REPUBLIC vs.

HANOVER WORLDWIDE TRADING CORPORATION

[G.R. No. 172102. July 2, 2010.]
FACTS:

 On October 15, 1993, Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation filed an application for
Registration of Title over Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New), situated in Barrio
Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of 103,350 square meters pursuant to P.D.No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree). The application stated that Hanover is the owner in fee
simple of Lot No. 4488, its title thereto having been obtained through purchase evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale.

 Attached to the petition are: 1) a Verification Survey Plan; 2) a copy of the approved Technical
Description of Lot 4488; 3) a copy of the Deed of Sale in favor of Hanover's President and
General Manager; 4) a copy of a Waiver executed by the President and General Manager of
Hanover in favor of the latter; 5) a Geodetic Engineer's Certificate attesting that the property
was surveyed; 6) a Tax Declaration; 7) a tax clearance; 8) a Municipal Assessor's Certification
stating, among others, the assessed value and market value of the property; and 9) a CENRO
Certification on the alienability and disposability of the property.

 There were no other oppositors to the application except the Republic. The Republic
contended that neither Hanover nor its predecessors-in-interest are in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto; the muniments of title, tax declarations and receipts of tax payments
attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence
of a  bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for ; Hanover is a private corporation
disqualified under the Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain; the parcels
of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic and are not
subject to private appropriation.

 On August 7, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision approving Hanover's application for
registration of the subject lot. It held that from the documentary and oral evidence
presented by Hanover, the trial court was convinced that Hanover and its predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, public, continuous, notorious and peaceful possession, in the
concept of an owner, of the land applied for registration of title, and that it had registrable
title thereto in accordance with Section 14 of P.D. 1529.

 Petitioner contends, however, that, pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the initial
hearing of the case must be not earlier than forty-five (45) days and not later than ninety
(90) days from the date of the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing.
Since the RTC Order was issued on June 13, 1995, the initial hearing should have been set not
earlier than July 28, 1995 (45 days from June 13, 1995) and not later than September 11,
1995 (90 days from June 13, 1995). Unfortunately, the initial hearing was scheduled and
actually held on September 25, 1998, some fourteen (14) days later than the prescribed
period.
 Petitioner also argues that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence in the
form of specific facts indicating the nature and duration of the occupation of its
predecessor-in-interest to prove that the latter has been in possession of the subject lot
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE: WON the Court agrees with petitioner on the more important issue that respondent failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that it or its predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the
subject property for the period required by law.
HELD: NO

 It is settled that a document or writing admitted as a part of the testimony of a witness does
not constitute as a proof of facts stated herein. Hanover's President and General Manager,
who identified the CENRO Certification, is a private individual. He was not the one who
prepared the Certification. The government official who issued the Certification was not
presented before the RTC so that he could have testified regarding its contents. Hence,
the RTC should not have accepted the contents of the Certification as proof of the facts
stated therein. The contents of the Certification are hearsay, because Hanover's President
and General Manager was incompetent to testify on the truth of the contents of such
Certification. Even if the subject Certification is presumed duly issued and admissible in
evidence, it has no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

 a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient.
Therefore, since the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, it must now be shown that
possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total
conformity with Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529.
 No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its predecessors-in-
interest had been possessing and occupying the subject property since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Hanover's President and General Manager testified only with respect to his claim that
he was the former owner of the subject property and that he acquired the same from the heirs
of a certain Damiano Bontoyan; that he caused the payment of realty taxes due on the
property; that a tax declaration was issued in favor of Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey
of the subject lot, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; and that his and Hanover's possession
of the property started in 1990.
 Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the
applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by
law.  Unfortunately, as petitioner contends, the pieces of evidence presented by respondent
do not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" proof necessary in cases of this nature.
 In the present case, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject property,
Hanover submitted a Certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (CENRO) attesting that "lot 4488, CAD-545-D, containing an area of
103,350 square meters, more or less, situated at Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu" was found to be
within "Alienable and Disposable Block-1, land classification project no. 28, per map 2545 of
Consolacion, Cebu." However, this certification is not sufficient.
NOTES:
 Applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a   bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
It is true, as respondent argues, that an examination of these requisites involve delving
into questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings
of the court a quo are generally binding on this Court, except for certain recognized exceptions, to
wit:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
 (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial Court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record
The Court finds that the instant case falls under the third and ninth exceptions.
 the CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public lands.  Thus, the CENRO
Certification should have been accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary's
issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Heirs of Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez

G.R. No. 146262, [January 21, 2005]

FACTS:
 Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. filed an application for registration of title before the
RTC of Pasig City. The land registration court issued an order of general default and hearings
on the application followed. On 31 May 1966, the land registration court granted the
application. The decision became final and executory, and the land registration court issued a
certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991.

 The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued on 20 October 1977 in
the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.

 Petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and Presentacion L. Psinakis , heirs
of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion. The motion alleged that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the
lots subject of the application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970.
Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute
Sale over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. invoking Section 22 of  PD 1529 petitioners also prayed that the court issue
the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. The
land registration court gave due course to the motion and conducted hearings. The Register of
Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their
spouses only on 18 August 1998.

 Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare void the decree issued by the
LRC and Original Certificate of Title. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show that
incumbent Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the Decrees on 20 October 1997, before he
assumed office on 8 July 1998 and even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaña issued the Order of 3 July
1998. Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to recall
the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request and explained the inconsistencies in the
dates in a letter dated 1 December 1998.

 The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority

 The LRA stated that the sole question for resolution is whether a notice of lis
pendens is registrable based on a motion to declare void the decrees and titles. The
LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion
is not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that
only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens relative to
the pending case.
The LRA focused on petitioners' standing in LRC. The LRA declared that petitioners are not
parties in LRC. Since a land registration case is a proceeding  in rem, an order of general
default binds the whole world as a party in the case. Petitioners are mere movants whose
personality the court has not admitted. Based on Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled
that petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the order of general default.

 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of the LRA's decision.
Petitioners filed the petition on the ground of manifest error and grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the LRA Administrator when he ruled in Consulta No. 2879 that the notice
of lis pendens is not registrable.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court reiterated
the LRA's ruling that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis
pendens. Petitioners have no legal personality because they failed to file a motion to lift
the order of general default in the land registration case.
ISSUE: WON PETITIONERS' MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
 Petitioners' enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the requisites.
Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis pendens
because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in LRC. As petitioners are
not parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the
requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the Register of
Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice of lis pendens.

 The land registration court granted the application in LRC on 31 May 1966 and issued a
certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion to consider the deed
of sale in the registration on 16 July 1997. Petitioners filed their motion to have the decrees
and the corresponding certificates of title declared void on 25 November 1998. Petitioners
filed both motions long after the decision in LRC No. became final and executory. Neither
petitioners nor even the applicants from whom they base their claim presented the Deed
of Sale before the land registration court while the action was pending.
 The Court hold that the motion filed by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in
the land registration proceedings for purposes of filing an application of a notice of  lis
pendens. However, the court disagree with the LRA and the appellate court's observation
that petitioners need to file a motion to lift the order of general default. A motion to lift
the order of general default should be filed before entry of final judgment. The land
registration court granted the application for registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued a
certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion on 16 July 1997. Thus,
even if petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of general default, the order of default
could not be set aside because the motion was filed out of time.
 Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By filing their motion to have the
decrees and the corresponding certificates of title declared void, they took the role of
oppositors to the application for land registration.
NOTES:
 Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit,
pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.
o The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the
registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or
contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result
of the pending litigation.
o The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final
judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations.
Second, it binds a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to
the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the
filing of a notice of lis pendens does not create a right or lien that previously did not
exist.
o Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying
only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the
supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former is not bound by the
property owner's undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate of title.
 An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property
has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. Although the
decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is
not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an
ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration
court.  Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the
certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of lis
pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the
real owner.
 The LRA states that under Section 26 of PD 1529 the order of default includes petitioners.
Therefore, petitioners' failure to move to lift the default order did not give them standing in
the case. As long as the court does not lift the order of general default, petitioners have no
legal standing to file the motion to declare void the decrees of registration issued to the
applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529 provides thus:

Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. — If no person appears and answers within the
time allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
contrary appearing, order a default to be recorded and require the applicant to
present evidence. By the description in the notice "To All Whom It May Concern",
all the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default
order.
o Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a default order shall be
entered against persons who did not appear and answer.

o Petitioners' justification for filing a motion to annul the decrees and titles, as
opposed to filing a motion to lift the order of general default, rests on two related
assumptions. First, with the filing of the 16 July 1997 motion and giving of due course
to the motion by the land registration court, petitioners assert that they acquired
legal standing in the registration proceedings. Second, buyer Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
stepped into the shoes of the sellers-applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta when applicants
sold the property to him. As successors-in-interest of the buyer, petitioners contend
that they are not strangers to the proceedings.

 A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of his loss of standing, a
party in default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be entitled to notice. A
party in default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the court, unless he files a
motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided in what is now  Section 3,
Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 Vergel v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125154, [September 28, 2001]
FACTS:
 On May 26, 1994, Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz Mañacop, Felicisima Flores,
Generoso and Blandino Salvacruz, Milagros Evangelista and the heirs of Corazon Santiago,
namely: Leocadio, Jr. and Concepcion Santiago (petitioners herein) filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna an application for registration of a parcel of land (for titling
purposes).
 On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands filed an
opposition to the application for registration. On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued an
order of general default against the whole world with the exception of Republic of the
Philippines
 On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales filed with the trial court an
"Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of General Default" alleging, inter alia, in her
affidavit that she "is claiming the land in question subject of this petition as an owner,
which motion was opposed by the petitioners herein. On October 12, 1995, respondent filed
with the trial court a reply to the opposition interposed by the petitioners and, at the same
time, filed an "Urgent Motion" praying for the suspension of the proceedings.On October 18,
1995, the trial court issued the first assailed order.
 On October 20, 1995, petitioners filed with the trial court a "Motion to Strike Out Urgent
Motion to Suspend Proceeding." On November 21, 1995 respondent filed with the trial court a
"motion for reconsideration" of the order denying the motion to set aside the order of general
default, which motion petitioners opposed. On November 28, 1995, the trial court issued its
second questioned order, the dispositive portion. On December 13, 1995, respondent filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court judge "acted
capriciously and without or in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused the exercise of his
discretion" in issuing the two aforementioned orders." 

 SYNOPSIS: Petitioners filed an application for land registration of a parcel of land in Los
Baños. The trial court subsequently issued an order of general default against the whole
world except the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent filed a motion to set aside the
order of general default, claiming that she failed to timely file her opposition because the
application was filed by petitioners in bad faith, surreptitiously and without notice to her.
The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals set aside the
order of general default.

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily when it set aside the trial
court's order of general default without factual basis. Since the Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for it to make finding of fact
constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect sufficient for the court to lift the order of
general default in the land registration case involved.

ISSUE:
whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court's order of general default in
the land registration case involved without making a specific finding of fraud, negligence, accident or
excusable mistake but relying on its view that substantial justice and speedy determination of the
controversy would be better attained in lifting the order of general default, to enable a claimant to
oppose and to establish a case of ownership in herself
HELD: We grant the petition.
 The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set aside the trial court's order of general default without
factual basis save for its own gut feeling, ipse dixit.  Respondent's failure to file timely
opposition to the application for land registration because she missed reading the publication
of the notice in the Official Gazette  or in the newspaper "Malaya" issue of August 8, 1994,   in
itself may not be considered excusable negligence.
 In respondent's motion to set aside order of general default, she alleged that petitioners were
aware of her claim of ownership over the subject property, but did not give her personal notice
of the filing of the application. She learned about the application by accident. In the petition
for certiorari she filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent alleged that petitioners filed the
application in bad faith, surreptitiously and without notice to her.  The Court of Appeals did
not make a finding on this.
 Hence, the court find that the appellate court erred in setting aside the order of general
default in the Land Registration Case, without making a specific finding of fraud, accident
or excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely opposing the application.
 We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to remand the case to the Court of Appeals
for it to make findings of fact constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect sufficient for
the court to lift the order of general default in the land registration case involved.