MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA and to sell their family home there.
and to sell their family home there. (POE’S RECKONING PERIOD FOR HER
C. ELAMPARO (GR NO 221697)
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC, FRANCISCO S.
TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ (GR NO. 221698-700)
FACTS:
 September 3, 1968 - Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned
as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar. Parental
custody was transferred to Emiliano Militar and wife.
 September 6, 1968 – Grace Poe was registered as foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar. She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar,
 Grace Poe (5 years old) – Grace was adopted by Fernando Poe Jr. and Susan Roces.
 May 13, 1974 – Petition for adoption in MTC of San Juan, Makani was granted. Her
name was changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
 1986 – Grace registered as a voter in COMELEC. She received her Voter’s ID.
 1988 – Grace applied for and was issued her Philippine passport. She left for the US in
the same year to pursue her education in Boston College in Massachusetts.
 July 27, 1991 – She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a dual citizen of
US and Philippines and who was based in US. They got married at Sanctuario de San
Jose Parish in San Juan City and flew back to US two days after their wedding.
 April 16, 1992 – She gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel in the US. The two of
her remaining children were both born in the Philippines.
 1998 – She renewed her Philippine passport.
 2001 – She became a naturalized American citizen and obtained a US passport.
 April 2004 – She came back to the Philippines with her second child Hanna to support
her father Fernando Poe’s candidacy as President in the May 2004 Elections. She also
gave birth to her youngest child during this year in the Philippines. She flew back to the
US on July 2004.
 December 2004 – She rushed back to the Philippines to be by the side of his sick
father. Her father eventually dies. She remained in the Philippines until February 2005
to take care of her father’s funeral and to assist in the settlement of the estate.
 2005 – Poe and husband decided to move and reside in the Philippines.
o Notified their children’s school for transfer
o Coordinate with property movers to relocate household goods, furniture, and
cars from US to Philippines
o Inquired Philippine authorities on how to transfer their pet
o 2004 – Already quit her job in the US
 May 2005 – She came home to the Philippines and secured her TIN from BIR. Her
children followed. Her wife was forced to say in US to complete his pending projects
RESIDENCY WHICH SHE STATED IN HER COC FOR 2016 ELECTIONS)
 2005 – Her family purchased a condominium unit and parking slot in San Juan City.
They were issued a Register of Deeds on February 20, 2006.
 2005 – It was discovered that there was a failure to secure a new Certificate of Live
Birth indicating her new name and the name of Roces and Poe as adoptive parents.
 2006 – She was issued a new Certificate of Live Birth with her new name.
 February 2006 – She returned to US to supervise disposal of remaining belongings.
She came back to the Philippines on March 2006.
 March 2006 – Her husband informed US Postal Service of the family’s abandonment of
residence in US.
 April 2006 – Their family home in US was sold.
 Early 2006 – They bought lot in Quezon City to build their family home.
 July 2006 – She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant
to RA No 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003).
o She filed with the Bureau of Immigration a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship with her children. Her petition was approved and she is deemed to
have reacquired her Philippine citizenship.
 August 2006 – She registered as a voter in San Juan City. She also secured a new
Philippine passport.
 October 2010 – She was appointed as MTRCB Chairperson by Aquino.
o Before assuming post, she executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance
to US and Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public
pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA No 9225. She stopped using her American passport.
 July 2011 – She executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of US
before the Vice Consul of US Embassy.
o In their questionnaire, she stated that she resided in the Philippines from
1968 to 1991 and from May 2005 to the day the questionnaire was
answered.
o She was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective October
2010.
 October 2012 – She filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator in the 2013
Elections. She answered 6 years and 6 months as her period of residence in
Philippines before May 13, 2013. She won with highest number of votes.
 December 2013 – She obtained her Philippine Diplomatic Passport.
 October 2015 – She filed her COC for Presidency in May 2016 Elections. She declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and her residence in the Philippines up to May 2016
would be 10 years and 11 months reckoned from May 24 2005.

COMELEC CASES AGAINST GRACE POE – 2016 ELECTIONS
FIRST: ESTRELLA ELAMPARO – Petition to deny due course or cancel Poe’s COC.
ARGUMENT: She alleged that Poe committed MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION when she
stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least 10 years and 11 months up to the day before the May 2016 elections.
ARGUMENT: Poe cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino because she was a
foundling. International law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings. She is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship because she is
not a natural-born Filipino. Natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.
ARGUMENT: Poe was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator
wherein she stated that she resided in the country for only 6 years and 6 months as of May
2013 Elections. She falls short of the ten-year residency requirement for Presidency. Poe failed
to re-establish her domicile in the Philippines.
POE’S CONTENTION
ARGUMENT: The COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo’s petition. Quo warranto
would be proper if she wins in the Presidential elections.
ARGUMENT: Petition failed to state a cause of action because it was not alleged that there was
any false statement in her COC.
ARGUMENT: Poe did not make any material representation in the COC.
 1934 Constitution – Foundlings were considered as Philippine citizens.
 Foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the
place where they are found.
 She reacquired her natural-born citizenship pursuant to RA No 9225.
 She executed a sworn renunciation of American citizenship prior to filing her COC.
 The burden was in Elamparo to prove that she did not possess natural-born status.
 She could re-establish residence as early as May 24, 2005.
 Her statement in the 2012 COC was an honest mistake and is not binding.
COMELEC DECISION: Petition to cancel COC is granted. Poe’s Motion for Reconsideration is
denied.
SECOND: FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRETAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ –
Petition to disqualify petitioner for lacking residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency.
ARGUMENT: Philippines adhere to the principle of jus sanguinis. Foundlings cannot be
considered as natural-born Filipino citizens since their blood relationship cannot be determined.
Foundlings were not included in the 1935 Constitution; hence, they are not included as natural-
born citizens. Poe has the burden to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.
ARGUMENT: Because Poe is not a natural-born citizen, she cannot reacquire natural-born
status pursuant to RA No 9225.
ARGUMENT: Poe cannot cite international conventions or treaties to support that foundlings
have a nationality. International conventions and treaties are not self-executory. Local
legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the
Philippines. There is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to
foundlings.
ARGUMENT: She did not comply with the ten year residency requirement.
 She acquired domicile from the time she renounced her American citizenship
(2010/2011).
 She lacked the intention to abandon US domicile due to her frequent trips to US.
ARGUMENT: Former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under RA No 9225 reacquires
only Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.
ARGUMENT: Poe admitted in her COC for Senator that she is a resident only for 6 years and 6
months.
SECOND (2): CONTRERAS PETITION
Poe’s COC must be cancelled due to noncompliance to the ten-year residency requirement.
 Reckoning period: July 18, 2006 – Philippine citizenship was approved by the Bureau
of Immigration
POE’S CONTENTION
1. TATAD- It should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
2. The petitions are basically quo warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility to
Presidency. Quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.
 3. The burden to prove her citizenship status is on the respondents. She enjoys the
presumption of natural-born status.
4. Customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the states where they are found.
5. As a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under RA No 9225. Acts
of the government enjoy presumption of regularity. Her declaration as natural-born
citizen, subsequent appointment, and decree of adoption bolster her status as a
natural-born citizen.
6. She reinstated her domicile on early 2005 when her children were resettled and they
purchased a condominium unit.
7. Renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a prerequisite for acquisition of domicile.
8. Her statement on her COC for Senator was an honest mistake and a mistake made in
good faith.
DECISION OF COMELEC: Poe is not a natural-born citizen. She failed to complete the ten-
year requirement. She committed material misrepresentation in her COC. She is not qualified to
be a candidate for Presidency. Cancellation of her COC is approved. Motion for
Reconsideration is denied.
MINOR ISSUE: Can COMELEC deny due course or cancel the COC of Poe on the exclusive
ground that she made in the certificate of a false material representation?
No. The COMELEC cannot itself decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate. No
provision in the powers and functions of the COMELEC (Article IX, C, Section 2) allows them to
do such. The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates cannot be supplied by
Rule 25, Sec. 1 of COMELEC’s rules.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS CASE – led to the amendment of Rule 25 [Rule 25 (2012
Amendment) requires declaration of a final judgment before disqualification]
1. Unless a candidate wins and is elected there is no necessity for determining his
eligibility for office.
2. Determination of eligibility takes a long time.
This still does not give COMELEC the power to decide disqualification of candidates.
WHO HAS THE POWER TO DECIDE SUCH? The Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in cases involving their members. The Supreme Court has the
power to judge contests relating to the election and qualifications of the President or Vice
President.
COURT’S RULING
I. CITIZENSHIP
Does Grace Poe have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen when she is a
foundling? Yes.
Is her reacquisition of her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen valid? Yes.
1. There is sufficient evidence to prove that Poe is a natural-born Filipino.
 The burden of proof was on the respondents and not with Poe to show that she is not a
Filipino citizen. They should have shown that Poe’s parents were aliens. Poe’s
foundling status did not shift the burden to her to prove that she is not a Filipino citizen,
especially when there is a high probability that her parents are Filipino.
 Solicitor General offered official statistics from 1965 to 1975 that showed that the
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino is
99.83%.
 At the time, the petitioner was found in 1968, majority of the population in Iloilo was
Filipino.
 OTHER CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE:
o She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Ilolilo.
o She has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair,
almond-shaped eyes and an oval face.
 SECTION 4, RULE 128 – Admissibility of the probability of evidence
 SOLICITOR-GENERAL: It is uncommon for foreigners to come to the Philippines so
they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind.
2. As a matter of law, foundlings are, as a class, natural-born citizens.
 INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
o There is no restrictive language which would exclude foundlings in the 1935
Constitution. The deliberations on the 1934 Constitutional Convention
discussed that persons of “unknown parentage” were not specified in law
because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. It was believed
that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that
illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings
followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby
making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution.
 DOMESTIC LAWS ON ADOPTION – Foundlings are Filipinos.
o Ellis and Ellis v. Republic – A child left by an unidentified mother to be
adopted by aliens was vested the status of a citizen of the Philippines. (Art 15,
NCC)
 o RA No 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995), RA No 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998), and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC (Rule on Adoption) –
expressly refer to Filipino children and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.
 ARTICLE IV, SEC. 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION - "Natural-born citizens are those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
o “Having to perform an act” must be personally done - The determination of
foundling status is done by the authorities, not the child.
o The object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child.
o The process of registering foundling is not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship or the election of citizenship.
 INTERNATIONAL LAW
o An international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation.
 The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation.
o Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations.
 Generally accepted principles of international law include international
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from
the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity).
1. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (GAPIL)
2. Article 7 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) – RATIFIED BY
THE PHILIPPINES
3. Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
4. Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws - A foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the
country of birth." (GAPIL); PH did not ratify
5. Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness – A foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is
found. (GAPIL); PH did not ratify.
"Generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international custom,
but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
 60 passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. Forty-twi if these
countries follow jus sanguinis.
These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a
generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of
nationals of the country in which the foundling is found
II. RA NO 9225 REACQUIRED POE’S NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN STATUS
 The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225, in line with the Congress, determines how
citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even
if it had been once lost.
 Bengson v HRET
o Natural-born status does not need to be continuous.
o “from birth”
 It was clarified that this means to be “at the time of birth.”
III. RESIDENCE
Is Grace Poe compliant with the ten-year requirement for residency to satisfy the
qualification for candidacy for Presidency? Yes.
 In addition to the evidence previously presented (former US passport showing her
arrival, e-mail correspondences for shipment of their household items, e-mails for
shipment of their pet, school records of their children’s transfer, tax identification card
starting on July 2005, titles for condominium and parking slot, tax declarations, proof of
donation of their US household items), the COMELEC, ignored evidence indicating
 animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States
of America.
 On the honest mistake in the COC for Senator
o MARCOS-ROMUALDEZ V. COMELEC: It is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement.
COURT RULING:
 COMELEC’S DECISIONS ON ELAMPARO AND TATAD PETITIONS ARE ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE.
 COMELEC’S CANCELLATION OF POE’S CANDIDACY FRO PRESIDENCY IS
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
 MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED
QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9
May 2016.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DOH
SECRETARY
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association posits the invalidity of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of Executive Order No 51 or the Milk Code
as it contains provisions that are unconstitutional and in excess of the law that is
supposed to implement it.
 The RIRR was issued by the Department of Health, headed by DOH Secretary
Francisco Duque.
 October 1986 - Executive Order No. 51 or the Milk Code was issued by President
Corazon Aquino. The law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of
Marketing Breastmilk Substitute (ICMBS).
o This code is adopted by the World Health Assembly in 1981.
 1990 – The Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of the Convention provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality and that all segments of society are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
 May 2006 – DOH issued the RIRR which took effect on July 2006.
 June 28, 2006 – Petitioners questioned whether the DOH violated the Constitution by
promulgating the RIRR and filed for the issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

Issue: Is the Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association, representing manufacturers of

breastmilk substitutes, a real party-in-interest? Yes.
 Petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation contains a provision which espouses that
the association is formed to represent the pharmaceutical and health care industry
before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, medical professions and the
general public.
 Petitioner’s legal identity is fused with its members who stand to be benefited or injured
by any judgment in the action.

Issue: Are the provisions of the RIRR constitutional?

I. Are the pertinent international instruments adverted by DOH part of the law of
the land?

DOH asserts that the RIRR implements various international instruments, not only the Milk
Code, such as: a) UNCRC, b) ICESCR, and c) CEDAW. These instruments contain general
measures to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of
breastfeeding. Said instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or
marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The only instruments that have specific provisions
regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and the various WHA Resolutions.
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF DOMESTIC LAW
o 1987 Constitution
 Doctrine of Transformation - The transformation method requires that
an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
 Doctrine of Incorporation - The incorporation method applies when,
by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law.
o ARTICLE VII, Section 21 of the Constitution – Treaties become part of the
law of the land through transformation.
 No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.
 The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any
local legislation.
 However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been
transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code.
Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this
jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
 The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to
emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS
absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general
public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly
provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if
such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
 It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms,
principles and practices that influence state behavior. "Soft law" does not fall into any
of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
VIOLATIVE PROVISIONS
 SECTION 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing
materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young
children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed, because they tend to convey
or give subliminal messages or impressions that undermine breastmilk and
breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or replacements, as
well as related products covered within the scope of this Code. This prohibits
advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing materials and activities for
breastmilk substitutes in line with the RIRR’s declaration of principle under Section 4(f).
 SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles – (f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of
infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related products are prohibited.
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code.
The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the regulatory
authority given to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion, and
marketing.
 With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative sanctions that are not
found in the Milk Code, the Court upholds petitioner's objection thereto.
 In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code grants
the DOH the authority to fix or impose administrative fines. Thus, without any express
grant of power to fix or impose such fines, the DOH cannot provide for those fines in the
RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded its authority by providing for such fines
or sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said provision is, therefore, null and void.
COURT DECISION:
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can
be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with
the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an
industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not
constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
DIGEST RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from
implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the respondents,
UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may
implement them through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our
domestic system. Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the
1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary
international law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the
(ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of
products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other
marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the
Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are
merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not
presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of
the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the
member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies
without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also
failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such protective
regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions under
the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no
harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in
consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.