Species Pluralism and Anti-Realism

Author(s): Marc Ereshefsky

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 103-120
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/188177
Accessed: 18-06-2020 07:24 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

The University of Chicago Press, Philosophy of Science Association are collaborating

with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy of Science

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Species Pluralism and Anti-Realism*

Marc EreshefskytS
Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary

Species pluralism gives us reason to doubt the existence of the species category. The
problem is not that species concepts are chosen according to our interests or that plu-
ralism and the desire for hierarchical classifications are incompatible. The problem is
that the various taxa we call 'species' lack a common unifying feature.

The biological literature does not suffer from a lack of definitions con-
cerning the nature of species. Quite the opposite. A plethora of defi-
nitions, or what biologists call "species concept," exist. Not merely one
or two prominent definitions, but at least seven well-accepted ones (Er-
eshefsky 1992a). Biologists and philosophers have responded to this
wealth of species concepts in two ways. Monists believe that biologists
should settle on a single species concept. Pluralists maintain that a
number of species concepts should be accepted as legitimate.
For my part, I side with the pluralists. The primary focus of this
paper, however, is not to argue for the acceptance of species pluralism,
but to study the relation between species pluralism and anti-realism.
Two prominent supporters of species pluralism, Philip Kitcher (1984)
and John Dupre (1993), suggest a realistic interpretation of species
pluralism: various species concepts, they argue, provide equally real
classifications of the organic world. More recently, Kyle Stanford (1995)

*Received August 1996; revised May 1997.

tSend requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of
Calgary, Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada; e-mail: ereshefs@acs.ucalgary.ca
:A version of this paper was presented at a meeting of the Pittsburgh International
Fellows, Castiglioncello, Italy, May 1996. I would like to thank David Baumslag, Mi-
chael Bradie, Mohamed Elsamahi, David Hull, Jim Lennox, Gerald Massey, Elliott
Sober, Ken Waters, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Financial
support and pleasant surroundings for work on this paper were provided by the Calgary
Institute for the Humanities.

Philosophy of Science, 65 (March 1998) pp. 103-120. 0031-8248/98/6501-0005$2.00

Copyright 1998 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

103

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
104 MARC ERESHEFSKY

has suggested that the adoption of species pluralism should

to be anti-realists. A similar anti-realist, pluralist stance can
in the works of Alexander Rosenberg (1985, 1994).
The aim of this paper is to set out why species pluralis
cause us to be anti-realists when it comes to the species cat
argument offered here will be different than those of Rosen
Stanford. Their anti-realist arguments are of the epistemolo
We have multiple ways of carving the organic world and we
know which is the correct one. We should therefore remain
concerning our theoretical concepts and choose them on inst
interest-relative grounds. The argument presented here for a
concerning the species category is quite different. The probl
a lack of information concerning the organic world. Instead
porary biological theory provides ample evidence that the t
is segmented by biological forces into different types of spe
Consequently, there is no single unitary species category, but
geneous collection of base taxa referred to by the term 'spec
That, in brief, is the main argument of the paper. What f
the details. The next section introduces the brand of species
used in this paper. That is followed by a review of various
for species anti-realism. In the end I will argue that we sho
the existence of the species category. I will not call into qu
reality of those lineages we call 'species'. According to conte
evolutionary theory, such taxa as Homo sapiens, Mesoneura
Alchorena ilicifolia exist. The problem is assuming that they
a single distinctive category called 'species'. The main argume
paper casts doubt on the reality of the species category but
existence of species taxa.

1. Species Pluralism. Species pluralism is a growth industry i

losophy of biology and biological taxonomy. At least five dist
of species pluralism have been offered in the last decade (se
1993, Ereshefsky 1992b, Kitcher 1984, Mishler and Brandon
Ruse 1987). I do not want to discuss all of those versions
pluralism here. Nevertheless, I should sketch the type of plu
sumed in this paper as well as contrast it with two promin
natives.1
At the outset, it should be noted that the motivation for

1. What follows is not intended as a full argument for the acceptance of

ralism but merely as a brief introduction to the topic. For more detailed a
the articles cited above.

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPECIES PLURALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 105

pluralism does not derive from the fact that biologists offer
species concepts. It stems from the suggestion that more th
those concepts is worthy of acceptance. Consider two prom
proaches to species: the interbreeding approach and the phy
approach. The interbreeding approach is typified by Mayr's (
logical species concept. According to Mayr, "species are grou
terbreeding natural populations that are reproductively isol
other such groups" (1970, 12). Species, in other words, are g
held together by interbreeding and protected by their orga
ability to mate with inter-specific organisms. Other species
that fall under the interbreeding approach (but differ from
include Patterson's (1985) Mate Recognition Concept and
(1974) Reproductive Competition Concept.
The phylogenetic approach to species is found in the work
(see, for example, Cracraft 1983, Mishler and Brandon 1987
ley 1989). Cladism is one of the primary schools of contempo
logical taxonomy. Its founder, Willi Hennig (1966), argues t
sifications should only highlight those groups of organisms t
result of common descent. Accordingly, he requires that ea
consist of an ancestral species and all of its descendant taxa.
are called 'monophyletic'. Hennig did not intend his notion
phyly to apply to species, but recent cladists have extended
to include species. For example, Mishler and Brandon (1987,4
a species as "the least inclusive taxon recognized in a classific
which organisms are grouped because of degree of monophy
Phylogenetic species are base monophyletic taxa, and they a
tained by a number of forces, including interbreeding, gene
stasis, selection, and developmental canalization (see below a
pleton 1989 for a discussion of these forces).
These two approaches to species-the interbreeding and
logenetic-carve the tree of life in different ways. Many inte
species fail to be phylogenetic species, and many phylogene
fail to be interbreeding species. Consider the first sort of c
interbreeding species fail to be phylogenetic species because
not contain all the descendants of a common ancestor. Rose
cites the example of a group of freshwater fish that forms
breeding species, yet that interbreeding species does not cont
descendants of a common ancestor. Some of its ancestor's descendants
have gone on to form a completely different interbreeding species. In
this example, we have a single phylogenetic species but multiple inter-
breeding species. Such cases are far from unusual. Any interbreeding
species whose members form a new species fails to be a phylogenetic
species. Such species, typically called 'ancestral species', are not mon-

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
106 MARC ERESHEFSKY

ophyletic because they do not contain all the descendants o

ancestor: they lack the members of the new species.
Conversely, many phylogenetic species fail to be interbr
cies. Phylogenetic species of asexual organisms are a prim
Asexual organisms reproduce by selfing, vegetative mean
fertilization. No interbreeding is required for their reprod
cies consisting of asexual organisms are bound by forces
interbreeding. As a result, they fail as interbreeding speci
situation arises in phylogenetic species of sexual organism
isolated populations. The populations of such species are no
by interbreeding among their members. Instead, those
form single species as the result of such forces as selection
homeostasis acting on their constituent organisms. Thoug
cies form phylogenetic species, they lack the gene flow req
terbreeding species.2
From these examples we see that the forces of evolution s
tree of life into different types of base lineages, namely,
and interbreeding species. Of course, this picture of or
could be wrong. Perhaps some of the abovementioned for
ability to produce stable taxonomic units. These are, after a
matters. Nevertheless, given what current evolutionary the
the forces of evolution segment the tree of life into differ
species.
Before moving on, it is worth noting that the form of species plu-
ralism used in this paper differs from other prominent versions. For
example, Mishler and Brandon (1987) concur that different forces seg-
ment the tree of life into various kinds of species. But they maintain
that these varying forces affect different branches of the tree of life.
Some branches contain species bound by interbreeding, others contain
species bound by ecological forces. Moreover, Mishler and Brandon
hold that each organism belongs to one and only one type of species.
The result is a single correct classification of the organic world. It may
contain various types of species, but only if those species exist on dif-
ferent branches. The sort of pluralism adopted in this paper is more
radical. An organism may belong to two different types of species at
the same time. For example, a single organism may belong to both an
interbreeding species and a phylogenetic species even though those spe-
cies are not fully co-extensive. (For empirical examples, see Rosen
1979, Frost and Hillis 1990, and de Queiroz and Donoghue 1988.)
Kitcher's (1984) and Dupre's (1993) forms of pluralism allow that

2. For further discussion of the disparity between interbreeding and phylogenetic spe-
cies, see de Queiroz and Donoghue 1988, Ereshefsky 1992b, and Section 4 below.

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPECIES PLURALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 107

the organic world is cross-classified by a number of speci

However, their forms of species pluralism are too radical.
Dupre suggest that the species category not only contains
lineages but also qualitatively defined sets of organism
words, they allow that the species category is an ontologi
class of spatiotemporally continuous particulars and qualit
fined sets. The form of pluralism used in this paper is mo
tive. It assumes that all species taxa are genealogical entitie
otherwise places species outside of the domain of evolution
The explanatory backbone of evolutionary theory is the a
that organisms are connected by genealogy. "Descent with
tion" is the phrase we often hear. Species taxa are the par
units in which descent with modification occurs-that is wh
often called 'units of evolution'.3 Sever the genealogical co
within species and one casts away the primary mode of exp
evolutionary biology.
More could be said concerning the differences among
other forms of species pluralism. Instead of dwelling on th
ences, let us now turn to the arguments from species plura
realism.

2. Stanford's Argument. Recently, Stanford (1995) has adopted

Kitcher's (1984) form of species pluralism and argued that it leads to
anti-realism. Stanford's argument is the following. Kitcher advocates
accepting a number of species concepts, but not any proposed concept.
For example, Kitcher rejects those concepts offered by creationists and
pheneticists. Kitcher suggests that we accept just those species that
stand in "interesting biological relations" (here I follow Stanford's
[1995, 80] interpretation of Kitcher). What constitutes such relations?
In brief, scientific theories provide explanatory schemata, and classifi-
cations render questions more tractable within a schema by highlight-
ing divisions relevant to that schema. Species concepts that allow the
construction of explanatorily useful classifications should be accepted,
provided they are not "redundant, boring, or wrongheaded" (Stanford
1995, 80).
With this regulatory principle for discerning species concepts, Stan-
ford makes his move for species anti-realism. His reasoning is sum-
marized as follows:

[B]y Kitcher's pluralistic criteria, the legitimate interests of biolo-

3. Which is not to say that species are the only units of evolution. Local populations,
even some genera, may be units of evolution. See Mishler and Donoghue 1982[1992],
129 and Ereshefsky 1991.

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
108 MARC ERESHEFSKY

gists constitute those divisions recognized as species. Thu

course of biological inquiry proceeds, we do not decid
were previously mistaken about which groups of organi
species; rather, as our explanatory and practical interest
which divisions of organisms actually are species change
As we have noted, which principles of division are biolog
teresting can vary without corresponding changes in the
organisms. Kitcher's species therefore lack that property
venience on the state of the mind independent mater
which we demand of real objects. (1995, 83)

To illustrate Stanford's argument, consider his example o

species concept. According to Stanford, we reject Cuvier's co
because it provides an inaccurate picture of the organic
because it is "wrongheaded" given present-day theory. Biolo
ory has changed and as a result so have the groups of organ
recognize as species taxa. The organic world has, more o
mained constant. Species taxa, thus, merely reside in our
theoretical interests.
I have two comments concerning Stanford's argument. First, it is
not an argument that turns on the adoption of species pluralism. In-
deed, pluralism is a red herring. Stanford's argument can be employed
for monism as well as pluralism. For instance, a monist who adopts
realism recognizes that species concepts come and go, but hopes that
eventually we will get the correct concept. Stanford's response is that
species concepts are only correct relative to a conceptual scheme and
not according to the world. So even if one species concept wins out
and receives universal acceptance, we should not assume that it high-
lights mind-independent divisions in nature. Stanford's interpretation
of how classifications are chosen is doing all the work here, and that
interpretation applies whether one is a monist or a pluralist. Similarly,
it applies whether one is talking about species or electrons. In a nut-
shell, one problem with Stanford's argument is that it is too global. We
would like to know why the existence of species is particularly prob-
lematic beyond the general claim that the reference of theoretical terms
depends on our interests.
My second comment concerns Stanford's general skepticism when
it is applied to species. For Stanford, species "lack that property, su-
pervenience on the state of the mind independent material world, which
we demand of real objects" (1995, 83). This statement can be read in
two ways. Perhaps Stanford is asserting that empirical evidence does
not affect our choice of species concepts. Instead species concepts are
chosen entirely on the basis of background theories and beliefs. How-

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPECIES PLURALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 109

ever, this line of reasoning seems implausible. Consider th

Species Concept. Supporters and detractors of the BSC b
empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of gene flow af
adoption of that concept. Mayr, for example, claims he ha
evidence supporting his concept (1970, Chapters 5 and 6; 19
320). Detractors of the BSC maintain they have falsifyin
(Donoghue 1985, Templeton 1989). The members of this
tainly believe that the empirical world is affecting their choice
concepts.
Another reading of Stanford takes him to be asserting tha
evidence affects our choice of species concepts but is insuf
making that choice. Theoretical assumptions must be broug
well. I have no qualms with this account of concept sele
choice of theoretical concepts is always affected by backgro
and beliefs. But unlike Stanford, I do not think that this im
leads to skepticism. If empirical evidence does in some slight
our choice of species concepts, then there is a glimmer of
matter how slight, that biologists may eventually choose the
cepts. In brief, the assumption that theoretical concepts ar
infused does not imply that biologists are not now on to som
that they never will be. Stanford needs to give us more tha
dard skeptic's argument against species realism. On the one
fails to cite anything particularly problematic about species
ism. On the other hand, it begs the question.

3. Pluralism and Hierarchy. Another argument from plurali

realism arises elsewhere. It involves the desire for hierarchical classifi-
cations. The Linnaean hierarchy is the framework that the vast ma-
jority of biologists use. Organisms are placed in species, species in
genera, and so on. Hierarchical classifications consist of a series of
nested taxa such that each unit is either completely subsumed by a
higher taxon or it is the highest taxon in the series. As a result, an
organism can belong to only one taxon per level of inclusiveness. My
dog Nellie, for example, can belong to only one species, namely, Canis
familaris. An organism can belong to more than one taxon, but those
taxa must be of different ranks. Nellie belongs to the species Canis
familaris, the genus Canis, and the family Canidae.
Why did Linnaeus require that an organism belong to only one spe-
cies? It stems from his adoption of Aristotelian essentialism (Cain 1958,
146ff.; Larson 1971, 146). According to that form of essentialism, each
entity belongs to a single least inclusive kind, what might be called a
'fundamental kind'. By knowing an entity's fundamental kind we know
its real essence, and in turn, we can explain and predict its necessary

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
110 MARC ERESHEFSKY

properties. This notion of a fundamental kind is not violated

entity's belonging to more than one kind, so long as those k
hierarchically arranged. What it cannot allow is an entity bel
more than one kind when those kinds are not hierarchically a
Otherwise, we will not know what that entity is, let alone b
explain its nature.
Now the rub for a realist interpretation of pluralism is the foll
A realist approach to species pluralism allows that an orga
belong to more than one species, while the Linnaean hierarch
that an organism belongs to only one species. So a realist inter
of species pluralism goes against a central tenet of the Linna
archy. The problem here is encapsulated by the following qu
How can a single organism belong to two different real specie
realists can argue that this is not a problem because on th
species do not exist. Indeed, this is the tactic Stanford (1995
takes in answering vexing problems concerning species identi
species taxa do not exist, such problems are pseudo-problems
There is another way around the conflict between pluralism
desire for hierarchical classifications other than embracing an
It involves rejecting essentialism. A pluralist can drop the es
requirement that each individual have a single essence. Th
allow an organism to belong to multiple real species. Essentia
fallen on hard times elsewhere. Many authors contend that sp
lack species-specific essences (Ghiselin 1974, Hull 1978), and a
of philosophers maintain that essentialistic kinds are not to
anywhere (Mellor 1977, Dupre 1993). If one is inclined to rej
tialism, then one might be willing to ease up on the requirem
an organism belongs to only one species.
However, the situation here is a bit more complicated than
Two types of essentialism are being discussed and should
guished. Kind essentialism asserts that kinds are defined by kind-
essences. Individual essentialism requires that each individual
gle set of essential properties throughout its existence. Som
adopt one form of essentialism while rejecting the other. For
one might think that kinds and species lack essences, yet in
organisms have their own essences (En9 1975). If one holds t
then the rejection of species essentialism does not eliminate th
between pluralism and the belief that each organism belongs
one species. An organism's essence might depend on its speci
bership, even though that species lacks an essence.
I prefer a more modest approach to rendering species plural
patible with the desire for hierarchical classifications. Suppos
organism has a single fundamental nature, but that nature i

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPECIES PLURALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 111

tated by its species membership. Instead, what makes an in

single organism is the causal relations that bind its spatial an
parts into a single instance of life. In other words, one mi
causal account of an organism's identity. The point here is n
a complete picture of organism identity, but to indicate tha
damental nature of an organism might be something other
membership in a species. Given this suggestion, an organism
tain its identity even though it belongs to different species
organism can be one and the same organism even though it
both a phylogenetic species and an interbreeding species. In
desire for hierarchical classifications does not pose a conce
block to a realist interpretation of pluralism.

4. The Heterogeneity Argument. There is a third and stron

why species pluralism should cause us to doubt the existen
species category. Unlike Stanford's argument it does not tur
ing a global form of scientific skepticism but is internal to
debate. Unlike the argument of the previous section, it is no
on essentialist assumptions. Species pluralism implies that
contains different types of species. If that is the case, then the
question should be raised: What do these different types of
in common that renders them species? If species taxa lack
unifying feature, then we have reason to doubt the existe
species category. What, then, is common to the entities ref
the term 'species'?
To begin, we might observe that all species have the comm
erty of being genealogical entities. But merely being a gene
tity will not suffice. From an evolutionary perspective, all taxa,
they be species, genera, or tribes, are genealogical entities.
commonality that distinguishes species taxa from other typ
A popular suggestion among biologists and philosophers is t
taxa share a similar type of cohesion or evolutionary unity
ample, see Hull 1976, 313; Eldredge and Cracraft 1980,
1981, 74). This suggestion has two components. First, the co
of species taxa lies in the similar type of process that rend
taxa cohesive entities. Second, the common nature of speci
in their containing a similar structure. The first is a claim abou
the second a claim about pattern.
As illustrated in the first section of this paper, the proc
cause taxa to be species vary. In species that have adequate
among their populations, interbreeding is the dominant unif
In phylogenetic species containing sexual organisms that live
populations, genetic homeostasis, selection, or development

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
112 MARC ERESHEFSKY

zation is primary. Similarly, phylogenetic species consisting o

organisms are bound by various forces other than interbreed
ferent species are unified by different types of processes. So
mon feature of species taxa does not lie in their unifying pro
Perhaps we are better off looking at the other half of the sugg
namely, that species taxa share a common type of causal stru
problem with this approach is that many phylogenetic and in
ing species have different structures. Consider the causal
found among the members of an interbreeding species. If an in
ing species consists of a single local population, its members
ally connected by the process of interbreeding. If an interbre
cies consists of a number of local populations, those populati
connected by interbreeding among the members of those pop
Either way, the process of interbreeding causes such species to
ally integrated entities. One complication is worth mentioning
gree of casual integration required to maintain the unity of in
ing species lies on a continuum (Templeton 1989[1992], 16
interbreeding species consist of a single population whose m
interbreed year round. Others consist of multiple populations
change genetic material only during the summer. Either way,
bers of such species are bound into single species by the int
process of interbreeding.
Now consider the structure of phylogenetic species. Some
monophyletic taxa consisting of asexual organisms. What bin
ual organisms into species are the forces of selection, geneti
stasis, and developmental canalization. These forces can cause
of organisms to belong to a single species without requiring a
interaction among them. Selection, for instance, can maintain
of a species by individually affecting each organism in a sim
The same goes for the actions of genetic homeostasis and dev
tal canalization. Homeostatic genotypes independently cause
ganisms of a species to have certain phenotypes; and develop
canalization independently constrains the ontogeny of each
In brief, phylogenetic species unified by these processes do
causally integrated entities. Notice that this observation applie
logenetic species consisting of asexual organisms and phylogen
cies of sexually reproducing organisms living in isolated pop
Neither type of species is sufficiently bound by interactive
processes.
Stepping back we see that interbreeding species are causally inte-
grated entities whereas many phylogenetic species are not. In other
words, species pluralism implies that the species category is an onto-
logical mixed bag. Some species are causally connected entities, other

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPECIES PLURALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 113

species are the result of non-interactive forces working at

of biological organization. Because species taxa are not c
unitary in the same way, their cohesiveness cannot be cited
mon unifying feature of species.
Just to bring the ontologically mixed nature of the specie
into sharper focus, notice that lineages considered species
proach often fail to be species on another approach. Fo
phylogenetic species whose populations (or organisms) fail to
genetic material have the structure of higher taxa on the in
approach: they consist of reproductively isolated organism
lations. Thus some phylogenetic species are higher taxa on
breeding approach. Similarly, some interbreeding specie
status of local populations or subspecies on the phylogenetic
they are merely one local population among many in a phy
species. In general, many interbreeding species lack the str
phylogenetic ones, and many phylogenetic species lack the s
interbreeding ones.
So, is there a common unifying feature of species taxa? E
taxon is a genealogical entity, but that commonality is too
it includes all taxa. Species taxa are maintained by different
so they lack a common type of unifying process. Finally,
logenetic and interbreeding species fail to be cohesive or uni
same way. What is left as the common feature of species t
term 'species', and a widespread motivation among biologis
the base taxonomic and evolutionary units of the Linnaean
Our search for the unifying biological feature of species tax
up empty-handed.4 In sum, a realistic interpretation of spec
ism-one that accepts the existence of different types of sp
implies that there is no unified ontological category called
implies that the species category does not exist. This I take
strong argument from species pluralism to the non-existe
species category.
It might be worthwhile to contrast the form of species a
offered here with Stanford's. Stanford's arguments are aim
existence of species taxa. He makes no explicit reference to t

4. Notice that the disunity of the species category is not merely due to a
failing to have a biological feature found in most species. The discrepanc
cies taxa is widespread-vast numbers of species form one type of spe
another. For example, much of life reproduces asexually (see Section 5
life forms phylogenetic species but not interbreeding species. Conversely,
tral species form interbreeding species but not phylogenetic ones (see Se
disunity of the species category is due to major discrepancies in the biolo
not a few exceptions.

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
114 MARC ERESHEFSKY

of the species category. The argument offered here takes a different

tack. The heterogeneous nature of the species category gives us reason
to doubt the existence of that category, yet it does not give us reason
to doubt the reality of the taxa we call 'species' (see Section 6). In fact,
the brand of species anti-realism offered here is more akin to Kitcher's
(1984) and Dupre's (1993) forms of species realism than Stanford's
anti-realism. Kitcher and Dupre allow the existence of species taxa, of
different types of species taxa (species pluralism), and of the species
category. The anti-realism offered here concurs that the taxa we call
'species' may be real and that there are different types of species. How-
ever, it takes the heterogeneous nature of the species category as evi-
dence that the species category does not exist.

5. Realist Rejoinders. Undoubtedly many will be unhappy with the

suggestion that the species category does not exist. Let us consider two
ways one might try to save that category. As Ken Waters has noted
(pers. comm.), the heterogeneity argument consists of two parts. First
comes the empirical claim that the organic world contains different
types of base taxa. Then comes the more philosophical claim that a
heterogeneous category is no category at all. Both aspects of the het-
erogeneity argument can be challenged.
To begin, someone might object that the heterogeneity argument
places too stringent a requirement on the existence of the species cate-
gory. I do not think that is the case. The criterion used here assumes
that a category exists only if its members share some commonality that
generally distinguishes them from entities outside the category. Com-
pared to essentialist and cluster accounts of natural kinds it is relatively
weak. Consider standard accounts of essentialism, either Locke's or
Putnam's. Such accounts require that all and only the members of a
natural kind share a set of properties that explains the other necessary
properties of those members. All and only copper, for example, is
thought to have a certain atomic structure that explains why copper
dissolves in various acids, conducts electricity, and so on. The require-
ment placed on the existence of the species category in this paper is
weaker. It requires a distinctive commonality among species taxa, but
not one necessarily found in all and only species-it allows exceptions.
Moreover, it would settle for a non-explanatory common property
among species taxa.
The requirement placed on the reality of the species category in this
paper is even weaker than Mill's and Hempel's cluster accounts of
kinds. Mill (1843[1963] vol. 8, p. 714) requires that the members of a
kind share a number of common features that allow us to make new
inferences about those members. Hempel (1965, 147) requires the iden-

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPECIES PLURALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 115

tification of an extensive cluster of theoretically useful cha

These accounts of kinds are less stringent than essentialism
do not require the occurrence of a property in all and only the
of a kind. Nevertheless, the requirement placed on the spec
in this paper is even weaker. It does not require that spec
number of common features-one would suffice. Nor does
that those features help us make new inferences concerning
of species. Relative to other accounts of natural kinds, the
used here for the existence of the species category is fairly
Still, one might object that I have neglected an importan
of kinds that is weaker than the requirement placed on
category. Perhaps the species category should be treated a
tive concept: species are either interbreeding species or ph
species or ecological species. In other words, to be a specie
to be one of those kinds of species. Disjunctive definitions
pealed to many authors, both philosophers and biologis
(1959, 24), for example, has suggested that the names of s
be defined disjunctively. Early in his career, Hull (1965[19
advocated a disjunctive definition of 'species'. Hull now pr
ditional monistic definition of 'species' (see Hull 1987, 1989)
Disjunctive definitions do a fine job of describing how we
terms. But that is all they do. A disjunctive definition of the s
gory would not tell us why various taxa are species. Nor would
evidence for the existence of the species category. It would mer
light our use of the term 'species'. To put the point anothe
junctive definitions lack ontological import. So though treat
cies category as a disjunctive concept might nicely describe our
habits, it would not substantiate the existence of that catego
Another and quite different way to counter the heterog
gument is to question the empirical claim that the organic
tains various types of species. This is the tactic the monist
nists argue that pluralists have too quickly jumped the gun
contend that we are presently very close to having the cor
concept. For example, Eldredge (1985, 200-201) and Ghi
[1992], 373; 1989, 74-75) maintain that lineages of sexua
are much more important in the course of evolution than a
Hence we should adopt only an interbreeding definition of
category. The nub of their argument is twofold: groups o
ganisms usually out-compete groups of asexual organisms;
uality is rare in nature. Both claims are problematic.
First off, why should numbers matter? Suppose most of l
planet reproduces sexually. That in itself does not imply t
organisms do not form lineages worthy of being called 'sp

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
116 MARC ERESHEFSKY

need a separate argument for that claim. Putting that aside, w

not so easily concede that most of life reproduces sexually. S
ologists, for example, Templeton (1989[1992], 164), contend t
uality is far from rare. Indeed, Hull (1988, 429) argues that
not asexuality, "turns out to be rare on every measure sugg
evolutionary biologists-number of organisms, biomass, am
energy transduced and so on."
What of the assertion that sexual organisms frequently out
asexual organisms? One advantage of sexual reproduction
pression of new phenotypes through the process of recombi
That, in turn, allows lineages of sexual organisms to more eas
in changing environments than do asexual ones. Still, asexua
duction has its advantages. The process of selfing gives asexu
isms a leg up in stable environments and those environment
conspecific mates are rare (Futuyma 1986, 282). Sexual repro
and asexual reproduction each have their advantages; it all de
the sort of environment an organism inhabits. The point here
give a full-blown argument for asexual organisms forming sp
merely to indicate that it is far from clear that the differenc
asexual and sexual organisms justifies reserving the term 'sp
sexual ones.
Problems for limiting the term 'species' to interbreeding species oc-
cur elsewhere and are not merely due to the existence of asexual or-
ganisms. Some biologists (see Donoghue 1985, 174; Templeton 1989
[1992], 165) suggest that many species of sexual organisms consist of
populations that exchange no genetic material. Thus many species of
sexual organisms fail to be interbreeding species. Similarly, proponents
of the phylogenetic species concept argue that many base monophyletic
taxa owe their coherence to processes other than interbreeding (see
Mishler and Brandon 1987). The upshot is that the interbreeding ap-
proach does not have a lock on the word 'species'. The problem for
monism here is not that the interbreeding approach is a weak one. It
does very well with certain types of lineages. The problem is that the
biological world consists of a plurality of theoretically significant base
lineages. Species pluralism is the result of a fecundity of biological
forces rather than a paucity of scientific information.
Stepping back, we see that according to current evolutionary theory
the tree of life contains different types of base lineages. Of course, current
theory could be wrong. Perhaps some of the processes I have mentioned
lack the ability to produce stable taxonomic entities. Perhaps we will end
up with a monistic species category. However, as things now stand in
biology, we have no reason to think that such a monistic definition is on
the horizon. In fact, we have every reason to believe that the species cate-

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPECIES PLURALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 117

gory will remain heterogeneous. As a result, we have every

doubt whether a single, unified species category exists.

6. Conclusion. Two concluding remarks are in order. First,

ment for species anti-realism offered here is merely against the
of the species category. Nothing I have said casts doubt on th
of those taxa we call 'species'. We can remain confident that
such taxa as Homo sapiens and Canisfamilaris. Of course, it
odd to call them 'species' in light of the heterogeneity arg
will consider that issue in a moment). The important point
the non-existence of the species category does not imply th
we call 'species' are mere artifacts.
The suggestion that we should doubt the reality of the sp
gory but not existence of species taxa is far from new. So
suggest that even Darwin held this view.5 Consider Dar
words. In the Origin he writes that "I look at the term spe
arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of in
closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentia
from the term variety" (1859[1964], 52). In a letter to Josep
Darwin goes even further:

It is really laughable to see what different ideas are prom

various naturalists' minds, when they speak of "species"
resemblance is everything and descent of little weight-
resemblance seems to go for nothing, and Creation the
idea-in some, sterility an unfailing test, with others it is
a farthing. It all comes, I believe, from trying to define the
able. (December 24, 1856; in F. Darwin 1887, vol. 2, 88
Of course Darwin did believe in the existence of evolving lin
those we call 'species'. The problem for him was the existen
species category and the other categories of the Linnaean hi
Finally, does the conclusion of this paper imply that the
cies' should be dropped from biological discourse? Perhaps
world of rational decision making that would be an opti
'Species' has outlived its usefulness in biology, and when it i
ambiguous. Why not replace it with terms that explicitly
the various types of lineages we now call 'species'? Gran
refers to interbreeding species as "biospecies" and ecologica
"ecospecies." To these we can add the term 'phylospecies' fo
genetic species.6

5. See Ghiselin 1969, 93ff. and Beatty 1985. See Stamos 1996 for a dissent
6. Additional reasons for shelving the term 'species' come from more gen

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
118 MARC ERESHEFSKY

To many, talk of eliminating the term 'species' from biolo

sound overly idealistic, indeed far-fetched. I tend to agree.
'species' is well entrenched in biology and has been used exten
hundreds of years. School children are taught about species f
earliest encounters with biology, and the word is found in ou
ments' laws. It is hard to see how 'species' could be eliminate
both ordinary and biological discourse. The case of 'species' r
question of how theoretical and practical concerns affect the
theoretical term. Though 'species' has outlived its theoretical
tical considerations keep it alive. What those considerations
how they outweigh theoretical ones deserves further study. P
aside, there still is an ontological problem concerning the real
species category. Call those base lineages whatever you want
istence of the species category is dubious.

REFERENCES

Beatty, J. (1985), "Speaking of Species: Darwin's Strategy", in D. Kohn (ed.), The

Heritage. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 265-281.
Beckner, M. (1959), The Biological Way of Thought. New York: Columbia Univer
Cain, A. (1958), "Logic and Memory in Linnaeus's System of Taxonomy", Pr
the Linnaean Society of London 169: 144-163.
Cracraft, J. (1983), "Species Concepts and Speciation Analysis", in R. Johnsto
rent Ornithology. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 159-187.
Darwin, C. (1859[1964]), On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Ed
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Darwin, F. (ed.) (1887), The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, including an Auto
Chapter. Third Edition. London: John Murry.
de Queiroz, K. and M. Donoghue (1988), "Phylogenetic Systematics and the Sp
lem", Cladistics 4: 317-338.
de Queiroz, K. and J. Gauthier (1992), "Phylogenetic Taxonomy", Annual Review
and Systematics 23: 449-480.
Donoghue, M. (1985), "A Critique of the Biological Species Concept and Recom
for a Phylogenetic Alternative", The Bryologist 88: 172-181.
Dupr6, J. (1993), The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunit
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Eldredge, N. (1985), Unfinished Synthesis. New York: Oxford University Press.
Eldredge, N. and J. Cracraft (1980), Phylogenetic Patterns and the Evolutiona
New York: Columbia University Press.
En9, B. (1975), "Necessary Properties and Linnaean Essentialism", Canadian J
Philosophy 5: 83-102.
Ereshefsky, M. (1991), "Species, Higher Taxa, and the Units of Evolution", Ph
Science 58: 84-101.
. (ed.) (1992a), The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
-- . (1992b), "Eliminative Pluralism", Philosophy of Science 59: 671-690.
-- . (1994), "Some Problems with the Linnaean Hierarchy", Philosophy of Science
186-205.

with the entire Linnaean hierarchy. See de Queiroz and Gauthier 1992; Ereshefsky 1994,
1997; and Pennisi 1996.

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPECIES PLURALISM AND ANTI-REALISM 119

. (1997), "The Evolution of the Linnaean Hierarchy", Biology and Philosophy 12:
493-519.
Frost, D. and D. Hillis (1990), "Species in concept and practice: herpetological applications",
Herpetologica 46: 87-104.
Futuyma, D. (1985), Evolutionary Biology, Second Edition. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer As-
sociation.
Ghiselin, M. (1969), The Triumph of the Darwinian Method. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
. (1987[1992]), "Species Concepts, Individuality, and Objectivity", Biology and Phi-
losophy 2: 127-143. Reprinted in Ereshefsky (1992a), The Units of Evolution, pp. 363-
380.
. (1989), "Sex and the Individuality of Species: A Reply to Mishler and Brandon",
Biology and Philosophy 4: 77-80.
Grant, V. (1981), Plant Speciation. Second Edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hempel, C. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays. New York: Free Press.
Hennig, W. (1966), Phylogenetic Systematics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Hull, D. (1965[1992]), "The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy: Two Thousand Years of
Stasis", British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science 15: 314-326, 16: 1-18. Reprinted
in Ereshefsky (1992a), The Units of Evolution, pp. 199-226.
. (1976), "Are Species Really Individuals?", Systematic Zoology 25: 174-191.
. (1978), "A Matter of Individuality", Philosophy of Science 45: 335-360.
. (1987), "Genealogical Actors in Ecological Roles", Biology and Philosophy
2:168-183.
. (1988), Science as a Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
. (1989), "A Function for Actual Examples in Philosophy of Science", in M. Ruse
(ed.), What the Philosophy of Biology Is. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
pp. 309-321.
Kitcher, P. (1984), "Species", Philosophy of Science 51: 308-333.
Larson, J. (1971), Reason and Experience: The Representation of Natural Order in the Work
of Carl von Linne. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mayr, E. (1970), Populations, Species, and Evolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
. (1988), "The Species Category", in E. Mayr, Toward a New Philosophy of Biology.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 315-334.
Mellor, H. (1977), "Natural Kinds", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28:
299-312.
Mill, J. S. (1843[1963]), A System of Logic, in J. M. Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of
John Stuart Mill, vol. 8. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Mishler, B. and R. Brandon (1987), "Individuality, Pluralism, and the Phylogenetic Species
Concept", Biology and Philosophy 2: 397-414.
Mishler, B. and M. Donoghue (1982), "Species Concepts: A Case for Pluralism", Systematic
Zoology 31: 491-503. Reprinted in Ereshefsky (1992a), The Units of Evolution, pp. 121-
138.
Paterson, H. (1985), "The Recognition Concept of Species", in E. Vrba (ed.), Species and
Speciation. Pretoria: Transvall Museum, pp. 21-29.
Pennisi, E. (1996), "Meeting Briefs: Evolutionary and Systematic Biologists Converge", Sci-
ence 273: 181
Ridley, M. (1989), "The Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem", Biology and Philosophy
4: 1-16.
Rosen, D. (1979), "Vicariant Patterns Historical Explanation in Biogeography", Systematic
Zoology 27: 159-188.
Rosenberg, A. (1985), The Structure of Biological Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
. (1994), Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press.
Ruse, M. (1987), "Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What?", British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 38: 225-242.
Stamos, D. (1996), "Was Darwin Really a Species Nominalist?", Journal of the History of
Biology 29: 127-144.

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 120 MARC ERESHEFSKY

Stanford, P. (1995), "For Pluralism and Against

Science 62: 70-91.
Templeton, A. (1989[1992]), "The Meaning of Species and Speciation: A Genetic Perspec-
tive", in D. Otte and J. Endler (eds.), Speciation and its Consequences. Sunderland, MA:
Sinauer. Reprinted in Ereshefsky (1992a), The Units of Evolution, pp. 159-185.
Wiley, E. (1981), Phylogenetics: The Theory and Practice of Phylogenetic Systematics. New
York: Wiley and Sons.

This content downloaded from 82.33.196.18 on Thu, 18 Jun 2020 07:24:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms