Crim WEEK 2 Cases

G.R. No.
125909 June 23, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN FLORA, accused-appellants.
QUISUMBING, J.
Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the decision dated November 7, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
1
26, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Criminal Case Nos. SC-4810, 4811 and 4812, finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of double murder and attempted murder, and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, payment of
P50,000.00 for indemnity, P14,000.00 for burial expenses and P619,800.00 for loss of earning capacity in Crim. Case
SC-4810 for the death of Emerita Roma; reclusion perpetua, payment of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P14,000.00 for
burial expenses and P470,232.00 for loss of earning capacity for the death of Ireneo Gallarte in Crim. Case SC-4811;
and imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 10 years of prision
mayor and payment of P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas for injuries sustained in Crim. Case SC-4812.
On February 26, 1993, Prosecution Attorney Joselito D.R. Obejas filed three separate informations charging
appellants as follows:
Criminal Case No. 4810
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay
Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused Edwin Flora @ Boboy,
and mutually helping one another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with intent to
kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one EMERITA ROMA y DELOS REYES, thereby
inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on her chest which caused her immediate death, to the damage
and prejudice of her surviving heirs.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation
are present. 2
Criminal Case No. 4811.
accused HERMOGENES FLORA @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused Erwin [Edwin] Flora
@ Boboy, and mutually helping one another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with
intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one IRENEO GALLARTE y VALERA, thereby
inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his chest which caused his immediate death, to the damage and
prejudice of his surviving heirs.
1âw phi 1.nêt
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation
are present. 3
accused Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused Erwin [Edwin] Flora @
Boboy, and mutually helping one another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with
intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one FLOR ESPINAS y ROMA, hitting the
latter on her shoulder, and inflicting upon her injuries which, ordinarily, would have caused her death, thus,
accused performed all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of a cause independent of their will, that
is, by the timely and able medical attendance given the said Flor Espinas y Roma, which prevented her
death, to her damage and prejudice. 4
During arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued. Resolving jointly Criminal Cases Nos.
SC-4810, SC-4811 and SC-4812, the trial court convicted both appellants for the murder of Emerita Roma and Ireneo
Gallarte, and the attempted murder of Flor Espinas. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds as follows:
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4810, for the death of Emerita Roma, the Court finds both accused
Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by
treachery and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
(b) P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and burial; and (c) P619,800 for lost (sic) of earning capacity, without
any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4811, for the death of Ireneo Gallarte, the Court finds both accused
Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery and with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b) P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and
burial; and (c) P470,232.00 for lost (sic) of earning capacity, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4812, for the injuries sustained by Flor Espinas, the Court finds both accused
Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder and
sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for her injuries and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
The facts of the case, borne out by the records, are as follows:
Days before the incident, appellant Hermogenes Flora alias "Bodoy," had a violent altercation with a certain Oscar
Villanueva. Oscar's uncle, Ireneo Gallarte, pacified the two.
On the evening of January 9, 1993, a dance party was held to celebrate the birthday of Jeng-jeng Malubago in Sitio
Silab, Barangay Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant Hermogenes Flora, allegedly a suitor of Jeng-jeng Malubago,
attended the party with his brother and co-appellant Edwin Flora, alias "Boboy". Also in attendance were Rosalie
Roma, then a high school student; her mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt, Flor Espinas. Ireneo Gallarte, a neighbor
of the Romas, was there too.
The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted. On signal by Edwin Flora, Hermogenes Flora
fired his .38 caliber revolver twice. The first shot grazed the right shoulder of Flor Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma,
below her shoulder. The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte who slumped onto the floor. Rosalie, was shocked and could
only utter, "si Bodoy, si Bodoy", referring to Hermogenes Flora. Edwin Flora approached her and, poking a knife at
her neck, threatened to kill her before he and his brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene.
The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health Unit in Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna, where Emerita and
Ireneo died.6
Early that same morning of January 10, 1993, the police arrested Edwin Flora at his rented house in Barangay
Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna. Hermogenes Flora, after learning of the arrest of his brother, proceeded first to the
house of his aunt, Erlinda Pangan, in Pangil, Laguna but later that day, he fled to his hometown in Pipian, San
Fernando, Camarines Sur.
The autopsy conducted by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Ricardo R. Yambot, Jr., revealed the following fatal wounds
sustained by the deceased:
EMERITA ROMA
a) Gunshot of entrance at the posterior chest wall near the angle of the axillary region measuring 1 cm. in
diameter with clean cut inverted edges involving deep muscles, and subcutaneous tissues and travel
through both lobes of the lungs, including the great blood vessels.
About 400 cc of clotted blood was extracted from the cadaver. The bullet caliver 38 was extracted from the
lungs.
The cause of her death was attributed to "Hypovolemic" shock secondary to massive blood loss secondary
to gunshot wound of the posterior chest wall.7
IRENEO GALLARTE
Gunshot wound of entrance at the left arm, measuring 1 cm. in diameter with clean cut inverted edges
involving the deep muscles, subcutaneous tissues traveling through the anterior chest wall hitting both lobes
of the lungs and each great blood vessels obtaining the bullet fragments.
About 500 cc. of clotted blood was obtained from the cadaver.
His cause of death was attributed to "Hypovelemic" shock secondary to massive blood loss secondary to
gunshot wound of the left arm. 8
Flor Espinas submitted herself to a medical examination by Dr. Dennis Coronado. Her medical certificate disclosed
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that she sustained a gunshot wound, point of entry, 2 x 1 cm. right supra scapular area mid scapular line (+)
contusion collar; and another gunshot wound with point of exit 1 x 1 cm. right deltoid area.
Three criminal charges were filed against the Flora brothers, Hermogenes and Edwin, before Branch 26 of the
Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. During the trial, the prosecution presented two eyewitnesses, namely, (1)
Rosalie Roma, daughter of one of the victims, Emerita Roma, and (2) Flor Espinas, the injured victim. Rosalie
narrated the treacherous and injurious attack by Hermogenes Flora against the victims. Flor detailed how she was
shot by him.
Felipe Roma, the husband of Emerita, testified that his wife was forty-nine (49) years old at the time of her death and
was a paper mache maker, earning an average of one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos a week. He claimed that his
family incurred fourteen thousand (P14,000.00) pesos as expenses for her wake and burial.
Ireneo Gallarte's widow, Matiniana, testified that her husband was fifty-two (52) years old, a carpenter and a
substitute farmer earning one hundred (P100.00) to two hundred (P200.00) pesos a day. Her family spent fourteen
thousand (P14,000.00) pesos for his wake and burial.
The defense presented appellants Hermogenes and Edwin Flora, and Imelda Madera, the common-law wife of
Edwin. Appellants interposed alibi as their defense, summarized as follows:
Version of Edwin Flora:
Edwin Flora, 28 years old, testified that accused Hermogenes Flora is his brother. On January 10, 1993,
around 1:30 in the morning, he was at Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna in the house of Johnny
Balticanto, sleeping with his wife. Policemen came at said house looking for his brother Hermogenes.
Replying to them that his brother was not living there, policemen took him instead to the Municipal building
of Paete and thereafter transferred and detained him to (sic) the Municipal building of Kalayaan.
He recalled that on January 9, 1993, after coming from the cockpit at about 3:00 p.m. he and his accused
brother passed by the house of Julito Malubago. His brother Hermogenes was courting the daughter of
Julito Malubago. At about 6:00 p.m. he went home but his brother stayed behind since there would be a
dance party that night. 10
Version of Hermogenes Flora:
Hermogenes Flora, 21 years old, testified that he did not kill Ireneo Gallarte and Emerita Roma and shot Flor
Espina on January 10, 1993 at about 1:30 in the morning of Silab, Longos Kalayaan Laguna.
On said date, he was very much aslept (sic) in the house of his sister Shirley at Sitio Bagumbayan, Longos,
Kalayaan. From the time he slept at about 8:00 in the evening to the time he woke up at 6:00 in the morning,
he had not gone out of her sister's house. He knew the victims even before the incident and he had no
severe relation with them.
xxx xxx xxx
He also testified that in the morning of January 10, 1993, Imelda Madera came to their house and told him
that his brother Edwin was picked-up by the policemen the night before. Taken aback, his sister told him to
stay in the house while she would go to the municipal hall to see their brother Edwin. Thereafter, his aunt
and sister agreed that he should go to Bicol to inform their parents of what happened to Edwin. 11
Madera corroborated the testimony of her husband. 12
As earlier stated, the trial court convicted accused-appellants of the crime of double murder and attempted murder.
Appellants now raise this sole assigned error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE TWO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO MORALLY ASCERTAIN THEIR IDENTITIES AND GUILT FOR THE
CRIMES CHARGED.
At the outset, it may be noted that the trial court found both appellants have been positively identified. However, they
challenge the court's finding that they failed to prove their alibi because they did not establish that it was physically
impossible for them to be present at the crime scene. According to the trial court, by Hermogenes' own admission,
the house of his sister Shirley, where appellants were allegedly sleeping, was only one (1) kilometer away from Sitio
Silab, where the offenses allegedly took place. The sole issue here, in our view, concerns only the plausibility of the
appellants' alibi and the credibility of the witnesses who identified them as the perpetrators of the crimes charged.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish two elements: (1) he was not at
the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
at the time of its commission. The defense of alibi and the usual corroboration thereof are disfavored in law since
13
both could be very easily contrived. In the present case, appellants' alibi is patently self-serving. Although Edwin's
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testimony was corroborated by his common-law wife, it is ineffectual against the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses
and surviving victims who contradicted his alibi. Moreover, an alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is
invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his immediate relative or relatives. Appellants'
15
defense of alibi should have been corroborated by a disinterested but credible witness. Said uncorroborated alibi
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crumbles in the face of positive identification made by eyewitnesses. 17
In their bid for acquittal, appellants contend that they were not categorically and clearly identified by the witnesses of
the prosecution. They claim that the testimonies of the said witnesses were not entitled to credence. They assail the
credibility of two eyewitnesses, namely Rosalie Roma and Flor Espinas, because of the alleged inconsistencies in
their testimonies. For instance, according to appellants, Rosalie Roma testified she was in the dance hall when the
gunshots were heard, and that she was dancing in the middle of the dance hall when Hermogenes shot Emerita
Roma, Ireneo Gallarte and Flor Espinas,
Q Where were you when Hermogenes Roma shot these Ireneo Gallarte, Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas?
A I was dancing, sir. (Emphasis ours.)

Q And how far were you from Hermogenes Flora when he shot these persons while you were dancing?
A Two armslength from me only, sir. 18
However, to a similar question, later in her testimony, she replied,
Q And where were these Emerita Roma, Your mother, Ireneo Gallarte and Flor Espinas when Hermogenes
Flora shot at them?
A They were beside each other.
Q And how far were you from these 3 persons?
A Because they were standing beside the fence and I was only seated near them, sir. (Emphasis ours.)
19
On this issue, we do not find any inconsistency that impairs her credibility or renders her entire testimony worthless.
Nothing here erodes the effectiveness of the prosecution evidence. What counts is the witnesses' admitted proximity
to the appellants. Was she close enough to see clearly what the assailant was doing? If so, is there room for doubt
concerning the accuracy of her identification of appellant as one of the malefactors?
Appellants argue that since the attention of witness Flor Espinas was focused on the dance floor, it was improbable
for her to have seen the assailant commit the crimes. On cross-examination, said witness testified that while it was
true she was watching the people on the dance floor, nonetheless, she also looked around (gumagala) and
occasionally looked behind her and she saw both appellants who were known to her. Contrary to appellants'
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contention that Flor did not have a sufficient view to identify the assailants, the trial court concluded that Flor was in a
position to say who were in the party and to observe what was going on. On this point, we concur with the trial court.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve respect, for it had the
opportunity to observe first-hand the deportment of witnesses during trial. Furthermore, minor inconsistencies do not
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affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their
credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
22
matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such 23
minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities. 1avvphi1
Appellants assert that Flor Espinas and Rosalie Roma were biased because they are relatives of the victim Emerita
Roma. However, unless there is a showing of improper motive on the part of the witnesses for testifying against the
accused, the fact that they are related to the victim does not render their clear and positive testimony less worthy of
credit. On the contrary, their natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating
other persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. 24
Here, appellants did not present any proof of improper motive on the part of the eyewitnesses in pointing to the Flora
brothers as the perpetrators of the crime. There is no history of animosity between them. Emerita Roma and Flor
Espinas were merely innocent bystanders when hit by gunfire. Where eyewitnesses had no grudge against the
accused, their testimony is credible. In the absence of ulterior motive, mere relationship of witnesses to the victim
25
does not discredit their testimony. 26
Coming now to the criminal responsibility of appellants. In the present case, when Hermogenes Flora first fired his
gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead, he became liable for Emerita's death and
Flor's injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on the basis of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended. 27
We find that the death of Emerita and of Ireneo were attended by treachery. In order for treachery to exist, two
conditions must concur namely: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution which would ensure
the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) such means,
method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen by the offender. When Hermogenes Flora
28
suddenly shot Emerita and Ireneo, both were helpless to defend themselves. Their deaths were murders, not simply
homicides since the acts were qualified by treachery. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that appellant Hermogenes
Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder for the deaths of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and
guilty of attempted murder of Flor Espinas.1âwphi 1.nêt
Is the other appellant, Edwin Flora, equally guilty as his brother, Hermogenes? For the murder of Ireneo Gallarte, was
there conspiracy between appellants? For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused and co-accused had the same purpose and were united in execution. Even if an accused did not fire a
29
single shot but his conduct indicated cooperation with his co-accused, as when his armed presence unquestionably
gave encouragement and a sense of security to the latter, his liability is that of a co-conspirator. To hold an accused
30
guilty as a co-conspirator by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he had performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the conspiracy. Edwin's participation as the co-conspirator of Hermogenes was correctly
31
appreciated by the trial court, viz.:
Edwin Flora demonstrated not mere passive presence at the scene of the crime. He stayed beside his
brother Hermogenes, right behind the victims while the dance party drifted late into the night till the early
hours of the morning the following day. All the while, he and his brother gazed ominously at Ireneo Gallarte,
like hawks waiting for their prey. And then Edwin's flick of that lighted cigarette to the ground signaled
Hermogenes to commence shooting at the hapless victims. If ever Edwin appeared acquiescent during the
carnage, it was because no similar weapon was available for him. And he fled from the crime scene together
with his brother but not after violently neutralizing any obstacle on their way. While getting away, Edwin
grabbed Rosalie Roma and poked a knife at her neck when the latter hysterically shouted "si Bodoy, Si
Bodoy," in allusion to Hermogenes Flora, whom she saw as the gunwielder. All told, Edwin, by his conduct,
demonstrated unity of purpose and design with his brother Hermogenes in committing the crimes charged.
He is thus liable as co-conspirator. 32
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita Roma and the injury of Flor
Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts done outside the
contemplation of the conspirators only the actual perpetrators are liable. In People v. De la Cerna, 21 SCRA 569, 570
(1967), we held:
. . . And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the
conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the
necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here, only
Serapio killed (sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was
fleeing away when shot.
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the murder of Ireneo Gallarte. He has
no liability for the death of Emerita Roma nor for the injuries of Flor Espinas caused by his co-accused Hermogenes
Flora.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Appellants Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
MURDER of Ireneo Gallarte and sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Ireneo Gallarte in the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; P14,000.00
compensatory damages for the wake and burial; and P470,232.00 representing loss of income without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(2) Hermogenes Flora is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the MURDER of Emerita Roma and the
ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor Espinas. For the MURDER of EMERITA ROMA, Hermogenes Flora is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Emerita Roma in the sum of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and burial, and P619,800.00 for loss of
earning capacity, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. For the ATTEMPTED
MURDER of Flor Espinas, Hermogenes Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for her injuries.
(3) Appellant Edwin Flora is ACQUITTED of the murder of Emerita Roma and the attempted murder of Flor
Espinas.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177218 October 3, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NOEL T. SALES, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and
inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of
Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales
(appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively. The Information 3 for parricide contained
the following allegations:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening at Brgy. San
Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit
[several] times, the different parts of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a
[piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby]
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On the other hand, the Information5 in Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical
injuries in the following manner:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening, at Brgy. San
Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
[accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate
son, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days
to the damage and prejudice of the victim’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6
When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges of parricide 7 and
slight physical injuries8 respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution which
was not objected to by the defense.9 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is
the father of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident,
appellant’s family was living in the conjugal home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and,
that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.10
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to
attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return
home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the
nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but
their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the evening of September
20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so
that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree,
appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and
did not do anything as she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter
was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She
also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar
collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her
efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told
appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a
hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take
them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that
Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His body was never
examined by a doctor.
The Version of the Defense
Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate occasions without the
permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the misdeed since
something untoward might happen to them. During those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by
their father.
However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents’ permission on September 16, 2002 and
failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are
broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally
arrived home at 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood
as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his
sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When Noemar lost
consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad
which was seven kilometers away from their house.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of
Noemar’s eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw him
pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died.
Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar
died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant
recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having
a weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures,
Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur
whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain. 11 Thereafter, appellant surrendered
voluntarily.12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In a Joint Decision,13 the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that
appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the
Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated
in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The
dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable
doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries
in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its
medium period.
Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal Code.
Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions
provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal15 which was given due course in an Order16 dated September 21, 2005.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its
Decision17 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal
Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to
the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issues
Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE
WITNESSES.19
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to
death. He believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in
attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they
traveled to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in
breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his
whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered
seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of tender years must
always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and
caution in administering the proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to
discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger
in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family dwelling without
permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was further aggravated by a report
that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still
had to borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that
appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of
venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was
only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness that appellant
stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his
sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless
too late to save the child’s life. It bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor
child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill
him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
xxxx
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is
indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct
consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.20 Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son
Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered
by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-
serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health
Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary
arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing
that Noemar’s cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his
contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified that
Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from
epilepsy. Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.
All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant committed the crime
of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of accused."21
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria
testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his
father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for
Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemar’s Death Certificate 22 was also presented in evidence.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is
sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002,
Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping
continued even outside the house but this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant
delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by
their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemar’s frail body to endure, he lost
consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemar’s birth certificate was
not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered. 23 As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the
fact that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while
under oath.24 Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These
testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the
evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay captain reported the death of Noemar.
The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of
his intent "to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture" 25 which is
the essence of voluntary surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut
tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered
injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. "The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the
accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim." 26
The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide
We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 should be increased to
₱30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 27 "In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also
impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid."28
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is
because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the presence of only
one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as
follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:
xxxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxxx
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating
circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper. 29
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein
appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to
have been examined by a physician thereafter.30 Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.31
Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community
Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the
same. His findings were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of Junior’s face just below the eye
and on both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and,
(2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained by the patient
due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr.
Primavera answered one to two weeks.32 But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in a week. 33
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father
and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves credence especially since the same is
corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus find that the
RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.
1awphil
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries sustained by Junior
should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under
paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for
labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same period.
xxxx
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in
its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto
menor in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that
affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case
Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition, an
interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house
in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter,
Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan
to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be
killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived
at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location
of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that
Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the
accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they
shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that
Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made
the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to
constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the
Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art.
4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is
possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should
have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally,
that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present,
the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the
offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which
prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal
tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of
the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an
act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal
the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was
not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and
fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused
failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and where the bullet
pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where
the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be
operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the
place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of the extraneous
circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the
murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no
application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference or
because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no
application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the
case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously
doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen
depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not. The community suffers from the mere
alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in
other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt
takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that
moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted
murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the
Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in
the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an
attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus
factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had
the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible
of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the
accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done
without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent
and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower
court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of
impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is
consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such
provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law.
Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt
irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not
fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot
escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It
appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the
offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible
crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility
as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent
is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment.
And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening
cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which
would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an
element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles
4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by
Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided
by the law, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's
conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then
all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as
such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon
them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated
July 14, 1997 in the sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam
Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals the events that
transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro
(BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check was payment for
Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow,
the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter
is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in the middle of
July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could issue checks payable
to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been
instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for
Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account
had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to
inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained
that she had to call and relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they
could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino
to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four:
for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's
accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner
a BDO check for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino
further testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check
bounced.5 Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam.
However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement
for the dishonored check.6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank account,
but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house around the
first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without
even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank that the
check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted
with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that
she was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then holding the
bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's
place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again
on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle.
Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go
with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia
who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and
entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash
she actually brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco.
Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the
palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked
money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as
Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that she
had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from the company.
She further testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where she was staying at
that time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a
pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her
husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca
asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when
Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was
never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997,
Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of
Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did
not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they
arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes,
Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then,
the NBI agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog
De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED
THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND
ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion of
which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale
Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution of
the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the crime of qualified
theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal
property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check
payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another − the check
belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain
– this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the
bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact that
she had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it
was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things – the check
was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it
was done with grave abuse of confidence – petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from
customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the personal property
subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing
stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused
is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently
without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft
was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to
kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no
harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he
was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to
Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent
portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual
means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims
sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the
execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was
by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially
inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to
500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or
property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the
means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the
intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because:
(1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is
empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case,
petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed
her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received
the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The
thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. 1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the ₱5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash
replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the
definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there is only one operative act of execution by the actor
involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another." Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the
language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the
latter’s consent."
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is
produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that
perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of
execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner
alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in
its consummated stage. x x x 13
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the
check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not
been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the ₱5,000.00 cash as
supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of
qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched
only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense,
petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the
fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of
her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a
different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the
allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the
due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of
criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December
16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of
an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43530 August 3, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
finding him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years and four months of prision
correccional and to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor for being an habitual delinquent,
with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R.
Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of
a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping
inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another
from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial judge and
the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted robbery, which we think is erroneous.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of
the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense,
inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means
of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an offense
which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it
is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere
beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of
the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined
and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance
of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that
the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to
commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain,
of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such
purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the
accused on the day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may
only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the
will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury
to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
1avv phil.ñet
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be
inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such
that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons
performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they
are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation , that is, in favor as well
as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and can not furnish
grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts
submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the
intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable
instances of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to
cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an
attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to
say, that the acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they would be
meaningless.
Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading to the commission of the
offense, are not punished except when they are aimed directly to its execution, and therefore they must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense."
Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21, 1892 — that in order to declare
that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary that their objective be known
and established, or that said acts be of such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the
criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for the designation of
the offense: . . . .
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under consideration does not constitute
attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. Tayag and Morales, 59 Phil., 606, and decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed
when a private person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will. The accused may be convicted and
sentenced for an attempt to commit this offense in accordance with the evidence and the following allegation
contained in the information: "... the accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a board
and unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store ... and that the accused did not succeed in entering the
store due to the presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon hearing the noise produced by the
breaking of the wall, promptly approached the accused ... ." Under the circumstances of this case the prohibition of
the owner or inmate is presumed. (U.S. vs. Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs. Ticson, 25
Phil., 67; U.S. vs. Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U.S. vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215; U.S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the
accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, —
inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him —
and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the wall should not be taken into
consideration as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case constitutes the
offense of attempted trespass to dwelling.
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to dwelling, if committed
with force, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par.
2); therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one
mitigating circumstance the penalty must be imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code,
the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of attempted trespass to
dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced
to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the reversal of the January 13,
1999 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999
resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal
Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape. 3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner with attempted rape reads
as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a
piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but
was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty." 5 Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were private complainant Martina
Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and
Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the decision of the CA, established the following
facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", …) along A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the
University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her
bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on
her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She
wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July
5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free.
With this …the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then
squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom,
MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not,
however, know. The only thing she had made out during their struggle was the feel of her attacker’s clothes and
weight. His upper garment was of cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17).
He … was wearing a t-shirt and shorts … Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel
Montes were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed … topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue … (TSN, July 5, 1993,
pp. 13-14). Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her
bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her room going through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers
to Question number 5; Id), the one without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993,
p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate …, was friendly until a week prior to
the attack. CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she
rejected him. …. (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the early morning
of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with “‘…a marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter
(sic) ΣΦ’ and below the quoted letters the word ‘1946’ ‘UST Medicine and Surgery’” (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and
black shorts with the brand name “Adidas” (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to Room
306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only
Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially
refused [but later, relented] …. S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the security guard’s logbook …:
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter from our tenant of Unit #-
306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be our tenant this coming summer break as he said
so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa
(Joseph), ….
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITO’s
knocking on the door woke him up, …. He was able to fix the time of CHITO’s arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he
glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he was awakened by the knock at the door ….
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in.
…. It was at around 3 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991 when he woke up again later to the sound of
knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista (Bernard), ….
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU’s room and thereat was shown by Bernard the open window through
which the intruder supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk to CHITO …. He
mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not being allowed to get out of the building.
Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None was in Room 310 so
Joseph went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to see if the others were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 o’clock that same morning …. They likewise invited CHITO and Joseph to go
with them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned ….
An occupant of Room 310 … Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that in the afternoon of December 13,
1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the
Building and were asked by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit. While they were
outside Room 310 talking with the authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to
search the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from
inside their unit which they did not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he saw the
gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing
it to school inside the classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic)
Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and
socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the handkerchief (Exhibit
"D-3) to be CHITO’s because CHITO had lent the very same one to him …. The t-shirt with CHITO’s fraternity
symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13, 1991, was what consisted mainly of
Renato R. Alagadan’s testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4 feet and appeared to be full but was
closed with a zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato
went back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 o’clock that afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at the
same place inside the bedroom where Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 o’clock in
Camp Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, having
acted in response to the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M. Managuelod dated December 13, 1991,
(Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.) conducted laboratory examination on the specimen collated and submitted….
Her Chemistry Report No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked ‘UNIMART’ with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh ‘C’ – One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked ‘JONAS’ with the following:
Exh. ‘D’ – One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. ‘E’ – One (1) white T-shirt marked ‘TMZI’.
Exh. ‘F’ – One (1) black short (sic) marked ‘ADIDAS’.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the above stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the following results:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ – POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ are insufficient for further analysis.
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ contain chloroform, a volatile poison." 6 (Words in bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied committing the crime
imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou. Unfolding a different version of the incident, the
defense sought to establish the following, as culled from the same decision of the appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of … (UST). With Robert Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was
likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity …. MALOU, …, was known to him being also a medical student at
the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building …, CHITO, wearing the prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants
and leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house located at … Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 o’clock
in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was included in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members
scheduled for a Christmas gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John
Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool …. Soon after, … the four (4) presidential
nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by one into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn … and was thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants when he was dunked. Perla
Duran, …, offered each … dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the Fraternity’s symbol
and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Alberto’s car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black
short pants with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and
Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December 13, 1991 and proceeded to the Building which they reached at about
1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks, and
toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day ….
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and …, S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch, approached. Because of this,
CHITO also looked at his own watch and saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO
entry …. xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 …. xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already about ten (10) minutes had lapsed
since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie window and for five (5)
minutes vainly tried to open the door until Rommel Montes, … approached him and even commented: "Okey ang
suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 … but was
likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, …, at last answered the door. Telling him,
"Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO and went inside the bedroom. CHITO ,
…changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still had on the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the
fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).
At 6 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up …. He was already in his school uniform when,
around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked the latter why this was so and, without
elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was not able to identify, went to
the room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the Building …. When two (2) CIS men came to
the unit asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself. Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU,
then asked him for the key to Room 306….
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told to dress up and the two (2) of them,
CHITO and Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame …, Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room and talked to him for 30
minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed them to undergo physical
examination at the Camp Crame Hospital ….. At the hospital, … CHITO and Joseph were physically examined by a
certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip ….
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short pants lent to him by Perla Duran
(Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7 o’clock in the morning of December
13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal
Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his presence but the
contents of the bag were already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort to ask CHITO
if the items thereat were his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his gray bag which he had left at
Room 306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed
placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray bag when he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 o’clock in the
early morning of December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at about 6 o’clock in the
morning to go to school and brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December 13, 1991,
he was not aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He only found out for the first
time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be among the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon,
when he was in Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioner’s fraternity brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan,
who both testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991 party held in Dr. Duran’s place at Greenhills, riding on
the same car going to and coming from the party and dropping the petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the
party. Both were one in saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants and
leather shoes at the time they parted after the party.7 Rommel Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of the said building,
also testified seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991 trying to open the door
of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and white barong tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants with stripes after the dunking
party held in her father’s house.8 Presented as defense expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry
instructor whose actual demonstration in open court showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30)
seconds without tearing nor staining the cloth on which it is applied.9
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision 10 convicting petitioner of attempted rape and accordingly
sentencing him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Renato D.
Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape as principal and as charged
in the information and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum,
with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for the accused to pay the offended party Martina Lourdes T.
Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorney’s fees of
P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court’s
judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings of the court a quo, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its equally assailed resolution of March
31, 1999.12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -
1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the attempted rape imputed to him,
absent sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial evidence since the
prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner are unreliable, inconclusive and
contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the award was improper and
unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence and that moral certainty
has not been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the ground that the offense charged against him has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable jurisprudence, the Court is
disposed to rule for petitioner’s acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no direct evidence pointing to him as
the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December
13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very
act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or
accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct
evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very act
of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime
as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and
right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence.13 In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where concealment is
highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who
committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial evidence may be sufficient
for conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if –
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when
taken together with the other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable
conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in question.
We quote with approval the CA’s finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the identity of the petitioner as such
intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the room of MALOU as Room 307
where he slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed.
Not only the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was
wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning
of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel of her intruder’s
apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITO’s bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO
leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind
of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different
witness, this time, Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory
examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the incident revealed that the
handkerchief and MALOU’s night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree burn
exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malou’s face the piece of cloth soaked in chemical
while holding her body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced the performance of an act indicative of an
intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that petitioner’s actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated
under the law, for there can not be any other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou
after he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said, adds that if
petitioner’s intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim. 15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse
with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. 16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs.
Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a
particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical
and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not
certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to
commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. 18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The
next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-
soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape. 1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following
its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of
pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will
logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that
there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted
the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess. The CA maintained that if
the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate
court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious.
Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His sexual organ is not yet
exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated woman already
mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He
has to make her lose her guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness. 20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in
criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of
an accused beyond reasonable doubt.21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of attempted rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an
attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the
victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is
not completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner’s act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand
inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute
attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s
sexual organ. xxx.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:

xxx, appellant was merely holding complainant’s feet when his Tito Onio arrived at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it
would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that mere holding of the feet is attempted
rape.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing
whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of
Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her
face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily,
while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they
constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation,24 it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts
for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details to
enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege
malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without
the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct
which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent
person.25 The paramount question is whether the offender’s act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or
disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.26 That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while
relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted
rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto
menor or a fine ranging from ₱5.00 to ₱200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the
charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to
30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of ₱200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202867 July 15, 2013

vs.
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision 1 dated 18 October 2011 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA-
Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The CA-Cebu affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10
March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2001-155)
convicting Regie Labiaga alias "Banok" (appellant) of murder and Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convicting appellant
of frustrated murder.
The Facts
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag
(Demapanag), was charged with Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm under an Information 3 which reads:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot JUDY CONDE
alias ‘JOJO’ with said unlicensed firearm, hitting her and inflicting gunshot wounds on the different parts of her breast
which caused her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal Case No.
2002-1777, under an Information4 which states:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Gregorio
Conde with said unlicensed firearm, hitting him on the posterior aspect, middle third right forearm 1 cm. In diameter;
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused; that is by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio Conde which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and Demapanag pled not guilty in both cases and joint
trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution presented four witnesses: Gregorio Conde, the victim in Criminal Case No.
2002-1777; Glenelyn Conde, his daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obañana and Dr. Edwin Jose Figura, the physicians at
the Sara District Hospital where the victims were admitted. The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant,
Demapanag, and the latter’s brother, Frederick.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and
his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter,
Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their house.
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called
Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other
accused were standing behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is already dead," and the three fled the crime
scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival while Gregorio
made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.
Dr. Jeremiah Obañana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that her death was caused by
"cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot wound." 5
Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the incident. He found that Gregorio sustained a
gunshot wound measuring one centimeter in diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma
formation" in his right shoulder.6
Version of the defense
Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23 December 2000. He claimed, however,
that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot
appellant, but the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle, the
shotgun fired. He claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill, which is approximately 14 kilometers
away from the crime scene. This was corroborated by Frederick, Demapanag’s brother.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence. Appellant, however, was
convicted of murder and frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said
accused to reclusion perpetua together with accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said accused to a prison term ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum,
together with the necessary penalty provided by law and without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs.
Accused’s entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his
sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes charged in both cases. The
Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy
Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
Appellant impugned the RTC’s Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely erred in convicting the appellant of the
crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 8 The CA-Cebu,
however, upheld the conviction for murder and frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by imposing the payment of moral and exemplary damages in both
criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a distinction between the civil indemnity awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case
No. 2001-1555 and the moral damages. The CA-Cebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555. It did not award
moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial court should have awarded both, considering that they are two different kinds
of damages. For death indemnity, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to the current judicial policy on the
matter, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of the surviving family
should be assuaged by the award of appropriate and reasonable moral damages." 9
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated March 10, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion
of the said Joint Decision should now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said
accused to reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde ₱25,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the costs Accused(’s) entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the
accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crime(s) charged in both cases. The
Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy
Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
The Ruling of the Court
Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that appellant is guilty of attempted murder
and not frustrated murder. We uphold appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify
the civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the award of moral and exemplary damages
in both cases.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Appellant’s feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases was correctly rejected by the RTC and the CA-Cebu.
This Court, in People v. Damitan,11 explained that:
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. However, appellant’s version of the incident was
uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the positive identification of the two (2)
principal witnesses of the prosecution.12
Appellant’s failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his testimony and his unconvincing demonstration
of the struggle between him and Gregorio before the RTC lead us to reject his claim of self-defense. Also, as
correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu, appellant’s theory of self-defense is belied by the fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorio’s alleged unlawful aggression and that it was
Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant claimed. And, when appellant was arrested the following morning, he did
not also inform the police that what happened to Gregorio was merely accidental. 13
Appellant’s claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit when the shotgun accidentally fired is also
implausible.
In contrast, we find that the Condes’ account of the incident is persuasive. Both the CA-Cebu and the RTC found that
the testimonies of the Condes were credible and presented in a clear and convincing manner. This Court has
consistently put much weight on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed
by the appellate court.14 In People v. Mangune,15 we stated that:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by
the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and
in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and
inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’ credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity to
take advantage of these aids.16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the credibility of the witnesses were not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight or misapprehension of relevant facts, the same must be sustained by this Court.
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A treacherous attack is one in which the victim was
not afforded any opportunity to defend himself or resist the attack.17 The existence of treachery is not solely
determined by the type of weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the execution
of the crime, and to render the victim defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated against the accused. 18
In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they were shot by appellant. The use of a 12-gauge shotgun
against two unarmed victims is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the victims the chance to fend off the offender.
We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and not frustrated murder in Criminal
Case No. 2002-1777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated felonies as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it
is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of
the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the
crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance. 20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely
medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the
victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not
frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This was admitted by
Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident:
Prosecutor Con-El:
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you tell the court what was the situation of the patient
when you examined him?
A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually ambulatory and not in distress.
xxxx
Court (to the witness)
Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?
A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds hematoma formation at the anterior aspect right
shoulder.22
Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder and
not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted murder
shall be two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under Article 248, that is, prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law provides:
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.1âwphi 1
Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional in its medium period to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period.
Award of damages
In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the amount of damages imposed by the lower court in
both cases. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, this Court hereby awards ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity 23 and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.24 The award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages in the foregoing case is
sustained. Appellant is also liable to pay ₱40,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
relation to Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cebu in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No.
01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, we find that appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of
Attempted Murder and shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and pay
₱40,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant
shall pay ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 224289, August 14, 2019
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DANG ANGELES Y GUARIN,

JAMES SANTOS @ "CHITA," DENNIS RAMOS, AND SONNY BAYNOSA @ "JONG," ACCUSED,
DANG ANGELES Y GUARIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
This appeal seeks to reverse the Decision dated March 13, 20151 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05193 which affirmed with modification the trial court's verdict of conviction against
appellant Dang Angeles y Guarin for murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder.2
The Information
Appellant Dang Angeles y Guarin, James Santos alias "Chita," Dennis Ramos, and Sonny Baynosa alias
"Jong,"3 were charged with murder and two (2) counts of frustrated murder in the following Amended
Information, viz:
Criminal Case No. L-8886
The undersigned hereby accuses DANG ANGELES y GUARIN, JAMES SANTOS @, "Chita",
DENNIS RAMOS and JOHN DOE @, "JHONG" of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:
"That on or about 11:45 o'clock in the evening of April 27, 2010 in Brgy. Gayaman, Binmaley,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping one another, with treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation, with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab ABELARDO Q. EVANGELISTA, with the use of a (sic) bladed weapons inflicting
upon him injuries as shown in the autopsy report which caused his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs. "
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.4
xxx xxx xxx
DENNIS RAMOS, and SONNY BAYNOSA @ "Jong" of the crime of FRUSTRATED
MURDER committed as follows:
"That on or about 11:45 o'clock in the evening of April 27, 2010 at Brgy. Gayaman, Binmaley,
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
knives, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery
and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there, (willfully), unlawfully and
feloniously attack, stab and hit ERIC Q. EVANGELISTA, inflicting upon him "lacerated wound 1 cm
back scapula area", secondary to stabbing, the accused having thus performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Murder but which did not produce it by reason of
cause/s independent of the will of the accused, that is due to the timely medical assistance rendered
to ERIC Q. EVANGELISTA to his damage and prejudice."
CONTRARY to Article 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.5
xxx xxx xxx
DENNIS RAMOS, and SONNY BAYNOSA @, "Jong" of the crime of FRUSTRATED
MURDER committed as follows:
"That on or about 11:45 o'clock in the evening of April 27, 2010 in Brgy. Gayaman, Binmaley,
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
knives, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery
and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there, (willfully), unlawfully and
feloniously attack, stab and hit MARK RYAN Q. EVANGELISTA, inflicting upon him "Grade II Liver
injury R. lobe Hmoritorcum secondary to stab wound R lumbar posterior aspect, the accused having
thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder but which did
not produce it by reason of cause/s independent of the will of the accused, that is due to the timely
medical assistance rendered to MARK RYAN Q. EVANGELISTA, to his damage and prejudice."
CONTRARY to Article 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.6
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
Criminal Case No. L-8886 was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 38, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, while Criminal Case Nos. L-8887 and L-8888, to Branch 37. All three (3) cases were
subsequently consolidated in Branch 38.7
Only Appellant got apprehended and detained. James Santos alias "Chita," Dennis Ramos, and Sonny
Baynosa alias "Jong" remained at large.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to all three (3) charges.8
Eric Q. Evangelista, Mark Ryan Q. Evangelista, Domingo Evangelista, SPO1 Ricardo De Vera, PO1
Tristan Fernandez, Rolando Quinto, Dra. Gladiola Manaois, and Dr. Cipriano Fernandez, testified for
the prosecution. On the other hand, appellant alone testified for the defense.
Version of the Prosecution
On April 27, 2010, around 11:30 in the evening, Eric and Mark Ryan Evangelista were inside their
residence in Barangay Gayaman, Binmaley, Pangasinan, celebrating the eve of their sister's
wedding.9 While the celebration was ongoing, they suddenly heard a loud noise coming from the
engine and muffler of a tricycle. Eric and their youngest brother Elmer stepped out of the house to
check what the loud noise was all about. Mark Ryan followed them shortly.10
Sonny "Jong" Baynosa occupied the driver's seat of the nearby parked tricycle where the noise was
coming from. He was in the company of appellant, James "Chita" Santos, and Dennis Ramos. As
brothers Eric and Elmer approached, appellant alighted from the tricycle, walked straight to and
forcefully stabbed Elmer in the right abdomen. The knife snapped.11
When Eric rushed to help Elmer, Baynosa stabbed him (Eric) in the back, just below his right shoulder.
Mark Ryan who followed his brothers was not spared. Santos stabbed him, too, in his right waist. 12
Abelardo rushed to his brothers' aid. But Ramos also stabbed him in the left stomach. Santos himself
turned to Abelardo and stabbed the latter in the right abdomen. Not to be outdone, appellant grabbed
an icepick and joined in. He stabbed Abelardo in the left chest. Baynosa also pulled an icepick and
stabbed Abelardo in the right chest. In view of the multiple stab wounds he sustained, Abelardo fell to
the ground. But still not satisfied, Santos stabbed him again in the back. Thereafter, appellant walked
away while Baynosa, Ramos, and Santos fled on board the tricycle.13
A cousin of the Evangelista brothers, Rolando Quinto, saw the incident but he was too scared to
help.14
Only after the assailants had left did Rolando and others approach and rush Elmer, Eric, Mark Ryan,
and Abelardo to the hospital.15 Abelardo was pronounced dead on arrival.16 Elmer died in the
hospital.17
Dr. Cipriano C. Fernandez treated Eric and Mark Ryan. As for Eric, Dr. Fernandez found a stab wound
in his back though it was not fatal. Dr. Fernandez opined that even without adequate medical
attendance, the wound would heal in seven (7) to ten (10) days. Eric got discharged from the hospital
on the following day.18
As for Mark Ryan, he sustained a stab wound in the waist (back). He had to be admitted into the
Intensive Care Unit. After twelve (12) hours, however, his condition worsened. Wasting no time, Dr.
Fernandez immediately did an operation on Mark Ryan. When Dr. Fernandez opened up Mark Ryan,
the latter's abdomen was filled with blood flowing from his punctured liver. It was a fatal injury which
could have caused Mark Ryan's death were it not for the timely and adequate medical attendance
given him. It would take him up to three (3) months to recover from this injury.19
SPO1 Ricardo de Vera and PO1 Tristan B. Fernandez were among the police officers who responded to
the reported stabbing incident. When SPO1 de Vera arrived at the locus criminis, the victims had
already been brought to the hospital. The victims' father, Domingo Evangelista, identified appellant as
one of the assailants. SPO1 De Vera and the other police officers were able to apprehend appellant.
After apprising him of his constitutional rights, they took appellant to the Lingayen Community
Hospital for medical examination. The police officers though were not able to apprehend Santos,
Ramos, and Baynosa.20
The prosecution offered the following evidence:
"A" to "A-2" : Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by PO1 de Vera and PO1 Fernandez
"B" to "B-1" : Domingo Evangelista's Sworn Statement and Supplemental Affidavit
"C" to "C-1" : Rolando Quinto's Affidavit
"D" to "D-1" : Eric Evangelista's Sworn Statement
"E" to "E-1" : Mark Ryan Evangelista's Sworn Statement
"F" to "F-1" : Certification of Police Blotter (Entry Nos. 01936, 01941-42)
"G" to "G-1" : Certification of Police Blotter (Entry No. 01943)
"H" : Two knives
"I" to "1-2" Abelardo Evangelista's Death Certificate
"J" to "J-1" Post Mortem Examination

"K" to "K-3" Photos showing Abelardo's body and the wounds he sustained
"L" to "L-3" : Medical Certificate issued to Eric Evangelista
"M" to "M-7” : Receipts showing the expenses for treatment of Eric's injury
" N" to "N-5" : Medical Certificate issued to Mark Ryan Evangelista
“O” to "O-19” : Receipts showing the expenses for treatment of Mark Ryan
Version of the Defense
Appellant testified that on April 27, 2010, his brother-in-law Marlon invited him to a party at Domingo
Evangelista's residence. Marlon was Domingo's nephew. Around 11:45 in the evening, he was outside
Domingo's house when Baynosa arrived on board his tricycle. Baynosa was in the company of Santos
and Ramos.21
Eric and Mark Ryan stepped out from the house and called out Baynosa for the loud noise coming from
the tricycle. Santos and Ramos alighted from the tricycle and asked the Evangelista brothers to stop
shouting to avoid further trouble. But Eric yelled even louder at Baynosa while Mark Ryan cursed
Baynosa and his companions.22
Then together, Eric and Mark Ryan walked up to the group and repeatedly punched Ramos. At this
point, Abelardo and Elmer arrived and hit Ramos in the head with a bottle. Not satisfied, Abelardo hit
Ramos a second time. In retaliation, Ramos drew a knife from his waist and stabbed Abelardo and
Elmer.23 When they saw what Ramos did to their brothers, Eric and Mark Ryan motioned to punch
Ramos but were repelled by Baynosa and Santos. Using their respective weapons, Baynosa and
Santos struck at Eric and Mark Ryan.24
Appellant claimed to be a silent witness to the unfolding of these tragic events. He got so scared, left,
and went home.25
While buying cigarettes from a nearby store, he saw Domingo and the police coming up to him.
Domingo pointed him out as among those who stabbed the Evangelista brothers.26
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Decision dated August 12, 2011,27 the trial court found appellant guilty of murder, frustrated
murder, and attempted murder, viz:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 8886, the Court finds accused Dang Angeles y
Guarin GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Abelardo Evangelista P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, P80,650.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 8887, the Court finds accused Dang Angeles y Guarin GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
imposed by law. He is further ordered to pay Eric Evangelista the amounts of P7,032.00. (sic) as
actual damages, P40,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 8888, the Court finds accused Dang Angeles y Guarin GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, and is sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. In addition, he is ordered to pay the
victim Mark Ryan Evangelista the amount of P40,000.00 as moral damages, P68,712.00 as actual
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the records of these cases be sent to (the) archives insofar as accused James Santos, Dennis
Ramos and Sonny Baynosa are concerned, to be revived upon their arrest.
SO ORDERED.28
The trial court found that the prosecution witnesses testified in a categorical, straightforward, and
spontaneous manner. Their testimonies were consistent on material points, more particularly, on how
each of the victims was stabbed by appellant and his co-accused. The trial court held that the credible
and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses necessarily prevail over appellant's denial.
The trial court further held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of
the crime because the perpetrators, including appellant, suddenly stabbed the unarmed victims
without any warning, thus, totally depriving the victims of the opportunity to defend themselves.
Finally, the trial court found appellant to have acted in conspiracy with his co-accused Santos, Ramos,
and Baynosa. As established by the evidence on record, these persons acted in such synchronized and
coordinated manner indicating unity of purpose and design.
The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for finding him guilty as charged in all three (3) cases. We
sum up below appellant's assigned errors, viz:29
(1) The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were incredible, illogical, and grossly inconsistent
with human experience. At the time of the incident, there was an ongoing party attended by relatives
and friends of the Evangelista family. It was, therefore, unthinkable, if not preposterous for the
Evangelista brothers not to have asked help from the people around who supposedly witnessed the
crimes. Even if some of these people may have been, out of fear, hesitant to help them, it was utterly
against human experience that even their relatives, other than their immediate family, remained
apathetic at such crucial time when their loved ones were being butchered. It even took their relatives
an hour to report the incident to the police.30
(2) Eric admittedly had a grudge against him (and vice versa), yet, during the alleged incident, he
purportedly attacked Elmer first, not Eric against whom he supposedly had a grudge.31
(3) The trial court should not have readily accepted the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who,
being the relatives of the victims, were not deemed disinterested witnesses. 32
(4) The testimonies of witnesses who themselves were aggrieved by the death of their relatives should
have been handled with the realistic thought that these witnesses had material and emotional ties
with the cases.33
(5) Although generally weak, denial gains commensurate strength when the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses is wanting and questionable.34
(6) It was Domingo, the victims' father, who implicated him as the assailant, albeit, Domingo himself
did not actually witness the incident.35
(7) Even assuming he was liable for Abelardo's death, he should not be made similarly liable for the
injuries sustained by Eric and Mark Ryan. The prosecution miserably failed to prove that he, Baynosa,
Ramos, and Santos conspired to commit the crimes charged. His mere presence at the locus
criminis did not mean he agreed to assault the Evangelista brothers.36
(8) Granting, without conceding that he was liable for the death of Abelardo and the injuries of Eric
and Mark Ryan, still, he cannot be held liable for murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder.
At most, he may only be held liable for homicide, frustrated homicide, and attempted homicide
because the qualifying circumstance of treachery was absent in these cases. Both Eric and Mark Ryan
knew he (appellant) had a bad reputation in the community. Thus, when Eric and Mark Ryan
approached him and his group, these two (2) were already deemed forewarned of the impending
danger to their lives. Hence, the attack on the Evangelista brothers cannot be considered to be
sudden, unexpected, or unforeseen. There can be no treachery when the victim was aware of the
impending or actual danger to his life.37
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Assistant Solicitor General Herman R. Cimafranca and
State Solicitor Cheryl Angeline M. Roque, essentially countered:38
(a) The trial court's factual findings are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal
unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked or misappreciated, which, if correctly
considered, may have altered the outcome of the case.39
(b) Relationship per se does not affect the credibility of these witnesses.40
(c) As between the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of
appellant, the former deserve more credence.41
(d) The trial court correctly appreciated the attendance of treachery as qualifying circumstance.
Assuming the Evangelista brothers were forewarned of the impending danger to their lives that could
have possibly come from appellant, they were not aware that at the time of the incident Angeles and
his group had actually intended to kill them. The sudden and unexpected attack launched by appellant
and his group on the Evangelista brothers completely rendered these men unable to defend
themselves.42
(e) Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the crime,
indicating a common design, concerted acts, and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. Consequently, the precise extent or modality of participation of each co-
conspirator becomes secondary.43
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
By its assailed Decision dated March 13, 2015,44 the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 38 (RTC) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
In Criminal Case No. L-8886, accused-appellant Dang Angeles y Guarin is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Abelardo Q. Evangelista the amounts of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral
damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for exemplary damages and Eighty Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P80,650.00) for actual damages as well as interest on all these damages
assessed at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
reasonable doubt of attempted murder and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay Eric Q. Evangelista the
amounts of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) for moral damages, Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for exemplary damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for temperate
damages as well as interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% from date of
finality of this decision until fully paid.
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay Mark Ryan Q.
Evangelista the amounts of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) for moral damages, Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) for exemplary damages and Sixty-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Twelve Pesos
(P68,712.00) for actual damages as well as interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of
6% from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.45
The Present Appeal
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief and prays anew for his acquittal. In compliance with Resolution
dated June 29, 2016, both appellant46 and the OSG47 manifested that, in lieu of supplemental briefs,
they were adopting their respective Briefs before the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the verdict of conviction against appellant for murder,
frustrated murder, and attempted murder?
Ruling
The appeal utterly lacks merit.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that appellant and his co-accused conspired to
slay Abelardo, Eric, and Mark Ryan all surnamed Evangelista.
Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony, and decide to commit it.48 Proof of express agreement, however, is not always required to be
shown.49
In People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Evasco, et al.,50 the Court emphasized the two (2) forms of
conspiracy. The first refers to express conspiracy. It requires proof of an actual agreement among the
co-conspirators to commit the crime. The second pertains to implied conspiracy. It exists when two
(2) or more persons are shown by their acts to have aimed toward the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, are in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiments. This is proved by the mode and manner the offense was committed, or from the acts of
the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, indubitably pointing to a joint
purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest.
In fine, even without proof of express agreement among the co-accused, conspiracy may still be held
to exist among them. We applied this rule in Evasco, viz:
Jimmy and Ernesto were shown to have acted in conspiracy when they assaulted Wilfredo. Although
their agreement concerning the commission of the felony, and their decision to commit it were not
established by direct evidence, the records contained clear and firm showing of their having acted in
concert to achieve a common design – that of assaulting Wilfredo. Direct proof of the agreement
concerning the commission of a felony, and of the decision to commit it is not always
accessible, but that should not be a hindrance to rendering a finding of implied
conspiracy. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, we are in full accord with the relevant findings of the Court of Appeals on the existence of
conspiracy among all the victim's attackers, including appellant himself, viz:
x x x x The presence of conspiracy in this case may be inferred from the following circumstances
where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, to wit: (1) The
accused-appellant together with the other accused arrived at the crime scene at the same time, (2)
Accused-appellant alighted from the same tricycle where the other accused rode, (3) Accused-
appellant and the other accused successively assaulted the victims – x x x x ; and (4) All accused fled
from the crime scene immediately after the stabbing incident.51 x x x x
Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses unequivocally depict one clear picture: appellant,
Baynosa, Ramos, and Santos all acted in a coordinated manner in order to consummate their common
desire, i.e. slay the Evangelista brothers. While there was no express agreement between appellant
and his co-accused, their concerted actions indicate that they did conspire with each other for the
fulfillment of such common purpose.52
Having established conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused, the next question is this: what
crime or crimes did appellant commit in connection with the death of Abelardo and the injuries
inflicted on Eric and Mark Ryan?

Murder
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA
7659)53 provides:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxx xxx xxx
Murder requires the following elements: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him
or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.54
There is no question regarding the first and fourth elements. Abelardo died of cardiorespiratory arrest
secondary to hypovolemic shock as a result of the multiple stab wounds inflicted on him. The
prosecution offered in evidence Abelardo's Death Certificate with Registry No. 2010-13555 and Post-
Mortem Examination Report dated April 28, 201056 of Gladiola M. Manaois. There is no evidence
showing that Abelardo was related by affinity or consanguinity with Angeles, hence, the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.
Appellant, however, belies the presence of the second and third elements.
The second element pertains to the identity of the accused as the person who killed the victim. Here,
prosecution witnesses Eric and Mark Ryan Evangelista, and Rolando Quinto consistently and positively
identified appellant and his companions as the ones who alternately or simultaneously stabbed
Abelardo to death, thus:
Eric
Evangelista
Q: Thereafter, what transpired next, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, my older brother, Abelardo Evangelista, was also stabbed by Dennis

Ramos, Madam.
Q: And what portion of his body was stabbed by accused Dennis Ramos was hit
(sic)?
A: He was hit on (the) left side of his abdomen, Madam.
Q: What was the weapon used by Dennis Ramos in stabbing your brother,
Abelardo Evangelista, on the left stomach of his body?
A: A knife, Madam.
Q: And after he was stabbed, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, James Santos helped each other in stabbing my brother wherein Dennis
Ramos again stabbed my older brother, Abelardo Evangelista, on the right
side of his stomach, Madam.57
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
Q: Who stabbed your brother, Abelardo Evangelista first?
WITNESS
A: Dennis Ramos, sir.
Q: And he (was) hit on what part?
A: Left side of his stomach, sir.
Q: And then you said the other accused helped each other in attacking your
brother, Abelardo?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you see if aside from Dennis Ramos the other accused also stabbed your
brother?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was the second person who stabbed your brother, Abelardo Evangelista,
if you know?
A: James (Santos), alias "Chita", sir.
Q: What did he use in stabbing your brother?
A: A knife, sir.
Q: What part of the body of your brother Abelardo Evangelista, was hit by James
Santos?
A: On his right abdomen, sir.[58
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So, after James Santos, alias "Chita" stabbed your brother, Abelardo
Evangelista, on the right abdomen, who was the next one who stabbed your
brother, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS:
A: Dang Angeles, Madam.
Q: And what portion of the body of your brother was hit by accused Dang
Angeles?
A: On his left chest, Madam.
Q: And what was the weapon used by accused Dang Angeles when he stabbed
your brother on his left chest?
A: He used icepick, Madam.

Q: Can you tell us, if you know, how long that icepick which was used by Dang
Angeles when he stabbed your brother?
A: One (1) foot long, Madam.
Q: And at that time after sustaining three (3) fatal wound(s), Mr. Witness, can
you tell us the relative condition of your brother?
A: He turned weak, Madam.
Q: But he was still standing?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: So, after Dang Angeles stabbed him, what transpired next, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, Sonny Baynosa followed in stabbing my brother, Madam.
Q: And what portion was hit by Sonny Baynosa, alias "Jong"?
A: On his right chest, Madam.
Q: And what weapon was used by accused Sonny Baynosa, alias "Jong" when he
stabbed your brother on his right chest x x x x
A: Icepick about a foot long, Madam, of the same size.
Q: And after he was stabbed by accused Sonny Baynosa, alias "Jong", what
happened to your brother, Abelardo Evangelista, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, he died, Madam.[59
xxx xxx xxx
Mark Ryan
Evangelista
Q: When you fell down, what transpired next, Mr. Witness?
A: Then my older brother Abelardo came to us.[60

xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened Mr. Witness, when your brother who is the victim in this case
Abelardo Evangelista went out to see likewise what was happening to you
and your other brothers?
A: He was stabbed by Dennis Ramos.[61
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened to your brother Abelardo after he was stabbed by Dennis x x

xx?
A: He was also stabbed by James Santos.[62
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So, after he was hit for the second time by accused James Santos, what
happened to your brother, Mr. Witness?
A: Then Dang Angeles stabbed my brother again on the left chest x x x x[63
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So after he was hit with an icepick by accused Dang Angeles which you said
to the Court, he was hit on his left chest, what happened to your brother?
A: Then Sonny Baynosa stabbed my brother Abelardo with an icepick on his

right chest.[64
xxx xxx xxx
Rolando
Quinto
Q: Mr. witness, after victim Mark Ryan Evangelista had fallen likewise (in) the
ground due to stab wound he sustained from accused James Santos, what
happened next?
A: Then Abelardo also arrived, ma'am.

Q: This Abelardo that you are referring to is the victim in this case?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: What happened when Abelardo arrived?
A: Dennis suddenly stabbed him on his stomach, ma'am.
Q: What happened to Abelardo when he was stabbed by Dennis?
A: He was stabbed by James and then they helped each other in stabbing him,
ma'am.
Q: You said that Abelardo was stabbed by Dennis and James, can you tell us the
names of those persons who also stabbed Abelardo aside from Dennis and
James?
A: Dang Angeles and Sonny Baynosa alias Jhong also stabbed him, ma'am.[65
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So who followed James, was it Dang Angeles or Sonny Baynosa?
A: Dang Angeles followed James in stabbing Abelardo, ma'am.[66
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After Dang Angeles hit Abelardo on his left chest, he was followed by Sonny
Baynosa?
A: Yes, ma'am.[67
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So that, (sic) after the victim in this case sustained at least four (4) stab
wounds inflicted by the accused one after the other using their respective
weapons, can you tell this Honorable Court what transpired next?
A: He fell on the ground when Dennis stabbed him again on his back, ma'am.[68
xxx xxx xxx

The trial court found that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were categorical, straightforward,
and spontaneous. They were also consistent on material points, particularly on the manner and the
locus criminis where appellant and his co-accused stabbed the Evangelista brothers.69
Indeed, when the credibility of the eyewitness is at issue, due deference and respect shall be given to
the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, and its conclusions anchored on said findings, absent any showing that it had overlooked
circumstances that would have affected the final outcome of the case. The foregoing rule finds an
even more stringent application where the findings of the trial court are sustained by the Court of
Appeals,70 as in this case. In People of the Philippines v. Jeffrey Collamat, et al.71 this Court
ordained:
In cases where the issue rests on the credibility of witnesses, as in this case, it is important to
emphasize the well-settled rule that "appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment
made by the trial court because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination."
We explained in Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that the findings of the trial court will not be overturned
absent any clear showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance that could have altered the outcome of the case, viz.:
Also, the issue hinges on credibility of witnesses. We have consistently adhered to the rule that where
the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the
highest degree of respect. These findings will not be ordinarily disturbed by an appellate court
absent any clear showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight or substance which could very well affect the outcome of the case. It is the
trial court that had the opportunity to observe 'the witnesses' manner of testifying, their furtive
glances, calmness, sighs or their scant or full realization of their oaths. It had the better opportunity
to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling
examination. Inconsistencies or contradictions in the testimony of the victim do not affect the veracity
of the testimony if the inconsistencies do not pertain to material points. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
So must it be.
Appellant, nonetheless, asserts that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were incredible,
illogical, and grossly inconsistent with human experience. He harps on the failure of the Evangelista
brothers to seek help from relatives and guests who were also in their house that night.
The argument fails to persuade.
In a long line of cases, this Court has recognized that different persons react differently to the same
situations for there is no hard and fast standard by which to measure a person's behavior or reaction
when confronted with a startling or horrifying occurrence, as in this case. Some may shout for help,
some may be hysterical, some fight back, and others may simply freeze and take the blows
mutely. People of the Philippines v. Golem Sota72 is apropos:
xxx xxx xxx
Noteworthy, in People v. Banez, the Court ruled that it is not at all uncommon or unnatural for a
witness who, as in this case, having seen the killing of a person, did not even move, help, or run away
from the crime scene, but simply chose to stay and continue plowing. It explained its ruling as follows:
It is settled that there could be no hard and fast gauge for measuring a person's reaction or
behavior when confronted with a startling, not to mention horrifying, occurrence, as in this
case. Witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending upon their situation
and state of mind, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. The workings of the human mind
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently to shocking stimulus -
some may shout, some may faint, and others may be plunged into insensibility. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant further attacks the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, alleging they are relatives of the
victims.
To begin with, relationship per se does not equate to bias or ulterior motive nor automatically tarnish
the testimony of a witness.73 On the contrary, a witness who is related to the victim is naturally
interested in securing the conviction of the guilty and definitely not the innocent or just any or some
"fall guy." Otherwise, the real culprits would gain immunity.74
In any case, against the prosecution witnesses' positive and categorical testimonies, appellant only
invokes denial. It bears stress that denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as in
this case, is a negative and self-serving defense. It carries scant, if not nil, evidentiary value. It cannot
prevail over the consistent and categorical declarations of credible witnesses on affirmative matters.75
Appellant next points to Ramos, Baynosa, and Santos as the persons who actually stabbed the
Evangelista brothers.
We are not convinced.
Appellant never before the investigating prosecutor imputed exclusive criminal liability on Ramos,
Baynosa, and Santos. Appellant did not even file his counter-affidavit during the preliminary
investigation.76 It could have been his chance to implicate the real culprits and consequently be freed
of any liability for the crime he later claimed not to have committed. But he did not.
In any event, We refer back to appellant's liability as co-conspirator in the murder of Abelardo.
Although he and his co-accused each had their respective designated roles to perform, no one is
excused from the consequent liability arising from the acts of his co-conspirator. In conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all.
In the alternative, appellant prays that his conviction for murder be reduced to homicide. He insists
that treachery did not attend the killing since the Evangelista brothers were already "obviously
forewarned" of the impending danger to their lives when they confronted him and his alleged
companions,77 aside from the fact that the Evangelista brothers knew full well of his notorious
reputation in the community.
Treachery means the offender directly employs means, methods, or forms for the purpose of ensuring
the execution of the crime without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery lies on the deliberate, swift, and unexpected attack on
the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim, leaving the latter no chance to resist or escape. 78
Here, when Abelardo came out of their house and approached his brothers, he already knew that
appellant and his companions had violently attacked his brothers. Thus, Abelardo was already aware
of the danger appellant posed in his person. It cannot be said, therefore, that the attack made against
him was "unexpected." In sum, Aberlardo was not an "unsuspecting victim.'" Consequently, treachery
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in Abelardo's killing.
The Court, nonetheless, holds that Abelardo's killing was attended by abuse of superior strength.
This qualifying circumstance is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 79
In People v. Casillar,80 the Court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strenght when four (4) armed assailants attacked the unarmed victim, as in this case. Too, in People
v. Garcia,81 the Court held that where four (4) persons attacked the unarmed victim but treachery
was not proven, the fact that there were four (4) assailants constitutes abuse of superiority. So must
it be.

for Attempted Murder and
for Frustrated Murder
In these cases, appellant similarly argue that none of the qualifying circumstances of treachery or
abuse of superior strength is present because the Evangelista brothers knew of his notorious
reputation in their community.
We do not agree.
In People of the Philippines v. Marcial D. Pulgo,82 the Court pronounced that treachery may still
be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person. What is decisive is
that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
Here, even assuming the Evangelista brothers knew of appellant's reputation as a troublemaker, there
was no showing that they were in fact aware of had otherwise the faintest idea that on the night in
question, appellant and his companions would launch a deadly attack on them.
Records show that when the Evangelista brothers saw appellant and his companions, they were just
seated inside the tricycle. Then the Evangelista brothers approached appellant and his companions to
ask them to tone down the noise coming from their tricyle because they had a party going on. Under
these circumstances, no one would have suspected that appellant and his companions would
aggressively react the way they did. Appellant was the first to launch his deadly, swift, unexpected,
and sudden attack on Elmer, then Baynosa and Santos joined in stabbing Eric and Mark Ryan,
respectively. As in Pulgo, the victims in these cases were both unarmed, making them more
vulnerable from the sudden attack of appellant and his group.
We agree with the relevant disquisitions of the Court of Appeals, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is evident that the attack in the victim made by accused-appellant and by the
other accused was sudden and deliberate. The attack was unexpected on the part of the unarmed
victims considering that they were in their house celebrating the forthcoming wedding of their sister.
The attack was executed in a manner that the victims were renderd defenseless and unable to
retaliate. The severity of the wounds forestalled any possibility of resisting attack. Without doubt,
accused-appellant and his co-accused took advantage of the situation. The acts of accused-appellant
and his co-accused were clear indications that they employed means and methods which tended
directly and specifically to ensure the successful execution of the offense. 83
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance in these cases is indubitable.
In murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill. If he or she did not have such intent,
he or she is liable only for physical injuries.84
In Gary Fantastico, et al. v. People of the Philippines, et al.,85 the Court considered the following
determinants of intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. The Court also considered the words uttered by the
offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as an additional determinative factor.
We now turn to the different stages of felony: consummated, frustrated, and attempted, as
enumerated and defined under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or
over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. (Emphasis supplied)
How does Article 6 insofar as the frustrated and attempted stages apply to Criminal Case Nos. L-8887
and L-8888?

Eric Evangelista
Eric sustained a single stab wound in the back portion of his right shoulder. Dr. Fernandez testified
that the wound was not fatal and with proper medication, the same would heal in seven (7) to ten
(10) days, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Doctor, in connection with Criminal Case No. L-8887 – Eric Evangelista,

can you tell us if there was a time (that) you treated him?
A: Yes, I did attend (to) this patient. I admitted him on April 28, 2010 and
discharged him the following day, April 29, 2010.
Q: Can you tell us the x x x physical condition of the patient, if you can recall?
A: x x x during the time I attended to this patient he sustained a stab wound at

the right scapular area x x x (Witness pointing to the right back in this area
scapular bone at the right).[86
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Aside from this stab wound, did you find any injury from the body of the
victim Eric Evangelista?
A: No more.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Court what would be the possible effect the
cause in connection (with) this injury if it bot be (sic) treated immediately x
x x?
A: I think you are referring to whether the wound is fatal? Before I answer that
all wound(s) no matter (how) superficial is fatal if you will not seek
medical attendance. You might develop tetanus or because the wound was
attended properly and medical attendance that wound is none (sic) fatal.
We remove that factor about possible infection.
COURT:
Q: What if factor not considered, will you consider?
WITNESS:
A: It is not fatal.
PROSECUTOR
PORLUCAS:
Q: As a follow up doctor, you stated this is stab wound, the injury of victim
Eric Evangelista is not fatal. Can you tell the Honorable Court likewise the
complication that may set in if no medical attendance and can you tell this
is not fatal will heal of (sic) its own?
WITNESS:
A: Yes.
Q: And can you tell this Honorable Court without any adequate medical
attendance, how many days will it heal?
A: Ten (10) days because of the possible infection.[87
xxx xxx xxx

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or
attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the
victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons
used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d)
the manner the crime was committed; (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries
are inflicted by him on the victim;88 and (f) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed.89
Here, the attendant circumstances showed that appellant and his companions intended to kill Eric and
his brothers Elmer, Abelardo, and Mark Ryan. The three (3) victims sustained multiple fatal stab
wounds. As a result, Elmer and Abelardo died. Mark Ryan was spared due to the timely and proper
medical attendance given him; and Eric was also spared because he sustained a non-fatal wound. But
this does not dissolve appellant's liability for attempted murder.
In Rivera, et al. v. People,90 the Court convicted appellants therein of frustrated murder although
the wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal, viz:
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced
his death does not negate petitioners' criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not
hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder.
xxx xxx xxx
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
The Court in People v. Lizada elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and
this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must
be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission
of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is
so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the
intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards
the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct
movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done
need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt
must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling the
victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion
of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.
As stated, the attendant circumstances here clearly show that appellant and his companions did intend
to kill the Evangelista brothers. They were able to deal multiple fatal blows on at least three (3) of the
brothers; but as for Eric, they did not spare him. He was also stabbed by Baynosa. It just so happened
they missed to hit him on a vital part like what they did to Eric's three (3) brothers.

Mark Ryan
As for Mark Ryan Evangelista, Dr. Fernandez testified that the victim's injury was fatal and could have
led to Mark Ryan's death were it not for the timely medical attention given him, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR
PORCULAS:
Q: Likewise, doctor, the private complainant is Mark Ryan Q. Evangelista.

Can you tell the Court if you remember treat(ing) this victim on April 28,
2010?
WITNESS:
A: Yes. I admit(ted) the patient and was discharged (in) May 7, 2010.
Q: Can you tell us likewise the physical condition of the victim at the time of
the admition (sic)?
A: At the time of the admition (sic) of the patient and after a few hours the
condition of the patient worsen and I have to schedule the operation.
Q: Can you tell us what were the injury or injuries sustained as you noticed to
the patient when you admit(ted) him?
A: There was (a) stab wound at the right lower back, in this area. "Witness
pointing to his lower back.
Q: And aside from that, what else did you do?
A: I think the main injury of this patient.
Q: So, that is the main injury. You mean it is fatal injury, doctor?
A: Yes, (it) is fatal.

Q: What did you do when you immediately noticed his fatal injury, doctor?
A: This patient was admitted to the ICU at 1:30 in the morning and then, at
about 1:10 in the (afternoon) about twelve (12) hours as admitted in the
ICU I noticed that there is something wrong, so, I scheduled immediately
operation.
Q: Few hours, thereafter, from admission this patient's operation was done
upon his person?
A: Yes.
Q: What was the result of your operation?
A: When I open the entire abdomen was filled of clotted (sic) blood meaning
none clotting component in the entire abdomen and the reason for that
was, the liver was injured. There was stab wound.[91
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Aside from qualification of the injury as fatal in nature, can you tell us if
you can approximately or probable time that the victim will sustain his life
any probable adequate medical attendance?
A: The patient may die on the same depending (on) the rate of the bleeding or
fast bleeding the patient might live about 1 to 3 days depending on the rate
of the blood lost inside.[92
xxx xxx xxx
Killing becomes frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which could have
produced the crime but did not produce it for reasons independent of his or her will. 93People v.
Lababo94 is apropros:
As for BBB's case, We agree with the RTC and CA's factual finding that the eight gunshot wounds
sustained by BBB, as contained in the Medico-Legal Certificate, would have caused his death if he was
not given timely medical attention. Furthermore, it does not appear that BBB was armed or was in a
position to deflect the attack. As a matter of fact, based on CCC's narration of the events that
transpired, the suddenness of the attack upon AAA and BBB cannot be denied. Only that, unlike AAA,
BBB survived.
The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which could
produce the crime but did not produce it for reasons independent of his or her will.
Here, taking into consideration the fact that BBB was shot eight times with the use of a firearm and
that AAA, who was with him at that time, was killed, convinces Us that the malefactor intended to
take EBB's life as well. However, unlike in AAA's case, BBB survived. It was also established that he
survived not because the wounds were not fatal, but because timely medical attention was rendered
to him. Definitely, EBB's survival was independent of the perpetrator's will. As such, this Court is
convinced that the attack upon BBB qualifies as frustrated murder.
All told, the trial court and Court of Appeals both did not err in finding appellant guilty of murder for
the death of Abelardo; attempted murder for the injury sustained by Eric; and frustrated murder for
the injury sustained by Mark Ryan.
Penalties

Murder
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, states:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances x x x x
Applying Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code95 here the lesser of the two (2) indivisible
penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua shall be imposed provided there is no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that attended the killing, as in this case. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly sentenced
appellant to reclusion perpetua.
Going now to appellant's civil liabilities, People of the Philippines v. Esmael Gervero, et
al.96 ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
Following the jurisprudence laid down by the Court in People v. Jugueta, accused-appellants are
ordered to pay the heirs of Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas, and Benito Basug, Jr. P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. It was also ruled
in Jugueta that when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the
amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded. In addition, interest at the rate of six
percent per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this decision
until fully paid.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly awarded Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil
indemnity to the heirs of Abelardo Evangelista.
On the award of actual damages, the family of Abelardo Evangelista presented receipts in the amount
of Forty Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P40,650.00) for coffin, funeral mass, and
blessing.97 Although they claimed to have also spent Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) for the wake,
they failed to present receipts for the alleged expense. Hence, the actual damages proven is only
Forty Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P40,650.00).
But, as pronounced in Gervero and People v. Jugueta,98"when no documentary evidence of burial or

funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be
awarded." Considering that the receipts presented by Abelardo's heirs did not exceed Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), they shall, in lieu of actual damages, be granted Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) temperate damages in order to avoid the situation where those who did not present any
receipt at all would get more that those who claimed for more than Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
but failed to present receipts for the excess of that amount. Verily, the heirs of Abelardo Evangelista
are entitled to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages.
As for moral and exemplary damages, the same must be increased to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) each in accordance with Gervero and Jugueta.

Attempted Murder
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. — A penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempt to commit a felony.
Under the indeterminate sentence law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be
properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the minimum term should be within the range of prision correccional, which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, and the maximum term should be
within the range of prision mayor in its medium term, which has a duration of eight (8) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years.99
The trial court and Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly sentenced appellant to two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
As for civil liabilities, Jugueta decreed:
I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes
involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
xxxx
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – P25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – P25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – P25,000.00
The award of moral damages here should be reduced from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00). The award of exemplary damages, however, is increased
from Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00). Appellant is
also liable to pay Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as civil indemnity.
As for actual damages, the parties stipulated on the receipts100 as proof of the expenses incurred by
Eric Evangelista for the treatment of the wounds he sustained.101
In its Decision dated March 13, 2015, the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, awarded Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) and not just the full claim of Seven Thousand and Thirty-Two Pesos
(P7,032.00) by Eric Evangelista. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
When actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, the award
of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.
Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven exceeds P25,000.00 then temperate damages
may no longer be awarded; actual damages base on the receipts presented during trial should instead
be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Eric Evangelista, the actual damages proven during the trial amount to less than
P25,000.00. Only medical expenses amounting to P7,032.00 were duly supported by receipts. Thus,
the award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 in lieu of P7,032.00 as actual damages is justified. 102
We clarify.
In People v. Villanueva,103 the victim's heirs claimed Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) as
actual and total expenses. But they were only able to present receipts up to Thirteen Thousand and
One Hundred Pesos (P13,100.00). The Court then, adopted the pronouncement in People v.
Albrazado104 where the Court granted temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, in the amount
of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00). The Court said in Albrazado that it "would be unfair for
the victim's heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot
produce any receipts."
Thus, in Villanueva, the Court said that it would be "unfair" for Villanueva's heirs to be awarded with
only Thirteen Thousand One Hundred Pesos (P13,100.00) "because the victim's heirs who tried but
succeeded in proving actual damages to the extent of P13,100 only, would be in a worse situation
than, say, those who might have presented no receipts at all but would now be entitled to P25,000
temperate damages." The Court ruled that "when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000 is justified
in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven
exceeds P25,000, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages based on the
receipts presented during trial should instead be granted"
Here, Eric's full claim was only Seven Thousand and Thirty-Two Pesos (P7,032.00). No more, no less.
For it was the only amount he spent for his treatment. Why then should he be given Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)? It would certainly be unjust for appellant to be compelled to pay more
than what Eric actually claimed to have spent for his treatment, i.e. Seven Thousand and Thirty-Two
Pesos (P7,032.00), exactly the amount covered by the receipts the People offered as Exhibits "M" to
"M-7."
It is, therefore, incorrect for the Court to award more than the amount Eric Evangelista actually
incurred for his treatment, let alone, beyond what Eric Evangelista himself claimed to have actually
spent.

Frustrated Murder
Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in
a frustrated felony.
In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the imposable penalty for frustrated murder
is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, appellant was
correctly sentenced to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As for civil liabilities, Jugueta decreed:

II. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other
crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
xxxx
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – P50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – P50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – P50,000.00
In sum, the awards of moral and exemplary damages are increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) each. Appellant is also ordered to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity.
As for actual damages, both the trial court and Court of Appeals correctly awarded Sixty Eight
Thousand Seven Hundred and Twelve Pesos (P68,712.00) the same being duly supported by
corresponding receipts.105
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated March 13, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05193 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
In Criminal Case No. L-8886, Dang Angeles y Guarin is found GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, in lieu of treachery is
appreciated against him. He is further ordered to PAY the heirs of Abelardo Q. Evangelista the
following amounts:
(1) Php50,000.00 as temperate damages;

(2) Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(3) Php75,000.00 as moral damages; and
(4) Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages
In Criminal Case No. L-8887, Dang Angeles y Guarin is found GUILTY of ATTEMPTED
MURDER and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one
(1) day of prision correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum. He is ordered to PAY Eric Q. Evangelista the following amounts:
(1) Php7,032.00 as actual damages;

(2)Php25,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(3)Php25,000.00 as moral damages; and
(4)Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages
In Criminal Case No. L-8888, Dang Angeles y Guarin is found GUILTY of FRUSTRATED
MURDER and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight months (8) and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum. He is ordered to PAY Mark Ryan Q. Evangelista the following amounts:
(1) Php68,712.00 as actual damages;

(2) Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(3) Php50,000.00 as moral damages; and
(4) Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively concedes
having performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead insists that as a result, he should be adjudged
guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its consummated stage of which he was convicted. The proposition
rests on a common theory expounded in two well-known decisions1 rendered decades ago by the Court of Appeals,
upholding the existence of frustrated theft of which the accused in both cases were found guilty. However, the
rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed by this Court.
As far as can be told,2 the last time this Court extensively considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or
consummated theft was in 1918, in People v. Adiao.3 A more cursory
treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People v. Sobrevilla,4 and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC.5 This petition
now gives occasion for us to finally and fully measure if or how frustrated theft is susceptible to commission under the
Revised Penal Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an Information 6 charging petitioner Aristotel
Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m.,
petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex
along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking
area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner
unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the
supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these
boxes to the same area in the open parking space.7
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking
space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the
vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area.
When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but
Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. 8 The filched items seized from the duo were four
(4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods
with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00.9
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred on the same day to
the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the police
investigation records that apart from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended by the
security guards at the scene and delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the incident.
However, after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner and Calderon were
charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day after the
incident.10
After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been innocent
bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago
and his fellow security guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. Calderon alleged that on the
afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his
neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada.11 As the queue for the ATM was long, Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy snacks
inside the supermarket. It was while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, leading them to head
out of the building to check what was
transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly "grabbed" by a security guard, thus commencing their
detention.12 Meanwhile, petitioner testified during trial that he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, 13 had been at
the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they
saw the security guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start running,
at which point he was apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he was detained at
the security office until around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought to the Baler Police Station. At
the station, petitioner denied having stolen the cartons of detergent, but he was detained overnight, and eventually
brought to the prosecutor’s office where he was charged with theft. 14 During petitioner’s cross-examination, he
admitted that he had been employed as a "bundler" of GMS Marketing, "assigned at the supermarket" though not at
SM.15
In a Decision16 promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90,
convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. They were sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as
maximum.17 The RTC found credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on
the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime.
Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal,18 but only petitioner filed a brief19 with the Court of Appeals,
causing the appellate court to deem Calderon’s appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed. Before the Court
of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was
apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. 20 However, in its Decision
dated 19 June 2003,21 the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s conviction.22 Hence the
present Petition for Review,23 which expressly seeks that petitioner’s conviction "be modified to only of Frustrated
Theft."24
Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively conceded both his felonious intent and his actual
participation in the theft of several cases of detergent with a total value of ₱12,090.00 of which he was charged. 25 As
such, there is no cause for the Court to consider a factual scenario other than that presented by the prosecution, as
affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The only question to consider is whether under the given facts, the
theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated.
II.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cites 26 two decisions rendered many years
ago by the Court of Appeals: People v. Diño27 and People v. Flores.28 Both decisions elicit the interest of this Court, as
they modified trial court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears
similarity to the present case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the
appellate court did not expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to the Diño and Flores rulings since they have
not yet been expressly adopted as precedents by this Court. For whatever reasons,
the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to pass before us. Yet despite the silence
on our part, Diño and Flores have attained a level of renown reached by very few other appellate court rulings. They
are comprehensively discussed in the most popular of our criminal law annotations, 29 and studied in criminal law
classes as textbook examples of frustrated crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft.
More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful scenarios that populate criminal law
exams more than they actually occur in real life. Indeed, if we finally say that Diño and Flores are doctrinal, such
conclusion could profoundly influence a multitude of routine theft prosecutions, including commonplace shoplifting.
Any scenario that involves the thief having to exit with the stolen property through a supervised egress, such as a
supermarket checkout counter or a parking area pay booth, may easily call for the application of Diño and Flores. The
fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay down convictions for frustrated theft further validates that Diño and
Flores and the theories offered therein on frustrated theft have borne some weight in our jurisprudential system. The
time is thus ripe for us to examine whether those theories are correct and should continue to influence prosecutors
and judges in the future.
III.
To delve into any extended analysis of Diño and Flores, as well as the specific issues relative to "frustrated theft," it is
necessary to first refer to the basic rules on the three stages of crimes under our Revised Penal Code.30
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony is
consummated "when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present." It is frustrated
"when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." Finally, it is attempted
"when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance."
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a "subjective phase," or that portion of the acts constituting the crime
included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which,
with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime.31 After that point has been breached, the subjective phase
ends and the objective phase begins.32 It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the
offense, the crime is merely attempted.33 On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case of
frustrated crimes, for in such instances, "[s]ubjectively the crime is complete." 34
Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand, and attempted felonies on
the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a
felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime
under the Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of ascertaining whether a crime
is attempted only would need to compare the acts actually performed by the accused as against the acts that
constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that
all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony
itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the felony was "produced" after all
the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory
definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in
turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies an important characteristic of a
crime, that "ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime," and accordingly, there can
be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.35 Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se,36 mens
rea has been defined before as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent," 37 and "essential for
criminal liability."38 It follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the
mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains
no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights." 39 The criminal statute must also provide for
the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown;
there must also be an actus reus.40
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced.
As a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the language of the
law expressly provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the
elemental question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious
set-up under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal
Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is
embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of execution. For example, the statutory definition of
murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase "shall kill another," thus making it clear that the felony is produced by
the death of the victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its elements are spelled
out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.— Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another
and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm
products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which
theft may be committed.41 In the present discussion, we need to concern ourselves only with the general definition
since it was under it that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and sustained. On the face of the definition,
there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another.
It is also clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present
the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or
intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking
be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 42
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of theft, which under early Roman law as
defined by Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass "any kind of physical handling of property belonging to
another against the will of the owner,"43 a definition similar to that by Paulus that a thief "handles (touches, moves) the
property of another."44 However, with the Institutes of Justinian, the idea had taken hold that more than mere physical
handling, there must further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus: "[f]urtum est contrectatio rei
fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve."45 This requirement of animo
lucrandi, or intent to gain, was maintained in both the Spanish and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since been
abandoned in Great Britain.46
In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or "unlawful taking," to characterize theft.
Justice Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once had a controversial interpretation and application.
Spanish law had already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento, finding
that it had to be coupled with "the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to
appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing." 47 However, a conflicting line of cases decided by the
Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be permanency in the taking 48 or an intent to permanently
deprive the owner of the stolen property;49 or that there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as
the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already
constituted apoderamiento.50 Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter thought that there
was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking. 51
So long as the "descriptive" circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi and
apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at
least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner
obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by
intent to gain, completed without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the extenuating benefit a
conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged to apply Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision, the theft would have been frustrated only,
once the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not produce
[such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." There are clearly two determinative
factors to consider: that the felony is not "produced," and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case. The first,
however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code 52 as to
when a particular felony is "not produced," despite the commission of all the acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is
the felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property
of another without the latter’s consent."
U.S. v. Adiao53 apparently supports that notion. Therein, a customs inspector was charged with theft after he
abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreign national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom
House. At no time was the accused able to "get the merchandise out of the Custom House," and it appears that he
"was under observation during the entire transaction."54 Based apparently on those two circumstances, the trial court
had found him guilty, instead, of frustrated theft. The Court reversed, saying that neither circumstance was decisive,
and holding instead that the accused was guilty of consummated theft, finding that "all the elements of the completed
crime of theft are present."55 In support of its conclusion that the theft was consummated, the Court cited three (3)
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the discussion of which we replicate below:
The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking the
fruit[,] he was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but
sometime later. The court said: "[x x x] The trial court did not err [x x x ] in considering the crime as that of
consummated theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen
who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking
full possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him for an interval of time." (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on
account of the solemnity of the act, although noticing the theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently,
however, while the defendant was still inside the church, the offended party got back the money from the defendant.
The court said that the defendant had performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as consummated.
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the
case took a small box, which was also opened with a key, from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales
and 20 centimos, and then he placed the money over the cover of the case; just at this moment he was caught by two
guards who were stationed in another room near-by. The court considered this as consummated robbery, and said:
"[x x x] The accused [x x x] having materially taken possession of the money from the moment he took it from the
place where it had been, and having taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the
acts necessary to constitute the crime which was thereby produced; only the act of making use of the thing having
been frustrated, which, however, does not go to make the elements of the consummated crime." (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, June 13, 1882.)56
It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish decisions cited therein, that the criminal actors in all
these cases had been able to obtain full possession of the personal property prior to their apprehension. The interval
between the commission of the acts of theft and the apprehension of the thieves did vary, from "sometime later" in
the 1898 decision; to the very moment the thief had just extracted the money in a purse which had been stored as it
was in the 1882 decision; and before the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen from the building where the theft
took place, as had happened in Adiao and the 1897 decision. Still, such intervals proved of no consequence in those
cases, as it was ruled that the thefts in each of those cases was consummated by the actual possession of the
property belonging to another.
In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an accused was guilty only of frustrated rather than
consummated theft. The case is People v. Sobrevilla,57 where the accused, while in the midst of a crowd in a public
market, was already able to abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the latter, perceiving the theft,
"caught hold of the [accused]’s shirt-front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a struggle, he recovered
his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who was afterwards caught by a policeman." 58 In rejecting the contention
that only frustrated theft was established, the Court simply said, without further comment or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is groundless. The [accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-book, and that
determines the crime of theft. If the pocket-book was afterwards recovered, such recovery does not affect the
[accused’s] criminal liability, which arose from the [accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book.59
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme Court cases cited in the latter, in that the
fact that the offender was able to succeed in obtaining physical possession of the stolen item, no matter how
momentary, was able to consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited therein contradict the position of petitioner in this
case. Yet to simply affirm without further comment would be disingenuous, as there is another school of thought on
when theft is consummated, as reflected in the Diño and Flores decisions.
Diño was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The
accused therein, a driver employed by the United States Army, had driven his truck into the port area of the South
Harbor, to unload a truckload of materials to waiting U.S. Army personnel. After he had finished unloading, accused
drove away his truck from the Port, but as he was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was stopped by
an M.P. who inspected the truck and found therein three boxes of army rifles. The accused later contended that he
had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the agreement that they were to meet him and retrieve
the rifles after he had passed the checkpoint. The trial court convicted accused of consummated theft, but the Court
of Appeals modified the conviction, holding instead that only frustrated theft had been committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident intent of the accused was to let the boxes of rifles "pass
through the checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as the truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it
would be allowed to pass through the check point without further investigation or checking."60 This point was deemed
material and indicative that the theft had not been fully produced, for the Court of Appeals pronounced that "the fact
determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were more or
less momentary."61 Support for this proposition was drawn from a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated 24
January 1888 (1888 decision), which was quoted as follows:
Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa sustraida sea determinate de la consumacion del delito de
hurto es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor la libre disposicion de aquella,
siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente, pues de otra suerte, dado el concepto del delito de hurto, no puede
decirse en realidad que se haya producido en toda su extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de tomar la cosa
ajena.62
Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then concluded:
This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order to make the booty subject to the control and disposal of the
culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed through the M.P. check point, but since the offense was opportunely
discovered and the articles seized after all the acts of execution had been performed, but before the loot came under
the final control and disposal of the looters, the offense can not be said to have been fully consummated, as it was
frustrated by the timely intervention of the guard. The offense committed, therefore, is that of frustrated theft. 63
Diño thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of
apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft is consummated or frustrated. This theory was applied again by
the Court of Appeals some 15 years later, in Flores, a case which according to the division of the court that decided it,
bore "no substantial variance between the circumstances [herein] and in [Diño]." 64 Such conclusion is borne out by
the facts in Flores. The accused therein, a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, issued a delivery
receipt for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto his truck at the
terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver proceeded to show the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at
the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on inspecting the van, and discovered that the "empty" sea van
had actually contained other merchandise as well.65 The accused was prosecuted for theft qualified by abuse of
confidence, and found himself convicted of the consummated crime. Before the Court of Appeals, accused argued in
the alternative that he was guilty only of attempted theft, but the appellate court pointed out that there was no
intervening act of spontaneous desistance on the part of the accused that "literally frustrated the theft." However, the
Court of Appeals, explicitly relying on Diño, did find that the accused was guilty only of frustrated, and not
consummated, theft.
As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found "no substantial variance" between Diño and Flores then before
it. The prosecution in Flores had sought to distinguish that case from Diño, citing a "traditional ruling" which
unfortunately was not identified in the decision itself. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the said
"traditional ruling" was qualified by the words "is placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of its contents at
once."66 Pouncing on this qualification, the appellate court noted that "[o]bviously, while the truck and the van were
still within the compound, the petitioner could not have disposed of the goods ‘at once’." At the same time, the Court
of Appeals conceded that "[t]his is entirely different from the case where a much less bulk and more common thing as
money was the object of the crime, where freedom to dispose of or make use of it is palpably less
restricted,"67 though no further qualification was offered what the effect would have been had that alternative
circumstance been present instead.
Synthesis of the Diño and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft
was produced is the ability of the actor "to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary." Such
conclusion was drawn from an 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in
determining whether theft had been consummated, "es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al
sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente." The qualifier "siquiera sea mas o menos
momentaneamente" proves another important consideration, as it implies that if the actor was in a capacity to freely
dispose of the stolen items before apprehension, then the theft could be deemed consummated. Such circumstance
was not present in either Diño or Flores, as the stolen items in both cases were retrieved from the actor before they
could be physically extracted from the guarded compounds from which the items were filched. However, as implied in
Flores, the character of the item stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to whether there could have been "free
disposition," as in the case where the chattel involved was of "much less bulk and more common x x x, [such] as
money x x x."68
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed observation on the import of the Diño ruling:
There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated when the thief is able to freely dispose of the
stolen articles even if it were more or less momentary. Or as stated in another case[ 69 ], theft is consummated upon
the voluntary and malicious taking of property belonging to another which is realized by the material occupation of the
thing whereby the thief places it under his control and in such a situation that he could dispose of it at once. This
ruling seems to have been based on Viada’s opinion that in order the theft may be consummated, "es preciso que se
haga en circumstancias x x x [70 ]"71
In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao and other cases, also states that "[i]n theft or
robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate
the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated." 72
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming variance with the Diño and Flores rulings.
People v. Batoon73 involved an accused who filled a container with gasoline from a petrol pump within view of a police
detective, who followed the accused onto a passenger truck where the arrest was made. While the trial court found
the accused guilty of frustrated qualified theft, the Court of Appeals held that the accused was guilty of consummated
qualified theft, finding that "[t]he facts of the cases of U.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v. Sobrevilla x x x indicate that
actual taking with intent to gain is enough to consummate the crime of theft."74
In People v. Espiritu,75 the accused had removed nine pieces of hospital linen from a supply depot and loaded them
onto a truck. However, as the truck passed through the checkpoint, the stolen items were discovered by the Military
Police running the checkpoint. Even though those facts clearly admit to similarity with those in Diño, the Court of
Appeals held that the accused were guilty of consummated theft, as the accused "were able to take or get hold of the
hospital linen and that the only thing that was frustrated, which does not constitute any element of theft, is the use or
benefit that the thieves expected from the commission of the offense." 76
In pointing out the distinction between Diño and Espiritu, Reyes wryly observes that "[w]hen the meaning of an
element of a felony is controversial, there is bound to arise different rulings as to the stage of execution of that
felony."77 Indeed, we can discern from this survey of jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar as frustrated theft
is concerned is muddled. It fact, given the disputed foundational basis of the concept of frustrated theft itself, the
question can even be asked whether there is really such a crime in the first place.
IV.
The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of frustrated, and not consummated, theft. As we
undertake this inquiry, we have to reckon with the import of this Court’s 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC.78
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4) persons in the premises of his
plantation, in the act of gathering and tying some coconuts. The accused were surprised by the owner within the
plantation as they were carrying with them the coconuts they had gathered. The accused fled the scene, dropping the
coconuts they had seized, and were subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to the police. After
trial, the accused were convicted of qualified theft, and the issue they raised on appeal was that they were guilty only
of simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was qualified, following Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, 79 but
further held that the accused were guilty only of frustrated qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the theft was consummated or frustrated was
raised by any of the parties. What does appear, though, is that the disposition of that issue was contained in only two
sentences, which we reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the felony as a consequence. They were not able to carry the
coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner.80
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether Diño, Flores or the Spanish authorities who may
have bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed evident problems with this formulation in Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors "were not able to perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the felon as a consequence."81 However, per Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime is frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of execution," though not producing the felony as a result.
If the offender was not able to perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted, provided that the non-
performance was by reason of some cause or accident other than spontaneous desistance. Empelis concludes that
the crime was
frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the timely arrival of the owner. However,
following Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, these facts should elicit the conclusion that the crime was only
attempted, especially given that the acts were not performed because of the timely arrival of the owner, and not
because of spontaneous desistance by the offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the present petition. Even if the two
sentences we had cited actually aligned with the definitions provided in Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, such
passage bears no reflection that it is the product of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal or jurisprudential
thought. Instead, the passage is offered as if it were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so settled it required
no further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited as authority on theft. Indeed, we cannot
see how Empelis can contribute to our present debate, except for the bare fact that it proves that the Court had once
deliberately found an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Even if Empelis were considered as a precedent for frustrated
theft, its doctrinal value is extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that inform it, and also by the fact
that it has not been entrenched by subsequent reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that frustrated theft is viable in this jurisdiction.
Considering the flawed reasoning behind its conclusion of frustrated theft, it cannot present any efficacious argument
to persuade us in this case. Insofar as Empelis may imply that convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this
jurisdiction, that decision is subject to reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the 1870 Codigo Penal de España was then in place. The
definition of the crime of theft, as provided then, read as follows:
Son reos de hurto:

1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las
cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño.
2. Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la apropriaren co intención de lucro.
3. Los dañadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del daño causado, salvo los casos previstos en los
artίculos 606, núm. 1.0; 607, núms, 1.0, 2.0 y 3.0; 608, núm. 1.0; 611; 613; Segundo párrafo del 617 y 618.
It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish Supreme Court decisions were handed
down. However, the said code would be revised again in 1932, and several times thereafter. In fact, under the Codigo
Penal Español de 1995, the crime of theft is now simply defined as "[e]l que, con ánimo de lucro,
tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño será castigado" 82
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code of Spain, "la libre disposicion" of the property is
not an element or a statutory characteristic of the crime. It does appear that the principle originated and perhaps was
fostered in the realm of Spanish jurisprudence.
The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926 commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal
de España. Therein, he raised at least three questions for the reader whether the crime of frustrated or consummated
theft had occurred. The passage cited in Diño was actually utilized by Viada to answer the question whether
frustrated or consummated theft was committed "[e]l que en el momento mismo de apoderarse de la cosa ajena,
viéndose sorprendido, la arroja al suelo." 83 Even as the answer was as stated in Diño, and was indeed derived from
the 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, that decision’s factual predicate occasioning the statement was
apparently very different from Diño, for it appears that the 1888 decision involved an accused who was surprised by
the employees of a haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of clothing off a mannequin, and who then proceeded
to throw away the garment as he fled.84
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft, and willingly recites decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain that have held to that effect.85 A few decades later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Calón pointed out
the inconsistent application by the Spanish Supreme Court with respect to frustrated theft.
Hay frustración cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del carro
que los conducia a otro que tenían preparado, 22 febrero 1913; cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto por la
intervención de la policia situada en el local donde se realizó la sustracción que impidió pudieran los reos disponer
de lo sustraído, 30 de octubre 1950. Hay "por lo menos" frustración, si existe apoderamiento, pero el culpale no llega
a disponer de la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay frustración "muy próxima" cuando el culpable es detenido por el perjudicado
acto seguido de cometer la sustracción, 28 febrero 1931. Algunos fallos han considerado la existencia de frustración
cuando, perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento de llevar los efectos hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo
1889, 22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo 1921; esta doctrina no es admissible, éstos, conforme a lo antes expuesto, son
hurtos consumados.86
Ultimately, Cuello Calón attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually possible:
La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el hurto se consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la
disposición del agente. Con este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada últimamente porla jurisprudencia española que
generalmente considera consumado el hurto cuando el culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y ésta quede por tiempo
más o menos duradero bajo su poder. El hecho de que éste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es indiferente.
El delito no pierde su carácter de consumado aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o fuere
recuperada. No se concibe la frustración, pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la
consumación del hurto no lo consume efectivamente, los raros casos que nuestra jurisprudencia, muy vacilante,
declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos consumados. 87 (Emphasis supplied)
Cuello Calón’s submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was content with replicating the Spanish
Supreme Court decisions on the matter, Cuello Calón actually set forth his own thought that questioned whether theft
could truly be frustrated, since "pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumación del
hurto no lo consume efectivamente." Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee how the execution of all the acts
necessary for the completion of the crime would not produce the effect of theft.
This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no weighted force in scholarly thought that obliges us
to accept frustrated theft, as proposed in Diño and Flores. A final ruling by the Court that there is no crime of
frustrated theft in this jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic pariah, for such a submission is hardly heretical in light of
Cuello Calón’s position.
Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the question from a fresh perspective,
as we are not bound by the opinions of the respected Spanish commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept that
theft is capable of commission in its frustrated stage. Further, if we ask the question whether there is a mandate of
statute or precedent that must compel us to adopt the Diño and Flores doctrines, the answer has to be in the
negative. If we did so, it would arise not out of obeisance to an inexorably higher command, but from the exercise of
the function of statutory interpretation that comes as part and parcel of judicial review, and a function that allows
breathing room for a variety of theorems in competition until one is ultimately adopted by this Court.
V.
The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies in the province of the legislature, through
statute, to define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as representatives of the
sovereign people, which determines which acts or combination of acts are criminal in nature. Judicial interpretation of
penal laws should be aligned with what was the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the language of
the law as it defines the crime. It is Congress, not the courts, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.88 The courts cannot arrogate the power to introduce a new element of a crime which was unintended by
the legislature, or redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew to the statutory language. Due respect for the
prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal
laws where a "narrow interpretation" is appropriate. "The Court must take heed of language, legislative history and
purpose, in order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids." 89
With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Diño/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to freely dispose
of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308,
whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what
this Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 90
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property of another without the latter’s consent. While the Diño/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the
offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender,
compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is
again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is
produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that
perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of
execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner
alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquino’s
commentaries, as earlier cited, that "[i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material
possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was
frustrated."91
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of
"taking" itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item.
But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for
it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been accomplished."
Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed
a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue
will not apply to the facts of this particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the
petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of
detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long
enough to load these onto a taxicab.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 92 And long ago, we
asserted in People v. Avila:93
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the physical
power of the thief, which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the taking must be effected animo
lucrandi and without the consent of the owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does not require that the
taking should be effected against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a distinction of
no slight importance.94
Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which
is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At
the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have
a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
Neither Diño nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained
possession over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of
property. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that
the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.
Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule —that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the
stolen property frustrates the theft — would introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect
any legislated intent,95 since the Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty
under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. It is difficult to formulate definite standards as to
when a stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the psychological belief of the
offender at the time of the commission of the crime, as implied in Diño?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size and weight of the
property, the location of the property, the number and identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the number
and identity of people whom the offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the manner
in which the stolen item had been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more. Even the fungibility or
edibility of the stolen item would come into account, relevant as that would be on whether such property is capable of
free disposal at any stage, even after the taking has been consummated.
All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was indeed
deprived of property by one who intended to produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will remain the
presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution, including the taking, have
been completed. If the facts establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar circumstances, the effect
could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been performed. But
once all these acts have been executed, the taking has been completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of property,
and ultimately the consummation of the theft.
Maybe the Diño/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Yet they do not align with the
legislated framework of the crime of theft. The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in
such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly
allows that the "free disposition of the items stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been
produced. Diño itself did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later Flores was
ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for legal support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and
even if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. The same holds
true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has not since found favor from this Court.
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched
the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we
decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be
no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take
considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference
to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206442 July 1, 2015
JOVITO CANCERAN, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 10, 2012 Decision and the
1
March 7, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 00559, which affirmed and modified the
2
September 20, 2007 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City
3
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2003-141, convicting petitioner Jovito Canceran (Canceran) for consummated Theft.
The records disclose that Canceran, together with Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz, Jr., was charged with
"Frustrated Theft." The Information reads:
That on or about October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00 noon, at Ororama Mega Center Grocery Department,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Jovito Canceran, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another with his co-accused
Frederick Vequizo, URC Merchandiser, and Marcial Diaz, Jr., a Unilever Philippines merchandiser both of Ororama
Mega Center, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at
₱28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega Center, represented by William Michael N. Arcenio, thus, performing all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of theft as a consequence but, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of some cause independent of accused’s will, that is, they were discovered by the employees of Ororama
Mega Center who prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, to the
damage and prejudice of the Ororama Mega Center.
Article 308 in relation to Article 309, and 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 4
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution presented Damalito Ompoc (Ompoc),a security guard; and William
Michael N. Arcenio (Arcenio), the Customer Relation Officer of Ororama Mega Center (Ororama),as its witnesses.
Through their testimonies, the prosecution established that on or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw Canceran
approach one of the counters in Ororama; that Canceran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes of Magic
Flakes for which he paid ₱1,423.00; that Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been checked; that
upon inspection by Ompoc and the packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic Flakes
biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth ₱28,627.20; that Canceran hurriedly left and a
chase ensued; that upon reaching the Don Mariano gate, Canceran stumbled as he attempted to ride a jeepney; that
after being questioned, he tried to settle with the guards and even offered his personal effects to pay for the items he
tried to take; that Arcenio refused to settle; and that his personal belongings were deposited in the office of Arcenio.
5
Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo merchandiser of La
Tondeña, Inc. and that on October 6, 2002, he was in Ororama to buy medicinefor his wife. On his way out, after
buying medicine and mineral water, a male person ofaround 20 years of age requested him to pay for the items in his
cart at the cashier; that he did not know the name of this man who gavehim ₱1,440.00 for payment of two boxes
labelled Magic Flakes; that he obliged with the request of the unnamed person because he was struck by his
conscience; that he denied knowing the contents of the said two boxes; that after paying at the cashier, he went out
of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney; that three persons ran after him, and he was caught; that he was
brought to the 4th floor of Ororama, where he was mauled and kicked by one of those who chased him; that they took
his Nokia 5110 cellular phone and cash amounting to ₱2,500.00; and that Ompoc took his Seiko watch and ring,
while a certain Amion took his necklace. 6
Canceran further claimed that an earlier Information for theft was already filed on October 9,2002 which was
eventually dismissed. In January 2003, a second Information was filed for the same offense over the same incident
and became the subject of the present case. 7
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Judgment, dated September 20, 2007, the RTC found Canceran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
consummated Theft in line with the ruling of the Court in Valenzuela v. People that under Article 308 of the Revised
8
Penal Code (RPC),there is no crime of "Frustrated Theft." Canceran was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, eight (8) months of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. 9
The RTC wrote that Canceran’s denial deserved scant consideration because it was not supported by sufficient and
convincing evidence and no disinterested witness was presented to corroborate his claims. As such, his denial was
considered self-serving and deserved no weight. The trial court was also of the view that his defense, that the
complaint for theft filed against him before the sala of Judge Maximo Paderanga was already dismissed, was not
persuasive. The dismissal was merely a release order signed by the Clerk of Court because he had posted bail. 10
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, Canceran filed an appeal where he raised the issue of double jeopardy for the first time. The CA held that
there could be no double jeopardy because he never entered a valid plea and so the first jeopardy never attached. 11
The CA also debunked Canceran’s contention that there was no taking because he merely pushed the cart loaded
with goods to the cashier’s booth for payment and stopped there. The appellate court held that unlawful taking was
deemed complete from the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if he had no opportunity to
dispose of the same. 12
The CA affirmed with modification the September 20, 2007 judgment of the RTC, reducing the penalty ranging from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Canceran moved for the reconsideration of the said decision,
but his motion was denied by the CA in its March 7, 2013 resolution.
Hence, this petition.
As can be synthesized from the petition and other pleadings, the following are the issues: 1] whether Canceran
should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the information; and 2] whether there was double
jeopardy.
Canceran argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction. He insists that there was already double jeopardy as
the first criminal case for theft was already dismissed and yet he was convicted in the second case. Canceran also
contends that there was no taking of the Ponds cream considering that "the information in Criminal Case No. 2003-
141 admits the act of the petitioner did not produce the crime of theft." Thus, absent the element of taking, the felony
13
of theft was never proved.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)contended that there was no double jeopardy as the first
14
jeopardy never attached. The trial court dismissed the case even before Canceran could enter a plea during the
scheduled arraignment for the first case. Further, the prosecution proved that all the elements of theft were present in
this case.
In his Reply, Canceran averred that when the arraignment of the first case was scheduled, he was already bonded
15
and ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who decided that the evidence was insufficient or the evidence lacked the
element to constitute the crime of theft. He also stressed that there was no unlawful taking as the items were
assessed and paid for.
The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.
Constitutional Right of the

Accused to be Informed of
the Nature and Cause of
Accusation against Him.
No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is
16
composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a
crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 17
Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property
belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or
force upon things. "Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the
offense could only be attempted theft, if at all."
18
"It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of
‘taking’ itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item.
But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for
it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been
accomplished." 19
A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was charged with "Frustrated Theft"
only. Pertinent parts of the Information read:
x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White
Beauty Cream valued at ₱28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega Center, represented by William Michael N.
Arcenio, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of theft as a consequence, but
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause independent of accused’s will x x x.
[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]
As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to charge Canceran of
consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced. Instead, the Information
should be construed to mean that Canceran was being charged with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily,
Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.
"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the complaint or
information and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an
accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on
which he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with
which he is charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in the
complaint or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right." Indeed, an accused
20
cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed
against him. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
21
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
22
The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted stage. In this case,
although the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of
Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because the
Information did not charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him, as he so protests.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined, not from the caption
or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated – these being
conclusions of law – but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information." In the case of Domingo v.
23
Rayala, it was written:

24
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of
the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to
the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. 25
In the subject information, the designation of the prosecutor of the offense, which was "Frustrated Theft," may be just
his conclusion. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the charge was qualified by the additional allegation, "but,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause independent of accused’s will, that is, they were discovered
by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds
White Beauty Cream, x x x. This averment, which could also be deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered
26
the charge nebulous. There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the accused, Canceran,
and holds that he was not properly informed that the charge against him was consummated theft.
No double jeopardy when

the first jeopardy never
attached
Anent the issue of double jeopardy, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the ruling of the CA.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for punishment for the same offense. The rule of double jeopardy has a
settled meaning in this jurisdiction. It means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter
cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice
and conscience. 27
Canceran argues that double jeopardy exists as the first case was scheduled for arraignment and he, already
bonded, was ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who decided that there was insufficient evidence to constitute the
crime of theft.
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. 28
Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran never raised the issue of double jeopardy before the RTC. Even 1âwphi 1
assuming that he was able to raise the issue of double jeopardy earlier, the same must still fail because legal
jeopardy did not attach. First, he never entered a valid plea. He himself admitted that he was just about to enter a
plea, but the first case was dismissed even before he was able to do so. Second, there was no unconditional
dismissal of the complaint. The case was not terminated by reason of acquittal nor conviction but simply because he
posted bail. Absent these two elements, there can be no double jeopardy.
Penalty of Attempted Theft
The penalty for consummated theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. The penalty lower by two
29
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals in an attempt to
commit a felony. The basis for reduction of penalty by two degrees is the penalty prescribed by law for the
30
consummated crime. Also, when the offenses defined in the RPC are punished with a penalty composed of two
periods, like in the crime of theft, the penalty lower by one degree is formed by two periods to be taken from the same
penalty prescribed.31
Here, the products stolen were worth ₱28,627.20. Following Article 309 par. 1 of the RPC, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed in. the same paragraph, because the value of the things stolen exceeded
₱22,000.00. In other words, a special aggravating circumstance shall affect the imposable penalty.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be within the range of Arresto Mayor
Minimum to Arresto Mayor Medium. In view of the special aggravating circumstance under Article 309 (1), the
maximum penalty should be Arresto Mayor Maximum to Prision Correccional Minimum in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 10, 2012 Decision and the March 7, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00559 are hereby MODIFIED, in that, the Court finds accused
Jovito Canceran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Theft.
Accordingly, the Court sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate prison term ranging from Four (4) Months of
Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months of Prision Correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188979 September 5, 2012

vs.
CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal from the June 15, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02759.
1
TheCA affirmed the February 22, 2007 decision 2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 209, Mandaluyong City, finding appellant Christopher Pareja guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape under an Amended Information that
reads:
That on or about the 16th day of June 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have
carnal knowledge of AAA, 13 years of age, sister of the common law spouse of accused, against her will and
3
consent, thus debasing and/or demeaning the intrinsic worth and dignity of the victim thereby prejudicing her normal
development as a child. 4
The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that at around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her
two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sister’s room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and
neck. AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket. The appellant removed AAA’s clothes, short
5 6
pants, and underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs. The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her
7
hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her
vagina. The appellant stopped when AAA’s cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellant’s upper thigh as the latter was
8
about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to
anyone. Immediately after, the appellant left the room. AAA covered herself with a blanket and cried.
9 10
At around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, AAA’s brother, CCC, went to her room and asked her why she was lying on the
floor and crying. AAA did not answer, and instead hurled invectives at CCC. AAA went to the house of her other
11
brother, but the latter was not in his house. AAA proceeded to the house of her older sister, DDD, at Block 19,
Welfareville Compound, and narrated to her what had happened. Afterwards, AAA and her two (2) siblings went to
the Women and Children’s Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police Station and reported the incident. 12
For his defense, the appellant declared on the witness stand that he hauled "filling materials" at his house, located at
Block 38, Fabella Compound, on the evening of June 15, 2003. At around 10:00 p.m., he went to his room and
slept. On the next day, the appellant, accompanied by his mother and brother-in-law, went to the municipal hall to
13
ask for financial assistance for his wife who was confined in the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctor told
him that his wife needed blood. Immediately after, the appellant and his companions went to Pasig City to find blood
donors. 14
On the evening of June 16, 2003, and while the appellant was folding the clothes of his son, two policemen entered
his house and informed him that a complaint for attempted rape had been filed against him. The police brought him to
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, forced him to admit the crime, mauled him, and then placed him in a
detention cell. The appellant added that he filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against the police
15
officers who beat him up. 16
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape in its decision of February 22, 2007, under the following terms:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him as he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
and to indemnify the victim, AAA, the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity. 17
The CA, in its decision dated June 15, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision. It explained that a slight penetration of the
labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape, and held that a slight penetration took place when the
appellant’s penis touched AAA’s vagina as he was trying to insert it.
The appellate court further ruled that the presence of people in the other room did not make it impossible for the
appellant to have raped the victim, because lust is no respecter of time and place. It also held that the victim’s lack of
tenacity in resisting the appellant’s sexual aggression did not amount to consent or voluntary submission to the
criminal act. 18
In his brief, the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him for the crime of rape, as the
19
prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of his penis into the victim’s vagina. He added that the
victim’s testimony was incredible and contrary to human experience.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
consummated rape. We convict him instead of attempted rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of all
the elements of this crime.
Carnal Knowledge Not Proven With

Moral Certainty
By definition, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat or intimidation,
or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is
demented. "Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections
20
with a woman." Carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt,
21
considering that it is the central element in the crime of rape.

22
In her testimony of February 9, 2004, AAA recounted the alleged rape, as follows:
FISCAL TRONCO:
Q: You said that the three of you then was (sic) sleeping on the floor, what is it that happened on that particular day
and time that is unusual?
A: It was like somebody was embracing me or hugging me, ma’am.
Q: When you felt that some (sic) is embracing and hugging you, what did you do?
A: I didn’t mind it because I thought that the person beside me just moved and when he made the movement, it’s
like that I was embraced, ma’am.
Q: Whom are you referring to?
A: My brother-in-law, ma’am.
Q: And after that, what else happened, if any, AAA?
A: Before that happened, my nephew cried and so I picked him up and put him on my chest and after a while, I
slept again and brought him down again and then "dumapa po ako" and I felt that somebody was kissing my nape,
ma’am.
Q: Were you able to see who was that somebody kissing your nape?
A: When I tried to evade, I looked on my side where the room was not that dark that I could not see the person and
so, I saw that it was my brother-in-law, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: When you saw that it was your brother-in-law kissing your nape while you were on a prone position, what else
happened, if any?
A: He kissed my neck, ma’am.
Q: What was your position while he was kissing your neck?
A: I was on my side at that time and I was also crying, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: Why were you crying at that time while he was kissing your neck?
A: I was afraid of what will happen next, ma’am.
Q: Aside from that incident that he was kissing your neck, was there any other previous incident that happened?
A: Yes, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: What incident was that?
A: At that time, my brother-in-law covered me and my nephew with a blanket and he tried to get my clothes off,
ma’am.
Q: When did this happen, AAA?
A: Also on said date, ma’am.
Q: You said that he covered you and your nephew with a blanket and then taking (sic) off your clothes?
A: Yes, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: Was he able to take off your clothes?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: What particular clothing was he able to take off?
A: My short pants and underwear, ma’am.
Q: While he was taking off your short pants and your underwear, what did you do, if any?
A: I tried to fight him off, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: You said that he was trying to take off your clothes and undergarments, what was your position at that time?
A: I was lying down, ma’am.
Q: What about him?
A: He was on my lap, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: You said that you saw him take off his short pants?
A: Yes, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: Did he also take off his brief?
A: Yes, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: And after that what happened, AAA?
A: After removing his undergarments, he suddenly brought his body on top of me and he held my hands. At that
time I was crying and still resisting and then he was trying to get my legs apart. I was still resisting at that time, and at
some point in time I felt weak and he was able to part my legs, ma’am.
Q: Could you please tell us how did (sic) he able to part your legs?
A: He did that with his legs while he was holding my hands, ma’am.
Q: And when he was able to part your legs, what happened next?
A: He tried to insert his sexual organ but he was not able to do so, ma’am.
Q: How did you know that he was trying to insert his sexual organ?
A: "Naidikit po niya sa ari ko."
Q: Which part of your body was he able to touch his sexual organ? (sic)
A: On my sexual organ, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: You mentioned earlier that he was not able to penetrate your private part, AAA?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: So, what happened after that?
A: I cried and then while I was resisting, I hit my wrist on the wall and my wrist was "nagasgas," ma’am.
xxxx
Q: And were you able to successfully resist?
A: Yes, ma’am, I was able to kicked (sic) his upper thigh, ma’am. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)
23
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellant’s penis did not penetrate, but merely ‘touched’ (i.e., "naidikit"),
AAA’s private part. In fact, the victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did not succeed in
inserting his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAA’s Sinumpaang Salaysay also disclosed that the appellant
24
was holding the victim’s hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This circumstance – coupled with
the victim’s declaration that she was resisting the appellant’s attempt to insert his penis into her vagina – makes
penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly, nothing in the records supports the CA’s conclusion
that the appellant’s penis penetrated, however slightly, the victim’s female organ.
Did the touching by the appellant’s penis of the victim’s private part amount to carnal knowledge such that the
appellant should be held guilty of consummated rape?
In People v. Campuhan, the Court laid down the parameters of genital contact in rape cases, thus:
25
Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in
this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated
rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the
mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g.,
mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded
eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia
majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of
the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which
does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the
penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the
mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. (italics supplied)
26
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female
organ." Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
27
attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness." 28
As earlier discussed, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the required
penile penetration. AAA’s testimony did not establish that the appellant’s penis touched the labias or slid into her
private part. Aside from AAA’s testimony, no other evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could confirm
whether there indeed had been penetration, however slight, of the victim’s labias. In the absence of testimonial or
physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the offender commenced the
commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico, we ruled that when the "touching" of
29
the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the
crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt acts: kissing AAA’s
nape and neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands and parting
her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance,
i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance. The totality of the appellant’s acts demonstrated the unmistakable objective
to insert his penis into the victim’s private parts.
A review of jurisprudence reveals that the Court has not hesitated to strike down convictions for consummated rape
when the evidence failed to show that penetration, however slight, of the victim’s vagina took place. In People v.
Bon, the Court found the appellant guilty of attempted rape only, as there was no indication that the appellant’s penis
30
even touched the labia of the pudendum of the victim. We further held that the appellant could not be convicted of
consummated rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain.
The Court had a similar ruling in People v. Miranda, where the accused tried to insert his penis into the victim’s
31
private parts, but was unsuccessful, so he inserted his fingers instead. We convicted the accused of attempted rape
only due to lack of evidence to establish that there was even a slight penile penetration. We noted, however, that the
appellant’s act of inserting his fingers would have constituted rape through sexual assault had the offense occurred
after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
In People v. Alibuyog, the victim declared that the accused placed his penis on her vagina; and claimed that it
32
touched her private parts. The Court set aside the accused’s conviction for rape, and convicted him of attempted rape
only, because we found the victim’s testimony too ambiguous to prove the vital element of penile penetration. We
added that the victim’s testimony was "replete with repeated denial of penile insertion." 33
Similarly, in People v. Quarre, the evidence for the prosecution consisted only of the victim’s testimony that the
34
accused tried, but failed, to insert his penis into her vagina, and she felt pain in the process. No medico-legal
examination report was presented in evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the accused’s conviction for rape,
and found him guilty of attempted rape only.
In People v. Ocomen, the Court also set aside the appellant’s conviction for rape because no proof was adduced of
35
even the slightest penetration of the female organ, aside from a general statement of the victim that she had been
"raped."
People v. Monteron is another noteworthy case where the Court set aside the appellant’s conviction for rape. In this
36
case, the victim testified that the accused placed his penis on top of her vagina, and that she felt pain. In finding the
accused guilty of attempted rape only, we held that there was no showing that the accused’s penis entered the
victim’s vagina. We added that the pain that the victim felt might have been caused by the accused’s failed attempts
to insert his organ into her vagina.
In People v. Mariano, the accused tried to insert his penis into the victim’s vagina, but failed to secure penetration.
37
The Court set aside the accused’s conviction for three (3) counts of rape and found him guilty of attempted rape only.
We explained the necessity of carefully ascertaining whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial
threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Arce, Jr., the Court found the accused guilty of attempted rape only, because the victim did not declare
38
that there was the slightest penetration, which was necessary to consummate rape. On the contrary, she
categorically stated that the accused was not able to insert his penis into her private parts because she was moving
her hips away. We further ruled that the victim’s attempt to demonstrate what she meant by "idinidikit ang ari" was
unavailing to prove that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Francisco, the victim testified that the accused "poked" her vagina. The Court set aside the accused’s
39
conviction for qualified rape, and convicted him instead only of attempted rape after failing to discern from the victim's
testimony that the accused attained some degree of penile penetration, which was necessary to consummate rape. 1âwphi 1
In People v. Dimapilis, the Court refused to convict the accused for consummated rape on the basis of the victim's
40
testimony that she felt the accused's penis pressed against her vagina as he tried to insert it. We explained that in
order to constitute consummated rape, there must be entry into the vagina of the victim, even if only in the slightest
degree.
Finally, in People v. Tolentino, the Court reversed the accused’s conviction for rape and convicted him of attempted
41
rape only, as there was paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place. We reasoned out that the
victim’s statements that the accused was "trying to force his sex organ into mine" and "binundol-undol ang kanyang
ari" did not prove that the accused’s penis reached the labia of the pudendum of the victim’s vagina.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion." We emphasize that a conviction cannot be made to
42
rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. In the present case, the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape.
The Proper Penalty and Indemnities
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for attempted rape is two degrees lower than the
prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua for consummated rape. Two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua is
prision mayor whose range is six (6) years and one (1) day to 12 years. Without any attendant aggravating or
mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed
upon the appellant is prision mayor in its medium period, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, which is prision correccional whose range is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, in any of
its periods. Accordingly, we sentence the appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
In addition, we order the appellant to pay the victim ₱ 30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱ 25,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱ 10,000.00 as exemplary damages, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on attempted rape cases. 43
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 15, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
02759 is MODIFIED, as follows:
The appellant's conviction for the crime of rape is VACATED, and
(1) we find appellant Christopher Pareja y Velasco GUILTY of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE;
(2) we SENTENCE him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum; and
(3) we ORDER him to PAY the victim the amounts of ₱ 30,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱ 25,000.00 as moral
damages; and ₱ 10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014
NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only
the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a
naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate
the female's vagina.
The Case
This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
1
conviction for attempted rape of the petitioner by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union (RTC),
and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordering him to pay moral damages
of ₱20,000.00 to AAA, the victim.
2
Antecedents
The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different victims. At
arraignment, he pleaded not guiltyto the respective informations, to wit: Criminal Case No. 2388
Attempted Rape
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road,
Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar,Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and
intimidation commenced the commission ofrape directly byovert acts, to wit: While private complainant AAA, an
unmarried woman, fifteen (15) yearsold, was sleeping inside the tentalong Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused
remove her panty and underwear and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast with
intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is
to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said
offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said
offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Acts of Lasciviousness
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road,
Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously touch the vagina of [BBB] against the latter’s will and with no other purpose but to satisfy his lascivious
4
desire to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows: 6
x x x [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and
glass wares in different municipalities around the country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto and Belinda employed
AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. From
Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney owned by
Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the
name of "Jess".
Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they parked in front of
Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that they will
have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.
On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less thanan hour later,
AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching
her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered
her not to scream or she’ll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas
fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not totell the incident to
her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she
failed to wake him up.
Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw
her companion awake but her hands wereshaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning. Later still, while they
were on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB asked the people around where they can find the municipal building.
An old woman pointed to them the place.
In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they met a policeman
by the name of "Sabas".
They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to the police station
where he personally confronted his accusers. When Norberto’s wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an
argument ensued between them.
On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 o’clock in the morning, the police investigator ordered the complainants to
return at6:00 o’clock in the morning. Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and BBB home with them and
worked for them until December 30, 1994, after which they were sent back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective sworn statements against
Norberto.
The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was presented in the assailed decision of the
CA, as follows:
7
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the story. The accused
maintains that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date of the alleged
incident, there were many people around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering the location of the
tents, which were near the road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open,
not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them.
He believes that the reason why the complainants filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose of
extorting money from him.
Judgment of the RTC
After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6, 2000 finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of lasciviousness in Criminal
Case No. 2389, to wit:
8
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the accused NORBERTO
CRUZ Y BARTOLOME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized in Article 335 in relation with (sic) Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code respectively. With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS PRISION MAYOR as Maximum and the accessory penalties
provided for by law and to pay the victim AAA the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.
With regard to the crime ofACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) MONTHS ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for
by law, and to pay the victim BBBthe amount of ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two cases is counted in his favor.
SO ORDERED. 9
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of attempted rape despite the
dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not testify.
On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for attempted rape in
Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to
the insufficiency of the evidence, holding thusly:
10
In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and inconsequential as to dent, even slightly, the
overall integrity and probative value of the prosecution's evidence insofar as AAA is concerned.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two (2)
degrees" prescribed by law for the consummated felony. In this case, the penalty for rape if it had been consummated
would have been reclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penalty Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. The penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetuais prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be the medium period of prision
mayorin the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty nextlower to that prescribed for the offense which in this case is prision correccionalin any of its periods.
We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of ₱20,000.00 by way of moral damages against the
accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral damages may be awarded without the need of proof or pleading since it is
assumed that the private complainant suffered moral injuries, more so, when the victim is aged 13 to 19.
Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the accused argues that there is not enough
evidence to support such accusation. BBB did not testify and neither her sworn statement was formally offered in
evidence to support the charge for acts of lasciviousness.
In this case, the evidence adducedby the prosecution is insufficient to substantiate the charge of acts of
lasciviousness against the accusedappellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the sworn
statement of BBB to the effectthat the accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing her breast and touching
her private part. However, she was not presented to testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw the accused
touching the private parts of BBB, there was no testimony to the effect that suchlascivious acts were without the
consent or against the will of BBB. 11
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CA’s decision was not in accord with law or with jurisprudence,
particularly:
I. In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the alleged victim; and
II. In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues that AAA still continued
working for him and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted rape in the early morning of
December 21, 1994, thereby belying his commission of the crime against her; that he could not have undressed her
without rousing her if she had gone to sleep only an hour before, because her bra was locked at her back; that her
testimony about his having been on top of her for nearly an hour while they struggled was also inconceivable unless
she either consented to his act and yielded to his lust, or the incident did not happen at all, being the product only of
her fertileimagination; that the record does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis was poised to
penetrate her; and that she and her mother demanded from him ₱80,000.00 as settlement, under threat that she
would file a case against him.12
On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA that cast doubt on her
veracity.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court reviews only questions of law. No review of the findings
13
of fact by the CA is involved. As a consequence of thisrule, the Court accords the highest respect for the factual
findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies
and the conclusions drawn from its factual findings, particularly when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial experience
has shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in the best position to decideissues of credibility of witnesses, having
themselves heard and seen the witnesses and observed firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of
testifying under exacting examination. As such, the contentionsof the petitioner on the credibility of AAA as a witness
for the State cannot beentertained. He thereby raises questions of fact that are outside the scope of this appeal.
Moreover, he thereby proposes to have the Court, which is not a trier of facts, review the entire evidence adduced by
the Prosecution and the Defense.
Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of law of whether or not the
petitioner’s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such thatthey faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and
touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted rape, the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted
and punished him. Based on the information, supra, he committed such acts "with intent of having carnal knowledge
ofher by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the
said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting
the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party."
There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. In People v.
Lamahang, the Court, speaking through the eminent Justice Claro M.Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt acts
14
would constitute anattempted felony, to wit:
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of
the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense,
inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and
natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the
offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. x x x x.
"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage iswanting, the
nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the
nature of the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature,
by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things
connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts
susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent aswell
as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The
relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to
produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertainedfrom the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to
avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator
to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt
to exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts
performed must be such that, withoutthe intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless." 15
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we have to determine the law
on rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the crime he was convicted of. That law was
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as follows:
Article335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in
the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxxx
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge isdefined simply as
"theact of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman," which explains why the slightest penetration of
16
the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the peniscapable of
consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female. In People v. Campuhan, the Court has
17 18
defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in rape in the following terms:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs,
a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeedtouched the labias or slid into the female organ,
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the
labias, which are required to be "touched" bythe penis, are by their natural situsor location beneath the mons pubisor
the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence,
the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g.,
mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the rounded
eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia
majoraor the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of
the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which
does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majorais the labia minora.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majoramust be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the
penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching
the mons pubisof the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendumby the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied]
It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita, the Court clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriñia whereby the offender
19 20
was declared guilty of frustrated rapebecause of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
offended party, was a stray decisionfor not having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on
rape stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a
frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Codeare that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim,
because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing more
to be done by him. 21
Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt actsfor purposes of the
attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada: 22
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular
crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etrefor the law requiring a direct overtact is that,
in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must
be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or
an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long
as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is.It is necessary that
the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the
"first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the
attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of
having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its
attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt actswithout the
offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts
performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal
law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted
23
rape withoutsuch overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted
rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminalintent be carried to its complete termination without being
thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The
24 25
gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of
sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing
her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from
such circumstances thatrape, and no other,was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so,
despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or
"susceptible of double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not
permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not
exclusively be rapehad he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other
felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.
26
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not include
equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended
crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his
perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory
27
acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for
himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such
acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the
Revised Penal Codefor as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality
no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent really was. 28
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of lasciviousness?
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the
offender’sintent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not
required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the
29
penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis
capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only
30
the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed. 31
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated whenthe
following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon
another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or
intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived ofreason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age. In that regard, lewdis defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it
32
signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.
33
The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA
embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and
satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His
embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of
evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any
inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if
any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in People v.
Bugarin, where the accused was charged with attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by means of
34
force and intimidation, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime
of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant],
a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away." The accused was held liable only for acts of
lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the actdescribed," and the intent to have
sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that the
"act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse." 35
Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished
with prision correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances, prision correccional is imposed in its medium
period, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower
than prision correccionalwhich ranges from one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the
indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one day of prision correccional, as the maximum.
In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender violates her chastity by his
lewdness. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
1âwphi 1
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for
omission." Indeed, Article 2219, (3), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in acts of
36
lasciviousness to recover moral damages. Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the record, decrees
37
that ₱30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages. In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of
38
₱20,000.00. 39
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to impose interest as a part of the
damages in crimes and quasidelicts. In that regard, the moral damages of ₱20,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.
40
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME guilty of ACTS
OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and, ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him with the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months
of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the
maximum; ORDERS him to pay moral damages of ₱30,000.00 and civil indemnity of ₱20,000.00 to the complainant,
with interest of 6% per annum on such awards reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and
DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213415, September 26, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIMMY EVASCO Y NUGAY AND ERNESTO

ECLAVIA, Accused.
JIMMY EVASCO Y NUGAY, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The determination of whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
attendant requires the arduous review of the acts of the accused in contrast with the diminished
strength of the victim. There must be a showing of gross disproportionality between each of them.
Mere numerical superiority on the part of the accused does not automatically equate to superior
strength. The determination must take into account all the tools, skills and capabilities available to the
accused and to the victim to justify a finding of disproportionality; otherwise, abuse of superior
strength is not appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
The Case
The Court considers and resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Jimmy Evasco y Nugay (Jimmy) who
assails his conviction for murder handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63, in
Calauag, Quezon through the judgment rendered on November 22, 2011 in Criminal Case No. 5019-
C,1 which the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed on appeal through the decision promulgated on January
6, 2014.2
Antecedents
For the killing of Wilfredo Sasot, Jimmy, along with Ernesto Eclavia (Ernesto), was indicted for murder
under the information that alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2006, at Barangay Mambaling, Municipality of Calauag, Province
of Quezon, Philippines; and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Jimmy Evasco, armed with a stone, conspiring and confederating with Ernesto Eclavia and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and taking advantage
of their superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit
with the said stone one Wilfredo Sasot, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries on his head,
which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The factual and procedural antecedents were summarized m the assailed decision of the CA in the
following manner, viz.:
x x x the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Lorna Sasot, Joan Fernandez, and Dr.
Haidee T. Lim in order to establish the following:
On June 6, 2006, at about 9:00 p.m., while in Barangay Mambaling, Calauag, Quezon, witness Lorna
Sasot (Lorna) went to the house of their neighbor, one Armando Braga (Armando), to fetch her
husband, Wilfredo Sasot (Wilfredo).
When Lorna arrived at Armando's house, she saw Ernesto boxing Wilfredo. Thereafter, she saw Jimmy
hit Wilfredo's head with a stone. As a result, Wilfredo fell to the ground with his face up.
While Wilfredo was still on the ground, Jimmy continuously hit him with a stone and Ernesto was
boxing Wilfredo's body.
After mauling Wilfredo, Jimmy and Ernesto walked away together.
Subsequently, Lorna brought Wilfredo to the hospital and was pronounced dead-on-arrival.
According to Lorna, Wilfredo did not fight back when Ernesto and Jimmy mauled him. He just parried
the hands of Ernesto. She also claimed that Jimmy was standing at the back of Wilfredo, when he
pounded a stone on Wilfredo's head many times.
Witness Joan Fernandez (Joan) corroborated the testimony of Lorna. She alleged that she was
standing for about four meters from the accused when the incident happened. Wilfredo was standing
when Jimmy and Ernesto mauled him. In particular, she stated, "[s]inusuntok po saka iyong bato
pinupukpuk po sa ulo ni Wilfredo Sasot."
Joan also stated that Jimmy hit Wilfredo's head with a stone, which is as big as her fist, while Ernesto
with his bare hands hit Wilfredo on his face, chest and neck. Jimmy and Ernesto simultaneously
attacked Wilfredo, who was unable to run because the two of them were holding him.
Lorna and Joan identified in open court Jimmy as one of the persons who mauled Wilfredo.
In addition, one Dr. Haidee T. Lim (Dr. Lim), Municipal Health Officer of Calauag, Quezon, testified for
the prosecution. She stated that she conducted a Post Mortem Examination of Wilfredo's cadaver. She
found that Wilfredo sustained a lacerated wound on his right ear, which could have been caused by a
blunt instrument or a hard object. She also averred that there was an abrasion on the area below the
chin of Wilfredo.
Dr. Lim also issued the Certificate of Death of Wilfredo and indicated therein that the "immediate
cause [of his death] was cerebral infected secondary to mauling, this means a traumatic death or
brain injury secondary to mauling."
For its part, the defense presented Jimmy in order to establish the following:
On June 6, 2006, Jimmy was in Barangay Mambaling, Calauag, Quezon and was having a drinking
spree with Wilfredo, Ernesto, Armando, Armando's son, along with a certain Efren and Ito.
At about 9:00p.m., Ernesto and Wilfredo had a heated argument. Because the group was allegedly
accustomed to such argument, the group did not interfere.
Thereafter, Ernesto and Wilfredo had a fist fight. Wilfredo stood up and Ernesto pushed him on a
chair. Then, Wilfredo fell to the ground. The group tried to pacify Ernesto and Wilfredo because the
latter was already lying on the ground.
In his cross-examination, Jimmy stated that when Ernesto and Wilfredo were fighting, he was held by
Armando and was told not to interfere. He also said that there were only two punches when Wilfredo
fell from his chair.
Jimmy averred that the group had a drinking session from 3:00 p.m. up to 10:00 p.m. After the
incident, he went home.4
Judgment of the RTC

After trial, the RTC convicted Jimmy, concluding that the Prosecution's witnesses were credible as they
did not have any ill-motive to impute a heinous crime against Jimmy unless the imputation was true;
that Jimmy and his co-accused had conspired to kill Wilfredo as borne out by their concerted actions in
assaulting the latter; that the killing of Wilfredo had been treacherous and attended with abuse of
superior strength; and that the attendance of evident premeditation was ruled out.
The dispositive portion of the judgment of the RTC reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the prosecution has sufficiently proved and convinced this court
beyond reasonable doubt that JIMMY EVASCO y Nugay is GUILTY of Murder for the killing of
Wilfredo Sasot and that he should be punished therefor. He is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua
or imprisonment from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years without eligibility for
parole. Let his preventive imprisonment be deducted from the penalty herein imposed pursuant to the
provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Jimmy Evasco is likewise ordered to indemnify the family of the late Wilfredo Sasot the following
amounts:
Php75,000.00 - civil indemnity for death;

Php75,000.00 - for and as moral damages;
Php30,000.00 - for and as exemplary damages;
Php25,000.00 - for and as temperate damages.
Let the records of the case insofar as Ernesto Eclavia alias Boy is concerned be sent to the Archives
without prejudice to its subsequent prosecution upon the arrest or voluntary surrender of said
accused.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Jimmy. It concurred with the disquisition of the RTC,
except that it declared that treachery was not attendant. It concluded that Jimmy had committed
murder because he and Ernesto abused their superior strength in killing the victim and in preventing
the latter from fleeing. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63 in Criminal Case No. 5019-C is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that all monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, this appeal.7
Issue
Jimmy argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction for murder considering that the RTC
gravely erred in finding that conspiracy had existed between him and Ernesto because there was no
direct evidence to prove the conspiracy, but only circumstantial evidence. He argues that the
Prosecution did not establish the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
information.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
The essential requisites of murder that the Prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt are,
namely: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (4) that the killing was not parricide or infanticide.8
As borne out by the record, Jimmy and Ernesto ganged up on Wilfredo, with Ernesto punching
Wilfredo and Jimmy, from behind, hitting Wilfredo on the head with a rock. According to the medico-
legal officer, the continuous trauma on the brain was the cause of Wilfredo's death. That Jimmy and
Ernesto were the authors of the crime who should be held criminally responsible for the killing of
Wilfredo is beyond dispute.
Did the acts of Jimmy and Ernesto establish a conspiracy between them?
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony, and decide to commit it.9 Conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by positive
and conclusive evidence, direct or circumstantial.
Jimmy and Ernesto were shown to have acted in conspiracy when they assaulted Wilfredo. Although
their agreement concerning the commission of the felony, and their decision to commit it were not
established by direct evidence, the records contained clear and firm showing of their having acted in
concert to achieve a common design – that of assaulting Wilfredo. Direct proof of the agreement
concerning the commission of a felony, and of the decision to commit it is not always accessible, but
that should not be a hindrance to rendering a finding of implied conspiracy. Thus, the Court has
discoursed in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People:10
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which
requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However,
conspiracies are not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second
form, the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to
have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied conspiracy is
proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a
concert of action and a community of interest.11
Indeed, when it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy could be inferred although no actual meeting among
them is proved.12
The lower courts disregarded the alibi and denial interjected by the accused-appellant in his defense.
The lower courts were correct in doing so, for alibi and denial were generally self-serving and easily
fabricated. Moreover, several witnesses positively identified Jimmy as one of the assailants of the
victim. Such positive identification, being categorical and consistent, could not be undone by alibi and
denial in the absence of any credible showing of ill-motive on the part of the identifying witnesses.13
The CA concluded that the assault was not treacherous. We concur. Treachery exists when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.14 For treachery to be appreciated,
therefore, the State must establish the following elements, to wit: (1) the accused must employ
means, method, or manner of execution that will ensure his safety from defensive or retaliating acts
on the part of the victim, with no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the accused must deliberately or consciously adopt such means, method, or manner
of execution.15 The sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the unsuspecting victim is of
the essence of treachery because such manner of attack deprives the latter of any real chance to
defend himself and at the same time ensures the commission of the assault without risk to the
aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.16
In this case, there was no evidence adduced to show that Ernesto and Jimmy had deliberately chosen
their particular mode of attack to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal intention. None of the
Prosecution's witnesses had seen how the assault had commenced; hence, treachery could not be held
to have attended the assault that led to the untimely death of the victim.
The CA found that Jimmy and Ernesto had perpetrated the killing with abuse of superior strength; and
that the manner of attack indicated abuse of their superiority,17 observing that their simultaneous acts
of hitting Wilfredo with the rock and mauling him together indicated their taking advantage of their
combined strengths to assault the victim.
We reverse the lower courts' findings. Abuse of superior strength is to be appreciated only when there
was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressors that was plainly and
obviously advantageous to the latter who purposely selected or took advantage of such inequality in
order to facilitate the commission of the crime. The assailants must be shown to have consciously
sought the advantage, or to have the deliberate intent to use their superior advantage. In this
context, to take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force excessively out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of the
attendance of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. 18
Mere numerical superiority on the part of the aggressors does not define the attendance of this
aggravating circumstance. As the Court pointed out in People v. Beduya:19
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that
there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime
was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative
strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants
purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take
advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means
of defense available to the person attacked. [Bold emphasis supplied]
A review quickly illustrates that the lower courts did not calibrate the relative strengths of the
aggressors and their victim. Their failure to do so was palpable enough, for there was no indication of
the assailants having deliberately taken advantage of their numerical superiority if there were no
witnesses who could describe how the assault had commenced. For sure, their having assaulted the
victim together was not by itself a definite index of their having deliberately taken advantage of their
greater number.
Considering that the numerical superiority of the assailants could not be considered as the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength that would qualify the killing, the crime was homicide, not
murder.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code punishes homicide with reclusion temporal. With the absence of
any aggravating circumstances, the medium period of reclusion temporal – from 14 years, eight
months and one day to 17 years and four months – is the proper imposable penalty. Pursuant to
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be derived
from prision mayor (i.e., from six years and one day to 12 years), the penalty next lower
than reclusion temporal, while the maximum of the indeterminate sentence should be 14 years, eight
months and one day. In short, the indeterminate sentence of the accused-appellant is 10 years
of prison mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as
the maximum.
To conform with People v. Jugueta,20 the Court reduces the civil indemnity and moral damages to
P50,000.00 each, but increases the amount of temperate damages to P50,000.00 (in lieu of actual
damages representing the expenses for the burial of the remains of the victim, which were not proved
with certainty). The award of exemplary damages is deleted because of the absence of any
aggravating circumstances. In addition, all the amounts allowed herein shall earn interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full settlement.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES accused-appellant Jimmy

Evasco y Nugay GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, and, accordingly, SENTENCES him to
suffer the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prison mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and ORDERS him to pay the heirs of the
late Wilfredo Sasot P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
temperate damages, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until full
settlement.
The accused-appellant shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 227748, June 19, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. EDDIE VERONA, ACCUSED,
EFREN VERONA AND EDWIN VERONA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an ordinary appeal to reverse the 1 August 2016 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR HC No. 01481 which affirmed with modification the 20 February 2012 Judgment 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 99-01-42, finding accused Eddie
Verona (Eddie) and accused-appellants Efren and Edwin Verona (Efren and Edwin) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the death of Manuel Tingoy (Manuel).
The Charge
In an Information signed by Provincial Prosecutor Teresita S. Lopez, Eddie, Efren, and Edwin were
charged with the crime of murder penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of October, 1998, in the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and abuse
of superior strength, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously performed the following
acts, to wit: accused Dioscoro Verona and Eddie Verona flagged down the passenger jeepney driven
by Romeo Ortega and when the vehicle stopped, accused Efren Verona, Edwin Verona and Edgar
Verona suddenly and unexpectedly took turns in hacking and stabbing Manuel Tingoy with the use of
short bolos and a long bolo which the said accused provided themselves for the purpose while accused
Rogelio Verona who was also armed with a bolo, stood on guard, thereby inflicting multiple incised and
stab wounds on the different parts of the body of Manuel Tingoy which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
During their arraignment on 22 November 1999, Dioscoro Verona, the father of Eddie and Edgar
Verona, Efren and Edwin pleaded not guilty. A pre trial conference was conducted on 7 December
1999. Trial on the merits of the case ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: (1) Ms. Eva Castafio, a passerby riding a motorcyle; and
(2) Dr. Nemia Yebron-Sangrano, the Municipal Health Officer of Dagami, Leyte. The prosecution also
formally offered in evidence documentary Exhibit "A" and series, the medico-legal necropsy report
issued on 28 October 1998 by Dr. Nemia Yebron-Sangrano, and Exhibit "B" and series, a sketch of the
human anatomy with printed name and signature of Dr. Nemia Yebron-Sangrano.4
The defense presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Edwin Verona, (2) Efren Verona,
and (3) Dioscoro Verona.
Dioscoro Verona died while under detention.5 Eddie Verona remains at large.6
Below is the version of facts of the prosecution as cited in the Decision of the Court of Appeals:
Around 8:40 in the morning of October 27, 1998, Romeo Ortega (Ortega) was driving his passenger
jeepney known as "Valizing" along the highway in Barangay Guingauan, Tanauan, Leyte. The
"Valizing" which was plying the Burauen-Tacloban City route, had Manuel [Tingoy] as conductor. The
jeepney came from Burauen, Leyte and was on its way to Tacloban City.
Dioscoro and Eddie flagged down the jeepney and Ortega stopped to let them aboard. Suddenly
Edgar, who was then standing on the left side of the jeepney, tried to stab Ortega with a "pisao"
(short bolo). However, it was the right hand of Arlene Yepes, the passenger seated on the left side of
Ortega, that was hit. Seeing Arlene Yepes wounded, Ortega immediately drove off.
Ortega knew Edgar as the conductor of "7 Brothers," a competitor transportation company plying the
same route - Burauen Tacloban City.
As the "Valizing" left, Eva Castaño, who was then riding a motorcycle twelve meters behind the said
jeepney saw Dioscoro, Eddie, Edwin, Edgar and Efren. Dioscoro, Eddie and Edwin carried long bolos,
about 70 em. in length, while Edgar and Efren carried short bolos, about 33-34 em. in length. Eva
Castaño also saw Rogelio Verona standing near a barangay tanod outpost, about six meters away
from the "Valizing."
Eva Castaño knew Efren, Edwin and Eddie even before the October 27, 1998 incident because she
used to go to Cansamada, Dagami, Leyte where said accused lived and had seen them in the place.
Manuel, the conductor, was then holding on with both hands on the "Valizing" and was standing on its
rear step board. Suddenly, Efren and Eddie stabbed Manuel at the back, causing the latter to fall on
the ground. As Manuel lay flat on the ground, Edwin hacked Manuel on the head and many times on
the body. Edgar also hacked Manuel. Dioscoro was seen holding a bolo as he stood near Manuel.
Dr. Nemia Yebron Sangrano, Municipal Health Officer of Dagami, Leyte, examined the dead body of
Manuel. In her Medico Legal Necropsy Report, she determined the death of Manuel as severe
hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds. The wounds sustained by the victim were:
xxxx
Dr. Sangrano identified wounds numbers 1, 2, 3 and 6 as fatal because such wounds injured vital
organs and major blood vessels. She opined that the incised and stab wounds could have been
inflicted by a sharp-edged instrument, such as a bolo.7
On the other hand, the version of facts of the defense as cited in the same Decision is as follows:
The defense presented appellants Edwin, Efren and Dioscoro.
Appellant Edwin declared that he was in Barangay Guingauan, Tanauan, Leyte on October 27, 1998
and was waiting for the results of the Jai-Alai game. After an hour, his brother Edgar and Manuel, the
victim, were fighting. He ran inside the house of a certain person nicknamed "Caradol" to get a long
bolo. His house was 30 meters away from the place where Edgar and Manuel were fighting. At the
time he saw them, Edgar and Manuel were delivering stab thrusts at each other. Edgar, who was
smaller than Manuel, was armed with a long bolo, while Manuel was armed with a short bolo. After
about 20 minutes of fighting, Manuel fell down because he sustained wounds on his head and nape.
Edgar was wounded on the finger of his left hand. [After] Manuel fell down, Edwin left and went to his
nipa hut in his ricefield in Barangay Cansamada, Dagami, Leyte. Edgar remained in the place. At the
time that Edgar and Manuel were fighting, Efren did not get involved. Edwin did not know where
Dioscoro was during the fight and he does not know Eva Castaño.
The second defense witness was Efren. On October 27, 1998, he was in the house of his uncle, Manuel
Manubay, in Barangay Cansamada East and was watching television. The night before, he also
watched television and went to bed at nine o' clock in the evening. Most of the time, he spends his
evenings in said house since it is big and he can watch television. The house of his father is located
from the house of his uncle Manuel Manubay. He stayed in the house of his uncle until noontime of
October 27, 1998 and left for home. After the incident, he just stayed in Barangay Cansamada until he
was arrested by the police [i]n September 1999. He does not know Manuel.
Dioscoro was the last defense witness. He died during the pendency of the case but after he testified
in court. He testified that he was in the barangay hall of Barangay Cansamada East on October 27,
1998 and was on duty as a barangay councilor. He was implicated in the case and came to know that
he was included three months after the incident. During those three months, he stayed in their house
and did what he customarily does. The distance from Barangay Cansamada East and Barangay
Guingauan, Tanauan, Leyte is about two kilometers. Edwin and Efren are his sons. He did not know
about what the prosecution witnesses testified against them.8
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Judgment dated 20 February 2012, the Regional Trial Court found Efren and Edwin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, abuse of superior strength, intent to kill, and conspiracy attending the commission of the
crime. The Regional Trial Court held that the version of the prosecution was more "credible and
believable and in accord with ordinary human experience."9 The dispositive portion of the Judgment
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused EFREN VERONA
and EDWIN VERONA, Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 99-01-42 and
each one of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for
parole. They are also hereby ORDERED to jointly and severally indemnify the Heirs of Manuel Tingoy,
the sum of Php75,000.00 for civil indemnity ex delict[o]; Php75,000.00 for moral damages; and
Php30,000.00 for exemplary damages.
Both accused EFREN VERONA and EDWIN VERONA are however ACQUITTED from the charge for
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 99-0lw40 due to insufficiency of evidence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.10
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 1 August 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, stating that "a trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed on appeal," especially if no facts of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal. The Court of Appeals thus held:
WHEREFORE, this appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated 20 February 2012 of Branch 6 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City in Crim. Case No. 99w01-42 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The phrase "without eligibility for parole" in the penalty is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.11
The Issue
Whether or not Eddie (at large), Efren, and Edwin are guilty of the crime of murder penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is unmeritorious. Efren and Edwin's defenses of alibi and denial deserve no credence since
they were not able to prove the impossibility of their physical presence at the time and scene of the
incident.
Efren and Edwin alleged the following grounds in their appeal:
1. Prosecution witness, Eva Castaño, was not credible and reliable, thus, the guilt of appellants [was]
not proven beyond reasonable doubt;
2. The trial court erred in finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime despite the
prosecution's failure to establish and prove it;
3. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery despite the failure of
the prosecution to establish and prove it; and
4. The trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength when
it should have been absorbed in treachery.
Inconsistencies may be disregarded if they do not impair the essential veracity of a

witness's testimony.
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things with the same quantum of
evidence of proof beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all of the
elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime.12 It is basic that when a crime is committed, the first duty of the prosecution
is to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no
conviction even if the commission of the crime is established.13
Efren and Edwin allege that the prosecution eyewitness, Eva Castaño, was not credible and reliable
because first, there were material inconsistencies and substantial contradictions in her statements,
and second, her relative position from the crime scene did not possibly afford her good visibility for
her to recognize the faces of the assailants.14
Efren and Edwin put much weight on the inconsistent testimony given by Eva Castaño regarding the
first time she saw Efren and Edwin. In her sworn affidavit, she recounted that she first saw Efren and
Edwin before the jeepney left. On the other hand, in her direct testimony, she testified that she first
saw them after the jeepney had left. Finally, on cross-examination, she admitted that she knew Efren
and Edwin even before the incident happened because she was a member of the cooperative in Brgy.
Cansamada, a barangay Efren and Edwin frequented.15
The above inconsistencies are minor details which do not detract from Eva Castaño's credibility. These
inconsistencies may be disregarded if they do not impair the essential veracity of the testimony of a
witness.16 The eyewitness's confusion regarding the first time she saw Efren and Edwin does not affect
in any manner the facts constituting the commission of the crime. The inconsistencies in her sworn
affidavit and in-court testimonies were minimal and immaterial. Even if she was approximately 12
meters away from the locus criminis and considering that she testified in court three years after the
incident, Eva Castaño was still categorical and consistent in the material details of her affidavit and
testimony, that is, the identities of Efren and Edwin and the commission of the crime of murder.
Furthermore, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that "findings of fact of the trial court as
to the credibility of witnesses are accorded great 1weight and respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings."17 This is because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility of witnesses, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has overlooked certain facts of substance and value. 18
Weighing the versions of the prosecution and the defense, the Regional Trial Court found that Efren
and Edwin's defenses of alibi and denial did not prove: the impossibility of their physical presence at
the time and scene of the crime. We agree with the Regional Trial Court that the testimony of the sole
eyewitness, Eva Castaño, was credible and straightforward:
[T]he Court has found the version of the prosecution to be credible[,] believable [and] in accord with
ordinary human experience. The eyewitness, Eva Castaño is also a resident of Dagami, Leyte and it
was reasonable to believe her claim that she personally knows the accused. Her narration of the
incident was clear, categorical and consistent in their material points. xxx. Certainly, a person
witnessing something as gruesome as the killing of a man by several men acting in concert with one
another is something which is not easily erased in one's memory. Here in this case, the said
eyewitness took the witness stand in the year 2001 or 3 years after the killing of the victim. Despite
the lapse of said period of time, she was able to accurately describe what she saw. xxx. Moreover, not
anyone among the accused ascribed any ill-will or ill-motive on her part as reason for her testimony.19
Where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with the accused, where the locus criminis afforded
good visibility and where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the
accused; then the witness's version of the story prevails over alibi and denial and deserves much
weight.20
The elements of murder and of conspiracy were proven.
Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that the prosecution sufficiently
proved Efren and Edwin's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The following elements were proven to
sustain the conviction for murder: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed said
person; (3) that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, such as treachery; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 21
Manuel's killing in this case was attended with treachery - a sudden and unexpected attack by the
aggressors on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressors, and without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim.22
In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was correctly appreciated by the lower courts
given the manner by which Efren and Edwin ki1led Manuel. The Regional Trial Court, being in the best
position to have assessed the evidence on record and heard the testimony of Eva Castaño, held that:
The evidence very clearly established that the victim was stabbed immediately after the Jeepney he
was riding - the victim then was positioned at the rear, standing on the stepboard of the vehicle - was
stopped by the accused. Prosecution eyewitness Eva Castaño categorically and in simple terms
described the manner in which the accused killed the victim: Efren Verona delivered the first stab blow
on the victim. After Manuel Tingoy fell to the ground, Edwin Verona hacked the victim on the head and
the body using his weapon; Edgar Verona also hacked the victim using his own 33 cms[.] long bolo;
Efren Verona utilized his own 33 cms[.] long bolo to stab the victim at the back of his body; and Efren
first stabbed the victim, and followed by Edwin. At the time he was first stabbed, Manuel Tingoy was
standing on the step board of the Jeepney [and] was holding on the bars.23
The sudden attack by Efren and Edwin with stab blows and 33-cm. long bolos against an unsuspecting
Manuel while he was riding the jeepney caught the victim by surprise. Manuel was clearly unprepared
and had no means to put up a defense. Such aggression ensured the commission of the crime without
risk on Efren and Edwin. Treachery was attendant not only because of the suddenness of the attack
but also due to the absence of opportunity to repel the aggress1on.
Regarding the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, we agree with Efren and Edwin
and the finding of the Court of Appeals that abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed in
treachery. Since treachery qualifies the crime of murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former.24
As for the issue of conspiracy, Efren and Edwin alleged in their Brief that "the facts of the case were
wanting of any overt acts that are reflective of any conspiracy amongst the five accused."25 However,
in the same Brief, Efren and Edwin cited the direct testimony of Eva Castaño which revealed that
"after the victim was first stabbed at the back by accused-appellant Efren, the other accused Edwin
did the hacking thrust, followed by Edgar; while the other two accused, Dioscoro and Eddie, were
merely described xxx as being there carrying a weapon."26
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Direct
proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is
common purpose to commit the crime.27
In this case, the hacking acts of Efren and Edwin, when taken together with the stabbing act of Efren,
reveal a commonality and unity of criminal design. The defense cannot aver that Dioscoro and Eddie's
mere act of carrying a weapon is not an overt act reflective of conspiracy because clearly, such act is
in line with the crime of murder. Regardless of the extent and character of Dioscoro and Eddie's
respective active participation, once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals. The act of one is the act of all.28
Thus, considering all of the foregoing, Efren and Edwin's conviction for the crime of murder must
stand.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder qualified by
treachery is reclusion perpetua to death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 934629 proscribing
the imposition of death penalty, and there being no aggravating circumstance that attended the
commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed on Efren and Edwin should be reclusion perpetua.
With respect to the award of damages, we affirm and find in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence30 the amounts adjudged by the Regional Trial Court, which were affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, that must be awarded to the heirs of Manuel Tingoy, to wit: (1) civil indemnity at Seventy-
Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00); (2) moral damages at Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00); and (3) exemplary damages at Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). All these
monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC
No. 01481, which affirmed with modification the 20 February 2012 Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 99-01-42, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that all the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175926 July 6, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by Henry Milan and Jackman Chua from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006. Said Decision affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting them and
one Restituto Carandang for two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in Criminal Cases No. Q-01-
100061, Q-01-100062 and Q-01-100063, the Informations for which read:
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100061
That on or about the 5th day of April 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault
and employ personal violence upon the person of PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO, by then and there shooting
the latter several times with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber hitting him on the different parts of the body,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the immediate heirs of said PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. 2
That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault
and employ personal violence upon the person of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, by then and there shooting the
latter several times with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him on the different parts of the body and as
soon as the said victim fell on the ground, by placing a hand grenade (sic) underneath the body which directly caused
an explosion and mutilated the body which directly caused the death of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of
the Civil Code.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. 3
That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon
the person of SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, by then and there shooting the latter with the use of a
firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him on his neck, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries, the
offender thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence,
but nevertheless did not produce it by reasons or causes independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.4
On May 15, 2001, accused-appellants Carandang, Milan and Chua pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
The prosecution evidence, culled from the testimonies of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, SPO1
Rodolfo Estores, Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Virgilio Calaro, P/Supt. Manuel Roxas and Dr. Wilson Tan,
yielded the following version of the facts:
In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for
assistance from the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her house at
Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City. The station commander called SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and instructed
him to talk to Milan’s sister, who was in their office. SPO2 Red, accompanied by Police Officer (PO) 2 Dionisio
Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1 Montecalvo, talked to Milan’s sister. Thereafter, SPO2 Red formed a team
composed of the officers who accompanied him during the interrogation, with him as team leader. The team received
further instructions from the station commander then proceeded to Calavite Street aboard two vehicles, a mobile
patrol car and an unmarked car.5
When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., 6 they alighted from their vehicles and surrounded Milan’s
house. SPO1 Montecalvo’s group went to the left side of the house, while SPO2 Red’s group proceeded to the right.
The two groups eventually met at the back of the house near Milan’s room. The door to Milan’s room was open,
enabling the police officers to see Carandang, Milan and Chua inside. SPO2 Red told the group that the persons
inside the room would not put up a fight, making them confident that nothing violent would erupt. However, when the
group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan immediately shut the door. 7
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling them inside the room. PO2 Alonzo
shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor
one after the other. Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not able to return fire and
were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming
his firearm at the assailants when Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground. SPO1 Estores
heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire his
gun and hit Milan. SPO1 Estores went inside the house and pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out. 8
Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of P/Sr. Insp. Calaro, Chief Operations Officer of the La
Loma Police Station 1, and P/Supt. Roxas, the Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 1 at the time of the
incident.9 SPO1 Montecalvo was brought to the Chinese General Hospital. Milan stepped out of the house and was
also brought to a hospital,10 but Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the house for several hours. There
was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender of Carandang and Chua, during which they requested for the presence of
a certain Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo.11 It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight when Carandang
and Chua surrendered.12 SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were found dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on the
floor with broken legs and gunshot and grenade shrapnel wounds. 13
Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted the post-
mortem examination of the bodies of SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo. He found that the gunshot wounds of Red and
Alonzo were the cause of their deaths.14
According to SPO1 Montecalvo’s account, Dr. Bu Castro of the Chinese General Hospital operated on him, removing
a bullet from the right portion of his nape. SPO1 Montecalvo’s hospitalization expenses amounted to ₱14,324.48. He
testified that it was a nightmarish experience for him as he feared that he might be paralyzed later on. 15
The defense presented the three accused as witnesses, testifying as follows:
Carandang claims that he had no firearm during the incident, and that it was the police officers who fired all the shots.
He was in Milan’s house during the incident in order to ask Milan to accompany him to convert his cellular phone’s
SIM card. When he arrived at Milan’s place, he found Milan and Chua playing a card game. A short time later, there
was banging on the door. The door of the house was destroyed and gunfire suddenly erupted, prompting him to take
cover under a bed. Chua cried out to him that he was hit and that he might lose blood. Milan ran outside and
sustained injuries as well. There was an explosion near the door, causing burns on Carandang’s left arm. Gunfire
continued coming from different directions for two to three minutes. Suddenly, the place became dark as the lights
went out.16
Since gunshots were still heard every now and then, Carandang stayed in the house and did not come out. Col. Tor,
the new Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Sikatuna, negotiated for Carandang to come out.
Carandang requested for the presence of his wife, Col. Doroteo Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo. He went out of
the house at around midnight when the three arrived.17
Milan testified that he was at home in Calavite St. at the time of the incident. He knew Carandang for seven months.
Chua was their neighbor. While playing a card game inside his room, they heard someone pounding at the door. He
stood and approached the door to check. The door was destroyed, and two unidentified men barged in. Gunshots
erupted. He was hit on the left side of his body. He ran out of the room, leaving Chua and Carandang behind. As he
was doing so, he saw his mother lying down and shouting "Itigil niyo ang putukan; maraming matatanda dito!" Milan
was then hit on his left leg by another gunshot.18
Chua testified that he went to the house of Milan at around noontime of April 4, 2001 to play a card game. They
played inside Milan’s ground floor room. Five to ten minutes later, Carandang arrived and laid down on the bed. Chua
did not pay much attention as Milan and Carandang discussed about cellular phones. Later, they heard a loud
banging in the door as if it was being forced open. Milan stood up to see what was happening. Chua remained seated
and Carandang was still on the bed. The door was forcibly opened. Chua heard successive gunshots and was hit on
his left big toe. He ducked on the floor near the bed to avoid being hit further. He remained in that position for several
hours until he lost consciousness. He was already being treated at the Chinese General Hospital when he regained
consciousness. In said hospital, a paraffin test was conducted upon him. 19
P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, later testified that the paraffin test on
Chua yielded a negative result for gunpowder nitrates, but that performed on Carandang produced a positive result.
She was not able to conduct a paraffin test on Milan, who just came from the operating room when she saw him.
Milan seemed to be in pain and refused to be examined.20
On April 22, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 21 finding Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two counts of
murder and one count of frustrated murder:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder described and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 63 of the same Code, for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo
qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each other, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of murder and to indemnify the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, as follows:
To the heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red:
1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. ₱149,734.00 as actual damages; and
4. ₱752,580.00 as compensatory damages
To the heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo:
1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
3. ₱139,910.00 as actual damages; and
4. ₱522,960.00 as compensatory damages.
Likewise, finding the accused Restituto Carandang, Henry Milan and Jackman Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of frustrated murder, described and penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2,
having acted in conspiracy with each other and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years of prision mayor to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
and to indemnify the victim Wilfredo Montecalvo as follows:
1. ₱14,000.00 as actual damages;
3. ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees; and
4. To pay the costs.22
Carandang, Milan and Chua appealed to this Court.23 The appeals were separately docketed as G.R. Nos. 160510-
12.24 Pursuant, however, to the decision of this Court in People v. Mateo, 25 the appeals were transferred26 to the Court
of Appeals, where they were assigned a single docket number, CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934.
On May 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision modifying the Decision of the trial court:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, in Criminal
Case Nos. Q-01-100061-63 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Murder
and one (1) count of Frustrated Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1) In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay the
heirs of PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red an indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the
amount of ₱2,140,980.69 and ₱2,269,243.62, respectively; and
2) In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, accused-appellants are hereby instead sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
With costs against the accused-appellants.27
Milan and Chua appealed to this Court anew.28 Carandang did not appeal, and instead presented a letter informing
this Court that he is no longer interested in pursuing an appeal. 29 On April 9, 2008, Milan and Chua filed a
Supplemental Appellant’s Brief to further discuss the Assignment of Errors they presented in their September 28,
2004 Appellant’s Brief:
I.
The court a quo erred in holding that there was conspiracy among the appellants in the case at bar.
II.
Assuming arguendo that conspiracy exists, the court a quo gravely erred in convicting them of the crime of
murder and frustrated murder instead of homicide and frustrated homicide only, the qualifying circumstance
of treachery not having been duly proven to have attended the commission of the crimes charged. 30
The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in conspiracy in the commission of the crimes
charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2
Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused were held equally criminally responsible therefor. The trial court
explained that Carandang, Milan and Chua’s actuations showed that they acted in concert against the police officers.
The pertinent portion of the RTC Decision reads:
Milan, Carandang and Chua were all inside the room of Milan. Upon arrival of police officers Red, Alonzo and the
others and having identified themselves as police officers, the door was closed and after Alonzo and Red pushed it
open and as Alonzo shouted, "walang gagalaw," immediately shots rang out from inside the room, felling Alonzo,
then Red, then Montecalvo. Chua was heard by Estores to shout to Milan: "Sugurin mo na" (tsn, October 16, 2001,
page 8). And as Milan lunged at Montecalvo, the latter shot him.
That the three acted in concert can be gleaned from their actuations. First, when they learned of the presence of the
police officers, they closed the door. Not one of them came out to talk peacefully with the police officers. Instead,
Carandang opened fire, Alonzo and Red did not even have the chance to touch their firearms at that instant. 31
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded on the acts of Milan and Chua showing that they acted
in concert with Carandang, to wit:
In the present case, when appellants were alerted of the presence of the police officers, Milan immediately closed the
door. Thereafter, when the police officers were finally able to break open said door, Carandang peppered them with
bullets. PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded. Then,
upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and seriously wounded, Chua ordered Milan to attack the police
officers. Following the order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but the latter, however, was able to shoot him.
At first glance, Milan’s act of closing the door may seem a trivial contribution in the furtherance of the crime. On
second look, however, that act actually facilitated the commission of the crime. The brief moment during which the
police officers were trying to open the door paved the way for the appellants to take strategic positions which gave
them a vantage point in staging their assault. Thus, when SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were finally able to get inside,
they were instantly killed by the sudden barrage of gunfire. In fact, because of the suddenness of the attack, said
police officers were not able to return fire.
Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in the conspiracy consisted of lending encouragement and moral
ascendancy to his co-conspirators as evidenced by the fact that he ordered Milan to attack the already fallen police
officers with the obvious intention to finish them off. Moreover, he did not immediately surrender even when he had
the opportunity to do so but instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the room until their arrest. 32
Milan and Chua object to the conclusion that they were in conspiracy with Carandang due to their acts of closing the
door and not peaceably talking to the police officers. According to them, those acts were caused by their being
frightened by the police officers who were allegedly in full battle gear. 33 Milan and Chua further assert that the
fortuitous and unexpected character of the encounter and the rapid turn of events should have ruled out a finding of
conspiracy.34 They claim that the incident happened so fast, giving them no opportunity to stop Carandang.35
Appellants contest the factual finding that Chua directed Milan to go after SPO1 Montecalvo, alleging that they were
both unarmed and that there was no way for Milan to attack an armed person. What really happened, according to
them, was that Milan ran out of the room for safety and not to attack SPO1 Montecalvo. 36 Milan claims that he was
already injured in the stomach when he ran out, and it was natural for him to seek safety.
Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered "Sugurin mo na!" to Milan, appellants argue that no crime was committed due
to the same as all the victims had already been shot when said words were shouted. 37 Furthermore, it appears to
have been uttered as a result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and did not inherently carry with it inducement or
temptation.38
In the Supplemental Brief, Milan and Chua point out that the assault on the victims was the result of the impulsive act
of Carandang and was not a result of any agreement or a concerted action of all the accused. 39 They claim that when
the shootout ensued, Chua immediately dove down near the bed while Milan ran out of the room out of fear. 40 It is
allegedly hard to imagine that SPO1 Montecalvo with certainty heard Chua utter the phrase "Sugurin mo na,"
considering that the incident happened so fast, there were lots of gunshots. 41
To summarize, Milan’s and Chua’s arguments focus on the lack of direct evidence showing that they conspired with
Carandang during the latter’s act of shooting the three victims. However, as we have held in People v.
Sumalpong, 42 conspiracy may also be proven by other means:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a
preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the
crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of
one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each. 43
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts (1)
before Carandang shot the victims (Milan’s closing the door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing
Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua’s directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and
Milan’s following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that
Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milan’s act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal
by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds
of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct participation.
Appellants’ attempt to instill doubts in our minds that Chua shouted "sugurin mo na" to Milan, who then ran towards
SPO1 Montecalvo, must fail. SPO1 Estores’s positive testimony 44 on this matter prevails over the plain denials of
Milan and Chua. SPO1 Estores has no reason to lie about the events he witnessed on April 5, 2001. As part of the
team that was attacked on that day, it could even be expected that he is interested in having only the real
perpetrators punished.
Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. 45 It was the trial court that
was able to observe the demeanors of the witnesses, and is consequently in a better position to determine which of
the witnesses are telling the truth. Thus, this Court, as a general rule, would not review the factual findings of the
courts a quo, except in certain instances such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of
specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the
presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court;
(9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. 46
Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation,
there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full
opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly
or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.47
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan’s act of closing the door facilitated the commission of the
crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open
illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend
themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.48
The trial court correctly sentenced appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-
100061 and Q-01-100062. The penalty for murder under Article 248 49 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying Article 6350 of the same Code, since there was no other modifying circumstance other
than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the penalty that should be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty for the frustrated murder of
SPO1 Montecalvo. Under Article 5051 in connection with Article 61, paragraph 252 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for frustrated murder is one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal.
Reclusion temporal has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Its medium period, which should be applied in this
case considering that there is no modifying circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, is 14
years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months – the range of the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty
under Section 153 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should then be
within the range of the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal, and thus may be any term within prision mayor, the
range of which is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The modified term of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, is within these ranges.
The civil liabilities of appellants should, however, be modified in accordance with current jurisprudence. Thus, in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, the award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each victim must
be increased to ₱75,000.00.54 In cases of murder and homicide, civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 and moral damages of
₱50,000.00 are awarded automatically, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim.55 Appellants are furthermore solidarily liable to each victim for ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, which is
awarded when the crime was committed with an aggravating circumstance, be it generic or qualifying. 56 However,
since Carandang did not appeal, he is only solidarily liable with Milan and Chua with respect to the amounts awarded
by the Court of Appeals, since the Court of Appeals’ Decision has become final and executory with respect to him.
The additional amounts (₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages) shall be borne only
by Milan and Chua, who are hereby held liable therefor solidarily.
In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the solidary liability of Milan and Chua for moral damages to SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo is likewise increased to ₱40,000.00, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 57 An award of
₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages is also warranted.58 The additional amounts (₱20,000.00 as moral damages and
₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages) are likewise to be solidarily borne only by Milan and Chua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006 is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, appellants Henry Milan and Jackman Chua are
held solidarily liable for the amount of ₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages
to the heirs of each of the victims, PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red, in addition to the
amounts to which they are solidarily liable with Restituto Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the lower courts and this Court:
a. The heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red are entitled to the following amounts:
i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua, while ₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and
Chua only;
ii. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iii. ₱149,734.00 as actual damages to be soldarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iv. ₱2,140,980.00 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity to be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua; and
v. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only;
b. The heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo are entitled to the following amounts:
i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua, while ₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and
Chua only;
ii. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iii. ₱139,910.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iv. ₱2,269,243.62 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity to be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua;
v. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only;
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, appellants Henry Milan and Jackman Chua are held solidarily liable
for the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo, in addition to the amounts to which they are solidarily liable with Restituto Carandang as held in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the lower courts and this Court, SPO1
Wilfredo Montecalvo is entitled to the following amounts:
i. ₱14,000.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
ii. ₱40,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by Carandang,
Milan and Chua, while ₱20,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua only;
iii. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only; and
iv. ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees, to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua.
3. Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of Six Percent
(6%) per annum from date of finality of this judgment.
1avv phi 1
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195196 July 13, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ESTANLY OCTA y BAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before us is a Notice of Appeal dated 30 July 2010 from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 19 July 2010 in
1 2
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03490, affirming the Decision dated 15 May 2008 in Criminal Case No. 04-224073 issued by
3
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 48, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Estanly Octa y Bas, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
As culled from the records, the prosecution's version is herein quoted:
In the morning of September 25, 2003, around 6:40 A.M., Johnny Corpuz (Johnny) and Mike Adrian Batuigas (Mike
Adrian) were on board a Honda Civic Car colored silver with Plate No. UPT 697 travelling on Buenos Aires St.,
Sampaloc, Manila when their way was blocked by a Mitsubishi box type Lancer car colored red-orange. The four (4)
armed occupants of the Lancer car alighted. Johnny did not open the door of the Honda Civic car but one of the
armed men fired his pistol at the left window of the civic car, thus compelling Johnny to open the locked door of the
car. The armed men went inside the car and Johnny was ordered to transfer at the back seat at that time. Inside the
car, Johnny was handcuffed, blindfolded and was even boxed. The armed men asked for the names and telephone
numbers of his mother-in-law. The armed men called his mother-in-law giving the information that Johnny was in their
custody and they would just meet each other at a certain place. They travelled for a while and then they stopped and
Johnny was brought to a safehouse.
After Johnny and Mike were kidnapped, the kidnappers communicated with Johnny’s wife Ana Marie Corpuz (Ana
Marie) giving the information that they have intheir custody her husband Johnny and her brother Mike Adrian. Ana
Marie tried to confirm the kidnapping incident by talking to her husband, who confirmed to his wife that he and Mike
Adrian were indeed kidnapped and they were in the custody of their abductors. Ana Marie sought the assistance of
the PACER [Police AntiCrime and Emergency Response] and stayed in a PACER safehouse located at P. Tuazon,
Cubao, Quezon City. During her stay, she had several communications with her husband’s kidnappers. The latter
started demanding the amount of ₱20 million for the release of her husband and her brother but the amount was
considerably reduced up to the time that Ana Marie was able to raise the amount of ₱538,000.00 which was accepted
by the kidnappers.
Finally, on September 30, 2003 at 10PM, the kidnappers set up the manner on how the ransom money would be
delivered. Ana Marie travelled to Quiapo Church, then to Quezon City circle up to SM Fairview and to Robinsons
Fairview. She was made to stop at Red Lips Beer House and go to the nearby Caltex Auto Supply where she would
see a man wearing a red cap and who would ask her "saan yong padala ni boss". She was instructed to deliver the
wrapped bundled ransom money to the man wearing red cap. When she saw the man with red cap, she was asked
for the money. At first, she did not give the money because she wanted to be sure that she was giving the money to
the right man. Using her own cellphone, she called up the man who had been instructing her all along and asked him
to confirm if the man in front of her is the right man to give the ransom money to, saying "kausapin mo muna ito kung
siya ba." The man in the phone and the man in the red cap talked for a while in another dialect which Ana Marie did
not understand. When she asked the man to give back her cellphone to her, he refused and, instead instructed her to
give the money to him. She described the man wearing red cap to be goodlooking, lightly built, in his early 20s,
around 5’4" in height and with dimples, which she later identified in court as accused Estanly Octa.
On October 1, 2003, Johnny was released by his captors after the payment of ransom money. He was detained for
the duration of six (6) days. After his release, he removed his blindfold and handcuffs but he could hardly regain his
sight and see things. He flagged down a private pick-up and learned that he was in Camarin, Caloocan City. He
asked a favor that he be driven to Meycauayan, Bulacan where he took a jeepney to Monumento, and from there, he
took a taxi bound home. When he was released, his brother-in-law Mike Adrian was also released. 4
The defense recounted a different set of facts, to wit:

x x x [O]n September 25, 2003, he was still in Daet, Camarines Norte working as a welder in the welding shop of his
uncle Edwin delos Reyes. He went to Daet on the second week of August 2003 and returned to Manila when he was
called by his father sometime in November 2003. In addition to his defense of denial and alibi, he clings to the theory
that he himself was a victim of abduction. He testified that, on December 1, 2003, while crossing the street, his way
was blocked by a van and thereafter, two (2) persons alighted and a gun was poked at him then he was boarded
inside the van. His hands were tied and eyes covered. The incident happened at Susano Road, Camarin, Caloocan
City. He was eventually brought to the PACER Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City. He claims that he was tortured to
admit the charge filed against him. At the PACER’s office, he was presented to a State Prosecutor of the DOJ but he
claimed he was not assisted by counsel. He said that he did not submit himself for medical examination. He
categorically stated that, when he was inquested by a State Prosecutor, he did not tell of the alleged torture that he
suffered because he was afraid. 5
On 4 December 2003, accused-appellant was arrested by the operatives of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER) on S[u]sano Road, Camarin, Caloocan City, in connection with another kidnap for ransom
incident. He was identified by prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz from a police line-up as the person who had
received the ransom money from her. Consequently, on 26 February 2004, an Information was filed against
6 7
accused-appellant charging him with the crime of kidnapping for ransom as follows:
That on or about 6:40 a.m. of September 25, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap and deprive JOHNNY L.CORPUZ and MIKE ADRIAN
BATUIGAS, a minor, of their liberty and against their will by means of threats and intimation with the use of firearms,
and then bring them through the use of a motor vehicle to a house, wherein they were detained for a period of six (6)
days, and that the abduction of the said victims was for the purpose of extorting Php538,000.00 was actually
delivered to the above-mentioned accused in exchange for the release of the victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
When arraigned on 5 July 2004,accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued. 9
On 15 May 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which is herein quoted:
10
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Estanly Octa y Bas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the felony charge [sic]
and pursuant to law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer maximum prison term of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
private aggrieved party of the following:
1. The amount of 538,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
2. The amount of 100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. The amount of 50,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost.
In view of the conviction of the accused, the Manila City Jail is ordered to commit his person to the National
Penitentiary immediately without necessary [sic] delay.
SO ORDERED. 11
In so ruling, the RTC ruled that prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz, wife of victim Johnny Corpuz, steadfastly
testified that she gave the ransom money in the amount of 538,000 to accused-appellant. She did not waiver in
identifying and describing him as good-looking, wearing red cap, light in built, in his early 20’s, 5’4" and with dimples.
The assertion of Ana Marie Corpuz that accused-appellant was sporting dimples was squarely corroborated by the
court’s observation when he took the witness stand. 12
The trial court also viewed the act of receiving ransom money as sufficient evidence to establish accused-appellant’s
conspiratorial act in the kidnapping for ransom of the victims in this case.13
With respect to the defense of denial and alibi, the RTC found them to be inherently weak as opposed to the
straightforward testimony of Corpuz. The claim of accused-appellant that he was abducted did not convince the court
either, inasmuch as it was not supported by evidence, nor was it the subject of an investigation. 14
Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a Decision promulgated on 19 July 2010, to wit:
15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeal in this case is DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Manila in Criminal Case No. 04-224073 finding Estanly Octa y Bas guilty of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay 538,000.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, 100,000.00 as moral damages and 50,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost,
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 16
The CA found the positive identification of accused-appellant by prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz to be
unwavering and steadfast. It stressed that his positive identification, when categorical, consistent, straightforward,
and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, would prevail over mere
alibi and denial. Such positive identification constituted direct evidence, and not merely circumstantial evidence.
17 18
Moreover, the CA ruled that accused-appellant had been rightly found to be a co-conspirator in this case. At the time
he received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still illegally
detained by the kidnappers. Accused-appellant’s act of taking the ransom money was an overt act made in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 19
Hence, the instant appeal. 20
ISSUES
In seeking a reversal of the decisions of the CA and the RTC, accused-appellant Octa argues that:
1. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the prosecutions’ failure to positively identify him as
the ransom taker; 21
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding him to be a conspirator to the crime charged; and
22
3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged based on circumstantial evidence. 23
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny accused-appellant’s appeal.
When the credibility of a witness is at

issue, the findings of fact of the trial
court are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect, more so if
those findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was the
one who received the ransom money. He primarily argues that prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz could not have
positively ascertained the identity of the ransom taker, because the area where the transaction took place was dark,
and the man was wearing a cap. Neither did Corpuz declare in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the person who
received the ransom money was sporting a dimple, a fact that she mentioned on direct examination. Accused-
24
appellant further insinuates that the police might have influenced his out-of-court identification in the line-up when
they informed Corpuz that they had apprehended some people who were suspects in other kidnap for ransom cases,
and that information might have conditioned her mind that the ransom taker had already been apprehended. 25
We disagree.
In People v. Basao, the Court held that:

26
[T]the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the
trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various
indicia available but not reflected on the record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between
fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or
the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch – these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying
through his teeth.27
xxxx
[Thus], when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored
on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by
the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally binding upon this Court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate
court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should
not be disturbed."28
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found Corpuz to be a credible witness who had categorically testified that she
saw the face of the ransom taker, and that he was actually the accused-appellant.
The fact that Corpuz failed to declare in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the ransom taker was sporting a dimple was
not fatal to her testimony because she was able to positively and categorically identify accused-appellant during the
police line-up and in open court.
Even accused-appellant’s insinuation that Corpuz could have been influenced by the police during the line-up cannot
be given weight in the face of his positive identification as the ransom taker. On this point, we agree with the
observation of the CA that "assuming arguendo that the accused-appellant’s out of court identification was defective,
her subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We emphasize that the
‘inadmissibility of a police line-up identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.’"
29
To hold an accused guilty as a co-

principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.
Accused-appellant also claims that he cannot be considered as a conspirator to the kidnapping in the absence of
concrete proof that he actually participated in the execution of the essential elements of the crime by overt acts
indispensable to its accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom money transpired only after the kidnapping had been
consummated and was not an essential element of the crime. 30
We disagree.
On point is our dissertation in People v. Bautista, to wit:

31
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is
1awp++i1
shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy
is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.
xxxx
Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. x x x.
xxxx
Taking these facts in conjunction with the testimony of Dexter, who testified that accused-appellant was the one who
received the ransom money x x x then the commonality of purpose of the acts of accused-appellant together with the
other accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the common design or purpose to commit the felony of
kidnapping for ransom.
Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as a principal for being a co-
conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659 x x
x. (Emphasis ours)
32
Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-appellant received the ransom money, the
crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still being illegally detained by the kidnappers. While
33
his receipt of the ransom money was not a material element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan
and was in fact the main reason for kidnapping the victims. Ransom is money, price or consideration paid or
34
demanded for the redemption of a captured person or persons; or payment that releases from captivity. Without
35
ransom money, the freedom of the detained victims cannot be achieved. The positive identification of accused-
appellant constitutes direct, and not merely circumstantial, evidence.
Accused-appellant's contention that he was convicted based only on circumstantial evidence deserves scant
consideration. We agree with the conclusion of the CA that "[Corpuz] testified that she gave the ransom money to
accused-appellant, and as the trial court declared, his act of receiving the ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial
act in the commission of the kidnapping for ransom. The positive identification of the accused-appellant then
constitutes direct evidence, and not merely circumstantial evidence." 36
With respect to the penalty imposed, we agree with the imposition by the RTC and the CA on accused-appellant of
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering the prohibition on the death penalty. To conform to recent
37
jurisprudence, we hereby modify the exemplary damages awarded by increasing the amount from ₱50,000 to
38
₱100,000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-HC
No. 03490 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay ₱538,000 as actual damages, ₱100,000 as moral damages, and ₱100,000 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and
ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research personnel should feel safest. After
all, this is where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this world are peacefully nurtured and debated.
Universities produce hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced concepts of perverse brotherhood for these
hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has resulted in a senseless death whose justice is now
the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there are
credible witnesses who present themselves courageously before an able and experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for hooliganism disguised as fraternity rumbles.
The perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of their actions. They must do so for there is an
individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family. Excruciating grief for them will
never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma
Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some
of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed against several members of the
1
Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E.
Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 219. The information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, armed with baseball bats, lead
pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head and clubbing him on
different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr., Cristobal Gaston, Jr., and Leandro Lachica, and the frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity
2 3 4
members Mervin Natalicio and Amel Fortes. Only 11 of the accused stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict
5 6
Guerrero, remained at large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix Tumaneng, and 7
Cesar Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00
p.m., they were having lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at the back of the Main Library of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly, Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"
8 9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when Venturina shouted,
and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them. The men were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, and
10
their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts. Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started
11
attacking him, hitting him with their lead pipes. During the attack, he recognized one of the attackers as Robert
12
Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off. 13
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions. 14
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education. Just before reaching it, he looked back and saw
15
Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where the commotion was. Both of 16
them did not have their masks on. He was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla because he often saw them in
17
the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan used to be his friend. The attack lasted about 18
thirty (30) to forty-five (45) seconds. 19
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when Venturina
shouted. He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks, running toward them. He
20 21
was stunned, and he started running. He stumbled over the protruding roots of a tree. He got up, but the attackers
22 23
came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and baseball bats until he fell down. While he was parrying the 24
blows, he recognized two (2) of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since they were not
wearing any masks. After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.
25 26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men coming toward
him, led by Benedict Guerrero. This group also beat him up. He did not move until another group of masked men
27 28
beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds. 29
When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground. Several bystanders brought him to the U.P. Infirmary
30
where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his wounds and fractures. 31
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back when Venturina shouted and saw a
group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of cloth around their heads. He ran 32
when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him
with lead pipes. While running and parrying the blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo
33
Jolette Fajardo because their masks fell off. He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main Library. He
34 35
then decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach House. There, he saw 36
Venturina lying on the ground. Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while Raymund E.
37
Narag was aiming to hit Venturina. When they saw him, they went toward his direction. They were about to hit him
38 39
when somebody shouted that policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran away. 40
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his car so they could bring Venturina to
the U.P. Infirmary. When they brought the car over, other people, presumably bystanders, were already loading
41
Venturina into another vehicle. They followed that vehicle to the U.P. Infirmary where they saw Natalicio. He stayed
42 43
at the infirmary until the following morning. 44
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up when he heard someone shout,
"Brods!" He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead pipes and baseball bats. Most of them had
45 46
pieces of cloth covering their faces. He was about to run when two (2) of the attackers approached him. One struck
47 48
him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed instrument. He was able to parry most of the blows
49
from the lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm. 50
He was able to run away. When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach House Canteen
51
and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano. He decided to go back to the canteen to help
52
his fraternity brothers. When he arrived, he did not see any of his fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who
53
attacked them. He ended up going to their hang-out instead to meet with his other fraternity brothers. They then
54 55
proceeded to the College of Law where the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the incident. 56
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group of attackers coming toward
them. When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina. He was also able to see Warren
57 58
Zingapan and George Morano at the scene. 59

Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded a jeepney to the College of Law
to wait for their other fraternity brothers. One of his fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera, told him that he received
60
information that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of the Main Library and were regrouping in SM
North. Lachica and his group then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and identify their attackers.
61 62
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them. Lachica saw Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
63
and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan. They had no choice but to get away from the mall and proceed
64
instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held a meeting. 65
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge their complaints with the
National Bureau of Investigation. Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told the U.P. Police that the victims would be
66
giving their statements before the National Bureau of Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police copies of their
statements. In the meantime, Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on December 8,
1994. He died on December 10, 1994. On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was conducted on the cadaver of Dennis
67
Venturina. Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, found that Venturina
68
had "several contusions located at the back of the upper left arm and hematoma on the back of both hands," "two (2) 69
lacerated wounds at the back of the head, generalized hematoma on the skull," "several fractures on the
70 71
head," and "inter-cranial hemorrhage." The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria, could have been caused by a hard
72 73
blunt object. Dr. Victoria concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.
74 75
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their respective
affidavits before the National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal examinations with their
76 77
medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found that Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated
wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear, and on the fingers; contused abrasions on both knees; contusion
on the left leg and thigh," all of which could have been caused by any hard, blunt object. These injuries required
78
medical attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of infliction. 79
Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head and on the right leg which could have been caused
by a blunt instrument." These injuries required hospitalization for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from
80
date of infliction. He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed abrasion on the left forearm which could
81
possibly be caused by contact with [a] rough hard surface and would require one (1) to nine (9) days of medical
attention." He found on Leandro Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound
82
on the infra scapular area, left side." On Christopher Gaston, Jr. he found "lacerated wounds on the anterior chest,
83
left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands; contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and
lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side." 84
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted the demurrer to
evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified by the prosecution's witnesses and
that he was not mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the prosecution. 85
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced their own statement of the facts, as follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera, a member of the U.P. Police, he was on foot patrol with another member of the U.P.
86
Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the College of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall)
when he vaguely heard somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went to the place where the alleged rumble was
happening and saw injured men being helped by bystanders. They helped an injured person board the service
vehicle of the Beach House Canteen. They asked what his name was, and he replied that he was Mervin Natalicio.
When he asked Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply but instead told him that his attackers were
wearing masks. Oscar Salvador corroborated his testimony.
87
Benjamin Lato, a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen, likewise testified that the identities of the attackers
88
were unrecognizable because of their masks. He, however, admitted that he did not see the attack; he just saw a
man sprawled on the ground at the time of the incident.
Frisco Capilo, a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main Library, was buying a cigarette at a vendor located
89
nearby. From there, he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten (10) men, wearing either masks of red
and black bonnets or with shirts covering their faces, came from a red car parked nearby. He also saw three (3) men
being hit with lead pipes by the masked men. Two (2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the victims was lifting the
other to help him, but the attackers overtook him. Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping
those who were injured. He likewise helped in carrying one of the injured victims, which he later found out to be Amel
Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda Panganiban, testified that she and her friends were
90
in line to order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion happened. She saw around fifteen (15) to
eighteen (18) masked men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any mask fall off. Her sorority sister and
another U.P. student, Luz Perez, corroborated her story that the masked men were unrecognizable because of their
91
masks. Perez, however, admitted that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to make a statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon, testified on substantially the same matters as Panganiban and Perez.
92
She also stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being beaten up by about three (3) to five (5)
masked men. She also stated that some of the men were wearing black masks while some were wearing white t-
shirts as masks. She did not see any mask fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano, accused-appellant Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier, her son was in Pampanga to visit
93
his sick grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son went to Pampanga before lunch that day and
visited the school where she teaches to get their house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, he had not been feeling well since December 5, 1994. He said that he
94
could not have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was absent even from work. He also testified
that he wore glasses and, thus, could not have possibly been the person identified by Leandro Lachica. He also
stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at the time since he was working to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla, he and another classmate, Michael Vibas, were working on a school project on
95
December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he could not have participated in the rumble as he had an injury affecting his
balance. The injury was caused by an incident in August 1994 when he was struck in the head by an unknown
assailant. His testimony was corroborated by Jose Victor Santos who stated that after lunch that day, Medalla
96
played darts with him and, afterwards, they went to Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva, on the other hand, testified that he was eating lunch with his girlfriend and another friend in
97
Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m. and went straight to their fraternity
hang-out where he was told that there had been a rumble at the Main Library. He also met several Sigma Rhoans
acting suspiciously as they passed by the hang-out. They were also told by their head, Carlo Taparan, not to react to
the Sigma Rhoans and just go home. Anna Cabahug, his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
98
Warren Zingapan also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time of the incident. He claimed to have gone to SM
99
North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding but ran into a fraternity brother. He also alleged that some Sigma Rhoans
attacked them in SM North that day.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo
100
Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George
101
Morano, and Raymund Narag. The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his
102
apprehension. The trial court, m evaluating the voluminous evidence at hand, concluded that:
103
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that of the ten accused, some were
sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the amorphous images during the
pandemonium, the beleaguered victims were able to espy and identify some of the attackers etching an indelible
impression in their memory. In this regard, the prosecution eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the attackers
rush towards them wielding deadly weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and bladed ones, and
pounce on their hapless victims, run after them, and being present with one another at the scene of the crime during
the assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not
one .of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply
bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and every single
accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure that no one else would escape conviction.
Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who
delivered the blows against them. 104
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to this court on automatic
appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal, the case was remanded to the Court of
105
Appeals. In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several Times before it was eventually assigned to
106 107
Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for the writing of the decision.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed the decision of the
108
Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members concurring an one (1) dissenting.
109 110
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellants attacked private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court by both parties, the issue may be further refined,
thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the information against them
contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to
prove that the masks fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence,
that accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.
An information is sufficient
when the accused is fully
apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the prosecution should not have included
the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since they were presenting testimonial
evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law." This includes the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and "to be informed of the
111
nature and accusation against him." 112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in compliance with
the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended pary; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea, this court has stated that:

113
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge
against him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for
his defense, precluding surprises during the trial. 114
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information.
Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, 115
therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms
of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain
anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the
masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in
116
alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The
inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the
commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not violative of
their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the act of
all." This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence
117
later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder. All
that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been alleged and that there
are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.
II
Findings of the trial court,

when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are given great weight
and credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People v. Daniel Quijada, as follows:
118
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the
heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath,
the carriage and mien. 119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias, this court stated that:
120
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable assumption that it is in a
better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal much of
themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception that makes the rule is where such findings arc clearly
arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that they
were reached without the careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial decision. (Emphasis
121
supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the presumption is always in favor of innocence. It
is only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two (42) witnesses for the defense were put
on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)-page decision, the trial court acquitted six (6) and convicted
five (5) of the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be said that the trial court acted arbitrarily or
that its decision was "so lacking in basis" that it was arrived at without a judicious and exhaustive study of all the
evidence presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great persuasive value, there is also nothing that precludes this
court from coming to its own conclusions based on an independent review of the facts and the evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently

identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be
credible. In its decision, the trial court stated that:
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not one
testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on
convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and every accused as a
participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure no one would escape conviction. Instead, each
eyewitness named only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the
blows against them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to have seen it all
but they could not, and did not, disclose any name. Lachica, on the other hand, said that he did not have the
opportunity to see and identify the person who hit him in the back and inflicted a two-inch cut. His forearm was also
hit by a lead pipe but he did not see who did it. Natalicio, one of the other three who were hospitalized, was severely
beaten by three waves of attackers totalling more than 15 but he could only name 3 of them. He added, however, that
he would be able to recognize those he saw if he would see them again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed to at least 5
but he stressed that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario, Daraoay, Denoista, and Penalosa during
the onslaught. Gaston could have named any of the accused as the one who repeatedly hit him with a heavy pipe
and stabbed him but he frankly said their faces were covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly beaten by
several groups but did not name any of the accused as one of those who attacked him. The persons he identified
were those leading the pack with one of them as the assailant of Venturina, and the two others who he saw standing
while he was running away. He added that he saw some of the accused during the attack but did not know then their
names. (Emphasis supplied)
122
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident," there would be slight inconsistencies in
123
their statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas, it was previously observed that:

124
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there
may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact,
jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their
testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed. (Emphasis supplied)
125
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla; 126
Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva; and Fortes was able to identify Feliciano, Medalla, and
127
Zingapan. Their positive identification was due to the fact that they either wore no masks or that their masks fell off.
128
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find ways to
identify the assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended. It has also been
previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants
and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements
thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 129
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have lost their masks. It had been testified
by the victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either a piece of cloth or a handkerchief and that
Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, and Feliciano had masks on at first but their masks fell off and hung around their necks.
130 131 132 133
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco Capilo during cross-examination who observed that some
of the attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot of people eating in the Beach House Canteen, and then
running towards different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some were not?
A Yes, sir. 134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence of mind to take a look at their
assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, must be
upheld to be credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's testimony credence while Gaston's testimony was
found to be "hazy." This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris members identified
by Mangrobang "should not be. misinterpreted to mean that the tt:'.stimony of Mangrobang was an absolute
fabrication." The court went on to state that they "were exonerated merely because they were accorded the benefit
135
of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under tumultuous and chaotic circumstances were [sic] not
corroborated and their alibis, not refuted." There was, therefore, no basis to say that Mangrobang was not credible;
136
it was only that the evidence presented was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence.
Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy" by the trial court only with regard to his identification
137
of Zingapan's companion. Gaston testified that he saw Zingapan with Morano, with Zingapan moving and Morano
staying in place. Fortes, however, testified that both Zingapan and Morano were running after him. Lachica also
testified that it was Medalla, not Morano, who was with Zingapan. Because of this confusion, the trial court found that
there was doubt as to who was really beside Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted into an acquittal for Morano. Despite
this, the court still did not" impute doubt in their testimonies that Zingapan was present at the scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its decision was brought about only upon a
thorough examination of the evidence presented: It accepted that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
victims but that these were minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that "[s]uch inconsistencies, and even
probabilities, are not unusual 'for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses."' 138
Evidence as part of the res

gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the
139
bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued,
could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, x x x." All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence.
140
The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence
is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part
of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.141
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony taken as part of
142
res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a particular
litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule
on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators
to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of
the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 143
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence,
they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:"
144
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference. Therefore, almost
always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a
crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons have different impressions and recollections of the
same incident. x x x145
(Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the bystanders could
have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of
the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some
remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the incident
from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred.
Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
The belated identification by
the victims do not detract from
their positive identification of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the U.P. Police or the Quezon City Police
but instead executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident gives doubt as
to the credibility of their testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera testified that on their way to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed the victims who
146
all told him they could not recognize the attackers because they were all wearing masks. Meanwhile, Dr.
Mislang testified to the effect that when she asked Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio answered that he did not
147
know because they were masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival fraternities. While this court does not
condone their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are certain practices that are
unique to fraternal organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the identities of their attackers but chose not to disclose it
without first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability is bolstered by the actions of Sigma Rho
after the incident, which showed that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris in SM North. Because of the
tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not have been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against the wrong
fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make the police officer
or the doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It should not be forgotten that the victims actually
witnessed the entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang were merely relaying
secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident also does not affect
their credibility since most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of them were well
enough to go to the National Bureau of Investigation headquarters in order to give their statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the advice of their senior "brads" and their legal counsel
that they executed their sworn statements before the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation instead of to the U.P. Police was the call of
their legal counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of Investigation more equipped to handle the
investigation. This does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were merely following the legal
advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of Investigation is better equipped than the U.P. Police to
handle the investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of Economics website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining campus security. Their station is located in front of the
College of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and order, secure and protect lives and property, enforce
basic laws, applicable Quezon City Ordinances, and University Rules and Regulations including policies and
standards; and to perform such other functions relative to the general safety and security of the students, employees,
and residents in the U.P. Diliman Campus. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
148
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for campus security. They are by no means an
actual police force that is equipped to handle a full-blown murder investigation. Fraternity-related violence in U.P. has
also increasingly become more frequent, which might possibly have desensitized the U.P. Police in such a way that
would prevent their objectivity in the conduct of their investigations. The victims' reliance on the National Bureau of
Investigation, therefore, is understandable.
III
Alibi cannot prevail over the

positive identification of the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim. In People v. Benjamin
149
Peteluna, this court stated that:

150
It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the defense of alibi
and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the
courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in
law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 151
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the accused-appellants merely offered
alibis and denials as their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld by both the trial court and the appellate
court while giving little credence to the accused-appellants' alibis. There is, thus, no reason to disturb their findings.
Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellants were correctly charged
with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball bats attacked Dennis
Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against Dennis Venturina was
committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of armed men. The appellate court,
however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the commission of the offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:

[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. 152
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz, this court stated that:

153
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
154
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to the findings of the trial
court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that although the attack was sudden and unexpected,
"[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of people who could see them" and that "there was a possibility for the
155
victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen could have helped the victims." 156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place
where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry
the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for
them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any
possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend
themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
The presence of conspiracy

makes all of the accused-
appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and
the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal
Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty
of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased by the
attackers," it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from inflicting harm to
157
them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring
them." It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done with an intent to
158
kill."
159
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants and the160
appellate court sustainedthis finding.161
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of
participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons
agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case
where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close
and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common
agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ...
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the
scene of the crime. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
162
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the accused-appellants
were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the
victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers.
The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-
appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is
relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical injuries. It would
be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only
Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill
was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to
kill.
1âwphi1
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted
murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on the five other lives whose once bright
futures are now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado. There is now more honor for them to
accept their responsibility and serve the consequences of their actions. There is, however, nothing that they can do to
bring back Dennis Venturina or fully compensate for his senseless and painful loss.
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps this case and many
cases like it can empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one which valorizes courage, sacrifice and
honor in more life-saving pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the Philippines. It colors the stories of many who
choose to expend their energy in order that our people will have better lives. Fraternity rumbles are an anathema, an
immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at
dangal."
This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26, 2010 is
AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren
L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal
Case No. Q95-61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 230778
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JUAN CREDO y DE VERGARA and DANIEL CREDO y DE VERGARA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
CARANDANG, J.:
This is an Appeal from the Decision dated October 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) finding accused-
1 2
appellants Juan Credo y De Vergara (Juan) and Daniel Credo y De Vergara (Daniel) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder and frustrated murder as co-conspirators. Juan was also found guilty for violation of Presidential Decree
No. (P.D.) 1866, the dispositive portion of which reads:
3
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 219 of Quezon City
dated 9 September 2013, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

4
The Antecedents
Juan and Daniel (collectively, accused-appellants) were charged with murder and frustrated murder. The two
separate Information respectively read as follows:
5
MURDER CASE NO. Q-04-125714
That on or about the 16th day of March, 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with four (4) other persons, whose true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been
ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation[,] treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of ANTONIO ASISTIN y PALCO@ TONY, by then and there stabbing him
several times with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the back and other parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said ANTONIO ASISTIN y PALCO @ TONY.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
FRUSTRATED MURDER CASE No. 0-04-125715
That on or about the 16th day of March, 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with four (4) other persons, whose true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been
ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then
and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
EVANGELINE CIELOS-ASISTIN@ Vangie, by then and there stabbing her several times with a bladed weapon,
hitting her on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious and grave wounds, thus performing all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony of MURDER as consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of some causes or accident independent of the medical attendance rendered to the will of the
said accused, that is, the timely and ablesaid victim, to the damage and prejudice of the said EVANGELINE CIELOS-
ASISTIN@VANGIE.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
Juan was additionally charged with violation of Section 32, in relation to Section 36 of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
7166 and Section 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 881, and Commission on Election Resolution No. 6446;
8 9 10
and
violation of P.D. 1866. The Information against Juan states:
11
VIOLATION OF GUN BAN CASE NO. 0-04-125717
That on or about the 16th day of March, 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, without any authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously bear, carry or transport [a] firearm, more particularly
described as follows: one (1) homemade shotgun (sumpak) in a public place, private vehicle or public conveyance,
without written authority from the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
VIOLATION OF P.D. NO. 1866 CASE NO. 0-04-125717
That on or about the 16th day of March, 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, without any authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
one (1) homemade shotgun (sumpak), without first having secured the necessary license/ permit issued by the proper
authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 13
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against them. Trial thereafter ensued.
14
According to the prosecution witnesses, Spouses Antonio Asistin (Antonio) and Evangeline Asistin (Evangeline)
operated a computer shop and a store at their residence located at No. 5 Zodiac Ext. Sagittarius St., Remar Village,
Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City. Daniel and Juan, brothers, are nephews of Evangeline. At around lunch time on
March 16, 2004, Daniel, an assistant at the computer shop, entertained male customers who wanted to rent tapes.
Evangeline instructed Daniel to let the male customers in. Evangeline got up and asked the men where they are from.
One of the men replied, "ano nga bang lugar iyon?." Evangeline then told them that if they are not from the area, they
could just buy the tapes. Evangeline went back to the table and continued eating her lunch. 15
When Evangeline stood up to get water from the refrigerator, Daniel and the two unidentified men suddenly
appeared. One of the unidentified men strangled her. Without saying anything, he pressed the lanseta and started
stabbing her. Evangeline struggled and resisted until she fell to the floor while that person continued to stab her.
Evangeline kicked him so he would not reach her body. Thereafter, the men who assaulted her left. Evangeline
recalled that she sustained eight stab wounds. 16
Once the two unidentified men left, Evangeline stood up and saw Antonio standing at the gate with several stab
wounds. Upon seeing Antonio, Evangeline told Daniel to chase the two men who had just left. According to
Evangeline, Daniel did not help her and even watched while she was being stabbed. He did not go out to chase the
two men. 17
After being stabbed, Antonio was able to walk to the door of the computer shop. Evangeline and Rufo Baguio
18
(Baguio), a neighbor, allegedly saw Daniel carry Antonio about two feet from the ground and then drop him, causing
his head to hit the ground. A few minutes later, Antonio was carried to the vehicle of a neighbor while Evangeline
19
took a tricycle with neighbor Roy Bischotso to the hospital. Antonio was declared dead on arrival.
20
Medico-Legal Report No. M-1171-04 revealed that the cause of Antonio's death is "multiple stab wounds on the
21
back, chest, and neck." On the other hand, Evangeline's Medico-Legal Certificate showed that she suffered
22 23
multiple stab wounds specified below:
FINDINGS:
GS-conscious, coherent, stretcher-borne.
1. Multiple stab wounds located at the following areas:
a. 2.0 cm, epigastric area;

b. 4.0 cm, left upper quadrant, abdomen;
c. 2.0 cm and 3.0 cm, left anterior pectoral area;
d. 2.0 cm, level of T5-T6, anterior axillary line, left;
e. 3 .0 cm, left antero-medical axillary area;
f. 2.0 cm and 3.0 cm, proximal-third, postero-lateral, left brachial region;
g. 3.0 cm, left scapular region;
h. 3.0 cm, left infra-scapular region.
CONLUSION:
Under normal condition without subsequent complications and/or deeper involvement present but not clinically
apparent at the time of examination, the above-described physical injuries shall require medical attention or shall
incapacitate the patient/ victim for a period not less than 31 days x x x.24
Incidentally, Baguio testified that at around 1:45 pm on March 16, 2004, he was in his house located at No. 3 Zodiac
Street, Remarville Subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City. While watching pool players with his grandchild
Roy, he saw Juan and another person carrying a heavy bag. Thereafter, two other men arrived. Baguio noticed that
25
Juan pointed to the direction of the residence of Spouses Asistin. The two men proceeded to the house of Spouses
Asistin, and, later on, Juan and the other man followed. 26
Meanwhile, prosecution witness Reynante Ganal (Ganal) testified that he was outside Spouses Asistin's residence
when he saw Juan and Daniel talking to each other in a vacant room together with three other male companions.
Although he was merely four arms-length away, he did not hear the conversation of the group. Juan came up to him
27
and asked how much he was renting his place. A few minutes later, while he was preparing to take a bath, he saw
28
Juan walking with an unidentified person. Juan asked permission to urinate at the back of the house. Thereafter,
29 30
someone shouted "nasaksak sila tatay at nanay." Then, his sister-in-law told him that two persons climbed the
fence. 31
In a sworn statement of Felipe Roque (Roque), Bantay Bay an Chairman, he stated that he responded at the crime
scene and assisted in rushing the victims to Bernardino Hospital. Roque claimed that at the emergency room,
Evangeline told him that Daniel was present when she and her husband were brutally stabbed and that he did not do
anything to help them. He went back to the crime scene where he found Daniel cleaning broken plates. He then
32
turned Daniel over to the responding barangay officials who later brought him to the police station for investigation. 33
On March 17, 2004, a follow-up operation was conducted by the police led by Police Officer 2 (PO2) Victorio B.
Guerrero (PO2 Guererro) after Daniel allegedly implicated his brother Juan to the crime. The operation resulted to the
arrest of Juan at his rented room. In his sworn statement, PO2 Guerrero alleged that Juan was nabbed while stashing
in his bag a homemade shot gun (sumpak). The bag also contained clothing, two live ammunitions for shotgun and a
fan knife measuring approximately seven inches long. He was allegedly in the process of absconding when he was
apprehended. 34
Juan and Daniel denied the allegations against them. Juan maintained that he sought employment with Spouses
Asistin but was rejected. Juan accepted their decision without any ill-feelings. On March 16, 2004, at around 1:30
35
pm, Juan watched television at his rented place in Luzon, Fairview, Quezon City. Thereafter, from 3:00 pm to 5:00
pm, he watched a basketball game about 14 meters away from the room he was renting. Then, at around 6:30 pm to
6:45 pm, he again watched television at his place. It was at this time that he heard a noise coming from outside.
Suddenly, someone kicked the door of his room. An armed policeman appeared with his brother Daniel who was in
handcuffs. He was asked to go with them to the police station where he was allegedly tortured into admitting
committing the crimes he is charged with. He also denied that a shotgun or sumpak was confiscated from him.
36 37
On the other hand, Daniel testified that at around 11:00 am on March 16, 2004, he was painting the roof of the house
of Spouses Asistin when he suddenly heard Evangeline shouting for help. Daniel immediately went down from the
roof and saw Antonio lying covered with blood on the ground near the garage. He was shocked upon seeing
38
Antonio's state. Daniel testified that he raised Antonio when he saw him wounded but the latter stood up, went out,
39
and kept cursing. When he went inside, he fell to the ground so Daniel carried him to a taxi.
40
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219 rendered its Decision dated September 9,
41
2013, the dispositive portion of which reads:
MURDER CASE NO. 0-04-125714
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel Credo y de
Vergara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reculsion perpetua for the death of Antonio Asistin y Palco.
1âш phi 1
Accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel Credo y de Vergara are further adjudged to pay jointly and severally,
the heirs of Antonio Asistin y Palco, represented by his widow, Evangeline Cielos-Asistin, and his daughter, Juliet
Asistin, the following amounts:
1) Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto;
2) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) Php 53,800.00 as actual damages.
FRUSTRATED MURDER CASE NO. 0-04-125715
WHEREFORE, the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel Credo y de Vergara are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder committed against Evangeline Cielos-Asistin, and they are
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel Credo y de Vergara are also sentenced to pay, jointly and
severally, the victim, Evangeline Cielos-Asistin, the sum of P207,277,89.00 (sic) as actual damages and moral
damages in the sum of P20,000.00.
VIOLATION OF GUN BAN CASE NO. 0-04-125716
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby acquits the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara of the offense of violation of Section
32 in relation to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7166 and Section 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6446, for lack of evidence.
VIOLATION OF P.D. NO. 1866 CASE NO. 0-04-125717
WHEREFORE, the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple illegal
possession of firearm and ammunitions under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and he is hereby imposed an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, up to eighteen
(18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The subject firearm and ammunitions shall be turned over to the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine
National Police for disposal.
No cost is adjudged in any of these cases. 42
In convicting Juan, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The RTC found that Juan
and Daniel merely made a general denial and failed to support their respective alibis. Consequently, they filed their
appeal with the CA.
In their Brief, Juan and Daniel impugned the findings of the RTC and raised the following errors:
43
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS INFLICTED THE FATAL INJURIES UPON THE VICTIMS, THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH TO
QUALIFY THE CRIMES TO MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. 44
Juan and Daniel argued that their presence, without executing any overt act, does not prove conspiracy in inflicting of
fatal injuries to Spouses Asistin. The defense emphasized that Daniel's alleged failure to help the victims does not
45
constitute positive act of assent or cooperation in the commission of the crimes charged. The defense pointed out
46
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses even confirmed that Daniel actually helped in carrying
Antonio. Also, Juan and Daniel did not flee. Daniel remained at the house of Spouses Asistin and cleaned the place
47
while Juan was found watching television at his rented place. Moreover, the defense insists that no motive can be
48
attributed to Daniel or Juan to conspire with strangers to commit the crimes. For the defense, Antonio's refusal to
accommodate Juan in their house is a shallow reason to provoke them to kill Spouses Asistin. The defense also
maintained that the admission of his arrest does not suffice to warrant a conviction under P.D. 1866. The defense
merely admitted the fact of Juan's arrest effected by PO2 Guerrero and nothing more. There was no admission with
regard to the confiscation of a shotgun or sumpak, ammunitions, or fan knife from his possession. Hence, his
conviction based on his supposed admission constitutes a reversible error. 49
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision dated October 13, 2016, the CA denied Juan and Daniel's appeal and affirmed their respective
50
convictions. In affirming their convictions, the CA held that the sworn statement of PO2 Guerrero sufficiently
established Juan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of P.D. 1866. The CA also found the circumstantial
evidence the prosecution presented sufficient to convict Juan and Daniel of conniving to commit murder and
frustrated murder. The CA did not consider Daniel's non flight as a badge of innocence sufficient to exculpate him
51
from criminal liability. 52
While the CA did not find treachery and abuse of superior strength attendant in the case, evident premeditation was
considered because Juan and Daniel were seen with the other unidentified co-conspirators gathering near the scene
of the crime. Hence, this appeal.
53
Juan and Daniel filed a Notice of Appeal on November 3, 2016. The Court notified the parties to file their
54
supplemental briefs. However, Juan and Daniel opted not to file a supplemental brief since they believe that they
55
had exhaustively discussed the assigned errors in their brief. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General
56
manifested that it is adopting its brief for the plaintiff-appellee. 57
Issues
1) Whether Juan and Daniel are guilty of murder;
2) Whether Juan and Daniel are guilty of frustrated murder; and
3) Whether Juan should be held criminally liable for violation of P.D. 1866.
Our Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
As a rule, the trial court's findings of fact are entitled great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this
rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a
case under appeal. After a judicious examination of the records, this Court found material facts and circumstances
58
that the lower courts had overlooked or misappreciated which, if properly considered, would justify a conclusion
different from that arrived by the lower courts.
Murder Case No. Q-04-125714 & Frustrated Murder Case No. Q-04-125715
The Court cites Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court in stating that "[c]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are
proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubts. Here, careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveals flaws and inconsistencies that
59
cast serious doubt on the veracity and truthfulness of their allegations and would merit the acquittal of Juan and
Daniel.
Evangeline admitted that neither Daniel nor Juan stabbed her and that she did not see Juan during the
incident. Their complicity was merely based on circumstantial evidence, having been allegedly seen near the
60
residence of Spouses Asistin, talking to strangers, before the incident took place. The prosecution witnesses admitted
to not knowing nor hearing what Daniel, Juan, and the other men were discussing. They also admitted not seeing
who killed Antonio.61
As We have held in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, to wit:

62
xxxx
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount
to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by positive and
conclusive evidence.
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which requires proof of an
actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to
have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy
exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied
conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a
community of interest.
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at least
an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them
will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own
acts. (Citations omitted; emphasis ours)
63
In this case, We find that the prosecution failed to present sufficient proof of concerted action before, during, and after
the commission of the crime which would demonstrate accused-appellants' unity of design and objective. There is no
direct proof nor reliable circumstantial evidence establishing that Juan and Daniel conspired with the unidentified men
who stabbed Spouses Asistin.
The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution - testimonies of Baguio and Ganal claiming that they saw
Juan and Daniel talking to each other moments before the crimes were committed do not prove conspiracy. Baguio
and Ganal insisted seeing three (3) unidentified men and Juan enter the house of Spouses Asistin. However, neither
of the witnesses could confirm to the Court that these men were the same men who stabbed Spouses Asistin nor
could they confirm that they heared their conversation. Furthermore, the claim of Baguio and Ganal that three (3)
unidentified men entered the house of Spouses Asistin contradicts the statement of Evangeline that only two (2)
unidentified men were allowed by Daniel to enter their house, and that she did not see Juan.
64 65
Ganal allegedly saw Juan and Daniel climb the fence of the compound of Spouses Asistin 's residence moments after
they were stabbed. However, this allegation was belied by his subsequent testimony quoted below:
66
PROS ONG:
Q What did you find out, if any?
A When I went out of the house I heard a shout repeatedly saying "si tatay at nanay nasaksak and my sister in law
told me that two male persons "umakyat sa bakod".
Q When your hipag told you that there were two persons "umakyat sa bakod" did she point to you the direction of that
bakod?
A Yes, ma'am. (Emphasis ours)

67
It is evident from the above-quoted testimony that he was testifying on a matter not perceived by his very own senses
as he did not see Juan and Daniel climb the fence. He merely relied on what his sister-in-law told him.
Moreover, Ganal's statement that Juan and Daniel climbed a fence is belied by the claim of Baguio that he guarded
Daniel while waiting for him to be arrested. His statement is difficult to believe since even Roque mentioned in
68
his Sinumpaang Salaysay that upon returning to the scene of the crime, he found Daniel cleaning broken plates.
69
Thus, We cannot rely on Ganal's testimony to corroborate the claim of the prosecution that they tried to escape.
Anent the strange behavior of Daniel, We find the degree of interference or participation of Daniel by allegedly
standing still while Evangeline was being stabbed and failing to come to her and Antonio's aid, insufficient to warrant
the conclusion that he is a co-conspirator. His conduct during and immediately after the stabbing incident cannot be
equated to a direct or overt act in furtherance of the criminal design of the two unidentified men.
While it may be true that Daniel acted differently from what was expected of him in the given situation, We cannot
fault him for reacting the way he did. We have held that "different people react differently to a given stimulus or type
of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling
or frightful experience." Certainly, a stabbing incident unfolding before his very eyes, involving his aunt and uncle at
70
that, was a frightful experience for Daniel. He should not be faulted for being in a state of shock after witnessing a
gruesome event.
Neither Evangeline nor any of the other prosecution witnesses saw who stabbed Antonio. The glaring fact that her
71
statements are not consistent with each other and that her conclusion was not supported by evidence is shown in the
exchange quoted below:
Q And, then what happened, Madam Witness? [sic]
A Afterwards, he left me and when I saw that he was gone, I stood up and I saw my husband standing at the gate.
But, before that he already sustained several stab wounds because I think Daniel and the other man help out in
stabbing him.
Prosecutor Macaren
Q And, when you saw your husband bloodied standing by your gate, what happened next?
A When I saw him standing I saw blood in his mouth and I told Daniel to help me in chasing the two (2) men because
they had just left but Daniel did not help me. And even before that, I already asked him while we were being stabbed
but he didn't help us and instead just watched us being stabbed.
Prosecutor Macaren
Q And, then what did you [sic] after asking Daniel to chase these two (2) persons who he let in?
A He didn't go out?
Q And, what happened then?
A I was even the first one (1) to go out of the house and that's why the neighbors learned that I was stabbed,
Sir. (Emphasis ours)
72
If she really thought at that moment that Daniel conspired with the two unidentified men in stabbing them, then it is
illogical for her to ask Daniel to help in chasing the two men. Moreover, considering that Antonio was at the gate
outside of the house and Daniel was inside the house while Evangeline was being stabbed, Evangeline could not
have known who stabbed Antonio. Thus, Evangeline's statement that Daniel watched her being stabbed inside the
house negates her own claim that Daniel helped out in stabbing Antonio who was at the gate of the house.
Interestingly, the claim ofEvangeline and Baguio that Daniel carried Antonio and suddenly dropped him, causing the
73 74
latter to sustain a head injury, is belied by the Medico-legal Report. The report did not indicate that Antonio sustained
any head injury at the time of his death. Moreover, this assertion contradicts Evangeline's other claim that Daniel did
75
not assist nor come to their aid after the stabbing incident. Considering that she and Baguio admitted seeing Daniel
carrying Antonio, We find no other reasonable explanation for him to carry Antonio at that moment other than to come
to the aid of Antonio.
It is also contrary to ordinary human experience to remain at the crime scene after the victims were brought to the
hospital. One who is guilty would have immediately fled the scene of the crime to avoid being arrested by the
authorities. If Daniel really conspired with the two unidentified men, he would have done acts that would consummate
the crime and he would have escaped to avoid being identified. A person with a criminal mind would have ensured
Evangeline's death and immediately fled the scene of the crime. Contrary to the observation of the lower court, his
non-flight is sufficient ground to exculpate him from criminal liability. His non-flight, when taken together with the
numerous inconsistencies in the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented, provides the Court sufficient
basis to acquit Daniel.
To Our mind, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when taken as a whole, failed to present a coherent and
consistent narration of the facts. Absent any proof sufficient to connect/relate Daniel and Juan to the criminal design
of killing Spouses Asistin, it cannot be concluded that Daniel and Juan were in conspiracy with the unidentified
aggressors in committing murder and frustrated murder. With their inconclusive conduct and participation, We cannot
conscientiously declare that they were principals or even accomplices in the crimes charged. The presumption of
innocence in their favor has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Case No. Q-04-125717)
Juan's conviction of violation of P.D. 1866, based solely on the testimony of arresting officer PO2 Guerrero, is
erroneous. We cannot ignore the possibility that the shotgun, ammunitions, and knife confiscated from Juan were
merely planted. It is too coincidental that at the very moment the police conducted a follow-up operation and made a
protective search at the room where Juan was staying, he was caught packing a bag filled with the seized items.
As pointed out by the defense, PO2 Guerrero only admitted the fact of Juan's arrest and nothing more. There was no
admission with regard to the confiscation of a shotgun or sumpak, ammunitions or fan knife from Juan's
possession. Juan cannot be convicted solely on the basis of the self-serving statement of PO2 Guerrero who was
76 77
not even presented during trial. Even the shotgun and the ammunitions confiscated were not presented during the
trial. The non-presentation of PO2 Guerrero and the seized items was suspicious, and should have alerted the lower
courts to be more circumspect in examining the records, considering the persistent claim of Juan of having been a
victim of frame-up. In view of the possibility of that the shotgun and ammunitions were planted, We find PO2
Guerrero's statement insufficient to convict Juan of violation of P.D. 1866.
Furthermore, even if the weapons seized from Juan were not planted, it does not follow that the prosecution proved
Juan's purported participation in the crimes charged against him. Contrary to what the prosecution would like Us to
believe, there appears to be no direct relation between the seized articles and the weapons used to inflict the stab
wounds on Evangeline and Antonio. It was not shown during trial that the weapons allegedly confiscated from Juan
were the same objects used in stabbing Evangeline and Antonio. In view of the dismissal of the criminal cases for
murder and frustrated murder, there is no reason to consider the items seized from Juan during an alleged protective
search on the person of Juan pursuant to a follow-up operation PO2 Guerrero conducted.
In conclusion, We recognize that the evidence for the defense is not strong because Daniel and Juan merely denied
participating in the brutal stabbing of Spouses Asistin. Their testimonies were uncorroborated by any other evidence.
Admittedly, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor. Nevertheless, the apparent
weakness of Juan and Daniel's defense does not add any strength nor can it help the prosecution's cause. If the
prosecution cannot establish, in the first place, Juan and Daniel's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the need for the
defense to adduce evidence in its behalf in fact never arises. However weak the defense evidence might be, the
prosecution's whole case still falls. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 9, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 219 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-125714, Q-04-125715, Q-04-125717, as well as the Decision
dated October 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06428 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-Appellants Juan Credo y De Vergara and Daniel Credo y De Vergara are ACQUITTED for failure to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and are ORDERED to be immediately released unless they are being held
for some other valid or lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court of the action taken
hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187536 August 10, 2011

vs.
MICHAEL BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review is the Amended Decision1 dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00658, finding appellants Michael Bokingco2 (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) guilty as conspirators beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On 31 July 2000, an Information3 was filed against appellants charging them of the crime of murder committed as
follows:
That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other,
armed with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence,
and nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by
hitting and beating his head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION
fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death. 4
On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed
to the crime charged.5
The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house along Mac Arthur Highway in Balibago,
Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which formed part of his house. He also maintained two (2) rows of
apartment units at the back of his house. The first row had six (6) units, one of which is Apartment No. 5 and was
being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasion’s brother-in-law, while the other row was still under construction at
the time of his death. Appellants, who were staying in Apartment No. 3, were among the 13 construction workers
employed by Pasion.6
The prosecution’s evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000, Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes
inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and went out of the back door. 7 A few
minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to check. He peeped through a
screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open
the screen door and attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times.
Vitalicio bit Bokingco’s neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually
subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the
kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen
floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while Vitalicio was treated for
his injuries.8
Elsa testified that she was in the master’s bedroom on the second floor of the house when she heard banging sounds
and her husband’s moans. She immediately got off the bed and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked
her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her
eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa was wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear
gas.9 Col then instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the
combination lock. Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck and
pulling her backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col:
"tara, patay na siya."10 Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3.
Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood. 11
PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4 in Barangay Salakot, Balibago, Angeles City.
At 1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he received a phone call regarding the incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp.
Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an investigation. He noticed a pool of blood on the cemented
floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw hammer with a green lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the
kitchen sink. A lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the nearby construction site. The police
went to Angeles University Medical Center afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw Pasion lying in one of the beds while Vitalicio
was still loitering around the emergency room. He approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both informed him of the
incident.12 He prepared a police report on the same day narrating the result of his investigation.13
Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during the preliminary
investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the
killing several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion. 14
The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra), contained the following findings:
1. Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds
2. Body in rigor mortis
3. Contusion with hematoma, right medial infraorbital region extending to the right of the root of the nose.
4. Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular region.
5. Contusion with hematoma, right angle of mandible.
6. Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular region.
7. Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.
8. Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal region.
9. Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital region.
10. Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third, right leg anterior 2 ½ x 6 ½ cm.
11. Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level of head of left humerus.
12. Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior median line, 7 cm above the nipple line, 0.8cm length, 0.5
cm wide and 1 cm deep, hitting and puncturing the manubrium sterni, not entering the thoracic cavity. Both
extremities round.
13. 2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest, 13 cm to the left of the anterior median line, 3 cm below
injury (12) 14 cm the right of the anterior median line 4 ½ on below injury (12). Wound 0.8 cm in length, both
extremities round.
14. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm length, left shoulder.
15. Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, C-shaped 2 ½ cm length.
16. Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8 cm length.
17. Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region, medial aspect, 2 cm length.
18. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length, occipital region 5 cm length involving all layers of the scalp
with brain tissue seen on the gaping wound.
19. Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 ½ cm to the right of injury (18) 1 ½ cm below, wound
involving the whole scalp.
20. Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, C-shaped 4 cm length, 3 cm length.
21. Lacerated wound left post-auricular region, region of the squamous part of the left temporal bone, C-
shaped (2) 3.5 cm and 4 cm lengths.
22. Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm length, 1 cm wide.
23. Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right fronto-parietal region with brain tissue out of the gaping
wound.
24. Lacerated wound, right submandibular region 0.3 x 3.5 cm.
25. Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.
26. Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone right with stellate linear extensions, with gaping, with brain
tissue maseration.
27. Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region, depressed, complete, C-shaped with linear extensions, with
gaping of bone with brain tissue maceration and expulsion.
28. Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.
29. Brain tissue damage.15
Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull proved fatal.16
Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20
a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to
know why he did not see Bokingco at the construction site on 28 February 2000. When Bokingco replied that he just
stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a
hammer and hit Pasion. They both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right
after the incident. He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000.17 During the cross-examination,
Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion. 18
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however resigned on 26
February 2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was
apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed to him as the
person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesn’t know Bokingco very well. 19
On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered judgment 20 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, and there being the two aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered
against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only,
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Each accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of
victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) to pay the heirs of the victim
Seventeen thousand six hundred pesos (P17,600.00) as actual damages, Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as
attorney’s fees, Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.21
In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but reduced the penalty
to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No. 7659, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant REYNANTE COL is
found GUILTY as conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper
imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli
Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral
damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(₱25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.22
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 and called the appellate court’s attention on the omission to rule on
Bokingco’s fate when it rendered the challenged decision. Appellants also noted the absence of other evidence, aside
from Bokingco’s admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in the instant case. Appellants maintained that the
admission made by Bokingco cannot be used as evidence against his alleged co-conspirator. Appellants also took
exception to the findings of the lower courts that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
nighttime and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the crime. 24
The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal liability of Bokingco in its dispositive
portion of its Amended Decision, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants MICHAEL

BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL are found GUILTY as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with
no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9346, the accused-appellant are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the possibility
of parole (in accordance with Section 3 of the said law). Each of the accused-appellants is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00); Fifty thousand
pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty
five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000.00) as attorney’s fees;
and to pay the costs.25
Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to submit
their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from notice thereof if they so desire. 26 Appellants manifested that they are no
longer filing a Supplemental Brief and are adopting their arguments in the Appellant’s Brief submitted before the
Court of Appeals.27 The appellee likewise manifested that it is dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief. 28 The
instant case was thus submitted for deliberation.
In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision, two issues were raised: 1) whether the qualifying
circumstances were properly appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of murder and 2) whether appellant Col is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco made two (2) separate and dissimilar
admissions: first, in his extrajudicial confession taken during the preliminary investigation where he admitted that he
and Col planned the killing of Pasion; and second, when he testified in open court that he was only provoked in hitting
Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head. On the basis of his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged
for murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery.
Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They question the presence of treachery in the
commission of the crime considering that no one from the prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion was
attacked by Bokingco. They also submit that evident premeditation was not proven in the case. They belittle
Bokingco’s extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing. The attendance of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence was likewise assailed by appellants. They aver that nighttime
was not purposely sought but it was merely co-incidental that the crime took place at that time. Neither has trust and
confidence been reposed on appellants by the victim to aggravate the crime by abuse of confidence. Appellants claim
that they were living in an apartment owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but because they worked
in the construction of the victim’s apartment.
On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the prosecution has established that Pasion was defenseless when
fatally attacked by Bokingco and there was no opportunity for him to defend himself from the unexpected assaults of
Bokingco. The OSG agrees as well with the trial court’s findings that evident premeditation, nighttime, and abuse of
confidence attended the commission of the crime.
We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the absence of any
proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must
prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. 29 Nobody witnessed the
commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something
on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.30
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion.31 But the admitted manner of killing is inconsistent with evident
premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the
following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination
and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 32 It is indispensable to show
how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. 33 In the instant
case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only
retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. 34 Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated
poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack.
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col’s plan to kill Pasion. 35 Bokingco’s
confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
In People v. Sunga,36 we held that "the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed
‘critical stages’ in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody
interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less
than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal
prosecution."37 In said case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission before the police. He later acknowledged the
same admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation
and while he did have a counsel, for the latter’s lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga’s rights, he was virtually
denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held inadmissible. 38 In the instant case, the
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the
time his confession was taken before a judge.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption that there was
evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely
sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Taking into account
that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion.
However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate the commission of the crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco for failure of the prosecution to prove the
presence of the qualifying circumstances.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance alleged and proven in the instant case, the penalty should be applied in its
medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable
penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor in any of its periods as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium
period as the maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, while reclusion temporal in
its medium period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Therefore, the indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum is appropriate under the circumstances. 39 The award of exemplary damages should be
deleted as no aggravating circumstance was proven.
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to hold him guilty as co-conspirator, it
must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, Col asserts that Bokingco’s uncounselled testimony that appellants planned to kill Pasion bears
no relevance considering the fact that there was no other evidence which will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims
that Elsa’s statements during trial, such as the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to open the vault
of the pawnshop, as well as the alleged statement she heard from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are not adequate
to support the finding of conspiracy.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Col’s conviction of murder by conspiracy by mentioning that
starting from the declaration of Bokingco, the victim’s wife, Elsa, also positively declared that Col blocked and
attacked her with a knife when she tried to check on her husband. She was left alone by Col when he was told by
Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For the OSG, appellants’ acts are indicative of conspiracy. The OSG
contends that the prosecution witnesses had no ill-motive to lie and falsely accuse appellants of the crime of murder.
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants.
We disagree.
This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court, owing to their
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination.40 However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely: 1) when the trial court’s findings of facts and
conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or 2) when certain facts of substance and value likely to
change the outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or 3) when the assailed decision is based
on a misapprehension of facts.41 The second exception obtains in this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is necessary that
conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest.42 Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential
to establish the existence of conspiracy.43
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as
clearly as the commission of the crime.44
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled together after killing her husband and
the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was being
attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault, thus:
Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that time and date when you were in your
master’s bedroom?
A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our building where we reside.
xxxx
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours of the morning on that day when you
were in your master’s bedroom?
A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to the kitchen since the door of the kitchen was directly
leading to the back door or back portion of the building where the apartments were situated.
Q: Why, on what floor is this master’s bedroom located?
A: Second floor.
Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what was happening?
A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs leading to the kitchen. I was not able to go out of the
kitchen because I was blocked.
Q: You were blocked by whom?
A: By Reynante Col.
Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How did he block you?
A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by Reynante Col and he was situated near the back door
of the pawnshop. There is a pawnshop in the front portion of our residence.
Q: When you saw him near the door of your pawnshop, did you confront him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you confront him?
A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here?
Q: What was the reaction of Reynante Col?
A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into my eyes and he put a sharp object under my chin.
(Witness demonstrating by putting her hand under her chin)
Q: How far was he before he attacked you?
A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two steps away from him.
(Around 3 meters)
Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of your body was hit?
A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.

Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear gas?
A: It was "mahapdi" (painful).
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see something or a sharp weapon under your
chin?
A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him poke the sharp object under my chin
and I bowed my head a little to avoid the tear gas. I was wounded under my chin and I felt the sharpness of
the object.45
xxxx
Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you?
A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.
Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?
A: To open the combination of the vault.
Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of the vault?
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.
Q: What vault are you referring to?
A: Vault of the pawnshop.
Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your residence?
A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.
Q: When you refused to open the vault of the pawnshop, what did Reynante Col do about it?
A: He did not say anything.
Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?
A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.
Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill you, did he agree?
A: No, sir.
Q: What else happened next when he did not agree to your offer of money?
A: He dragged me going towards the back door.46
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the
most, Col’s actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against
appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder. 47
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place.
This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that
there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they
separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he
sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up
anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop. 1avvphi 1
In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col,
specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or
her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them.48 An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of
the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration.49 In order that
the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common
object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. 50 As we have
previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the
extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Bokingco’s judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter
hit him in the head.
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. The Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from notice.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. He is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years (6) and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum Appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Noli
Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral
damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000.00) as
attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132895 March 10, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 260, National Capital
1
Judicial Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86, finding appellants Elizabeth Castillo ("Castillo") and Evangeline
Padayhag ("Padayhag") guilty of Qualified Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and sentencing them to death.
2
The Information charging Castillo, Padayhag and Imelda Wenceslao with the crime of kidnapping, reads:
3
That on or about March 1, 1995, in Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, said accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, conspiring
together, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, carry away, and seriously detain HORACIO CEBRERO IV @ "Rocky", a five years old
child (sic), which kidnapping or serious detention lasted for more than three (3) days thereby depriving him
of his liberty, and which was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the parents of the victim, to
the damage and prejudice of the victim himself and his parents.
The said accused IMELDA CASTILLO WENCESLAO, without having participated in the said crime as a
principal, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously participated (sic) in the execution of the
crime by previous and simultaneous acts by allowing and furnishing the use of her residence where victim
Horacio Cebrero IV was kept knowing him to have been taken by principal accused Elizabeth Castillo and
Evangeline Padayhag without the consent of his parents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on 10 May 1995, both Castillo and Padayhag initially pleaded guilty. However, on 18 May 1995,
Castillo and Padayhag withdrew their plea of guilt. They entered a plea of not guilty on 3 August 1995. Imelda
Wenceslao remains at large.
The prosecution submitted documentary evidence and presented eight witnesses, namely: (1) Horacio Cebrero IV
("Rocky"), the victim; (2) Rosanna Baria, the victim’s "yaya"; (3) Luis Cebrero, the victim’s father; (4) Sandra Cebrero,
the victim’s mother; (5) Staff Sgt. Alejandro Delena of the Philippine National Police ("PNP"); (6) Wivino Demol, a
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP") Intelligence Security Group, army surveillance and search
team; (7) Capt. Raniel Ramiro, also of the AFP Intelligence Security Group; (8) and Staff Sgt. Manual Iglesias of the
PNP.
The defense presented only two witnesses: Castillo and Padayhag themselves.
The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") summarized the prosecution’s version of the incident in the appellee’s
brief, as follows:
On March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria was employed as one of the household helpers of Mr. and Mrs. Luis De
Guzman Cebrero at their residence in Classic Homes, B. F. Parañaque, Metro Manila (p. 26, tsn, August 3,
1995). In the morning of said date, Femie, another housemaid of the Cebreros’ and Baria’s relative, bathed
and dressed up Rocky, the couple’s six year old son and afterwards advised Baria that someone, who was
also a Cebrero househelper, will fetch Rocky (p. 28, supra). At about 8:00 a.m., a tricycle arrived. On board
was a woman, whom Baria pointed to in court and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p.
26, supra). Baria assisted Rocky to board the tricycle. The tricycle brought Rocky and the woman, whom
Rocky pointed to in court and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 9, tsn, August 3, 1995), to a
nearby "Mcdonald’s". Thereat, they were joined by another woman (p. 13, supra) whom Rocky pointed to in
court and who gave her name as Elizabeth Castillo (p. 9, supra). The three proceeded to a house far from
the "Mcdonald’s" (p. 13, supra) where Rocky slept "four times" (p. 14, supra).
At about 5:30 p.m. of March 1, 1995, Luis Cebrero arrived home from work. When his son DJ arrived, he
informed his father that Rocky did not attend school. Luis Cebrero asked Baria (pp. 4-5, tsn, August 22,
1995) who told him that Rocky was fetched at home by a woman to attend a birthday party (p. 5, supra).
Informed thereof, Mr. Cebrero then called up his friends and went to the police station to report that his son
was missing (p. 9, supra).
At about 7:30 p.m. that night, Luis Cebrero received a telephone call from a woman saying, "Ibigay mo sa
akin ang ATM card mo o ang bata" (p. 10, supra). Luis replied, "Kailangan ko ang bata". The woman asked
how much money was in his ATM and Luis replied P40,000.00. Luis then requested to talk to his son but the
woman said, "Hindi puwede, malayo dito ang anak mo at tatawag na lang uli ako" (p. 10, supra).
Luis Cebrero decided to connect a tape recorder to his phone. On March 2, 1995, at about 7:20 p.m., his
phone rang. The caller was a woman telling him, "Bigyan mo ako nang isang million", to which he replied,
"Hindi ko kayang ibigay ang isang million". The caller told Luis that she will call back later on (pp. 11-
12, supra).
The Cebreros informed the authorities that two of their maids were hired from an agency, the General
Services, Inc. at Parañaque. Major Ordoyo of the Intelligence Security Group, Philippine Army (PA) sent
Sergeants Rempillo and Iglesias to the agency to verify this. The two were furnished by General Services,
Inc. with the personal data of the maids named Elizabeth Castillo and Jasmine Nuñez (pp. 13-14, tsn, March
12, 1996).
When the caller did not contact Luis Cebrero the following day, March 3, 1995, he instructed his wife to raise
some money. From the bank, Mrs. Cebrero withdrew P800,000.00 in P1,000.00 denomination. The bank
provided Mrs. Cebrero a list containing the serial numbers of the money withdrawn (pp. 15-16, supra).
On March 4, 1995, at about 9:30 p.m., Luis Cebrero received a telephone call. The caller was a woman who
asked, "Ano nasa iyo na ba ang pera"? Luis answered, "Hindi ko kayang ibigay sa iyo ang halagang iyon,
kalahati lang ang kaya kong ibigay". The caller said, "Sige, puede na yan (p. 17, supra) and instructed Luis
Cebrero to be in Paco, Obando, Bulacan, alone, at about 2:00 a.m.; that at Paco, Obando, Bulacan, is a
"Farmacia Dilag" and beside it is a street which Luis must follow until he reaches the church called
"Sabadista" where he should drop the money (p. 18, supra). Luis Cebrero received another call on that
same night instructing him to stop in front of the Farmacia Dilag and walk on the street beside it going to a
chapel and to drop the money on the chapel’s terrace (p. 19, supra).
Informed of the place for the pay-off, on March 4, 1995, Major Ronnie Eleazar, Commanding Officer of the
Intelligence Security Group (ISG), Philippine Army, briefed his men on Rocky’s kidnapping and assigned
them their respective tasks in the stakeout they will undertake around the pay-off area (pp. 6-7 tsn, January
30, 1996). At about 11:00 p.m. of March 4, 1995, Sgt. Alejandro Delena and his ISG team, proceeded to
Obando, Bulacan for the stakeout. After positioning themselves near the stakeout site, a car arrived and
stopped in front of the chapel. The man alighted and placed a bag in front of the chapel and immediately left
(p. 10, supra). After about forty (40) minutes, two women appeared, proceeded to where the bag was
dropped. On seeing the bag, the women laughed and left. After about two (2) minutes, the two women
returned, picked up the bag and immediately left (pp. 11-12, supra). The ISG team searched the area
around the drop-off place but the two women were nowhere to be found (p. 17, supra). In court, Sgt. Delena
pointed to and identified Castillo and Padayhag as the two women he saw in front of the chapel in Obando,
Bulacan and who, later on, picked up the bag dropped by Luis Cebrero (p. 12, supra).
Puzzled by the sudden disappearance of the two women, Sgt. Delena and his team remained at the stake-
out area. The team befriended the residents of the place, one of whom was a certain Joselito Torres who
claimed to be the former boyfriend of Elizabeth Castillo whom he recognized from the picture shown to him
by Sgt. Delena. Torres informed the ISG team that Castillo had already left for Mindanao. Sgt. Delena
immediately communicated the information, including the address of Gigi Padayhag in Navotas, to his
commanding officer (p. 19, supra).
At about 9:00 p.m. of March 5, 1995, Luis Cebrero was at home when a tricycle stopped in front of his
house. Somebody knocked at the door and when Luis Cebrero opened it, he saw his son, Rocky (pp. 23-24,
tsn, August 22, 1995).
On March 12, 1995, an ISG team headed by Sgt. Manuel Iglesias was dispatched to Navotas to locate
"Gigi" Padayhag at the address furnished by Sgt. Delena. The team found Padayhag who upon being
apprised of the kidnapping of Rocky Cebrero, voluntarily went with the ISG team to Camp Crame to clear
her name (p. 14, tsn, May 22, 1996).
Upon the instruction of the ISG, Sgts. Delena and Demo were ordered to proceed to Dipolog City to look for
Castillo (pp. 20-21, tsn, January 30, 1996). Sgt. Delena arrived in Dipolog City on March 13, 1996. He was
briefed and shown the area where Castillo could be found (p. 23, supra).
When Sgt. Demol arrived in Dipolog City, he and Sgt. Delena coordinated with the PNP stationed at
Barangay Tulong, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte (p. 41, tsn, March 12, 1996). Thereat, Sgt. Demol requested
for the assistance of persons from Barangay Mitimos, where Castillo was believed to be hiding. The PNP
assigned them two barangay officials of Mitimos who, when shown the picture of Castillo, said that the
woman in the picture is in Barangay Mitimos (p. 46, supra).
Upon the request of the police, the two barangay officials conducted a daily surveillance on Castillo. On
March 18, 1995, Sgt. Demol reported to the ISG headquarters that Castillo was in Barangay Mitimos. In turn,
Sgt. Demol was advised that ISG will be sending him, through JRS Express, copies of the list of serial
numbers of the bills used as pay-off and a DOJ subpoena (p. 54, supra). Upon receipt of said documents,
Sgt. Demol applied for a search warrant (p. 58, supra) which was granted by the Dipolog City Regional Trial
Court on March 21, 1995 (p. 57, supra). The search warrant was shown to Elizabeth Castillo and her father
who signed the same (pp. 60-61, supra). The search yielded a black bag placed in a carton inside the house
(pp. 61-62) containing money in P1,000.00 bills in the total amount of P277,000.00 (p. 68, supra). The serial
numbers of the recovered money bills appeared in the list furnished to Sgt. Demol by ISG (pp. 88-89, supra).
Thereafter, the money was deposited with the Regional Trial Court at Dipolog City (p. 89, supra).
Prosecuted for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, Evangeline Padayhag and Elizabeth Castillo initially
pleaded guilty upon arraignment and were each meted the penalty of life imprisonment (p. 4, tsn, August 3,
1995). The trial court, however, on motion based on improvident plea, ordered the withdrawal of the plea of
guilty and directed the re-arraignment of Castillo and Padayhag.
After trial, Castillo and Padayhag were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as charged. 4
Appellants maintain their innocence and present their own version of the events in their brief, as follows:
1. Accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO was a househelper at the Cebrero household from December 1993 to
January 1995. She did the cleaning of the house, laundry of dirty clothes, and also took care of Rocky, son
of Luis and Sandra Cebrero;
2. Accused Evangeline Padayhag, also a househelper, is a friend of Elizabeth Castillo. The two met
sometime in 1994 at Paco, Ubando, Bulacan, when Padayhag worked in the household of Julito Lawagon,
the latter being the neighbor of Helen Lim, Elizabeth Castillo’s sister;
3. Upon assumption from work, Castillo was promised by Mrs. Sandra Cebrero a monthly salary of one
thousand two hundred pesos (P1,200.00);
4. Castillo, however, was never given compensation during her entire employment in the Cebrero
household;
5. Castillo was also not treated nicely by the Cebrero spouses. When something gets lost in the house, she
was always the one being blamed, although the children were the ones getting the things. Besides, they say
bad words against her. Thus, she has no other choice but to leave her work;
6. Castillo had been consistently demanding from the Cebrero spouses her unpaid wages for one year; but
her demands remained unheeded;
7. Having reached only elementary education, Castillo believed that the only effective way for her to claim
back her unpaid wages is to use Rocky, son of the Cebrero Spouses;
8. On 1 March 1995 Castillo called Padayhag, telling the latter that her boyfriend is sick. At that time,
Padayhag was already working at Jelaya St., B.F. Homes, Parañaque under the employ of Lulu Sablan.
Castillo fetched Padayhag. The two, however, did not go to see Padayhag’s boyfriend but instead they went
to a playground;
9. Castillo then instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky from his house at Cesar Virata St., B.F. Homes,
Parañaque, Manila. When Padayhag asked why she wanted to see Rocky, Castillo answered that she
missed the boy. Padayhag obliged to the request, knowing that the latter would not do any harm to the boy;
10. It was only the first time that Padayhag saw Rocky;
11. She brought the child to a market at B.F. Parañaque, where Castillo was waiting. The three went on a
stroll. Thereafter, they went to the house of Imelda Wenceslao, Castillo’s sister, at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. Castillo noticed that Rocky had a fever, so she requested Vangie to buy a medicine;
12. Padayhag was not told by Castillo as to when the latter would return the boy. Padayhag did not sense
anything wrong with what had happened as she believed that Castillo only took Rocky for a stroll;
13. Imelda Wenceslao asked why they brought a child along with them. Castillo answered that she just
wanted to see the boy. Wenceslao then asked if they asked permission from the parents, and Castillo
answered "no";
14. At night, Castillo talked to Mr. Luis Cebrero over the phone to inform him that Rocky was with her. Mr.
Cebrero told her not to harm the boy. No threat or demand for ransom was ever made by the accused to the
Cebrero spouses. She never asked Mr. Cebrero how much money he had in the bank;
15. The following day, 2 March 1995, Castillo called Mr. Cebrero again to tell him that she could not yet
return Rocky because he still had a slight fever. She also told Mr. Cebrero: "Hindi nyo ako sinusuwelduhan".
He asked her: "Magkano ba ang kailangan mo?" She did not answer. Then Mr. Cebrero said: "May pera ako
rito, kalahating milyon." At that moment, Castillo hanged-up the phone;
16. Castillo denied in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 25 August 1999, attached as Annex "A" and made an
integral part hereof, that she demanded one million (P1,000,000.00) from the Cebrero spouses;
17. On the evening of 4 March 1995, when Castillo called Mr. Cebrero, he asked them where they were. The
accused told him that they were in Paco, Ubando, Bulacan, near a Protestant Church. Mr. Cebrero then
said: "Pupunta ako riyan bandang 2:00 ng madaling araw (March 5, 1999) na may bitbit na pera at ilalapag
ko ito sa may simbahan";
18. On 5 March 1995, at around 4:30 a.m. Castillo and Padayhag went out to buy "pandesal". They noticed
that at a post near a Church, a dog was trying to pull a black plastic bag. They picked it up and brought it
home. When they opened it, they found five bundles of money, in P1,000.00 denomination;
19. At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Mr. Cebrero heard a tricycle stop in front of their house. Someone
knocked at the door, and when he opened the door, he saw Rocky;
20. On 11 March 1995, Capt. Raniel Ramiro, Intelligence Security Group of the Philippine Army, together
with his men, after coordinating with Caloocan Police, arrested Evangeline Padayhag at her residence at
Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City. The military men did not have a warrant of arrest at this particular operation;
21. The military were civilian-dressed. They pretended to be Padayhag’s cousins who came from abroad,
and they "invited her to a birthday party". However, they brought her to Fort Bonifacio for interrogation. It
was only then that Padayhag learned that her companions were military men;
22. At Fort Bonifacio, the police coerced Padayhag to confess to the crime, threatening her: "Pag hindi ka pa
umamin, kami na mismo and bibitay sa iyo". Padayhag, however, did not confess to the commission of the
crime. She was then brought to Camp Crame at Quezon City on that same date;
23. The following day, 12 March 1995, during the custodial investigation, a certain Major Meneses was
exerting pressure on Padayhag to reveal where the P500,000.00 is. She told Major Meneses: "Wala akong
pera na ganoon kalaki." He said to her: "Pag hindi ka umamin, papatayin na kita talaga!" Her answer was:
"Patayin nyo man ako, hindi ako aamin dahil wala akong ganoong kalaking pera." Major Meneses then
slapped Padayhag and hit her with a stool on her leg;
24. Major Meneses also threatened Padayhag that if she would not confess to the crime, he would
submerge her on a drum. They forcibly brought her to a toilet room. She saw there two big drums. Major
Meneses then told her: "Iyong mga hindi umamin, nilulublob namin dito sa drum". Padayhag shouted.
Thereafter, someone knocked at the door and said: "Pakawalan n’yo na iyan dahil marami nang tao". They
brought her out of the room and handcuffed her;
25. SPO1 Larry Pablo was likewise threatening Padayhag: "Pag hindi ka pa umamin, ihuhulog na kita sa
bintanang ito!" (They were on the third floor of a building) "Alam mo ba kung ilan na ang naihulog namin
diyan? Panlabindalawa ka na sa ihuhulog namin diyan!";
26. During the custodial investigation, Padayhag was not assisted by a counsel, nor has she waived her
right to counsel. She was coerced by the police into signing an extrajudicial confession without even
explaining to her the contents thereof;
27. Atty. Eranio Sedillo only arrived one hour (1 hr.) after Padayhag had already signed the questioned
extrajudicial confession;
28. Elizabeth Castillo was arrested at Mitimos, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte on or about 21 March 1995.
Police officers came to her house, and when they informed her that they were looking for the money, she
voluntarily gave it to them;
29. The approximate amount of money taken by Castillo was only twenty thousand (P20,000.00) She
returned the rest of the money to the police who arrested, her;
30. Castillo vehemently denied in her Sinumpaang Salaysay (par. No. 14) that she returned only
P227,000.00;
31. Castillo and her escorts were fetched in Manila by a van. Inside the van, they blindfolded her. They
removed her blindfold when they reached Camp Crame;
32. Major Meneses and SPO1 Larry Pablo investigated her. She was slapped by Pablo, forcing her to admit
where the money is;
33. During the investigation, Pablo poked a gun on her, then forced her to write what he would say to her.
He instructed her to write: "Na kapag hindi ko isasauli ang lahat ng pera ay pwede n’yo na akong patayin".
Castillo followed the instructions because of fear.
5
In an 11-page Decision, of which nine pages were devoted to the recital of facts, the trial court found the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses more credible and gave no weight to Castillo and Padayhag’s defenses. The trial court
convicted appellants on 17 December 1997 and imposed on them the death penalty, thus:
Originally, both accused pleaded guilty to the offense and were meted the penalty of life imprisonment.
However, shortly thereafter, they moved to withdraw their plea claiming it was precipitate, which the court
allowed and proceeded with a full-blown trial.
Accused Elizabeth Castillo demanded money from Rocky’s parents for the release of the latter. She told his
father to bring the money to Obando Bulacan. The Court can only imagine the pain, worry, fear and anxiety
of the boy’s parents while their youngest son was under detention.
Ransom is money, price or consideration demanded for the redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity" (Corpus Juris Secundum 458). The testimony of Elizabeth Castillo that
she did not know about the money cannot be given weight. Two hundred Seventy Seven Thousand
(P277,000.00) Pesos was found among her things, the bills bearing the same serial number as the money
paid to her.
The court has taken a hard look in determining the liability of Evangeline Padayhag as it seems that her only
participation in the crime was picking up the boy from his house. Although she did not get part of the ransom
the fact is that she fully and directly cooperated and did her part to carry out the resolution of her co-
accused. Under these facts there was conspiracy to extort ransom. People versus Kamad Akiran, 18 SCRA
239.
The Court is convinced that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG are sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of death. Further, they are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of Five
Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as moral damages and Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
Pesos as exemplary damages plus costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED. 6
Appellants seek the reversal of their conviction by raising the following assignments of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISAPPRECIATING (SIC) THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY TO EXTORT RANSOM
IN THIS CASE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION OF EVANGELINE

PADAYHAG.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE CASE AT BAR. 7
We affirm the trial court’s judgment convicting Castillo. However, we acquit her co-accused Padayhag.
To sustain a conviction for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the 8
prosecution must establish the following: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or
in any other manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer. 9
Appellant Castillo’s Liability
Castillo asserts that the victim’s parents did not pay her wages when she worked as a maid of the victim’s
family. She claims that it was this injustice, her educational level and her ignorance of the law, which impelled her to
10
take Rocky. She faults the trial court for refusing to consider this. Castillo is mistaken. Whether or not her employer
failed to pay her salary is irrelevant. No amount of perceived injustice can serve as justification for any person to
retaliate through the commission of another crime. The trial court was therefore correct in disregarding Castillo’s
claim that Rocky’s parents committed injustice on her.
Castillo’s claim of injustice cannot justify in any way her demand for ransom. Ransom is "money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from
captivity." Thus, even if she had a right to demand payment of her unpaid wages, the money she actually demanded
11
and eventually received, is still ransom.
Castillo’s reliance on her low educational level is similarly unavailing. The penalty for kidnapping for ransom is the
singular and indivisible penalty of death. This bars the application of any alternative, mitigating or aggravating
circumstance. 12
Mr. Cebrero admitted that he was unable to identify his son Rocky’s abductors. De Lena and Iglesias, the police
officers who did the stake-out during the "pay-off," testified that the two women suddenly disappeared after retrieving
the plastic bag containing the ransom. The police officers’ inability to explain how two simple maids managed to give
5 carloads of police officers the slip severely discredits their account of what happened that day.
Rocky’s testimony, however, leaves no room for doubt. Only six years of age when he testified, Rocky was candid
and direct in his recollection, narrating events as a young boy saw them happen, thus:
COURT
Alright. Rocky, when Vangie went to fetch you from your house.
A Yes.
COURT
You took a tricycle.
A Yes.
COURT
Where did you go?
A I do not know.
PROS. FONACIER
Your Honor, please, may we request that the rule on evidence be not strict on this boy. The witness is of
tender age.
ATTY. SOLUREN
There is no strict implementation as to what the Honorable Prosecutor stated. There is no strict
implementation of the rules of court. In fact, we are very lenient but the fact is, the child said he does not
know. But the question is – he was giving the answer to this witness.
COURT
Ask another question.
Q Rocky, nang sumakay kayo ni Vangie sa tricycle, nakita mo ba si Beth Castillo?
A Nakita namin si Beth sa McDonalds. Malapit sa amin.
Q Rocky, nakita ninyo si Beth. Ngayon, tatlo na kayo, ikaw, si Beth at si Vangie?
A Yes.
Q Rocky, noong magkasama na kayong tatlo, saan kayo nagpunta?
A Nasundo namin si Beth.
Q Noong nasundo na ninyo si Beth, saan kayo nagpunta?
A Sa bahay nila.
Q Kaninong bahay?
A Hindi ko alam.
Q Malayo ba sa McDonald o malapit. Sinabi mo kanina, nagpunta kayo sa bahay nila?
A Yes.
Q Iyong bahay na pinuntahan ninyo, malayo sa McDonald?
A Malayo.
Q Anong sinakyan ninyo?
A Hindi ko alam.
Q Noong dumating kayo doon sa bahay na hindi ninyo, bahay, natulog ka ba doon?
A Yes.
Q Ilang beses ka natulog doon?
A 4 sleeps.
Q Pinakakain ka ba sa bahay na pinuntahan ninyo?
A Yes.
Q Ano ang pinakakain sa iyo?
A Champorado and fish.
Q Sino ang nagpapakain sa iyo?
A Vangie.
Q Sino si Vangie. Puede mo bang ituro sa amin?
PROS. FONACIER
The witness is pointing to accused Evangeline Padayhag as the Vangie he was referring to.
Q Doon sa 4 sleeps mo sa bahay na iyon, saan ka pa nila dinala?
A Pinauwi na ako.
Q Sinong kasama mo noong pinauwi ka?
A Wala, pero mula sa McDonald, naiwan na ako sa tricycle hanggang sa bahay. 13
Unshaken by rigorous cross-examination, Rocky’s testimony would have been more than enough to convict Castillo.
The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. But there is more. The evidence on
14
record amply supports the factual findings of the trial court. Both the evidence of the prosecution and the defense
establish the commission of the crime.
Castillo admitted she instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky on 1 March 1995:
Q And as a result of sitting at the palaruan, Miss witness, what happened next?
A Pinasundo ko si Rocky kay Vangie, mam.
Q And why did you ask Vangie to fetch Rocky, Miss witness?
A Kasi po naalala ko pagnamamalengke ako at kasama ko si Rocky, lagi po kaming pumupunta sa

palaruan, mam
Q And then what happened next, Miss witness?
A Sinundo po ni Vangie si Rocky, mam.
Q Whom did Vangie fetch, Miss witness?
A Si Rocky po, mam.
Q And after Rocky fetched by Vangie, what happened next?
A Ipinasyal po namin si Rocky, mam. (Emphasis supplied)

15
She also testified that she had no permission from Rocky’s parents to take the child with her:
T Saan kayo nananghalian?

S Doon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.
T Noong dumating kayo doon, ano naman ang sinabi ng kapatid mo sayo?
S Ang sabi niya, bakit daw may kasama kaming bata.
T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo kay Imelda?
S Sabi ko pinasyal lang po namin.
T Hindi tinanong ni Imelda kung bakit pinasyal nyo ang bata, kung may paalam yong bata doon sa
kanyang magulang?
S Tinanong po.
T Ano naman ang sinabi mo sa kanya?
S Sinabi ko gusto ko lang makita si Rocky.
T Pero, ano ang sinabi mo noong tinanong kung may paalam ang bata sa kanyang magulang, anong
naging sagot mo sa katanungan niya?
S Ang sabi niya baka daw pagalitan kami.
T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo?
Your Honor, may we asked (sic) the witness to be more responsive with her answer.
COURT
What was the question, please?
Stenographer:
(Reading back the question)
T Noong tinanong ni Imelda kung may paalam ang bata sa mga magulang, ano ang sagot mo?
S Ang sabi ko po hindi, walang paalam.
T Ano ang naging reaction ng iyong kapatid na si Imelda?
S Bakit daw hindi nagpaalam. (Emphasis supplied)

16
Castillo testified that, during the period of Rocky’s detention she called Rocky’s father, Mr. Cebrero, to wit:
Q What happened next Miss witness?
A Tinawagan ko po ang mga Cebrero.
Q Who of the Cebreros did you call up?
A Si Luis Cebrero po, mam.

Q What happened next after that?
A Pagtawag ko po kay Mr. Luis Cebrero tinanong po niya sa akin kung nasaan si Rocky, mam.
Q And what is your reply?
A Sinabi ko po na nandidito sa amin, mam.
Q After that what happened next?
A Nagalit po si Luis Cebrero sa akin, mam.
Q And what did you do when Luis Cebrero got angry?
A Tinanong po niya ako kung magkano ang kailangan ko, mam.
Q And what else did he say, Miss witness?
A Sinabi po niya sa akin na huwag ko raw pong sasaktan si Rocky, mam.
Q And then what else?
A Pinipilit po niya ako na kung magkano daw ang kailangan namin na pera, pagkatapos hindi ko
na po sinagot ang tanong niya, mam.
Q And then what happened next?
A Binaba ko na po iyong telepono, mam. (Emphasis supplied)

17
The number and time of these calls coincided with the calls Mr. Cebrero received from Castillo telling him that she
had Rocky and instructing him to pay the ransom for Rocky’s release.
Additionally, Castillo by her own admission placed herself at the time and place where the "pay-off" occurred:
T Sa pangatlong araw naman, nandoon ka pa rin ba at saka si Rocky?
S Opo.
T Sa bahay ni Imelda?
S Nagpaalam po ako sa kapatid ko na maghahanap muna ako ng trabaho.
T Si Vangie, saan naman siya noon?
S Nandoon pa rin sa Dagat-dagatan po.
T Si Rocky naman?
S Andoon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.
T Mga anong oras yon na nagpaalam ka na maghanap ng trabaho?
S Umaga po ako nagpaalam.

T Kung ganoon umalis ka ng umagang yan?
S Opo.
T Saan ka naman pumunta?
S Naghanap po ako ng trabaho.
T Saan ka naghanap ng trabaho?
S Sa may bandang Bulacan po.
T Sa may Paco Obando, doon ka ba pumunta?
S Hindi po.
T Saang parte ka ng Bulacan pumunta?
S Malapit po sa may – Hindi ko na po matandaan yong pinuntahan namin.
T Malapit sa may?
S Papunta na po ng Obando, pero hindi nakarating doon.
T Saan ka pumunta doon para maghanap ka ng trabaho?
ATTY. SOLUREN
Already answered, Your Honor, that the place papunta ng Obando pero hindi pa nakakarating sa Obando.
STATE PROSECUTOR FONACIER
That is why I am asking.
COURT
What place is that? Witness may answer.
T Anong detalyadong lugar?
S Sa may Julo po.
T Ano yong Julo?
S Malapit po iyan sa Obando
COURT
Saang bayan ng Bulacan yon?
S Yon lang po ang alam ko. (Emphasis supplied)

18
Beyond a feeble excuse that she was in Obando in order to look for employment, Castillo provides no other plausible
reason why her presence at that place, at such an opportune time should not be taken against her as additional
evidence of her guilt. To attribute this to coincidence, as Castillo would probably have us do, taxes one’s credulity.
The same can be said of her inability to explain how the ransom money was found in her possession when she was
caught by policemen in Dipolog. Castillo plainly contradicts herself on this point. In Castillo’s brief, she admitted going
to the "pay-off" site on the day Mr. Cebrero was told to leave the ransom for Rocky’s release. Castillo admitted she
found at the site a black plastic bag filled with money and brought it home. However in her testimony before the trial
19
court, she maintained that the first time she saw the same plastic bag was when it mysteriously appeared in her
luggage when she went to Dipolog:
Q And thereafter, Miss witness, what happened next?
A Hinanap ko iyong mga kagamitan ko po, mam.
Q And for what purpose you looked at your things, Miss witness?
A Para ayusin po iyong mga kagamitan ko para makapagpahinga na po ako, mam.
Q What happened next, Miss witness?
A May nakuha ako na isang plastic bag sa loob ng aking bag, mam.
Q And what is this plastic bag about, Miss witness?
A May laman po na pera, mam.
Q And how much money was there in that plastic bag, Miss witness?
A Hindi ko po alam.
Q And what did you observe about the money in the plastic bag?
A Nagulat po ako, mam.
Q And why were you surprised?
A Hindi ko po kasi lubos na maisip na ang bag na aking dala dala ay may laman na isang
malaking halaga na pera, mam.
Q And what did you do after learning that there was money inside your bag, Miss witness?
A Pinabayaan ko na lang po at inaantay na may kumuha na lang po niyon sa akin mam. (Emphasis20
supplied)
Castillo insists that she took Rocky simply because she missed him, and wanted to spend time with him. At the same
time, in her brief Castillo claims that what spurred her to take Rocky was her desire to get her unpaid wages from the
Cebreros. 21
Castillo also points out that Rocky came along freely with them, was not harmed, and was even cared for during his
detention. This argument is pointless. The essence of kidnapping is deprivation of liberty. For kidnapping to exist, it is
not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a
22
kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the victim.
Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the
place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the child’s freedom remains
at the mercy and control of the abductor.
Next, Castillo explains that she called Mr. Cebrero not to ask for ransom but to tell him that Rocky was with her and
unharmed. Castillo admitted that Mr. Cebrero pleaded with her not to harm Rocky. Castillo failed to explain, however,
why she did not inform Mr. Cebrero of their exact whereabouts so that Mr. Cebrero could fetch Rocky. Her failure to
inform Mr. Cebrero clearly shows she kept Rocky in detention considering she called Mr. Cebrero several times while
she had physical control over Rocky.
Castillo’s explanation that she decided to return Rocky only when he was no longer sick is also implausible. In the
first place, she failed to explain why she did not return the child the moment she found out he was sick. That would
have been the more prudent course of action at that time. However, one day after the "pay-off" on 4 March 1995,
Rocky suddenly appeared by himself at the Cebreros’ home on 5 March 1995. Any reasonable person would
conclude that the pay-off and the return of the child were related events. Castillo would have us attribute this to
coincidence.
Castillo would also have us believe that what prompted her sudden departure for Dipolog, where she was eventually
captured, was her inability to find employment in Manila. And yet Castillo does not explain why she tried to bring
Padayhag along with her to Dipolog.
Finally, Castillo points out that the prosecution coached Rocky’s testimony. True, Rocky admitted he did not know the
contents of the document he signed in front of the fiscal. Rocky also stated that he was told to testify that Padayhag
23
forced him to go with her, and finally, that he must accuse both appellants as his abductors. These admissions,
24
damaging as they may sound, are of little use to appellants. The reason is simple. The facts to which Rocky’s
testimony pertains to are the very same facts Castillo herself admitted on the witness stand. Even if we were to
discredit Rocky’s testimony entirely, the facts of his kidnapping stand proven by no less than Castillo’s own admission
on the witness stand and in her brief.
With the evidence Castillo’s own testimony established, the prosecution’s witnesses did little more than corroborate
what Castillo herself had admitted. Since Castillo admitted in open court that she instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky
even without the parents’ permission, we find her explanations futile. Her allegations of torture and of signing a sworn
statement without counsel are useless. After claiming to have been tortured into making her sworn statement, logic
would have it that Castillo should have debunked the contents of that statement through her testimony. Instead, she
freely and voluntarily recounted events as she narrated them in her sworn statement. Moreover, there is no allegation
that the trial court decided her guilt based on her sworn statement. The trial court based its decision on the
testimonies of all the witnesses, including Castillo’s.
In sum, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt Castillo’s guilt.
Appellant Padayhag’s Liability
The same cannot be said of Padayhag. Our review of the evidence on record shows that the prosecution failed to
prove Padayhag’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We reiterate the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including
those not raised by the parties. This becomes even more imperative in cases where the penalty imposed is death.
25
Padayhag’s sole involvement in this entire episode is her act of fetching Rocky and bringing him to where Castillo
was waiting for them. Padayhag then went strolling with the two, went to the house of Castillo’s sister together with
Castillo and Rocky, and then later left the house. From this fact alone, the prosecution would have us rule that
Padayhag acted in conspiracy with Castillo. The prosecution contends that without Padayhag’s help, Castillo could
not have abducted Rocky.
We are not persuaded.
There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in concert with Castillo to commit the same
criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken chain
of events that directly and definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime without any space for baseless
suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through. Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission of
26
the crime itself.

27
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and (2) unity in execution of an
unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of an act that contributes to the goal of another is not enough.
The act must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient
indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a common design. 28
Padayhag’s act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity with Castillo’s plan, a plan Padayhag did
not even know. Both appellants testified that Padayhag met Castillo only because Castillo told Padayhag that
Padayhag’s boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they were to visit Padayhag’s boyfriend that the
two met. When they met, Padayhag realized that Castillo had deceived her:
Q Why? (sic) Elizabeth Castillo fetched you on February 28, 1995 and why did you decide to leave your
employment?
A Kasi sabi po niya sa akin ang boyfriend ko raw ay maysakit, sir.
Q And could you tell us who is that boyfriend of yours?
A Si Jessie Mercader po, sir.
Q And what is the address of Jessie Mercader, at that time, February 28, 1995?
A Sa Caloocan City po, sir.
Q And you said he was sick. What was his sickness?
ATTY. SOLUREN
Your Honor, that is misleading.
COURT
Reform your question.
Q Madam witness, you said that you were informed that your boyfriend was sick. Did you go and see
your boyfriend?
A Sumama po ako kay Elizabeth Castillo pero hindi na po kami natuloy pumunta doon, sir.
Q For what reason you did not go?
A Hindi po sinabi sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo, sir.
Q So, you did not come to find out what was the sickness of your boyfriend?
A Hindi na po sir.
Q Are we made to understand, madam witness, when you left your employer on 28 February 1995 for
the reason that your boyfriend was sick, you did not actually go and see your boyfriend?
A Opo, sir. 29
After the two spent the day together, Castillo beseeched Padayhag to fetch Rocky citing as reason her love for the
child and a desire to spend time with the boy. Padayhag is a young lass from the province who only finished Grade
Two. Padayhag was thus easily misled by the more worldly Castillo. Padayhag’s testimony reveals her naiveté:
COURT
Q Ano ang sinabi sa iyo bakit mo susunduin ang bata?
A Namimiss na raw po niya iyong bata at nais niyang makita, Your Honor.
COURT
Tapos ikaw ang pinasundo niya doon sa bata?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Tapos noon dalhin sa Caloocan, ano pa, sinabi pa rin niya namimiss niya ang bata ganoon uli ang sinabi
niya sa iyo?
A Wala na po siyang sinabi sa akin, Your Honor.
COURT
Hindi ka ba nakahalata na may mali doon sa pangyayaring iyon?
A Ang pagkakaalam ko po ay ipapasyal lamang niya ang bata, Your Honor.
Q Sa Caloocan?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Tapos umalis ka na pagkatapos ninyong kumain doon ng kapatid niya?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Ipinasyal ba niya ang bata?
A Hindi ko na po alam kasi umalis nga po pagkatapos namin kumain, Your Honor.
COURT
Kailan niya sinabi sa iyo na ibabalik ang bata?
A Wala po siyang sinabi kung kailan, Your Honor.
COURT
Ganoon ba ang alam mo sa pamamasyal?
A Siya naman po ang nagyaya, Your Honor. 30
Her ignorance and susceptibility to confusion becomes more evident in the following exchange:
COURT
Kailan ka ba umalis kay Mr. Julito Luwagon?
A Hindi ko pa matandaan, Your Honor.
COURT
Pero sabi mo kanina ay pitong buwan ka doon?
A Opo pitong buwan ako roon pero hindi ko po matandaan kung anong buwan, Your Honor.
ATTY. SOLUREN
She only finished Grade II, Your Honor.
COURT
Yes I know it but she would know that she works for seven (7) months. Alam mo ba na December 1994 ka
nagsimula mangamuhan kay Julito Luwagon?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo at Hulyo tama ba iyon?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Papaano nangyari noong Enero 1995 ikaw ay nagtratrabaho na kay Lulu Sablan?
A Itinuro po sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo na mag-apply ng trabaho sa may BF Homes, Your Honor.
COURT
Kailan kayo nagkita nitong si Elizabeth Castillo?
A Noong January lang po, Your Honor.
COURT
Saan kayo nagkita?
A Pinaalis niya po ako doon sa pinagtratrabahuan ko sa may Dagat Dagatan, Your Honor.
COURT
Alam mo ba kung ilang buwan mayroon ang isang taon?
A Hindi ko po alam, Your Honor.
COURT
Pero alam mo ang mga buwan, Enero, Pebrero.. alam mo iyon?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Sige nga sabihin mo nga sa akin kung anu-ano ang mga buwan?
A Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo, Hulyo, Agosto, Setyembre, Oktubre, Nobyembre at
Disyembre po, Your Honor. 31
Padayhag’s confusion in the way she answered the questions propounded to her only highlights the fact that she was
not aware of Castillo’s plans and was vulnerable to the latter’s manipulation. Her straightforward and wide-eyed
admission of facts that incriminate her demonstrate a level of honesty that can only be found in those who do not
know the art of deceit. Far from a cold and calculating mind, Padayhag strikes us as one whose innocence often
leaves her at the mercy of her more worldly peers. It is clear that she acted with the full belief that Castillo was doing
nothing wrong. Whatever moved her to do what Castillo asked of her is up for speculation. What matters is that her
motivation in fetching Rocky was not to kidnap the boy. To impose criminal liability, the law requires that there be
intentional participation in the criminal act, not the unwitting cooperation of a deceived individual.
32
In its brief the prosecution itself cites that any inquiry as to the liability of an individual as a conspirator should focus
on all acts before, during and after the commission of the crime. We have done precisely that, and it is precisely why
33
we rule for her innocence. After her stroll with Castillo and Rocky, she left when Castillo brought the boy to her
sister’s house in Caloocan. She never visited nor contacted Castillo afterwards. She remained at her house and
34
refused to go with Castillo when the latter suddenly tried to coax her to go to Dipolog. None of the money used as
ransom was found in her possession. Her involvement in the "pay-off" was never established. The testimony of two
prosecution witnesses, Sgt. De Lena and Sgt. Iglesias, claiming that Padayhag was with Castillo when the latter
picked up the ransom in Obando, is contradicted by Castillo’s admission in open court that she brought along a
certain "Mila" and not Padayhag. In addition, the testimonies of these two police officers suffer from their failure to
35
explain how they suddenly lost track of the two women who took the ransom in front of their very eyes.
All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of conspiracy. We also find that the prosecution failed to
prove Padayhag’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Gonzales we held:
36
In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the
37
prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational
38
basis must be removed. The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this framework,
39 40
the prosecution must prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The
presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.
The failure to prove Padayhag’s involvement as a conspirator reveals how tenuous the evidence is linking her to the
crime. Padayhag’s culpability hinges on how her act of fetching Rocky and bringing him to Castillo formed part of a
concerted effort to kidnap the child. The act of fetching the boy, by itself, does not constitute a criminal offense. By
itself, it is not even sufficient to make her an accomplice. For a person to be considered an accomplice there must be
a community of design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal, the co-accused concurs with the latter.
Mere commission of an act which aids the perpetrator is not enough. As we explained in People v. Cual: 41
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the
previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable
as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.
There was therefore a need for clear and convincing proof that this single act was committed to kidnap the child. The
prosecution failed to prove this. Padayhag explained that Castillo coaxed her into fetching Rocky through another
deception and by playing on her feelings of sympathy and friendship. Castillo corroborated this on the witness stand.
The prosecution failed to prove otherwise.
The facts as established show that the only thing Castillo told Padayhag was to fetch Rocky because Castillo missed
her former ward. Upon reaching the house of the Cebreros, the boy’s nanny handed over to Padayhag the child.
There is no allegation or evidence that Padayhag knew the criminal plan of Castillo. Neither is there any hint that
Castillo told Padayhag to abduct the boy, or to misrepresent herself or use means that would have led Padayhag to
suspect that Castillo had some criminal design. Nor was there any proof that Padayhag knew that Castillo had no
permission from the boy’s parents. The appearance of the boy itself, newly bathed and dressed for a stroll, would
have led Padayhag to believe whatever story Castillo contrived to ask her in fetching the boy.
A criminal conviction must stand on the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution, and not on the
weakness of the defense of the accused. The prosecution should have done more to establish Padayhag’s guilt.
Instead, the prosecution left a lot of room for other possible scenarios besides her guilt. This is a fatal error. The
presumption of innocence imposes a rule of evidence, a degree of proof that demands no less than total compliance.
As we explained in United States v. Reyes: 42
The presumption of innocence can be overborne only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which
means proof, to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence,
as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for
the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than
the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty- a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, we find Padayhag’s explanation sufficiently supported by circumstances aside from Castillo’s
testimony. Padayhag’s acts before, during and after the crime all point to the conclusion that she was no more than
an unwitting tool of Castillo. Castillo misled her into a meeting. Castillo again misled her into fetching Rocky. Castillo
never met or contacted her after the day of Rocky’s abduction. Castillo also testified that she did not bring Padayhag
along with her when she went to Obando on the day that coincided with the "pay-off." The only circumstance linking
Padayhag to that event is the shaky account of two police officers who admitted that their quarry inexplicably
disappeared before their very eyes. Even the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, by itself,
cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Nothing links Padayhag to the demand for ransom.
43
She never received any part of the ransom, precisely because she did not even know it existed.
Penalty and Damages
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed upon proof that the kidnapping was
44
committed to extort ransom from the victim or any other person. We find that the prosecution has established
Castillo’s guilt for this crime beyond reasonable doubt. However, Castillo’s pecuniary liability must be modified to
conform with jurisprudence. The award of exemplary damages must be deleted in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance. Mr. Cebrero testified that their family suffered serious anxiety at the possibility of not seeing Rocky
again. The pain and anguish they experienced justifies the award of moral damages. However, we reduce the trial
45
court’s award of moral damages to P100,000 in line with current jurisprudence. 46
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 260, National Capital Judicial Region,
in Criminal Case No. 95-86 convicting appellant Elizabeth Castillo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
Elizabeth Castillo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay the victim P100,000 as moral damages.
The award for exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal basis. The trial court’s Decision convicting appellant
Evangeline Padayhag is REVERSED. We ACQUIT Evangeline Padayhag and order her immediate RELEASE from
confinement unless held for another lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to report to
the Court, within five days from notice, compliance with this Decision.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, upon
finality of this decision, let certified true copies of the records of this case be forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 220598
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First Division), Respondents
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN,, J.:
On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the
petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the
petitioners GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNOAGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the
immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 1
On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the reconsideration of the
decision, submitting that:
I. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S GIVING DUE COURSE TO A CERTIORARI ACTION ASSAILING AN

INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE VIOLA TES RULE 119, SECTION 23 OF THE
RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT AN ORDER DENYING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
SHALL NOT BE REVIEWABLE BY APPEAL OR BY CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS WHICH AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OR
DEPRIVATION OF THE STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
A. THE DECISION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE PROSECUTION OF

PLUNDER, VIZ. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN PLUNDERER AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TO
HIM/HER, BOTH OF WHICH ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THE TEXT OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7080.
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE CONFIDENTIAL/INTELLIGENCE
FUND (CIF) DISBURSEMENT PROCESS, QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF CO-MINGLING OF
FUNDS AND AGUAS' REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) THAT BULK OF THE
PHP365,997,915.00 WITHDRAWN FROM THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE'S
(PCSO) CIF WERE DIVERTED TO THE ARROYO-HEADED OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.
C. ARROYO AND AGUAS, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, IN CONSPIRACY WITH THEIR

COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174, COMMITTED PLUNDER VIA· A COMPLEX ILLEGAL SCHEME
WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS.
D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER WERE NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PEOPLE SHOWS, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT ARROYO, AGUAS AND THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174 ARE
GUILTY OF MALVERSATION. 2
In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and granting of the motion
for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or revival of the charge against
them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove the corpus delicti of
plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as well as personal benefit on the
part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution of the crime of plunder; that the State did
not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against
her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to be informed of the accusation against her because the information did
not necessarily include the crime of malversation; and that even if the information did so, the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case for that purpose.
Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Com1 to deny the motion for
reconsideration.
In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was denied its day in
court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts and pieces of evidence in order
to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the information sufficiently included all that was
necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the accusations against them.
Ruling of the Court
The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.
To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were improper remedies in light of Section
23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of their demurrer prior to the
judgment in the case either by appeal or by certiorari; that the Court has thereby limited its own power, which should
necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order denying
the petitioners' demurrer to evidence; that the proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for the petitioners to
proceed to trial and to present their evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there had been grave abuse of
discretion attending the denial, the Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the petitioners'
compliance with the stringent requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which they did not establish.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx
xxxx
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)
The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier submission, was squarely resolved in the decision,
as follows:
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because the Sandiganbayan, as shall
shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial
court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an
insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to
go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not
be limited, because to do so -
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the com1 that authority
is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of
oursuperintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of
jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly
incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the
bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to
evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was
guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the
absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence
of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 3
We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the demurrer to evidence
through certiorari. We have had many rulings to that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, the
4
Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to
evidence that was tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.
Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated because the decision imposed additional
elements for plunder that neither ' Republic Act No. 7080 nor jurisprudence had theretofore required, i.e., the
identification of the main plunderer, and personal benefit on the part of the accused committing the predicate crime of
raid on the public treasury. The State complains that it was not given the opportunity to establish such additional
elements; that the imposition of new elements fu1iher amounted to judicial legislation in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; that the Court nitpicked on the different infirmities of the information despite the issue revolving
only around the sufficiency of the evidence; and that it established all the elements of plunder beyond reasonable
doubt.
The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of plunder did not require personal benefit on the
part of the raider of the public treasury. It insists that the definition of raids on the public treasury, conformably with
the plain meaning rule, is the taking of public money through fraudulent or unlawful means, and such definition does
not require enjoyment or personal benefit on the part of plunderer or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for them
to be convicted for plunder.
The submissions of the State are unfounded.
The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as embedded in pertinent jurisprudence. This we
made clear in the decision, as follows:
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit
plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied
agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by
express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law)
states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(₱50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered
by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed,
acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder
against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be
members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordim1tes or other
persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied
conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven by
the Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature of the conspiracy
charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and acquisition was
made, thus:
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different
parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts
have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The
gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from
illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS
and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts,
agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
5
Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the identification in the information of
such public official as the main plunderer among the several individuals thus charged is logically necessary under the
law itself. In particular reference to Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein - including
the petitioners - were 10 public officials; hence, it was only proper to identify the main plunderer or plunderers among
the 10 accused who herself or himself had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of
at least ₱50,000,000.00.
The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R. A. No. 7080 is itself ambiguous. In order to
ascertain the objective meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the public treasury cannot be divided into parts. This
is to differentiate the predicate act of raids on the public treasury from other offenses involving property, like robbery,
theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does not expressly define this predicate act, the Court has
necessarily resorted to statutory construction. In so doing, the Court did not adopt the State's submission that
personal benefit on the part of the accused need not be alleged and shown because doing so would have defeated
the clear intent of the law itself, which was to punish the amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth in
6
the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱150,000,000.00 by any combination or series of acts of
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.
As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as well as the deliberations of Congress indicated
the intent of Congress to require personal benefit for the predicate act of raids on the public treasury, viz.:
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:
Section l .Definition of Terms. – xxx
xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, prope1iy, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is
conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of
a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be
made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is
associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases,
and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to
misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance, privilege,
or right used improperly, unforcsccably, or not as intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that
the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four
other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such
use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation
and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis,
raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
7
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for plunder. In not
requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator
Tafiada, viz.:
Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or knowingly benefited".
One does not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly benefited". A
candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer, knowing that the
contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from the plunder, would he also suffer the penalty,
Mr. President, for life imprisonment?
Senator Tafiada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5,
on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I believe that
under the examples he has given, the Court will have to...
Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the country but
because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And, of
course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of
plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or
he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee amendment.
But, as I said, the examples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the Record. And, I believe that in
those examples, the Court will have just to take into consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the case
and the evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed from the
coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who was not the main
plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The requirement of
personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA and
Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the
public treasury beyond reasonable doubt. 8
Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the totality of its evidence, particularly the different
irregularities committed in the disbursement of the PCSO funds, i.e., the commingling of funds, the non-compliance
with LOI No. 1282, and the unilateral approval of the disbursements. Such totality, coupled with the fact of the
petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of public funds, showed the existence of the conspiracy to
commit plunder among all of the accused.
The contention lacks basis.

As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted the petitioners' respective demurrers to
evidence and dismissed the plunder case against them for insufficiency of evidence because:
x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the
demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for
plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 9
Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the evidence adduced against the petitioners. We need
not rehash our review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to stress that the Prosecution failed to
establish the corpus delicti of plunder - that any or all of the accused public officials, particularly petitioner Arroyo, had
amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
₱50,000,000.00.
Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the information, the Court did not engage in
purposeless nitpicking, and did not digress from the primary task of determining the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by the State against the petitioners. What the Court thereby intended to achieve was to highlight what
would have been relevant in the proper prosecution of plunder and thus enable itself to discern and determine
whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient or not. In fact, the Court categorically clarified that in discussing the
essential need for the identification of the main plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the information, but
was only enabling itself to search for and to find the relevant proof that unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as the
"mastermind" - which was how the Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation - in the context of the implied
conspiracy alleged in the information. But the search came to naught, for the information contained nothing that
averred her commission of the overt act necessary to implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to commit the crime of
plunder. Indeed, the Court assiduously searched for but did not find the sufficient incriminatory evidence against the
petitioners. Hence, the Sandiganbayan capriciously and oppressively denied their demurrers to evidence.
Fifthly, the State posits that it established at least a case for malversation against the petitioners.
Malversation is defined and punished under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thusly:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the
amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter,
the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).
The elements of malversation are that: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he/she is responsible for
the misappropriation of public funds or property through intent or negligence; and (c) he/she has custody of and
received such funds and property by reason of his/her office. 10
The information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 avers: 11
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O. VALENCIA,
MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, BENIGNO B.
AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized
under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then the
President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO 0.
VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget
and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then
Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the
Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue
advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring
and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally 'amass,, accumulate and/or
acquire directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS
(PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar
schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence
Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing,
and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also
in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned
amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or
conveying the same into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and
fictitious expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, in
several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In thereby averring the predicate act of malversation, the State did not sufficiently allege the aforementioned essential
elements of malversation in the information. The omission from the information of factual details descriptive of the
aforementioned elements of malversation highlighted the insufficiency of the allegations. Consequently, the State's
position is entirely unfounded.
Lastly, the petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State can
amount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because their acquittal under the
decision was a prior jeopardy within the context of Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, to
wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the consideration and granting of the motion for
reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12- CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for insufficiency of
evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them. In People v. Tan, the Court
12
shows why:
In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates
as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had rested
its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the
grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
xxxx
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the
only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
... The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
13
The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a
new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such,
14
every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment.
With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate
the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject
the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.
It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the accused
three related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple
punishments for the same offense. The rationale for the three protections is expounded in United States v. Wilson:
15 16
The interests underlying these three protections arc quite similar. When a defendant has been once
convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he not be
subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the same offense. Ex
pa rte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). When a defendant has been acquitted of an
offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict
him,
"thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though innocent, he may be
found guilty."
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).
The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so important that exceptions to the principle have
been only grudgingly allowed. Initially, a new trial was thought to be unavailable after appeal, whether
requested by the prosecution or the defendant. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (No. 15,204) (CCD
Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). It was not until 1896 that it was made clear that a defendant could seek a new trial after
conviction, even though the Government enjoyed no similar right. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145927 August 24, 2007
SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS,1 Petitioners,

vs.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal cases 2 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no
less than 36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and several suppliers of
construction materials for defalcation of public funds arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu First Highway
Engineering District in 1977. Because of the sheer magnitude of the illegal transactions, the number of people
involved, and the ingenious scheme employed in defrauding the government, this infamous 86 million highway scam
has few parallels in the annals of crime in the country.
The Case
Petitioners Simon Fernan, Jr. and Expedito Torrevillas seek the reversal of the December 4, 1997 Decision 3 of the SB
in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 1640, 1641, 1642, 1643, 1818, 1819, 1820, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1879, 1880,
1881, 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1888, 1889, 2839, 2840, 2841, 2842, 2843, 2844, 2845, 2846, 2847,
2848, 2849, 2850, 2851, 2852, 2853, 2854, 2855, 2856, 2857, 2858, 2859, 2860, 2861, 2862, 2863, 2864, 2865,
2866, 2867, 2868, 2869, 2870, 2871, 2872, 2873, 2874, 2875, 2876, 2877, 2878, 2879, 2880, 2881, 2882, 2883,
2884, 2885, 2886, 2887, 2888, 2889, 2890, 2891, 2892, 2893, 2894, 2895, 2896, 2897, 2898, 2899, 2900, 2901,
2902, 2903, 2904, 2905, 2906, 2907, 2908, 2909, 2910, 2911, 2912, 2913, 2915, 2917, 2918, 2919, 2920, 2921,
2922, 2923, 2924, 2925, 2926, 2927, 2928, 2929, 2930, 2931, 2932, 2936, 2937, 2938, and 2939, 4 all entitled People
of the Philippines v. Rocilo Neis, et al., finding them guilty of multiple instances of estafa through falsification of public
documents;5 and the subsequent August 29, 2000 SB Resolution which denied their separate pleas for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Fernan, Jr. disputes the adverse judgment in only six (6) cases, namely: 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914,
and 2918; while petitioner Torrevillas seeks exoneration in nine (9) cases, namely: 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909,
2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932.
Both petitioners assert their strong belief that their guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and,
hence, exculpation is in order.
The Facts
The SB culled the facts6 this way:
On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores Jr. of COA Regional Office No. 7, directed auditors
Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes to verify and submit a report on sub-allotment advises issued to various
highway engineering districts in Cebu, particularly, the Cebu City, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd and the Mandaue City
Highway Engineering Districts. Complying with the directive, they conducted an investigation and in due course
submitted their findings. Their report (Exhibit C) confirmed the issuance of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs)
in the districts mentioned. They discovered that two sets of LAAs were received by the districts. One set consists of
regular LAAs which clearly indicated the covering sub-allotment advices and were duly signed by Mrs. Angelina
Escaño, Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office. The LAAs were numbered in proper sequence and duly
recorded in the logbook of the Accounting, Budget and Finance Division. The other set consists of fake LAAs which
do not indicate the covering sub-allotment advice and were signed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat and Engr.
Jose Bagasao, instead of the Finance Officer. These fake LAAs were not numbered in proper sequence; they were
mostly undated and were sometimes duplicated. They could not be traced to the files and records of the Accounting,
Budget and Finance Division. The accounting entry for the disbursements made on the fake LAAs was debited to the
Accounts-Payable Unliquidated Obligations (8-81-400) and credited to the Checking Account with the Bureau of
Treasury (8-70-790). Nevertheless, the expenditures were taken from obligations of the current year (1978) because
all the supporting papers of the payment vouchers were dated in that year. The entries in the journal vouchers filed
with the MPH Regional Office were adjusted every month to 8-81-400 (unliquidated or prior years obligation), 8-83-
000 (liquidated or current year obligations) and 8-70-700 (Treasury/Agency Account). All of these were approved for
the Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat. Mangubat, however, had no authority to approve them
because since October 1977, he had already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. There were indications that
the practice had been going on for years.
xxxx
Due to these serious irregularities, then President Marcos created a Special Cabinet Committee on MPH Region VII
"Ghost Projects Anomalies" which in turn organized a Special Task Force composed of representatives from the
Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau (FMIB), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Treasury and the
Commission on Audit. The mission of the task force was to conduct a wider and more extended investigation in all the
fifteen (15) highway engineering districts of MPH Region VII, including the Cebu First Highway Engineering District,
the 1977 questionable disbursements of which are the subject matter of these cases.
xxxx
For a better understanding of these highways cases, the flow in the release of funds to the various agencies of the
government and the control devices set up for disbursement and accounting of public funds should first be explained.
A chart (Exhibit B) graphically shows the flow of allotments from the Ministry down to the district level.
On the basis of appropriation laws and upon request made by heads of agencies, the then Ministry of Budget
released funds to the various agencies of the government by means of an Advice of Allotment (AA) and a Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (CDC). The Advice of Allotment is an authority for the agency to incur obligations within a
specified amount in accordance with approved programs and projects. The Cash Disbursement Ceiling is an authority
to pay. Upon receipt of the AA and CDC from the Budget, the Central Office of the agency prepares the Sub-Advice
of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC) for each region, in accordance with the
disbursement allotment. These are sent to the Regional Office. Upon receipt, the Budget Officer of the region
prepares the corresponding Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAA) which are forwarded to the various districts of the
region (The amount that goes to each district is already indicated in the Advice of Allotment). Only upon receipt of the
LAA is the district office authorized to incur obligations.
Now, how are funds released by the Regional Office to the different districts and ultimately paid out to contractors, the
District Engineer submits to the Regional Director a request for allotment in accordance with the program of work
prepared by the former. This procedure starts with the preparation of a Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSE)
in the District Office by the Senior Civil Engineer, approved by the District Engineer, and signed by the Chief
Accountant of the Highway Engineering District, who certifies as to the availability of funds. The RSE is then
submitted to the Regional Director for approval. Once it is approved, a Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) is
prepared by the Chief Accountant of the district Senior Civil Engineer. The ROA signifies that a certain amount of
district funds has been set aside or earmarked for the particular expenditures stated in the RSE. On the basis of the
ROA, the District Office puts up advertisements, [conducts] biddings, makes awards and prepares purchase orders
which are served on the winning bidder. The District Office also prepares a summary of deliveries with the
corresponding delivery receipts and tally sheets, conducts inspection and prepares the General Voucher for the
payment of deliveries. Once the General Voucher (GV) has been prepared, the corresponding check in the form of a
Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by the Disbursing Officer and finally released to the contractor.
At the end of every month, the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is prepared, listing
all the checks issued during that period. The RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting division of the region. Upon
receipt of the RCIDDO, the Regional Office draws a journal voucher, debiting the account obligation (liquidated or
unliquidated obligation, whichever is applicable), and crediting the account Treasury Check Account for Agency
(TCAA). The RCIDDO is recorded in the Journal of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officers (JCIDDO) and
posted in the general ledger at the end of each month.
Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO, the ROAs are summarized in the Reports of Obligations Incurred (ROI) in
the District Office, once or twice a month, depending upon the volume of transactions. The ROI is then submitted to
the Regional Office. Upon receipt of the ROI, the accountant of the Regional Office draws a journal voucher taking up
the following entry: debiting the appropriation allotted (0-90-000) and crediting the obligation incurred (0-82-000). This
is recorded in the general voucher and posted to the general ledger at the end of each month. The journal voucher is
prepared, closing the account 8-70-709 to 8-71-100-199 at the end of each month. It is also recorded and posted to
the general ledger. At the end of the month, the balances of each account shown in the general ledger are
summarized in a statement called the trial balance. The trial balance is submitted to the MPH Central Office in Manila
where it is consolidated with other trial balances submitted by other regional offices.
xxxx
The elaborate accounting procedure described above with its system of controls was set up obviously to make sure
that government funds are properly released, disbursed and accounted for. In the hands of untrustworthy guardians
of the public purse, however, it proved to be inadequate. There were loopholes which an unscrupulous person adroit
in government accounting could take advantage of to surreptitiously draw enormous sums of money from the
government.
Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose
Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII, met at the Town and Country
Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from government coffers.
Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money through the use of fake LAAs, vouchers and other
documents and to conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other government officials and employees. In fine,
the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of LAAs and RSEs so that the amount covered by each general voucher
is less than P50,000.00 to do away with the approval of the Regional Auditor; the charging of disbursements to
unliquidated obligations due the previous year to provide the supposed source of funds; and the manipulation of the
books of account by negation or adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal
disbursements in excess of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial
balances submitted to the Regional Office.
Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him carry out his plan. They typed
the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to
contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido on her part manipulated the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers
and General Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements. Thus, in the initial report of the
auditors (Exhibit D), it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the
following manipulations:
"The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were generally not signed by the Finance Officer nor recorded in
the books of accounts. Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated
Obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the
unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year. To conceal the overcharges to
authorized allotments, account 8-81-400 and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements
ceiling, adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-
400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790. These journal vouchers
in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basis of the fake LAAs. Thus, the
affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790), as appearing in the trial balance would not show the
irregularity. The checks, however, were actually issued."
The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. Other government employees, tempted by the prospect of
earning big money, allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents.
Although the anomalies had been going on for sometime (February 1977 to June 1978), the PNB and Bureau of
Treasury had no inkling about it until the NBI busted the illegal operations. (Some of the recipients of the stolen funds
spent lavishly and bought two cars at a time). The reason for this is that, at that time, the PNB and Bureau of
Treasury were not furnished copy of the mother CDC and the local branch of the PNB did not receive independent
advice from the PNB head office in Manila. There were no deposits of money made with the PNB from which
withdrawals could be charged. Only CDCs were presented to it, and not knowing that some of the CDCs were fake,
the PNB branch paid out the checks drawn against them. The bank had also no way of knowing what amount was
appropriated for the district; consequently, it did not know if the limit had already been exceeded. Only an insider
steep in government accounting, auditing and banking procedures, particularly their flaws and loopholes, could have
pulled off such an ingenious and audacious plan.
xxxx
Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District, hereinafter
referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other
highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed. The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirty-
four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4,734,336.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-
Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1, 1977 to
December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu First HED appears to have also received for the same period
another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to P4,680,694.76 which however, could not be traced to any Sub-
Advice of Allotment (SAA) or matched to the Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH
and Regional Office. This is highly irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures.
It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior year’s obligations and chargeable to
Account 8-81-400, obviously because, they were not properly funded. Furthermore, the list of projects in Region VII
for 1977 showed that Cebu First HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its
districts from February to May 1977, with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00. On the other hand, the
expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to P140,692.00, and these were all completed
within the period from November to December, 1977. These completed projects were properly funded by legitimate
LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only P754,504.00. However, an additional amount of P3,839,810.74 was spent
by the Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be
traced to any authoritative document coming from the MPH.
xxxx
A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando Mangubat,
Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of Region VII. Those
LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the
vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly used for the
maintenance and repair of the national highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the enormous additional
expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in the district, as found out by the NBI, did not show any
improvement. As testified to by several barangay captains, the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading
anapog or limestone on potholes of the national highway.
Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional amount of
P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon the said amount from the government coffer into
the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well as the suppliers and
contractors who conspired and confederated with them.
The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH
Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other conniver, Delia
Preagido, after being found guilty in some of the cases, became a state witness in the remainder. On the basis of her
testimony and pertinent documents, Informations were filed, convictions were obtained, and criminal penalties were
imposed on the rest of the accused.
On the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering
District. Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914,
and 2918 allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of materials, used as bases for
the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers. Fund releases were made to the suppliers,
contractors, and payees based on these general vouchers.
The Information against Fernan, Jr. in SB Criminal Case No. 2879 reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escaño, Delia Preagido,
Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde, Josefina Luna, Jose
Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino
Pagdanganan, Ramon Quirante, Mariano Montera, Mariano Jarina, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron, Zosimo
Mendez, Simon Fernan, Jr. and Juliana de los Angeles for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial
documents, committed as follows:
That on, about and during the period from December 1, 1976 up to January 31, 1977, both dates inclusive, in the City
of Cebu and in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo Neis, Assistant
District Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public
Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office, conniving with each other
to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of Angelina Escaño,
Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of same
Regional Office; Camilo de Letran, Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, MPH,
Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant Director MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region
VII; Matilde Jabalde, Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina Luna, Accountant II, MPH, Region VII;
Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner, MPH, Region VII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del
Rosario, Chief Finance and Management Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant, MPH,
Central Office; Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising
Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, Central Office; Ramon Quirante,
Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera, Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; Mariano Jarina,
Clerk in the Property Division of Cebu I HED; Leo Villagonzalo, Auditor’s Aide of Cebu I HED; Zosimo Mendez,
Auditor of Cebu I HED; Asterio Buqueron, Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Simon Fernan, Jr., Civil Engineer of
Cebu I HED and Juliana de los Angeles, an alleged supplier, all of whom took advantage of their official positions,
with the exception of Juliana de los Angeles, mutually helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents, to wit:
1. Request for Allocation of Allotment
2. Letter of Advice of Allotment
3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
4. General Voucher No. B-15
5. Check No. 9933064
6. Abstract of Bids
7. Purchase Order
8. Statement of Delivery
9. Report of Inspection
10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment
11. Trial Balance
by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash
disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of 1,400
cu. m. of item 1087 for use in the repair of the Cebu Hagnaya Wharf road from Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00, when in truth
and in fact, as all the accused knew, the same were not true and correct; by making it appear in the voucher that
funds were available and that there were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase;
that a requisition for said item was made and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding
purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the road construction materials were delivered,
inspected and used in the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in
fact, as all the accused know, all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications,
the above-named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency, in payment of the non-existing deliveries; that the said
amount of P28,000.00 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII
showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher, as a designed means to cover-up
the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of the said amount, misappropriated, converted and misapplied the
same for their personal needs, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount of
TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Informations in the six (6) cases involving Fernan, Jr. were essentially identical save for the details as highlighted
in boldface above. For ease of reference, Fernan, Jr.’s criminal cases are detailed below:
Criminal Dates of Main Documents Items Allegedly Purchased Amount of

Case No. Commission Falsified Fraud
2879 December 1, 1. General Voucher 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the repair of PhP
1976 up to No. B-15; the Cebu Hagnaya Wharf road from Km. 50.30 to 28,000.00
January 31, 1977 2. Check No. Km. 60.00
9933064;
2880 December 1, 1. Request for 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the repair of PhP
1976 up to Allocation of the Bogo-Curva-Medellon road from Km. 110.00 28,000.00
January 31, 1977 Allotment 101-12- to Km. 119.00
105-76;
2. General Voucher
No. B-55;
3. Check No.
9933104;
2881 January 2, 1977 1. Request for Approximately 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for use in PhP
up to February 28, Allocation of the repair and rehabilitation of damaged roads 31,000.00
1977 Allotment 101-2-56- and bridges by Typhoon Aring at the Tabogon-
77; Bogo provincial road from Km. 92 to Km. 98
2. General Voucher
No. B-245;
3. Check No.
9933294;
2885 January 2, 1977 1. Request for materials for use in the repair and rehabilitation of PhP
up to January 31, Allocation of the Daan-Bantayan road from Km. 127.00 to Km. 30,000.00
1977 Allotment 101-12- 136
112-76;
2. General Voucher
No. B-76;
3. Check No.
9933125;
2914 October 1, 1977 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the PhP
up to November No. B-927; rehabilitation of the Cajel-Lugo, Barbon barangay 27,000.00
30, 1977 2. Check No. road
9403425;
2918 January 2, 1977 1. General Voucher 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for the rehabilitation of PhP
up to February 28, No. B-107; the Cebu North Hagnaya Wharf road from Km. 30,000.00
1977 2. Check No. 71 to Km. 76
9933157;
On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859,
2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932.
The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case No. 2855 reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escaño, Delia Preagido,
Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde, Josefina Luna, Jose
Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino
Pagdanganan, Ramon Quirante, Jorge de la Peña, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron, Expedito Torrevillas, Mariano
Montera and Rufino V. Nuñez for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents, committed as follows:
That on, about and during the period from June 1, 1977 up to June 30, 1977, both dates inclusive, in the City of Cebu
and in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo Neis, Assistant District
Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways
and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office, conniving with each other to defraud
the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of Angelina Escaño, Finance Officer of
Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office;
Camilo de Letran, Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, MPH, Region VII; Heracleo
Faelnar, then Assistant Director MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII; Matilde Jabalde,
Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina Luna, Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose Sayson,
Budget Examiner, MPH, Region VII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del Rosario, Chief
Finance and Management Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office;
Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising Accountant,
MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, Central Office; Ramon Quirante, Property
Custodian of Cebu I HED; Jorge de la Peña, Auditor of Cebu I HED; Leo Villagonzalo, Auditor’s Aide of Cebu I HED;
Asterio Buqueron, Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Expedito Torrevillas, representative of the Engineer’s Office,
Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera, Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; and Rufino V. Nuñez, an alleged
supplier, all of whom took advantage of their official positions, with the exception of Rufino V. Nuñez, mutually helping
each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following
documents, to wit:
1. Request for Allocation of Allotment – 101-10-186-76; 10-190-76; 10-192-76; 10-188-76; 10-180-76
2. Letter of Advice of Allotment
3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
4. General Voucher No. B-613
5. Check No. 9403099
6. Abstract of Bids
7. Purchase Order
8. Statement of Delivery
9. Report of Inspection
10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment
11. Trial Balance
by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash
disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of
153.63 m. t. of item 3108 for use in asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road at Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52, when in
truth and in fact, as all the accused knew, the same were not true and correct; by making it appear in the voucher that
funds were available and that there were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase;
that a requisition for said item was made and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding
purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the road construction materials were delivered,
inspected and used in the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in
fact, as all the accused know, all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications,
the above-named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine Currency, in payment of the non-existing
deliveries; that the said amount of P48,431.85 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central
Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher, as a designed
means to cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of the said amount, misappropriated, converted
and misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the
total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85),
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Torrevillas cases were substantially the same save for the details highlighted in the aforequoted typical
accusatory pleading. For ease of reference, Torrevillas’ criminal cases are particularized as follows:
Criminal Dates of Main Documents Falsified Items Allegedly Purchased Amount of

Case No. Commission Fraud
2855 June 1, 1977 up to 1. Request for Allocation of 153.63 m. t. of item 310 for use in PhP
June 30, 1977 Allotment 101-10-186-76; asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road 48,431.85
10-190-76; 10-192-76; 10- from Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52
188-76; 10-180-76;
2. General Voucher No. B-
613;
3. Check No. 9403099;
2856 June 1, 1977 up to 1. Request for Allocation of 153.76 m. t. of item 310 for use in the PhP
June 30, 1977 Allotment 101-10-15-76; 9- asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road 48,472.84
201-76; 8-152-76; 8-153- from Km 108.34 to Km. 109.52
76;9-181-76; 9-184-76
619;
3. Check No. 9403105;
2858 June 1, 1977 up to 1. Request for Allocation 151.35 m. t. of item 310 for use in the PhP
July 31, 1977 Allotment 101-6-234-76; 6- asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road 47,713.09
237-76; 6-239-76; 6-241-76; from Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52
6-240-76
629;
3. Check No. 9403115;
2859 June 1, 1977 up to 1. Request for Allocation of 110.01 m. t. of item 310 for use in PhP
June 31, 1977 Allotment 101-7-63-76; 8- asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road 34,680.65
102-76; 8-121-76 from Km. 108.34 to Km.109.52
631;
3. Check No. 9403117;
2909 September 1, 1. General Voucher No. B- 1,200 cu.m. of item 108 for use in the PhP
1977 up to 928; rehabilitation of the Buanoy-Cantibas, 27,900.00
November 30, 2. Check No. 9403426; Balaban barangay road
1977
2910 September 1, 1. General Voucher No. B- 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the PhP
1977 up to 929; rehabilitation of the Magay-Canamukan, 27,900.00
November 30, 2. Check No. 9403427; Compostela barangay road
1977
2914 October 1, 1977 1. General Voucher No. B- 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the PhP
up to November 927; rehabilitation of the Cajel-Lugo, Barbon 27,000.00
30, 1977 2. Check No. 9403425; barangay road
2919 January 2, 1977 1. General Voucher No. B- 1,550 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the PhP
up to February 28, 244; repair and rehabilitation of damaged 31,000.00
1977 2. Check No. 9933293; roads and bridges at the Toledo-
Tabuelan national road from Km. 71 to
Km. 83
2932 June 1, 1977 up to 1. Request for Allocation of 250 gals of aluminum paint 324 gals of PhP
July 31, 1977 Allotment 101-7-83-76; 7-84- red lead paint for use in the 44,762.58
76; 7-124-76; 8-153-76; 8- maintenance of national roads and
170-76; bridges
2. General Voucher B-643;
3. Check No. 9403130;
The Sandiganbayan’s Ruling
The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of petitioner Fernan, Jr.; and in its December 4, 1997 Decision, it
found him criminally liable in the six (6) cases against him, thus:
In Criminal Case No. 2879, the Court finds accused JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA,
ZOSIMO MENDEZ, MARIANO JARINA and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance,
hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly
and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to
pay their proportionate share of the costs.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2880, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE,
MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to
ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of
Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of
them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay
a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2885, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE,
ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of
Philippines in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to
ZOSIMO MENDEZ, SIMON FERNAN, Jr. and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals
in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby
sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and
severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Torrevillas suffered the same fate and was convicted in the nine (9) criminal cases, to wit:
MARIANO MONTERA, and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law,
to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of
the Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Thirty One Pesos and 85/100 (P 48,431.85);
and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of
the Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Two Pesos and 84/100 (P 48,472.84);
and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Seven
Thousand Seven Hundred Thirteen Pesos and 9/100 (P47,713.09); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of
the Philippines in the amount of Thirty Four Thousand Six Hundred Eighty pesos and 65/100 (P34,680.65); and , to
pay their proportionate share of the costs.17
FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of
Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00); and, to pay their
FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of
Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00); and, to pay their
In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to
pay their proportionate share of the costs. (Emphasis supplied.)
MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr. GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P
3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand
Pesos (P 31,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 20 (Emphasis supplied.)
MARIANO MONTERA, PEDRITO SEVILLE and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Two Pesos
and 58/100 (P 44,762.58); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 21 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners made the supplication before the court a quo to recall the adverse judgments against them which was
declined by the August 29, 2000 SB Resolution.
Firm in their belief that they were innocent of any wrongdoing, they now interpose the instant petition to clear their
names.
The Issues
Petitioners put forward two (2) issues, viz:
The honorable Sandiganbayan totally ignored petitioners constitutional right to be presumed innocent when
it ruled that the burden of convincing the hon. Court that the deliveries of the road materials attested to have
been received by them were not ghost deliveries rests with the accused and not with the prosecution.
II
The honorable sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners as co-conspirators despite the prosecution’s
failure to specifically prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts and circumstances that would implicate them
as co-conspirators and justify their conviction.
The Court’s Ruling
We are not persuaded to nullify the verdict.
Petitioners’ guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt
Petitioners mainly asseverate that their guilt was not shown beyond a peradventure of doubt and the State was
unable to show that government funds were illegally released based on alleged ghost deliveries in conjunction with
false or fake tally sheets and other documents which they admittedly signed.
We are not convinced.
Our Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved.22 This sacred task unqualifiedly means proving the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt. Definitely, "reasonable doubt" is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but such
uncertainty that "a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence." Reasonable
doubt is present when
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves the minds of the [judges] in that condition
that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge; a certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it.23
A thorough scrutiny of the records is imperative to determine whether or not reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of
accused Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas.
Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents as defined and
penalized under Articles 318 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
ART. 318. Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage
caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage
another by any deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. – The penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The complex crime is pruned into the following essential elements:
For estafa
1. Deceit: Deceit is a specie of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in any false representation or
contrivance whereby one person overreaches and misleads another, to his hurt. There is deceit when one is
misled, either by guile or trickery or by other means, to believe to be true what is really false. 24
2. Damage: Damage may consist in the offended party being deprived of his money or property as a result
of the defraudation, disturbance in property right, or temporary prejudice. 25
For falsification
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2. That he takes advantage of his official position;
3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts defined under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code.26
Before the SB, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated September 1, 1988 was entered into between the State
and the accused with the following stipulations and admissions:
(1) To expedite the early termination of the instant cases and abbreviate the testimony of Mrs. Delia
Preagido, the prosecution and the accused have agreed to reproduce and adopt as the testimony of
Preagido in the instant cases, her previous testimonies in Criminal Cases Nos. 889, etc. (Mandaue City HED
’78 cases), on May 18 and 19, 1982 and in Criminal Cases Nos. 1446-1789, etc. (Danao City HED ’77
cases) on November 10, 1987 and March 14, 1988, both on direct and cross examination x x x without
prejudice to whatever direct and/or cross examination question, that may be propounded by the Prosecution
and the accused on said State witness, which questions will only be limited to the fake or irregular LAA’s and
SACDC’s issued to Cebu I HED in 1977, the sale of such fake or irregular LAA’s and SACDC’s issued to
Cebu I HED in 1977, the sale of such fake or irregular LAA’s and SACDC’s in said engineering district in the
said year and the participation of the accused thereon;
(2) That in the event Mrs. Delia Preagido is presented to testify as a State witness in the instant cases
without reproducing and adopting her previous testimonies in the Mandaue City HED ’78 and the Danao City
HED ’77 cases, she will identify documents and exhibits which have been previously marked and identified
by other prosecution witness x x x.
(3) That in the previous testimonies of Mrs. Delia Preagido in the Mandaue City HED ’78 and the Danao City
HED ’77 cases, she identified twenty-six separate lists containing names of officials and employees of MPH,
Regional Office No. VII, of the various Highways Engineering Districts in MPH, Region VII, and the MPH
Central Office who have allegedly received money or various sums from 1977 to 1978 out of the proceeds or
sales of fake LAA’s in 1977 and 1978 and, therefore, to obviate Mrs. Preagido’s previous testimony of these
lists, the Prosecution hereby reproduces and adopts specifically such testimony and the markings of the
lists, i.e., Exhibits ‘KKK’, ‘KKK-1’ to ‘KKK-25’ in the Mandaue City HED ’78 cases and Exhibits ‘0000’, ‘0000-
1’ to ‘0000-25’ in the Danao City HED ’77 cases, substituted or re-marked accordingly as ‘Exhibits ‘LL’, ‘LL-
1’ to ‘LL-25’ in the instant cases.27
As a result of this MOA, the testimony of state witness Preagido on the modus operandi of the conspirators, or the
unique and distinct method of procedure by which the malversation of public funds in Region VII of the MPH was
perpetrated and accomplished, dealt a major blow to the defenses raised by petitioners. Preagido’s vital testimony,
wherein she identified the methods, documents, exhibits, and other pertinent papers that led to the crafting of fake
Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs),28 general vouchers, disbursement of funds for non-existent projects, general
vouchers, and other documents, was not even successfully refuted or overturned by petitioners.
Preagido confirmed and admitted under oath that the illegal disbursement of public funds pertained to non-existent
projects and was supported by fake LAAs, fake general vouchers, and other pertinent papers that were also falsified.
The fake LAAs and general vouchers were, in turn, supported by signed tally sheets that pertained to alleged ghost
deliveries of road construction materials for non-existent or illegal projects.
The fake tally sheets, delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related
documents signed on separate occasions by petitioners, which were attached as supporting documents to
corresponding general vouchers; the alleged amounts and quantities of road construction materials delivered; and the
specific fake general vouchers, checks, and other pertinent documents issued which led to the illegal disbursement of
funds are summarized as follows:
Petitioner Fernan, Jr.
Criminal Specific Main Documents Items Allegedly Purchased FAKE LAAs Amount of
Case No. Exhibits Falsified that authorized Fraud
purchase
2879 T-86-f-1, 1. General 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the Not numbered PhP
etc. (Tally Voucher No. B- repair of the Cebu Hagnaya Wharf road contrary to 28,000.00
Sheets) 15; from Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00 official
2. Check No. procedure
9933064;
2880 T-87-f-1, 1. Request for 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the Not numbered PhP
etc. (Tally Allocation of repair of the Bogo-Curva-Medellon road contrary to 28,000.00
Sheets) Allotment 101-12- from Km. 110.00 to Km. 119.00 official
105-76; procedure
2. General
Voucher No. B-
55;
3. Check No.
9933104;
2881 T-104-g-1, 1. Request for Approximately 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 Not numbered PhP
etc. (Tally Allocation of for use in the repair and rehabilitation of contrary to 31,000.00
Sheets) Allotment 101-2- damaged roads and bridges by Typhoon official
56-77; Aring at the Tabogon-Bogo provincial procedure
2. General road from Km. 92 to Km. 98
Voucher No. B-
245;
3. Check No.
9933294;
2885 T-89-f-1, 1. Request for Materials for use in the repair and Not numbered PhP
etc. (Tally Allocation of rehabilitation of the Daan-Bantayan road contrary to 30,000.00
Sheets) Allotment 101-12- from Km. 127.00 to Km. 136 official
112-76; procedure
2. General
Voucher No. B-
76;
3. Check No.
9933125;
2914 T-115-g-1, 1. General 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the PhP
etc. (Tally Voucher No. B- rehabilitation of the Cajel-Lugo, Barbon 27,000.00
Sheets) 927; barangay road
2. Check No.
9403425;
2918 T-116-f-1, 1. General 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for the Not numbered PhP
etc. (Tally Voucher No. B- rehabilitation of the Cebu North Hagnaya contrary to 30,000.00
Sheets) 107; Wharf road from Km. 71 to Km. 76 official
2. Check No. procedure
9933157;
Petitioner Torrevillas
Criminal Specific Exhibits Main Documents Items Allegedly Purchased FAKE LAAs Amount of Fraud
Case Falsified that
No. authorized
purchase
2855 T-33-f (Delivery 1. Request for 153.63 m. t. of item 310 for Not PhP 48,431.85
Receipt); T-33-f- Allocation of use in asphalting of the numbered
1 (Daily Tally Allotment 101-10- Toledo-Tabuelan road from contrary to
Sheet); 186-76; 10-190-76; Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52 official
10-192-76; 10-188-
76; 10-180-76; procedure
2. General Voucher
No. B-613;
3. Check No.
9403099;
Receipt); T-34-f- Allocation of use in the asphalting of the numbered
1 (Daily Tally Allotment 101-10-15- Toledo-Tabuelan road from contrary to
Sheet); 76; 9-201-76; 8-152- Km 108.34 to Km. 109.52 official
76; 8-153-76;9-181-
76; 9-184-76 procedure
2. General Voucher
No. B-619;
3. Check No.
9403105;
Receipt); T-35-f- Allocation Allotment use in the asphalting of the numbered
1 (Daily Tally 101-6-234-76; 6-237- Toledo-Tabuelan road from contrary to
Sheet); 76; 6-239-76; 6-241- Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52 official
76; 6-240-76
procedure
2. General Voucher
No. B-629;
3. Check No.
9403115;
Receipt); T-36-f- Allocation of use in asphalting of the numbered
1 (Daily Tally Allotment 101-7-63- Toledo-Tabuelan road from contrary to
Sheet); 76; 8-102-76; 8-121- Km. 108.34 to Km.109.52 official
76
procedure
2. General Voucher
No. B-631;
3. Check No.
9403117;
2909 T-113-b 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu.m. of item 108 for Not PhP 27,900.00
(Request for No. B-928; use in the rehabilitation of numbered
Supplies and the Buanoy-Cantibas, contrary to
Equipment); T- 2. Check No. Balaban barangay road official
113-d (Report of 9403426;
Inspection); T- procedure
113-c (Abstract
of Sealed
Quotation)
2910 T-114-c 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for Not PhP 27,900.00
(Request for use in the rehabilitation of numbered
Supplies and No. B-929; the Magay-Canamukan, contrary to
Equipment); T- Compostela barangay road official
114-e (Report of 2. Check No.
Inspection); T- 9403427; procedure
114-f (Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)
2914 T-115-c 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for Not PhP 27,000.00
(Request for No. B-927; use in the rehabilitation of numbered
Supplies and the Cajel-Lugo, Barbon contrary to
Equipment); T- 2. Check No. barangay road official
115-e (Report of 9403425;
Inspection); T- procedure
115-f (Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)
2919 T-117-g 1. General Voucher 1,550 cu. m. of item 108 for Not PhP 31,000.00
(Delivery No. B-244; use in the repair and numbered
Receipt); T-117- rehabilitation of damaged contrary to
g-1, etc. (Daily 2. Check No. roads and bridges at the official
Tally Sheets) 9933293; Toledo-Tabuelan national
road from Km. 71 to Km. 83 procedure
2932 1. Request for 250 gals of aluminum paint Not PhP 44,762.58
Allocation of 324 gals of red lead paint for numbered
Allotment 101-7-83- use in the maintenance of contrary to
76; 7-84-76; 7-124- national roads and bridges official
76; 8-153-76; 8-170-
76; procedure
2. General Voucher
B-643;
3. Check No.
9403130;
On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they either signed the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts,
reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related documents which became part of the
supporting documents that led to the issuance of general vouchers and eventually the disbursement of public
funds.29 The tally sheets are statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of materials for
the construction and maintenance of roads that have been delivered on supposed project sites on given dates at
specific places.
As a result of petitioners’ signatures in the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for
supplies and materials, and other supporting documents—which became the basis for payment to suppliers—public
funds were released via general vouchers and checks to the said suppliers despite the fact that the latter did not
make any deliveries in accordance with projects allegedly funded by mostly fake LAAs.
The accusation that there were no actual deliveries of road construction and maintenance materials in support of
projects or otherwise funded by LAAs was proven true by the testimonies of the various barangay captains and
residents of the barangay who were supposed to be benefited by the construction and repair activities of the Cebu
First Highway Engineering District. The testimonies of these barangay captains and residents are summarized as
follows:30
1. MACARIO LIMALIMA, Barangay Captain of Barangay Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, testified that his barangay is
traversed by the national highway stretching to a distance of 2 kilometers and 750 meters (Km. 122; Km. 123 to 125).
He described the road as full of potholes. Except for filling up these potholes with "anapog" or crushed limestone, no
major repairs were undertaken on the said road in 1978 or in previous years. (TSN., pp. 6-14, June 5, 1986).31
2. FELOMINO ORBISO, Barangay Captain of Cawit, Medellin, Cebu, from 1972 to 1981, testified that his barangay is
traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 125 to Km. 127.9. He described the road as a rough or dirt
road. No improvement was ever made on this road whether during the year when he gave his statement to the NBI
(1978) or in previous years. The road remained in bad shape, with numerous potholes which the camineros merely
filled up with limestone. (TSN., pp.14-19, June 5, 1986).32
3. TIMOTEO ANCAJAS, Barangay Captain of Paypay, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 132 to Km. 134 ½, or a distance of 2 ½
kilometers. He described the portion of the highway as a rough road with potholes. He stated that the only
improvement done on this road was the filling up of the potholes with "anapog" or crushed limestone and this was
done only once in 1977. It even took the camineros three months from the time the limestones were delivered to start
working on the road. (TSN., pp. 20-26, June 5, 1986).33
4. LUCIA PEÑAFLOR, Barangay Captain of Don Pedro, Bogo, Cebu, from 1966 to 1982, testified that her barangay
is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 103 to Km. 105 ½, up to the boundary of San Remigio, and
from the boundary to Daan Bantayan, a distance of more than 3 kilometers. It was only in 1984 or 1985 when this
portion of the national highway was asphalted. Prior to that, the road was maintained by filling up the potholes with
crushed limestone or "anapog." These potholes started to appear between January and June of 1977. However, as
alleged by her in her affidavit (Exh. II-1-d), these potholes were filled up only from January to June, 1978. (TSN., pp.
28-46, June 5, 1986).34
5. MARCELO CONEJOS, Barangay Captain of Tapilon, Daan Bantayan, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 130 to Km. 134, or a distance of 4 kilometers. In
1977, said portion of the national highway was in bad condition and that nothing was done to improve it until 1982,
except for the time when the potholes were filled up with crushed limestones. (TSN., pp. 48-56, June 5, 1986).35
6. REMEDIOS FELICANO, Barangay Captain of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982, testified that her
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching form Km. 109 to Km. 110. She described said portion of the
national highway as "stoney." The only maintenance work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of
potholes with crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside. (TSN., pp.57-67, June 5, 1986).36
7. ALBERTO BRANSUELA, a resident of Barangay San Jose, Catmon, Cebu, from 1974 to 1978, testified that
barangay San Jose is traversed by the national highway (Km. 58), covering a distance of ½ kilometer more or less.
He stated that while this portion of the national highway was already asphalted as of 1977, there were potholes which
the camineros filled up with anapog taken from the roadside. (TSN., pp. 69-80), June 5, 1986).37
8. CARIDAD PUNLA, Acting Barangay Captain of Barangay Corazon, Catmon, Cebu, from 1977 to 1982, testified
that the Poblacion of Catmon is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 57 to Km. 58. In 1977, only
more than ½ of this portion of the national highway was cemented while the remaining portion was asphalted. While
said portion of the national highway already had cracks and potholes as of 1977, the real problem was the uneven
elevation of the surface of the shoulder of the road. No general repair was undertaken by the authorities to correct the
uneven elevation, except for the work done by the camineros who covered up the potholes. (TSN., pp. 81-89, June 5,
1986).38
9. FELIPE MOLIT, Barangay Captain of Bao, Sugud, Cebu, from 1975 to 1982, testified that barangay Bao was
traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 59 to Km. 60 1/2. He described said portion of the national
highway as a gravel road surfaced with anapog. In 1977, the said road already had potholes which maintenance men
filled up with anapog beginning in March, 1977. The anapog was hauled in from Km. 64, the usual excavation place
of anapog. It took only 3 truckloads of anapog to cover the entire length of the 1 ½ kilometers traversing their
barangay. (TSN., pp. 90-99, June 5, 1986).39
10. LEONARDO PINOTE, Barangay Captain of Barangay Argawanon, San Remigio, Cebu, from 1972 to 1980,
testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway covering a distance of ½ kilometers more or less. In
1977, this portion of the national highway was a rough road with potholes. In the same year, camineros worked on
the road, using wheelbarrows, shovels and rakes, pitching up the potholes with anapog. (TSN., pp. 29-35, June 6,
1986).40
11. PEDRO ORSAL, Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980, testified that
his barangay is traversed by the national highway, from Km. 107 to Km. 110, or a distance of three kilometers more
or less. In 1977, the road from Km. 107 to Km. 108 was a gravel road. It was properly maintained by the highways
people, and every time potholes appeared on the road, they would be filled-up with anapog. This material was
dumped along the road by trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways. On the other hand, the road leading to the heart
of the poblacion was asphalted, but with potholes. In 1977, the potholes were filled up by camineros with gravel
delivered by dump trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways. It was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and
extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc. x x x (TSN., pp.36-45, June 6, 1986).41
The inescapable conclusion from the aforementioned testimonies of the barangay captains and residents of Cebu
whose respective barangay are traversed by the national highway is that there were no actual major repair works
undertaken on the national highway except the filling of potholes by crushed limestone (anapog). Clearly, there were
no deliveries of supplies and materials for asphalting and repair of roads described in the tally sheets and other
supporting documents signed by petitioners.
While petitioner Torrevillas presented Vice-Mayor Emigdio Tudlasan of Tabuclan, Cebu, who testified that he saw the
asphalting of the Tabuclan Road from kilometers 18 to 19, said testimony is not conclusive on the actual delivery of
the supplies indicated in the tally sheets, as Tudlasan was not present at the time of alleged delivery. Moreover, his
testimony runs counter to the testimonies of Barangay Captain Remedios Feliciano of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu and
Barangay Captain Pedro Orsal of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu. Feliciano testified that she was Barangay Captain
of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982; that her barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching
from km. 109 to km. 110; and that the only work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with
crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside. On the other hand, Orsal testified that he was
Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980; that his barangay is traversed by
the national highway, from km. 107 to km. 110; that in 1977, the road from km. 107 to km. 108 was a gravel road
maintained by the highways people, and every time potholes appeared on the road, they would be filled-up with
anapog, which was dumped along the road by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that it was only in 1978 when the
road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc.
Compared to the testimony of Vice-Mayor Tudlasan, the testimonies of Barangay Captains Feliciano and Orsal are
entitled to more weight and credit, and are more credible considering the fact that they are residents of the area
where the road supposedly to be repaired is located plus the fact that they saw only limestone, not asphalt, that was
used in the repair of the road in 1977. The testimonies of Feliciano and Orsal are further buttressed by the findings
and statements of government witnesses, namely––Ruth Inting Paredes, Supervising Commission on Audit (COA)
Auditor assigned to Region VII; Felicitas Cruz Ona, Supervising COA Auditor assigned to the main COA office;
Federico A. Malvar, Senior National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent of the Anti-Graft Section and member of the
COA NBI team assigned to investigate the anomalies; Rogelio C. Mamaril, Supervising NBI Agent of the Anti-Fraud
and Action Section; and Delia Comahig Preagido, Accountant III, MPH, Region VII––to the effect that the general
vouchers and LAAs that corresponded to the aforementioned tally sheets signed by petitioner Torrevillas were fake or
falsified. Undeniably, the government witnesses have no motive to testify falsely against petitioner Torrevillas and,
hence, credible. We conclude that there were no actual deliveries of supplies for asphalting of road and repair on
kilometers 108 and 109, which were the subjects of Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and 2859.
Glaring is the finding of the SB that the Cebu First Highway Engineering District, to which petitioners were assigned,
had fake LAAs totaling to PhP 4,924,366.50, while the fake Cash Disbursement Ceilings issued amounted to PhP
6,271,150.42 The Cebu First Highway Engineering District had also issued checks per unrecorded reports in the total
sum of PhP 1,135,176.82.43 Therefore, the total illegal disbursements in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District
alone were a staggering PhP 12,330,693.32 circa 1977.
Of this total, petitioner Fernan, Jr. freely admitted signing tally sheets which pertained to non-existent deliveries of
road construction supplies and materials totaling PhP 146,000, 44 including PhP 27,000 in Criminal Case No. 2914
where petitioner Torrevillas was among the co-accused.45 These tally sheets were attached as the supporting papers
to fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers.
These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885,
and 2914) and Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2918). 46
On his part, petitioner Torrevillas voluntarily admitted to signing tally sheets, reports of inspection, requisitions of
supplies and equipment, and other pertinent documents totaling an even greater amount of PhP
337,861.01,47 including PhP 27,000 in Criminal Case No. 2914 where petitioner Fernan, Jr. was among the co-
accused.48 These documents signed by petitioner Torrevillas were likewise attached as supporting papers to fake
general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers.
These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Rufino V. Nuñez (Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and 2859),
Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2909, 2910, and 2914), Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2919), and
Manuel Mascardo (Criminal Case No. 2932).49
These general vouchers and checks could not be traced to genuine LAAs. Ergo, there were no actual deliveries of
supplies and materials for the road repair and rehabilitation in Region VII, which were the subjects of the criminal
cases where petitioners were charged.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that all the essential elements of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents were present. There is no question that petitioners, at the time of the
commission of the crime, were public officers—civil engineers—assigned to the MPH. Their signing of tally sheets
and related documents pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair and construction constitutes
intervention and/or taking advantage of their official positions, especially considering that they had the duty to inspect
the purported deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the documents and the statements contained in them.
The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals of material facts which the petitioners had the duty to
verify and confirm. These tally sheets were attached as supporting documents to fake LAAs and subsequently
became the bases for the disbursement of public funds to the damage and prejudice of the government. Indubitably,
there exists not even an iota of doubt as to petitioners’ guilt.
The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public documents are present in the cases against
petitioners, as follows:
1. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas made it appear that supplies for road construction and maintenance
were delivered by suppliers allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said supplies were not
delivered and no actual asphalting or repair of road was implemented. In doing so, petitioners:
1.1. Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission of the offenses;
1.2. Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers; and
1.3. Made untruthful statements in several narrations of fact.
2. Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146,000 in the case of Fernan, Jr. and PhP 337,861.01 in the case of
Torrevillas, as payments to various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent supplies.
By way of defense, petitioners posit that the tally sheets and other documents could in fact be traced to genuine LAAs
that were in the custody of the NBI. Unfortunately, these genuine LAAs were not introduced in evidence. It is an age-
old axiom that s/he who alleges something must prove it. Petitioners’ assertion that the documents they signed were
all genuine and duly covered by genuine LAAs was substantiated only by their own self-serving and uncorroborated
testimonies. We hesitate to give much weight and credit to their bare testimonies in the face of clear, convincing,
overwhelming, and hard evidence adduced by the State.
If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense, and they firmly believed that the documents were indeed in the
custody of the NBI, then petitioners could have easily procured the compulsory process to compel the production of
said documents. However, petitioners miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces tecum which the court a quo could
have readily granted. The inability to produce such important and exculpatory pieces of evidence proved disastrous to
petitioners’ cause. Their conviction was indeed supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt which was not
overturned by defense evidence.
Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another
Petitioners vigorously claim error on the part of the lower court when it made the finding that they were co-
conspirators with the other parties accused despite the dearth of evidence to amply demonstrate complicity.
We are not convinced by petitioners’ postulation.

Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution. Considering,
however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by
direct evidence. In People v. Pagalasan, the Court explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary:
After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in
nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,
showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or
more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.50
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-called
"wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of
narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as
with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then
retailer and consumer.51
We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the "wheel" conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who
constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single hub, namely: Rolando
Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz
(Clerk II), who controlled the separate "spokes" of the conspiracy. Petitioners were among the many spokes of the
wheel.
We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through Associate Justice Cipriano A. Del Rosario, Chairperson of the
Third Division, in elaborating the intricate web of conspiracy among the accused, thus:
Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him carry out his plan. They typed
fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling fake LAAs to contractors at
26% of the gross amount. Preagido manipulated the general ledger, journal vouchers and general journal through
negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements. In the initial report of COA auditors Victoria C. Quejada and
Ruth I. Paredes it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the
following manipulations:
"The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were not signed by the Finance Officer nor (sic) recorded in the
books of accounts. Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated
obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the
unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year. To conceal the overcharges to
authorized allotments, account 8-81-400 (sic) and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements
ceiling, adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-
400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790. These journal vouchers
in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basis of fake LAAs. Thus the affected
accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790), as appearing in the trial balance, would not show the irregularity. The
checks, however, were actually issued."52
The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. Other government employees, tempted by the prospect of
earning big money, allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents.
xxxx
3. Cebu First Highway Engineering District Anomalies
Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District, hereinafter
referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other
highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed. The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirty-
four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4,734,336.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-
Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1, 1977 to
December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu First HED appears to have also received for the same period
another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to P4,680,694.76 which however, could not be traced to any Sub-
Advice of Allotment (SAA) OR MATCHED TO THE Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from
the MPH and Regional Office. This is highly irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures.
It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior year’s obligations and chargeable to
Account 81-400, obviously because, they were not properly funded. Furthermore, the list of projects in Region VII for
1977 showed that Cebu first HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its districts
from February to May, 1977, with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00. On the other hand, the expenditures for
barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to P140,692.00, and these were all completed within the
period from November to December, 1977. These completed projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and
CDCs in the total amount of only P754,504.00. However, an additional amount of P3,839,810.74, was spent by the
Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to
any authoritative document coming from the MPH.
The following payments for materials purchased for the year 1977 were made to appear as payment for prior year’s
obligation and were paid out of fake LAAs:
Supplier No. of
Kind of Materials Measurement Amount
Vouchers
Rufino Nuñez 29 Item 310 4,640,275 mt P1,374,135.00
J. delos Angeles 21 Item 108 22,290 cu.m. 433,300.00
Iluminada Vega 11 Item 108 8,325 cu.m. 191,500.00
Florencio Gacayan 10 Item 108 7,800 cu.m. 156,000.00
Ismael Sabio, Jr. 6 Item 108 6,198 cu.m. 123,960.00
FBS Marketing 3 Lumber 70,610.00
Cebu Hollow Blocks 2 Hollow Blocks 19,880.00
Bienvenido Presillas 4 Equip. Rental 29,580.00
T.R. Eustaquio Ent. 1 Office Supplies 7,461.90
Santrade Mktg. 1 Johnson Products 8,392.90
Pelagia Gomez 1 Item 108 2,000 cu.m. 40,000.00
M & M Ent. 1 Paints 49,736.20
Freent Ind. 1 Office Supplies 590.20
Total……… P2,505,147.00
The NBI also discovered that there were purchases of materials in 1977 that were charged to current obligations but
paid out of spurious LAAs, to wit:
Supplier No. of
Kind of Materials Measurement Amount
Vouchers
Rufino Nuñez 11 Item 310 162,549 m.t.
P529,475.00
Item 108 5,000 cu.m.
Juliana delos Angeles 16 Item 108 13,280 cu.m. P276,400.00
Item 111 1,00 cu.m. 24,000.00
Item 200 307 cu.m. 7,982.00

Iluminada Vega 3 Item 108 3,600 cu.m. 72,090.00
Florencio Gacayan 2 Item 108 2,400.00 cu.m. 48,000.00
Vicon Ent. 1 Steel Frame 19,042.74
Ismael Sabio, Jr. 5 Item 108 6,950 cu.m. 139,000.00
Jabcyl Mktg. 3 Bridge Materials 128,764.80
Total……… P1,339,663.74
Grand Total ………. P3,839,810.74
A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando Mangubat,
Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of Region VII. Those
LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the
vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly used for the
maintenance and repair of the national highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the enormous additional
expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in the district, as found out by the NBI, did not show any
improvement (Exhibit II). As testified to by several barangay captains, the road maintenance consisted merely of
spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national Highway.
Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional amount of
P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon off the said amount from the government coffer
into the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well as the suppliers and
contractors who conspired and confederated with them.53
After a close re-examination of the records, the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the anti-graft court that
petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused, headed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat, who were
similarly convicted in practically all the 119 counts of estafa. Undisturbed is the rule that this Court is not a trier of
facts and in the absence of strong and compelling reasons or justifications, it will accord finality to the findings of facts
of the SB. The feeble defense of petitioners that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of accused
Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud the government does not merit any consideration. The State is not
tasked to adduce direct proof of the agreement by petitioners with the other accused, for such requirement, in many
cases, would border on near impossibility. The State needs to adduce proof only when the accused committed acts
that constitute a vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. In the
case at bench, the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, and requests for
supplies and materials by petitioners on separate occasions is vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in
siphoning off government funds. Without such fabricated documents, the general vouchers covering the supply of
materials cannot be properly accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for the preparation of checks.
State witness Ruth Paredes, Supervising COA Auditor, elaborated on the procedure regarding the award of the
contract more specifically to the payment of the contractor or supplier. Once the Request for Supplies and Equipment
is approved by the Regional Office, the Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) or the request for funds is signed
by the District Engineer pursuant to the approved plans and budget and signed by the district accountant as to
availability of funds.
The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award the contract to the lowest bidder. The Purchase Order
(PO) is prepared and addressed to the winning bidder. Upon delivery of the supplies and materials, the supplier bills
the district office for payment. Consequently, the requisitioning officer will prepare the general voucher which must be
accompanied by the following documents:
a. The ROA;
b. The PO;
c. The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations;
d. The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets; and
e. The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier.
After the preparation and submission of the general voucher and the supporting documents, the disbursing officer
shall prepare and draw a check based on said voucher. The check is countersigned by an officer of the district office
and/or the COA Regional Director based on the amount of the check.
Thus, it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher cannot be prepared and
completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the
supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully consummated. Thus,
petitioners’ acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Surely, there were ghost or false deliveries of supplies and
materials as convincingly shown by the testimonies of the barangay captains, officials, and residents of the areas
where the materials were allegedly used. More importantly, if there were actual deliveries of materials made, then
there would be no need to fake the LAAs because the suppliers will have to be paid the cost of said materials plus a
reasonable profit. As a result, there is nothing or not much to share with the more than 30 or so co-conspirators, for
the suppliers would not be too dim-witted to part with even their cost in buying the materials they allegedly supplied.
Moreover, the fake delivery receipts and tally sheets signed by petitioners were linked to the general vouchers upon
which check payments were made to the suppliers who were found guilty of participating in the fraud. With respect to
petitioner Fernan, Jr., he signed tally sheets on the ghost deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and Ismael Sabio, Jr.
On the part of petitioner Torrevillas, he signed false tally sheets and delivery receipts on supplies allegedly delivered
by Rufino V. Nuñez, Juliana de los Angeles, Ismael Sabio, Jr., and Manuel Mascardo. Lastly, the checks issued to
these suppliers based on general vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and general vouchers signed by
petitioners cannot be traced to any genuine LAAs, resulting in the inescapable conclusion that these LAAs were
unauthorized; hence, fake or fabricated. These are undisputed tell-tale signs of the complicity by petitioners with the
Mangubat syndicate.
In People v. Mangubat, the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy in the Cebu highway scam in a trenchant manner:
Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link in a chain and the desistance of even one of them
would prevent the chain from being completed, then no conspiracy could result as its consummation would then be
impossible or aborted. But when each and everyone of the accused in the instant cases performed their assigned
tasks and roles with martinet-like precision and accuracy, by individually performing essential overt acts, so much so
that the common objective is attained, which is to secure the illegal release of public funds under the guise of fake or
simulated public documents, then each and everyone of said accused are equally liable as co-principals under the
well-established and universally-accepted principle that, once a conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven, the act of
one is the act of all and such liability exists notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in the execution of the
offense.54
In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the conspiracy among the accused
including petitioners. The conviction of petitioners must perforce be sustained.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the December 4, 1997 Decision of the SB in the consolidated
criminal cases subject of this petition.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148965 February 26, 2002
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is the
submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be excluded from
the charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President
of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family,
his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing
1
with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents
therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was
assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10,
2001 and no bail for petitioner’s provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the
Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent
Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis,
petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put
2
him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not
in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody.
In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court.3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The
Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him." 4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called ‘Entry of Appearance,’ To Direct Ombudsman To
Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents." 5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s "Motion to Quash and
Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." Petitioner’s alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after
6
arraignment of all accused. The court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO
QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH
dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended
Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, his VERY
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable
cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION
TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be
allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for
July 10, 2001, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused."7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the
motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a
plea of "not guilty" for him.
8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying
him the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which
and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal,
not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality." 9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal
protection of the laws.
10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has been
settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan. We take off from the Amended Information which charged
11
petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA" AND a.k.a
"JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series
of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE

AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-
accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS,
and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00],
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,

KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001" 12
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the premise
that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then
assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is divided
into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder
together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others;
(2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder;
and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of
plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate
amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of
pecuniary benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged
with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to ₱545 million. Contrary to petitioner’s
posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several instances." The
phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the
Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase
"several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as they appear in R.A.
No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular,
13
not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a
repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word "combination"
contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder committed by a series of the same
predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to
charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million,
which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne
out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his
co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
"x x x xxx xxx
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also surreptitious
collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the statements of Gov.
Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an
emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another
P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan" of jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by
Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]." 14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was
delivered to petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire
sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
"x x x xxx xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and
Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng
collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest
or interference by law enforcers; x x x."
15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable
cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the petitioner
for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial.
The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be
resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the courts
in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense." Thus, he posits the following questions:
16
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose on one
who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty? What
if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty
imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law does not
provide the standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to
say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have intended." 17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with only
one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the
Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death.
R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner,
however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired with
former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of
the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the
penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances,
as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses
and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected – contrary to the dictum
that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of substantive due process."
18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in sub-
paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a
principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs
of the Amended Information. 19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-vis the provisions
of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of
plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder
was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail
the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President
Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the
items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on
several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and
expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense.
This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the
enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other
conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became
part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items
[2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance
with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited
the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense
under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended
Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with
each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity,
petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as
related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that
petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a)
of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to
amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate
acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate
Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and
folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government
prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly
committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth. They also found that under the then existing laws
20
such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved
different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime
and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and
graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39)
separate and independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. 21
No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the
22
Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the
use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth
and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many
states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of
malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine
statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the
depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting
influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different
parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonality—to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such
sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them,
by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two
structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub")
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually
involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler,
then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub is
former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common
goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the
allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could serve as
a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in common law.
Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a
crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such
as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the
agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense. The essence of conspiracy is the combination of
24
two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself
criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective,
25
coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense. 26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of
conspiracy – conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure
27
officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371, as 28
follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire either to
commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner
or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or
District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust or
place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any
officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure
him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the
lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of
his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or
both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States; and (2)
conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any offense against the
United States" refers to an act made a crime by federal laws. It refers to an act punished by statute. Undoubtedly,
29 30
Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or regulatory. These laws cover
31
criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc.
and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of
antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal regulation. Section 371 penalizes
32
the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally separate
and distinct from the substantive offense, hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the substantive count does not
33
foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy. 34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or money. It
also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least
by means that are dishonest. It comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner whatever, whether the
35
fraud be declared criminal or not. 36

The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law
on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means of effecting the
object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars. An indictment for
37
conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the agreement was
directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. To allege that the defendants conspired
38
is, at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To
allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement. The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and
39
where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is
required in cases where such object is charged as a substantive offense. 40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American courts deal
with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack particularities of time,
place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the
Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When
conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the
offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the
information for this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by
statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate
date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order
to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by
reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The information must also state the acts or
41
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The acts or omissions
42
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
43
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
44
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
45
must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
46
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against
him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime
must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of "conspiracy to commit treason" is
committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or
to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. The elements of this crime are:
48
(1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the
Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war
against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the offender and
other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in
itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy
is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them
answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the
49
conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is
50
the act of all. In People v. Quitlong, we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should
51 52
be alleged in the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused
persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy,
or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in
order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with
the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the
individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all
the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common
design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it
necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive
offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the
offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and
reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following
the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or
alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A
C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have
confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an
agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of
the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime,
the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the
use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can
aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may
be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx xxx x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the
commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives
or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the
53
conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same
facts.
54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that
may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an
agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and
actually pursue it. A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
55
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the
accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused."
Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former
President in committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before this
Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons."
Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if
he goes back to his place of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner
1âwphi 1
replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion
for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution of
Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." Petitioner reiterated the motion
for bail he earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan. 56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and
requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution dated
December 20, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for "lack of factual basis." Basing its finding on the earlier
57
testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince
the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he
be allowed to post bail."
58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both
the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden
of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be
conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20,
2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five months
ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner’s guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the
evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189833 February 5, 2014

vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano (Morilla) from the Decision of the Court of
1
Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that of his co-accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court,
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱10,000,000.00 each.
2
The Regional Trial Court Judgment
On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla) were
charged in a criminal information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the
Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicate crime group as they all help
one another, for purposes of gain in the transport of illegal drugs, and in fact, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually aiding and abetting one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport by
means of two (2) motor vehicles, namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with commemorative plate to
read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan, Quezon Province, methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug which is commonly known as shabu, and with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty
eight (503.68) kilos, without authority whatsoever.3
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 1 August 2007 convicted Morilla and his co-accused Mayor
4
Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan, Quezon, of illegal transport of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
5
commonly known as shabu, with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos.
However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the prosecution’s failure to present sufficient evidence to convict them
of the offense charged. The dispositive of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena and Javier
Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Accordingly, both accused are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y
Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as representative sample which is still in the
custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory is ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper
disposition.
6
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles driven by Mayor Mitra and Morilla,
one with control number 888 and the other an ambulance with plate number SFK-372, as the police officers have
already acquired prior knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be used for transportation of dangerous
drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the information turned out to be accurate and indeed, the two accused
had in their motor vehicles more than five hundred kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride. 7
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the
sacks and that he was merely requested to transport them to Manila on board his Starex van. He explained that he
only accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. It likewise dismissed
the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he
thought that he was just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other
passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he
was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they were caught in flagrante delicto of
transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by each of them. Absent any convincing circumstance to
corroborate their explanations, the validity of their apprehension was sustained. 8
The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the testimonies of the four accused
themselves. It was found by the trial court that the two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the
ambulance van driven by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was ahead of the
ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers. However, the ambulance driven by Morilla
was stopped by police officers. Through the untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside
the van. Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained narra wooden tiles.
Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further inspection. When it was
opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request
Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to
persuade them to let him pass. His request was rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of
9
the sacks turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride. This discovery prompted the operatives to
10
chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was asked to
stop. They then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives noticed that his van was also loaded
with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Thus, Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the
vehicle for inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon
examination, the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride. 11
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial court for failure on the part of the
prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled that Dequilla’s and Yang’s mere
presence inside the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that they were also conspirators of Mayor Mitra
and Morilla. 12
The Court of Appeals Decision
On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld the finding of conspiracy between
Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to transport several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride
on board their respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally transport methamphetamine hydrochloride
was readily shown when Morilla agreed to drive the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with
Mayor Mitra, who drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van. 13
The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the illegal contents of the sacks. The
claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden tiles was implausible due to the obvious disparity of texture and
volume. 14
Court’s Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be convicted for conspiracy to commit the
offense charged sans allegation of conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the prosecution was able to prove
his culpability as alleged in the Information.
15
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure to substantiate his
16
argument that he should have been informed first of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He pointed
out that the Information itself failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the statement "the above-named
accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an
organized/syndicated crime group as they all help one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport x x x." He argued that conspiracy was only inferred from the words used in the Information. 17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at this point, is deemed to have
been waived due to Morilla’s failure to assert it as a ground in a motion to quash before entering his plea.18
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to contradict the allegation of
conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
19
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.
20 21
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not sufficient to prove
that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into
and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred
from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In 22
this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a
common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were
on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police
operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a
routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the
sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he
was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed the instruction of
his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs on board
their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to
another." It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra,
23
who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing
dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge. 24
In a similar case of People v. Libnao, this Court upheld the conviction for illegal transportation of marijuana of Libnao
25
and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag full of marijuana leaves when they were flagged down on board a
passing tricycle at a checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, the penalty for illegal transportation of methamphetamine
26
hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683, the penalty was amended to life
27
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in
Republic Act No. 7659, where the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
28
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of ₱10,000,00.00 to be paid by each of the accused but
amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 and the principle of
retroactive application of lighter penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after
which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special
disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment, on the other hand, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration
and carries no accessory penalties. 29
The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People, thus:

30
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in accord with
law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991,
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683. The decree provided that for
violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to
₱30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 further introduced new amendments to Section
15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty
prescribed in Section 15 was changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to
₱30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000.00 to ₱10 million." On the other hand,
Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the
amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than
life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the
petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.
1âwphi1
We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:
"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law, being more
lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded
retroactive application, x x x."
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule that criminal
statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect," the penalty imposed by the trial
court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion
perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to
him.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 13 July 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with respect to the penalty to be imposed
as Reclusion Perpetua instead of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of ₱10,000,000.00 by each of the accused.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July
11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.3 Out of this union, two female
children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses
Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad
Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of
the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were
covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-
law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of necessary implication
should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration15 arguing that petitioner's liberal
construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim
was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be
a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE

INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which
explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy"
under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as
indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that
the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations
on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that
respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only
unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or
dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases
of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain any
provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC
in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal,"
"accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the
persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262
because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the
RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her
child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the
acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the
petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case,
the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment
of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be
remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.25
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy
or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is
an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present
petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy
is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or
absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer
delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the
dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

125909 June 23, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Criminal Case No. 4810

Criminal Case No. 4811.

Criminal Case No. 4812

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds as follows:

Version of Edwin Flora:

Version of Hermogenes Flora:

xxx xxx xxx

Madera corroborated the testimony of her husband. 12

crumbles in the face of positive identification made by eyewitnesses. 17

A I was dancing, sir. (Emphasis ours.)

A Two armslength from me only, sir. 18

However, to a similar question, later in her testimony, she replied,

A They were beside each other.

Q And how far were you from these 3 persons?

does not discredit their testimony. 26

appreciated by the trial court, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

The Version of the Defense

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appeal is without merit.

The Charge of Parricide

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries

Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,

(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;

(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.

2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and

The petition deserves considerable thought.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.

RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,

xxx xxx xxx

(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx.

xxx xxx xxx.

xxx xxx xxx:

xxx xxx xxx