sustainability

Article
Multidisciplinary Composition of Climate Change
Commissions: Transnational Trends and
Expert Perspectives
Magnus C. Abraham-Dukuma 1, * , Michael O. Dioha 2 , Natalia Bogado 3 ,
Hemen Mark Butu 4 , Francis N. Okpaleke 5 , Qaraman M. Hasan 1,6 , Shari Babajide Epe 7
and Nnaemeka Vincent Emodi 8
1 Centre for Environmental, Resources and Energy Law, Te Piringa—Faculty of Law, University of Waikato,
Hamilton 3216, New Zealand; qh51@students.waikato.ac.nz
2 Department of Energy & Environment, TERI School of Advanced Studies, New Delhi 110070, India;
michael.dioha@terisas.ac.in
3 Institute for Communication Psychology and Media Education, University of Koblenz-Landau,
76829 Landau, Germany; bogado@uni-landau.de
4 Department of Climate Change, Graduate School, Kyungpook National University, Daegu 41566, Korea;
hemenseter@knu.ac.kr
5 Department of Politics and Public Policy, University of Waikato, Hamilton 3216, New Zealand;
okpalekefrancis@gmail.com
6 Department of Law, College of Humanities Science, University of Raparin,
Ranya 46012, Kurdistan Region, Iraq
7 West African Science Service Centre on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use,
Université Abdou Moumouni, Niamey 10896, Niger; babadjide.s@edu.wascal.org
8 Future Energy Research Group, Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, University of Tasmania,
Hobart, TAS 7005, Australia; nnaemeka.emodi@utas.edu.au
* Correspondence: mca13@students.waikato.ac.nz




Received: 23 October 2020; Accepted: 4 December 2020; Published: 9 December 2020


Abstract: Climate change governance has metamorphosed from multilateral pacts such as the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement to the enactment
of country-specific dedicated legislation for mitigation and adaptation. A common feature of this
phenomenon is the establishment of an expert committee on climate change, or simply, a climate
change commission (CCC). For effective climate change governance, a multidisciplinary CCC will play
a key role. The objective of this study is to inquire into the multidisciplinary requirements of a CCC
and how multidisciplinarity can influence the efficacy of climate governance measures. Accordingly,
it inquires into transnational circumstances on the disciplinary/multidisciplinary composition of CCCs
and samples the perspectives of over 120 climate policy experts—through a structured survey—to
draw insights into how countries could establish a suitable multidisciplinary CCC in legislative and
policy processes. Key results from transnational circumstances and expert perspectives reveal the
propriety of establishing CCCs to drive robust mitigation and adaptation policies. As the study shows,
multiple countries have already incorporated diverse domains and backgrounds of expertise in the
composition of their CCCs. Furthermore, our experts’ survey reveals overwhelming support among
respondents (98%) for CCCs, and all those who support these commissions believe they should be, to
some degree, independent and multidisciplinary. Experts’ perspectives reveal a spectrum of specific
desirable multidisciplinary categories—legal, physical science, biosciences, energy and engineering,
economics, planning, social sciences, ethics, governance, health, and communication. We also
highlight some caveats regarding multidisciplinarity and reflect on the existence of quasi-institutions
across countries without dedicated CCCs.

Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280; doi:10.3390/su122410280 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability

Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 2 of 23

Keywords: climate change governance; climate change commission; climate policy; expert
engagement; climate advisory multidisciplinarity

1. Introduction
Climate change has gained notoriety as one of the most significant concerns of humanity [1].
Scholars also recognize it as a super-wicked problem requiring serious governance and policy responses
at multidimensional and multilateral levels [2,3]. This recognition underscores the urgency of potent
mitigation and adaptation measures. This fact forms the background for, as well as justifies, the
enactment and proliferation of dedicated climate change legislation and relevant policies to support
mitigation and adaptation measures globally. There is also a specific growing trend of establishing
a climate change commission (CCC) as part of climate governance frameworks of sovereign states.
We construe “trend” here simply as the general course, style, direction or prevailing tendency
regarding the establishment of multidisciplinary CCCs. We do not attach any temporal dimension to
this description.
This paper represents the foremost scholarly effort to inquire into the modalities for establishing
optimal CCCs. We are cognizant of the possibility of other factors for operationalizing this institutional
arrangement. However, in this paper, we focus on the multidisciplinary composition of the commission,
drawing insights from national circumstances in countries already establishing relevant institutions
in their legal and policy frameworks, and analyzing the perspectives of climate policy experts on
the issue. Reflecting the evolving trend at the time of its authorship, the paper was inspired by the
proliferation of climate change legislation and the growing emergence of CCCs in multiple countries
across the globe [4–8]. It is apparent that the rapidly evolving climate governance architecture is
receiving scholarly attention. However, there is a scant examination on the particular issue of CCC,
which appears to be one of the core features of the evolving climate governance regime across multiple
jurisdictions. Most studies on climate governance concentrate on describing and explaining the climate
change policies of a particular country or region [9]. Also, there is a paucity of studies that focus on
the importance of multidisciplinary expertise in improving climate change mitigation and adaptation
efforts across countries [10]. As noted in [11], the defragmentation of research and cooperation between
disciplines amplified the issue of climate change and led to the establishment of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has also been observed that cooperation across disciplines improves
fluidity in research and deepens the understanding of complex climate issues [12]. Therefore, exploring
the multidisciplinary requirement of climate governance institutions (in this case, CCCs) can potentially
advance the state of scholarship within the climate change research community.
The objective of this study is to inquire into the multidisciplinary requirements of a CCC and how
multidisciplinarity can influence the efficacy of climate governance measures. The study, building
on the existing and growing literature on climate governance, provides a scholarly analysis of
multidisciplinary requirements for entrenching CCCs that produce robust mitigation and adaptation
measures in countries’ climate governance regimes. The scope of the paper traverses 11 countries, all
signatories to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the
Paris Agreement. They are the United Kingdom, Philippines, Norway, France, Sweden, New Zealand,
Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Germany. These countries were selected because they
constitute prime case studies of countries that have enacted dedicated climate change legislation
and established CCCs as part of their climate change governance regimes. This delimited focus
also provides a direct picture regarding the issue of “climate change commission” as opposed to the
existence of state departments or other institutions with similar functions. The multidisciplinary
characteristics of CCCs across these countries represent the transnational circumstances reported in
the study. In order to match transnational circumstances with ideal governance criteria for policy
efficacy, we sampled the perspectives of climate policy experts. We present these as part of the results
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 3 of 23

in Section 4, before undertaking a synthesized discussion to aid the operationalizing of CCCs as more
countries consider enacting more dedicated climate change legislation, as well as establishing CCCs.
The next section will situate the evolution of climate change governance—particularly highlighting
the emergence of CCCs—across multiple jurisdictions (Section 2). We present the justification and
context for our study and describe the methods and materials adopted for its execution in detail
(Section 3); followed by results from transnational circumstances and expert survey responses (Section 4);
synthesized discussion (Section 5); and conclusions (Section 6).

2. Evolving Climate Change Governance Architecture: A Review

Climate change governance has multiple parallels, but in this study, we draw from the literature to
conceptualize it as “all purposeful mechanisms and measures aimed at steering social systems toward
preventing, mitigating, or adapting to the risks posed by climate change” [13]. It is, perhaps, best
succinctly captured as a broad range of options for coordination concerning climate change adaptation
and mitigation [14]. Within this framing, we note the existence of international, national, transnational
and nonstate actors that all work towards achieving mitigation and adaptation objectives [15].
It has become conventional at the global scene to address problems through cooperation among
countries, often through bilateral and multilateral frameworks. This is partly owing to the transnational
effects of such problems and the universal brotherhood of all humanity. These considerations underpin
international and global environmental agreements that seek to address climate change [16,17].
Climate change, being one of humanity’s greatest challenges, lends itself as a humanitarian imperative
requiring concerted efforts, cooperation and burden-sharing by all countries of the world [18].
Stakeholders, policymakers, diplomats and political think tanks have consistently endeavoured to
entrench and develop a comprehensive and integrated international regulatory regime for climate
change mitigation and adaptation. The United Nations climate change regime—predominantly
consisting of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement—represents the global focal point for such an
international cooperation.
However, the international governance of climate change is not within the exclusive purview of
the United Nations. On the contrary, the topic lends itself to numerous well-meaning policy initiatives
of other international organisations and nonstate actors [19]. Hence, the notion of fragmentation of
climate governance arises [20]. From the dimension of nonstate actors, the private sector plays a crucial
role in terms of investments and leadership in innovation, hence the need for states to initiate suitable
incentives for useful private-sector engagement in climate governance [21].
We also note the emergence and prevalence of global citizen deliberation—a deliberative assembly
composed predominantly of lay citizens—as an important framework that can inform global climate
governance and other problems of the world [22,23]. In fact, there are numerous other frameworks
that fall outside our scope. At this juncture, it is important to state that this study does not intend
duplicating other scholarly efforts to track the emergence of climate governance trends and strategies
globally. This explains the brevity of the present review to situate the evolution of global climate
governance in recent history. A corollary, and more relevant, objective here is to contextualize state
governance measures through the enactment of climate change legislation, formulation of relevant
policies and the establishment of CCCs as part of the climate governance features across the globe.
As climate change mitigation and adaptation dominate the global agenda, it has also become
salient to ensure the existence of functional legal and policy frameworks that clearly define mandates,
responsibilities and the implementation of strategies that are consistent with climate goals [24].
These frameworks would facilitate actions that reduce climate risks and inhibit actions that increase
them. Relatedly, there was a surge in the number of climate-related policies and laws from 60 in 1997
to over 1200 in 2017 in about 164 countries [4,8]. As of August 2020, the database of the Grantham
Research Institute records over 1800 climate-related policies and laws globally (Grantham Online
Climate Law Database https://climate-laws.org/#map-section). These include specific legislations and
policies on climate change, and related laws and policies that affect climate action.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 4 of 23

The relatively rapid proliferation of climate change policies and legislations actually help to
reduce emissions. Research shows that each new law potentially reduces annual CO2 emission per
unit of gross domestic product by 0.78% nationally in the short term (during the first three years),
and by 1.79% in the long term (beyond three years) [6]. However, these do not necessarily translate
into large-scale emissions reduction required to achieve net-zero scenarios by 2050 [6]. The net-zero
emissions goal certainly necessitates the emergence and evolution of far-reaching legal and policy
measures to drive large-scale emissions reduction.
Legislative and policy instruments around the world are now clearly prescribing specific elements
to galvanize more potent climate action, especially mitigation efforts. These encompass the setting of
emissions reduction targets, capping of national carbon budgets, establishment of emissions pricing
schemes, establishment of CCCs, among other measures. It is apparent that the existence of a CCC has
become a relevant component of the climate governance architecture around multiple countries, as
Section 4 will show. Despite this governance trend, there is scarce scholarly analysis on the modality of
operationalizing or establishing an optimal CCC. This is clearly a gap in the literature, which we fill by
our modest study.
Consequently, this study contributes to the literature by inquiring into transnational circumstances
on the establishment of CCCs and samples the perspectives of over 120 climate policy experts—through
a structured survey—to draw insights into how countries could establish suitable CCCs in legislative
and policy processes. We define CCC in this paper narrowly, to capture the formal institution
established by legislation or policy processes and designated as “climate change commission” or an
“expert committee on climate change” or simply “committee on climate change”, with the principal
function of providing expert and evidence-based advisory services to inform state climate policy
responses and strategies across countries. We take due cognizance of the possible existence of
quasi-institutions with identical functions across multiple states. For example, there are ministerial
and interministerial committees on climate change across multiple countries. We are also aware of the
existence of ministries, departments and agencies of government with functions relating to climate
change mitigation and adaptation. However, we limit our focus to independent CCCs or independent
expert committees on climate change established by legislation or policy processes. In the next section,
we present the study justification and scope, as well as enumerate our materials and methods.

3. Justification, Materials and Methods

3.1. Justification
Contemporary political/administrative systems face serious challenges and difficulties regarding
effective climate governance. Some specific documented examples include, but are not limited to: the
long-time framing for addressing climate change, global implications and the tendency to wait for
other countries to act, revolutionary societal ramifications, scientific uncertainty, and distributional and
equity linkages [25]. These challenges predominantly stem from the multidimensional complexities
associated with climate governance and the need for both innovative and evidence-based approaches
that may fall outside the expertise of traditional institutions, as well as political and government
functionaries in most countries [26]. More so, there is usually a fundamental deficit in governance
when it comes to dealing with the systemic dimension of risks; lack of adequate arrangements to
take responsibility; failure to move from ”business as usual” to action; and lack of imagination and
capacity to face unanticipated outcomes, especially with risk-averse political systems [27]. Moreover,
governments may not actively undertake climate change policies in essential sectors for the country’s
economy. For instance, the recent Zero Carbon Act in New Zealand covers only 5% of emissions
from the agricultural sector in the country’s emissions trading scheme [28]. Thus, traditional political
institutions would have to evolve into suitable machineries for tackling the peculiarities of climate
change mitigation and adaptation.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 5 of 23

The idea of establishing a CCC or an expert committee on climate change is recognizable in

the literature as a unique institution that is desirable for serious climate action [29]. Arguably, the
central remit of a CCC is its evidence-based advisory role. This advisory capacity profits from
thorough and high-quality research on multidimensional—scientific, socioeconomic, sociopolitical,
legal and policy—issues on climate change [30]. Given this expectation, and the emergence of CCCs
across multiple jurisdictions, we argue that governments and policymakers should also consider the
disciplinary and multidisciplinary backgrounds of the members of the CCC. We believe that this
particular character could potentially contribute to the efficacy of the CCC, as well as the robustness of
its mitigation and adaptation policies, drawing from the rich repository of its multidisciplinary and
multidimensional expertise.
A valid poser to the establishment of a CCC could be the existence of government ministries,
departments and agencies with similar functions. However, appointments into these government
positions are mostly political. We posit that a dedicated nonpolitical, independent, nonpartisan
commission/committee may be better suited to inform better policymaking. We anchor this argument
based on the robust knowledge derived from the nonpoliticized expertise of an independent
evidence-based committee/commission [31]. The consideration of issues is likely to be more objective
and expert-oriented, drawing from the expertise of different members of the committee/commission,
as opposed to political appointees who may have limited technical knowledge on the different aspects
and dimensions of climate issues. Consequently, we believe that the insights drawn from transnational
circumstances and responses of leading climate experts would complement the growing literature on
climate governance.
In addition, institutional inertia within traditional government ministries, departments and
agencies can hamper the effective and timely response to climate change if left solely to state bureaucratic
configurations [25]. No doubt, state bureaucratic and administrative arrangements are often relevant
for driving governmental solutions to problems, but administrative and bureaucratic traditions and
behaviours can negatively affect the efficacy of such institutional arrangements, especially for climate
change governance [32,33]. This correlates with institutional inertia, which manifests through specific
mechanisms with implications for effective climate governance—huge climate action costs framing,
uncertainty in conceptualizing climate change to elicit potent action, organizational path dependency
that resists change in the polity, incumbent power relations that support existing ineffective intuitional
arrangements, and entrenching the legitimacy of incumbent norms and policies [34]. Thus, institutional
inertia hinders the emergence of recalibrated and efficacious climate governance arrangements and
underscores the suitability of establishing expert-driven CCCs and similar institutions that are well
suited for delivering climate change mitigation and adaptation objectives

3.2. Materials and Methods

The key questions underpinning our study are as follows: (1) What are the current trends in
the multidisciplinary composition of CCCs? (2) What is the rationale for the establishment of a
CCC? (3) Does multidisciplinary expertise contribute towards the efficacy of a CCC? To answer
these questions, we split our study methodology into two parts. The first part seeks to answer the
first research question (RQ). This part is an analysis of the trends in the disciplinary composition
of CCCs in the nations studied. Here, we used a qualitative approach to identify the disciplinary
composition of the CCCs in 11 different countries that are all members of the UNFCCC and signatories
to the 2015 Paris Agreement. As highlighted in the introduction, this limited number represents
some—perhaps a majority—of the countries that have enacted dedicated climate change legislations,
as well as established independent CCCs as part of their climate governance regimes.
Transnational qualitative trend analysis is not new in the literature. It has been widely applied
over the years for studies such as migration [35] and political communication [36]. Recently, we have
observed a transnational trend in the disciplinary composition of national CCCs as enshrined in
new climate change legislations. Consequently, this observed trend challenges our assumptions on
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 6 of 23

what disciplinary backgrounds should constitute a CCC. While it is uncertain as to whether this new
trend will engender efficacious climate responses in the future, we believe that there is a need to
investigate the issue to provide robust understanding for scholarship and policymaking. Accordingly,
we first identified countries around the world that have established dedicated CCCs. Then, we
studied the disciplinary, multidisciplinary (and possible industry-centric) components of the CCCs.
These provided a useful understanding of trends in these countries (RQ 1).
The transnational trend analysis is complemented by the second part based on experts’ perspectives
on the subject matter. This part seeks to answer RQs 2 and 3. The second part of our study is based on
the expert-perspective method. According to this approach, results are obtained by capturing the views,
assessments or opinions of competent experts in the subject domain to get a broader understanding
of a problem from different angles [37]. This approach assumes that some people have a deeper
understanding of a particular topic, compared to others. Consequently, if we acquire this knowledge
from a pool of experts in the subject matter, the results will potentially exceed the outcomes collected
from a single expert [38].
Generally, experts’ perspective on a topic is scoped through questionnaires to understand the
subjective division or consensus of experts on a given topic [39]. Thus, this method can produce
qualitative and quantitative results which can be used to support decisionmaking quickly. This feature
makes this approach particularly suitable for our study as we seek to explore the current locus
of agreement and disagreement within the climate change experts’ community on the disciplinary
requirements of a CCC. In a bid to collect the perspectives of the experts on this issue, the second part
of our study uses a structured survey to capture the views, assessments and opinions of competent
experts on CCCs. The survey is composed of 10 questions from which we extracted both qualitative
and quantitative data.
In the first question of the survey, we asked the respondents if they support the idea of a CCC
in a country’s policy framework. In the second question, we asked them if they agree that a CCC
can provide useful advisory services to the government. The third question seeks to understand the
extent to which the respondents support the independence of a CCC. The first, second and third
questions seek to understand the rationale for the establishment of a CCC (RQ 2). From the fourth to
the eighth question, we focused specifically on questions related to subject disciplines. Specifically,
we gauged the extent to which the respondents agree that a country’s CCC should include an expert
in climatology, economics, environmental science, social issues and general scientific knowledge.
These areas of expertise were selected based on their relevance in the field of climate change mitigation
and adaptation. For instance, climatology is a key area providing expert knowledge on the atmosphere
and weather patterns over time, which is useful in supporting effective climate change response.
The ninth question seeks to bring everything together. We surveyed the respondents on their
opinion on the collective inclusion of experts in the fields of climatology, economics, environmental
science, social issues and scientific knowledge in a country’s CCC. Finally, in the tenth question, we
inquired, in an open-ended fashion, what other specialized fields our respondents would suggest for a
country’s CCC. This question was included to provide a platform for respondents to indicate those
areas of expertise that they consider indispensable in a CCC. The fourth to the tenth questions seek
to understand the contribution of multidisciplinary expertise towards the efficacy of a CCC (RQ 3).
For a better understanding, the research and survey questions are provided in the supplemental online
material (Supplementary Materials).

3.2.1. Participant Selection and Survey Administration

For the study participants, a purposive technique was used in selecting participants from academia,
industry, civil societies, and government institutions. We also ensured that our respondents were
pooled from diverse academic and professional backgrounds in order to get a balanced view of the
subject matter, as would be appropriate [40]. In a similar bid, we ensured that the respondents were
evenly distributed in terms of geographical location and national origin. While selecting respondents,
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 7 of 23

we considered people with substantive and demonstrated experience in the issues of climate change at
national and international levels. For example, the list of the IPCC lead authors for the sixth assessment
report (AR6) served as a solid repository to select our respondents. We also considered climate change
journal editors, authors of climate change-related articles from academic publications and project
reports. We considered stakeholders that run climate change-related nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and for-profit industries with strong links to climate change initiatives.
We sent emails and direct messages to different experts via LinkedIn and requested their participation
in the study through an attached web-link to the survey. A total of 150 survey invitations were sent to
our respondents using an online web form. The questionnaire contained nine multiple-choice and one
open-ended question. After a 21-day period, 129 anonymized and confidential survey responses were
collated and, consequently, analyzed.

3.2.2. Method for Data Analysis

Data resulting from responses to questions 1 through 9 were analyzed using descriptive statistics
to identify trends and commonalities. It is important to note that, because this study used a purposive
nonprobabilistic sample, results cannot be generalized to a larger population. However, the sample
gathered allowed us to identify, among respondents, some consistencies that are indicative of experts’
preferences and recommendations for the role and composition of CCCs.
Qualitative content analysis is used in analyzing the response to question 10 of the survey.
This method allows for a systematic description and meaning of qualitative data [41]. Based on this
method, we assigned each part of the material a coding frame. As Table 1 shows below, this was used in
tabulating the calculated frequencies of each response and making empirical sense of the data collated.

Table 1. Coding frame for the analysis of responses to question 10.

Category 1 Legal i.e., law/policy/international relations

Category 2 Industry i.e., energy/transport/agriculture/food
i.e., biology/oceanography/biodiversity/biotechnology/
Category 3 Biosciences
Geography/geology/meteorology/hydrology/forestry
Category 4 Economics i.e., finance/economic
Category 5 Planning i.e., engineering/development/management
i.e., psychology/sociology/anthropology/history/political
Category 6 Social Sciences
science/education
Category 7 Ethics i.e., religion/philosophy/moral
Category 8 Governance i.e., politicians/interest groups/community groups
Category 9 Health i.e., medicine/public health/environmental health
Category 10 Communication i.e., media/marketing
Category 11 Uncategorized

Coding was conducted manually by two independent coders. Given the small sample of responses
to be coded, intercoder reliability was assessed manually by an independent party on the entire data
sample. Agreement was close to absolute (99.5%), and the one case of disagreement was resolved by
assigning it a random value, per standard practice [42]. Results are available in full as supplemental
online material (Supplementary Materials). Figure 1 shows the overview of the research methods
adopted in this study.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 8 of 23
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 22

Overview of
Figure 1. Overview of the
the general
general methodological
methodological framework.
framework.

4. Results
4. Results

4.1. Transnational Trends

4.1. Transnational Trends
Here, we analyze legislative and institutional design trends across multiple countries regarding
Here, we analyze legislative and institutional design trends across multiple countries regarding
the establishment of CCCs. As earlier highlighted, we delimited our focus to only countries with
the establishment of CCCs. As earlier highlighted, we delimited our focus to only countries with
specific CCCs or similar institutions in national climate change legislations and policy processes.
specific CCCs or similar institutions in national climate change legislations and policy processes.
Within this scope, we captured 11 countries, with predominance in Europe. We highlight these
Within this scope, we captured 11 countries, with predominance in Europe. We highlight these
locations in Figure 2. For ease of presentation, we summarize the trends in these countries in Table 2.
locations in Figure 2. For ease of presentation, we summarize the trends in these countries in Table 2.
In addition to our justification presented in Section 3, Figure 2 clearly shows a scanty global atlas on
In addition to our justification presented in Section 3, Figure 2 clearly shows a scanty global atlas on
the establishment of CCCs. Given the evolving global trend of climate policy architecture, we suggest
the establishment of CCCs. Given the evolving global trend of climate policy architecture, we
the possible establishment and proliferation of CCCs in more countries across different continents in
suggest the possible establishment and proliferation of CCCs in more countries across different
the future. Consequently, our study provides a useful reference material to assist countries with the
continents in the future. Consequently, our study provides a useful reference material to assist
multidisciplinary composition of their CCCs.
countries with the multidisciplinary composition of their CCCs.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280
Table 2. Transnational trends on the composition of independent CCCs.
Country Institution Establishment Summary of Objectives
• Providing independent expert
advice on climate policies.
• Conducting reviews to
produce relevant reports.
Climate Change Climate Change • Assisting the Climate Change
Australia
Authority Authority Act 2011 Minister to prepare
government’s policy response.
• Researching matters related to
climate change.
• Evaluating national climate
objectives in line with
international commitments.
• Analyzing potential
The Danish Council transition pathways.
Climate Change Act 2014
Denmark on Climate Change • Advisory services on potential
and the Climate Act 2019
(The Climate Council) transition mechanisms
and scenarios.
• Stakeholders
consultancy services.
• Supporting the planning of
Scientific Expert climate change policy and the
Body—Finland’s related decisionmaking.
Finland Climate Panel Climate Change Act 2015 • Researching and data
(The Finnish Climate collection on mitigation
Change Panel) and adaptation.
Disciplinary Composition
Not specifically prescribed. The law
requires a Chair to head the Authority,
a Chief Scientist and up to
seven other members.
However, at the time of writing, the
Authority’s membership was
composed of experts from the
domains of public policy, energy,
business and economics, agriculture,
maritime science, numerical
modelling, and engineering [43].
Experts with broad expertise in
energy, buildings, transport,
agriculture, environment, nature,
economy, climate science and
behavioural research.
Not specifically prescribed, but the
law requires the representation of
different fields of science
in the expert body.
9 of 23
Remarks
There is an opportunity to
incorporate a wide
multidisciplinary composition of
experts, even as Australia considers
a bill to abolish the existing Climate
Change Authority for a new
Climate Change Commission.
The present Authority could be
reconfigured to include more
diversity of experts. Alternatively,
the likely successor commission
could also consider the results of
this study.
The Climate Council shows
relevant multidisciplinary
composition, but there remains an
opportunity to incorporate a wide
multidisciplinary composition of
experts with other relevant skills.
At the time of writing, the Panel’s
members represented different
branches of science from
educational sciences to atmospheric
sciences [44]. However, there is an
opportunity for the law to
specifically prescribe
multidisciplinary fields
of expertise.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280
Table 2. Cont.
Country Institution Establishment Summary of Objectives
• Annually evaluating France’s
greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions trajectory.
• Assessing the implementation
and effectiveness of policy
Law No. 2019-1147 on measures decided by state
Energy and the Climate and local authorities.
High Council on
France and Executive • Analyzing the socioeconomic,
Climate Change
promulgation in as well as environmental
November 2018 impacts of various
public policies.
• Providing expert opinions on
the national low-carbon
strategy and carbon budgets.
• Examination of national
emissions data.
• Examination of assumptions
on GHG reduction underlying
Council of Experts on Climate Protection Act mitigation measures.
Germany
Climate Change 2019 • Provision of expert opinion to
the government before the
implementation of
mitigation measures.
• Advise and recommend
Climate Action and Low national climate change
The Climate Change
Ireland Carbon Development Act mitigation and adaptation
Advisory Council
2015 plans and policies.
Disciplinary Composition
Scientific, technical and economic
expertise in the fields of climate and
ecosystem sciences, the reduction of
GHG emissions, adaptation and
resilience to climate change.
Five specialized persons from the
fields of climatology, environmental
science and social matters; and
possessing outstanding scientific
knowledge and experience in required
prescribed fields.
Not prescribed, but the establishing
law provides that, in constituting the
membership of the Advisory Council,
the Government shall have regard to
the range of qualifications, expertise
and experience necessary for the
proper and effective performance of
the functions of the Advisory Council.
10 of 23
Remarks
The multidisciplinary character of
the High Council on Climate
Change aligns with the logic of an
ideal framework, but needs broader
multidisciplinary. composition for
well-informed and efficacious
policymaking.
Similar to New Zealand’s CCC,
Germany’s Council of Experts on
Climate Change evinces an array of
relevant multidisciplinary fields.
This framework can also potentially
support well-informed climate
policy responses, although it is still
possible to capture other
multidisciplinary fields and
industry components.
There is a clear acknowledgement
in the law of the need to appoint
experts with requisite expertise and
experience into the Climate Change
Advisory Council. The lack of
useful prescription of the required
experts or fields of expertise
presents a good opportunity for the
Irish Republic to amend its climate
change law. This study becomes
useful in this respect.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280
Table 2. Cont.
Country Institution Establishment Summary of Objectives
• Providing a framework for the
development and
implementation of clear and
stable climate change policies.
Climate Change Response • Providing independent expert
Climate Change
New Zealand (Zero Carbon) advice on mitigation
Commission
Amendment Act 2019 and adaptation.
• Monitoring and review of
progress towards achieving
emissions reduction goals.
• Assessing best approaches for
analyzing and describing
national-level climate risk.
• Identifying key global climate
risk factors, and considering
Executive appointment their importance for the
Climate Risk
Norway pursuant to the Climate Norwegian economy and
Commission
Act 2018 financial stability.
• Provision of climate
risk analytical
framework/methodology to
private and public sectors.
• Sole policymaking institution
responsible for coordinating,
Republic Act No. 9729
Climate Change monitoring and
Philippines (Climate Change
Commission evaluating government
Act 2009)
mitigation measures.
11 of 23
Disciplinary Composition Remarks
Understanding of climate change
mitigation and adaptation, as well
as likely effects of policy responses;
work experience with local and
central governments; knowledge of
The multidisciplinary and
public policy and regulatory
multidimensional spectra of New
processes; technical and
Zealand’s CCC represent a robust
professional skills, experience, and
framework for formulating
expertise in, and an understanding
well-informed climate
of innovative approaches relevant
policy responses.
to the environmental, ecological,
social, economic and distributional
effects of policy interventions;
sectoral representation at regional
and local levels.
Not an ideal CCC that provides a
living framework for continuous
advisory functions. The Norwegian
Climate Risk Commission seems to
Not prescribed.
rather be a financial risk-prevention
commission that was to deliver its
recommendation on climate risks in
Norway by 14 December 2018 [45].
Not prescribed. The establishment
legislation presupposes an
“independent autonomous” Two key areas in need of
institution, but also requires the consideration include: the practical
country’s President to serve as autonomy/independence of the CCC
Chairman of the CCC. The and capturing multidisciplinary fields.
President, as Chairman, can then
appoint three Commissioners.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 12 of 23

Table 2. Cont.

Country Institution Establishment Summary of Objectives Disciplinary Composition Remarks

• Providing independent
assessment of how
government’s climate policies Not specifically prescribed.
are compatible with However, at the time of writing, the The absence of disciplinary
climate goals. Council comprised members from composition requirements of the
Climate Act 2017 and the
Climate Policy • Evaluating the GHG emission the fields of political science, Climate Policy Council represents a
Sweden Swedish Climate Policy
Council reduction trajectory (positive environmental social science, policy gap. This can be filled by the
Framework
or negative) of various industrial energy policy, prescription of suitable
policy areas. economics, climatology, multidisciplinary fields.
• Identifying policy areas in and environmental history [46].
need of additional measures.

Experience and knowledge in

business competitiveness; climate
policy and its national impact;
climate science and other branches
This premier climate governance
of environmental science;
• Advisory functions on framework provides an early
understanding of the peculiarities
emissions reduction targets, insight for understanding the
United Committee on Climate Change Act 2008 of the four British
carbon budgets, and reporting modalities for enacting a dedicated
Kingdom Climate Change (Amended in 2019) countries—England, Scotland,
on progress. climate change legislation,
Wales and Northern Ireland;
as well as instituting
economics analysis and forecasting;
a multidisciplinary CCC.
emissions trading; energy
production and supply; financial
investment; technology
development and diffusion.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 13 of 23
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 22

Figure2.2. Global
Figure Global atlas
atlas of
of jurisdictions
jurisdictions with
with specific
specific climate
climate change
changecommissions
commissions(CCCs)
(CCCs)as
asofofOctober
October
2020. Source: Authors.
2020. Source: Authors.

4.2. Expert Survey Analysis

Experts’ acceptance rate for CCCs is significantly high as an overwhelming 98.5% of respondents
supported the idea of a CCC in a country’s policy framework. Among them, 99% agreed that CCCs
could provide useful advisory roles, with more than half of respondents (58.7%) expressing strong
agreement. Furthermore, among those who supported the inclusion of CCCs in policy frameworks,
92% said that CCCs should be independent. The remaining 8% expressed only moderate support for the
independence of CCCs. Notably, all respondents who supported the existence of CCCs also supported
their independence. However, the slight reservation by some to have independence conferred on CCCs
depicts a level of distrust in the ability of these commissions to provide objective services without
being subject to some oversight from a prescribed supervisory body.
Regarding the inclusion of climatology experts in the CCC, those who support the existence of
CCCs express overwhelming support for this inclusion, with 93.7% of respondents agreeing or strongly
agreeing. Only 5.5% reported indecision and one respondent expressed opposition. The same level of
support was documented for the inclusion of an expert in economics, with only 7.8% being ambivalent
about it. Interestingly, 100% of those who were indecisive about the inclusion of an economics expert
agreed to the inclusion of a climatology expert and, conversely, all of those who were ambivalent
about including a climatology expert expressed significant agreement to the inclusion of an economics
expert. This is exemplary of the well-documented disagreement between neoclassical economics and
environmental economics [47–50]. It signals that CCCs might not make resolutions with an absolute
consensus. Even if the goal is generally agreed upon, the path to the said goal is still very much a
debate among experts.
A vast majority of our respondents (97.6% of those) who support CCCs also favour the inclusion
of environmental science experts, while the remaining 2.4% expressed ambivalence. Although there
was almost absolute agreement on the need to include social science experts (97.6%), the 2.4% who
expressed opposition or ambivalence agreed (mostly highly) to the inclusion of climatology and general
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 14 of 23

science experts in CCCs. Again, we see here a tendency to construe climate change as either social or a
scientific issue.
Regarding the inclusion of experts possessing general scientific knowledge, 95% of those who
support CCCs agreed with their inclusion. Surprisingly, the remaining 5% expressed either ambivalence
or opposition towards the inclusion of members from the scientific community. Furthermore, this
opposing 5% consistently supported (most of them strongly) the inclusion of environmental science,
economics, social issues and climatology experts in CCCs. This opposition towards the inclusion of
experts with general scientific knowledge is intriguing among respondents who had well-defined
attitudes towards the inclusion of experts in all the other fields.
However, when we analyzed the responses provided to the open-ended question on what other
specialized fields should be included in the CCCs, we noticed that most respondents in this subsample
supported the inclusion of experts outside the realm of the hard sciences such as psychology, political
economy, development, governance, policy and engineering. Thus, these contradictory responses
among respondents in this subsample could be interpreted as expressing a preference for the inclusion
of more experts from social sciences instead of strictly from the physical sciences.
Respondents who did not support the creation of CCCs do not represent a significant portion
of the sample. Out of 129 experts surveyed, only two said they do not support the idea of a CCC in
a country’s policy framework. The overwhelming support for the creation of CCC is a noteworthy
finding and, although the small sample of experts consulted does not allow this study to generalize
findings, it is a clear indication of experts’ dominant position when it comes to the need to include
CCCs in policy frameworks.
Among those who opposed the creation of a CCC, some consistencies are worth noting. For instance,
both respondents agreed that the CCC should include an expert in economics. Yet, they were ambivalent
about including environmental science experts and in disagreement about including social issues
experts. Finally, they both said they would probably not support a CCC that includes experts from all
mentioned areas. Their answers to the open-ended questions provide a potential explanation for these
findings. For instance, one of the respondents stated that CCCs should comprise “interest groups and
not simply actors.” This response reflects the weight the respondent assigned to public representation
in CCCs and hints at a concern that experts and political actors might overwrite public views in CCCs.
Similarly, the second respondent expressed scepticism about partisanship in a consolidated
commission. In addition, the respondent expressed concern about the possibility that “expert voices
in one area will be drowned out of compromise” by experts in other areas. Instead, this respondent
proposed that the government receives advice from different experts on different issues without the
need to constitute a commission. The issue of “weights” attached to expert advice or opinion is critical
to climate change mitigation and adaptation, especially when measuring aspects like vulnerability
and risk [51,52]. In practice, it is all but impossible for advice from experts to be considered “equal”.
Generally, our hierarchical nature as humans creates varied levels of influence, power, dominance
and skills, and the status associated with these traits [53]. Relatedly, metrics like years of experience,
educational qualifications and certifications, the historical relevance of an expert’s alma mater, social
standing and even political influence can—and in most cases will—affect the weight attached to the
submissions individual experts make. Although this study did not survey the issue of the weighting of
submissions, it is indicative of the enormity of the challenge it presents that experts have expressed
their concerns without the need to be prompted.
The analysis of experts’ responses to what other specialized fields should be included in a CCC
indicates mixed preferences among respondents, but it also points to some consistencies (Figure 3).
Out of a sample of 221 recommendations to include a specific area of expertise in CCCs, 19.5% were
suggestions to include experts in the legal field. Largely, law and policy experts were the most
recommended, with 74.4% of responses in the legal category referring to law (41.8%) and policy (32.5%)
as areas of expertise required in CCCs.
 The analysis of experts’ responses to what other specialized fields should be included in a CCC
indicates mixed preferences among respondents, but it also points to some consistencies (Figure 3).
Out of a sample of 221 recommendations to include a specific area of expertise in CCCs, 19.5% were
suggestions to include experts in the legal field. Largely, law and policy experts were the most
recommended,
Sustainability with
2020, 12, 74.4% of responses in the legal category referring to law (41.8%) and policy
10280 15 of 23
(32.5%) as areas of expertise required in CCCs.

9% Cat 1: Legal
3%
19%
Cat 2: Industry
6% Cat 3: Biosciences
Cat 4: Economics
6% Cat 5: Planning
Cat 6: Social Sciences
4% 15% Cat 7: Ethics
Cat 8: Governance
Cat 9: Health

15% Cat 10: Communication

10% Cat 11: Uncategorised

8% 5%

Figure 3.
Figure 3. Results
Resultsofofcontent
content analysis
analysis of open-ended
of open-ended question:
question: WhatWhat
other other specialized
specialized field/fields
field/fields would
would
you you suggest
suggest for a country’s
for a country’s CCC? CCC?

Similarly, 14.9% of
of responses
responses suggested
suggestedthetheinclusion
inclusionofofexperts
expertsfrom
fromthe social
the sciences,
social outout
sciences, of
which
of which 38%38%mentioned
mentionedpolitical
politicalscientists,
scientists,27%
27%mentioned
mentioned psychology
psychology experts,
experts, 11%
11% mentioned
sociologists, and 5.5% anthropologists. Thus, Thus, legal
legal and
and social
social sciences
sciences experts
experts were the two most
recommended categories. Industry
Industry experts
experts follow
follow these,
these, with
with 14.9%
14.9% ofof responses
responses falling into this
category. Out of these, energy emerged as the most recommended area of expertise, with 72.7% of
responses in the category. Agriculture, in turn, received 21.2% of the responses in the category and
transport only 12.1%.
The economics category received significant attention, considering that question 5 already covered
the issue of whether a CCC should include experts in economics. Nonetheless, 10% of responses
further emphasized the need to include this area of expertise when asked about other areas to be
considered important in a CCC. These results show, with the limitations imposed by our sample size,
the importance experts place on economics when it comes to the issue of climate policy framework
and institutions. Another category that received considerable attention was, unsurprisingly, the one
comprising all biosciences, with 10% of total responses falling into this category. Within this group,
27.2% of responses expressed the need to include geography experts, 13.6% suggested biology experts
and 9% hydrology.
Experts from the planning category received lower endorsement, with only 7.7% of responses
falling into this category. Nearly half of responses (47%) suggested the inclusion of engineers in CCCs.
Planning was followed by health, with 6.3% of total responses and governance with 5.9%. Among the
latter, the mention of interest and community groups is worth noting, with 30% of responses in the
governance category referring to the importance of public involvement in CCCs. Finally, 4.1% of
responses emphasized the importance of ethics, philosophy and religion in guiding CCCs towards
their objectives.
The category that received the least number of responses was communication, with 2.7% of
responses. Communication plays a key role in public engagement and adoption of climate change
policies [54–56]. Therefore, it is surprising that experts do not assign more importance to communication,
media and marketing as valuable skills in a country’s CCC. We reckon that this might be an oversight
on the part of the experts. It might also have been a consequence of our sample size. In today’s world,
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 16 of 23

it would be unfathomable to discount the role of communications in the advancement of nationwide

climate change policies.
Another insight derived from the analysis of experts’ responses to what other specialized fields
should be included in a CCC is the need to include people with transdisciplinary knowledge. As a
respondent stated “ . . . I would also suggest to include inter or transdisciplinary experts who can
more easily bridge between different disciplines and bodies of knowledge”. Overall, the survey results
conform to the fact that climate change is a multifaceted, interwoven issue that must be dealt with
from varying angles, incorporating expertise and knowledge from diverse fields of endeavour

5. Discussion
Our discussion narrows the insights drawn from our study towards four specific themes.
First, we synthesize the transnational trends on the multidisciplinary composition of CCCs, while paying
attention to the perspectives of climate policy experts, analyzed in Section 4. Second, we reflect on some
caveats regarding the multidisciplinary composition of CCCs. Third, we reflect on quasi-institutions,
as well as their possible limitations regarding their suitability for addressing climate change.
Fourth, we go further to provide some practical implications of the study.

5.1. A Synthesis
The disciplinary and multidisciplinary constituents of CCCs in countries studied are expectedly
varied in terms of expert composition, stated objectives, age and legislative frameworks underlying
them. As such, each CCC is better suited to tackle some, but not all, aspects of climate change on the
agenda of their host nations.
The UK has the oldest CCC, taking into account the year of establishment in 2008, closely followed
by the Philippines and Australia in 2009 and 2011, respectively. The other nations established theirs
fairly recently, between 2014 and 2019. In the countries studied, CCCs emerged on a firm legislative
basis, suggesting a strong political will to pursue climate action, in spite of the controversy surrounding
climate change as a topic.
Our analysis reveals that most existing CCCs are narrowly focused with a few expert fields recurring
across the board, namely: policy experts, social scientists, environmental scientists, climatologists,
economic and financial experts. Other fields are specified in some but not all nations, namely: technical
experts, governance experts, transport experts, agriculture experts, energy experts and others were
rarely occurring only in one country (the UK): an environmental historian, an emissions trading expert
and a numerical modelling expert.
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom had the most robust CCCs in terms of specified
expert fields needed to constitute one, while others were less robust. We consider statements such
as “diverse scientific fields” to be ambiguous and detrimental to forming CCCs that encompass the
requisite knowledge when compared to the detailed cum specific results of our research.
In addition to our results on the transnational trends analysis (Table 2), we summarize the
dynamics identified amongst CCCs in Table 3.
As Table 3 shows, mitigation emerged by far as the most common trend among nations with CCCs,
with few outlining clear-cut adaptation objectives for their CCCs. Only France detailed resilience as a
goal for its CCC. Most CCCs are delineated as providing advisory services, recommendations, research,
reviews, evaluations and assessments.
A few fields were altogether neglected across the board including industry, forestry and land use,
which constitute the two most neglected aspects of climate change mitigation and adaptation [57,58].
Therefore, we suggest that countries could consider incorporating these neglected fields, including the
specific suggestions of surveyed experts into their CCCs.
Nonetheless, we note that disagreements and arguments are to be expected as they come with the
climate governance domain, especially when debating complex and contentious issues. While there
remains some logic in establishing multidisciplinary CCCs, the risk of “too many cooks spoiling the
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 17 of 23

broth” is possible. Therefore, a solution could be forming CCCs that have independent workgroups
much in line with the IPCC approach.

Table 3. Summary of dynamics of CCCs.

Characteristics
Country Age (Years) IN ES AD MI EP
Australia 9 # #  # 
Denmark 6  #  # 
Finland 5   # # 
France 1  # # # 
Germany 1 # # # # 
Ireland 5   # # #
New Zealand 1 # # # # 
Norway 2    # 
Philippines 11 #  #  #
Sweden 3 # #  # 
United
12  #  # 
Kingdom
Key: Yes = #, No = , Unclear = , IN = Independent, ES = Expertise Specified, AD = Adaptation Focused,
MI = Mitigation Focused, EP = Easily Politicized.

5.2. Caveats on CCCs and Their Multidisciplinary Composition

As the preceding analysis establishes, a CCC composed of experts drawn from different disciplinary
backgrounds may be suitable for formulating informed, expert-based, and efficacious climate change
mitigation and adaptation policies. However, we highlight some caveats regarding this assertion.
The first caveat relates to the nexus between a country’s climate performance and the justification
for establishing a multidisciplinary CCC. This is premised on the notion that countries with or without
a CCC may still perform highly in their climate performance rankings. To underscore this point, the
2020 Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI)—an initiative by a consortium of the Climate Action
Network (CAN), GERMANWATCH and New Climate Institute—ranks countries’ aggregated CCPI
based on four sets of weightings: GHG emissions, renewable energy, energy use and climate policy [59].
The 2020 results of the CCPI analyzed the climate performance of 57 countries and weighted their
scores. Comparing that with the 11 countries we evaluated in this paper (Table 2), only the UK,
Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway were among the countries that had the top-tier weighting
ranks [59]. Of the five, Sweden had the highest aggregate weighting (75.77%). Like Sweden, the UK
(69.8%) and Norway (61.14%) had good performance indexes, despite the need for ensuring ideal
multidisciplinarity in their CCCs. Likewise, Finland (63.25%) and Denmark (71.14%) also had top
aggregate weightings, yet their CCCs need a clear delineation of multidisciplinary fields of expertise.
In contrast, New Zealand, which has a comparatively well-composed multidisciplinary CCC,
ranked 37th in its CCPI (45.67%). However, it is important to concede that the New Zealand CCC was
only recently established. Likewise, France is ranked in the yellow zone (57.9%) in terms of its CCPI,
even though it has a High Council on Climate Change with a good measure of multidisciplinarity.
Australia is ranked in the red zone at 56%, while the Philippines is not ranked altogether. The foregoing
buttresses the point that multidisciplinary CCCs may not automatically translate to improved CCPI
among countries.
The second caveat relates to country-level peculiarities necessary for actualizing an independent
and multidisciplinary CCC. The political dynamics of countries differ remarkably. Thus, countries with
governments influenced by authoritarian political ideologies or censorship to liberal ideas and scientific
freedom are more likely to dis-incentivize the establishment of a multidisciplinary independent CCC
or take its recommendations seriously. A related point is the desirability of political leadership in
allowing a multidisciplinary and independent CCC. Most political leaders agree that climate change is a
major concern but share different views regarding its threats and visions for solutions. Thus, if political
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 18 of 23

leadership does not consider a multidisciplinary and independent CCC as salient in advancing its
goals in the competitive global economy, it may be unsupportive for its establishment.
The third relates to the issue of science versus policymaking. Apart from the possibility that a
multidisciplinary-composed CCC could translate to the classical case of “many hands spoiling the
soup”, scientific reporting is often laden with technical jargons, clutters, and permutations that may be
inconsequential for policymaking or political leadership. Thus, while the idea of multidisciplinary
composition makes sense, the CCC’s scientific findings and reporting from its processes must be
translatable to actionable policies.

5.3. Reflecting on Quasi-Institutions

Within the scope of our study, and as earlier highlighted, we describe all governmental departments,
agencies or parastatals with skeletal climate action roles as “quasi-institutions.” They are not also
explicitly established as dedicated CCCs. Sometimes, they can also include interministerial committees
for climate change, and other similar political arrangements. Accordingly, quasi-institutions exist
in many countries, if not almost all the countries in the world. However, these institutions may not
provide bias-free advice and knowledge such as nonpolitical, independent and nonpartisan CCCs
can do [25]. Independent institutions such as CCCs can create positive coordination by focusing on
common and strategic policies rather than a narrow political agenda [60]. Having positive coordination
for climate change policies at the national level leads to greater coordination at the regional and global
levels. The European Commission for climate change adaptation discovered this fundamental gap
among member states [61]. Thus, the Commission suggested more actions to solve this problem.
Our study suggests that an independent and multidisciplinary CCC is a significant solution in this
regard. Thus, 98.5% of experts in our survey supported the idea of CCC as part of a country’s policy
framework. Among these respondents, 92% confirmed that the CCCs should be independent and no
one was against the independence of the CCCs.
Having independent CCCs is significant to overcome the vulnerability of many quasi-institutions.
As most of these institutions are state-centric and predominantly focus on the global agenda, they
dismiss critical local aspects of climate policy, such as the prevalent socioeconomic situations in
the country [62]. Our study also reflects this crucial point, as 97.6% of the respondents supported
the inclusion of social science experts as part of CCCs. As earlier highlighted, the countries with
independent CCCs and multidisciplinary experts are ranked among the top countries for the 2020
CCPI [59]. Three out of the four top countries have independent CCCs [59].
Simultaneously, as our results show, there is a considerable shift from quasi-institutions towards
the establishment of independent CCCs. The factors for this shift vary among countries worldwide.
Lack of or weak independence of the previous quasi-institution members was the primary factor for
non-governmental organizations to insist on establishing an independent CCC in Ireland [63,64].
Moreover, our findings suggest that CCCs should comprise experts from various disciplines.
Quasi-institutions may dismiss this useful character. For example, one of the weaknesses of the
interministerial committees for climate change in some Southern African countries is missing
cross-sectoral stakeholders with ignoring the social and cultural knowledge of indigenes [65]. However,
“information, knowledge, tools, and skills” are considered as crucial elements for undertaking policy
actions in climate change [66]. Hence, our findings are consistent with the literature.

5.4. Practical Implications

The transnational trends and perspectives of climate policy experts reported in the study show
the propriety of establishing multidisciplinary CCCs to drive robust mitigation and adaptation
policies. One key implication is the desirability of incorporating a broad spectrum of multidisciplinary
categories—including law/legal, industry, energy, the physical sciences, engineering, biosciences,
economics, planning, social sciences, ethics, governance, health, and communication. Countries without
an existing CCC also have an ample opportunity to explore multidisciplinarity when establishing
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 19 of 23

suitable institutions for climate governance. Relatedly, countries lacking sufficient personnel with
requisite domains of expertise will need to support the development of local manpower to drive their
climate policies and strategies [67].
In addition, we earlier noted the fragmentation of climate governance, as well as the existence of
multilevel governance arrangements. Within this milieu, we identified the existence of global citizen
deliberation. However, within the state level, it is important to underline the emergence of transnational
climate change governance (TCCG), which occurs when networks operating in the transnational
political sphere authoritatively steer constituents toward public goals [68,69]. An important point
that has become evident in the literature is the need for legitimacy, authority and the ability of TCCG
networks to steer constituents towards contributing to useful climate action [70,71]. Therefore, we
believe that our study also has practical implications for the development of TCCG groups and other
nonstate actors. Some key deductions in this regard include the need to ensure multidisciplinary pooling
of relevant experts, capacity building and the dissemination of evidence-based information among
actors and constituents. These features align with the necessity of building relevant competencies that
support climate policies of countries [67]. Consequently, they could provide a formidable evidence
base for strategic engagement with state actors and the wider community towards contributing to
effective climate governance measures. Finally, they could also potentially contribute to well-informed
rule-setting and the implementation of robust climate policies.
Nonetheless, we emphasize that the establishment of CCCs and their multidisciplinarity may
not necessarily determine the climate performance index of countries, as our study has, in passing,
highlighted diverse climate performance rankings of countries with these institutional arrangements.
It is also important to consider the political and democratic peculiarities of countries while contemplating
the establishment of independent multidisciplinary CCCs. This may not be feasible, for example,
in jurisdictions with poor democratic norms. However, in jurisdictions with suitable democratic
circumstances, it is desirable to entrench independent multidisciplinary CCCs. This feature potentially
overcomes the institutional and operational limitations faced by quasi-institutions in countries’ climate
governance arrangements.

6. Conclusions
This paper set out to inquire into the multidisciplinary requirements of a CCC and how
multidisciplinarity can influence the efficacy of climate governance measures. Accordingly, we studied
transnational trends and sampled the perspectives of climate policy experts on the disciplinary and
multidisciplinary requirements for the composition of CCCs. One evident conclusion from transnational
circumstances and the views of experts is the salience of multidisciplinarity in the composition of CCCs
for efficacious climate change policies and strategies. Multidisciplinary CCCs essentially translate to
countries “bringing their best foot forward” in dealing with and responding to climate change threats.
The study also highlighted the need for countries with quasi-institutions to engage experts
and possibly establish multidisciplinary CCCs to circumvent the numerous challenges prevalent in
contemporary political and administrative systems, as well as obviating the problem of institutional
inertia in the climate governance process. Though a multidisciplinary CCC may not engender automatic
changes in a country’s climate performance, its potential to drive optimal mitigation and adaptation
goals in the long term underscores its relevance in countries’ climate governance configurations.
Furthermore, we acknowledge certain limitations in our study and suggest insights for future
analysis. Firstly, this study predicated its analysis on a small subset of survey responses and the use
of a purposive nonprobabilistic sample; hence, results cannot be generalized to a larger population.
Repeating the analysis performed in this study in the future, using a broader dataset could provide
insights that are more relevant for the multidisciplinary composition of CCCs. Secondly, and perhaps
more importantly, the predominant focus of the study has been on the multidisciplinary composition
of CCCs, and not necessarily their effectiveness. However, as countries intensify their mitigation and
adaptation efforts, it is equally important to assess the effectiveness of climate governance interventions.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10280 20 of 23

Consequently, future studies could investigate the effectiveness of CCCs across multiple countries,
as well as undertake a useful comparison with quasi-institutions. It is also worthwhile to examine how
the influence of groups that fear adverse consequences of mitigation policies is combined with scientific
uncertainty as well as the challenges posed by conflicts of power and interest in climate governance.

Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/24/10280/s1,

Table S1: What other specialized field/fields would you suggest for a country’s climate change commission?
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, M.C.A.-D. and M.O.D.; Project administration, M.C.A.-D.; Supervision,
M.C.A.-D.; Investigation, M.C.A.-D., M.O.D., N.B., H.M.B., F.N.O., Q.M.H., S.B.E. and N.V.E.; Formal analysis,
M.C.A.-D., M.O.D., N.B., H.M.B., F.N.O., Q.M.H., S.B.E. and N.V.E.; Methodology, M.C.A.-D., M.O.D., N.B. and
N.V.E.; Data curation, N.B. and H.M.B.; Writing-original draft, M.C.A.-D., M.O.D., N.B., H.M.B., F.N.O., Q.M.H.,
S.B.E. and N.V.E.; Writing-review & editing, M.C.A.-D., M.O.D., N.B., H.M.B., F.N.O., Q.M.H., S.B.E. and N.V.E.
All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: The authors sincerely thank the editorial team of Sustainability/MDPI for their multi-dimensional
support and the reviewers for their useful comments towards the improvement of the manuscript.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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