that
is inadequately captured by the existing literature on the international rela-
tions of forced migration. The characterization of the regime by the analogy
of Prisoner’s Dilemma fails to capture the asymmetrical interests and power
relations that result from this dynamic. A more appropriate game theoreti-
cal analogy is that of a suasion game, in which a stronger actor has little di-
rect interest in cooperating, while the weaker actor has so little bargaining
power that it can either accept what is offered or disengage entirely. Given
few direct interests and no binding normative or legal obligation to con-
tribute, Northern states have historically had little incentive to contribute to
the protection of refugees beyond their territory for its own sake. Mean-
while, Southern states have had little bargaining power within the refugee
regime and have had to take what is offered or simply harm themselves by
refusing all assistance for the refugees they host.
As the four case studies suggest, this suasion game logic has often been
overcome by the creation of linkages between the refugee issue, on the one
hand, and states’ perceived interests in areas such as migration, security, de-
velopment, and peacebuilding, on the other. States have not contributed to
refugee protection for its own sake but have done so insofar as contributing
to this global public good has simultaneously offered linked private benefits
 Alexander Betts 175

in other areas. The creation of linkages has underpinned the success of

CIREFCA and the Indo-Chinese CPA by expanding the range of interests
involved within multilateral bargaining and hence the bargaining power of
both North and South. In contrast, the limitations of ICARA were due to the
absence of linkages and the assumption of UNHCR that donor states would
contribute based on altruistic motives. Meanwhile, the limitations of Con-
vention Plus arose in part due to the lack of credibility of the linkages that
UNHCR attempted to make between refugee protection and migration, se-
curity, and development.
Although it should be highlighted that states’ interests are not necessar-
ily synonymous with refugees’ interests, and that interstate cooperation can
work against enhancing refugee protection, identifying the potential of link-
ages is important because it highlights the role that UNHCR can play in
guiding, channeling, and reconstructing states’ interests into enhanced
refugee protection or solutions to mass influx or protracted refugee situa-
tions. While linkages should not be taken as a monocausal explanation for
North-South cooperation, highlighting their importance shows the need for
further research to understand the circumstances in which they can con-
tribute to sustainable multilateral cooperation and to the provision of global
public goods. Furthermore, insofar as issue linkages may allow Southern
states or intergovernmental organizations greater agency in overcoming the
North-South impasse in areas of global governance, these findings may have
implications for other analogous areas of global governance, such as certain
communicable diseases, poverty, and specific environmental problems, for
which the problem is generally located in the South and the means to resolve
it lies primarily in the North. c

Notes
Alexander Betts is Hedley Bull Research Fellow in international relations at the
University of Oxford, where he is director of a MacArthur Foundation–funded re-
search project on global migration governance. He has previously worked as a con-
sultant for the UNHCR and the Council of Europe.
1. Most of the international relations literature on forced migration has been
more historical and descriptive than theoretical. See, for example, G. Loescher and
L. Monahan, eds., Refugees and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990); G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2001).
2. A. Suhrke, “Burden-Sharing During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of
Collective Action Versus National Action,” Journal of Refugee Studies 11, no. 4
(1998): 396–415; E. Thielemann, “Between Interests and Norms: Burden-Sharing in
the European Union,” Journal of Refugee Studies 16, no. 3 (2003): 253–273.
3. M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books,
2001), pp. 4–7.
4. L. Schuster, “The Realities of a New Asylum Paradigm,” COMPAS Working
Paper WP-05-20 (Oxford: Centre on Migration Policy and Society, 2005); A. Betts,
176 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

“The International Relations of the ‘New’ Extraterritorial Approaches to Forced Mi-

gration,” Refuge 22, no. 1 (2004): 58–70; Oxfam, Foreign Territory: The Interna-
tionalisation of EU Asylum Policy (Oxford: Oxfam, 2005).
5. In 2001, 72 percent of the world’s 12 million refugees were hosted by de-
veloping countries. UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2001 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2002).
6. G. Loescher and J. Milner, Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and
International Security Implications, Adelphi Paper 375 (London: Routledge, 2005).
7. J. Crisp, “A New Asylum Paradigm? Globalization, Migration and the Un-
certain Future of the International Refugee Regime,” New Issues in Refugee Re-
search, Working Paper No. 100 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2003).
8. This acknowledgment was, for example, present in the initial justificatory
literature of UNHCR’s Convention Plus initiative. See, for example, “Convention
Plus at a Glance,” www.unhcr.ch.
9. Suhrke, “Burden-Sharing During Refugee Emergencies,” pp. 396–415.
10. The work of Todd Sandler has highlighted how some impurely public
goods can simultaneously yield a range of private benefits (joint products) that ac-
crue to the provider of that public good. See, for example, R. Cornes and T. Sandler,
The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997). This has been applied to analyze the refugee regime. See,
for example, A. Betts, “Public Goods Theory and the Provision of Refugee Protec-
tion,” Journal of Refugee Studies 16, no. 3 (2003): 274–296.
11. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics, pp. 7–12.
12. Betts, “Public Goods Theory,” pp. 274–296.
13. A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, Theories of International
Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 50; L. Martin, “The
Rational State Choice of Multilateralism,” in J. Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Mat-
ters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1993), pp. 91–121.
14. J. Conybeare, “Public Goods, Prisoners’ Dilemmas, and the International
Political Economy,” International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 1 (1984): 5–22.
15. A. Stein, “The Politics of Linkage,” World Politics 33, no. 1 (1980): 62.
16. E. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in Interna-
tional Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 76.
17. V. Aggarwal, “Reconciling Multiple Institutions: Bargaining, Linkages and
Nesting,” in V. Aggarwal, ed., Institutional Designs for a Complex World (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 16; E. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage
and International Regimes,” in F. Kratochwil and E. Mansfield, eds., International
Organization: A Reader (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), pp. 364–384; Haas,
When Knowledge Is Power, pp. 76–80.
18. Martin, “The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism,” p. 105.
19. Ibid.
20. B. Stein, “Regional Efforts to Address Refugee Problems,” paper presented
at ISA, Toronto, 21 March 1997.
21. UN General Assembly Resolution 35/42, 25 November 1980.
22. R. Gorman, “Linking Refugee Aid and Development in Africa,” in R. Gor-
man, ed., Refugee Aid and Development: Theory and Practice (London: Greenwood
Press, 1993), p. 63.
23. UNHCR Archives, Post-ICARA Steering Committee, “3rd Draft of Steer-
ing Committee of Post-ICARA Coordination Meeting,” held 15/9/81, New York,
HCR/NY/572 (Fonds UNHCR 11, 391.62/460).
 Alexander Betts 177

24. UN General Assembly Resolution 36/124, 14 December 1981, cited in J.

Milner, “Golden Age? What Golden Age? A Critical History of African Asylum Pol-
icy,” paper presented at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, 28 January
2004.
25. UNHCR Archives, Note for the File: Summary of Statements Relating to
ICARA II Made at Informal Meetings of ExCom Representatives, 27/5/83 (Fonds
UNHCR 11, 391.78/215).
26. UNHCR Archives, High Commissioner’s Opening Remarks at the 3rd
Steering Committee Meeting on ICARA II, 14/11/83, Jessen-Petersen’s summary of
the debate (Fonds UNHCR 11, 391.78/398A).
27. Stein, “Regional Efforts to Address Refugee Problems.”
28. For an overview of the approach of ICARA II, see A. Betts, “International
Cooperation and Targeting Development Assistance for Refugee Solutions: Lessons
From the 1980s,” Working Paper No. 91, New Issues in Refugee Research (Geneva:
UNHCR, 2004).
29. UNHCR, “Review of the CIREFCA Process,” 1994, www.unhcr.ch; UNHCR,
“Questions and Answers About CIREFCA,” prepared for the seminar “Implementa-
tion of a Human Development Approach for Areas Affected by Conflict in Central
America and Related Strategies for the Post-CIREFCA Process,” June 1993, UNHCR
Fonds 11, Series 3, 391.85.5.
30. For a detailed analysis, see A. Betts, “Comprehensive Plans of Action: In-
sights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese CPA,” Working Paper No. 120, New Is-
sues in Refugee Research (Geneva: UNHCR, 2006).
31. “Introductory Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata,” Informal Meeting of
ExCom, Geneva, 28/1/94, UNHCR Fonds 391.86.5 (emphasis added).
32. For example, Article 8 of the Esquipulas II peace agreement referred ex-
plicitly to displacement, and CIREFCA’s CPA was itself incorporated as Chapter 1
of UNDP’s wider Special Programme of Economic Cooperation for Central Amer-
ica (PEC), which was the main development plan linked to the peace process.
UNHCR’s ability to promote a commitment to the displaced relied upon appealing
to and channeling these wider interests. “From Conflict to Peace and Development:
Note on Implementation of the Concerted Plan of Action of CIREFCA,” Pablo Mateu
(JSU) to K. Asomani (RBLAC), 17/3/92, UNHCR Fonds 361.86.5.
33. Jenifer Otsea, CIREFCA JSU, to UNHCR Brussels, “CIREFCA: A Strategy
for Solutions,” 8/2/93, UNHCR Fonds 391.86.5.
34. Memo, Ruprecht Von Arnim, Representative to Brussels, to Jenifer Otsea,
Headquarters, “The Ninth San José Summit of Foreign Ministers of the EC and
Countries of Central America,” 3/3/93, UNHCR Fonds 391.86/381.
35. Sérgio Vieira de Mello, “Preparation of the International Conference on So-
lutions to the Problems of Central American Refugees as a Contribution to Peace: Re-
port on a Mission to Central America, Mexico and UN Headquarters, 16–18 March
1988,” UNHCR Fonds 391.86.1.
36. Ibid.
37. “Principles and Criteria for the Protection and Assistance of Refugees, Repa-
triation and Displaced Persons,” prepared by the Juridical Committee of CIREFCA,
UNHCR Fonds 391.86.3 HCR/Mex/0890.
38. “Procedures for the Preparatory Activities of the Conference Itself and the
Establishment of Follow-Up Mechanisms: Proposal Submitted to the Organizing
Committee Meeting, Guatemala, 24 January 1989,” UNHCR Fonds 391.86.3 HCR/
NYC/0102.
178 North-South Cooperation in the Refugee Regime

39. “Preparatory Meeting for CIREFCA, Guatemala, 12–14 April 1989,” UNHCR
Fonds 391.86.3.
40. “Vietnam and Laos Finally Join Talks on Refugees,” New York Times, 30
October 1988.
41. Ibid.
42. Memo, Sérgio Vieira de Mello to Refeeudin Ahmed, Secretary-General’s
Office, “Recommended Opening Speech for Kuala Lumpur Meeting, 7–9 March,”
22 March 1989, UNHCR Fonds 11, Series 3, 391.89 HCR/NYC/0248.
43. “Report on the Meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Interna-
tional Conference on Indochinese Refugees,” Geneva, 19–20 April 1989, UNHCR
Fonds 391.89 HCR/THA/0516 (emphasis added).
44. Memo, UNHCR, Washington, DC, to Headquarters, “A Staff Report on the
International Conference on Indochinese Refugees, 1989, prepared for 101st Con-
gress,” 7 July 1989, UNHCR Fonds 391.89
45. Memo, UNHCR Washington, DC, to Headquarters, “A Staff Report on the
International Conference on Indochinese Refugees, 1989, prepared for 101st Con-
gress,” 7 July 1989, UNHCR Fonds 11, Series 3, 391.89.
46. “Opening Statement by the UN Secretary-General to the International Con-
ference on Indochinese Refugees,” Geneva, 13 June 1989, UNHCR Fonds 391.89.
47. Council for Refugee Rights Conference, Westminster, California, 7 May
1989, UNHCR Fonds 391.89.
48. Memo, UNHCR Washington, DC, to Headquarters, “A Staff Report on the
International Conference on Indochinese Refugees, 1989,” prepared for 101st Con-
gress,” 7 July 1989, UNHCR Fonds 391.89.
49. Ibid.
50. Aspen Institute, “Recommendations for the New Administration on United
States Policy Towards Indochina,” by Dick Clark, director of the Indochina Policy
Forum, November 1988.
51. Interviews with UNHCR staff and relevant state diplomats following the
close of the initiative in November 2005.
52. Statement by Ruud Lubbers, “Lubbers Launches Forum On Convention Plus
Initiative,” 27 June 2004, www.unhcr.ch.
53. Interview with Ardi Stoios-Braken, first secretary (Humanitarian Affairs),
Netherlands, in Geneva, 16 September 2004.
54. Interview with Jeff Crisp, director of Policy and Research, Global Com-
mission on International Migration, Geneva, 20 September 2004.
55. “Draft Framework for a Comprehensive Plan of Action for Somali Refu-
gees,” on file with the author.
56. Ruud Lubbers, Opening Statement, Second Convention Plus Forum, 12
March 2004, www.unhcr.ch.
57. Interview with Jean-François Durieux, head of the Convention Plus Unit
(CPU), Geneva, 7 September 2004.
58. Statement of the Ugandan Government to the Fourth Convention Plus Forum,
Geneva, 20 May 2005, on file with the author.
59. Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies, presentation to the Con-
vention Plus Forum, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 23 February 2005, on file with the
author.