Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. vs.

Court of Whether or not the failure of LGVHAI to file its by-laws within one month
Appeals from the date of its incorporation as mandated by Section 46 of the
Corporation Code, result in automatic dissolution.
G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997)

RULING:
FACTS:
No, the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws would not result to
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) as an
its automatic dissolution. The use of the word “must” in the provision is not
association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas was
always imperative as to what the petitioner contends. Statutes should be
organized on February 8, 1983. It was registered with the Home Financing
taken as a whole and the use of the principle that the best interpreter of a
Corporation as the sole homeowner’s organization in the said subdivision
statute is the statute itself reveals clearly that the legislature intended to use
under Certificate of Registration No. 04-197. For unknown reasons, said
the words “must” to be directory and not mandatory.
association, LGVHAI, did not file its corporate by-laws.
The Corporation Code Section 46 requires the filing of by-laws but it
Upon the attempt of the officers of the LGVHAI to register its by-
does not provide for the consequences of noncompliance. However, such
laws, they failed and discovered that there were two other organizations
omission has now been rectified by Presidential Decree No. 902-A which
within the subdivision namely the North Association and the South
states that the failure to file by-laws within the required period is only a
Association. Both associations were able to register and file its by-laws. In
ground for suspension or revocation of the certificate of corporation. There
July, 1989, Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI and was informed by
must be a proper notice and hearing for due process and corporations must
Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of the legal department of the Home
be given a chance to explain their neglect or omission. Therefore, there can
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), that LGVHAI had been
be no automatic corporate dissolution.
automatically dissolved for it did not file its by-laws within the period required
by the Corporation Code. The Corporation Code and the Presidential Decree No. 902-A are
statures in pari materia and they must be construed and harmonized with
The officers of the LGVHAI then filed a complaint questioning the revocation
other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
of LGVHAI’s registration without due notice and hearing and prayed for the
cancellation of the certificate of registration of the North and the South
Associations. After obtaining a favorable ruling from HIGC Hearing Officer REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Danilo C. Javier, the South Association, after a dismissed appeal to the G.R. No. 122256. October 30, 1996
Appeals Board of the HIGC for lack of merit, consequently appealed to the
Court of Appeals hence a petition for review for certiorari was filed.
FACTS:
Private respondent owned several hectares of land in Davao del
ISSUE/S:
Norte, which the government took pursuant to R.A. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private respondent's certificate of title
were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to farmer-
beneficiaries.
However, in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings, a lower
"Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner" was stated. Private respondent filed a
Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC. Private respondent prayed that
DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed
its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant
to the latter's Revised Rules of Procedure, before recourse to the RTC could
be had.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied so he therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, contending
that a petition for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 Rules 56-57 falls
under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not in cases involving claims for just compensation under
R.A. 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the
DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to the RTC under
Rule 57
RULING:
No. It is true that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over
"all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform," except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. However, Special
Agrarian Courts, which are RTCs, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction
over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under R.A. No. 6657." The DAR is an administrative agency which
cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over
criminal cases.
Rule 50 must be construed in harmony with Rule 57. The DAR, as an
administrative agency, cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent
domain. Any effort to transfer the jurisdiction to administrators would be
contrary to Rule 57 thus void. What the adjudicators are empowered to do is
only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and CRISTINO
JAMIAS
vs.
AUDITOR GENERAL and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM
FACTS:
Petitioner Cristino Jamias was a Professor of English Language and
Literature and concurrently was Head of the University Publications
Department in the University of the Philippines. His service had been
continuous for more than fifteen years prior to reaching the age of 65 years
on July 20, 1961.
Dean Tomas S. Fonacier of the U.P. College of Arts and Sciences
wrote President Sinco (now regent) for the extension reasoned with the
reasons that he was healthy, currently tasked with writing the history of the
University of the Philippines and that his substitute is still assigned in Baguio.
President Sinco favorably endorsed Dean Fonacier's request to the Board of
Regents which approved the extension of Prof. Jamias' services until April 15,
1962.
Auditor Alfredo Liboro, the Auditor General's representative at U.P.,
questioned the legality of the resolution of the Board of Regents. On
February 1, 1962, Auditor General Pedro M. Gimenez affirmed the U.P.
Auditor's ruling and held that the Board of Regents was without power to
extend the services of U.P. professors beyond the compulsory limit of 65
years.
Government Service Insurance System, with the aid of the Auditor General,
informed Prof. Jamias that his services rendered after the compulsory
retirement age were illegal; and that he (Jamias) was not entitled to
compensation.
Prof. Jamias sought reconsideration which was eventually turned
down by the GSIS. Then followed the directive of U.P. Auditor Alfredo Liboro
that Prof. Jamias' salary be withheld beginning with the weekly salary due on
March 7, 1962.
Petitioners U.P. Board of Regents and Cristino Jamias subsequently
then filed an original petition for prohibition against respondents, Auditor
General and the GSIS. They seek to stop the Auditor General and his men
from withholding Prof. Jamias' salary and to restrain GSIS from deducting
any amount from his five-year lump sum retirement annuity upon retirement
on April 16, 1962.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines
(U.P.) may extend the tenure of a professor beyond the retirement age by
law fixed at 65 years.
HELD:
No, the U.P. Board of Regents do not have the authority to extend the tenure
of a professor beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65 years. Under
Republic Act 3096 —
"(e) Retirement shall be automatic and compulsory at the age of sixty-five
years, and optional retirement at the age of sixty-three shall be allowed with
lump sum payment of present value of annuity for first five years, and future
annuity to be paid monthly, and other benefits given to a compulsorily retired
member as provided for in Republic Act Numbered Six hundred sixty, as
amended, if he has completed fifteen years of service and if he has not been
separated from the service during the last three years of service prior to
retirement; otherwise he shall be allowed to continue in the service until he
shall have completed the required length of service unless he is otherwise
eligible for disability retirement...
Prof. Jamias has reached the age of 65 years on July 20, 1961. At that time,
Republic Act 3096 was already operative as it was enacted on June 17, 1961.
No power or authority was there to then extend the service of a government
employee beyond 65 years of age. In conclusion, the U.P. Board of Regents is
then powerless to extend his service beyond July 20, 1961. And, its resolution
now under consideration is null and void.
Cuyegkeng vs. Cruz
108 Phil 1147
July 26, 1960
Facts:
On November 25, 1959, petitioners Jose Cuyegkeng, Pedro Mayuga,
Benjamin Roa, Timoteo Alday, Dominador Jacinto, Alejandro Gaerlan and
Rosita Rivera-Ramirez initiated a quo warranto proceeding against
respondent Dr. Pedro Cruz. Petitioners prayed for two causes of action. They
pray that they be declared as duly qualified for the position of member of the
Board of Medical Examiners and that Dr. Cruz’s appointment be rendered
illegal. They also pray for a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the
respondent to cease, desist and refrain from assuming the office, and for the
respondent to pay for the costs of this suit.
Petitioners’ cause of action is based on the fact that their names
appear on the list of qualified physicians submitted to the President and that
the respondent, whose name was not on the list, was appointed by the
President. Petitioners maintain that, pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 2382, the President cannot appoint any person not included in the list
submitted by Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association to the
Board of Medical Examiners, and that the appointment of the respondent is
null and void.
Respondent alleged in his answer that three of the petitioners are
not qualified for appointment to the Board of Medical Examiners, pursuant
to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 2382. He also alleged that the list submitted
by the executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association is merely
recommendatory in nature, and that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is
unconstitutional and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the President’s appointment of Dr. Cruz as a
member of the Board of Medical Examiners is valid pursuant to the provisions
of Republic Act No. 2382.
Held:
Yes, the appointment of Dr. Cruz as a member of the Board of
Medical Examiners is valid.
The members of the Court are split into three groups in their views
on the issues raised by the pleadings. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382,
which the petitioners rely, provides:
Section 13. The Board of Medical Examiners, its composition and
duties. The Board of Medical Examiners shall be composed of six members to be
appointed by the President of the Philippines from a confidential list of not more
than twelve names approved and submitted by the executive council of the
Philippine Medical Association, after due consultation with other medical
associations, during the months of April and October of each year. xxx
The first group held that the provisions of Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 2382 are mandatory in character and unconstitutional. The second group
views that the said portion of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is merely
directory in nature. The third group deems it unnecessary to inquire into the
constitutionality of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 or to determine
whether the said provision is mandatory or directory. The group believe that
the President made the appointment pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 2382, which provides:
Section 15. Tenure of office and compensation of members. The
members of the Board of Medical Examiners shall hold office for one year:
Provided, that any member may be reappointed for not more than one year. xxx
The members of the third group held that it is not absolutely
necessary that the person reappointed to the Board of Medical Examiners
under Section 15 be included in the list mentioned in Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 2382. In case of conflict between two provisions of the same statute,
the last in order of position is frequently held to prevail.
Therefore, respondent has a good and valid title to his office.
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc., vs Commissioner of Customs and Court of
Tax Appeals
GR No. 19337
September 30, 1969
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal
sugar for export, the produced sugar being placed in containers referred to as
jute bags. It made two importations of jute bags, free from custom duties and
special import tax, conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within
one year from the date of importation. However, only 1/3 of the jute bags
were exported within one year after their importation. The remaining bags
were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within 3 years
from their importation. Petitioner asked for an extension of the period but
was denied. Due to the petitioner’s failure to show proof of the exportation
of the balance of remaining jute bags within one year from their importation,
Petitioner was required to pay, representing the customs duties and special
import tax due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest and later on
demanded the refund of the amount it had paid under section 106 (b) in
relation to section 105 (x) of the Tariff Customs Code.
Issue: Whether or not the interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or
uncertain statute by the Executive Department or other Administrative
Agencies should be given consideration? In this case, the Bureau of Customs.
Held: Yes, the interpretation of the Bureau of Customs should be given
weight.
Ratio: The provisions in question (Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of
1909 and Sec. 105(x)) have not been the subject of previous judicial
interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for
administrative construction “shall apply. The aforementioned sections, while
fixing at one year the period within which the containers therein mentioned
must be exported, are silent as to whether the said period may be extended.
It was by reason of this silence that the respondent issued AO 389 and 66 to
eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law and,
to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned
in the law as non-extendible.
The interpretation of an ambiguous law by the executive department or other
agency charged with its administration is entitled to consideration and the
highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in
determining the meaning of the law, especially when the construction is long
continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the
statute, or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code,
the construction placed by it should be given controlling weight.
Manila Lodge vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-41001)
Facts:
Act No. 1360 authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay.
The claimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided
that the reclaimed area "shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that
the City of Manila is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land
formed by the Luneta extension at the north end for a hotel site, and to lease
the same. Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 1657,
amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of manila either to lease
or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.
On July 13, 1911 the City of Manila conveyed 5,543.07 square meters of the
reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE. In January 1963 the BPOE
petitioned the CFI of Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the
City Manila to repurchase the property.On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold
for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with all the improvements
thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation.
In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the CFI of Manila a petition for the
reannotation of its right to repurchase. The court, after hearing, issued an
order, dated November 19, 1964, directing the Register of Deeds of the City
of Manila to reannotate in toto the entry regarding the right of the City of
Manila to repurchase the property after fifty years. From this order TDC and
BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968. The court rendered on
July 14, 1972 its decision finding the subject land to be part of the "public park
or plaza" and, therefore, part of the public domain.
From said decision the therein plaintiff TDC as well as the defendant Manila
Lodge No. 761, BPOE, appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the action was patrimonial
property of the City of Manila and not a park or plaza.
Held: We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for public use.
• if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila as its
patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of the
whole reclaimed area without need of authorization to do so from the
lawmaking body. Act No. 1360, as amended, however, provides by necessary
implication, that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area
without being authorized by the lawmaking body. If the reclaimed area were
patrimonial property of the City, the latter could dispose of it without need of
the authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside,
lease, or sell given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so construe
the statute as to render the term "authorize," which is repeatedly used by the
statute, superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics
that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute
and that a statute should be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes
inoperative or superfluous. To authorize means to empower, to give a right
to act. Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb "authorize" with the
adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statue or section." Hence
without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila
could not lease or sell even the northern portion; much less could it dispose
of the whole reclaimed area.
• Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern
portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel site. The subject property is not that
northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the
southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius est exlusio
alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property.
The application of this principle of statutory construction becomes the more
imperative in the case at bar inasmuch as not only must the public grant of
the reclaimed area to the City of Manila be, as above stated, strictly construed
against the City of Manila, but also because a grant of power to a municipal
corporation, as happens in this case where the city is authorized to lease or
sell the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as
are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the
objectives of the corporation.
PLDT v CIR
THE PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., plaintiff-appellant,
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant is a corporation organized and carrying on
business under a special franchise granted by the Philippine Legislature, Act.
No. 3436 approved on November 28, 1928, as amended by Commonwealth
Act. No. 407, and under the franchise contained in Act. No. 1368 of the
Philippine Commission. Under Act No. 1368, sections 4 and 5, the company
was subject to the franchise tax of 2% of all gross receipts but under Act. No.
3436, the franchise tax was reduced to 1%.
Plaintiff-appellant then paid its franchise tax but chose to omit 13
items as basis of the tax which were computed at 1% or 2%, depending on
the act which the items were accrued. However, defendant-appellee
demanded the sum of P3,977.22 instead of P3,191.29, as computed by the
plaintiff-appellant. The plaintiff-appellant paid it under the protest and asked
for the ruling of the officer but was ruled against. The plaintiff-appellant then
brought action in the Court of the First Instance of Manila but such court
absolved the defendant-appellee from the plaintiff-appellant’s complaint.
Now comes this instant case where plaintiff-appellant argues that the CFI
erred on its judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in construing the phrase “gross
receipts” in computing for the tax due.
HELD:
Yes, the CFI of Manila was wrong to hold that “to construe the
phrase gross receipts as meaning only actual receipts so as to exclude
therefrom amounts which the plaintiff-appellant should have collected but
failed to collect, would place a premium on the failure of the plaintiff-
appellant to collect amounts receivable through no fault of the government.
It would be tantamount to depriving the government of the revenue to which
it is entitled, simply because the plaintiff-appellant has failed to collect said
amounts.”
The plaintiff-appellant should not pay the franchise tax on
uncollected fees or amounts due from the regular customers, on the ground
that they were not gross receipts. "Receipts" means amounts actually
received, for otherwise they would not be receipts. The acts of the Legislature
granting the franchises should be construed so as not to contravene or violate
the organic acts for otherwise said legislative acts would be null and void or
unconstitutional. The organic acts use the word "earnings." A person may
have earned his salary but may not have collected it, or may be unable to
collect it from an insolvent employer. A person cannot demand payment of
his unpaid salary unless he has earned it. This would show that to collect is a
different act from to earn. Consequently, the uncollected "gross receipts"
which should be construed as meaning the same thing as "gross earnings"
should be subject to the franchise tax.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. HON. CELSO AVELINO, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII, and the City of
Mandaue
G.R. No. L-39699
March 14, 1979
Facts:
Respondent City of Cebu, in accordance with Presidential Decree
No. 231 (PD No. 231), enacted in 1973, to take effect on January 1, 1974, the
challenged ordinance, or the Mandaue City Tax Code. The City Treasurer, on
April 1, 1974, demanded from petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
payment of the said specific tax on the total volume of beer it produced in the
City of Mandaue. SMC, on April 8, 1974, contested the collection of said
specific tax "on the ground that Section 12(e) (7) in relation to Section 12(e)
(1) and (2), Mandaue City Ordinance No. 97, is illegal and void because it
imposed a specific tax beyond its territorial jurisdiction." Respondent City to
its City Fiscal, pursuant to such Presidential Decree, then referred the matter.
Its validity was sustained. Then came the appeal to the Secretary of Justice,
with the then Acting Secretary of Justice Macaraig, as noted, rendering the
opinion that it is "of doubtful validity." The City where it squarely put in issue
the validity of such ordinance, thus contesting the opinion of the Acting
Secretary of Justice, thereafter filed a suit for collection.
SMC filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the Ordinance No. 97,
Section 12 should be nullified and that the filing of the suit is not the “appeal”
contemplated in the PD. CFI: motion to dismiss denied. SMC went to
Supreme Court praying for writs of certiorari and prohibition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the filing of such action after such opinion was rendered may
be considered "an appeal" under the Presidential Decree.
Held:
Yes, action by City of Cebu is valid. Petition is dismissed. Case remanded for
further wings.
1. JURISDICTION TO PASS UPON THE VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIONS. — The
validity of a statute, an executive order or ordinance is a matter for the
judiciary to decide and that whenever in the disposition of a pending case
such a question becomes unavoidable, then it is not only the power but the
duty of the Court to resolve such a question.
2. INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION; SUIT FOR COLLECTION IN
CONSONANCE WITH THE APPEAL PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN THE
LOCAL TAX CODE. — To construe that a suit for collection cannot be viewed
as the appeal provided in Sec. 47 of the Local Tax Code would be to raise a
serious constitutional question. For it would in effect bar what otherwise
would be a proper case cognizable by a court precisely in the exercise of the
conceded power of judicial review just because the procedure contended for
which is that of an "appeal," under the circumstances a term vague and
ambiguous, was not followed. SMC may not be sufficiently award of the
implications of such a proposition. It would run counter to the well-settled
doctrine that between two possible modes of construction, the one which
would not be in conflict with what is ordained by the Constitution is to be
preferred. Every intendment of the law should lean towards its validity, not
its invalidity.
3. PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF STATUTES. — The finding by the then
Acting Secretary of Justice that the Mandaue City Tax Code in question was
of "doubtful validity" is far from a categorical declaration of its being
repugnant to the Constitution or its being ultra vires. That betrays a
realization that unless and until the judiciary speaks in no uncertain terms,
the presumption of validity continues. Misgivings as to the livelihood of an
alleged infringement of any binding norm do not suffice.
Emilio Flores, et al. vs Vicente San Pedro, et. al
G.R. No. L-8580, September 30, 1957
FACTS: The petitioners, former employees in respondents’ electric and ice
plants in Pangasinan, filed three suits on May 7, 1954 in the Court of First
Instance of that province to recover compensation for overtime work they
allegedly rendered during the period of their employment with the aggregate
sum claimed being P152,473.34. The defendants, now respondents herein,
moved for the dismissal of the suits on the ground of prescription, invoking
the three-year prescriptive period for actions under the Wage Law (R.A. No.
602) in default of a prescriptive period for actions under the Eight-Hour Labor
Law. The lower Court herein upheld the defendants’ theory and amended
the complaint. Reconsideration of the order having been denied, the
plaintiffs brought the present petition for certiorari to have the said order
annulled as violative of their vested rights and rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Respondents in their answer question the propriety of the remedy
but they did not press that point in their memorandum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive period under the Minimum Wage Law
can be extended to actions arising under the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
HELD: No, the prescriptive period under the Minimum Wage Law cannot be
extended to actions arising under the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
Under Section 17 of Republic Act no. 602 or the Minimum Wage Law,
the prescriptive period provided therein specifically refers to the
enforcement of any cause of action under that Act and its application cannot
be extended to cause of action under the Eight-Hour Labor Law on the theory
propounded by the lower court that the two laws are in pari materia, because
in point of fact they are not. While it is true that both relate to labor, they are
distinct and separate measures. One treats of minimum daily wages with no
provision for compensation for overtime work; the other deals with the
length of a working day in terms of hours with express provision for
compensation for service rendered beyond the required hours of work. Also,
the penalties prescribed in one are different from those in the other.
Moreover, the rule of pari materia is resorted to only as an aid to statutory
construction.
On the other hand, the rule is that the general law shall supply
deficiencies in special laws. In the absence, therefore, of any prescriptive
period in the Eight-Hour Labor Law, the statute of limitations provided for in
the general law — in this case Act No. 190 (the old Code of Civil Procedure) or
the new Civil Code — applies. The court found the view reasonable, and there
being no dispute that the contracts of employment in the present case were
oral, they hold that the period of prescription applicable to petitioners'
actions in the lower court was, both under Act 190 and the new Civil Code, six
years. That period should be counted — since there is no special provision
which ordains otherwise — from the day petitioners' actions could have been
brought. (Art. 1969, old Civil Code; art. 1150 of the new.) And such actions
could have been brought at the end of each regular pay period when payment
of overtime compensation became due.
In view of the foregoing, the order complained of is modified in the
sense that the petitioners' complaints shall be amended to include only those
portions of petitioners' claims for overtime payment as are within the period
of six years counted from the accrual of their respective causes of action.
Lacson v Roque
92 Phil. 456
January 10, 1953
Facts:
On 20 October 1952, following the acquittal of the Deputy Chief of
Police for in a criminal prosecution for malversation of public funds, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson of Manila, made a radio broadcast in which he criticized the
court’s decision stating that: "I have nothing but contempt for certain courts
of justice. . . . I tell you one thing (answering an interrogator), if I have the
power to fire Judge Montesa (the trial judge) I will fire him for being
incompetent, for being an ignorant…an ignomaus.” Judge Montesa filed a
libel case against Mayor Lacson. Following the complaint, the President
wrote the Mayor a letter that notified him of his suspension in view of the
pending case against him.
Issue:
Whether or not Mayor Lacson may be suspended by the President
from his post.
Held:
No, Mayor Lacson may not be suspended by the President from his
post. Under Sec 9 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No.409):
“the Mayor shall hold office for four years unless sooner removed” shall be
construed in relation to removal statutes. Thus, it meant that the Mayor
cannot be removed except for the causes stated in the removal statutes. Sec
64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code confers upon the President the
power to remove officials from the office but it must be done “conformably
to law” and only for acts for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In
this case, the allege libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty,
hence he may not be suspended due to this ground.
CITY OF NAGA VS. CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD
VELASCO
G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976
MARTIN, J.
FACTS:
On June 15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga enacted
Ordinance No. 360. The petitioners claimed that respondents were not
"compelled" but voluntarily paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance
No. 360. On February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the City
Treasurer who denied the same. Respondents alleged that under existing
law, Ordinance No. 360, did not take effect in 1970, the year it was approved
but in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval, or in 1971.
Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360 took effect in the quarter of the
year of its approval, that is in July 1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 305 provides that "Each approved ordinance ... shall take effect and be
enforced on and after the 10th day following its passage unless otherwise
stated in said ordinance ... ".
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Ordinance No. 360 enacted on June 15, 1970
should be effective and enforceable in the next succeeding year after the year
of its approval or in 1971.
RULING:
 On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment
holding that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga was
enforceable in the year following the date of its approval, that is, in 1971 and
required the petitioners to reimburse the respondents.
The different opinions as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect is
due to the conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code
as invoked by respondents to support their stand and Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) as invoked by petitioners to support their
stand.
That Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2
of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject
matter -- enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. They can be
considered in pari materia. When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of
statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together.
Enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are supposed
to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the
legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislation on the same
subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. (G.R. No. L-
36049; Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 11, pp. 535- 536.)
It is a principle in statutory construction that a statute will not be
construed as repealing prior acts on the same subject in the absence of words.
Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to
harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable
interpretation.
De Jesus Vs People (GR L-61998)
February 22, 1983
Facts:
Defeated mayoral candidate of the Nacionalista party, Ananias Hibo, filed a
complaint with the COMELEC charging Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC
registrar of Casiguran, with violation of 1978 Election Code. Asst. Fiscals
Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog of the Tanodbayan conducted the
investigation and issued a resolution finding the existence of prima facie case
against petitioner for violation of section 89 and subsections of Section 178
of Election Code of 1978.
After approval by Tanodbayan, an information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner questions jurisdiction of Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan over the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case.
Ruling:
The supreme court speaking through Justice Escolin ruled that under the
Constitution, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over ". . .offenses
committed by public officers . . . relation to their office as may be determined
by law" (Sec. 5, Art. XIII) while the Office of the Tanodbayan shall "receive and
investigate complaints relative to public office." (Sec. 6, Art. XIII).
The clause, "as may be determined by law" is, to be imbued with grave
import. It called for a legislation that would define and delineate the power
and jurisdiction of both the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan, as what, in
fact had been provided for in Presidential Decree Nos. 1606 and 1607,
creating the said entities. Thus, under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over: (c) Other crimes or offenses
committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office."
Plainly, the above quoted paragraph (c) is but a re-statement of the
constitutional provision relating to the Sandiganbayan. It is also to be noted
that it is phrased in terms so broad and general that it cannot be legitimately
construed to vest said entity with exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses
committed by public officers in relation to their office. Neither can it be
interpreted to impliedly repeal the exclusive and original jurisdiction granted
by Section 184 of the Election Code of 1978 to the court of first instance to
hear and decide all election offenses, without qualification as to the status of filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals but said court
the accused. rendered its decision in favor of SGIT, Inc.
Apart from the fact that repeals by implication are not favored, it is noted that The Issue/s:
while Section 184 of the Election Code deals specifically with election Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in construing BP Blg. 22.
offenses, Section 4(c) of P. D. 1606 speaks generally of "other crimes or
Held:
offenses committed by public officers. . . in relation to their office." Needless
Yes. During the investigation, it was proved that the notices of dishonor of
to state, as between specific and general statute, the former must prevail
the checks were given to SGIT, Inc. instead of petitioner Yu Oh. This became
since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does.
detrimental to the legal basis of SGIT, Inc. in providing that the petitioner
And where a reconciliation between the statute is possible, as in the case at
violated BP 22. It was proven through an interview of Mr. Novales that
bar, the former should be deemed an exception to the latter.
despite his knowledge with regard to the lack of funds on the part of the
petitioner he still sought for such payment to be rendered. Thus, the
Elvira Yu Oh, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, defendant Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the CA and acquitted the petitioner of
GR 125297 the violations of BP 22 with further instruction that said petitioner will pay the
June 6, 2003 P 500,000 with 12% interest per annum from the date of finality of herein
judgement.
Statement of the Facts: Elvira Yu Oh, petitioner, purchased pieces of
jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc. but was unable to render
payment for such jewelry. SGIT, Inc. proceeded to file a civil case in the People vs Gatchalian
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. On a later date, SGIT, Inc.’s general manager, 104 PHIL 664 (1958)
Joaquin Novales III, entered into an agreement/compromise which required
FACTS:
petitioner to pay such jewelry through issuing ninety-nine checks with the
Alfonso Gatchalian(Gatchalian) was the owner and manager of the
amount of P50,000 dated on the 15th and 30th of every month starting
New Life Drug Store. He had Expedito Fernandez (Fernandez) as a salesman
October 1990 and a lump sum of P1 million by November 16, 1996
in the said establishment. During the period between August 4, 1951, and
accompanied with the last check. The petitioner complied with said
December 31, 1953, Gatchalian allegedly paid Fernandez a monthly salary of
agreement and issued 10 checks with the specified amount but was later
P60 - P90, contrary to the provisions of Republic Act 602. This act of paying
dishonored by the Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC) due to their finding
such a salary left a difference of P1,016.64 in unpaid salaries for the period
that the account was closed. The dishonor slips for each of the checked issued
abovementioned. The Court of First Instance dismissed the informations
were returned to Mr. Novales. The circumstances led Mr. Novales to file ten
against Gatchalian, and directed the Regional Representative of the
informations, docketed as criminal cases 92-26243 and 92-36252 before the
Department of Labor to institute a civil action against the erring employer for
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City citing the violations of the petitioner in
the colection of the alleged underpayment of wages. The Government took
the Batas Pambansang Bilang 22, otherwise known as the “Bouncing Checks
this appeal.
Law”. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of SGIT, Inc. Petitioner Yu Oh
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of RA 602 should be strictly construed
against the state, awarding a favorable ruling for Gatchalian.
HELD:
NO. The pertinent rule of strict construction of penal laws does not
apply in this case.
RATIO:
Generally, penal laws should be strictly construed against the State.
However, this rule of statutory construction will not apply in this case because
the law is clear and free from ambiguity. Even though RA 602 does not
explicitly declare failure to pay the prescribed minimum wage as unlawful,
Section 15 (a) provides that "Any person who wilfuly violates any of the
provisions of this act shall upon conviction" be subject to the penalty
prescribed. It clearly indicates that the legislature intended not only to punish
those acts expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared, but
are clearly in conflict with the provisions of RA 602. The failure to pay the
minimum wage is embodied in this scenario.
The main objective of the law in providing a rock-bottom wage to be
followed would be defeated if the court were to adopt a restrictive policy in
punishing those who do not pay the minimum wage. If the law is to survive, it
must be real, militant, and effective.
Thus the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the informations
filed against Gatchalian. The Supreme Court ordered that these cases be
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
84 PHIL 842-847 [G.R. No. L-1949. October 31, 1949.] REALTY
INVESTMENTS, INC.
and PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
MARIANO
VILLANUEVA ET AL., defendants. MARIA PASTRANA and PRUDENCIO
CASTRENCE,
appellees.
FACTS:
Although several defendants are mentioned, only the facts of Maria
D. Pastrana and her husband will be stated. Plaintiff, Realty Investment Inc.
is the registered owner of Valhalla Gardens Subdivision in Rizal City. On May
8, 1941, Pastrana bought from Plaintiff one lot (262-VV) for P7,200 and paid
P700 on account of the purchase price for the execution of the deed of sale.
The deed provided that Pastrana pay the rest of the balance at the end of
every month, in an installment of P85.93 with 10% interest per annum until
balance is complete. Failure to pay on those dates would result the payment
due and demandable in its entirety and either consider the contract of sale
rescinded or allow repossession and sale of the property. Defendant already
paid 8 installments, when the war between U.S. and Japanese broke out. Due
to the event, the office of the Plaintiff closed and the payments were
interrupted, considering an Americans worked there. In 1944, Defendant paid
to the Enemy Property Custodian of the Japanese Army in the Philippines,
the remaining unpaid installments. The custodian cancelled the deed of the
Plaintiff and transferred the certificate title No. 75513. According to the facts,
the complaint prays the court to declare due and payable the purchase price
of P6,238.14; declare null and void, the sale between the defendant and the
Japanese authorities; declare plaintiff owner of the lot; order register of
deeds to reinstate the title. Or defendant order payment to plaintiff for the
remaining balance plus interest from April 1, 1945.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Plaintiff is entitled to repossession and payment
according to the deed of sale executed with Defendant?
HELD:
Yes, Plaintiff-appellants prayer is reversed. Although, moratorium
law proclaimed under EO No. 25 as amended by Order No. 32 is the premise
of the motion to dismiss, in Alejo vs. Gomez, the Court ruled that suit for
unlawful detainer and rents in arrears was not affected by the moratorium,
the recovery of the unpaid rentals, it was said, being an accessory to the main
action. Examining the plaintiff’s allegations and prayer, the primaryobject of
action is the validity of the payment made between the Japanese Alien
Property Custodian and the title issued in pursuant of those payments. The
Court ruled that such object is considered the main cause of action. It is
considered an alternative remedy in case the defendant is unable to fulfill the
stipulations of the deed of sale. The sole object was a monetary obligation.
Moratorium orders were conceived exclusively for the benefit of the debtor
in the strict sense of the term. They were not intended to suspend other rights
of action. Moratorium should not be in derogation of the protection against
the impairment of the obligations of contracts and other constitutional
guarantees. Therefore, EO No.’s 25 and 32 must be strictly applied to matters
falling within their scope and purpose.
G.R. No. L-55166. May 21, 1987
ELISA R. MANOTOK vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
FACTS: In 1977, the Tambunting Estate and a property along the Sunog de
Apog were included in the priority list of the Zonal Improvement Program
because of the finding that both had been described as blighted
communities. A year after, a fire affecting the Tambunting Estate prompted
the President and Metro Manila Governor to announce that the national
government would acquire the property for the victims. The National
Housing Authority (NHA or public-respondent) was designated to negotiate
with the owners for the acquisition of the property, but it did not materialize.
In 1980, Presidential Decree (PD) 1669 and PD 1670 were issued by
the President - these are expropriations of the Tambunting Estate and a
property along the Sunog de Apog respectively. The PD determined the
amount of the property, when it was to be paid to the owners, the conditions
of the property, and designated the NHA as the administrator to take
immediate possession and disposition, with the power of demolition of
expropriated properties and their improvements. The NHA requested for the
Certificate of Title of the Properties from the Registry of Deeds, sent a letter
informing the owners that a deposit had already been made pertaining to the
expropriated property, and circulated instructions to the tenant-occupants of
the properties not to pay their rentals to the owners for their lease-occupancy
of the properties.
Hence the owners, herein petitioners, raise the constitutionality of
the PD 1669 and 1670 for deprivation of the their right to due process, right
to just compensation, and equal protection of the law for failure of the public-
respondent to follow Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court dealing with
expropriation proceedings. The respondents argue that the power of
eminent domain is inherent in the state and that expropriation proceedings
are political in nature and the courts must respect the decision of the law-
making body unless the legislative decision is clearly and evidently arbitrary,
unreasonable, and devoid of logic and reason; and that all that is required is
that just compensation be determined with due process of law which does
not necessarily entail judicial process.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1669 and PD 1670 are constitutional.
RULING: No. Although it is true that the power of eminent domain is inherent
in every state, the provisions in the Constitution provide for its limitations,
which are: first, the taking must be for a public use, secondly, the payment of
just compensation must be made, and thirdly, due process must be observed
in the taking. The challenged decrees are uniquely unfair in the procedures
and the powers given to the respondents.
There was no hearing or proceeding that took place. The
expropriation was instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the
signing of the decree. The owners were not given any opportunity to contest
the values of their expropriations, plead their side, or question the amount of
payments fixed by the decree. There was also no showing that there were
debates on why the properties were particularly selected and why they were
categorized blighted communities. Furthermore, the decisions, rulings,
orders and resolutions of the NHA expressly declared as beyond the reach of
judicial review which are not tenable. These shortcut methods embodied in
the decrees on expropriation do not achieve the desired results of the
Constitution.
The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory every time a
specific decree or law orders the expropriation of somebody's property and
provides its own peculiar manner of taking the same. Neither should the
courts adopt a hands-off policy just because the public use has been ordained
as existing by the decree or the just compensation has been fixed and
determined beforehand by a statute.
Antonio a. Barretto et al. vs. Augusto H. Tuason et al.
[G.R. No. 23923. March 23, 1926]
FACTS:
Don Antonio Tuason founded a mayorazgo on February 25, 1974 of
strict agnation upon the third and the remainder of the fifth of all his
properties. It was therein provided, that the revenue of the properties and
all such others as might be annexed thereto, should be distributed in the
proportion of four-fifths for the first-born, and his successors, and one-fifth
for the other eight children and other descendants of the founder,
mentioned in the instrument. On June 4 of the same year, the founder died
in the City of Manila.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the first-born possessor of this mayorazgo is a mere
usufructuary of the entailed properties.
2. Whether or not this mayorazgo is, in its essence, a trust (fideicomiso).
3. Whether or not the plaintiffs are included in the word “grandchildren”
(nietos) employed in the clause and are entitled to the fifth of revenues of
his properties.
RULING:
1. Yes, the first-born possessor of this mayorazgo is a mere usufructuary of
the entailed properties. Mayorazgo, defined according to Alcubilla and
Escriche that it is the right to succeed of properties subject to the ownership
of a family with the prohibition of alienation. Both used the expression
“ownership of the family” and not “ownership of the first-born possessor”.
Also, the founder provided in the instrument the title of “possessor” and not
“owner” to the first-born. In the 17th clause, it is declared that it is the
environment and possession of the mayorazgo (not absolute ownership).
Consequently, the first-born has the enjoyment and possession of the
properties of the mayorazgo, but subject to the strict obligation of preserving
them intact, that it is forbidden to sell, alienate or encumber them. Thus, the
possessors are a usufruct.
2. Yes, this mayorazgo is a trust. In seeking out the antecedents of this
institution, every mayorazgo contains the essential elements of a
fideicomiso, the fideicomiso is the genus and the mayorazgo the the species.
Not every fideicomiso is a mayorazgo, but every mayorazgo is a fideicomiso.
Thus, it is a mayorazgo and a fideicomiso. Mayorazgo is a right granted to
each first-born to succeed to the entailed properties in order to preserve
them in the family and deliver in the order of succession to the following first-
born. Fideicomiso is a charge of confidence imposed upon the first-born
usufructuary possessor to preserve the entailed properties and deliver
thereof to the succeeding first-born. While he possesses the mayorazgo, the
first-born is a trustee, but he is not a beneficiary. If he enjoys the properties
he does not do so as either trustee or beneficiary, but as a usufructuary heir.
The beneficiaries are the 8 younger children of the founder and other
relatives in the deed of foundation.
3. Yes, plaintiffs are included in the word “nietos” and entitled to the
revenues. In the instrument, the word “descendants” is also employed.
Considering the instrument as a whole, there is no sufficient reason for
restricting the meaning of the word “nietos” to sons of sons alone. Also, there
was no intention of the founder to restrict the grant of usufruct of the fifth of
the revenue by limiting it to a certain number of generations of the younger
children, but that he intended to extend it all of the descendants of the latter.
If this is so, the rule of law of the Partidas applies: Privileges are to be
interpreted with liberality in accordance with the will of him who grants them.
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA)
vs.
HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS (MARCOS)
G.R. No. 120082 (September 11, 1996)
Facts:
Petitioner MCIAA was created by virtue of RA No. 6958, and since
the time of its creation, enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of
realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its charter. However, on October
11, 1994, the LGU of Cebu City demanded for payment for realty taxes on
several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner.
MCIAA objected to such demand for payment as baseless and
unjustified, claiming its exemption under its own charter which exempts it
from payment of realty taxes. It also cited Section 133 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations on the taxing power of the
LGU.
However, Respondent Cebu City countered that such tax exemption
privilege was already repealed in pursuant to Section 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code that took effect on January 1, 1992. Mentioned sections
effectively withdrew the tax exemption privilege enjoyed by all persons
whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under RA No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions.
As Cebu City was about to issue a warrant of levy against the
properties of petitioner, MCIAA was compelled to pay its tax account and
thereafter led a Petition for Declaratory Relief, contending that the taxing
powers of LGUs do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees on an
instrumentality of the national government. MCIAA also asserted that while
it is indeed a GOCC it nonetheless stands on the same footing as an agency
or instrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its
powers and functions.
The RTC dismissed the petition in the light of its finding, that the
LGC does indeed state the express cancellation and withdrawal of exemption
of taxes by GOCCs.
Issue:
Whether or not MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes?
Held:
No. MCIAA is not exempt from realty taxes by Cebu City. Taxation is
the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. As a general rule, the power
to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse
is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the
tax on the constituency who are to pay it. Accordingly, tax statutes must be
construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the
taxpayer.
The enactment of the LGC, in the last paragraph of section 234,
withdrew exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural
or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner MCIAA is,
undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its
exemption from such tax granted it by its charter has been withdrawn.
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, No, CENVOCO is not obliged to pay the tax deficiency claimed by CIR.
G.R. No. 107135, [February 23, 1999], 303 SCRA 508, 363 PHIL 130-139 In statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule must be
strictly construed but reasonably construed. Exceptions may extend only if
the language fairly warrants, and thus doubts must be resolved in favor of the
Facts: The Commissioner of Internal Revenues (CIR), through its Deputy
general provisions of a statute rather than the exceptions. When a statute
Commissioner SGD Eufracio D. Santos, the petitioner in the case, contends
comes with an exception, the court will not reduce it nor add meaning to what
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), one of the respondents, before the
is implied. As a basic rule, in the absence of a clear legislative intent, a
Supreme Court regarding the latter’s prior decision on the tax deficiency
statute’s words should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage or
allegedly incurred by Central Vegetable Oil Manufacturing Co., Inc.
meaning.
(CENVOCO), represented by its President, Mr. James Chua, the respondent
of the preceding case. Thus, according to SC, the law which CIR embraced as its basis for
CENVOCO's tax deficiency is a proviso of Section 168 of the Tax Code. SC tells
CENVOCO, a manufacturer of edible oil and coconut, coprameal
that the exception provided in the said law should be strictly construed that
cake, and such other coconut oil related products paid its sales tax due for its
the sales, miller’s, and excise taxes on all other materials, except the raw
purchased containers and packaging materials from its supplier in 1986 but
materials used in the milling process, and the sales taxes paid on the
was subjected to the three percent (3%) miller’s tax by the CIR for its
containers and packaging materials purchased may be credited against the
amounting to P 1,575,514.70.
manufacturer. The SC claimed that the purchased containers and packaging
A letter after the other were exchanged by the respondent and the
materials by CENVOCO are not considered as raw materials as to what is
petitioner. CENVOCO wrote CIR a request for reconsideration to the latter’s
defined by the statute.
initial assessment, stating that the final provision of Section 168 of the Tax
The SC dismissed CIR’s petition and affirmed CA’s decision, it found
Code does not apply to the sales tax paid on the recently purchased
no error as to what CENVOCO had initially paid its total sales taxes and was
containers and packaging materials and shouldn’t’ve been included in the
in no way liable to the tax deficiency claimed by the deputy commissioner.
three percent (3%) miller’s tax. CIR replied to CENVOCO that their
Moreover, SC stressed that in statutory construction, tax burdens are not to
assessment is valid. CENVOCO was dissatisfied with CIR’s answer and
be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed beyond what the tax code
directly filed a petition to Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) for a review, which then
expresses to ordinary tax payers but when it is against the government, then
decided the case in favor of the oil manufacturer. CIR then appealed to CA
tax statutes must be construed with strictissimi juris or a process in which the
the decision made by CTA, but CA affirmed the assailed decision in toto. CIR
rule of process shall be applied strictly or a document interpreted strictly.
was disappointed with the outcome of the case and has raised its petition to
the Supreme Court (SC).
Issue: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. vs. Province of
Laguna, et al.
Whether or not CENVOCO is obliged to pay the alleged three percent (3%)
tax deficiency for its purchased containers and packaging materials to CIR. G.R. No. 151899

Ruling: August 16, 2005

FACTS: PLDT is a holder of a legislative franchise under Act No. 3436, as ISSUE:
amended, to render local and international telecommunications services. Whether or not PLDT is exempt from paying local franchise tax
On August 24, 1991, the terms and conditions of its franchise were
HELD:
consolidated under Republic Act No. 7082, Section 12 of which embodies
No. Petitioner PLDT is not exempt from paying local franchise and business
the so called in-lieu-of-all-taxes clause, where under PLDT shall pay a
taxes to the Respondent Province.
franchise tax equivalent to 3% of all its gross receipts, which franchise tax
shall be “in lieu of all taxes”. Section 23 of RA 7925 does not operate to exempt PLDT from
payment of franchise tax. In applying strict construction of laws and statutes,
Thereafter, the Local Government Code took effect granting
granting tax exemptions and the rule of doubts should be resolved in favor of
provinces and other local government units the power to impose local
municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal
franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. Thus, the Province of
taxing powers, Section 23 of RA 7925 cannot be considered as having
Laguna enacted a provincial ordinance imposing a franchise tax upon all
amended petitioner’s franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the
businesses enjoying a franchise, which includes PLDT. PLDT thereafter paid
imposition of local franchise taxes.
the Province of Laguna its local franchise tax liability for the year 1998 in the
amount of Php 1,081,212.10. The statute must be clear and it should leave no doubt of the
intention of the legislature to grant such tax exemption.
Prior to that, Congress enacted the Public Telecommunications
Policy Act of the Philippines. The Department of Finance, thru its Bureau of
Local Government Finance, issued a ruling to the effect that PLDT, among REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
other telecommunication companies, became exempt from local franchise Vs
tax. Therefore, PLDT shall be exempt from the payment of franchise and
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
business taxes imposable by LGUs under Section 137 and 143, respectively of
of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF
the Local Government Code, upon the effectivity of RA 7925 which states
OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE
that:
CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO.,
However, PLDT shall be liable to pay the franchise and business LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
taxes on its gross receipts during the period that PLDT was not enjoying the CORPORATION, respondents.
“most favored clause” provision of RA 7025.
PLDT refused to pay the Province of Laguna its local franchise tax
Facts:
liability for the following year and it even filed with the Office of the Provincial
The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines prohibition
Treasurer a written claim for refund of the amount it paid as local franchise
proceedings against Judge Guillermo P Villasor (Villasor) for acting in excess
tax for the previous year.
of jurisdiction or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
No refund was granted and PLDT instituted a petition before the
of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
RTC of Laguna against the Province and its Provincial Treasurer but was
denied.
properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), hence the
garnishments are nullified and voided.
A decision on July 3, 1961 was rendered in Special proceedings in favor of the
respondents P.J Kiener Co., LTD., International Construction Corporation,
and the petitioner herein, confirming the amount of P1.7m. On June 24, 1961
Villasor made an order which was final and executory.
On June 26, 1961, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, upon examining the writ,
served notices of garnishment with several banks, particularly the Philippine
Veterans Bank.
Issue:
Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Villasor is valid
Held:
No. What Villasor did was unconstitutional. From the basic concept
of non-suitability of the state, public funds cannot be the object of
garnishment even if the consent from the suit prior has already been given.
Disbursement of public funds should be passed through several appropriation
laws as required by the constitution.
[ G. R. No. L-23080, September 20, 1965 ]
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, PETITIONER,
VS. CITY OF DAVAO AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENTS, ITT PHILIPPINES, INC. INTERVENOR.
Facts:
PLDT, Inc. filed a suit against the City of Davao and the Public
Service Commission. Petitioner seeks to enjoin Davao City from fulfilling its
contract with ITT Philippines, Inc. for the thallation of Davao City's telephone
system. It further seeks to compel the Public Service Commission to require
that Davao City first obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
ITT Philippines, Inc. filed a motion to intervene, which was granted, and an
answer in intervention. Petitioner replied to the answer in intervention.
Petitioner twice applied for preliminary injunction but same was denied.
On August 7, 1963 and December 27, 1963 the Davao City Council
passed Resolutions Nos. 664 and 2015, authorizing the establishment and
maintenance of a city-wide telephone system, owned, maintained and
operated by Davao City.
Pursuant thereto Davao City entered into a contract with ITT
Philippines, Inc. under the terms of ITT. Petitioner maintains that the
projected installation would result not only in unlawful expenditure of public
funds but prejudice to the rights of petitioner as prior owner and operator
since 1931 of a city-wide telephone system in the City.
Issues:
(1) WON Davao City has no power to establish and operate a telephone
system; and
(2) WON Davao City has first to secure a certificate of public convenience
and necessity from the Public Service Commission.
Held:
(1) No, Davao City was responding to the pressing necessity in adopting the
resolutions to establish a telephone system that can fully serve and benefit
the people in its territory. A municipal corporation is not prevented from
constructing and operating a competing plant, although a franchise had been
granted a private company for a similar public utility, provided the franchise
is not exclusive. Section 14 of Act No- 3436 states:
"Sec. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and
power to grant any corporation, association, or person other than the grantee
franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of messages or signals
shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise."
(2) Regarding the issue of whether Davao City has first to secure a certificate
of public convenience and necessity, the Public Service Act exempts from
said requirement all government entities:
"Section 13. (a) The Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and
control over all public services and their franchises, equipment, and their
properties, and in the exercise of its authority, it shall have the necessary
powers and the aid of the public force: Provided, That public service owned
or operated by government entities or government-owned or controlled
corporations shall be regulated by the Commission in the same way as
privately-owned public services, but certificates of public convenience or
certificates of public convenience and necessity shall not be required of such
entities or corporations.
"Section 14. The following are exempted from the provisions of the preceding
section:
"(e) Public service owned or operated by any instrumentality of the National
Government or by any government-owned or controlled corporations,
except with respect to the fixing of rates."
It cannot be seriously denied that Davao City is a Government entity.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied, without costs.
Quimsing vs Lachica
112 Phil 110 (1961)
Facts: Petitioner Joaquin Quimsing is the owner and manager of a duly
licensed cockpit, located in the District of Molo, City of Iloilo. On February 13,
1958, the cockpit was raided by members of the city police force and the
Constabulary under the command of Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso
Aliño Jr., upon the ground that it was being illegally operated on that day,
which was Thursday, not a legal holiday. Quimsing claimed that the cockpit
was authorized to operate on Thursday by an ordinance of the City Council of
Iloilo, approved on October 31, 1956. This notwithstanding, Capt. Lachica
allegedly threatened to raid the cockpit should cockfighting be held therein,
thereafter, on Thursdays. Moreover, Quimsing and nine (9) other persons
were arrested and then charged in the Municipal Court of Iloilo with a
violation of Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285
and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Petitioner commenced the present action, in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, against the respondents where he set up two causes of
action namely an action to recover damages from respondents and an action
for writ of preliminary injunction. In their answer, respondents alleged that
the raid and arrest were made in good faith. Respondents, likewise, set up a
P150,000 counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages. The CFI dismissed
the petition and the respondent's counterclaim. As a result thereof,
Petitioner filed an appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 938, as amended, gives local
governments a blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any time and for
as long as said governments may wish it.
Ruling: The court ruled in the negative.
To begin with, repeals and even amendments by implication are not
favored, whereas an affirmative answer would entail a vital amendment,
amounting, for all practical purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and 2286
of the Revised Administrative Code.
Secondly, grants of power to local governments are to be construed
strictly, and doubts in the interpretation thereof should be resolved in favor
of the national government and against the political subdivisions concerned.
Thirdly, it is a matter of common knowledge that cockfighting is one
of the most widespread vices of our population, and that the government has
always shown a grave concern over the need of effectively curbing its evil
effects. The theory of petitioner herein presupposes that the Republic of the
Philippines has completely reversed its position and chosen, instead, to place
the matter entirely at the discretion of local governments. We should not,
and can not adopt, such premise except upon a clear and unequivocal
expression of the will of Congress, which, insofar as said premise is
concerned, is not manifest from the language used in Republic Act No. 938,
as amended.
Lastly, "cockpits" and "cockfighting" are regulated separately by our
laws. Thus, section 2243 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers
municipal councils "to regulate cockpits". Yet, the authority of said council
over "cockfighting" is found in sections 2285 and 2286 of said Code, not in
said section 2243 (i). Similarly, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes, not illegal "cockpits", but "illegal cockfighting". What is more,
participation in cockfights "on a day other than those permitted by law", in
dealt with in said article separately from participation in cockfights "at a place
other than a licensed cockpit." .
DOMALANTA, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GR. No. L-55932, March 16, 1987
FACTS:
Magdalena Bautista, a 38-year old widow, owned a house and lot
which the same is registered under her name, with an area of 237 square
meters at 473 Santolan Road, Quezon City. Tomas Ilao occupied and leased a
portion of the said lot from Bautista since 1964 to whom he paid loans to. On
August 1, 1956, Bautista signed a note promising Ilao to sell one-fourth of her
lot to him if she failed to pay her debt, however, he discovered that Bautista
intended to sell it to another. On February 5, 1960, he further claimed one-
fourth of the said where the following year, Bautista secured a loan of P3,000
from Ignacio Domalanta recommending her to mortgage said lot to him for
her debt. Then, Bautista filed a petition against Ilao’s claim which was denied
by the court.
In 1962, when said mortgage obligation matured, Bautista sold the property
to her counsel, Atty. Teodoro Domalanta, son of Ignacio, for P6,000.
Thereafter, both filed a complaint against Ilao to recover possession of the
property to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. While the case was
pending, Atty. Teodoro transferred said property to his brother Dominador
Domalanta for P8,000.In 1964, Ilao was ordered by the court to vacate said
property as soon as he was paid the sum of P500 by the plaintiffs. Then,
Dominador filed a suit against Bautista for non-payment of rentals in the said
property. Subsequently, Bautista filed against the Domalantas a suit praying
for her sale of property to be declared as valid mortgage and that the titles
issued in the registry be annulled.
The Court of First Instance decided that said sale as mortgage is declared
valid in favor of Bautista; ordering the plaintiffs and the defendants to pay
each other certain amounts. The Court of Appeals (CA), upon appeal of the
Domalantas, modified such decision still declaring said sale as an equitable
mortgage.
On September 19, 1980, the CA issued a resolution declaring said appealed
judgment as final and executory given that no motion for reconsideration was
filed upon receipt of said judgment on August 5, 1980. However, Atty.
Domalanta claimed that he mailed a motion for reconsideration on August
28, 1980 but said motion was misaddressed, hence it did not reach the court
until September 23, 1980, where said motion was denied by the CA. Atty.
Domalanta filed a motion to set aside the resolution and argued that said
copy of the decision was received by him on August 13, 1980, however the
postmaster recorded that said copy was received by Atty. Domalanta on
August 12, 1980, again, denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred denying the motion for
reconsideration and the motion to set aside the resolution dated September
19, 1980 by Atty. Domalanta.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the motion for
reconsideration and motion to set aside the resolution. Under the rules of
statutory construction, liberal construction is used to expand meaning of
statutes within its spirit and reason or which gives a statute its generally
accepted meaning. However, statues may not be liberally construed if its
clear and plain language rejects such interpretation. In the present case, the
CA ruled that even when the decision was received on August 12 or 13 of 1980,
the motion for consideration was still 26 days late when it was received by
court on September 23, 1980. The court did not grant liberality in its rules
because their decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Hence, giving such motions liberality will not be in accordance with the intent
and reason of its rules. Thus, the Court of Appeals, following the exact word
and intendment of its rules, did not err in denying such motions.
Diokno v Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
G.R. No. L-4712
July 11, 1952
Facts: Plaintiff, Ramon Diokno was a holder of a backpay certificate of
indebtedness under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304 (“Backpay Law”).
He had an outstanding loan with the defendant, Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, of which was still unpaid. Defendant, Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation was created by Republic Act No. 85. The corporation was created
to provide credit facilities for the rehabilitation and development of
agriculture, commerce, and industry, the reconstruction of property
damaged by war, and the broadening and diversification of the national
economy. Plaintiff sought to compel the defendant corporation to accept
payment of the balance of his indebtedness with his backpay certificate. The
defendant resisted on the ground that plaintiff's demand was not only not
authorized by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 but contrary to the provisions
thereof and that the law permits only the acceptance or discount of backpay
certificates and not the repayment of loans. The court a quo held that section
2 of Republic Act No. 304 was permissive merely, and that even if it were
mandatory, plaintiff's case cannot fall thereunder because he is not acquiring
property for a home or constructing a residential house, but compelling the
acceptance of his backpay certificate to pay a debt he contracted. The appeal
involved the interpretation of section 2 of Republic Act No. 304, which
provides:
. . . And provided, also, That investment funds or banks or other financial
institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to
availability of loanable funds, and any provision of their charters, articles of
incorporations, bylaws, or rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, accept or discount at not more than two per centum per
annum for ten years such certificate for the following purposes only: (1) the
acquisition of real property for use as the applicant's home, or (2) the building
or construction or reconstruction of the residential house of the payee of said
certificate: . . .
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff can use his backpay certificate to pay off his
outstanding loan balance to defendant corporation.
Ruling: No. In the provision subject of controversy, it is to be noted that the
verb-phrase "shall accept or discount" has two modifiers, namely, "subject to
availability of loanable funds" and "at not more than two per centum per
annum for ten years." As to the second modifier, the interest to be charged,
there seems to be no question that the verb phrase is mandatory, because
not only does the law use "at not more" but the legislative purpose and intent,
to conserve the value of the backpay certificate for the benefit of the holders,
for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a
maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance
shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation.
The phrase "subject" means "being under the contingency of" (Webster's Int.
Dict.) a condition. If the acceptance or discount of the certificates is to be
"subject" to the condition of the availability of loanable funds, it is evident
that the Legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the
condition that there are "available loanable funds." In other words,
acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds. In
so far as the discount and acceptance of backpay certificates are concerned, Issue:
should be interpreted to be directory merely, not mandatory, as claimed by Whether or not the appointments of sectorial representatives for
plaintiff-appellant, the same to be construed as a directive for the the local legislative body made by the Secretary of the Local Government
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to invest a reasonable portion of its funds are lawful, constitutional, and valid.
for the discount of backpay certificates, from time to time and in its sound
Ruling:
discretion, as circumstances and its resources may warrant. The acceptance
The Supreme Court ruled that the appointments of Arcadio Tambo
and discount of backpay certificates has been placed within the sound
and Pablo C. Sison as sectoral representatives of the Sangguinang Bayan of
discretion of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, and subject to the
Binalonan are legal and valid.
availability of loanable funds.
Article X, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
“Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation
Legaspi v. Estrella
as may be prescribed by law”. The phrase “as may be prescribed by law” is not
189 SCRA 58 prospective in character. The word "may" is an auxiliary verb showing,
24 Aug. 1990 opportunity or possibility. Under ordinary circumstances, the phrase "may
Facts: be" implies the possible existence of something. Thus, the phrase “as may be
prescribed by law” should be understood to mean as prescribed by such law
In compliance to Article X, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, the
that governs the matter at the time the Constitution is ratified or that could
Municipal Council of Binalonan passed a resolution recommending the
be enacted thereafter. Hence, the said provision commands that all
appointment of respondents Arcadio Tambo and Pablo C. Sison as sectorial
legislative bodies of local governments must have sectorial representatives,
representatives. Pursuant to the said resolution, the Secretary of the Local
and such should be appointed in accordance with the law, whether the law
Government issued a memorandum on August 8, 1989 appointing Tambo
presently exists or is yet to be passed.
and Sison as sectorial representatives of the Sangguinang Bayan of
Binalonan to represent the agriculture and industrial sectors, respectively. In the case at bar, the law governing sectorial representation is
Section 146 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337). Under the Local
Petitioners Jesus S. Legaspi, Primitivo Loveranez, Jr., and Eduardo
Government Code, the power to appoint sectorial representatives is
L. Lauder filed for a petition to impugn the appointments made by the
conferred upon the President of the Philippines but the Secretary of the Local
Secretary of the Local Government. The petitioners are questioning the
Government, may, by the authority of the President inform such sectorial
validity and legality of the appointments, they argue that such appointments
representatives of their appointments. Thus, in the case at bar, it was actually
are unlawful and unconstitutional since it was not signed by the President of
the President and not the Secretary of the Local Government who made the
the Philippines and since there is yet no enabling law to implement Article X,
appointments to Arcadio Tambo and Pablo C. Sison as sectorial
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution.
representatives, the Secretary merely served as the communicator of such
The Regional Trial Court, headed by its Presiding Judge, Hon.
appointments.
Santiago G. Estrella, dismissed the petition. Hence, the case was appealed to
the Supreme Court.
 Vda. de Mesa v. Mencias Held:
124 Phil 1187-1202, G.R. No. L-24583 Yes. The death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in
October 29, 1966 the election protest filed against him, it may be stated as a rule that an
election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite
the death of the protestee. With the death of De Mesa, however, contingency
Facts:
not expressly provided for by the Revised Election Code was ushered in.
Francisco De Mesa and Maximino Argana were opponents for the mayoralty Nevertheless, precisely by express mandate of Rule 134 of the Rules of Court,
of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections. De Mesa won the election and said rules may however be applied in suppletory character.
thereafter proclaimed and assumed office. Meanwhile, the defeated
It is our considered view that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court applies
candidate Argana, filed an election protest against De Mesa charging him of
to election contests to the same extent and with the same force and effect as
the perpetration of frauds, terrorism and other irregularities in certain
it does in ordinary civil actions. And we declare that unless and until the
precincts. De Mesa, on the other hand filed a counter-protest and sought to
procedure therein detailed is strictly adhered to, proceedings taken by a court
shift responsibility for irregularities to the protestant and his followers.
in the absence of a duly appointed legal representative of the deceased
However, while the case is pending Mayor De Mesa was assassinated. Argana
protestee must be stricken down as null and void.
moved for the constitution of committees on revision of ballots which
Considering that, in the case at bar, the trial court failed to order the
requires the protestee's widow and children to appear within fifteen days
protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
from notice. They did not show up. Argana then reiterated his move for the
deceased protestee, but instead — in derogation of the precepts of the Rule
appointment of commissioners on revision of ballots, and the trial court
in question and in the total absence of a legal representative of the deceased
granted the motion aforesaid. The trial court, in its decision adjudged the
protestee. It is no argument against this conclusion to contend that the
protestant Maximino Argana as the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, in the
requirement for the procurement of a legal representative of a deceased
1963 elections.
litigant is couched in the permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory
De Mesa’s widow filed a petition which include among others for the
word "shall."
reconsideration of the decision upon the ground that pursuant to the
"Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court, it was legally improper for the trial
justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or public
court to have proceeded ex parte with the election case. The trial court
officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the
denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the deceased protestee,
public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be
and order stricken from the record their motion for reconsideration and new
construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon
trial and their cautionary notice of appeal. The movants elevated the case to
as a duty" (Black, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 540-543).
CA on a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court connotes a directory
or mandatory compliance.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R.
BREHM and ESTER MIRA BREHM, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant
FACTS:
Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with
temporary assignment at Subic Bay. He married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen,
who had a daughter Elizabeth. After the marriage, the couple established
their residence at Intramuros, Manila, and the minor Elizabeth had always
been under their care and support of Brehm. The spouses filed a Joint Petition
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor
Elizabeth on January 28, 1959. The spouses claimed that they have mutually
given their consent to the adoption, not only to promote her best interest and
well-being, but also to give her a legitimate status.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granted the petition of
the spouses. However, The Solicitor General claimed that it was error for the
Court in adjudging Elizabeth. Petitioner argued that Article 335 of the New
Civil Code which prohibits a non-resident alien to adopt was inapplicable to
him because it covers adoption only for the purpose of establishing a
relationship of paternity and filiations where none existed, but not where the
adopting parents are not total strangers to the child. Petitioners further
contended that they could adopt pursuant to Article 338 of the Civil Code
which expressly authorizes the adoption of a stepchild by a step-father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Brehm was allowed to adopt Elizabeth under Art. 335
of the Civil Code?
HELD:
No, Brehm is not allowed to adopt Elizabeth. Under the rules of
statutory construction, a statute must be construed as a whole. Article 338
should be construed in connection with Article 335. Par. 4 of Article 335 clearly
states that "The following cannot adopt ... (4) non-resident aliens." Hence, it
is mandatory because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched
in negative terms, importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise
than designated. On the other hand, Par. 3 of Article 338 provides that "the
following may be adopted: (3) step-child by the step-father or step-mother."
This provision is merely directory and can only be given operation if the same
does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Article 335. Moreover, it is
Article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case and before
Article 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be
established. Therefore, the petitioner being a non-resident makes him not
qualified to adopt under the Civil Code.
Mendoza vs Cayas
98 Phil 107
December 17, 1955
FACTS:
Petitioner Josefa Mendoza alleges that she was born out of wedlock
by Claro Bustamante and Paula Mendoza in 1983. She was supported and
reared by said Claro Bustamante and was openly introduced as his daughter
to his acquaintances. Before his death in 1929, Claro delivered to Josefa a
private document signed by him and attesting that she was his natural
daughter. This document Josefa kept until the outbreak of the second world
war in 1941; then, in the confusion caused by the hostilities, she lost the
paper, and did not find it again until 1953. In the meantime, Claro
Bustamante's widow by a second marriage, Teodora Cayas, and his
legitimate son, Nicasio Bustamante, had extrajudicially partitioned his
estate.
Josefa instituted these proceedings for the judicial administration
and settlement of the estate of Claro Bustamante, and for the recovery of her
corresponding share therein as his acknowledged natural child. Defendants
alleged that she was never duly acknowledged, and that her action for
acknowledgment was instituted too late.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Josefa's action to compel recognition as natural child is now
barred
HELD:
Yes, her action to compel recognition is barred. Under Article 137 of
the Code, the action to compel recognition is expressly conditioned by law
upon its being commenced during the lifetime of the natural parent, unless
the latter dies while the claimant was a minor, or unless a document of
recognition, previously unknown, is discovered after the parent's death. In
this case, Petitioner does not come under the first exception, because she
was already 36 years old when her father died in 1929. She also does not fall
under the second exception because she had knowledge of the existence of
the document of recognition for 12 years from 1929, when her father
delivered it to her, down to 1941, when she first mislaid it.
Assuming that the limitation of actions set by the last paragraph of
Article 137 was repealed by the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), the new
Civil Code of 1950 cannot be retroactively applied to disturb the vested rights
of the appellees who have held the property as owners for the last fifteen
years (Art. 2253). Once more, vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura
subveniunt: the laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
Miranda vs. Guanzon
GR. No. L-4992
October 27, 1952
Facts:
On March 8, 1951, The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgement
in favor of the petitioner, Alfredo Miranda (Miranda), against the respondent,
David Guanzon (Guanzon), in Civil Case 8465. The copy of the judgement was
received by the respondent on March 17,1951.
Nineteen days from the receipt of the copy of judgement, Guanzon
filed a notice of appeal and a cash appeal bond as well as a record on appeal.
The court approved the record on appeal and instructed the clerk of court to
forward it to the Court of Appeals along with supporting evidences.
The petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss in the Court of Appeals
saying that Guanzon failed to perfect his appeal within the reglementary
period in accordance with Section 17, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The
respondent filed an opposition claiming that the appeal was perfected within
the time prescribed because the case does not come within the purview of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Miranda filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied which
prompted Miranda to file a petition for certiorari.
Issues:
Whether or not the appeal should be dismissed because it was not filed
within the period prescribed by Section 17, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
Yes, the appeal should be dismissed. The case filed by the petitioner against
the respondent comes within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act. Section 17, Rule 41 of The Rules of Court provides that the appeal in
workmen’s compensation case should be perfected in the manner provided
by the rules in ordinary cases, but within fifteen days. Section 13, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court also provides that the when the appeal is not perfected
within the reglementary period, the appeal shall be dismissed. Rules of
Statutory Construction provides that statutes or rules prescribing the time for
litigants to take certain actions or to appeal from a decision is generally
mandatory and such statutes or rules require strict compliance.
In the case at bar, the respondent filed his appeal after nineteen days
from receipt of the judgement instead of the fifteen-day period provided by
Section 17, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The requirement regarding the
perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory
but jurisdictional, thus, it requires strict adherence. The failure to file the
appeal within the time prescribed by law takes the case out of the jurisdiction
of the court. Therefore, the appeal filed by the respondent should be
dismissed.
VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA vs. HON. NORBERTO C.
DEVERA
GR No. 116695. June 20, 1997
FACTS:
Private Respondent Susana Guevara filed a complaint for forcible
entry against Patricio Guevara and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex
Guevara before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities of Iloilo City. The Court
served Summons on the petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file
an answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. On September 4,
1993, petitioners filed an urgent motion for the extension of time to file an
answer, but the court denied the same on the ground that it was prohibited
by the Rules on Summary Procedure. On September 8, 1993, past the ten
days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent
motion praying for the admission of their answer. They also filed another
motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer. The court denied
both motions and resolved the complaint for forcible entry in favor of the
private respondent. Petitioners thus file a petition for certiorari and
injunction, claiming that the prescriptive periods must be construed liberally
in their favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Rule on Summary Procedure on the period of
pleadings should be applied liberally
HELD:
NO. The Rules on Summary procedure on the period of pleadings
should be applied strictly. The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated
for the purpose of achieving an “expeditious and inexpensive determination
of cases”. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits
altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Indeed, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 authorizes the Court to stipulate that the period
of filing pleadings in cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure shall
be “non-extendible”.
Following this, it is clear that the use of the word “shall” in the Rule
on Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the
challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would
subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its
objective of expediting the adjudication of suits.
In addition, the petitoners’ justification of “oversight” is hardly valid.
Oversight implies negligence at best and ignorance at worst. The negligence
displayed by petitioners is celarly inexcusable.
Thus, the Supreme Court denied the petition.
Gabriel Vs Encarnacion (GR L-6736)
May 4,1954
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside an order issued by
respondent Judge Francisco Arca on April 29, 1953, granting the motion of
co-administratrix Petrita Pascual and her co-heirs for the sale of all the real
properties of the intestate estate of Eligio Naval as well as the order issued by
respondent Judge Demetrio B. Encarnacion on May 27, 1953, sustaining the
above order and denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioners.
Petitioner argues that the proper regulations in the proceeding were
not followed by lower courts (Section 4 of rule 90). It was noted that said
motion was primarily set for hearing by counsel on December 5, 1952, upon
giving due notice to the opposite counsel, but that the motion was not
actually heard because there was no judge who could act and take cognizance
thereof. Aside from that instance, the motion was never set for hearing again
for which reason counsel for petitioners was surprised when he received copy
of the order of the court granting the motion for the sale of the property.
Issue:
Whether or not regulations were followed in the case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Bautista, held that the answer
must of necessity be in the negative for the simple reason that the motion
filed by respondents for the sale of the real properties of the estate has not
been set for hearing by the court as required by the regulations.
When the court decides to authorize the sale of the property of the decedent
because it appears beneficial to the heirs, the same shall be made subject to
the regulations provided by the Rules of Court. Failure to comply with these
regulations will have the effect of rendering the order authorizing the sale
void as well as the sale made in pursuance thereof.
The decisions of the lower courts were set aside and a new hearing was
scheduled.
 Gador vs COMELEC
GR No. 52365
January 22, 1980
Ponente: Fernandez, J.
Facts:
A petition alleges the petitioner as a candidate for the Office of
Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent on the incoming January 30,
2980 local election; that he filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election
Registrar on January 7, 1980. On January 11, the petitioner caused the
Election Registrar of Ozamiz City to wire the Chairman, Commission on
Elections, reiterating the information that the petitioner had filed a
certificate of candidacy on January 7; in view of the President’s
announcement that the resolution of respondent, Commission on Elections,
for the extension of time for filing certificated of candidacy from January 4 to
January 10 had been denied, there is a strong probability that the petitioner’s
name as candidate for Mayor may not be included in the list of candidates to
be votes which is to be printed soon and distributed in Ozamiz; and that
judgement should be rendered commanding the respondent to immediately
include the petitioner in the list of candidates.
Issue:
Whether or not the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which
was filed on January 7, 1980 valid.
Held:
No, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is not valid.
Ratio:
Section 7, BP 52, provides that “The sworn certificate of candidacy
shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980.”
It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not
extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
Therefore, the certificate of candidacy having been filed beyond
January 4, 1980 is void.
TICZON vs COMELEC (G.R. No. L-52451, March 31, 1981)
Facts:
In 1963, Zacarias Ticzon, as a member of the Liberal Party, was
elected as mayor in San Pablo City while Cezar Dizon, a Nacionalista
candidate, was elected as vice-mayor. In 1967, Dizon was elected as mayor of
San Pablo City. On 1971, Dizon was reelected as mayor beating Ticzon who
ran as a rebel Liberal Party candidate. However, in 1978, Dizon had switched
from the Nacionalista to Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) and became the
official KBL candidate for mayor in the elections while Ticzon became the
official Nacionalista standard-bearer.
On January 23, 1980, Antonio Cosico, filed with the COMELEC a
petition to disqualify Ticzon for reasons that he was nominated by the
Nacionalista Party although he admittedly ran as a Liberal Party candidate in
the 1971 elections. Ticzon alleged that he was expelled from the Liberal Party
due to his running as a rebel candidate and, consequently, in 1980, became
partyless.
In the evening of January 30, 1980, the canvass of the election
returns began. Later, Dizon asked the COMELEC to change the board of
canvassers on the ground of bias and partiality in favor of Ticzon. COMELEC
responded saying that, if Ticzon were to win, it would be suspended on the
grounds of his pending disqualification case. The following day, Dizon filed
with the COMELEC a petition for suspension of the canvass and the
nullification of the election, alleging that Ticzon has restored to vote-buying
and has employed strongarm tactics. The COMELEC then acted on it,
suspending the canvas of the votes for city mayor, vice-mayor and members
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod in San Pablo City.
Ticzon then filed for certiorari for the purpose of suspending the
enforcement of the suspension, in which the Court issued a resolution of
restraining order against the COMELEC. Dizon was not added as a Hence the case is dismissed for lack of merit.
respondent in the case. The restraining order was not implemented as the old
board of canvassers has been replaced with a new one, upon Dizon’s wishes,
and that the order did not prohibit a change in the board. The COMELEC
thereafter stood in the same ground as Dizon, and the new board canvassed
all the returns. The Court then followed with another restraining order for the
canvasses by the new board.
On February 12, 1980, the court ruled Ticzon was disqualified from
running in the elections. Dizon won as the new mayor on February 12,
thereafter Ticzon filed a petition to oust Dizon as a mayor on the ground of
turncoatism.

Issue: Whether the Comelec committed a grave abuse of discretion?

Held:
No, the COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. The
COMELEC is empowered to "enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections" and is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and disqualifications" of elective officials. It is "the sole
judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or
rulings shall be final and executory" and it has "direct control and supervision
over the board the canvassers" and any member of the board "may at any
time be relieved for the cause and subtitled motu propio by the commission".
The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in changing the city board
of canvassers' in directing and it acted within its powers and jurisdiction in
taking steps based on its findings. It investigating the situation in the light of
the representations made by Dizon. The COMELEC had jurisdiction to make
the factual finding that Ticzon changed his party affiliation within six months
preceding the elections. It is not a whimsical and capricious preceding the
elections. It is supported by documentary evidence. There is no justifications
for the Court to interfere with the action taken by the COMELEC.