Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA No.
7942) MGB sent notice-letters to petitioner, requiring her
Cases:
1. Republic Act No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of
1995);
2. DENR Administrative Order No. 95-23, Series of
1995;
3. THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191249, March 14, 2018
CORAZON LIWAT-MOYA, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER
SURVIVING HEIRS, NAMELY: MARIA THERESA
MOYA SIOSON, ROSEMARIE MOYA KITHCART AND
MARIA CORAZON MOYA
GARCIA, Petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO R. ERMITA AND RAPID CITY REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FOR ITSELF AND AS
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF CENTURY PEAK
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to
reverse and set aside the 30 September 2009
Decision1 and the 8 February 2010 Resolution 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104063,
which upheld the 1 June 2007 Decision 3 of the Office
of the President (OP) in O.P. Case No. 07-A-034
entitled "In Re: Application for Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement of Ms. Corazon Liwat-Moya
Denominated as AMPSA No. SMR-013-96."
THE FACTS
On 22 May 1991, petitioner Corazon Liwat-Moya
(petitioner) filed an application for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB). The
application was denominated as AMPSA No. SMR-
013-96, covering 650 hectares of land located at
Loreto, Surigao del Norte, within Parcel III of the
Surigao Mineral Reservation (SMR).4
Pursuant to her application, petitioner undertook
the required publications. She also alleged that she
had substantially complied with the mandatory
documentary requirements of her application for
MPSA.5
On 15 February 1993 and 19 February 1997, the
to submit additional requirements for her
application. The MGB did not receive any response. 6
On 3 March 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7942, or
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, was enacted.
Pursuant to the preferential rights given by R.A. No.
7942 to mining claims and applications when the law
took effect, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) issued DENR
Memorandum Order (DMO) 91-01 providing the
"Guidelines in the Implementation of the Mandatory
September 15, 1997 Deadline for the Filing of
Mineral Agreement Applications by Holders of Valid
and Existing Mining Claims and Lease/Quarry
Applications and for Other Purposes." Under Section
13 thereof, all holders of pending applications for
MPSA which still lack mandatory requirements shall
submit on or before 15 September 1997, a status
report on all such requirements and a letter of
intent undertaking to fully comply with all
mandatory requirements within forty-five (45)
calendar days, or until 30 October 1997.
On 24 November 1998, the MGB sent a letter to
petitioner notifying her of her failure to submit all
the mandatory requirements under DMO No. 97-07'.
There was no response from petitioner. 7 On 19
October 1999, the MGB sent another letter, but the
same was returned to the sender with the notation
that "addressee moved[,] no forwarding address." 8
Consequently, on 26 February 2001, the MGB,
through then-director Floracio C. Ramos, issued an
order9 denying petitioner's application for MPSA on
the ground of noncompliance with pertinent laws,
rules and regulations despite due notice, particularly
on petitioner's noncompliance with the set deadlines
under DMO No. 97-07.
On 25 June 2001, respondent Rapid City Realty &
Development Corporation (RCRDC) filed with the
MGB three (3) exploration permit applications (EPA)
which were consolidated into one application
denominated as EPA-000058-XIII. The area covered
by petitioner's application for MPSA is included in
RCRDC's EPA.10 On 7 January 2004, the MGB issued
an area clearance certifying that the area covered by
RCRDC's EPA was not in conflict with any valid and
existing mining tenements.11
On 21 December 2004, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the MGB's 26 February 2001
order, alleging that there was improper service of
the letters-notice and the order in violation of DMO
No. 99-34.12
On 7 January 2005 and 14 January 2005, RCRDC's
EPA was duly published in The Manila Times and The
Surigao Times. It was also aired over DXRZ-A, a local
radio station in Surigao City, and posted in required
locations, as mandated by existing rules and
regulations.13
On 19 July 2005, the Assistant Secretary and
Concurrent Director of the MGB, Jeremias L. Dolino,
issued an order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner
thereafter appealed to the DENR Secretary on 16
August 2005.14
On 23 June 2005, the Panel of Arbitrators of the
MGB issued a certification that as of said date, no
adverse claim, protest or opposition was filed against
RCRDC relative to the latter's EPA.15
On 8 August 2005, petitioner filed a protest against
RCRDC's application with the MGB Panel of
Arbitrators, which she subsequently amended on 22
November 2005.16
On 25 May 2006, RCRDC conditionally assigned its
rights and interests over EPA-000058-XIII to Century
Peak Corporation (CPC) through a Deed of
Conditional Assignment.17
On 13 June 2006, the DENR Secretary rendered a
decision18 which reversed and set aside the 16 July
2005 order of the MGB Director. In said decision, the
DENR Secretary indicated that petitioner's
assertions "teem with convincing validity" and
consequently ordered the reinstatement of her
application for MPSA. The DENR Secretary also
directed the MGB to set a schedule for compliance
with the mandatory requirements upon petitioner's
receipt of a copy of the decision.
On 28 June 2006, RCRDC filed with the DENR
Secretary a Motion for Leave to Intervene with
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision.
On 18 December 2006, the Panel of Arbitrators of
the MGB dismissed petitioner's motion pending
adverse claim/opposition against RCRDC for being
moot and academic, in view of the DENR Secretary's
decision.19
On 6 January 2007, the DENR Secretary issued an
order20 denying RCRDC's motion, holding that the
issues raised in the motion "could be properly
ventilated with the Panel of Arbitrators who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the issues
raised, and this Office is only of appellate
jurisdiction."
Aggrieved, RCRDC filed an appeal with the OP on 18
January 2007.
The Ruling of the Office of the President
On 1 July 2007, the OP, through Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita, issued a decision ordering that
the 6 January 2007 decision of the DENR Secretary
be vacated and reversed. It ruled that RCRDC is
entitled to intervene in the case because it has a
substantial right to protect its EPA, which covers the
areas previously assigned to petitioner. It also held
that the DENR Secretary erred in reinstating
petitioner's cancelled application for MPSA because
records show her negligence relative to her
application which is thus barred by laches.
On 3 July 2007, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the OP decision, but it was denied
on 21 May 2008.21 Thereafter, petitioner filed a
petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA,
assailing this decision.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 30 September 2009, the CA issued a decision
denying the petition for lack of merit. The CA ruled
that RCRDC had the right to intervene before the
DENR Secretary, which right continues until the case
is finally decided because intervention is allowed at
any time before rendition of judgment and, in
certain cases, even on appeal. It also opined that
petitioner's application for MPSA ipso facto expired
when she did not take any step to comply with the
pertinent provisions of DMO No. 97-07; and that
the subsequent letters-notice sent by the MGB after
the deadlines, i.e., the 24 November 1998 and the
19 October 1999 letters, served no purpose because
the deadlines set under DMO 97-07 were
inextendible.
On 21 October 2009, petitioner filed her motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its 8
February 2010 resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
Petitioner now comes to this Court seeking to set
aside the decisions of the CA on the following
grounds:
1. CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS, AS
CORRECTLY HELD BY THE DENR
SECRETARY, HAS ORIGINAL AND
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
INTERVENTION AS EXPRESSLY
MANDATED BY R.A. NO. 7942 OR
THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF
1995. HENCE, THE PROPER FORUM
FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
INTERVENTION WAS THE PANEL OF
ARBITRATORS AND NOT THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; AND
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE OP TO RULE
ON PETITIONER'S EXPLORATION
PERMIT APPLICATION WHICH
WAS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE;
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
THE DENR CORRECTLY REINSTATED
THE AMPSA NO. SMR-013-96 OF
THE PETITIONER IN HIS ORDER
DATED 13 JUNE 2006 RULING THAT
THE LATTER'S ASSERTIONS TEEM
WITH CONVINCING VALIDITY.
The core issue in the instant case is whether or not
petitioner's MPSA application was properly denied.
THE COURT'S RULING
It is the policy of our mining laws to promote
national growth through the grant of supervised
exploration and development of mineral resources to
qualified persons, necessitating the complete and
prompt compliance with requirements.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 463, or the Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974, was the
operative law at the time petitioner filed her
application for MPSA. It underscored the importance
of mineral production to the growth of national
economy and the need to encourage qualified
persons to undertake the exploration and
development of mineral resources, viz:
WHEREAS, mineral production is a major support of
the national economy, and therefore the intensified
discovery, exploration, development and wise
utilization of the country's mineral resources are
urgently needed for national development;
WHEREAS, the existence of large undeveloped
mineral areas and the proliferation of small mining
claims deter modern development of the country's
mineral resources and urgently require well-
planned exploration, development and systematic
exploitation of mineral lands to accelerate
production and to bolster the national economy;
WHEREAS, effective and continuous mining
operations require considerable outlays of capital
and resources, and make it imperative that persons
possessing the financial resources and technical
skills for modern exploratory and development
techniques be encouraged to undertake the
exploration, development and exploitation of our
mineral resources;
WHEREAS, the foregoing objectives cannot be
achieved within the shortest possible time without
removing the deficiencies and limitations of existing
laws and improving the same in order to provide for
a modernized administration and disposition of
mineral lands and to promote and encourage the
development and exploitation thereof. (emphasis
and underlining supplied)
R.A. No. 7942, the present law on mining, adopts a
similar policy, to wit:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — All mineral
resources in public and private lands within the
territory and exclusive economic zone of the
Republic of the Philippines are owned by the State. It
shall be the responsibility of the State to promote
their rational exploration, development, utilization
and conservation through the combined efforts of
government and the private sector in order to
enhance national growth in a way that effectively
safeguards the environment and protects the rights
of affected communities. (emphasis and underlining
supplied)
R.A. No. 7942 defines the persons qualified to
undertake mining operations, to wit:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. —
x x x x
(aq) "Qualified person" means any citizen of the
Philippines with capacity to contract, or a
corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative
organized or authorized for the purpose of engaging
in mining, with technical and financial capability to
undertake mineral resources development and duly
registered in accordance with law at least sixty per
centum (60%) of the capital of which is owned by
citizens of the Philippines: Provided, That a legally
organized foreign-owned corporation shall be
deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting
an exploration permit, financial or technical
assistance agreement or mineral processing permit,
(emphasis and underlining supplied)
xxxx
Relative to mineral production sharing agreements
under P.D. No. 463, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279
also instructs that said agreements should
incorporate the minimum terms and conditions
enumerated therein.22 Towards this end, DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 57, providing the
guidelines on mineral production sharing
agreements under E.O. No. 279, sets forth the
minimum requirements that must be submitted by
prospective proponents.23
These provisions bring to the fore the intent of the
law to boost national economy by granting mineral
exploration and development only to qualified
persons who can competently and promptly
undertake mining operations.
They underscore the need not only for complete but
also prompt compliance with the specific
requirements of the rules. Complete compliance is
necessary to ensure that the MPSA applicant is a
qualified person as defined under the law and has
the requisite skills, financial resources, and technical
ability to conduct mineral exploration and
development consistent with state policies. Prompt
compliance, on the other hand, ensures that non-
moving applications are weeded out in order to give
other qualified persons an opportunity to develop
mining areas whose potential for mineral production
might never be realized, to the detriment of our
national economy.
Consistent with this intent, Section 113 of R.A. No.
7942 limits the period for entering into mineral
agreements by a holder of mining claims and
applications filed under P.D. No. 463 and still
pending when the new law took effect, viz:
Section 113. Recognition of Valid and Existing
Mining Claims and Lease/Quarry Application. —
Holders of valid and existing mining claims,
lease/quarry applications shall be given preferential
rights to enter into any mode of mineral agreement
with the government within two (2) years from the
promulgation of the rules and regulations
implementing this Act. (emphasis and underlining
supplied)
DAO No. 96-40, or the Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7942, in compliance
with the above mandate, sets a specific date for
compliance and further provides that failure to
exercise the preferential rights granted by the law
within the stated period results in automatic
abandonment of the pending application, viz:
Section 273. Recognition of Valid and Existing
Mining Claims and Lease/Quarry Applications. —
Holders of valid and existing mining claims,
lease/quarry applications shall be given preferential
rights to enter into any mode of Mineral Agreement
with the Government until September 14,
1997: Provided, That failure on the part of the
holders of valid and subsisting mining claims,
lease/quarry applications to exercise their
preferential rights within the said period to enter
into any mode of Mineral Agreements shall
constitute automatic abandonment of the mining
claims, quarry/lease applications and the area
thereupon shall be declared open for mining
application by other interested parties. (emphasis
and underlining supplied)
In line with the above, DMO No. 97-07 was issued,
providing for the guidelines in processing pending
mining applications with insufficient compliance
with requirements at the time R.A. No. 7942 took
effect. Section 13 thereof specifies the requirements
for the pending applications, viz:
Section 13. Status of Pending MPSA and FTAA
Applications Filed Under DAO No. 57 and No. 63 with
Insufficient Compliance with Mandatory
Requirements Pursuant to the IRR.
All holders of pending MPSA and FTAA applications
filed under DAO No. 57 and No. 63 with insufficient
compliance with the mandatory requirements
pursuant to the IRR shall submit on or before
September 15, 1997, a Status Report on all such
requirements specifically indicating those yet to be
complied with and a Letter of Intent undertaking to
complete compliance with all mandatory
requirements within forty-five (45) calendar days,
or until October 30, 1997; Provided, that failure of
the concerned applicant to file said Status Report
and Letter of Intent by September 15, 1997 or to
submit all mandatory requirements by October
30,1997 shall cause the denial of the pertinent
MPSA/FTAA applications; Provided, further, that in
the case of the mandatory Certificate of Satisfactory
Environmental Management and Community
Relations Record, the submission of the pertinent
and duly accomplished application forms may be
accepted in lieu thereof. (emphasis and underlining
supplied)
Section 14 additionally provides that the deadlines
are not subject to extension, viz:
Section 14. No Extension of Periods. —
The deadline set at September 15, 1997 pursuant to
Section 4 hereof and all other periods prescribed
herein shall not be subject to extension. (emphasis
and underlining supplied)
It is therefore clear that the preferential right given
to applications still pending upon the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7942 is subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the applicant submits the status report,
letter of intent, and all the lacking requirements as
provided by DMO No. 97-07; and (2) that said
compliance is performed within the deadlines set.
The non-fulfilment of any of these conditions
precludes the DENR Secretary, through the MGB,
from even considering the grant of an MPSA to
petitioner, for such grant contemplates that the
applicant has completed the requirements and that
an evaluation thereof shows his competence to
undertake mineral production. Clearly, without the
complete requirements, the MGB would have no
basis for evaluation.
Petitioner's failure to submit all the documentary
requirements within the deadline rendered her MPSA
application ipso facto cancelled pursuant to DMO
No. 97-07 in relation to R.A. No. 7942.
It is not disputed that petitioner filed her application
for MPSA on 22 May 1991, under P.D. No. 463 and
the rules then operative; that her compliance with
the requirements was substantial24 rather than
complete; that she was directed to submit additional
requirements by the MGB through a letter-notice
dated 15 February 1993, which was not heeded; that
her application was still pending when R.A. No. 7942
took effect on 3 March 1995; that the MGB sent her
another letter dated February 1997, which again
went unheeded; that DMO No. 97-07 was thereafter
issued on 27 August 1997 and published in The
Manila Times a day after; and that petitioner failed
to submit the requirements under DMO No. 97-07
within the deadline set therein.
The MGB order of denial noted that petitioner failed
to file the status report, letter of intent, and all other
requirements under DMO No. 97-07, even after
letters-notice to her were sent through registered
mail.25 Petitioner did not refute this. She merely
posits that the service of the letters-notice was
defective because the MGB did not comply with the
three letters-notice rule in DMO No. 99-34.
Section 8 of DMO No. 99-34 provides that the MGB
"shall adopt the Three Letters-Notice Policy in
exacting compliance of mining applicants with all
requirements to support mining applications. Thus,
each letter-notice shall give the mining applicant
fifteen (15) to thirty days upon receipt of the Letter-
Notice to comply with the pertinent requirement:
Provided, That an interval of no more than thirty (30)
days between deadlines shall be observed in sending
the Letters-Notice."
Petitioner contends that the 24 November 1998 and
19 October 1999 letters-notice of the MGB were
sent after the expiration of the deadline under
DMO No. 97-07 and were one (1) year apart, in
violation of the provision.
Petitioner mistakenly appreciates the import of DMO
No. 97-07 in relation to DAO No. 96-40 and R.A. No.
7942, as well as the relevance of the three notice-
letters policy embodied in DMO No. 99-34.
Notably, the rules26 mandate that petitioner's failure
to submit a status report, letter of intent, and the
other requirements to complete her pending MPSA
application within the prescribed period shall cause
the automatic cancellation of her mining application.
In Bonaventure Mining Corporation v. V.I.L. Mines,
Inc.,27 the Court found that a corporation, which filed
a financial or technical assistance application (FTA A)
prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7942, filed its
letter of intent only on 26 September 1997, or 11
days after the 15 September 1997 deadline
prescribed in DMO No. 97-07 in case of
relinquishment/divestment of areas in excess of the
maximum contract area for FTAAs. Accordingly, the
Court held that noncompliance with DMO No. 97-07
on retention requirements caused the automatic
cancellation of the FTAA. The Court ruled thus:
DMO 97-07 was promulgated precisely to set a
specific date for all FTAA applicants within which to
relinquish all areas in excess of the maximum
prescribed by law. Accordingly, the deadline cannot
be extended or changed except by amending DMQ
97-07. OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juan had no
authority to extend the deadline set by DMO 97-07.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The language of the memorandum order is plain,
precise and unequivocal — the period cannot be
extended. Beyond that, the pending FTAA
applications could no longer be officially acted upon
as they were deemed to have expired. DMO 97-07
could only be extended by another memorandum
order or law specifically amending the deadline set
forth therein. No government officer or employee
can do so.
x x x x
It is Our considered view that the FTAA application
of Greenwater ipso facto expired when it did not
take any step to comply with the order. There was
no need for any pronouncement or official action. If
ever there would be any executive action, it would
only be to certify that the application was already
cancelled as OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juan
did when, on January 23, 1998 (sic), it wrote
Greenwater that its application over the excess
areas was cancelled. No executive action can stretch
the deadline beyond what was stated in the
memorandum order, DMO 97-07.
OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juan violated DMO
97-07, when in his October 22, 1997 Letter, he gave
Greenwater a period beyond the date of the
deadline within which to submit the technical
descriptions of the areas it wanted to relinquish. By
giving Greenwater a period extending beyond
October 30, 1997, he was in effect extending the
deadline set forth in Section 13 of DMO 97-07. That
he could not lawfully do.
He had no authority extending the deadline
because the memorandum order which he was
supposed to implement stated that the "period
prescribed herein shall not be subject to
extension." Beyond October 30, 1997 all FTAA
applications which failed to comply with the
memorandum order expired and were deemed
cancelled by operation of law. 28 (emphasis and
underlining supplied)
The instant case does not merely involve the delayed
filing of the requirements under DMO No. 97-07, but
the complete absence thereof. Thus, there is all the
more reason to apply this Court's pronouncement in
the above case.
Consequently, petitioner's application for MPSA is
deemed to have been automatically denied when
the deadline lapsed without her submission of the
pertinent requirements.
The DENR Secretary exceeded his authority when he
directed the MGB to set a schedule for petitioner's
compliance with the lacking mandatory
requirements, for in effect he extended the deadline,
contrary to the express mandate of DMO No. 97-07.
It is thus clear that petitioner cannot invoke any
defect in the service of the letters-notice or the
order of denial, sent after the expiration of the
deadline to support her position that the denial of
her application was invalid. The following reasons
further strengthen this position:
First, the rules expressly provide that her application
shall be denied the moment she fails to comply with
the requirements within the deadline. No executive
action or pronouncement was even necessary
because DMO No. 97-07 already provided the
consequence for failure to meet the deadline. 29 The
order of denial issued by the MGB was only
confirmatory of the status, mandated by the law and
rules.
Second, it is well-settled that duly published
administrative rules and regulations which
implement the law that they have been entrusted to
enforce have the force and effect of that law and are
just as binding as if they have been written into the
statute. They enjoy the presumption of regularity
and validity until finally declared otherwise by the
courts.30 Their publication serves as constructive
notice to the general public.31 It appears on record,
undisputed, that DMO No. 97-07 was duly published
in The Manila Times on 28 August 1997. 32 Thus,
petitioner was presumed to have known that her
compliance with certain requirements was
mandated within a specific deadline in order to
retain her MPSA application.
Third, petitioner's reliance on the three letters-notice
rule under DMO No. 99-34 is misplaced. Issued after
the enactment of R.A. No. 7942, the rule is a mode
of exacting compliance for applications filed under
said law. It cannot apply to applications filed prior to
the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942 because, as
discussed, the law limited the compliance of
applications filed before its effectivity within a
specific period, i.e., two (2) years from the
promulgation of rules and regulations implementing
the law. Per DAO No. 96-40, clarified by DMO No.
97-07, said two-year period had expired on 15
September 1997 and 30 October 1997 with no
extensions. Thus, at the time that DMO No. 99-34
was issued on 27 December 1999, it had already
contemplated that applications filed under the
previous law (1) were able to complete the
requirements within the deadline or (2) were denied
by operation of law due to noncompliance.
Even if DMO No. 97-07 did not specifically provide
the sanction of denial for noncompliance with
requirements within the deadline, the MGB is
authorized to cancel mining applications for
noncompliance with the laws and rules.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7942 charges the MGB with the
administration and disposition of mineral lands and
mineral resources, viz:
Section 9. Authority of the Bureau. — The Bureau
shall have direct charge in the administration and
disposition of mineral lands and mineral
resources and shall undertake geological, mining,
metallurgical, chemical, aid other researches as well
as geological and mineral exploration surveys. The
Director shall recommend to the Secretary the
granting of mineral agreements to duly qualified
persons and shall monitor the compliance by the
contractor of the terms and conditions of the
mineral agreements. The Bureau may confiscate
surety, performance and guaranty bonds posted
through an order to be promulgated by the Director.
The Director may deputize, when necessary, any
member or unit of the Philippine National Police,
barangay, duly registered nongovernmental
organization (NGO) or any qualified person to police
all mining activities. (emphasis and underlining
supplied)
Pursuant thereto, DAO No. 96-40 authorizes the
MGB to deny or cancel mining applications that fail
to comply with pertinent laws, rules, and
regulations, to wit:
Section 7. Organization and Authority of the Bureau.
x x x x
The Bureau shall have the following authority,
among others:
x x x x
e. To cancel or to recommend cancellation after due
process, mining rights, mining applications and
mining claims for non-compliance with pertinent
laws, rules and regulations. (emphasis and
underlining supplied)
It is clear from the foregoing that even if the rules
did not provide a specific sanction in case of
noncompliance with the requirements, the MGB
could properly exercise its power to cancel mining
applications for said reason.
It must be noted that from the time she filed her
MPSA application in 1991 up to the time the MGB
issued its order of denial on 2001, petitioner did not
exert any effort to fully comply with the
requirements under the rules, as she has even
admitted that her compliance was merely
substantial rather than complete. 33 This merited the
denial of her application based on the above
provision.
The MGB's denial of petitioner's application is thus
valid and perforce stands. It was rendered pursuant
to the agency's administrative powers, which has
been defined as a function that is "concerned with
the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs." 34 This
Court has previously ruled that an agency's grant or
denial of applications, licenses, permits, and
contracts are executive and administrative in
nature.35 Being purely administrative, it may not be
interfered with by the courts unless the issuing
authority has gone beyond its statutory authority,
has exercised unconstitutional powers or has
clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his
duty or with grave abuse of discretion.36 These do
not obtain in the case at bar, because the MGB's
denial was grounded on petitioner's noncompliance
with the application for MPSA requirements within
the deadline set by the rules, a fact that petitioner
does not dispute.
Even equitable considerations cannot favor
petitioner.
Petitioner cannot seek refuge under equitable
considerations bearing in mind that there is no
showing that she had endeavored to complete her
application for more than 10 years from the time it
was filed; that it was only after three (3) years from
the issuance of the MGB's order of denial that she
filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, and her
allegation of improper service is baseless; and that
the reasons she cites as basis for her lack of action
(i.e., the challenge lodged against the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 279 and subsequently
R.A. No. 7942) are clearly insufficient to hold off
action on her MPSA application because well-settled
is the rule that laws are presumed constitutional
unless finally declared otherwise by judicial
interpretation.37 It has even been held that the
possible unconstitutionality of a statute does not by
itself justify an injunction against its enforcement. 38
Considering the foregoing, the areas previously
covered by petitioner's application for MPSA became
open for mining applications the moment the
deadlines outlined in the rules lapsed without her
submission of the documentary requirements.
Consequently, when RCRDC filed its EPA on 25 June
2001, after the lapse of the deadline under DMO No.
97-07 and after the MGB had issued the order
denying petitioner's application, the areas were
already open and could validly be the subject of
RCRDC's application. Thus, what is inequitable is to
rule now that it is petitioner's application which
should be given due course.
It is also for this reason that it is unnecessary to pass
upon the issue on the propriety of RCRDC's resort to
intervention, for it is clear that petitioner had
already lost any right to her mining application by
operation of law prior to the date that RCRDC filed
its EPA, and the DENR Secretary had no authority to
reinstate her application. Notably, in its five (5)-page
decision, the DENR Secretary did not cite any legal or
substantive basis for the order of reinstatement,
other than a vague reference to the "convincing
validity" of appellant's assertions, to wit:
The appellant's assertions teem with convincing
validity that to deny her the chance to prove herself
in this field of endeavor would not be in keeping
with her constitutional rights to due process.
We now resolve the case substantively and sacrifice
the matter of technicality in order to serve a higher
objective, that is, to give Ms. Moya a fair chance to
show how serious she is to this venture and help in
her own little way boost the sagging economy.39
This constituted the whole of the DENR Secretary's
discussion on the merits of petitioner's appeal. No
explanation was made as to why her assertions were
valid and why the rules should be disregarded in her
case. As previously discussed, there is utterly no
basis to disregard the clear mandate of DMO 97-07.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated 30 September 2009 and the Resolution dated
8 February 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 104063 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D.
MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences
Bureau, respondents
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on
the validity of two Administrative Orders issued by
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of
certain Executive Orders promulgated by the
President in the lawful exercise of legislative powers.
Herein controversy was precipitated by the change
introduced by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution on the system of exploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural
resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable
lands of public domain through "license, concession
or lease" under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions1 allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
The adoption of the concept of jura regalia2 that all
natural resources are owned by the State embodied
in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, as well as
the recognition of the importance of the country's
natural resources, not only for national economic
development, but also for its security and national
defense,3 ushered in the adoption of the
constitutional policy of "full control and supervision
by the State" in the exploration, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources. The
options open to the State are through direct
undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint
venture; or production-sharing agreements, or by
entering into agreement with foreign-owned
corporations for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization.
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or
product-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements
may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by
law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the
development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.
xxx xxx xxx
The President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the
State shall promote the
development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the
Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from
its execution. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the mandate of the above-quoted
provision, legislative acts4 were successively issued
by the President in the exercise of her legislative
power.5
To implement said legislative acts, the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) in turn promulgated
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, the validity and
constitutionality of which are being challenged in
this petition.
On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her then legislative powers under Article
II, Section 1 of the Provisional Constitution and
Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
promulgated Executive Order No. 211 prescribing
the interim procedures in the processing and
approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals pursuant to
the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the
continuity of mining operations and activities and to
hasten the development of mineral resources. The
pertinent provisions read as follows:
Sec. 1. Existing mining permits,
licenses, leases and other mining
grants issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural
 Resources and Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences, including
existing operating agreements and
mining service contracts, shall
continue and remain in full force
and effect, subject to the same
terms and conditions as originally
granted and/or approved.
Sec. 2. Applications for the
exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources,
including renewal applications for
approval of operating agreements
and mining service contracts, shall
be accepted and processed and
may be approved; concomitantly
thereto, declarations of locations
and all other kinds of mining
applications shall be accepted and
registered by the Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences.
Sec. 3. The processing, evaluation
and approval of all mining
applications, declarations of
locations, operating agreements
and service contracts as provided
for in Section 2 above, shall be
governed by Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws and their
implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, however,
that the privileges granted, as well
as the terms and conditions
thereof shall be subject to any and
all modifications or alterations
which Congress may adopt
pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise
promulgated Executive Order No. 279 authorizing
the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing
agreements for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the
guidelines for such agreements and those
agreements involving technical or financial
assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals. The pertinent provisions relevant to this
petition are as follows:
Sec. 1. The Secretary of the
Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (hereinafter
referred to as "the Secretary") is
hereby authorized to negotiate and
enter into, for and in behalf of the
Government, joint venture, co-
production, or production-sharing
agreements for the exploration,
development, and utilization of
mineral resources with any Filipino
citizens, or corporation or
association at least sixty percent
(60%) of whose capital is owned by
Filipino citizens. Such joint venture,
co-production, or production-
sharing agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and shall
include the minimum terms and
conditions prescribed in Section 2
hereof. In the execution of a joint
venture, co-production or
production agreements, the
contracting parties, including the
Government, may consolidate two
or more contiguous or geologically
— related mining claims or leases
and consider them as one contract
area for purposes of determining
the subject of the joint venture, co-
production, or production-sharing
agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The Secretary shall
promulgate such supplementary
rules and regulations as may be
necessary to effectively implement
the provisions of this Executive
Order.
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, which
 are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order,
shall continue in force and effect.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279,
the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR
Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989,
captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement under Executive Order No. 279." 6 Under
the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative
Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing
mining leases or agreements which were granted
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small
scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and
gravel and quarry resources covering an area of
twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year
from the effectivity of these guidelines.
On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR
Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying
down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
through Negotiation."7
Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR
Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the persons
or entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs)
and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs)
within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR
Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991.
Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall
cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand
and gravel claims. Section 3 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 82 provides:
Sec. 3. Submission of Letter of
Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs). The
following shall submit their LOIs
and MPSAs within two (2) years
from the effectivity of DENR A.O.
57 or until July 17, 1991.
i. Declaration of Location (DOL)
holders, mining lease applicants,
exploration permitees, quarry
applicants and other mining
applicants whose mining/quarry
applications have not been
perfected prior to the effectivity of
DENR Administrative Order No. 57.
ii. All holders of DOL acquired after
the effectivity of DENR A.O. No. 57.
iii. Holders of mining leases or
similar agreements which were
granted after (the) effectivity of
1987 Constitution.
Failure to submit letters of intent
and MPSA applications/proposals
within the prescribed period shall
cause the abandonment of mining,
quarry and sand and gravel claims.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by
the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82
after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. 8 to file
the instant petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality before this Court.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners
Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends
that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his
rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 279. On the assumption that the
questioned administrative orders do not conform
with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner
contends that both orders violate the
non-impairment of contract provision under Article
III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground
that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-
terminates existing mining agreements and
automatically converts them into production-
sharing agreements within one (1) year from its
effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative
Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters
of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing
Agreements within two (2) years from the date of
effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall
cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and
sand gravel permits.
On July 2, 1991, the Court, acting on petitioner's
urgent ex-parte petition for issuance of a restraining
order/preliminary injunction, issued a Temporary
Restraining Order, upon posting of a P500,000.00
bond, enjoining the enforcement and
implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos.
57 and 82, as amended, Series of 1989 and 1990,
respectively.9
On November 13, 1991, Continental Marble
Corporation, 10 thru its President, Felipe A. David,
sought to intervene 11 in this case alleging that
because of the temporary order issued by the Court ,
the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 in San Fernando,
Pampanga refused to renew its Mines Temporary
Permit after it expired on July 31, 1991. Claiming that
its rights and interests are prejudicially affected by
the implementation of DENR Administrative Order
Nos. 57 and 82, it joined petitioner herein in seeking
to annul Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 and
prayed that the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 be
ordered to issue a Mines Temporary Permit in its
favor to enable it to operate during the pendency of
the suit.
Public respondents were acquired to comment on
the Continental Marble Corporation's petition for
intervention in the resolution of November 28,
1991.12
Now to the main petition. If its argued that
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 have the effect
of repealing or abrogating existing mining
laws 13 which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of Executive Order No. 279. Invoking
Section 7 of said Executive Order No.
279, 14 petitioner maintains that respondent DENR
Secretary cannot provide guidelines such as
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 which are
inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order
No. 279 because both Executive Order Nos. 211 and
279 merely reiterated the acceptance and
registration of declarations of location and all other
kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, until
Congress opts to modify or alter the same.
In other words, petitioner would have us rule that
DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued
by the DENR Secretary in the exercise of his rule-
making power are tainted with invalidity inasmuch
as both contravene or subvert the provisions of
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 or embrace
matters not covered, nor intended to be covered,
by the aforesaid laws.
We disagree.
We reiterate the principle that the power of
administrative officials to promulgate rules and
regulations in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what
is provided in the legislative enactment. The
principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in the case
of United States v. Barrias. 15 The scope of the
exercise of such rule-making power was clearly
expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi
Molina, 16 decided in 1914, thus: "Of course, the
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be
extended. So long, however, as the regulations
relate solely to carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law
itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the
regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provision of the law, they are valid."
Recently, the case of People v. Maceren 17 gave a
brief delienation of the scope of said power of
administrative officials:
Administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the
law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its
general provision. By such
regulations, of course, the law
itself cannot be extended (U.S. v.
Tupasi Molina, supra). An
administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress (Santos
vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422;
Teoxon vs. Members of the Board
of Administrators, L-25619, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs.
General Auditing Office, L-28952,
December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660;
Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August
29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceeding to carry
into effect the law as it has been
enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or
expanding the statutory
 requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute.
Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned (University of
Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12
C.J. 845-46. As to invalid
regulations, see Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69
Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78
Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil.
Veterans Administration, L-27299,
June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The rule or regulation should
be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative
agency (Davis, Administrative Law,
p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security
Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the
basic law and a rule or regulation
issued to implement said law, the
basic prevails because said rule or
regulations cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic
law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
Considering that administrative rules draw life from
the statute which they seek to implement, it is
obvious that the spring cannot rise higher than its
source. We now examine petitioner's argument that
DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82
contravene Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 as
both operate to repeal or abrogate Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, and other mining laws
allegedly acknowledged as the principal law under
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279.
Petitioner's insistence on the application of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of
declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old
system of exploration, development and utilization
of natural resources through "license, concession or
lease" which, however, has been disallowed by
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By
virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its
implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions
dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral
resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, and other existing mining laws are
deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate
as the governing law. In other words, in all other
areas of administration and management of mineral
lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, and other existing mining laws, still
govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279
provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, which
are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order,
shall continue in force and effect.
Specifically, the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, on lease of mining claims under
Chapter VIII, quarry permits on privately-owned
lands of quarry license on public lands under Chapter
XIII and other related provisions on lease, license and
permits are not only inconsistent with the raison
d'etre for which Executive Order No. 279 was passed,
but contravene the express mandate of Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It force and
effectivity is thus foreclosed.
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on
February 2, 1987, 18 the State assumed a more
dynamic role in the exploration, development and
utilization of the natural resources of the country.
Article XII, Section 2 of the said Charter explicitly
ordains that the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. Consonant
therewith, the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources may be undertaken
by means of direct act of the State, or it may opt to
enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements, or it may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for which must set forth the minimum terms and
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization conditions provided under Section 2 thereof.
of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to
according to the general terms and conditions regulate and enter into mining agreements does not
provided by law, based on real contributions to the include the power to preterminate existing mining
economic growth and general welfare of the lease agreements.
country.
To begin with, we dispel the impression created by
Given these considerations, there is no clear petitioner's argument that the questioned
showing that respondent DENR Secretary has administrative orders unduly preterminate existing
transcended the bounds demarcated by Executive mining leases in general. A distinction which spells a
Order No. 279 for the exercise of his rule-making real difference must be drawn. Article XII, Section 2
power tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. of the 1987 Constitution does not apply
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically retroactively to "license, concession or lease"
authorizes said official to promulgate such granted by the government under the 1973
supplementary rules and regulations as may be Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987
necessary to effectively implement the provisions Constitution on February 2, 1987. The intent to
thereof. Moreover, the subject sought to be apply prospectively said constitutional provision was
governed and regulated by the questioned orders is stressed during the deliberations in the
germane to the objects and purposes of Executive Constitutional Commission, 19 thus:
Order No. 279 specifically issued to carry out the
mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 MR. DAVIDE:
Constitution. Under the
proposal, I notice
Petitioner likewise maintains that Administrative that except for
Order No. 57, in relation to Administrative Order No. the [inalienable]
82, impairs vested rights as to violate the non- lands of the
impairment of contract doctrine guaranteed under public domain, all
Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution other natural
because Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 resources cannot
unduly pre-terminates and automatically converts be alienated and
mining leases and other mining agreements into in respect to
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year [alienable] lands
from effectivity of said guideline, while Section 3 of of the public
Administrative Order No. 82, declares that failure to domain, private
submit Letters of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs within two corporations with
(2) years from the effectivity of Administrative Order the required
No. 57 or until July 17, 1991 shall cause the ownership by
abandonment of mining, quarry, and sand gravel Filipino citizens
permits. can only lease
the same.
In Support of the above contention, it is argued by Necessarily,
petitioner that Executive Order No. 279 does not insofar as other
contemplate automatic conversion of mining lease natural resources
agreements into mining production-sharing are concerned, it
agreement as provided under Article 9, would only be
Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the consequent the State which
abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit can exploit,
LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3, Administrative develop, explore
Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said Executive and utilize the
Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary to same. However,
negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements the State may
enter into a joint MR. VILLEGAS:
venture, co- This is not
production or applied
production- retroactively.
sharing. Is that They will be
not correct? respected.

MR. VILLEGAS: MR. DAVIDE: In

Yes. effect, they will
be deemed
MR. DAVIDE: repealed?
Consequently,
henceforth upon, MR. VILLEGAS:
the approval of No. (Emphasis
this Constitution, supplied)
no timber or
forest During the transition period or after the effectivity of
concession, the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 until the
permits or first Congress under said Constitution was convened
authorization can on July 27, 1987, two (2) successive laws, Executive
be exclusively Order Nos. 211 and 279, were promulgated to
granted to any govern the processing and approval of applications
citizen of the for the exploration, development and utilization of
Philippines nor to minerals. To carry out the purposes of said laws, the
any corporation questioned Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82,
qualified to now being assailed, were issued by the DENR
acquire lands of Secretary.
the public
domain? Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 provides:

MR. VILLEGAS: ARTICLE 9

Would
Commissioner
TRANSITORY PROVISION
Monsod like to
comment on
9.1. All existing mining leases or
that? I think his
agreements which were granted
answer is "yes."
after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution pursuant to Executive
MR. DAVIDE: So,
Order No. 211, except small scale
what will happen
mining leases and those pertaining
now license or
to sand and gravel and quarry
concessions
resources covering an area of
earlier granted
twenty (20) hectares or less shall
by the Philippine
be subject to these guidelines. All
government to
such leases or agreements shall be
private
converted into production sharing
corporations or
agreement within one (1) year
to Filipino
from the effectivity of these
citizens? Would
guidelines. However, any minimum
they be deemed
firm which has established mining
repealed?
rights under Presidential Decree
463 or other laws may avail of the
 provisions of EO 279 by following
the procedures set down in this
document.
It is clear from the aforestated provision that
Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all
existing mining leases or agreements which were
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears
mention that under the text of Executive Order No.
211, there is a reservation clause which provides
that the privileges as well as the terms and
conditions of all existing mining leases or
agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211,
shall be subject to any and all modifications or
alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Hence, the strictures of the
non-impairment of contract clause under Article III,
Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution 20 do not apply
to the aforesaid leases or agreements granted after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended,
modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress
to achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 279 issued on July 25,
1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise
of her legislative power has the force and effect of a
statute or law passed by Congress. As such, it validly
modified or altered the privileges granted, as well as
the terms and conditions of mining leases and
agreements under Executive Order No. 211 after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by authorizing
the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing
agreements for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources and prescribing the
guidelines for such agreements and those
agreements involving technical or financial
assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of
the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant
to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition,
are subject to alterations through a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the State. In the 1950
case of Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 21 where the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 34 changing the
50-50 sharecropping system in existing agricultural
tenancy contracts to 55-45 in favor of tenants was
challenged, the Court, upholding the
constitutionality of the law, emphasized the
superiority of the police power of the State over
the sanctity of this contract:
The prohibition contained in constitutional
provisions against: impairing the obligation of
contracts is not an absolute one and it is not to be
read with literal exactness like a mathematical
formula. Such provisions are restricted to contracts
which respect property, or some object or value, and
confer rights which may be asserted in a court of
justice, and have no application to statute relating to
public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the State, and involving the
public rights and public welfare of the entire
community affected by it. They do not prevent a
proper exercise by the State of its police powers. By
enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general
welfare of the community, even the contracts may
thereby be affected; for such matter can not be
placed by contract beyond the power of the State
shall regulates and control them. 22
In Ramas v. CAR and Ramos 23 where the
constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act No.
1199 authorizing the tenants to charge from share to
leasehold tenancy was challenged on the ground
that it impairs the obligation of contracts, the Court
ruled that obligations of contracts must yield to a
proper exercise of the police power when such
power is exercised to preserve the security of the
State and the means adopted are reasonably
adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are,
therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.
The economic policy on the exploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural
resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution could not be any clearer. As enunciated
in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the
exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources under the new system mandated in
Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a
sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of
the people; and an expanding productivity as the key
to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
The exploration, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources are matters vital to the
public interest and the general welfare of the
people. The recognition of the importance of the
country's natural resources was expressed as early
as the 1984 Constitutional Convention. In connection
therewith, the 1986 U.P. Constitution Project
observed: "The 1984 Constitutional Convention
recognized the importance of our natural resources
not only for its security and national defense. Our
natural resources which constitute the exclusive
heritage of the Filipino nation, should be preserved
for those under the sovereign authority of that
nation and for their prosperity. This will ensure the
country's survival as a viable and sovereign republic."
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police
power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of
contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant
to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest; extends to all the vital
public needs. The passage of Executive Order No.
279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211
provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry
into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution.
Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any
provision which would lead us to conclude that the
questioned order authorizes the automatic
conversion of mining leases and agreements granted
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-
sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of
Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or
agreements shall be converted into production
sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibility
contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of
the Government that all existing mining leases and
agreements are automatically converted into
production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the
use of the term "production-sharing agreement" if
they are so minded. Negotiation negates
compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested
by petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral
production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a
meeting of the minds of the parties after
negotiations arrived at in good faith and in
accordance with the procedure laid down in the
subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.
We, therefore, rule that the questioned
administrative orders are reasonably directed to the
accomplishment of the purposes of the law under
which they were issued and were intended to secure
the paramount interest of the public, their economic
growth and welfare. The validity and
constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and
82 must be sustained, and their force and effect
upheld.
We now, proceed to the petition-in-intervention.
Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of
Court, an intervention in a case is proper when the
intervenor has a "legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof. "Continental Marble
Corporation has not sufficiently shown that it falls
under any of the categories mentioned above. The
refusal of the DENR, Regional Office No. 3, San
Fernando, Pampanga to renew its Mines Temporary
Permit does not justify such an intervention by
Continental Marble Corporation for the purpose of
obtaining a directive from this Court for the issuance
of said permit. Whether or not Continental Marble
matter best addressed to the appropriate
government body but certainly, not through this
Court. Intervention is hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on
July 2, 1991 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 217837, September 04, 2019
MR HOLDINGS, INC. AND MARCOPPER MINING
CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, v. ROLANDO A. DE
JESUS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE OFFICER-
IN-CHARGE (OIC)-REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND
GEOSCIENCES• BUREAU (MGB), REGION IV-B
(MIMAROPA) AND VICENTE S. PARAGAS, CESO III,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR REGION IV-B
(MIMAROPA), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
determine the status of the same. The Mine
Management Division of the MGB also requested for
a final plotting of Onephil's applied area with the
Survey Section. Additionally, recommendations of
the Protected Areas Wildlife and Coastal Zone
Management Service (PAWCZMS) and the Forest
Management Service (FMS) of the DENR were
sought by the One-Stop Shop Committee (OSSC) of
Region IV-B in order to facilitate the issuance of an
Area Status and Clearance.

After the OSSC received the recommendations of the

Before the Court is a petition for review
concerned government agencies, the MGB apprised
on certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Onephil that its application conflicts with an
Court assailing the Decision2 dated August 14, 2014
existing mining lease contract, a mining application
and Resolution3 dated April 16, 2015 of the Court of
and a portion of the Marinduque Wildlife
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129058, which
Sanctuary. The MGB, thus, required Onephil to
dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed the
amend its application (EPA-IV-B-177) and exclude
Decision4 dated December 21, 2011 of the Regional
the affected areas. In compliance thereto, Onephil
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52 (RTC) in SCA Case
submitted its amended application removing the
No. 07-118343 that, in turn, dismissed petitioners' 
protected areas of the Marinduque Wildlife
amended petition for prohibition and mandamus
Sanctuary. Unfortunately, the land area covered by
(Amended Petition).
the amended application was still in conflict with
several mining applications and/or claims.
Facts
On the other hand, petitioner-appellant Marcopper
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the CA, are
Mining Corporation, the operator of the San Antonio
as follows:
Copper Project (SACP) and the owners of private
On 3 May 2007, Onephil Mineral Resources, Inc.,
lands, private works and mining infrastructure and
(hereafter Onephil) filed an Exploration Permit
facilities therein with an area of about 4,243
Application covering a land area of 5,335.0806
hectares located in the Municipalities of Sta. Cruz
hectares in the Municipalities of Sta. Cruz and Boac,
and Boac, Marinduque, has a pending application for
Province of Marinduque denominated as EPA-IV-B-
Mineral Production] Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
177 before the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau
denominated as AMA IV-B 127, filed on 22 March
(hereafter MGB).
2001, for a total area of 763.6650 hectares with the
MGB. The said application is a renewal of
On the basis of the said application, the MGB,
Marcopper's previous Lode Lease Contracts Nos. V-
through its Survey Section, projected the technical
199 and V-1149.
description of the land area applied for in the
Mineral Land Survey Map (MLSM) covering the
Aware of Onephil's application, Marcopper sent a
(MIMAROPA) Region. The MLSM is a map consisting
letter to respondent-appellee Rolando De Jesus, the
of several cardboards with control numbers each
Office[r]-In-Charge (OIC) Regional Director, MGB
corresponding to specified coordinates. Each
Region IV-B (MIMAROPA) notifying him that the
cardboard contains boxes with a corresponding area
areas covered by the SACP are closed to mining
of nine (9) hectares and each individually named box
applications and requested the latter to ensure that
represents both existing and previous mining
said areas should be excluded from any application
applications and claims.
for Exploration Permit, MPSA or x x x any other type
of mining application.
The Survey Section of the MGB found that the
application of Onephil overlaps several other mining
On 30 October 2007, Onephil submitted its
applications or claims. The list of mining applications
amended application (for an Exploration Permit) to
or claims affected by Onephil's application was
MGB and, this time, the same showed no conflict
forwarded to the Mining Services Division to
with any existing mining applications or claims. As a
result, the OSSC issued an Area Status and Clearance
in favor of Onephil with the notations from the
Lands Management Services (LMS), FMS, PAWCZMS
and the MGB Region IV-MIMAROPA. According to
the findings of these agencies, the OSSC found that
"the applied area is open to mining application".
Despite the issuance of the Area Status and
Clearance, Onephil's  Exploration Permit Application,
to date, is still pending before the MGB.
Meanwhile, on 19 November 2007, Marcopper
sought to expand its MPSA AMA IV-B 127 and
consequently filed an amended sketch plan. On the
same date, Marcopper sent another letter to De
Jesus calling again his attention to the fact that the
area covered by its MPSA Application No. AMA IV-B
127 are now included in the amended sketch plan
covering the entire SACP with a total area of
4,668.3222 hectares. Marcopper reminded De Jesus
that it has valid mining rights over the said land
under R.A. No. 7942 and "are under the private
works" of the SACP. However, the MIMAROPA Area
Status report shows that the additional areas are in
conflict with several Exploration Permit
Applications, including that of Onephil.
In a letter dated 16 November 2007, the MGB sought
Onephil's comment to Marcopper's claim. Onephil
replied to MGB, stating that at the time it "applied
for the application permit the areas [are] clear and
open for mining". Finding merit in Onephil's
contentions, the MGB rejected Marcopper's claim
that the overlapped areas are closed to mining
applications. The MGB likewise denied the
amendment of Marcopper's MPSA Application No.
AMA IV-B 127 as the same conflicts with Onephil's
EPA-IV-B-177.
Aggrieved, on 26 November 2007, appellants filed
a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(WPI) against De Jesus before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. The case was docketed as SCA Case
No. 07-118343 and raffled by (sic) Branch 52 thereof
(hereafter court a quo). Appellants contended that
De Jesus committed grave abuse of discretion when
he accepted and acted on Onephil's Exploration
Permit Application knowing that the land covered by
the same overlaps with SACP land.
Appellants likewise filed an Amended Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus to include in the case
respondent-appellee Vicente S. Paragas, CESO III, in
his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Region IV-B (MIMAROPA) for approving the
OSSC's Area Status and Clearance in favor of
Onephil.
On 20 December 2007, the court a quo, through
Presiding Judge Antonio Rosales issued an Order
denying appellants' prayer for injunction and set the
case for pre-trial.5
Subsequent to this, on February 22, 2008,
respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. They
argued that the issues raised are considered mining
disputes and thus were under the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators. 6
Petitioners opposed this and argued that
respondents' act of processing Onephil Mineral
Resources, Inc.'s (Onephil) Exploration Permit
Application was a violation of their rights since the
application covered lands and private works in the
San Antonio Copper Project (SACP).7 They also
argued that the Amended Petition did not involve
mining rights but involved a violation of petitioners'
proprietary rights.8
On May 23, 2008, the RTC issued an Order 9 denying
the Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that it had primary
jurisdiction over the case since it did not involve a
mining dispute.10 It also ruled that the Panel of
Arbitrators had no jurisdiction over the case.11
On July 23, 2008, respondents filed a petition
for certiorari  before the CA questioning the May 23,
2008 Order of the RTC. 12This was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 104490.13 But in a Resolution14 dated
November 13, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition
for non-compliance with the CA's
directives.15 Respondents' motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. 16
Respondents then filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Court and
docketed as G.R. No. 188229.17 The Court, in a
Resolution dated March 8, 2010, denied the petition
for failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed
an error in dismissing the petition for certiorari.18
Subsequently, after trial on the merits, the RTC,
through Acting Presiding Judge Ruben Reynaldo G.
Roxas, rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners'
Amended Petition for lack of jurisdiction.19 The RTC
ruled that the issue raised in the Amended Petition
involves a mining dispute and is therefore within
the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators. 20
The RTC ruled as follows:
Verily, the instant controversy involves both an
application for a mineral agreement by petitioners
and the exploration permit application by OMRI.
Thus, petitioners pray for the exclusion of the
conflicting areas in OMRI's Exploration Permit No.
EPA-IVB-177. In the same breadth, they seek to
include the claimed area in its own MPSA
Application No. AMA-IVB-127. Stated differently,
this controversy involves the adjudication of
petitioner's rights with respect to their MPSA
application vis-a-vis OMRI's rights with respect to
its EPA.
Similarly, since petitioners invoke their supposed
ownership and possessory rights over surface lands
to defeat OMRI's application, the instant controversy
also falls under Section 7(c) of R.A. 7942 because it
refers to surface owners, occupants and
concessionaires of the real property affected by the
mining activities conducted by the claim-
holders/concessionaires (entities which are holding
mining rights granted by the government).
x x x x
Truth be told, after a thorough evaluation of the
records, this Court was convinced of the necessity
for technical knowledge on the subject matter
before it can competently adjudicate the factual
issues in this case. Specifically, during the
proceedings, petitioners tried to show that they have
mining rights, property and structures over the
entirety of the claimed area through their expert
witness, Geodetic Engineer Armando E. Quinto. The
latter used his specialized knowledge in engineering
to determine the metes and bounds of what it (sic)
claimed to be the SACP area and, in the process,
referred extensively to topological maps and Global
Positioning System (GPS) coordinates during his
testimony. Similarly, respondents presented
personnel from the MGB, who used their specialized
engineering knowledge and repetitively referred to
topological maps and the Mineral Land Survey Map
(MLSM) to establish previous and current mining
claims. Surely, these circumstances only lead to the
conclusion that indeed, a mining dispute exists, and
that the Panel of Arbitrators is especially suited to
determine the factual issues in this case. 21
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing
considerations, the Amended Petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.22
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the
Amended Petition. The CA ruled that the issue
involved in the Amended Petition is the overlap or
conflict between Onephil's EPA-IV-B-177 and
petitioner Marcopper Mining Corporation's
(petitioner Marcopper) MPSA No. AMA-IV-B127 over
the land sought to be covered by the SACP. 23 For the
CA, the case pertains to factual matters of whether
petitioner Marcopper was able to prove the
existence of the overlap or conflict between its
claimed area and that covered by Onephil's
Exploration Permit Application such that the latter
need not be approved or that the land covered by
petitioner Marcopper's claim be excluded from the
grant of Onephil's application.24 The CA ruled that to
resolve the controversy, it would require the
application of technological knowledge and
experience of mining authorities. 25 This involves a
mining dispute, which the CA defined as follows:
The jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators is
embodied in x x x Section 77 of R.A. No. 7942 (The
Philippine Mining Act of 1995), to wit:
"SEC. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. — There shall be a
panel of arbitrators in the regional office of the
Department composed of three (3) members, two
(2) of whom must be members of the Philippine Bar
in good standing and one [1] licensed mining
engineer or a professional in a related field, and duly
designated by the Secretary as recommended by the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director. Those
designated as members of the panel shall serve as
such in addition to their work in the Department
without receiving any additional compensation. As
much as practicable, said members shall come from
the different bureaus of the Department in the
region. The presiding officer thereof shall be selected
by the drawing of lots. His tenure as presiding officer
shall be on a yearly basis. The members of the panel
shall perform their duties and obligations in hearing
and deciding cases until their designation is
withdrawn or revoked by the Secretary. Within thirty
(30) working days, after the submission of the case
by the parties for decision, the panel shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and
decide on the following:

(a)  Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
(b)  Disputes involving mineral agreements or
permits;
(c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires[."] x x x found that the RTC (albeit with a new judge), after
xxxx
Under the above-quoted provision, mining dispute is
a dispute involving (a) rights to mining areas, (b)
mineral agreements, Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreements (FTAA), or permits, and (c)
surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires. In the case
of Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration vs[.] Macrosia,
the Supreme Court explained that the phrase
"disputes involving rights to mining areas" in Section
77(a) of R.A. No. 7942 refers to any adverse claim,
protest, or opposition to an application for mineral
agreement or conferment of mining rights, while
Sec[tion] 77(b) thereof refers to disputes involving
mineral agreements and permits. Parenthetically,
the "permit" referred to in Section 77(b) of the
[Philippine] Mining Act pertains to exploration
permit, quarry permit, and other mining permits
recognized in Chapters IV, VIII, and IX of the
[Philippine] Mining Act.
Additionally, in the case of Gonzales vs[.] Panel of
Arbitrators, the Supreme Court held that the Panel
of Arbitrators' jurisdiction is limited only to those
mining disputes which raise questions of fact or
matters requiring the application of technological
knowledge and experience.26 (Emphasis in the
original; citations removed)
Further, the CA ruled that petitioners were not
entitled to a writ of prohibition and mandamus
because they have an adequate remedy under
Republic Act No. (RA) 794227 or the Philippine
Mining Act by filing a complaint with the Panel of
Arbitrators in order to determine whether or not
there exists an overlap or conflict in petitioner
Marcopper's mining claim or application. 28
The CA also ruled that the Court's Resolution 29 in
G.R. No. 188229, entitled "The Regional Executive
Director, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Region IV-B [MIMAROPA], et al. vs. MR
Holdings, Inc. and Marcopper Mining Corporation"
did not settle the issue of jurisdiction since the Court
only affirmed the CA's dismissal of the petition for
certiorari on procedural grounds.30 Neither the CA
nor the Court delved into the issue of jurisdiction
over the Amended Petition.31 Nonetheless, the CA
also ruled that the RTC's May 23, 2008 Order is
merely interlocutory and cannot be considered as
having finally resolved on the merits the issue of
whether the case involves a mining dispute. 32 The CA
evaluating the records, including the testimonies of
the parties, was convinced of the necessity for
technical knowledge and expertise in order to
determine the metes and bounds of what petitioners
are claiming to be part of their mining claims. 33
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.
The Decision  dated 21 December 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in SCA
Case No. 07-118343 STANDS.
SO ORDERED.34
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but this was
denied. Hence, this Petition.
Issues
The issues raised in the Petition are as follows:
[I.]
xxx THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE ISSUE RAISED
IN THE CASE A QUO IS A MINING DISPUTE BETWEEN
TWO CLAIMANTS. THE ISSUE IS THE REFUSAL BY
RESPONDENTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO COMPLY
WITH SECTION 19 OF R.A. NO. 7942, THE MINING
LAW OF 1995, THAT CERTAIN MINING AREAS ARE
CLOSED TO MINING APPLICATIONS. THIS ISSUE IS
PROPERLY THE SUBJECT OF A PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS UNDER RULE 65 OF
THE RULES OF COURT.
[II.]
xxx THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN DEFYING THE RESOLUTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 188229 WHICH
UPHELD THE ORDER DATED MAY 23, 2008 OF THEN
PRESIDING JUDGE ANTONIO M. ROSALES IN THE
CASE A QUO. THE RESOLUTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN G.R. NO. 188229 IS DEEMED TO BE A
DECISION ON THE MERIT[S]. THE ORDER DECLARING
THAT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION AND THAT THE
CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A MINING DISPUTE HAS
ATTAINED FINALITY. THE RTC'S ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE DECIDED THE CASE A QUO STRANGELY
UNAWARE OF HIS OWN COURT'S PREVIOUS ORDER,
AND THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY RESOLUTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT, UPHOLDING THE RTC'S
JURISDICTION.
[III.]
xxx THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT
ONEPHIL IS NOT A HOLDER OF MINING RIGHTS.
BEING A MERE APPLICANT FOR AN EXPLORATION
PERMIT, ONEPHIL HAS NOT ACQUIRED MINING
RIGHTS.
[IV.]
xxx THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT
ONEPHIL, BEING A MERE APPLICANT FOR AN
EXPLORATION PERMIT, DOES NOT FALL INTO THE
CATEGORIES OF A PARTY TO A DISPUTE, THE
RESOLUTION OF WHICH IS UNDER THE JURISDICTION
OF THE MGB PANEL OF ARBITRATORS.
xxx THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT R.A.
NO. 7942 PROVIDED PROTECTION TO THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS OF PRIVATE LAND OWNERS WITH PRIVATE
WORKS. THAT UNLESS SUCH LAND OWNERS GIVE
THEIR CONSENT IN WRITING, THEIR PRIVATE LANDS
ARE CLOSED TO MINING APPLICATIONS. IT IS THESE
RIGHTS THAT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROTECTS
AND WHICH R.A. NO. 7942 PROVIDED, WHICH
RESPONDENTS HAVE VIOLATED BY DECLARING THEIR
AREAS OPEN TO MINING APPLICATIONS WITHOUT
THEIR CONSENT.35 (Emphasis omitted)
Distilling the foregoing, there are essentially only
two issues for the Court's resolution, and they are:
(a) whether the dispute is within the jurisdiction of
the Panel of Arbitrators; and, (b) whether the Court,
in G.R. No. 188229, already ruled with finality that it
is the RTC and not the Panel of Arbitrators that has
jurisdiction over the Amended Petition.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is denied.
The Panel of Arbitrators has
jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that "[w]hat is involved in this case
are private lands and private works which are closed
to mining applications pursuant to Section 19 of [RA]
7942."36Petitioners' theory is that "[u]nless the
consent of the private landowners is secured, private
land area is closed to mining applications." 37
Petitioners also argue that the real issue is "whether
or not respondents public officials acted illegally and
without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in declaring [that] the area
applied for by Onephil is open to mining
application."38 For petitioners, this is not "a mining
dispute, nor does it require the technical expertise
of [the] Panel of Arbitrators."39
Petitioners' arguments lack basis.
The nature of an action and whether the tribunal has
jurisdiction over such action are to be determined
from the material allegations of the complaint, the
law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and
the character of the relief sought irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims averred since jurisdiction is not affected by
the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an
answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the
same.40
Here, the following are settled:
Onephil's Exploration Permit Application
EPA-IV-B-177 does not include areas
(a)
covered by petitioner Marcopper's MPSA
application AMA-IVB-127;41
The area covered by Onephil's EPA-IV-B-
177 overlaps with the private lands and
(b) private works included in the SACP, but are
not included in Marcopper's AMA-IVB-
127;42 and,
Marcopper is the owner of the private
(c) lands and works which are covered by the
area subject of Onephil's EPA-IV-B-177.43
In their arguments, petitioners try to make a
distinction that what they are questioning is the
action of respondents for issuing the Area Clearance.
But the material allegations in the Amended Petition
belies this posture as they show that petitioners are
essentially opposing the Exploration Permit
Application of Onephil or any other applicant for
mining rights that allegedly overlaps with the SACP.
Their Amended Petition alleges the following:
27. That public respondents' unjust and wrongful
refusal to block-off and exclude the areas of the San
Antonio Copper Project from any EP or MPSA or
other mining applications by third parties will open
the flood gates to illegal entries and incursions over
the said areas in the guise of an (sic) illegally issued
EP or MPSA applications, and has caused and is
causing grave injustice and irreparable injury to
petitioners.
28. Public respondents with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of  jurisdiction,
tantamount to lack of  jurisdiction, have
indiscriminately and unlawfully accepted, processed
and published, and continue to accept, process and
publish EPAs of third persons and entities in the
areas of the San Antonio Copper Project, and has
(sic) unlawfully refused to block-off and exclude the
said mining areas from any EPA, MPSA OR FTAA
applications, contrary to law and in flagrant
violation of the mining rights of
petitioners.44 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
underscoring in the original omitted)
In fact, in their prayer in their Amended Petition,
petitioners state:
3. After due proceedings, the petition be granted
and judgment be rendered:
a) Converting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction into
a  Permanent  Writ  of Prohibitory and  Mandatory
Injunction.
b)  The privileged writ of prohibition be  issued
commanding public respondents OIC Regional
Director, and Executive Regional Director,
respectively, for MGB, Region IV-B (MIMAROPA),
their agents, representatives and persons acting in
his behalf to  desist from  accenting, processing,
publishing and issuing to third persons and entities
whomsoever Exploration Permits (EPs), Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), or Financial
Technical  Assistance  Agreement  (FTAA)  within  by the parties for decision, the panel shall have
the boundaries of petitioners' San Antonio Copper
Project Area at San Antonio, Sta. Cruz, Marinduque,
which areas are closed to mining applications; and,
c) Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding said
public respondents, their agents, representatives
and persons acting in their behalf to block-off
and exclude from any Exploration Permit
Application (EPA), or MPSA application, or FTAA
applications by third persons or entities the mining
areas of the San Antonio Copper Project which are
closed to mining applications.45 (Emphasis  and 
underscoring  supplied;  underscoring  in original
omitted)
Even as the petition is couched as one
for mandamus and prohibition, what petitioners
really seek is the denial of Onephil's application and
other application for mining rights insofar as they
overlap with the private lands over which petitioners
claim they have rights. The hair-splitting distinction
they make that what they are questioning is the
issuance of respondents of the Area Clearance
utterly fails to convince the Court. Once more, the
material allegations of their Amended Petition and
the character of the reliefs they seek indubitably
show that the case involves a dispute over the
conferment of mining rights to Onephil — which is
within the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators.
To reiterate, the jurisdiction of the Panel of
Arbitrators is stated in Section 77 of the Philippine
Mining Act as follows:
Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. — There shall be a
panel of arbitrators in the regional office of the
Department composed of three (3) members, two
(2) of whom must be members of the Philippine Bar
in good standing and one a licensed mining engineer
or a professional in a related field, and duly
designated by the Secretary as recommended by the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director. Those
designated as members of the panel shall serve as
such in addition to their work in the Department
without receiving any additional compensation. As
much as practicable, said members shall come from
the different bureaus of the Department in the
region. The presiding officer thereof shall be selected
by the drawing of lots. His tenure as presiding officer
shall be on a yearly basis. The members of the panel
shall perform their duties and obligations in hearing
and deciding cases until their designation is
withdrawn or revoked by the Secretary. Within thirty
(30) working days, after the submission of the case
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide
on the following:
(a)  Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
(b)  Disputes involving mineral agreements or
permits;
(c)  Disputes involving  surface owners,  occupants
and claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the
Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.
The foregoing is reflected in the Philippine Mining
Act Implementing Rules and Regulations (Philippine
Mining Act IRR),46thus:
Section 202. Jurisdiction of Panel of Arbitrators
The  Panel of Arbitrators shall  have exclusive and
original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the
following:
a. Disputes involving rights to mining
areas;
b. Disputes involving Mineral
Agreements, FTAAs or Permits;
c. Disputes involving surface owners,
occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires[.]
Interpreting paragraph (a) of Section 77 of
the Philippine Mining Act, the Court in Celestial
Nickel Mining Exploration Corp. v. Macroasia
Corp. ,47  held that paragraph (a) of Section 77 of the
Mining Act "specifically refer only to those disputes
relative to the applications for a mineral agreement
or conferment of mining rights."48
The current dispute squarely falls under paragraph
(a) of Section 77 of the  Philippine Mining Act as it
involves a dispute relative to the application of
Onephil for an exploration permit.
In fact, the procedure outlined in the Philippine
Mining Act and its IRR as to the process in applying
for and the grant of an exploration permit leads to
the clear conclusion that it is the Panel of Arbitrators
that has jurisdiction over this dispute.
Upon the filing of the application for an exploration
permit, the concerned Regional Office (RO) or the
MGB shall check the control maps if the area applied
for is free or open for mining applications. If there
are specific claims or conflicts or complaints of
overlaps from landowners, nongovernment
organizations, local government units, and other
concerned stakeholders, the Regional Director is
directed to exert all efforts to resolve the same. After
resolving any issues, the RO or the MGB shall issue
the Area Clearance.49
Once the Area Clearance is issued, the RO shall issue
a Notice of Application for Exploration Permit to the
applicant for publication and radio announcement
and for posting. The Notice shall be published in two
newspapers, one of general circulation published in
Metro Manila and another one published in the
municipality or province where the proposed permit
area is located. The Notice shall also be posted in
bulletin boards for one week in the province,
municipality and barangay where the proposed
permit area is located. Radio announcements of the
notice shall also be done every day for one week. 50
Within five working days from the last date of
posting and radio announcement, certifications shall
be issued by the concerned officers on the
compliance with the posting and radio
announcement requirement. The affidavit of the
publisher will also be submitted as proof of the
publication.51
The Philippine Mining Act IRR also specifically states
that "[a]ny adverse claim, protest or opposition shall
be filed directly, within ten (10) days from the date
of publication or from the last date of posting/radio
announcement, with the Regional Office concerned
or through any PENRO52 or CENRO53 concerned for
filing in the Regional Office concerned for purposes
of its resolution by the Panel of Arbitrators pursuant
to the provisions of the Act and these implementing
rules and regulations."54
Petitioner Marcopper, claiming that its private lands
should be excluded from Onephil's Exploration
Permit Application, may file such protest or
opposition with the Panel of Arbitrators within 10
days from the date of publication or from the last
date of posting/radio announcement. The Panel of
Arbitrators is mandated to decide on the dispute
within 30 days after the case is submitted for
decision.55 The decision of the Panel of Arbitrators is
appealable to the Mines Adjudication Board, 56 and in
turn, the decision of the Mines Adjudication Board is
appealable to the Court.57
It is only when the dispute is settled with finality, as
certified by the Panel of Arbitrators, will the Regional
Director then issue the Exploration Permit. Section
21 of the Philippine Mining Act IRR further states
that "[u]pon final resolution of any adverse claim,
protest or opposition, the Panel of Arbitrators shall
issue a Certification to that effect within five (5)
working days from the date of finality of resolution
thereof. Where no adverse claim, protest or
opposition is filed after the lapse of the period for
filing the adverse claim, protest or opposition, the
Panel of Arbitrators shall likewise issue a
Certification to that effect within five (5) working
days from receipt of the request of any concerned
party."58
Thereafter, Section 23 of the  Philippine Mining Act
IRR states that after the terms and conditions of the
exploration permit have been evaluated and after
conflicts have been cleared, the Director of the MGB
or the Regional Director concerned shall issue the
exploration permit, thus:
Section 23. Registration of Exploration Permit
Upon evaluation that all the terms and conditions
and all pertinent requirements are in order and that
the subject area has been cleared from any conflict,
the Director in case of Mineral Reservation areas or
the Regional Director concerned in case of Non-
Mineral Reservation areas and upon clearance by the
Director shall approve and issue the Exploration
Permit. The Permittee shall cause the registration of
the same in the Regional Office concerned within
fifteen (15) working days from receipt of the written
notice and upon payment of the required
fees: Provided, That the Permittee shall comply with
the required consultation with the Sanggunian
concerned pursuant to the pertinent provisions of
RA No. 7160, The Local Government Code of 1991,
prior to the implementation of the Exploration Work
Program.
In filing a petition for mandamus and prohibition —
instead of following the procedure outlined above —
petitioners attempted to circumvent and avoid the
jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators. The Court
cannot allow this legal maneuvering as the material
allegations and the relief sought by petitioners show
that the dispute clearly falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators. The RTC and
the CA therefore correctly dismissed the Amended
Petition.
Issue of jurisdiction can be raised at
any time.
Petitioners argue that the Court's dismissal of its
petition in G.R. No. 188229 already settled the issue
of jurisdiction.59 Petitioners' arguments lack merit.
To recall, respondents herein filed a Motion to
Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, which the RTC
denied in an Order dated May 23,
2008.60 Respondents filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA, which was summarily
dismissed.61 The summary dismissal by the CA was
affirmed by the Court in G.R. No. 188229. 62
In Machado v. Gatdula,63 the Court ruled that
"[w]henever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall
be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any
time, during appeal or even after final judgment.
Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is
conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone
the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently
set aside."64
Further, in Bilag v. Ay-ay,,65 the Court reiterated that
"when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action[,] x x x [as] any act that it performs without
jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any
binding legal effects."66
Here, the RTC did not commit an error in dismissing
the Amended Petition despite the Order dated May
23, 2008. The issue of jurisdiction may be interposed
at any time and may be ruled upon even during
appeal or even after finality of judgment. The RTC,
CA, or even the Court cannot conveniently set aside
the fact that the Philippine Mining Act conferred
jurisdiction over the dispute involved in the
Amended Petition with the Panel of Arbitrators.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
;
6. THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 216949, July 03, 2019
EDUARDO T. BATAC, PETITIONER, v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, TEDDY C. TUMANG, RAFAEL P.
YABUT, AND PANTALEON C. MARTIN, Replying to Mayor Tumang, Batac said that Martin
RESPONDENTS. had never been a tenant of his land. He pointed out
that the land was not for distribution as its area was
DECISION only three (3) hectares and the retention was given
to his parents under the land reform law. He further
LEONEN, J.: asserted that a tenant does not have the authority
to request that any part of the land be removed
without the landowner's permission. Batac also
Absent a showing that the Office of the Ombudsman
demanded P600,000.00 as payment for the soil that
acted in an "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical[,] or
Mayor Tumang and his co-perpetrators had taken
despotic manner[,]"1 this Court will not interfere
from his property, as well as compensation for the
with its exercise of discretion in determining the
depreciation of his property.11
existence of probable cause.
Batac later sent another letter asking that Mayor
This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari 2 assailing
Tumang meet with him, but received no reply. 12
the undated Joint Review Order 3 and November 27,
2014 Joint Order4 of the Office of the Ombudsman,
On August 25, 2005, Batac went to Mexico,
which reversed its earlier Resolution5 and
Pampanga to talk to Martin. While he was there, he
Decision,6 and dismissed the charges against then
tried to get in touch with Mayor Tumang, but the
Mexico, Pampanga Mayor Teddy C. Tumang (Mayor
mayor was out of town. Batac then wrote the mayor
Tumang), then Barangay San Antonio Captain Rafael
another letter to reiterate his demands, but when he
P. Yabut (Barangay Captain Yabut), and Pantaleon
still did not receive a reply, he sent a demand letter
Martin (Martin).
through his lawyer.13
On February 28, 2006, Eduardo T. Batac (Batac) filed
Based on these allegations, Batac claimed that
before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mayor Tumang and his co-perpetrators committed
Luzon a Complaint7 against Mayor Tumang, Barangay
the crime of theft and violated Republic Act No. 3019
Captain Yabut, and Martin. He averred that in May
and Republic Act No. 6713.14
2005, he was informed that his property in Barangay
San Antonio, Mexico, Pampanga was being quarried
In its November 8, 2010 Resolution, 15 the Office of
without his consent, under the instructions of
the Ombudsman found probable cause against
Mayor Tumang, and using Mayor Tumang's dump
Mayor Tumang, Barangay Captain Yabut, and
trucks.8
Martin for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No, 3019. It found that Martin posed himself as a
When he visited his property on June 21, 2005, Batac
tenant of the property, provided no evidence of his
saw that it had been unevenly leveled and reduced
tenancy, and exercised an act of ownership over the
to below ground level. On July 7, 2005, Batac wrote
property.16 The local officials, meanwhile, were
Mayor Tumang, asking why the property was being
found inexcusably negligent when they acceded to
quarried without his permission and requesting that
Martin's request without the property owner's
it be stopped. He also tried to contact Barangay
consent. The Office of the Ombudsman further ruled
Captain Yabut through text, but the latter did not
that Batac was injured by the quarrying, because he
reply.9
was deprived from the use of the lahar deposits. 17
Meanwhile, in reply to Batac's letter, Mayor Tumang
However, the charges of theft and violation of
provided Batac a copy of a July 11, 2005 Affidavit
Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(a) were dismissed. 18
executed by Martin. Claiming to be a tenant of the
quarried property, Martin, in his Affidavit, asked
The dispositive portion of the Resolution read:
the local government to quarry it since the lahar
deposits on it had been preventing him from
cultivating the land. Martin added that he did not WHEREFORE, having established probable cause for
inform Batac about this request because the land Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, let the
was being processed for land distribution. 10 corresponding Information be FILED against Mayor
Teddy C. Tumang, Barangay Captain Rafael P. Yabut
and Pantaleon C. Martin.
The charges of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. 3019 and Theft are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO RESOLVED.19 (Emphasis in the original)
On November 8, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman
also issued a Decision on the administrative aspect
of Batac's Complaint.20 It found Mayor Tumang and
Barangay Captain Yabut guilty of misconduct and
violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713,
and penalized them each with a three (3)-month
suspension.21
Mayor Tumang, Barangay Captain Yabut, and Martin
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 22 of the
Resolution, as did Batac.23
In its undated Joint Review Order, 24 the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed all charges against Mayor
Tumang, Barangay Captain Yabut, and Martin.
In ruling that no corrupt practice under Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 had been committed, the
Office of the Ombudsman reasoned that the element
of undue injury to any party or giving a private party
unwarranted benefits was absent. It found that
Batac was not injured since he did not own the lahar
deposits on his property. Neither was the
government injured since the lahar was used for
road development in San Antonio.25                            Thus, Batac filed this Petition for Certiorari. 32 In turn,
        
While acknowledging that the public officials could
be held administratively liable for not securing a
permit before quarrying, the Office of the
Ombudsman nonetheless found the charges lacking
in merit. It noted that after the Complaint had been
filed in 2006, Mayor Tumang was re-elected in 2007
and 2010, which rendered the charge against him
moot under the condonation doctrine. As for
Barangay Captain Yabut, the record showed no
evidence that he had conspired with Mayor Tumang
in the unauthorized quarrying.26
Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended
that the following actions be taken:
1. RECALL and SET ASIDE the
Resolution of 8 November 2010;
2. DISMISS the criminal aspect of the
complaint for lack of merit;
3. DISMISS the administrative aspect
of the complaint respecting
respondent Teddy Tumang,
applying the Condonation
(doctrine; and as to respondent
Rafael Yabut, for lack of merit; and
4. a copy of this Joint Review Order
be furnished the Commission on
Elections, Department of [the]
Interior and Local Government,
and the Civil Service Commission
for guidance and
27
information.  (Emphasis in the
original)
Then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales
(Ombudsman Carpio Morales) approved the Joint
Review Order on November 23, 2012. 28
In its November 27, 2014 Joint Order, 29 the Office of
the Ombudsman denied Batac's Motion for
Reconsideration. It explained that lahar deposits are
minerals, which are owned by the State under
Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995.30
This Joint Order was similarly approved by
Ombudsman d Morales on December 16, 2014.31
the Office of the Ombudsman filed its
Comment,33 while Mayor Tumang, Barangay Captain
Yabut, and Martin jointly filed their
Comment/Opposition.34 To these, Batac filed his
Consolidated Reply.35
Petitioner asserts that public respondent Office of
the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it rendered the undated Joint
Review Order and November 27, 2014 Joint
Order.36 He maintains that, acting in conspiracy with
respondent Martin, respondents Mayor Tumang and
Barangay Captain Yabut acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence that caused him undue injury when they
broke into his property and removed the lahar
deposits without his consent.37 He claims that since
the lahar deposits were found on private land, they
are not minerals under the Philippine Mining Act.
Instead, he insists that under Article 440 of the Civil
Code, he, as the landowner, has the right to
everything in his property, including the lahar
deposits.38
Assuming that the lahar deposits are minerals under
the law, petitioner asserts that respondents still had
no permit to quarry or extract them. 39 Further
assuming the lahar was owned by the State, he
claims that respondents caused the State undue
injury by quarrying it without the necessary
permits.40
Public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, emphasizes that an extraordinary writ of
certiorari may be issued only in case of grave abuse
of discretion, not against a mere error in the exercise
of jurisdiction.41 Nonetheless, it maintains that its
finding of lack of probable cause for a violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 is supported by
law and substantial evidence.42 It argues that since
the lahar deposits are naturally-occurring inorganic
substances, they are minerals and are, thus, owned
by the State under Article XII, Section 2 of the
Constitution and Section 4 of the Philippine Mining
Act.43 Petitioner, therefore, has no right to possess
the lahar deposits, and cannot be injured by its
hauling.44
Public respondent also asserts that there was no
undue injury to the government because it was not
disputed that the lahar deposits taken from the
property were used for road development in San
Antonio, Pampanga.45
For their part, respondents Mayor Tumang, Barangay
Captain Yabut, and Martin maintain that removing
the lahar deposits was consistent with the
respondent public officers' power as local chief
executives to promote general welfare under the
Local Government Code.46 They add that petitioner
presented no evidence to show the element of
undue injury.47
The issues for resolution are:
First, whether or not public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in
not finding probable cause to file complaints against
respondents Mayor Teddy C. Tumang, Barangay
Captain Rafael P. Yabut, and Pantaleon C. Martin for
corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act;
Second, whether or not undue injury was caused to
petitioner Eduardo T. Batac when the lahar deposits
were hauled without the necessary permits; and
Finally, whether or not undue injury was caused to
the government when the lahar deposits were
hauled without the necessary permits.
The Petition is dismissed.
I
Generally, this Court does not interfere with the
Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its
prosecutorial and investigative powers, and in its
determination of reasonable ground to believe a
crime has been committed.48
Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct
alleged errors of fact or law that do not constitute
grave abuse of discretion.49 This Court only reviews
the Office of the Ombudsman's determination of
whether probable cause exists upon a clear showing
of its abuse of discretion, or when it exercised it in
an "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical[,] or despotic
manner."50
In Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman,51 this Court
explained the various policy reasons behind this
deference:
An independent constitutional body, the Office of
the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people[,] and [is] the preserver of
the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the
sole power to determine whether there is probable
cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against
an accused. This function is executive in nature.
The executive determination of probable cause is a
highly factual matter. It requires probing into the
"existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which
he [or she] was prosecuted."
The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the
power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better
position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the
evidence on hand needed to make a finding of
probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts,
we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.
Practicality also leads this Court to exercise restraint
in interfering with the Office of the Ombudsman's
finding of probable cause. Republic v. Ombudsman
Desierto explains:
[T]he functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way
that the courts would be extremely swamped if they
could be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private [complainant].52 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)
Absent the existence of grave abuse of discretion,
this Court generally shall not disturb public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman's
determination as to whether probable cause exists in
this case.
II
The only element of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act under dispute here is whether
respondents caused undue injury, either to the
government or to petitioner, when they hauled the
lahar deposits from petitioner's property.
Claiming ownership over the lahar deposits,
petitioner insisted that he suffered injury due to
respondent Mayor Tumang's refusal to pay the value
of the lahar deposits. This claim of ownership is
based on Article 440 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ARTICLE 440. The ownership of property gives the
right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially.
Anchored solely on this provision, petitioner claims
that the lahar deposits belonged to him, having
naturally been attached to his land as a result of a
volcano eruption.
Public respondent, however, points out that natural
resources are owned by the State. 53 Article XII,
Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State.
Meanwhile, Section 4 of the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 provides:
SECTION 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. —
Mineral resources are owned by the State and the
exploration, development, utilization, and processing
thereof shall be under its full control and
supervision. The State may directly undertake such
activities or it may enter into mineral agreements
with contractors.
Section 3 of the law defines "minerals" and "mineral
resource":
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - . . .
. . . .   
 
 
(aa) "Minerals" refers to all naturally occurring
inorganic substance in solid, gas, liquid, or
any intermediate state excluding energy
materials such as coal, petroleum, natural
gas, radioactive materials, and geothermal
energy.
. . . . 
 
(ad) "Mineral resource" means any
concentration of minerals/rocks with
potential economic value.
Furthermore, Executive Order No. 224, series of
2003, entitled, "Rationalizing the Extraction and
Disposition of Sand and Gravel/Lahar Deposits in the
Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac and Zambales,"
provides:
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of the State that said
sand and gravel/lahar deposits be properly utilized
for the benefit of both local and the national
governments and all concerned, with due regard to
the environment.
. . . .
SECTION 1. Processing and Issuance of Mining
Permits. — The issuance of permit to extract and
dispose of industrial sand and gravel/lahar deposits
by the MGB shall be governed by Chapter 8 of R.A.
No. 7924.
The acceptance, processing and evaluation of
applications for permits to extract industrial sand
and gravel/lahar deposits in Pampanga, Tarlac and
Zambales shall be undertaken through a Task Force
composed of the MGB and the Provincial Governor.
These provisions treat lahar deposits as minerals,
which are owned by the State and are covered by
various laws on mining. Thus, on this matter, public
respondent ruled that there was no undue injury:
It is respectfully submitted that the removal of the
lahar deposits from the subject property did not
amount to causing undue injury to complainant
under Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended. As
reflected above, complainant does not own the lahar
deposits which came about as a result of the Mount
Pinatubo eruption. Therefore, complainant's
contention that he incurred damages because
respondent Tumang refused to pay him for the value
of lahar deposits that were removed from his land
has no leg to stand on. Neither did respondents
cause undue injury to the government, as it is not
disputed that the lahar removed from complainant's
land were used for road development in San
Antonio, Pampanga. Lastly, it cannot also be said
that public respondents gave unwarranted benefits,
advance or preference to any private party. 54
Petitioner has failed to address this head-on and
explain, with legal or factual basis, why none of the
foregoing provisions apply to the lahar deposits on
his property. Consequently, this is not the
appropriate case to resolve the issue of ownership of
deposits accreted into one's property. Thus, his claim
of injury, based on ownership of the lahar deposits,
is doubtful.
Nonetheless, this Court notes that there could have
been some injury to petitioner since: (1) as a
landowner, he could have been granted a
gratuitous permit to extract the lahar deposits
under Section 50 of the Philippine Mining Act; and
(2) the law contemplates compensating a surface
owner like petitioner for damages done by mining
right holders when conducting mining operations
on the privately-owned land.55
However, the possibility of injury to petitioner is
not sufficient to find grave abuse of discretion on
the part of public respondent.
This Court explained at length the concept of injury
under Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan:56
In Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that
"unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official
support; unjustified; unauthorized; or without
justification or adequate reasons. "Advantage"
means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from
course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or
higher evaluation or desirability; choice or
estimation above another.
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, which was
approved by Congress in Spanish reads:
(e) Causar algun perjuicio indebido a cualquiera,
incluyendo al Gobierno, o dar a alguna persona
particular cualesquier beneficios, vengaja o
preferencia injustificados en el desempeho de sus
funciones administrativas judiciales de indole oficial
con manifiesta parcialidad, evidente mala fe o crasa
negligencia inexcusable. Esta disposicion se aplicara
a los funcionarios y empleados de oficinas o de las
corporaciones del gobierno encargados de otorgar
licencias o permisos u otras concesiones.
"Perjuicio" means prejudice, mischief, injury,
damages. Prejudice means injury or damage, due to
some judgment or action of another. Mischief
connotes a specific injury or damage caused by
another. "Indebido" means undue, illegal, immoral,
unlawful, void of equity and moderations. In Pecho
v. Sandiganbayan, the Court en banc defined injury
as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in
his person, or in his rights, reputation or property;
the invasion of any legally protected interests of
another." It must be more than necessary or are
excessive, improper or illegal. It is required that the
undue injury caused by the positive or passive acts
of the accused be quantifiable and demonstrable
and proven to the point of moral certainty. Undue
injury cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a
violation of a right has been established.
In Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, the Court en banc held
that proof of the extent or quantum of damage is
not essential. It is sufficient that the injury suffered
or benefits received can be perceived to be
substantial enough and not merely
negligible.57 (Citations omitted)
Thus, to constitute undue injury under Section 3(e),
the injury must quantifiable and demonstrable.
Moreover, Section 5058 of the Philippine Mining Act
only provides that a landowner may be granted a
gratuitous permit, but does not provide for any
priority to be accorded to a landowner. This Court
cannot assume that petitioner would have been
granted a private gratuitous permit. By ignoring and
bypassing the laws on lahar extraction, respondents
eliminated the possibility of petitioner applying for a
gratuitous permit. This injury to petitioner, however,
is not quantifiable. There could have been
quantifiable and demonstrable injury to petitioner by
reason of damage to the surface level of his
property, but given the evidence presented and
arguments raised, it was not grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent when it
found otherwise.
III
Petitioner's claim that there was injury to the
government could have been persuasive.
Unfortunately, as set forth here, it is insufficient for
this Court to find that public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion, and to reverse its
determination.
On the issue of injury to the State, the Joint Review
Order read:
Neither did respondents cause undue injury to the
government, as it is not disputed that the lahar
removed from complainant's land were used for
road development in San Antonio, Pampanga.59
Petitioner did not present evidence or significant
arguments relating to the undue injury of the
government before public respondent. Similarly, his
initial Complaint did not mention any mining laws, as
it was premised on his claimed ownership over the
lahar. This theory ignored injury to the State.
Likewise, before this Court, petitioner asserts:
It is in the interest of the State that said sand and
gravel/lahar deposits be properly utilized for the
benefit of both local and the national governments
and all concerned, with due regard to the
environment. However, such extraction of lahar
deposits must be made with the proper authority
and/or permit from the MGB and the task force
created under E.O. No. 224.60 (Citation omitted)
This Court entertains the idea that some injury to
the government may have existed—there may have
been fees and taxes for the quarrying of the lahar
deposits, or the local government may have paid
the full price of the road development, despite the
lahar deposits having been obtained without any
fee. However, the arguments and the paucity of
evidence set forth here are insufficient to reverse
the finding of public respondent on this matter.
While it may have been preferable for public
respondent to further address or investigate the
possible injury to the government, its decision not to
do so, given the arguments and evidence presented,
cannot be the basis of granting the Petition. Having
constitutional discretion and gravely abusing that
discretion are two (2) entirely different concepts
canonically established by jurisprudence.
Finally, this Court notes that there could have been
an information filed for theft of minerals, which the
Philippine Mining Act punishes with imprisonment:
SECTION 103. Theft of Minerals. — Any person
extracting minerals and disposing the same without
a mining agreement, lease, permit, license, or steals
minerals or ores or the products thereof from mines
or mills or processing plants shall, upon conviction,
be imprisoned from six (6) months to six (6) years or
pay a fine from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), or both, at the
discretion of the appropriate court. In addition, he
shall be liable to pay damages and compensation for
the minerals removed, extracted, and disposed of. In
the case of associations, partnerships, or
corporations, the president and each of the directors
thereof shall be responsible for the acts committed
by such association, corporation, or partnership.
However, again, this was not raised by the parties.
Consequently, this Court cannot find grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent in not
considering this point.
In light of these circumstances, public respondent's
dismissal of the charges against respondents cannot
be considered arbitrary. It found no probable cause
that a crime had been committed, making it difficult
to proceed with the case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari
is DISMISSED. The undated Joint Review Order and
the November 27, 2014 Joint Order of the Office of
the Ombudsman are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
;
7. G.R. No. 209165
LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
AGHAM PARTY LIST (represented by its President
Rep. Angelo B. Palmones), Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing
the Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013 2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00012.
The Facts
Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is
the operator of a mining claim located in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. LAMI’s mining area is covered by Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement3 No. 268-2008-III
dated 26 August 2008 by virtue of an Operating
Agreement4 dated 5 June 2007 with Filipinas Mining
Corporation.
LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, non-
commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. A port is a vital infrastructure to the
operations of a mining company to ship out ores and
other minerals extracted from the mines and make
the venture economically feasible. Brgy. Bolitoc,
about 25 kilometers away from the mine site, makes
it an ideal location to build a port facility. In the area
of Sta. Cruz, Shangfil Mining and Trading Corporation
(Shangfil)/A3Una Mining Corporation (A3Una) and
DMCI Mining Corporation, have been operating their
own ports since 2007.
LAMI secured the following permits and compliance
certificates for the port project: (1) Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Environmental Compliance Certificate5 (ECC) R03-
1104-182 dated 2 May 2011 covering the
development of causeway, stockpile and related
facilities on LAMI’s property with an area of 18,142
sq.m.; (2) DENR provisional foreshore lease
agreement with LAMI;6 (3) Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) Clearance to Develop a
Port;7 (4) PPA Permit to Construct a Port; 8 (5) PPA
Special Permit to Operate a Beaching Facility; 9 and
(6) Tree Cutting Permit/Certification 10 from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR.
The Zambales Alliance, a group of other mining
companies operating in Sta. Cruz, Zambales which do
not have their own port, namely Eramen Minerals,
Inc.; Zambales Diversified Metals Corporation;
Zambales Chromite Mining Corporation, Inc.;
BenguetCorp Nickel Mines, Inc., supported the port
project of LAMI and issued Letters11 of Intent to use
the port facilities of LAMI upon completion.
The Bolitoc community – the barangay, its officials
and residents – gave several
endorsements12 supporting the project. Even
the Sangguniang Bayan  of Sta. Cruz gave its consent
to the construction of the port.13
However, LAMI allegedly encountered problems
from the local government of Sta. Cruz, headed by
Mayor Luisito E. Marty (Mayor Marty). LAMI stated
that Mayor Marty unduly favored some mining
companies in the municipality and allegedly refused
to issue business and mayor’s permits and to receive
payment of occupation fees from other mining
companies despite the necessary national permits
and licenses secured by the other mining companies.
On 24 April 2012, Mayor Marty issued an
order14 directing LAMI to refrain from continuing
with its clearing works and directed the Sta. Cruz
Municipal Police Chief Generico Biñan to implement
his order. On 26 April 2012, LAMI responded through
a letter15 explaining that Mayor Marty’s order was
illegal and baseless. Chief Biñan, together with two
of his deputies, went to LAMI’s port site to demand
that LAMI cease its clearing works. LAMI’s supervisor
showed Chief Biñan all of LAMI’s permits. In a
Memorandum dated 3 May 2012, Chief Biñan made
a report to his supervisor, S/Supt. Francisco DB
Santiago, Jr. (S/Supt. Santiago), Zambales Police
Provincial Director, that there was no leveling of a
mountain on the port site. On 6 May 2012, S/Supt.
Santiago made a Special Report re: Police
Assistance16 to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Regional Director citing the findings of Chief Biñan.
Thereafter, Rep. Dan Fernandez, a member of the
Committee on Ecology of the House of
Representatives, passed House Resolution No. 117
(HR 117) entitled "Resolution Directing the
Committee on Ecology to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid
of Legislation, on the Implementation of Republic Act
No. 7942, Otherwise Known as the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995, Particularly on the Adverse Effects of
Mining on the Environment." HR 117 was issued in
order to conduct an alleged ocular inspection of the
port site in aid of legislation. On 21 May 2012, the
Committee on Ecology conducted an ocular
inspection of the LAMI port site, as well as the other
ports adjacent to LAMI’s – those of Shangfil/A3Una
and D.M. Consunji, Inc. The Committee allegedly
never visited any mining site in the area of Sta. Cruz.
Meanwhile, on 30 April 2012, the DENR
Environmental Management Bureau in Region III
(DENR-EMB R3) received a letter dated 27 April 2012
from Mayor Marty inquiring if the ECC the DENR
issued in favor of LAMI allowed LAMI to cut trees
and level a mountain.
On 25 May 2012, representatives from the DENR
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) in Zambales and the local government of
Sta. Cruz conducted an ECC compliance monitoring
of LAMI’s property. The DENR PENRO team found
that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the
ECC. Accordingly, a Notice of Violation (NOV) dated 1
June 2012 was issued against LAMI for violation of
certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist
order from further constructing and developing until
such time that the ECC conditions were fully
complied.
On 8 June 2012, a technical conference was held
where LAMI presented its reply to the NOV. The
DENR-EMB R3 ascertained that LAMI’s violations of
the four conditions of its ECC constitute minor
violations since they only pertain to non-submission
of documents. However, the leveling of the elevated
portion of the area was a major violation. A penalty
was consequently imposed on LAMI, and the
DENREMB R3 directed LAMI to (1) immediately
cause the installation of mitigating measures to
prevent soil erosion and siltation of the waterbody,
and (2) submit a rehabilitation plan.
On 11 June 2012, LAMI wrote a letter17 to the DENR-
EMB R3 regarding the commitments agreed upon
during the technical conference. LAMI signified
compliance with the conditions of DENR-EMB R3.
Attached to the letter were: (1) Official Receipt of
payment of penalties under Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1586, (2) Matrix of Mitigation and Rehabilitation
Plan, (3) Designation of Pollution Control Officer
dated 6 May 2011, and (4) Tree Cutting Permit dated
17 April 2012 issued by DENR R3 CENRO.18
On 20-21 June 2012, the DENR composite team,
composed of DENR-EMB R3, Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB) R3 and PENRO Zambales, conducted
an investigation to determine whether mitigating
measures done by LAMI were sufficient. The
composite team found that LAMI’s activities in its
property would not result to any environmental
damage to its surrounding communities.
Thereafter, the DENR-EMB R3 lifted the cease and
desist order after LAMI was found to have complied
with the requirements. In a Letter 19 dated 24
October 2012, Lormelyn E. Claudio (Dir. Claudio), the
Regional Director of DENR-EMB R3 wrote:
xxxx
The violated ECC conditions have been rectified and
clarified while the penalty corresponding to such
violation was fully paid and the required
rehabilitation and mitigating measures were already
implemented as committed. As such, the matter
leading to the issuance of the NOV is now resolved.
As ECC holder, you are enjoined to ensure the
effective carrying out of your Environmental
Management and Monitoring Plan.20
Meanwhile, earlier, or on 6 June 2012, respondent
Agham Party List (Agham), through its President,
former Representative Angelo B. Palmones (Rep.
Palmones), filed a Petition21 for the issuance of a
Writ22 of Kalikasan against LAMI, DENR, PPA, and the
Zambales Police Provincial Office (ZPPO).
Agham alleged that LAMI violated: (1) Section 6823
of PD No. 705,24 as amended by Executive Order No.
277,25 or the Revised Forestry Code; and (2)
Sections 5726 and 6927 of Republic Act No. 7942,28
or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Philippine
Mining Act). Agham added that LAMI cut mountain
trees and flattened a mountain which serves as a
natural protective barrier from typhoons and floods
not only of the residents of Zambales but also the
residents of some nearby towns located in
Pangasinan.
On 13 June 2012, this Court remanded the
petition29 to the Court of Appeals for hearing,
reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.
On 25 June 2012, LAMI filed its Verified Return dated
21 June 2012, controverting Agham’s allegations.
LAMI stated that it did not and was not violating any
environmental law, rule or regulation. LAMI argued
that:
(1) LAMI had the necessary permits and
authorization to cut trees in the port site; (2) LAMI
had the necessary permits to construct its port; (3)
LAMI consulted with and obtained the support of the
Sangguniang Barangay and residents of Barangay
Bolitoc; (4) LAMI’s port site is located on private and
alienable land; (5) there is no mountain on the port
site; (6) the Philippine Mining Act is irrelevant and
inapplicable to the present case; and (7) the other
allegations of Agham that LAMI violated
environmental laws, rules or regulations are likewise
baseless, irrelevant and false. LAMI stated further
that there is no environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities and
provinces.
Public respondents DENR, PPA and ZPPO, filed with
the Court of Appeals their Pre-Trial Brief dated 1
August 2012. In the Pre-Trial Brief, public
respondents stated that they will present the
following witnesses: (1) Dir. Claudio, Regional
Director, DENR-EMB R3; two from the PPA – (2)
Engineer Marieta G. Odicta (Engr. Odicta), Division
Manager, Engineering Services Division, Port District
Office, Manila, Northern Luzon; and (3) Emma L.
Susara (Ms. Susara), Department Manager,
Commercial Services of the PPA (NCR); and (4)
S/Supt. Santiago, Provincial Director of the ZPPO.
The witnesses of public respondents submitted their
Judicial Affidavits dated 6 August 2012. The
testimonies of the witnesses were offered to prove
the facts and allegations in the petition:
(1) Dir. Claudio30 –
a) That the issues presented by Agham were
already subject of the complaint filed by
Mayor Marty with the DENR-EMB R3;
b) That the DENR-EMB R3 issued an ECC to
LAMI;
c) That the DENR-EMB R3 acted on the
complaint of Mayor Marty with regard to
construction by LAMI of its port facility;
d) That the DENR-EMB R3 issued a NOV
dated 1 June 2012 to LAMI;
e) That the DENR-CENRO issued a tree
cutting permit to LAMI;
f) That there is no mountain within or inside
the property of LAMI in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta.
Cruz, Zambales;
g) That the cutting of the trees and the
partial leveling of a landform (which is
determined to be an "elongated mound"
but is alleged to be a "mountain" by the
petitioner) conducted by LAMI in its
property in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz,
Zambales do not pose adverse
environmental impact on the adjoining
communities more so to the larger areas or
the entire provinces of Zambales and
Pangasinan.
(2) Eng. Odicta31 –
a) That the PPA issued a permit to construct
to LAMI only after due application and
submission of the required documents;
b) That other private companies, namely:
DMCI Mining Corporation and
Shangfil/A3Una constructed port facilities
along the Brgy. Bolitoc coastline and
contiguous to where the port facility of
LAMI is located.
(3) Ms. Susara32 –
a) That the PPA issued a clearance to
develop and a permit to operate to LAMI
only after due application and submission of
the required documents;
b) That other private port facilities, namely:
DMCI Mining Corporation, Shangfil/A3Una
are operating along the Brgy. Bolitoc
coastline and contiguous to where the port
facility of LAMI is located; and
c) That since the 1970’s, the coastline along
Brgy. Bolitoc, Municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Zambales, has been the location of port
 facilities necessary for mining operations in
the province of Zambales.
(4) S/Supt. Santiago33 –
a) That the members and officials of the
ZPPO did not violate, or threaten with
violation, petitioner’s right to a balanced
and healthful ecology;
b) That the members and officials of the
ZPPO did not cover-up any alleged illegal
activity of LAMI; and
c) The contents of the Memorandum
(Special Report re: Police Assistance) dated
6 May 2012 submitted by S/Supt. Santiago
to the PNP Regional Director.
On 10 September 2012, Agham presented its first
and only witness, former Rep. Angelo B. Palmones.
Rep. Palmones was cross-examined by counsel for
LAMI and counsel for public respondents DENR, PPA,
and ZPPO.34
On 26 September 2012, public respondents
presented their witnesses.35
On 28 September 2012, LAMI manifested that it was
adopting the testimonies of the witnesses of the
public respondents. On the same hearing, LAMI
presented its witness, Felipe E. Floria, LAMI’s Vice-
President and General Manager.36
In a Decision37 dated 23 November 2012, the Court
of Appeals decided the case in favor of petitioner.
The appellate court found that the government,
through the CENRO, authorized LAMI to cut trees
and LAMI strictly followed the proper guidelines
stated in the permit. The appellate court also stated
that there can be no flattening of a mountain when
there is no mountain to speak of. Thus, for failing to
comply with the requisites necessary for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan, the Court of Appeals
resolved to deny the petition. The dispositive portion
of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.38
Agham filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Court of Appeals. In its Motion for Reconsideration,
Agham argued that the alleged leveling of the
subject hill by LAMI: (1) was not sanctioned by the
DENR since LAMI allegedly had no ECC from the
DENR; (2) affected the ecological balance of the
affected towns and provinces since such leveling was
done without the concurrence of its residents; and
(3) instigated the gradual eradication of the strip of
land mass in Sta. Cruz, Zambales that serves as
protective barrier from floods brought about by the
swelling or surging of the coastal water moving
inward reaching other towns of Zambales and
Pangasinan.39
On 4 February 2013, LAMI filed its
Comment/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration. Agham then filed its Reply dated 21
February 2013.
In a Resolution dated 6 March 2013, the Court of
Appeals declared that Agham’s Motion for
Reconsideration was submitted for resolution.
Subsequently, Agham filed a Supplemental Reply
dated 29 April 2013 reiterating the same arguments.
In a Resolution40 dated 31 May 2013, the Court of
Appeals set Agham’s Motion for Reconsideration for
hearing on 13 June 2013. At the hearing, all parties
were given time to argue their case. Thereafter, the
Motion for Reconsideration was submitted for
resolution.
Agham then filed a Manifestation dated 17 June
2013 summarizing its arguments. On 4 July 2013,
LAMI filed a Motion to Expunge with Ad Cautelam
Comment/Opposition. On 11 July 2013, the Court of
Appeals, for the last and third time, submitted the
Motion for Reconsideration for resolution.
In an Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013,
the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its
original Decision dated 23 November 2012. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision
dated November 23, 2012 is hereby RECONSIDERED
and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another judgment
is rendered GRANTING the petition for WRIT OF
KALIKASAN as follows, to wit:
 (1) respondent LNL Archipelago Minerals,
Inc. (LAMI) is directed to PERMANENTLY
CEASE and [DESIST] from scraping off the
land formation in question or from
performing any activity/ies in violation of
environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(2) the respondent LAMI as well as the
Secretary of Department of Environment
and Natural Resources and/or their
representatives are directed to PROTECT,
PRESERVE, REHABILITATE and/or RESTORE
the subject land formation including the
plants and trees therein;
(3) the Secretary of DENR and/or his
representative is directed to MONITOR
strict compliance with the Decision and
Orders of the Court; and make PERIODIC
REPORTS on a monthly basis on the
execution of the final judgment.
SO ORDERED.41
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues for our resolution are (1) whether LAMI
violated the environmental laws as alleged by
Agham, and (2) whether LAMI flattened any
mountain and caused environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that it has the necessary permits
and authorization to cut trees on the port site,
controverting the allegation of Agham that it
violated Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. Petitioner also insists that it did not
violate nor is it violating the Mining Act as alleged by
Agham. Petitioner argues that it is not conducting
any mining activity on the port site since the mine
site is about 25 kilometers away from the port site.
Further, petitioner adds that after filing its Verified
Return dated 21 June 2012, Agham never mentioned
again the alleged violation of the Revised Forestry
Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act.
Instead, Agham changed its position and later
claimed that LAMI was flattening a mountain on the
port site which was allegedly illegal per se. Petitioner
insists that Agham did not even present evidence to
establish any environmental damage which is
required for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ
of Kalikasan.
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that even if
the subject land formation is not a mound, hill or
mountain, the fact remains that the scraping and
leveling done by petitioner caused serious
environmental damage which affects not only the
municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales but also the
nearby towns of Zambales and Pangasinan.
The present case involves the extraordinary remedy
of a Writ of Kalikasan which is under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases.42 Section 1, Rule
7, Part III of the said Rules provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ. – The writ is a remedy
available to a natural or juridical person, entity
authorized by law, people’s organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces.
The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil
action and conceptualized as an extraordinary
remedy,43 covers environmental damage of such
magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces. The writ is available against an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity.
The following requisites must be present to avail of
this remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or
entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation
involves or will lead to an environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
In the present case, Agham, in its Petition for a Writ
of Kalikasan, cited two laws which LAMI allegedly
violated: (1) Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code,
as amended; and (2) Sections 57 and 69 of the
Philippine Mining Act.
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended, states:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber,
or Other Forest Products Without License. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber
or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the
penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
xxxx
There are two distinct and separate offenses
punished under Section 68 of PD 705:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and
removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and
regulations.44
In the present case, LAMI was given a Tree Cutting
Permit45 by the CENRO dated 17 April 2012. In the
permit, LAMI was allowed to cut 37 trees with a total
volume of 7.64 cubic meters within the port site,
subject to the condition that the trees cut shall be
replaced with a ratio of 1-30 fruit and non-bearing
fruit trees. Thereafter, the Forest Management
Service and Forest Utilization Unit, both under the
DENR, issued a Post Evaluation Report 46 dated 3 May
2012 stating that LAMI properly followed the
conditions laid down in the permit. The relevant
portions of the Post Evaluation Report state:
x x x the following findings and observations are
noted:
1. That the tree cutting
implemented/conducted by the company
was confined inside Lot No. 2999, Cad 316-
D situated at Barangay Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz,
Zambales and within the area previously
granted for tree cutting;
2. It was found that the thirty seven (37)
trees of various lesser-known species and
fruit bearing trees with a total volume of
7.64 cubic meters as specified in the permit
were cut as subject trees are located within
the directly affected areas of the port
facility project of the company;
3. The other trees previously inventoried
and are not directly affected by the project
within the same lot are spared; and
4. There are forty four (44) various species
of miscellaneous trees counted and left
with a computed volume of 6.04 cubic
meters.
Relative the above findings and in compliance with
the terms and conditions of the permit issued, the
company should be reminded to replace the trees
cut therein as specified in support with the
environmental enhancement program of the DENR.
xxxx
Since LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by the
CENRO and even passed the evaluation conducted
after the issuance of the permit, then clearly LAMI
had the authority to cut trees and did not violate
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended.
Next, Agham submitted that LAMI allegedly violated
Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act.
Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act
state:
Section 57. Expenditure for Community
Development and Science and Mining Technology –
A contractor shall assist in the development of its
mining community, the promotion of the general
welfare of its inhabitants, and the development of
science and mining technology.
Section 69. Environmental Protection – Every
contractor shall undertake an environmental
protection and enhancement program covering the
period of the mineral agreement or permit. Such
environmental program shall be incorporated in the
work program which the contractor or permittee
shall submit as an accompanying document to the
application for a mineral agreement or permit. The
work program shall include not only plans relative to
mining operations but also to rehabilitation,
regeneration, revegetation and reforestation of
mineralized areas, slope stabilization of mined-out
and tailings covered areas, aquaculture, watershed
development and water conservation; and
socioeconomic development.
These two provisions are inapplicable to this case.
First, LAMI is not conducting any mining activity on
the port site. LAMI’s mine site is about 25 kilometers
away from the port site. Second, LAMI secured all
the necessary permits and licenses for the
construction of a port and LAMI’s activity was limited
to preparatory works for the port’s construction. The
Philippine Mining Act deals with mining operations
and other mining activities. Sections 57 and 69 deal
with the development of a mining community and
environmental protection covering a mineral
agreement or permit.
Here, Agham reasoned that LAMI was destroying the
environment by cutting mountain trees and leveling
a mountain to the damage and detriment of the
residents of Zambales and the nearby towns of
Pangasinan. Agham simply submitted a picture taken
on 4 June 2012 where allegedly the backhoes owned
by LAMI were pushing the remnants of the mountain
to the sea.
This explanation, absent any concrete proof, is
untenable.
Clearly, Agham did not give proper justifications for
citing Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining
Act. Agham did not even present any evidence that
LAMI violated the mining law or any mining
undertakings in relation to LAMI’s construction of a
port facility. Agham only alleged in very general
terms that LAMI was destroying the environment
and leveling a mountain without conducting any
scientific studies or submitting expert testimonies
that would corroborate such allegations.
Section 2(c), Rule 7, Part III of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases provides:
Section 2. Contents of the petition. - The verified
petition shall contain the following:
(c) The environmental law, rule or regulation
violated or threatened to be violated, the act or
omission complained of, and the environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.
The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan
petitioner has the burden to prove the (1)
environmental law, rule or regulation violated or
threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission
complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases states that the magnitude of
environmental damage is a condition sine qua non  in
a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and
must be contained in the verified petition.
Agham, in failing to prove any violation of the
Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the
Philippine Mining Act, shifted its focus and then
claimed that LAMI allegedly flattened or leveled a
mountain.
The mountain, according to Agham, serves as a
natural protective barrier from typhoons and floods
to the residents of Zambales and nearby towns of
Pangasinan. Thus, Agham argues that once such
natural resources are damaged, the residents of
these two provinces will be defenseless and their
life, health and properties will be at constant risk of
being lost.
However, Agham, in accusing that LAMI allegedly
flattened a mountain, did not cite any law allegedly
violated by LAMI in relation to this claim. Agham did
not present any proof to demonstrate that the local
residents in Zambales, and even the nearby towns of
Pangasinan, complained of any great danger or harm
on the alleged leveling of the land formation which
may affect their lives, health or properties. Neither
was there any evidence showing of a grave and real
environmental damage to the barangay  and the
surrounding vicinity.
To belie Agham’s contentions, the records, from the
testimonies of those experts in their fields, show
that there is in fact no mountain in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta.
Cruz, Zambales.
First, in the Judicial Affidavit0 47 dated 6 August 2012,
the Regional Director of DENR EMB R3, Dir. Claudio,
categorically declared that there is no mountain on
LAMI’s property. The relevant portions state:
32. Q: One of the complaints of Mayor Marty in his
letter dated 27 April 2012, x x x, is that LAMI is
"leveling a mountain" in its property in Barangay
Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. Is there really a
mountain in the property of LAMI in the said place?
A: None, sir. The subject landform is not considered
as a mountain based on commonly accepted
description of a mountain as having 300 meters to
2,500 meters height over base. The highest elevation
of the project area is 23 meters.
33. Q: Do you have any proof that the landform in
LAMI’s property is not a mountain?
A: Yes, sir. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB), Regional Office No. III, through the OIC of the
Geosciences Division, issued a Memorandum dated
June 26, 2012 proving that there is no mountain in
LAMI’s property. The proper description of the
landform, according to the said memorandum, is an
"elongated mound"48
Second, LAMI, through the Judicial Affidavit 49 dated 3
August 2012 of Felipe E. Floria, LAMI’s Vice-President
and General Manager, was able m to establish that
Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz had no mountain. The
relevant portions provide:
126. Q: Why do you say that this elevated portion is
not a "mountain"?
A: The port site where the alleged mountain is
located is only 1.8 hectares of alienable and
disposable land. It is private property, lawfully
possessed by LAMI, with the latter exercising rights
based on its occupation thereof. The mound and/or
ridge within the private property is only about 23
meters high. The base or footing of the mound
therein which the Petitioner insists is a mountain is
only 1.5 hectares, and the height is approximately 23
meters. I have been advised that a mountain, as
described by the United Nations Environment
Programme – World Conservation Monitoring Centre
("UNEP-WCMC"), must be, at least, of a height
greater than 300 meters or 984 feet in addition to
other requirements on slope and local elevation
range. In other countries, the United Kingdom for
example, the minimum height requirement is 2,000
ft or 609.6 meters.50
Third, several government entities and officials have
declared that there is no mountain on the port site:
(1) in a Letter51 to LAMI signed by the Sangguniang
Bayan members of Sta. Cruz dated 4 June 2012,
the Sangguniang Bayan members stated that there
is no mountain in the area; (2) in a
Memorandum52 dated 4 June 2012, the CENRO
concluded that the "mountain" is a "hill falling under
Block I, Alienable and Disposable land per LC Map
635"; and (3) in a Special Report 53 re: Police
Assistance dated 6 May 2012, the Provincial Director
of PNP Zambales reported to the PNP Regional
Director, citing the findings of the local chief of
police, that no leveling of a mountain transpired in
the area.
Last, in an Inspection Report54 dated 26 June 2012,
the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Geosciences
Division of the DENR concluded that the "mountain"
is only an elongated mound. The findings and
conclusion of the report provide:
FINDINGS
 1. The Bolitoc LAMI Port Facility is
approximately centered at the intersection
of geographic coordinates 15°45’00.4"
north latitude and 119°53’19.9" east
longitude, x x x. It is bounded on the north
by the West Philippine Sea (Bolitoc Bay), on
the west and east by the continuation of
the elevated landform, and to the south by
an unnamed creek and a concrete barangay
road connecting the Brgy. Bolitoc to the
Zambales National Highway.
Brgy. Bolitoc also hosts the port facilities of
the DMCI and the Shangfil Corporation both
of which occupy the former loading site of
the defunct Acoje Mining Corporation.
2. The landform of interest is characterized
by a roughly east-west trending elevated
and elongated landmass. Within the LAMI
site, the elevated landform measures 164
meters in length and about 94 meters in
width and is almost parallel to the coastline.
It has a maximum elevation located at its
eastern end of 26 meters above mean sea
level more or less. Its western end has an
elevation of 23 meters above mean sea
level more or less x x x. The landform is
about 16 meters higher than the barangay
road and nearby houses x x x.
From the LAMI area, the landform
continues eastwards to the DMCI and the
Shangfil Port facilities and also westwards
to the vicinity of Brgy. Bolitoc proper.
3. The area is underlain by interbedded
calcareous sandstone, shale, and siltstone
of the Cabaluan Formation (formerly
Zambales Formation), x x x. Rock outcrops
show the sedimentary sequence displaying
almost horizontal to gently dipping beds cut
by a minor fault. These rocks weather into a
1-2 meter silty clay.
DISCUSSION
Considering elevated landform of interest measures
164 meters in length and about 94 meters in width
disposed in an elongate manner with a maximum
elevation of 26 meters more or less above mean sea
level and is about 16 meters higher than the
barangay road and nearby houses and using the
Glossary of Landforms and Geologic Terms x x x by
Hawley and Parsons, 1980 above that the elevated
landform is neither a mountain or hill, but instead it
is considered elongated landmass/or elongated
mound.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above geological and landform
(geomorphic) classification, considering its elevation
of 23 to 26 meters above mean sea level and which
is 16 meters above the barangay road and vicinity,
the elevated landform present in the LAMI port
facility is neither a hill or mountain. Its elevation of
16 meters above its vicinity is lower than a hill (30
meters). Its height above its vicinity can be possibly
categorized as a mound which is defined by the
Dictionary of Geological terms (1976) prepared by
the American Geological Institute as which defines a
mound as "a low hill of earth, natural or artificial." In
the United Kingdom, mounds are also called hillocks
or knolls. The term elongated is prefixed as a
modifier to describe its east-west disposition. Hence,
the elevated landform of interest is considered as
elongated mound.55 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the lone witness of Agham,
former Rep. Palmones, admitted in the 10
September 2012 hearing conducted by the Court of
Appeals that he was incompetent to prove that the
elevated ground located in Brgy. Bolitoc is a
mountain. The relevant portions56 of Rep. Palmones’
testimony provide:
Atty. Gallos: Mr. Congressman, you conducted an
ocular inspection in Brgy. Bolitoc in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales on May 21?
Cong. Palmones: Yes.
xxxx
Atty. Gallos: That was the first time you were in Brgy.
Bolitoc?
Cong. Palmones: Yes.
Atty. Gallos: That was also the first and the last
ocular inspection that you did so far in Brgy. Bolitoc?
Cong. Palmones: Yes.
xxxx
Atty. Gallos: What is the name of this mountain?
Cong. Palmones: I really don’t know the name of
the mountain, Your Honor.
Atty. Gallos: What is the elevation or height of this
mountain?
Cong. Palmones: I really don’t know the elevation
of that mountain, Your Honors.
Atty. Gallos: What is the base of this mountain?
Cong. Palmones: I really don’t know, Your Honors.
Atty. Tolentino: Your Honor, the witness is
incompetent to answer the questions.
Cong. Palmones: I’m not competent to answer that
question.
Atty. Gallos: Your Honor, that’s exactly our point.
He is claiming that there is a mountain but he
cannot tell us the height, the slope, the elevation,
the base, Your Honor. So you admit now that you
do not know, you do not have the competence to
state whether or not there is a mountain?
Cong. Palmones: I really don’t know what is the
technical description of a mountain but based on
the information that we got from the community
during the consultation it’s full of vegetation before
it was leveled down by the operation, Your
Honors. (Emphasis supplied)
Agham, in its Motion for Reconsideration with the
Court of Appeals, then asserted that even if the
subject land formation is not a mound, hill or
mountain, the fact remains that the scraping and
leveling done by petitioner caused serious
environmental damage which affects not only Sta.
Cruz, Zambales but also the nearby towns of
Zambales and Pangasinan.
The Court of Appeals, in granting the Motion for
Reconsideration embodied in its Amended Decision
dated 13 September 2013, held that what LAMI did
was not to simply level the subject land formation
but scrape and remove a small mountain and,
thereafter, reclaim a portion of the adjacent waters
with the earth it took therefrom, making out of the
soil gathered to construct a seaport. The Court of
Appeals stated that the scraping off or the cutting of
the subject land formation by LAMI would instigate
the gradual eradication of the strip of land mass in
Brgy. Bolitoc which serves as protective barrier to
floods brought about by the swelling or surging of
the coastal water moving inward reaching other
towns of Zambales and Pangasinan. The Court of
Appeals added that the port site is prone to frequent
visits of tropical depression and that the coastal
portions of the "Sta. Cruz Quadrangle – Zambales
and Pangasinan province" are touted to be highly
susceptible to landslide and flooding.
We do not subscribe to the appellate court’s view.
First, the Court of Appeals did not provide any basis,
in fact and in law, to support the reversal of its
original decision. Agham, in its Motion for
Reconsideration, did not present new evidence to
refute its claim that LAMI leveled a "mountain" or
that there was an environmental damage of
considerable significance that will harm the life,
health and properties of the residents of the
municipality of Sta. Cruz and its neighboring towns
or cities, or even the provinces of Zambales and
Pangasinan. The pleadings and documents submitted
by Agham were just a reiteration of its original
position before the original Court of Appeals’
decision was promulgated on 23 November 2012.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege
for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has to show
that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would
be violated. In the present case, the allegation by
Agham that two laws – the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended, and the Philippine Mining Act – were
violated by LAMI was not adequately substantiated
by Agham. Even the facts submitted by Agham to
establish environmental damage were mere general
allegations.
Second, Agham’s allegation that there was a
"mountain" in LAMI’s port site was earlier
established as false as the "mountain" was non-
existent as proven by the testimonies of the
witnesses and reports made by environmental
experts and persons who have been educated and
trained in their respective fields.
Third, contrary to Agham’s claim that LAMI had no
ECC from the DENR, the DENR restored LAMI’s ECC.
After LAMI was issued a Notice of Violation of its ECC
dated 1 June 2012 by the DENR-EMB R3, LAMI
complied with all the requirements and its ECC had
been reinstated. In the Letter57 dated 24 October
2012, Dir. Claudio wrote:
xxxx
Regarding the alleged cutting of trees and leveling of
the mountain, we have verified that:
1. There is no illegal cutting of trees since a Tree
Cutting Permit was issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO).
Monitoring of the compliance with the conditions of
the said Permit was also undertaken by the CENRO;
and
2. There is no leveling of a mountain. As certified by
the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 3, the
landform in the area is an elongated mound which is
164 meters in length and 94 meters in width and its
maximum elevation is 26 meters above mean sea
level.
Further, we recognize your efforts in revegetating
the exposed side slopes of the cut portion of the
mound and the construction of drainage system and
silt traps to prevent the siltation of the bay.
The violated ECC conditions have been rectified and
clarified while the penalty corresponding to such
violation was fully paid and the required
rehabilitation and mitigating measures were already
implemented as committed. As such, the matter
leading to the issuance of the NOV is now resolved.
As ECC holder, you are enjoined to ensure the
effective carrying out of your Environmental
Management and Monitoring Plan.
Even Rep. Dan S. Fernandez, the Chairman of the
Committee on Ecology of the House of
Representatives, acknowledged that LAMI had fully
complied with its ECC conditions. In a Letter 58 dated
26 February 2013 addressed to the DENR Secretary,
Rep. Fernandez wrote:
xxxx
On 21 February 2013, the Committee on Ecology
received a letter from Director Lormelyn E. Claudio,
the Regional Director for Region III of the
Environment Management Bureau of the DENR. The
letter ascertains that, among other things, based on
the investigation and monitoring conducted led by
Dir. Claudio, LAMI is, to date, in compliance with its
environmental commitments as required under the
ECC and said Order.
In view thereof, the Committee would like to express
its appreciation for the apt and prompt action on the
matter. We expect that the subject company’s
conformity to environmental laws, as well as its
activities’ impact on the environment, will remain
closely monitored and evaluated.
xxxx
Last, the alleged scraping off or leveling of land at
LAMI’s port site is deemed insignificant to pose a
detrimental impact on the environment.
Dir. Claudio testified at the hearing conducted by the
Court of Appeals on 26 September 2012 that the cut
and fill operations of LAMI only affected the port site
but not the surrounding area and that the
environmental effect was only minimal and
insignificant. The relevant portions of Dir. Claudio’s
testimony provide:
A/Sol. Chua Cheng: Madam Witness, you made
mention that the cut and fill operations involved
the... or the causeway created during the cut and fill
operation is 82 meters in length and 8 meters in
width. What is the overall environment effect of this
cut and fill operation in Barangay Bolitoc?
Dir. Claudio.: It is minimal, insignificant and
temporary in nature, Sir, because as I mentioned,
only 11,580 cubic meters had been stripped off and
the tree cutting which had been issued with a permit
is only less than about 37 trees based on the Post
Evaluation Report done by the CENRO, Sir.
A/Sol. Chua Cheng: What about the effect of such
cut and fill operations as regards the two provinces,
Pangasinan and Zambales, does it have any effect or
what is the extent of the effect?
Dir. Claudio: It is just localized; it is just confined
within the project area because we required them
to put up the drainage system, the drainage, the
canals and the siltation ponds and the laying of
armour rocks for the sea wall and the construction of
causeway, Sir, to avoid erosion and sedimentation.
We also required them to rehabilitate the exposed
slopes which they already did.
xxxx
A/Sol. Chua Cheng: Only in the project area
specifically located only in Brgy. Bolitoc?
Dir. Claudio: Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales, Sir. It
does not in any way affect or cannot affect the
Province of Pangasinan as alleged, Sir.59 (Emphasis
supplied)
Even the Geoscience Foundation, Inc., which
conducted a scientific study on the port site
regarding the possible damage to the environment
from the construction of the port facility, found that
the landform was too small to protect against
typhoons, monsoons and floods due to heavy rains
and storm surges. Its Report 60 on the Topographical,
Geomorphological and Climatological
Characterization of the LAMI Port undertaken in
September 2012 stated:
6.0 Findings in Relation to the Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan
xxxx
1. The LAMI Port is partly situated in a hill
and not a mountain. The topographic and
geologic maps of NAMRIA and the MGB do
not show the presence of a mountain where
the port is partly located. The detailed
topographic survey moreover indicates that
this hill had an original elevation of 23
m.MSL in the portion where it was
excavated to 0accommodate the access
road leading to the wharf.
Mountains attain much higher elevations
than 23 m.MSL. Kendall et al. (1967),
defines a mountain as having a height of at
least 900 meters and are usually
characterized by a vertical zonation of
landscape and vegetation due to increasing
elevations.
2. No leveling of a mountain was done. The
construction of the access road required a
V-cut through the hill that lowered it from
23 m.MSL to 7.5 m.MSL. This elevation is
still much higher than the flat land
surrounding the hill. The hill had an original
length of 600 meters through which the V-
cut, which has an average width of 26.5
meters, was excavated. Only a small portion
of the hill was therefore altered.
The topographic survey further reveals that
the total volume of earth material removed
is 24,569 cubic meters, which would fit a
room that has a length, width and height of
29 meters. This amount of earth material
does not constitute the volume of a
mountain.
3. The hill is too small and not in the right
location to protect against typhoons. The
hill cannot serve as a natural protective
barrier against typhoons in Zambales and
some towns of Pangasinan because it is too
small compared to the magnitude of
typhoons. Typhoons approach the country
from east and move in a west to northwest
direction through Zambales Province as
clarified in Figure 7. They are even able to
cross the Sierra Madre Range and the
Zambales Range before reaching Zambales
Province. Since the port is situated at the
western coastline of Zambales, it would be
the last thing a typhoon would pass by as it
moves through Zambales.
4. The hill is too small to protect against the
Southwest Monsoon. The hill does not
shield any area from the heavy rains that
batter the country during the Southwest
Monsoon. It is too small to alter the effect
of the Southwest Monsoon in the way that
the Sierra Madre Range forces the
Northwest Monsoon to rise over it and
 release much of its moisture as orographic
precipitation on the windward side of the
range such that the leeward side is drier.
5. The hill is not in the right location to
protect against flooding due to heavy rains.
The hill does not protect against the floods
that occur from heavy rains. Since Zambales
regionally slopes down to the west, flood
water during heavy rains will move from
east to west following the flow direction of
rivers in the area. Flood water from the
Zambales Range will inundate the coastal
plain first before reaching the coastline
where the hill is situated. Figure 11 depicts
the flow direction of flood water in the
municipality.
6. The hill is too small to protect against
floods due to storm surges. Storm surges
appear as large waves that are caused by
the pushing of the wind on the surface of
the sea or ocean during storm events. Since
the hill has a present length of only 420
meters, it is too small to prevent flooding
due to storm surges.1âwphi1 The large
waves will just skirt the hill and sweep
through the low-lying coastland to the west
and east of the hill.
The hill shields against the direct impact of large,
south-moving waves to several homes located
immediately south of the hill. Since the V-cut of the
access road is small compared to the rest of the hill
and terminates at a relatively high 7.5 m.MSL, this
protection offered by the hill is not significantly
diminished.61
Further, the DENR composite team, in its Report of
Investigation62 conducted on 20-21 June 2012 on
LAMI’s port site to ensure that LAMI undertook
mitigating measures in its property, found that
LAMI’s activities posed only a minimal or
insignificant impact to the environment. The
relevant portions of the Report state:
Findings and Observations:
The composite team gathered data and the following
are the initial observations:
1. Site preparation which includes site
grading/surface stripping, low ridge cut and
fill and reclamation works were observed to
have been undertaken within the project
area;
2. A total volume of approximately 11,580
cubic meters of soil cut/stripped from low
ridge was noted being used for causeway
construction. Part of the discarded soil with
a volume of 5,843 cubic meters was already
used for causeway preparation while the
remaining 5,735 cubic meters was noted
still on stockpile area;
3. Discarded soil generated from ridge cut
and fill consists of clay with sandstone and
shale;
4. The partial low ridge cut and fill poses
minimal or insignificant impact to the
environment due to threats of storm
surges, strong winds and flooding because
the protective natural barriers against
northeast monsoon are the mountain
ranges in the eastern part of Zambales and
Pangasinan which are geologically and
historically effective as in the case of the
adjoining and operational ports of the
DMCI and Shang Fil.
5. The height of the low ridge is still
maintained at an elevation of 23.144
meters above sea level while the
constructed access road to the causeway
has an elevation of 7.46 meters with a
width of 8 meters and length of 80-100
meters only.
Remarks and Recommendation:
The construction of the access road on the low
ridge does not pose adverse environmental impact
to the adjoining communities more so to the larger
areas or the entire province of Zambales and
Pangasinan.
It was determined as a result of our verification and
based on the above findings supported with field
GPS reading that there had been no leveling of the
mountain undertaken in the project site as there is
no mountain existing inside the area covered by the
ECC issued by EMB-Region 3. The landform claimed
by Mayor Marty to be a mountain is actually an
elongated low ridge with a peak of approximately 23
meters above sea level which is located in a private
land falling under Block 1, Alienable and Disposable
Land per LC Map 635 with Lot No. 2999 originally
owned by Mr. Severo Monsalud which was
transferred to Sta. Cruz Mineral Port Corporation
with a Contract of Lease with LAMI (data provided by
CENRO Masinloc through a Memorandum dated
June 4, 2012). The proponent (LAMI) only
implemented road cutting of low ridge in the middle
to make an access way to the proposed marine
loading facility. More so, tree cutting done by LAMI is
covered by a Permit to Cut issued by DENR-Region 3-
CENRO, Masinloc which is responsible for the
inventory and monitoring of cut trees.
x x x x63 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, from all the foregoing, we agree with the
appellate court, in its original Decision dated 23
November 2012, when it denied the petition for a
Writ of Kalikasan:
As between the too general and very hypothetical
allegation of large-scale environmental damage at
one hand, and the remarks of government experts
on the other, We are inclined to give more credit to
the latter. Below is the further articulation of our
stance:
Presumption of regularity
It is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and
experience, that official duty has been regularly
performed. Therefore, the fact that the "remarks
and recommendation" of the composite team from
EMB R3, MGB R3, and PENRO Zambales were made
in the exercise of their government function, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
such official duty stands. It is incumbent upon
petitioner to prove otherwise, a task which it failed
to do here.
Expert findings are afforded great weight
The findings of facts of administrative bodies
charged with their specific field of expertise, are
afforded great weight by the courts, and in the
absence of substantial showing that such findings are
made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence
presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of
stability of the governmental structure, should not
be disturbed. x x x.64
In sum, contrary to the findings of the appellate
court in its Amended Decision dated 13 September
2013, we find that LAMI did not cause any
environmental damage that prejudiced the life,
health or property of the inhabitants residing in the
municipality of Sta. Cruz, the province of Zambales
or in the neighboring province of Pangasinan.
Agham, as the party that has the burden to prove
the requirements for the issuance of the privilege of
the Writ ofKalikasan, failed to prove (1) the
environmental laws allegedly violated by LAMI; and
(2) the magnitude of the environmental damage
allegedly caused by LAMI in the construction of
LAMI' s port facility in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz,
Zambales and its surrounding area. Thus, the
petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ
of Kalikasan must be denied.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the Amended Decision dated 13
September 2013 of the Court of Appeals
and REINSTATE AND AFFIRM the original Decision
dated 23 November 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00012 which DENIED the petition for
the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.
SO ORDERED.
;
8. G.R. No. 135190      April 3, 2002
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others
similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO
CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD
OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the March 19, 1998
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
44693, dismissing the special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition  and mandamus,  and the
resolution dated August 19, 1998 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land
situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve
known as the "Diwalwal Gold Rush Area." Located at
Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and
Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land has been
embroiled in controversy since the mid-80's due to
the scramble over gold deposits found within its
bowels.
From 1985 to 1991, thousands of people flocked to
Diwalwal to stake their respective claims. Peace and
order deteriorated rapidly, with hundreds of people
perishing in mine accidents, man-made or otherwise,
brought about by unregulated mining activities. The
multifarious problems spawned by the gold rush
assumed gargantuan proportions, such that finding a
"win-win" solution became a veritable needle in a
haystack.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation
(Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133
(EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which
included the hotly-contested Diwalwal
area.1 Marcopper's acquisition of mining rights over
Diwalwal under its EP No. 133 was subsequently
challenged before this Court in "Apex Mining Co.,
Inc., et al. v. Hon. Cancio C. Garcia, et al.," 2 where
Marcopper's claim was sustained over that of
another mining firm, Apex Mining Corporation
(Apex). The Court found that Apex did not comply
with the procedural requisites for acquiring mining
rights within forest reserves.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27,
1991 Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-
Scale Mining Act. The law established a People's
Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by
the Secretary of the DENR3 and created the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under
the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and
control.4 The statute also authorized the PMRB to
declare and set aside small-scale mining areas
subject to review by the DENR Secretary 5 and award
mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain
conditions.6
On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran issued Department Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the
Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-
scale mining.7 The issuance was made pursuant to
the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by
Proclamation No. 369, which established the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP
No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production
Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over
Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional
Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case No.
8-8-94 entitled, "Rosendo Villaflor, et al. v.
Marcopper Mining Corporation."
On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was
pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to
petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation (SEM),8 which in turn applied for an
integrated MPSA over the land covered by the
permit.
In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI)
accepted and registered the integrated MPSA
application of petitioner. After publication of the
application, the following filed their oppositions:
a) MAC Case No. 004(XI) - JB Management
Mining Corporation;
b) MAC Case No. 005(XI) - Davao United
Miners Cooperative;
c) MAC Case No. 006(XI) - Balite Integrated
Small Scale Miner's Cooperative;
d) MAC Case No. 007(XI) - Monkayo
Integrated Small Scale Miner's Association,
Inc.;
e) MAC Case No. 008(XI) - Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines;
f) MAC Case No. 009(XI) - Rosendo Villaflor,
et al.;
g) MAC Case No. 010(XI) - Antonio Dacudao;
h) MAC Case No. 011(XI) - Atty. Jose T.
Amacio;
 i) MAC Case No. 012(XI) - Puting-Bato Gold
Miners Cooperative;
j) MAC Case No. 016(XI) - Balite Communal
Portal Mining Cooperative; and
k) MAC Case No. 97-01(XI) - Romeo
Altamera, et al.
In the meantime, on March 3, 1995, Republic Act
No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted.
Pursuant to this statute, the above-enumerated
MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of
Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving
conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequently took
cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was
consolidated with the MAC cases.
On April 1, 1997, Provincial Mining Regulatory Board
of Davao passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1997,
authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits
(OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in the
Diwalwal mines.
Thus, on May 30, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint
for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 61, against the DENR Secretary
and PMRB-Davao. SEM alleged that the illegal
issuance of the OTPs allowed the extraction and
hauling of P60,000.00 worth of gold ore per
truckload from SEM's mining claim.
Meanwhile, on June 13, 1997, the RPA resolved the
Consolidated Mines cases and decreed in an
Omnibus Resolution as follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING,
the validity of Exploration Permit No. 133 is
hereby reiterated and all the adverse claims
against MPSAA No. 128 are DISMISSED. 9
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued
Memorandum Order No. 97-03 10 which provided,
among others, that:
1. The DENR shall study thoroughly and
exhaustively the option of direct state
utilization of the mineral resources in the
Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall
include, but shall not be limited to, studying
and weighing the feasibility of entering into
management agreements or operating
agreements,  or both, with the appropriate
government instrumentalities or private
entities, or both, in carrying out the
declared policy of rationalizing the mining
operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area;
such agreements shall include provisions for
profit-sharing  between the state and the
said parties, including profit-sharing
arrangements with small-scale miners, as
well as the payment of royalties to
indigenous cultural communities, among
others. The Undersecretary for Field
Operations, as well as the Undersecretary
for Legal and Legislative Affairs and
Attached Agencies, and the Director of the
Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are
hereby ordered to undertake such studies. x
x x11
On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition  and mandamus  before the
Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR
Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining
Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP
grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the above-
quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the
ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused
therein would effectively impair its vested rights
under EP No. 133; that the DENR Secretary unduly
usurped and interfered with the jurisdiction of the
RPA which had dismissed all adverse claims against
SEM in the Consolidated Mines cases; and that the
memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the
unwarranted condition that certain studies be
conducted before mining and environmental laws
are enforced by the DENR.
Meanwhile, on January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a
decision in the Consolidated Mines cases, setting
aside the judgment of the RPA. 12 This MAB decision
was then elevated to this Court by way of a
consolidated petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 132475
and 132528.1âwphi1.nêt
On March 19, 1998, the Court of Appeals, through a
division of five members voting 3-2,13 dismissed the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 44693. It ruled that the
DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in
issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the
same was merely a directive to conduct studies on
the various options available to the government for
solving the Diwalwal conflict. The assailed
memorandum did not conclusively adopt "direct
state utilization" as official government policy on the
matter, but was simply a manifestation of the
DENR's intent to consider it as one of its options,
after determining its feasibility through studies. MO
97-03 was only the initial step in the ladder of
administrative process and did not, as yet, fix any
obligation, legal relationship or right. It was thus
premature for petitioner to claim that its
"constitutionally-protected rights" under EP No. 133
have been encroached upon, much less, violated by
its issuance.
Additionally, the appellate court pointed out that
petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 are not
inviolable, sacrosanct or immutable. Being in the
nature of a privilege granted by the State, the permit
can be revoked, amended or modified by the Chief
Executive when the national interest so requires. The
Court of Appeals, however, declined to rule on the
validity of the OTPs, reasoning that said issue was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RPA.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above decision, which was denied for lack of merit
on August 19, 1998.14
Hence this petition, raising the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR, AND HAS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT
THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, OR HAS
DECIDED IT IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN
UPHOLDING THE QUESTIONED ACTS OF
RESPONDENT DENR SECRETARY WHICH ARE
IN VIOLATION OF MINING LAWS AND IN
DEROGATION OF PETITIONER'S VESTED
RIGHTS OVER THE AREA COVERED BY ITS EP
NO. 133;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT AN ACTION ON THE
VALIDITY OF ORE TRANSPORT PERMIT (OTP)
IS VESTED IN THE REGIONAL PANEL OF
ARBITRATORS.15
In a resolution dated September 11, 2000, the
appealed Consolidated Mines cases, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 132475 and 132528, were referred to the
Court of Appeals for proper disposition pursuant to
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 16 These
cases, which were docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos.
61215 and 61216, are still pending before the Court
of Appeals.
In the first assigned error, petitioner insists that the
Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the
assailed memorandum order did not adopt the
"direct state utilization scheme" in resolving the
Diwalwal dispute. On the contrary, petitioner
submits, said memorandum order dictated  the said
recourse and, in effect, granted management or
operating agreements as well as provided for profit
sharing arrangements to illegal small-scale miners.
According to petitioner, MO 97-03 was issued to
preempt the resolution of the Consolidated Mines
cases. The "direct state utilization scheme" espoused
in the challenged memorandum is nothing but a
legal shortcut, designed to divest petitioner of its
vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No.
133.
We are not persuaded.
We agree with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the
challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt
"direct state utilization" as a policy in resolving the
Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum
clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder
was merely a study  of this option and nothing else.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, it did not grant
any management/operating or profit-sharing
agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for
that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials
concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility. As the Court of Appeals extensively
discussed in its decision:
x x x under the Memorandum Order, the
State still had to study prudently and
exhaustively the various options available to
it in rationalizing the explosive and ever
perilous situation in the area, the
debilitating adverse effects of mining in the
community and at the same time, preserve
and enhance the safety of the mining
operations and ensure revenues due to the
 government from the development of the
mineral resources and the exploitation
thereof. The government was still in earnest
search of better options that would be fair
and just to all parties concerned, including,
notably, the Petitioner. The direct state
utilization of the mineral resources in the
area was only one of the options of the
State. Indeed, it is too plain to see, x x x that
before the State will settle on an option, x x
x an extensive and intensive study of all the
facets of a direct state exploitation was
directed by the Public Respondent DENR
Secretary. And even if direct state
exploitation was opted by the government,
the DENR still had to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the same x x x, in
coordination with the other concerned
agencies of the government.17
Consequently, the petition was premature. The said
memorandum order did not impose any obligation
on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever
between and among the parties to the dispute. At
this stage, petitioner can show no more than a mere
apprehension that the State, through the DENR,
would directly take over the mines after studies
point to its viability. But until the DENR actually does
so and petitioner's fears turn into reality, no valid
objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on
grounds which are purely speculative and
anticipatory.18
With respect to the alleged "vested rights" claimed
by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is
invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still
being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A
reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that
the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of the
issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein
asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the
permit which purportedly had expired. In other
words, whether or not petitioner actually has a
vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still
an indefinite and unsettled matter. And until a
positive pronouncement is made by the appellate
court in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133
cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive
rights that can be impaired by the issuance of MO
97-03.
Similarly, there is no merit in petitioner's assertion
that MO 97-03 sanctions violation of mining laws by
allowing illegal miners to enter into mining
agreements with the State. Again, whether or not
respondent BCMC and the other mining entities it
represents are conducting illegal mining activities is a
factual matter that has yet to be finally determined
in the Consolidated Mines cases. We cannot
rightfully conclude at this point that respondent
BCMC and the other mining firms are illegitimate
mining operators. Otherwise, we would be
preempting the resolution of the cases which are still
pending before the Court of Appeals.19
Petitioner's reliance on the Apex Mining case to
justify its rights under E.P. No. 133 is misplaced. For
one, the said case was litigated solely between
Marcopper and Apex Mining Corporation and
cannot thus be deemed binding and conclusive on
respondent BCMC and the other mining entities
presently involved. While petitioner may be
regarded as Marcopper's successor to EP No. 133
and therefore bound by the judgment rendered in
the Apex Mining  case, the same cannot be said of
respondent BCMC and the other oppositor mining
firms, who were not impleaded as parties therein.
Neither can the Apex Mining case foreclose any
question pertaining to the continuing validity of EP
No. 133 on grounds which arose after the judgment
in said case was promulgated. While it is true that
the Apex Mining  case settled the issue of who
between Apex and Marcopper validly acquired
mining rights over the disputed area by availing of
the proper procedural requisites mandated by law, it
certainly did not deal with the question raised by the
oppositors in the Consolidated Mines
cases, i.e. whether EP No. 133 had already expired
and remained valid subsequent to its transfer by
Marcopper to petitioner.  Besides, as clarified in our
decision in the Apex Mining  case:
x x x is conclusive only between the parties
with respect to the particular issue herein
raised and under the set of circumstances
herein prevailing. In no case should the
decision be considered as a precedent to
resolve or settle claims of persons/entities
not parties hereto. Neither is it intended to
unsettle rights of persons/entities which
have been acquired or which may have
 accrued upon reliance on laws passed by
appropriate agencies.20
Clearly then, the Apex Mining  case did not invest
petitioner with any definite right to the Diwalwal
mines which it could now set up against respondent
BCMC and the other mining groups.
Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that
under no circumstances may petitioner's rights
under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its
challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a
privilege granted by the State, which may be
amended, modified or rescinded when the national
interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the
exploration, development and utilization of the
country's natural mineral resources are matters
impressed with great public interest. Like timber
permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in
the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right
within the purview of the non-impairment of
contract and due process clauses of the
Constitution,21 since the State, under its all-
encompassing police power, may alter, modify or
amend the same, in accordance with the demands of
the general welfare.22
Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised
against a mere study of an alternative which the
State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake
in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section
2, of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically
provides:
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the
State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development
of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
(Underscoring ours)
Likewise, Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 states:
SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources.  -
Mineral Resources are owned by the State
and the exploration, development,
utilization, and processing thereof shall be
under its full control and supervision.
The State may directly undertake such
activities or it may enter into mineral
agreements with contractors. (Underscoring
ours)
Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy
of full control and supervision of the exploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural
mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the
same or by entering into agreements with qualified
entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his
authority when he ordered a study of the first
option, which may be undertaken consistently in
accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated
above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded
from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it
is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing
complexities generated by the gold rush. As implied
earlier, the State need be guided only by the
demands of public interest in settling for this option,
as well as its material and logistic feasibility.
In this regard, petitioner's imputation of bad faith on
the part of the DENR Secretary when the latter
issued MO 97-03 is not well-taken. The avowed
rationale of the memorandum order is clearly and
plainly stated in its "whereas" clauses. 23 In the
absence of any concrete evidence that the DENR
Secretary violated the law or abused his discretion,
as in this case, he is presumed to have regularly
issued the memorandum with a lawful intent and
pursuant to his official functions.1âwphi1.nêt
Given these considerations, petitioner's first
assigned error is baseless and premised on tentative
assumptions. Petitioner cannot claim any absolute
right to the Diwalwal mines pending resolution of
the Consolidated Mines cases, much less ask us to
assume, at this point, that respondent BCMC and the
other mining firms are illegal miners. These factual
issues are to be properly threshed out in CA G.R. SP
Nos. 61215 and 61216, which have yet to be decided
by the Court of Appeals. Any objection raised against
MO 97-03 is likewise premature at this point,
inasmuch as it merely ordered a study of an option
which the State is authorized by law to undertake.
We see no need to rule on the matter of the OTPs,
considering that the grounds invoked by petitioner
for invalidating the same are inextricably linked to
the issues raised in the Consolidated Mines cases.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44693 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191705, March 07, 2016
BASIANA MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION,
BASIANA MINERALS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
AND RODNEY O. BASIANA, IN HIS OWN PERSONAL
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND DULY AUTHORIZED
REPRESENTATIVE OF BASIANA MINING
EXPLORATION CORPORATION AND BASIANA
MINING DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND SR
METALS INC. (SRMI), Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Basiana Mining Exploration
Corporation (BMEC), Basiana Mining Development
Corporation (BMDC), and Rodney O. Basiana
(Basiana) (petitioners) assail the Amended
Decision2 dated June 18, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103033, which
granted the motions for reconsideration dated
January 21, 20093 and December 23, 20084 of the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and SR
Metals, Inc. (SRMI), respectively, reversed and set
aside the CA's Decision5 dated December 10, 2008
and dismissed the petition for review filed by the
petitioners, among others.
The Facts
Petitioner BMEC, headed by its President Basiana,
applied on July 31, 1997 for a Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the DENR for the
extraction of nickel and other minerals covering an
area of 6,642 hectares in Tubay and Jabonga, Agusan
del Norte, docketed as MPSA (XIII)-00014. 6
Pending approval of its application, BMEC, on April
29, 2000, assigned to Manila Mining Corporation
(Manila Mining) all its rights and interest in MPSA
(XIII)-00014, with the latter acknowledging BMEC as
the real and true owner of said application.7 Manila
Mining, in turn, assigned on October 17, 2005, its
rights and interest to SRMI.8 A day after, or on
October 18, 2005, Basiana and SRMI executed a
Memorandum of Agreement where SRMI agreed,
among others, to undertake technical and
geological tests, exploration and small-scale mining
operations of the site subject of MPSA (XIII)-
00014.9 Necessary permits and certificates were
then issued by the DENR and the Provincial
Government of Agusan del Norte to SRMI, San R
Construction Corporation (San R) and Galeo
Equipment Corporation (Galeo). Consequently,
SRMI, using BMEC's application, applied for an MPSA
for the extraction of nickel, iron and cobalt on a 591-
ha area in Tubay, Agusan del Norte. The application
was docketed as APSA-000014-XIII.10
On November 24, 2006, the DENR Secretary issued a
cease and desist order against the mining operations
due to excess in annual production, maximum
capitalization and labor cost to equipment
utilization. The Minerals Development Council, on
December 7, 2006, also advised SRMI, San R and
Galeo to immediately stop all mining activities in
Tubay, which were conducted under the pretext of
small-scale mining.11
Basiana then filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court of Butuan City on May 15, 2007 for
rescission of contract, abuse of rights and damages
against SRMI, docketed as Civil Case No. 5728.12 For
its part, BMEC, then already known as BMDC, also
filed a complaint for breach of trust, accounting and
conveyance of proceeds, judicial confirmation of
declaration of partial nullity of contract and
termination of trust, and abuse of rights with
damages against SRMI, San R, Galeo, et al. on July
13, 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 5746. 13
Subsequently, the Director of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB), on January 10, 2008,
recommended the approval of APSA-000014-XIII
filed by SRMI.14 Thus, BMEC and Basiana filed with
the MGB Panel of Arbitrators (MGB-POA) a petition
to deny and/or disapprove and/or declare the nullity
of the application for MPSA and/or cancellation,
revocation and termination of MPSA.15 Pending
resolution of the protest before the MGB-POA, the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR
Secretary entered into MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII with
SRMI for the development and commercial
utilization of nickel, cobalt, iron and other associated
mineral deposits in the 572.64-ha area in Tubay,
Agusan del Norte.16
Hence, the herein petitioners filed a petition for
review with the CA assailing the issuance of MPSA
No. 261-2008-XIII on the grounds that (1) "there was
clear violation of due process and the entire
proceedings was railroaded and suited for the
benefit of [SRMI]," and that (2) the approval of the
application is a patent nullity and/or absolutely
without any factual and legal basis. 17
CA Decision dated December 10, 2008
The CA initially granted the petition and declared
MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII null and void. 18 According to
the CA, MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII should be stricken
down for the reasons that the DENR Secretary has
no authority and jurisdiction to approve SRMI's
application pending resolution by the MGB-POA of
the petitioners' protest. The CA ruled that the
grounds raised by the petitioners in their protest, to
wit: (a) "the application of [SRMI] to extract mineral
and dispose nickel, iron and cobalt for commercial
purposes is a falsified document;" and (b) "[SRMI] is
not qualified to undertake the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals in Tubay,
Agusan del Norte," involve a dispute on rights to
mining areas and fall within the jurisdiction of the
MGB-POA.19
The CA also found that the petitioners adopted the
wrong mode of appeal when it filed a petition for
review before it; nevertheless, it resolved to treat
the petition as one for certiorari since it alleged
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR
Secretary in approving the application despite the
pendency of the petitioners' protest. 20
SRMI filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
decision, which was granted by the CA.21
CA Amended Decision dated June 18, 2009
According to the CA, the petition for review filed by
the petitioners cannot be treated as a special civil
action for certiorari for lack of jurisdictional
grounds.22 The CA ruled that the approval by the
DENR Secretary of SRMFs application does not
involve a quasi-judicial function since both the
petitioners and SRMI are still applicants and there
was yet an adjudication of rights between
them.23 The CA also ruled that the petition for review
was premature due to the absence of any decision or
resolution rendered by a competent body exercising
a quasi-judicial function and the petitioners should
have exhausted all administrative remedies available
before it filed the petition for review.24 The CA also
stated that even if it were to treat the petition as a
special civil action for certiorari, it failed to show any
grave abuse of discretion committed by the DENR
Secretary when it entered into MPSA No. 261-2008-
XIII.25 Citing Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration
Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation,26 the CA ruled
that it is the DENR Secretary that has jurisdiction to
cancel existing mining agreements.27 Finally, the CA
found the petitioners to have committed forum
shopping as the petition for review was filed despite
the pendency of the protest with the MGB-POA.28
Petition before the Court
Hence, the present petition anchored on the ground
that —
THE HONORABLE [CA], WITH DUE RESPECT,
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS OWN
RESOLUTION, XXX, DECLARING THAT THE MPSA
ISSUED BY THE [DENR] AS NULL AND VOID, BY
GIVING THE FOLLOWING SPECIOUS AND BASELESS
LEGAL GROUNDS, WHICH ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE: X X
X.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The petitioners insist that they made the proper
recourse when they filed a petition for review with
the CA because the determination by the DENR
Secretary as to the propriety of the MGB Director's
recommendation of approval and SRMFs
qualification to undertake development and its
compliance with the law requires an exercise of its
quasi-judicial function, and that the issue of whether
the petitioners failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies when it did not await the MGB-POA's
resolution of its protest involves questions of law. 30
The petitioners also take exception to the CA's use of
the Celestial Nickel Mining31 case, citing alleged
differences. According to the petitioners, in Celestial
Nickel Mining, the Court did not make an issue on
the remedy resorted to by Blue Ridge Mineral
Corporation (Blue Ridge) and instead, delved on the
merits of the case thereby implying that the filing of
a petition for certiorari resorted to by Blue Ridge was
proper. Also, Celestial Nickel Mining did not rule into
the action of the DENR Secretary in entering into the
mining agreement because its issuance was not
raised before the MGB Director and the DENR
Secretary and neither was it presented before the
CA. This case, on the other hand, presents sufficient
grounds why the DENR Secretary's approval was
illegal and tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
that is, despite that the DENR Secretary and the
MGB Director knew of the existence of the protest
before the MGB-POA, the agreement was still
entered into.32
SRMI, meanwhile, argues that the DENR Secretary's
signing of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII was within his
authority and that the grounds raised by the
petitioners are mere rehash of the arguments raised
in the CA.33
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General, who appeared for the DENR Secretary,
maintains that the CA properly dismissed the
petition on ground of forum shopping.34
Ruling of the Court
Without stamping approval on the validity of MPSA
No. 261-2008-XIII, the Court dismisses the petition
for the simple reason that the petitioners' recourse
to the CA was erroneous.
First, the act of the DENR Secretary in approving
SRMI's application and entering into MPSA No. 261-
2008-XIII is not an exercise of its quasi-judicial
power; hence, it cannot be reviewed by the CA,
whether by a petition for review under Rule 43 or a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Depending on its enabling statute, 35 administrative
agencies possess distinct powers and functions -
administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial.
"Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs."36 Quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicator/ power, on the other
hand, "is the power to hear and determine questions
of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and
to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law."37 "A government agency performs
adjudicator/ functions when it renders decisions or
awards that determine the rights of adversarial
parties, which decisions or awards have the same
effect as a judgment of the court." 38
In the case of the DENR Secretary, its power to
approve and enter into a MPSA is unmistakably
administrative in nature as it springs from the
mandate of the DENR under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that
"[t]he [DENR] shall x x x be in charge of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the country's natural
resources."39 Contrary to the petitioners' position,
the determination by the DENR Secretary as to (1)
the propriety of the MGB Director's
recommendation of approval, and (2) the
qualification of SRMI to undertake development
and its compliance with the law, does not involve
the exercise of quasi-judicial power. Note that
under Section 41 of DENR Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 96-40, initial evaluation of an application
for an MPSA is made by the MGB Regional Office in
the area covered by the application. Thereafter, the
application will be reviewed by the MGB Director for
further evaluation.40 It is only after the MGB Director
has evaluated the application that the same will be
forwarded to the DENR Secretary for final evaluation
and approval. In approving an MPSA, the DENR
Secretary does not determine the legal rights and
obligations of adversarial parties, which are
necessary in adjudication. In fact, it is only after an
application is approved that the right to undertake
the project accrues on the applicant's part, and until
then, no rights or obligations can be enforced by or
against any party.41 Neither does the DENR Secretary
resolve conflicting claims; rather, what is involved
here is the determination whether a certain
applicant complied with the conditions required by
the law, and is financially and technically capable to
undertake the contract, among others. Thus,
in Republic of the Philippines v. Express
Telecommunication Co., Inc.,42 the Court stated that
the powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce (natural resources) by law such as
granting of licenses, permits, leases and contracts, or
approving, rejecting, reinstating, or canceling
applications, are all executive and administrative in
nature. It even further ruled that purely
administrative and discretionary functions may not
be interfered with by the courts. 43
Jurisprudence also emphasized the administrative
nature of the grant by the DENR Secretary of license,
permits, lease and contracts, reiterating the
distinction made in Pearson v. Intermediate
Appellate Court44 between the different mining
claims/disputes, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes
have recognized a distinction between (1) the
primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of
law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (and the bureau directors) of an
executive or administrative nature, such as
"granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or
approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling
applications, or deciding conflicting
applications," and (2) controversies or
disagreements of civil or contractual nature between
litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that
may be adjudicated only by the courts of
justice.45 (Emphasis ours)
This distinction has been carried over under Republic
Act No. 7942 (R.A. No. 7942) or the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995.46
Moreover, even assuming, for the sake of argument,
that recourse to the courts may be had by the
petitioners, the circumstances of this case do not
warrant its intervention at this point for the
following reasons:
For one, in their petition for review filed with the CA,
the petitioners prayed that MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII
be set aside and its implementation enjoined. 47 In
effect, the petitioners seek a cancellation of MPSA
No. 261-2008-XIII. As earlier discussed, however, the
power to approve and enter into agreements or
contracts rests primarily with the DENR Secretary.
Perforce, the power to cancel an MPSA likewise lies
with the DENR Secretary. Such implied power of the
DENR Secretary was upheld by the Court in Celestial
Nickel Mining.
Celestial Nickel Mining involved the cancellation of
several mining lease contracts in favor of Macroasia
Corporation. The pivotal issue in said case was
defined by the Court as: "who has authority and
jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral agreements
under [R.A. No. 7942] in relation to [Presidential
Decree No.] 463 and pertinent rules and
regulations."48 In acknowledging the DENR
Secretary's power to cancel mining agreements, the
Court provided the reasons, as follows: (1) the DENR
Secretary's power to cancel mineral agreements
emanates from his administrative authority,
supervision, management, and control over mineral
resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987; 49 (2) R.A. No.
7942 confers to the DENR Secretary specific
authority over mineral resources, which includes the
authority to enter into mineral agreements on behalf
of the Government upon the recommendation of the
Director and corollarily, the implied power to
terminate mining or mineral contracts; 50 (3) the
power of control and supervision of the DENR
Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend
cancellation of mineral rights under R.A. No. 7942
demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to
cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral
agreements;51 and (4) the DENR Secretary's power to
cancel mining rights or agreements can be inferred
from Section 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR A.O. No. 96-
40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a
permit/mineral agreement/Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement.52
Given that it is the DENR Secretary that has the
primary jurisdiction to approve and cancel mining
agreements and contract, it is with the DENR
Secretary that the petitioners should have sought
the cancellation of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII, and not
with the courts. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
instructs that if a case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized training and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before resort to the courts is had. 53
For another, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies bars recourse to the courts
at the very first instance.
The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a
controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for
review. A premature invocation of a court's
intervention renders the complaint without cause of
action and dismissible.54 (Citations omitted)
The DENR Secretary, no doubt, is under the control
of the President; thus, his decision is subject to
review of the latter.55 Consequently, the petitioners
should have appealed its case to the Office of the
President under A.O. No. 18, series of
1987,56 instead of directly seeking review by the
court.57
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Amended
Decision dated June 18, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 103033 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
and
10. G.R. No. 201785, April 10, 2019
DIAMOND DRILLING CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, v. CRESCENT MINING
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 207360, April 10, 2019
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, PETITIONER, v. DIAMOND DRILLING
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
A. REYES, JR., J.:
Can the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), through a court order, be
compelled to amend a Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) to reflect the acquisition by
judicial sale of a partial interest therein? This is the
question posed by these petitions, which stem from
the Order1 dated August 31, 2011 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 133,
in Civil Case No. 00-055. The said order directed the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to
amend MPSA No. 057-96-CAR by appending the
name of Diamond Drilling Corporation of the
Philippines (DDCP) as joint contractor thereto with
forty percent (40%) ownership therein. The validity
of the order was questioned in two separate
petitions for certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA), resulting in two conflicting decisions:
one upholding,2 and another annulling3 the order.
The Court is now asked to resolve the conflict.
The Facts4
On October 27, 1993, Crescent Mining and
Development Corporation (Crescent), a Filipino
corporation, and Pacific Falkon Resources
Corporation (PFRC), a Canadian corporation, entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) in preparation
for the formation of a joint venture to undertake
copper and gold mining operations within a 534-
hectare area in Guinaoang and Bulalacao, Mankayan,
Benguet (the Guinaoang Project).
On November 12, 1996, the Republic of the
Philippines, through then DENR Secretary Victor
Ramos, and by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
79425 (Mining Act) and DENR Administrative Order
No. 96-40, awarded MPSA No. 057-96-CAR to
Crescent. Under the agreement, Crescent was
granted the exclusive right to conduct initial
exploration and possible development and
commercial utilization of minerals that may be
found within the Guinaoang Project area.
On August 5, 1997, Crescent and PFRC executed a
Letter-Agreement amending the JVA. Under their
new arrangement, PFRC acquired a 40% stake in the
Guinaoang Project. A copy of the Letter-Agreement
was then sent by the parties to, and recorded in,
the Regional Office of the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB) in Baguio City.
On January 11, 2000, DDCP, PFRC's drilling
contractor, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of
money with damages and prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment against PFRC before
the RTC of Makati City.
After ex parte presentation of evidence, the trial
court issued an Order dated January 28, 2011
granting the application for the issuance of a
preliminary attachment.6 PFRC's 40% share in the
Guinaoang Project was attached and levied upon
through a Notice of Attachment/Levy which was
served upon the office of the MGB of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region (CAR), where the 40% share is
officially recorded.
After PFRC failed to file its responsive pleading
within the reglementary period, the trial court issued
an Order dated January 5, 2001 declaring PFRC in
default.7
On April 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a
Decision8 holding PFRC liable to DDCP in the amount
of US $307,726.00 for aggregate unpaid billings,
interest, and attorney's fees, as well as for the
amount of P300,000.00 as exemplary damages.
On October 19, 2001, Entry of Judgment was issued
in the case and, at DDCP's instance, a writ of
execution was issued by the trial court. By virtue
thereof, the 40% interest of PFRC in the Guinaoang
Project was levied. Thereafter, a Notice of Levy on
Execution over the said 40% interest was served on,
and caused to be recorded with, the MGB-CAR.
On December 31, 2001, PFRC's interest in the
Guinaoang Project was publicly auctioned
whereupon DDCP came out as the highest bidder.
Thereafter, a Certificate of Sale was issued by the
Sheriff of the RTC of Makati City in favor of DDCP.
The sale was duly registered with the MGB-CAR.
Hence, DDCP became the 40% equitable owner.
In 2008, DDCP requested the MGB to record its 40%
interest in the Guinaoang Project. The request was
denied by then DENR-MGB Director Horacio C.
Ramos (Director Ramos) on the ground that DDCP
has not acquired any interest in MPSA No. 057-96-
CAR since the said Agreement is between the
government and Crescent; that PFRC has no equity
in Crescent; and, that the decision in Civil Case No.
00-055 only involves PFRC, and not Crescent.
The MGB, through Director Ramos, also ratiocinated
that the JVA between PFRC and Crescent as regards
the Guinaoang Project is a private matter between
the said corporations such that the conveyance by
PFRC to DDCP of its interest therein is not within
the DENR Secretary's authority to approve.
In view of the denial, DDCP filed a Motion dated June
2, 2011 praying that an order be issued directing the
DENR Secretary, thru the MGB Director, to amend
MPSA No. 057-96-CAR by incorporating the 40%
ownership of DDCP therein. The DENR Secretary and
the MGB Acting Director filed their Comment and
Vehement Opposition to the Motion, etc. dated
August 12, 2011 on the grounds that they cannot be
bound by any issuance of the court as they are not
parties in the proceedings; that the amendment of
MPSA No. 057-96-CAR can only be made by the
mutual agreement of the parties thereto, that is,
the Government of the Philippines and Crescent;
and, that DDCP has not presented any compelling
reason for the amendment of MPSA No. 057-96-
CAR.
After the parties' submissions, the trial court issued
the assailed Order9 on August 31, 2011 granting
DDCP's motion. The decretal portion of the issuance
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Secretary of the [DENR]; thru the
Director of the [MGB], is
hereby DIRECTED to AMEND [MPSA] No. [0]57-96-
CAR by APPENDING the name of [DDCP] as joint
contractor thereto with forty percent (40%)
ownership therein, subject to compliance with
nationality and other qualification requirements of
[R.A.] No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
and its implementing Rules and Regulations.
SO ORDERED.10 (Emphases in the original)
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied,
the DENR filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 124038.
Crescent also assailed the order through another
petition for certiorari, which was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 121603.
Rulings of the CA
CA-G.R. SP No. 121603
On January 30, 2012, the CA 17th Division rendered a
Decision11 in favor of Crescent, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The Order dated 31 August 2011 of the
[RTC], National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City,
Branch 133, in Civil Case No. 00-055 is ANNULLED;
and all the respondents, as well as any person/s
acting for and on their behalf, are ENJOINED from
enforcing or implementing the same. Public
respondent is hereby ordered to immediately
desist from conducting further proceedings in
connection with the Motion dated 02 June 2011 filed
by private respondent in Civil Case No. 00-055. Costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphases in the original)
The CA 17th Division agreed with Crescent's
assertion that the trial court no longer had
jurisdiction to issue the assailed order, as DDCP's
motion to amend MPSA No. 057-96-CAR is
essentially a motion for execution of the Decision
dated April 23, 2001 which was filed beyond the
five-year period within which a decision may be
executed by motion. The CA 17th Division also held
that the relief granted by the assailed order is not a
part of the execution proceedings, and is therefore
outside the ambit of the trial court's general
supervisory control over the execution process.
CA-G.R. SP No. 124038
In its Decision13 dated December 14, 2012, the CA
2nd Division ruled against DENR and in favor of DDCP,
disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
assailed issuances STAND. No costs.
SO ORDERED.14
Relying on Section 30 of R.A. No. 7942 and Section
46 of DENR Administrative Order No. 20-21, the CA
2nd Division held that the assignment of the 40%
share in the Guinaoang Project in favor of PFRC
should be deemed automatically approved, since
the DENR failed to act on the registration of the JVA
between Crescent and PFRC. Therefore, PFRC
became the absolute owner of a 40% share in MPSA
No. 057-96-CAR. This contractual interest being a
form of property, it was liable to levy and execution
upon a judgment, as was done by the Sheriff of the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 133 in favor of DDCP.
Adopting the reasoning of the trial court, the CA
further held that the order did not constitute an
intrusion into the power and prerogatives of the
DENR-MGB under R.A. No. 7942 because it was
merely a consequence of Crescent's voluntary
divestment of the 40% share in favor of PFRC and
the subsequent judicial proceedings which led to the
transfer of such share to DDCP. Notably, the CA
2nd Division viewed the order as part of the execution
proceedings, such that the court's "general
supervisory control" over the execution process
remains applicable.
The DENR and DDCP filed their respective motions
for reconsideration which were both denied by the
appellate court. Aggrieved, both sought recourse to
this Court. DDCP's petition for review was filed on
June 25, 2012 and was docketed as G.R. No.
201785;15 while the DENR's petition for review was
filed on June 24, 2013 and was docketed as G.R. No.
207360.16 In a Resolution17 dated August 7, 2013, the
Court granted the Solicitor General's motion to
consolidate the two cases.
The Issues
DDCP raises the following issues in G.R. No. 201785:
A. THE HONORABLE CA GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE COURT A
QUO ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, IN GRANTING DDCP'S MOTION
TO DIRECT THE DENR/MGB TO AMEND THE
MPSA; and
B. THE HONORABLE CA SHOULD HAVE
OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
BECAUSE CRESCENT HAD OTHER PLAIN,
SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDIES IN THE
ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW THAT IT
INEXPLICABLY FAILED TO AVAIL OF.18
The DENR raised the following issues in its petition:
I. WHETHER THE DENR CAN BE BOUND BY
THE TERMS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 00-055
WITHOUT BEING A PARTY THERETO;
II. WHETHER THE TERMS OF A FINAL AND
EXECUTORY DECISION CAN BE MODIFIED
DURING ITS EXECUTION STAGE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT DIRECTING THE AMENDMENT
OF THE MPSA TO INCLUDE DDCP AS A NEW
JOINT CONTRACTOR CONTRAVENED THE
PROVISIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING
ACT OF 1995, ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
 AND REGULATIONS (IRR), AND THE TERMS
OF MPSA NO. 057-96-CAR ITSELF;
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE AMENDMENT OF
THE MPSA IS A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
ON THE PART OF THE DENR, WHOSE
PERFORMANCE CANNOT BE DIRECTED BY
JUDICIAL ORDER; and
V. WHETHER THE ACQUISITION BY DDCP OF
PFRC'S 40% INTEREST IN THE GUINAOANG
PROJECT COVERED BY MPSA NO. 057-96-
CAR, CONSTITUTES A CONVEYANCE BY
ASSIGNMENT UNDER R.A. NO. 7942.19
The core issue raised by these petitions is the
existence of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
of the Order dated August 31, 2011.
Ruling of the Court
The petitions assail the Order on both procedural
and substantive grounds. The Court, therefore,
groups the issues accordingly and discusses them ad
seriatim.
In G.R. No. 201785, DDCP puts in issue: 1) the
propriety of Crescent's resort to certiorari; and 2) the
appellate court's finding that the order was issued
beyond the reglementary period for executing a
decision by motion. In G.R. No. 207360, the DENR
puts in issue: 1) its subjection to the order despite
not being a party to DDCP's collection case; and 2)
the effect of the order on the final and executory
decision in DDCP's collection case.
Propriety of resort to certiorari
The Court is not obliged to tackle this issue, as
DDCP did not raise it before the appellate court.
In Dimaandal v. PO2 Ilagan, et al.,20 the Court said:
At the outset, we reiterate the well-settled rule that
no question will be entertained on appeal unless it
has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to
the attention of the lower court, administrative
agency, or quasi-judicial body need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule. Any issue raised for the first time is barred by
[estoppel].
Note that this principle forbids parties from changing
their theory of the case. A party, after all, is bound
by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action
he stands on, and cannot be permitted after having
lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of
action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the
matter anew either in the same forum or on
appeal.21 (Citations omitted)
Propriety of execution by motion
"It is axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully
satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and
for all."22 "[I]t is when the judgment has
been satisfied that the same passes beyond review,
for satisfaction thereof is the last act and end of the
proceedings."23 In Vda. de Paman v. Judge
Señeris,24 the Court held that "[a] case in which an
execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the
court which rendered the judgment has a general
supervisory control over its process of execution,
and this power carries with it the right to determine
every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution."25 The Court, therefore,
allowed the enforcement of the employer's
subsidiary liability in the criminal proceeding for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide because
at that point the judgment had not yet been fully
satisfied. Likewise, in Seavan Carrier v. GTI
Sportswear,26 where execution had already
commenced but the certificate of sale issued by the
deputy sheriff in favor of the prevailing parties did
not cover the full amount of the judgment, the Court
ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing to
determine the exact amount still owing to the
judgment creditors, on the ground that the trial
court continued to exercise the power to control the
execution of its decision, since the judgment had not
yet been fully satisfied.
Also, Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court limits
the time within which a writ of execution may be
issued; but it does not prescribe a period when the
sale at public auction shall take place after the
issuance of such writ and a valid levy made pursuant
thereto. The execution sale simply carries out the
execution writ and the levy which, when issued,
were valid.27 Accordingly, the Court has held that a
valid execution issued and levy made during the
lifetime of the writ of execution may be enforced by
a sale thereafter,  i.e., a sale made even beyond the
lifetime of the writ of execution, provided such sale
is made within ten (10) years from the entry of
judgment. This rule rests upon the principle that the
levy is the essential act by which the property is set
apart for the satisfaction of the judgment and taken
into custody of the law.28
Applying these principles to the case at bar, the
Court holds that the judgment in favor of DDCP
should be deemed fully satisfied at the time it filed
the motion to amend the MPSA. The trial court had
already lost jurisdiction by the time it issued the
assailed order, for upon the acquisition by judicial
sale of DDCP of PFRC's 40% interest in the Guinaoang
Project, DDCP had already acquired property of its
judgment debtor which stands as payment for the
judgment debt.
DDCP's assertion that the assailed order is a mere
continuation of the execution proceedings is
unavailing. It must be noted that PFRC was a foreign
corporation whose only attachable property in this
jurisdiction was its 40% share in the Guinaoang
Project. Under the JVA between Crescent and PFRC,
the 40% share in the Guinaoang Project pertained to
the "Assets" of the Project,29 defined as "the
Claims, Mineral Production Agreement, Other
Tenements, Facilities, Mineral Products and Supplies
and all other assets acquired or held by the parties
with respect thereto or pursuant to this Agreement
as the same may exist from time to time."30 In turn,
the LetterAgreement dated August 5, 1997 referred
to the "execut[ion of] the necessary and recordable
transfer documents to evidence the ownership of
PFRC of Forty Per Cent (40%) interest in the
Guinaoang Project and the 1996 Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement."31 By the execution sale, DDCP
became subrogated to all the rights of PFRC under
the JVA and the Letter-Agreement dated August 5,
1997. The right to demand the amendment of the
MPSA to reflect the 40% interest therein is only one
among the bundle of rights that DDCP had acquired
in the execution sale. These rights constitute
property which may stand as payment for the
judgment debt. As regards the share in the MPSA, at
this point, the remedy of DDCP no longer lays with
the trial court but with the DENR Secretary, because
the approval of an amendment to an MPSA to reflect
a transfer or assignment of rights therein is a power
and function of the DENR Secretary under Section 30
of the Mining Act - which brings us to the substantive
issues of the case.
Principle of state control over mining agreements;
Nature of DENR Secretary's power to approve
transfers or assignments of MPSA rights
DDCP asseverates that it is entitled to be designated
as co-contractor in the MPSA. Both the DENR and
Crescent counter that the MPSA cannot be amended
to reflect such designation without their consent.
The DENR further asserts that it cannot be bound by
the provisions of the JVA, therefore, it cannot be
compelled to amend the MPSA in accordance with
the said JVA.
The Court sustains the position of the government.
An MPSA can only be amended to include a new co-
contractor if the government, through the DENR,
approves the amendment; and the requirements
set by law are complied with; as this is tantamount
to a transfer of a mineral agreement right.
Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution states in
part:
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases
of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant. (Emphases Ours)
To implement this Constitutional provision, Congress
passed R.A. No. 7942, or the Mining Act, which
governs the exploration, development, utilization
and processing of all mineral resources. 32 Section 4
of the Mining Act provides:
SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. — Mineral
resources are owned by the State and the
exploration, development, utilization, and
processing thereof shall be under its full control and
supervision. The State may directly undertake such
activities or it may enter into mineral agreements
with contractors. (Emphasis Ours)
Accordingly, the Court held in Hon. Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc.33 that:
All projects relating to the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources are projects of
the State. While the State may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by these citizens x x x, the projects
nevertheless remain as State projects and  can
never be purely private endeavors.
Also, despite entering into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements, the
State remains in full control and supervision over
such projects. x x x.34 (Italics in the original and
emphases and underscoring Ours)
The Mining Act fleshes out the power of the state
over mineral agreements. Section 8 of said law vests
in the DENR the primary responsibility "for the
conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the State's mineral resources including
those in reservations, watershed areas, and lands of
the public domain." Pursuant to this responsibility,
the DENR is given the following powers:
a. To promulgate rules and regulations as may
be necessary to implement the intent and
provisions of the Act;
b. To enter into Mineral Agreements on behalf
of the Government or recommend Financial
or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
to the President upon endorsement of the
Director;
c. To enforce applicable related laws such as
the Administrative Code, the Civil
Code, etc.; and
d. To exercise such other authority vested by
the Act and as provided for in these IRR.
To implement the principle of state control over the
mineral resource utilization, the Mining Act utilizes
MPSAs as a mode of enlisting private sector
participation in mining operations. MPSAs under the
Mining Act are in the nature of production sharing
agreements. This type of agreement was first
developed and used in Indonesia in the mid-1960s as
a means for the state to gain greater control over
the extraction and utilization of natural
resources.35 The Regalian doctrine is an integral
premise of production sharing agreements, for in
such agreements, the state is explicitly recognized as
the owner of all mineral resources within its
territory. Through such an arrangement, the
government is able to tap into the resources of the
private sector without relinquishing control over the
resources to be extracted.36 Accordingly, the Mining
Act vests in the Secretary the following powers with
respect to MPSAs:
1. Power to enter into mineral agreements on
behalf of the Government;37
2. Power to approve applications for mineral
agreements;38
3. Power to promulgate the IRR, including the
rules for processing applications for mining
rights;39
4. Power to approve assignments or transfers
of mineral agreements other than
FTAAs;40 and
5. Authority to approve the cancellation or
withdrawal of mining agreements.41
In turn, the MGB has been given "direct charge in
the administration and disposition of mineral lands
and mineral resources."42 It was also given additional
powers and duties such as:
1. Authority to determine if an applicant for a
mineral agreement possesses a satisfactory
environmental track record;43
2. Authority to receive applications for mineral
agreements covering areas within mineral
reservations;44
3. Duty to undertake geological, mining,
metallurgical, chemical, and other
 researches, as well as geological and
mineral exploration surveys;45
4. Duty of the MGB Director to recommend to
the Secretary the granting of mineral
agreements to duly qualified persons and to
monitor the compliance by the contractor
of the terms and conditions of the mineral
agreements;46
5. Power to confiscate surety, performance
and guaranty bonds posted through an
order to be promulgated by the MGB
Director;[47
6. Power of the MGB Director to deputize,
when necessary, any member or unit of the
Philippine National Police, barangay, duly
registered non-governmental organization
or any qualified person to police all mining
activities;48 and
7. Powers of the Secretary as delegated to the
MGB Director.49
The IRR of the Mining Act states that an MPSA is an
agreement wherein the Government grants to a
contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining
operations within, but not title over, the contract
area and shares in the production whether in kind
or in value as owner of the minerals therein, with
the Contractor providing the necessary financing,
technology, management and personnel to conduct
the mining operations.50 Section 3(ab) of the Mining
Act places MPSAs under the class of mineral
agreements, which are explicitly defined as contracts
between the government and a contractor. It is,
therefore, clear that under the Mining Act, an MPSA
is a contract whereby the State, through the DENR,
grants to a private party the exclusive right to
conduct mining operations within a specified area,
in exchange for a share in the proceeds of the
operations.
The assailed order is particularly aimed at Paragraph
2.11 of MPSA No. 057-96-CAR, which reads:
2.11 Contractor means CRESCENT MINING AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION under this
Agreement provided such assignment of any such
interest is accomplished pursuant to the provision
hereof.51
DDCP seeks to have this provision amended to
reflect its asserted status as co-contractor. The
Court rules that this is not possible under the facts
of this case, for the principle of state control in the
Mining Act mandates that the addition of a new
contractor to an MPSA by virtue of a transfer of
mineral agreement rights must be made with the
consent of the government, as manifested by the
approval of the DENR Secretary; and in compliance
with the requirements set forth by the Mining Act
and its IRR. DDCP has failed to prove compliance
with both requisites.
DDCP anchors its right to become a co-contractor
on its acquisition by judicial sale of PFRC's 40%
interest in the Guinaoang Project. PFRC's right to
this 40% interest is, in turn, based on the Letter-
Agreement dated August 5, 1997 between it and
Crescent. These transactions, through which
Crescent and PFRC successively "disposed of or
parted with an asset or an interest in an
asset,"52 both constitute transfers of rights in the
MPSA. Transfers of rights in an MPSA are governed
by Section 30 of the Mining Act and Section 46 of its
IRR, viz.:
SEC. 30. Assignment/Transfer. — Any assignment or
transfer of rights and obligations under any mineral
agreement except a financial or technical assistance
agreement shall be subject to the prior approval of
the Secretary. Such assignment or transfer shall
be deemed automatically approved if not acted
upon by the Secretary within thirty (30) working days
from official receipt thereof, unless patently
unconstitutional or illegal.
SEC. 46. Transfer or Assignment of Mineral
Agreement. — A Contractor may file an application
for the total or partial transfer or assignment of its
Mineral Agreement to a Qualified Person(s) upon
payment of an application fee (Annex 5-A) with the
Bureau/concerned Regional Office for evaluation.
No. application shall be accepted for filing unless
accompanied by the pertinent Deed of Assignment
that shall contain, among others, a stipulation that
the transferee/assignee assumes all obligations of
the transferor/assignor under the Agreement. Any
transfer or assignment of rights and obligations
under any Mineral Agreement shall be subject to the
approval of the Secretary upon the recommendation
of the Director: Provided, That any transfer or
assignment of a Mineral Agreement shall not be
approved unless the transferor/assignor or
Contractor has complied with all the terms and
conditions of the Agreement and the provisions of
the Act and these implementing rules and
regulations at the time of transfer/assignment:
Provided, further, That any transfer or assignment
shall be deemed automatically approved if not
acted upon by the Secretary within thirty (30)
calendar days from official receipt thereof, unless
patently unconstitutional, illegal or where such
transfer or assignment is violative of pertinent rules
and regulations: Provided, finally, That the
transferee assumes all the obligations and
responsibilities of the transferor/assignor under the
Mineral Agreement.
If circumstances warrant and upon the
recommendation of the Director, the Secretary may
impose additional conditions for the approval of
transfer/assignment of the Mineral Agreement.
Under these provisions, the requisites fm: a valid
transfer or assignment of rights in an MPSA are as
follows:
1. An application for transfer or assignment
filed by the contractor named in the MPSA;
2. Payment of application fee with the MGB or
concerned DENR Regional Office;
3. Submission of a Deed of Assignment with a
stipulation that the transferee/assignee
assumes all obligations of the
transferor/assignor under the Agreement;
4. Proof of compliance by the
transferor/assignor or Contractor with all
the terms and conditions of the Agreement
and the provisions of the Mining Act and its
IRR at the time of transfer/assignment;
5. Approval of the DENR Secretary; and
6. Assumption by the transferee/assignee of
all the obligations and responsibilities of the
transferor/assignor under the Mineral
Agreement.
DDCP admits that the Letter-Agreement dated
August 5, 1997 between Crescent and PFRC is not
compliant with these requisites.53 Instead, it claims
that pursuant to the automatic approval clause in
Section 30 of the Mining Act, the transfer should be
deemed approved because the DENR failed to act
on the said Letter-Agreement within 30 days after
its registration therewith.
DDCP is mistaken.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
Letter-Agreement dated August 5, 1997 cannot
operate to transfer any rights under MPSA No. 057-
96-CAR because such Letter-Agreement is not
compliant with Section 46 of the Mining Act's IRR.
Furthermore, in view of the principle of state control
permeating the Mining Act, the Court holds that the
automatic approval clause applies only to
applications which satisfy all the requisites laid
down in Section 46 of the Mining Act's IRR. A
contrary view would render inutile the DENR
Secretary's power to approve assignments or
transfers of rights in MPSAs, for it would mean that
applications not acted upon by the Secretary within
the prescribed period would be deemed approved
regardless of compliance with the requisites set
forth in Section 46 of the IRR.
Moreover, given the powers and the mandate
vested in the DENR and the MGB with respect to
mineral agreements, it is evident that the DENR
Secretary's power to approve transfers and
assignments of mineral agreements and mineral
agreement rights is discretionary in nature and
therefore outside the reach of the trial court's
orders.54 In determining whether or not to approve
an assignment or transfer of mineral agreement
rights, the DENR Secretary determines if the
assignee/transferee is a "qualified person" under the
definition of the Mining Act. This process
includes  inter alia a determination of the party's
"technical and financial capability to undertake
mineral resources development,"55 and of the
transferor, assignor or contractor's compliance with
all the terms and conditions of the MPSA and the
provisions of the Mining Act and its IRR at the time
of transfer/assignment:56 a process which requires
the Secretary to evaluate the facts and
circumstances of each application and make a
judgment as to whether or not the applicant satisfies
the standards set by the statute and its
implementing rules.
Considering that the transfer of the 40% interest in
the Guinaoang Project to PFRC was invalid, the levy
and subsequent sale thereof to DDCP did not
transfer any right in MPSA No. 057-96-CAR in favor
of DDCP that would entitle it to an amendment
thereof. The DENR's assertion that the assailed order
cannot be executed against it is therefore justified,
since there was no valid transfer of mineral
agreement rights that would necessitate its
involvement in the proceedings.

To conclude, the Court reiterates the long-standing

doctrine that the buyer in an execution sale only
acquires the right of the judgment
debtor.57 Therefore, DDCP could only have acquired
those rights and interests which may legally be held
by its debtor, PFRC, under the law and the JVA with
Crescent. The right to be included in MPSA No. 057-
96-CAR as a co-contractor is not among those rights.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in

G.R. No. 207360 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated December 14, 2012 and Resolution dated May
16, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
124038 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition in G.R. No. 201785 is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated January 30, 2012 and Resolution
dated May 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 121603 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.