GREGO vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997)

RELEVANT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: A statute, despite the generality

in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which
transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not
backward.

FACTS:

Respondent Humberto Basco (Basco) in 1981 was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. Subsequently, Basco
ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988
local elections and won. He then sought for re-election in the year 1992 and again,
succeeded. Despite the successful re-election, he found himself facing several lawsuits filed
by his opponents who wanted to remove him from his position. Basco, after the dismissal of
the lawsuits against him, remained unafraid and ran again for Councilor in 1995 for which
he won again for the third time.

Petitioner Wilmer Grego (Grego) in 1995 then filed with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification of Basco on the ground that he should be disqualified from running for any
elective position since he had been removed from office as a result of an administrative case
pursuant to Section 40 (b) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code. Respondent argues
that said provision would not apply to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity.
The COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
also later on denied by the COMELEC hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code
should apply retroactively to those removed from office prior to its effectivity.

HELD:

No, the provision would not apply retroactively for it is already a settled issue.
Statutes are not to be construed as intended to have retroactive effect so as to affect pending
proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from
the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly
indicate that the same operates retroactively. It therefore follows that Section 40 (b) of the
Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case. Basco was therefore not
subject to disqualification.
 STATUTE OPERATES PROSPECTIVELY UNLESS THE CONTRARY IS MADE
MANIFEST.

CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. L-20563, October 29, 1968

FACTS: Prior to the effectivity of R.A. 1299, the petitioner had been paying the sales tax of
APO Portland Cement produced by it, computed at 7% of the gross selling price inclusive of
the cost of the bag containers of cement and the gypsum used in the manufacture of said
product. After the approval of the amendment of the law, petitioner stopped paying sales tax
on its gross sales and instead paid the ad valorem on the selling price of the product after
deducting therefrom the corresponding cost of the containers thereof.
Before the ruling of the CIR, petitioner filed with the CTA a petition for review. It was
alleged in the petition that the percentage taxes collected by respondent are refundable since
under R.A. 1299, producers of cement are exempt from the payment of said tax and that
there was also over payment of ad valorem taxes.
The CTA dismissed their petition holding: (1) that petitioner was not exempt from
payment of the sales taxes on its APO Portland Cement prior to the effectivity of R.A. 1299,
it being then considered a manufactured product; (2) that petitioner is not entitled to the
deduction from the gross selling price of the cost of raw materials, the value of the bag
containers and gypsum in the absence of evidence that they had been previously subjected
to the 7% tax imposed by Secs. 186 and 190 of the Tax Code; (3) that for so much of the
sales taxes that were billed, charged to, and paid for by its customers, the petitioner is not
the proper party to claim for refund; and (4) that the right to claim for refund of taxes alleged
to have been erroneously paid thru wrong computation, double payment, or otherwise, is
already barred by prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the refund of percentage tax and ad valorem
taxes

HELD: No. The only change brought about by said amendment is the incorporation of the
definition of the word "minerals" and the term "mineral products." Petitioner contends that
since the purpose of the amendment was merely to clarify the meaning of said terms, the
section should be construed as if it had been originally passed in its amended form, so that
cement should be considered as "mineral product" even before the enactment of R.A. 1299,
and therefore exempt from the sales or percentage tax. The Court held that it is a settled
rule in statutory construction that a statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the
express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt
must be resolved against the retrospective effect. There is nothing in the context of the
provision in question that would manifest the legislature's intention to have the provision
apply to taxes due in the past. The use of the word "shall" gives the unmistakable impression
that the lawmakers intended this enactment to be effective only in futuro.
 In re: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI

G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970

Relevant Statutory Construction Doctrine:

Constitution provides that no Ex post facto law shall be enacted
Facts:

Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., a duly recognized non-stock and non-profit corporation, filed
a petition for declaratory relief and is praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of
R.A. No. 6132, stating:
“No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow himself to be
represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization, and
no political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or
other organization or organized group of whatever nature shall intervene in the
nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or
give aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against
his campaign for election…’’
The corporation is claiming that the aforementioned section of the statute violates the due
process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto
law.

Issue:

1. Whether Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 is constitutional.

2. Whether Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 is an ex post facto law.

Held:

Yes, The first three grounds were overruled by the Court when it held that the
questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of expression, freedom
of association, freedom of assembly and equal protection clauses; for the same is designed
to prevent the clear and present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the
prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the laws.

No, Petitioner’s claim that the statute is an ex post facto law is likewise untenable.
From the definition of ex post facto laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal
laws which are given retroactive effect. While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of
any provision of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for
acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There
is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision
thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval.
 People of the Philippines v. Ferrer
G.R. No. 32613
December 27, 1972

Relevant Statutory Construction Doctrine: A bill of attainder must apply retroactively

and reach past conduct.

Facts:
On March 5, 1970, a criminal complaint was filed against the respondent Feliciano
Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, which
outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and
punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
Respondent Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder. On May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court,
charging the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. Respondent Tayag also
moved to quash on the grounds that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder, it is vague,
it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof, and it denies him the
equal protection of the laws. The trial court, in its resolution, declared the statute void on
the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad.

Issue: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Held:
No, the Anti-Subversion Act is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative
act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. It is necessary that it must apply
retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of
attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt.

In this case, the statute is prospective in nature. Section 4 of the Anti-Subversion

Act prohibits acts committed after the approval of the Act. Only those who "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines or of any subversive association" after June 20, 1957
are liable. The members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the
enactment of the law were given the opportunity to escape liability by renouncing their
membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall exempt
such persons from liability. Since the Anti-Subversion Act does not apply retroactively, it
cannot be considered as a bill of attainder.
 PEOPLE VS SUBIDO
G.R. NO.21734, 5 September, 1975

RELEVANT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:

STATUTES; PENAL STATUTES ARE TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT. — It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to
be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. In the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny, and to construe
it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendants.

FACTS: Accused was found guilty of libel and was sentenced to 3 months of arresto mayor
with accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of P500, to indemnify the offended party
in the sum of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the judgement, by eliminating the penalty
of imprisonment and reducing the indemnity to P5,000. Accused also seeked the trial
court to have his appeal bond cancelled.

He argued that although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity, he could not
be required to serve the amount of the fine and the indemnity in the form of subsidiary
imprisonment because said judgement did not expressly and specifically provide that he
should serve fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Upon opposition of the offended party, the lower court declared that the
accused has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine and
indemnity prescribed in the decision.

The Supreme Court modified the orders holding that accused may no longer be
required to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the indemnity and
affirmed the orders denying the motion for cancellation of appeal bond and sentencing him
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and
indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

RULING: No, the accused cannot be required to serve the fine and indemnity in the form of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The accused is favored by the retroactive
force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No.5475 which exempts
an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil
liability.

It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. In the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny, and to construe
it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant. Considering that Article
39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is favorable to the accused, the same should be
made applicable to him. Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be required to serve his civil liability to the
offended party in the form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because this is
no longer required by the aforesaid article.
 Republic v. Samia G.R. No. 17569

RELEVANT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: A statute cannot be given

retrospective application when it affects substantive rights and not merely procedural
matters.

FACTS: On May 29, 1959, pursuant to Republic Act No. 1162, the plaintiff filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to expropriate 31 parcels of land located in two
different parts of Manila and owned by 14 persons. 21 parcels of land are found on Pingkian
st., Tondo, Manila while 10 are at the corner of Jose Abad Santos Avenue and Bambang st.

On motion of the defendants to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground
that plaintiff had no right to expropriate the land in question, pursuant to the ruling in other
cases.

Plaintiff appealed with the contention that R.A. No. 1162 was amended by R.A. No. 1990
and further amended by R.A No. 2342 and under such amendments, its complaint stated a
cause of action so that its dismissal constitutes a reversible error. It contends that
expropriation is proper under the amendments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff has valid cause of action to expropriate parcels of land
in question.

Ruling: No, the complaint in this case, as already stated, was filed on May 29, 1959. At that
time, the law applicable was R.A No.1990 which referred only to “landed estates or haciendas
in the City of Manila, Quezon City and its suburbs.”
R.A. 2342, which took effect on June 20, 1959, cannot be given retrospective application so
as to govern the present proceedings, because it affects substantive rights and not merely
procedural matters.
 Municipality of Sta. Fe v Municipality of Aritao

Statutes do not operate prospectively where the law expressly provides that it does not

FACTS:
In October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in Nueva Vizcaya, filed before
the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the determination of boundary dispute involving
the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. The trial was almost over when the court realized
its oversight under existing law.
On December 9, 1988, the court suspended the proceedings and referred the case to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. In turn, the Sanggunian concerned passed
on the matter to its Committee on Legal Affairs, Ordinances & Resolutions which adopted
the former Provincial Board’s Resolution No. 64 adjudicating the two barangays as part of
respondent’s territory. The Sanggunian approved the Committee’s recommendation but
endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings & preservation of the
status quo pending finality of the case.
In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The
RTC denied the motion ruling that since there was no amicable settlement in the
Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a “decision” favoring a party. The court held that, under
the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity
to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and that in
case no such settlement is reached, the court proceedings shall be resumed.
Subsequently, respondent filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack
of jurisdiction since the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already
belonged to the Sanggunian Panlalawigan & no longer with the trial court. The RTC granted
the motion. The CA then affirmed. According to the CA, a new legislation can be given
retroactive effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC vesting jurisdiction to the
Sanggunian was given retroactive effect. Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the
latest will of the people expressed through Congress on how boundary disputes should be
resolved, the same must prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on
the creation of local government units as well as settling boundary disputes are political in
character, hence, can be changed from time to time and the latest will of the people should
always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Regional Trial
Courts no longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

HELD:
NO, the RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the
responsibility of the court to dismiss an action “whenever it appears that [it] has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at the time
of the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident. It was duty-bound
to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the choice of the proper forum
was crucial – for the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time by this Court as it would never become final and executory.
Likewise, the standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action;
otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make the court’s decision a “lawless” thing. As
correctly pointed out by the RTC it will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the case
concerning a boundary dispute if its decision will not after all be followed by the people
concerned because the decision is totally unacceptable to them.
 EUGENIO CHAVEZ, petitioner v. THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and
AQUILINO DE LOS REYES, respondents
G.R. No. L-17814.
October 31, 1963

Statutory Construction Doctrine: Non-retroactivity of amendment by R.A. No. 2263 as to

succession to tenancy relationship.
Facts:
Sometime in 1957, respondent De los Reyes purchased a 1 & ½ hectare of Riceland
in Barrio Dalig, Balayan Batangas from Troadio Frontera. De los Reyes could not take
possession of the land because the then incumbent tenant, Pablo Chavez, a septuagenarian,
did not want to surrender the land to its new owner. Pablo worked the same principally with
the aid of his son Eugenio Chavez.
On July 27, 1957, De los Reyes filed a petition with this Court against Pablo Chavez
asking for authority to dispossess said tenant, on grounds, first 1) Pablo was already
incapacitated to work the land himself due to old age, second 2) He wanted to work the land
himself, but the suit was dismissed.
On October 21, 1958, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility). The law governing tenant
and landowner relationship when he died is Republic Act. No. 1199. Under this statute, the
relationship between petitioner Chavez and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by
reason of such death.
On April 8, 1959, petitioner Chavez filed a petition in respondent court (5 th Regional
District, San Pablo City). This time, R.A. No. 1199 was amended by R.A. No. 2263. This
amendment provides for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant’s
death or incapacity “between the landholder and one member of the tenant’s immediate farm
household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who
shall cultivate the land himself personally...”

Issue/s:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 2263 can be applied retroactively.

Held:
No, Republic Act No. 2263 cannot be applied retroactively.
Since the law in force when the tenant died was R.A. No. 1199, which provided that
the tenancy relationship between him and the respondent landowner was terminated by
reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 2263 did not operate to confer
upon petitioner, son of the deceased, any successional right to continue as tenant.
In the case of Ulpiendo vs. CAR, 109 Phil., 964, it was held: "The amendment to
Section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263, providing for the continuance
of the relationship in the event of the tenant's death or incapacity 'between the landholder
and one member of the tenant's immediate farm household who is related to the tenant
within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself
personally . . . which took effect on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied retroactively."
To hold otherwise would lay open this particular provision of the law to the objection
of unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already
become vested.
 TEOFILO MARTINEZ vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 132852. May 31, 2000

DOCTRINE: STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City. During the hearing on June 23, 1994, petitioner represented by Atty. Jesus
Chavez of the Public Attorney's Office objected to petitioner's motion to be allowed to litigate
as pauper and moved instead to strike out the entire testimony of the witness for the
prosecution on the ground that it was inadmissible for being violative of the testimonial
privilege afforded to children in cases involving their parents. The judge deferred his ruling
on the objection and allowed the testimony to be continued. On July 21, 1994, the trial court
issued an order overruling the objection. On August 8, 1994, the court denied the motion
for reconsideration. This prompted the petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when
it issued the assailed orders. On August 23, 1994, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals
a motion to litigate as pauper to avail of this privilege. The appellate court subsequently
denied the motion and directed petitioner to remit the docket fees amounting to P420.00
within 5 days from notice. On April 7, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order, but this was similarly denied. In the assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the petition was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fees. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the same was likewise dismissed.

ISSUE: whether or not a motion to litigate as pauper can be entertained by an

appellate court.

RULING: Yes, a motion to litigate as pauper can be entertained by an appellate court.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that
extent procedural laws are retroactive. The Court therefore held that a motion to litigate as
an indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of
appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil actions. Accordingly, the questioned
resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion.

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with all the evidentiary
requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as pauper. The affidavits executed
by himself and two other disinterested persons were enough to convince the court that
petitioner is qualified to litigate as indigent.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November

1997 dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioner Teofilo Martinez and its Resolution
dated 2 January 1998 denying reconsideration are SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED for appropriate action to the
Court of Appeals which is further ordered to allow petitioner to litigate as pauper and to
return to him the amount of P420.00 representing the docket fees he paid.
Relevant Statutory Construction Doctrine – Retroactivity effect applies in both P.D. 725
and the re-acquisition of Filipino Citizenship by administrative repatriation

Juan G. Frivaldo v Commission on Elections

257 SCRA 727

June 28, 1996

Facts:

Juan Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of the Governor of
Sorsogon on March 20,1995. Raul Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec
praying that Frivaldo be disqualified by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1995, Second Division of COMELEC granted the petition of Lee, a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by Frivaldo which remained unacted until after elections. His
candidacy continued and after a few days COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the
Second Division. In the elections, Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes. Lee filed a
petition praying for his proclamation as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon as he
garnered the second highest number of votes. On June 21, 1995 COMELEC directed the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim Lee as the winning candidate. Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon on June 30,1995. Frivaldo filed with the COMELEC a new
petition praying the annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
alleged that on June 30, 1995, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines
after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 on August 17, 1994. On December 19.
1995, the COMELEC First Division promulgated that Lee was not legally entitled to be
proclaimed the winner having not obtained the highest number of votes; and that Frivaldo
having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation and having garnered the highest
number of votes is qualified to hold the office of governor. Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal?

Held:

Yes, the repatriation was valid. Under Philippine Law, citizenship may be required by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Under the P.D. No. 725, it creates
a new right and also provide for a new remedy for former natural born Filipino who had lost
their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine Citizenship. The law is
deemed to be curative and remedial statute which is generally held to be retroactive in
nature. It is not only the law itself (P.D. No. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but
even the repatriation granted under said law. In the case at bar the repatriation granted to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed retroactive to the date of his application on
August 17, 1994. Hence, he lost his foreign nationality before the election of 1995 and was
therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. Lee’s petition was dismissed.
 DAVID VS. DANCEL

G.R. No. L-21485 July 26, 1966

REGALA, J.

DOCTRINE: Repeal by implication not favored; will not be decreed unless it is manifest
that the legislature so intended unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

FACTS: Petitioner filed this action for quo warranto in the Manila Court of First Instance,
seeking the ouster of respondent Angel Dancel from the position of Chief, Tax Registration
Section, Real Estate Division, Treasurer's Office in the City of Manila, to which petitioner
claims to be lawfully entitled to appointment. Under Republic Act No. 1080, the eligibility
granted is subject to the condition precedent that the position involved requires professional
knowledge of the applicant. Still it is argued that respondent Dancel, like petitioner, is only
a second grade eligible and should not have been appointed to the vacant position. For him
to be able to question Dancel's qualification, David must first show that he himself has a
right to the office.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT petitioner possesses civil service eligibility for the position.

WHETHER OR NOT petitioner have such a right and is qualified for promotion.

RULING: No. Petitioner is considered a second grade eligible. Petitioner is considered a first
grade eligible, but he is so only with respect to positions "the duties of which involve
knowledge of the respective profession" under Republic Act No. 1080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1844. Petitioner claims that, as early as 1956, he was granted first grade
civil service eligibility after having passed the Bar examinations. He could be in this case, of
the law profession. Since the position of Chief of the Tax Registration Section does not
require professional knowledge of the law, the court ruled that petitioner could only be
considered a second grade eligible. Furthermore, the efficiency rating of an employee at the
time promotion is made and not his subsequent rating is the one that determines his
competence.

No. petitioner has not shown a right to the disputed position and consequently he can not
maintain an action for quo warranto. At the time of his appointment, Dancel had an
efficiency rating of 90% as against petitioner's 84%. Under Executive Order No. 503, series
of 1934, the minimum requirement is 85%. Petitioner claims that Executive Order No. 503
was repealed by the Compilation of the Civil Service Laws and Rules of 1956 that "provisions
which are obsolete have naturally been eliminated." Since Executive Order No. 503, series
of 1934, is not included in the compilation, it must be because it is "obsolete." The
Compilation of Civil Service Laws and Rules was prepared merely by the Bureau of Civil
Service and could not possibly have repealed Executive Order No. 503, series of 1934 since
under Article 7 of the Civil Code, "laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary.
 Pacia Vs Kapisanan

99 Phil 45 (1956)

Concepcion J.

Doctrine: Every amendment is deemed to have a prospective effect, in the absence of an

express or clear provision to the contrary, which does not exist in the cases under
consideration.

Facts: Beinvenido Pacia (5 years tenure;dismissed June 1951), Vicente Vinas (6

years;dismissed September 1952) and Guillermo Orbeta (6 years;dismissed December 1952)
were dismissed from service by Manila Railroad Company for prolonged absences,
falsification and conversion of the mount of 6.40 and theft of one lubricant can respectively.
Defendant Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company, is a duly registered
labor union and relief association, composed as its name indicates, of employees of the
Manila Railroad Company.

At the time of said dismissals of plaintiffs herein, Article VI, section 1, paragraph (f) of the
Constitution and by-laws of the defendant, which had been approved in 1950, provided that
any member separated from the service of the company shall be given by the defendant a
gratuity of P1,000, if he had served the company continuously for forty years, and that,
otherwise, he shall have a gratuity of P100 for each year of service, not exceeding the
aggregate amount of P1,000.

The defendant argues that the aforequoted provision was amended on 1953 and it has a
retroactive effect.

The Court of First Instance sided with the defendant which led the plaintiffs to file this case
to Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or Not the contested amendment shall have a retroactive effect.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that every amendment is deemed to have a
prospective effect, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary, which does
not exist in the cases under consideration. The amendment adopted on March 27, 1953,
had provided for its retroactive operation, it would have been null and void, and,
accordingly, ineffective, insofar as it affected the right thus previously vested in
plaintiffs herein, for the defendant could not, and cannot, by its unilateral act, impair its
contractual obligations.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay to plaintiffs Bienvenido Pacia, Vicente Viñas and Guillermo
Orbeta, the aforementioned sums of P500, P640 and P656, respectively, with interest
thereon, at the legal rate, from December 10, 1953, as to the first sum, and from February
20, 1954, as to the last two sums, these being the dates of the filing of their respective
complaints. The defendant shall, also, pay the costs.
 MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC. vs MANUEL T. FLORES
G.R. No. L-9396, 16 August, 1956

RELEVANT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL

STATUTES; EFFECT OF. — The actual existence of a statute prior to its declaration as
unconstitutional, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored.

FACTS: In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a
complaint to recover from Manuel T. Flores some chattel mortgage installments due in
September 1941. Manuel Flores pleaded prescription: 1941-1954, which caused the
complaint’s dismissal. Manila Motor Company appealed to the Court of First Instance, which
ruled that the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. Thus,
the ten-year term had not yet elapsed when Manila Motor sued for collection.
However, Flores appealed, arguing that the moratorium laws did not have the effect
of suspending the prescriptive period because they were held to be unconstitutional in the
case of Rutter vs Esteban. Thus, the moratorium laws should be viewed as inoperative as if
it had never been passed. No rights can be built upon it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the moratorium laws suspended the prescriptive period despite being
declared unconstitutional.

HELD: YES. The moratorium laws suspended the prescriptive period despite being declared
unconstitutional.

RATIO: Although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute confers no right,
creates no office, affords no protection, and justifies no acts performed under it, Rutter vs.
Esteban may be construed to mean that at the time of the decision, the Moratorium law
could not be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such declaration, is an operative fact. It may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine of
unconstitutional statutes having no effect whatsoever.
 [G.R. No. L-25494. June 14, 1972.]
NICOLAS SANCHEZ vs. SEVERINA RIGOS

Statutory Construction Doctrine: The Cardinal rule in construing different provisions of

one and the same law or code, such interpretation should be favored as will reconcile or
harmonize said provisions and avoid a conflict between the same.|d

FACTS:

In 1961, Plaintiff and Defendant executed and instrument entitled “Option to

Purchase”, where Defendant agreed to sell Plaintiff a parcel of land. If the sum of P1,510 is
not paid within 2 years, the option shall be deemed “terminated and elapsed”. In 1963,
Plaintiff paid Defendant but rejected the payment, even when several tenders were paid
within the stipulated period. Plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance for damages.
Plaintiff argued that under Art. 1479 of the Civil Code, there is an accepted unilateral
promise to buy or sell on the part of the promisor. Plaintiff also argues that under Art. 1324
of the Civil Code, ‘When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the
offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal,
except when the option is founded upon consideration, as something paid or promised.' The
Defendant argues that there was nothing in the contract to indicate her agreement and
promise supported by a consideration distinct from the price stipulated from the sale of the
land.

ISSUE: Whether or not, there was a consideration distinct from the sale of the land?

HELD: No. There was no consideration because the “Option to Purchase” was only an offer
to sell. The court said, "There is no question that under article 1479 of the new Civil Code
'an option to sell,' or 'a promise to buy or to sell’, as used in said article, to be valid must be
supported by a consideration distinct from the price.” Even if there is a unilateral promise
to buy or sell, and even if accepted, it would only be binding if there is a consideration
present. If there is no support of consideration, it may be withdrawn. Since there is no valid
contract without cause or consideration, the promisor is not bound by his promise. This
court’s view is to avoid the conflict between Article 1324 on Contracts and Article 1479 on
Sales, both of the Civil Code.
 [G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992]
ANTONIO A. MECANO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Implied repeals are not favored. There is implied repeal when there is clear showing of the
legislature intent to repeal the act or provision. This can be shown by irreconcilable
conflict between the new act and the prior act, and the new act covers the whole subject
and clearly intended to substitute it.

FACTS: Petitioner is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized due to cholecystitis and
claims reimbursement for his hospital expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). Despite
recommendation, the COA denied the claim relying upon the Administrative Code of 1987.
They argued that this repealed the RAC solely for the reason that the same section was not
re-stated nor re-enacted in the AC of 1987.

ISSUE: Whether of not the Administrative Core of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699
of the RAC.

HELD: No. The nature of the repealing clause, being an implied general repealing provision,
does not specifically repeal Section 699 of the RAC. There are two categories of repeal by
implication: First, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the earlier statute and
the latter one. Second is if the later act covers the whole subject and clearly intended that
the latter be a substitute for the former act. In the case at bar, there is no conflict with the
two codes regarding the same subject matter, nor does it state that the section is abrogated.
What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. Therefore, there
is no repeal of Section 699 and petitioner is given due course to claim his' benefits.
 LUCIANO ESCOSURA, DIONISIO ASIS, PRIMATIVO BINALBER,
PROCOPIO CIPRIANO, FEDERICO HIPOLITO, CESAR VILLAREAL, and
PABLO R. CRUZ, petitioners-appellees, vs. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., respondent-
appellant.
GR L-16696 and L-16702
January 31, 1962

Relevant Statutory Construction Doctrine:

Non-Retroactivity of amendment for Section 14(a) of RA 1161 as to sick leave pay
benefits of employees.

Statement of the Facts:

Petitioners are employed under San Miguel Bewery, Inc. At various times from 1958
to 1959 during their employment, they fell ill and were confined in the hospital for treatment.
For the duration of their confinement, they were given by the employer sick leave pay to the
pursuant to its Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan which is deemed a private health plan
between the petitioner and respondent. Even with such payment from the respondent the
petitioners claimed for sickness benefit allowance under the Social Security Act for the
respective period of their confinement. The petitioners cited Section 14(a) of Republic Act
1161, their receipt of sick-leave pay less than the full wage does not preclude them from
claiming for the allowances provided in the law. The respondents countered that the
petitioners having already received sick leave to pay (although not full pay) said petitioners
cannot claim for the same period of their sick leaves the benefits entitled under the Social
Security Act as these are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the
employer.

In citing laws such as Article 1695 of the new Civil Code and etc., it is not disputed
that the phrase "leave with pay" used without any qualifying adjective, meant that the
employee was entitled to full compensation during the period of his leave of absence.

Moreover, let it be noted that the present cases arose before the amendment of the
Social Security Act by Republic Act 2668, by the phrase "before all leaves of absence with
pay" to "before all sick leaves of absence with pay." It was also pointed out by the Social
Security Commission:

“×××× We do not think that Congress intended to give such power to the employer as
to make him capable of rendering a provision of the Act impotent and inoperative.”

The Issue/s:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to receive further benefits in citing the
Statutory Construction of RA 1161 Section 14(A) “before all leaves of absence with pay” from
respondent-employer.

Held:

Yes. The petitioner is entitled to such compensation. The statutory construction was
clear and the case at bar the petitioner, by law, is allowed to seek the benefits provided by
the Social Service Commission since if the respondent proceeds in disallowing the petitioner
to benefit of the privileges under the Social Security Act, would defeat the purposes of the
law. Also, the former provision before its amendment will apply instead the latter provision
since the latter cannot be applied retroactively since it would infringe on vested rights.
 Repeal, generally
(Chapter 10, page 542)

The City of Manila vs. Francisco Reyes

[G.R. No. L-8857. September 28, 1956]

RELEVANT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: The change in condition and

circumstances after the passage of a law, which necessitated the enactment of a statute to
overcome the difficulties brought about by such change does not operate to repeal the
prior law, nor make the later statute so inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it.

FACTS:

The defendant has appealed from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
sentencing him to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Php 1,339.00, with legal interest. This
represents license fees and Mayor’s permit fees due from the defendant on his retail sales of
flour pursuant to Ordinance No. 3364

Appellant insists that the promulgation of Executive Order No. 305 and passage of
Republic Acts Nos. 426 and 650 rendered Ordinance No. 3364 oppressive and
unenforceable. He is alleging that this ordinance was conceived when flour was free
commodity and could be imported by anyone, unlimited as to quantity or time, can be sold
to anybody and unlimited as to price or time. Whereas in EO No. 305 and RA Nos. 426 and
650, flour is controlled, an importer has to secure an import license, importation is made in
the name of the Government and limited as to quantity and there is control as to whom to
sell and as to selling price.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is correct.

RULING: Yes, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is correct. There is nothing
in RA Nos. 426 and 650 or in EO No. 305 which suspends or repeals Ordinance No. 3364.

RA No. 426, as amended by RA No. 650, merely enumerates what commodities are
controlled, regulates importation, creates the Import Control Office and provides penalty for
its violations. EO No. 305 merely created the PRISCO. It is quite clear that the Acts and
Executive Order in question may be enforced consistently with Ordinance No. 3364. The
ordinance imposes a fee on merchants and dealers who sell goods in retail based on the
amount of sales and regardless of profits, with the result that it cannot be said to be
inconsistent with RA Nos. 426 and 650 which merely impose controls on certain
commodities. Appellant conveys that flour is now a controlled commodity and which will
diminish his profits, but this point is immaterial for the lawmakers in enacting the Acts,
deemed to have taken into account the existing conditions. In fixing the selling and buying
prices of flour as controlled commodity, profit is certain and pro-determined thus, it is not
oppressive and conscienceless.
 PEOPLE vs ALMUETE

G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976

RELEVANT STATUTORY DOCTRINE: Implied Repeal by Revision or Codification.

FACTS:

Wenceslao Almuete, et. al, were charged with a violation of sec. 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law. It was alleged that the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her
riceland, without notice or her, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five
cavans of palay each to her damage.

The accused pleaded not guilty on the grounds that it lacks details as to how they
violated the law, to which the Lower Court denied their motion. Respondents appealed again
for reasons that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged, and that
there is no law punishing it. The Lower Courts granted the appeal because it does not
describe the circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found, it does not specify
the date agreed upon for the threshing of harvests, and it does not allege that the palay
threshed exceeded 10% of the net share based on the last normal harvest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tenant’s act of pre-threshing without notice of the landlord is
punishable pursuant to sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law.

RULING:

No. The Court cannot punish the respondents for crimes of violations under laws
which are already repealed. The prohibition on pre-threshing as stated from Sec. 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law was already impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform
Code of 1963, therefore the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the
landlord under the Agricultural Tenancy Law has also already ceased to be an offense under
the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense would be repugnant and
abhorrent to the Code of Agrarian Reforms.
 (Joaquin v. Navarro y Castro, G.R. No. L-576, [August 4, 1948], 81 PHIL 373-377)

RELEVANT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: Implied repeal by revision or

codification - Revised statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced
in the new statute shall prevail and whatever is excluded there from shall be discarded.

FACTS: Ramon Joaquin (petitioner-appellee) is the adopted child of the deceased spouses,
Joaquin Navarro and Angela Joaquin, meanwhile Antonio Navarro (oppositor-appellant) is
the legitimate child of the said spouses.

Antonio questions the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila of assigning
Ramon as the administrator of the intestate estate of their late parents. He contends that
the decree of adoption that Ramon possesses is null and void.

The appellant points at article 174 of the Civil Code which prohibits spouses who
have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting another. Also, in the
memorandum of Antonio, he further claims that even under the Code of Civil Procedure
petitioner's adoption is still null and void, because section 766, which provides that "any
inhabitant of the Philippine Islands being the husband of any woman who has a minor child
by a former husband, may petition the Court of First Instance of the Province in which he
resides for leave to adopt such minor child, evidently limits the right of the stepfather to
adopt to a legitimate minor child; and that since Ramon is a natural child of their mother
Angela Joaquin, his adoption by Joaquin is alleged to be illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code relating to adoption had been
replaced and repealed by the corresponding provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which
do not contain specifically the prohibition specified by article 174 of the Civil Code.

RULING: Yes, the Code of Civil Procedures provisions on adoption had replaced and repealed
the relative provisions of the Civil Code.

The court explained that, where a new statute tackles the whole subject matter of a
prior law and adds new provisions and makes changes, and where such law, whether it be
in the form of an amendment or otherwise, is evidently intended to be a revision of the old
act, it repeals the old act by implication.

According to the Court, section 766 of the Code of Civil Procedures refers only to the
adoption of a legitimate minor child, but it does not operate as a prohibition for the adoption
by a husband and wife jointly of the latter's illegitimate minor child which is clearly
permissible under the general provision of section 765 provides that "an inhabitant of the
Philippine Islands, not married, or a husband and wife jointly, may petition the Court of
First Instance of the province in which they reside for leave to adopt a minor child."
Additionally, an illegitimate child may be adopted is clearly indicated by section 769 which
generally states that "if the child to be adopted is illegitimate the consent of his father to the
adoption shall not be required.”

The Court therefore concluded that the adoption of Ramon Joaquin by the deceased
spouses is valid under the Code of Civil Procedure.
 National Power Corporation v. Arca
G.R. No. 23309, 31 October 1968)

RELEVANT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: General law does not repeal

special law, generally.

FACTS:
On December 26, 1963, The Philippine Power and Development Company and the
Dagupan Electric Corporation filed an injunction suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civil case no. 55824) to restrain enforcement by the National Power Corporation of
a revised rate of charges for the electric power and energy sold by defendant. The new
rates was scheduled to take effect January 1, 1964. In the revised rates, the petitioners
found the increase of cost to be unreasonable, excessive and unnecessary. They also
contended that the revised rates had not been previously approved by the Public Service
Commission. There was a gross violation of the provisions of the current contracts between
the plaintiff and defendant due to the fact that the new rates embodied in the revision was
not first settled between the parties through arbitration. The plaintiffs prayed the court for
a temporary restraining order to prevent the scheduled enforcement and implementation
of the revised rates and amended contracts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 2 of the Commonwealth Act 120 was already repealed by RA 2677

HELD:
No. The Section 2 of the Commonwealth Act 120 was not repealed by RA 2677.

Under Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act 2677, amending the Public Service Act and
approved on 18 June 1960, the Public Service Commission was vested with jurisdiction to
fix the rate of charges by public utilities owned or operated by any instrumentality of the
National Government or by any government — owned or controlled corporation. But the
enactment of this later legislation, which is a general law, cannot be construed to have
repealed or withdrawn the exempting proviso of Section 2, paragraph (g), of the
Commonwealth Act No. 120. For it is now the settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a
special statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a
subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to
repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to
include the cases embraced in the special law" (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil.
225).

A special law, like Commonwealth Act 120, providing for a particular case or class of
cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, although the general statute are broad
enough to include the cases embraced in the special law, in the absence of a clear intent to
repeal. In the present case, there appears to be no legislative intent to repeal or abrogate
the provisions of the earlier special law.
 G.R. No. L-58289 July 24 1982

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

Vs

THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER

and/or THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; respondents

RELEVANT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: Amendments are construed as if

the old statute was repealed and a new form has been adopted.

Facts:

The petition was filed by Honorable Valentino L. Legaspi (Legaspi), incumbent of the interim
Batasang Pambansa, praying that Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty and filing
of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes” unconstitutional.

He argued that the said decree was issued under the supposed legislative powers that was
granted to him under an amendment of the past 1935 Constitution which states that: “All
powers vested in the President of the Philippines and the laws of the land which are not
herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and hereby vested in the
President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise.” Amendment No. 6, amended
by plebiscite-referendum the said provision in 1976 which states that: “Whenever in the
judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the Interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in... his
judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the
necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the
land.” Which was again amended in 1981.

He also argued that the said decree was promulgated without the knowledge of the Batasang
Pambansa, which is also deemed to be unconstitutional because the 1935 Constitution
provides that: “The President may only grant amnesty with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa.”

Issue:

Whether or not Amendment No. 6 still has the same effect after it has been amended again
in 1981.

Held:

It was held that PD 1840 was constitutional because Amendment No. 6 clearly states that
in case of a state of emergency, whatever the president declares becomes part of the law of
the land. In the case at bar, when President Marcos passed PD 1840, he was not acting out
of jurisdiction since he was acting within the boundaries that Amendment No. 6 of the 1935
Constitution vested in him.
 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

GR 122156, 3 February 1997

Applicable Law Doctrine: Constitution defined under Constitutional Construction.

FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a
letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the
GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
WON the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par. of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is not self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly,
the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details
may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions.

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
 Javellana v. Executive Secretary

Applicable Doctrine: Justiciable and Political Questions; Constitutional Construction

FACTS
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was
amended by Resolution No. 4 calling a Convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines. The 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its
functions and approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Then,
the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino
people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well
as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on
January 15, 1973.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a case against the Executive Secretary and the
Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their
subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of b the proposed
Constitution not found in the present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. The petition
was filed by Javellana, as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter” and as “a
class suit, for himself, and on behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated.” Javellana
also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including. Respondents are acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground that the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify
the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

ISSUE
Whether the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 - ANNOUNCING THE
RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE
1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, is a justiciable question

HELD
On the issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices or six (6) members of the
Court, held that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and
non-political question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “inasmuch as it is
claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court
should keep hands-off out of respect to the people’s will, but, in the negative, the Court may
determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935
Constitution been complied with.”

To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not
the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935
Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the
constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time
of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.

Thus, the issue of whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance
with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence
here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
 RELEVANT DOCTRINE: Ascertaining legislative intent to protect the life, liberty and
property of people pursuant to the Constitution.

US vs. ANG TANG HO

G.R. No. L-17122

February 27, 1922

FACTS: The legislature passed Act No. 2868 or the act penalizing the monopoly and holding
of palay, rice and corn during a special session in 1919. The said act authorizes the
Governor-General to issue and promulgate rules and emergency measures for the
furtherance of the act without however, specifying and defining the price of the rice or any
rules for fixing the price. In the same year, the Governor-General issued a proclamation,
Executive Order No. 53, where he fixed the price of the rice as it should be sold. Then, the
Governor-General charged Ang Tang Ho for selling the rice at an excessive price where he
was convicted and served a sentence of a five-month imprisonment. Ang Tang Ho appealed
and claimed that the lower court erred in finding the proclamation issued by the Governor-
General as valid, and that there was an undue delegation of power under Act No. 2868,
assailing its unconstitutionality.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional and that there was an undue
delegation of power to the Governor-General.

RULING: Yes, Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional and there was an undue delegation of power
by the legislature to the Governor-General. Under the rules of statutory construction, the
Constitution shall be construed to ascertain the intent of the framers and to protect the
people’s interests. In the present case, the legislature passed Act No. 2868 while it is
incomplete; there was no indication of necessary conditions applicable to the power given to
the Governor-General. The said act, which authorized the Governor-General to determine
the price as to how the rice shall be sold, made a crime out of the proclamation (E.O. No.
53) issued by the said Governor-General which prejudiced Ang Tang Ho’s rights and
interests. The Constitution ought to protect the rights of the people and under a republican
government, such as the Philippines, the power to delegate powers to fix the price at which
rice should be sold, can never be delegated. Thus, Act No. 2868 by the legislature is
unconstitutional.
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v Land Tenure Administration

G.R. No. L-21064

February 18, 1970

Relevant Statutory Construction Doctrine:

The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails.

Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. Republic Act No. 2616
took effect. It is therein provided: "The expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City
jointly owned by the J. M. Tuason and Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and Company,Inc.,
and Florencio Deudor, et al., is hereby authorized."

Respondent, Land Tenure Administration was directed by the then Executive Secretary to
institute the proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate. Petitioner, J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. filed before the lower court, a special action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction against respondents praying that the above act be declared unconstitutional,
seeking in the meanwhile a preliminary injunction to restrain respondents from instituting
such expropriation proceeding, thereafter to be made permanent after trial.

Petitioners sought to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the
estate. Under Art. 8, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, “The Congress may authorize, upon payment
of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to individuals” Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional
because the provision in the Constitution refers to “lands” not landed estates.

After trial, the lower court promulgated its decision holding that Republic Act No. 2616 as
amended is unconstitutional and granting the writ of prohibition prayed for.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 2616 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
No. The question is one of constitutional construction. It is assumed that that the words in
the constitutional provisions express the objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed in which case the
significance attached to them prevails. This case is such a case and is therefore one of
minimal construction.

The Constitution clearly states that “land” not “landed estates” can be expropriated. It has
a broader scope, allowing the legislature to expropriate more types of land. The law does not
distinguish between different types regardless of how big or small it may be, as long as there
is a need to address a growing social problem such as inequality.

The congress has the legislative will to expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for
sale. Moreover, it cannot be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise such authority.
 Ordillo v. COMELEC
192 SCRA 100
December 4, 1990

Doctrine: Constitutional Construction - How the language of the Constitution is construed

(words should be understood in their common or ordinary meaning except when technical
terms are employed).

Facts: Article 10, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution states that autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera shall be created. Pursuant to this, on January 30,
1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao, and the city of Baguio voted in a plebiscite regarding the implementation of Republic
Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.” However, the results show that only the Ifugao Province approved by a majority of
5,889 votes, while the rest of the above-mentioned provinces and city devastatingly rejected
by 148,676 votes.

Subsequently, on February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that
the Organic Act for the Region has been approved by a majority of the votes in the province
of Ifugao. The Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum stating that only the
provinces and city voting for the establishment of the CAR shall be included in the said
region. Therefore, only the province of Ifugao legally and validly constitutes the CAR. This
resulted to the petitioner filing a petition for declaration of non-ratification of the Organic
Act for the Region upholding that the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that
the said region should be composed of more than one constituent unit.

Issue: Whether or not the Ifugao province alone can legally and validly constitute the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Held: No. The words used in the Constitution should be understood in their common or
ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed. Words such as provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas as mentioned in Article 10, Section 15 of the
Constitution indicates that the “region” to be created should be composed of more than one
constituent unit, as the word “region” – in its ordinary sense – means two or more provinces.
Thus, Ifugao province alone can legally and validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. A.D. Guerrero
G.R. No. L-20942
September 22, 1967

RELEVANT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: Courts should take into

consideration previous laws in construing the constitution. Constitutional Construction

FACTS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied the claim for refund in the sum of
P2,441.93 filed by the administrator of the estate of Paul I. Gunn, thereafter substituted by
the present respondent A. D. Guerrero as special administrator. The deceased operated an
air transportation business under the business name and style of Philippine Aviation
Development; his estate, it was claimed, "was entitled to the same rights and privileges as
Filipino citizens operating public utilities including privileges in the matter of taxation." The
CIR disagreed, ruling that such partial exemption from the gasoline tax was not included
under the terms of the Ordinance and that in accordance with the statute, to be entitled to
its benefits, there must be a showing that the United States of which the deceased was a
citizen granted a similar exemption to Filipinos. The refund as already noted was denied.
The matter was brought to the Court of Tax Appeals on a stipulation of facts, viewing the
Ordinance differently, it "ordered the petitioner to refund to the respondent the sum of
P2,441.93 representing 50% of the specific taxes paid on 61,048.19 liters of gasoline actually
used in aviation during the period from October 3, 1956 up to May 31, 1957." Not satisfied
with the above decision, petitioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code allowing Filipinos
a refund of 50 percent of the specific tax paid on aviation oil, could be availed of by citizens
of the United States and all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by them in view of their privilege under the Ordinance to operate public utilities
"in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.

HELD: No. The Court sustained the petitioner. It is a Philippine law principle that for a tax
exemption to exist, it must be expressly stated in a statute that it exempts one from paying
taxes. Exemption on taxes are never presumed. In the case at bar, since there is no express
stipulation in Ordinance, no tax exemption or tax refund must be made.
 Aquino vs COMELEC

G.R. No. L-40004 January 31, 1975

Statutory Construction Doctrine: Realities existing at the time of adoption; object to be

accomplished.

FACTS:

It is a petition for prohibition filed on January 31,1975, filed to nullify the following
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366-A, calling a referendum for February 27, 1975,
Presidential Decrees Nos. 629 and 630 appropriating funds therefor, and Presidential
Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the referendum questions, as well as other
presidential decrees, orders and instructions relative to the said referendum.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed their comment on January 28,
1975. After the oral argument of over 7 hours on January 30, 1975, the Court resolved to
consider the comment as answer and the case submitted for decision.

The petition is predicated states that President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold
any legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the
1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations,
decrees and orders. This challenges the title of the incumbent President to the office of the
Presidency and therefore is in the nature of a quo warranto proceedings, the appropriate
action by which the title of a public officer can be questioned before the courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not President Marcos is the incumbent President of the Philippines within the
purview of Section 3 of Article XVII on the transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution.

HELD:

Yes, President Marcos is the incumbent President. Since President Ferdinand E.

Marcos was the only incumbent President of the Philippines at the time the new Constitution
was approved by the Constitutional Convention, the Constitutional Convention had nobody
in mind except him who shall initially convene the interim. Assembly. (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,
Transitory Provisions). It was the incumbent President Marcos alone who issued Martial Law
Proclamation No. 1081, orders, decrees as well as instructions, and performed others acts
as president prior to the approval and ratification of the new Constitution. It was the
incumbent President Marcos alone who issued Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081, orders,
decrees as well as instructions, and performed others acts as president prior to the approval
and ratification of the new Constitution.

Consequently, he was the incumbent President which the Constitutional Convention had in
had in mind when it provided in Section 3(2), Article XVII. "that all the proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President
shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even
after lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked
or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of
the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the
regular National Assembly." Therefore, the term incumbent President of the Philippines
employed in Section 9 of the same Article XVII likewise could only refer to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos
 CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
194 SCRA 317
1991

DOCTRINE: Realities existing at the time of adoption; object to be accomplished.

FACTS: On July 25, 1987, Pres. Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 284, which authorizes a
cabinet member, undersecretary and assistant secretary to hold more than two positions in
the government and government corporations and to receive the corresponding
compensation therefor.
Petitioners seeks declaration of the unconstitutionality of the said executive order on
the ground that it violates Sec. 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "the
President, Vice President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure."
The DOJ however in its issued Opinion No. 73 construed Section 13 of Art. VII
together with Sec. 7, par. 2 of Art. IX-B which provides that "Unless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold other office
or employment in the Government."

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes, E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional. The Court took into consideration the history
of the times, the conditions under which the constitutional provision was framed, and its
object. Before the adoption of the constitutional provision there was a proliferation of newly-
created agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations
where Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants were designated to head or sit as
members of the board with corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances, and
other prerequisites of office. This practice led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who
took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.
The manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during
their tenure. The language of Sec. 13, Art. VII of the Constitution is prohibitory so that it
must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege
of holding multiple government offices. The phrase "unless otherwise" should be given literal
interpretation to refer only those instances cited in the Constitution itself to wit: the Vice
President appointed as Cabinet Member under Sec. 3, Art. VII, and the Secretary of Justice
being ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII.
 Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR

G.R. No: 86889; December 4, 1990

Doctrine:Constitutional Construction - Proceedings of the Convention (Where the

intent of the framers does not appear in the text of the provision, reliance may be made on
extrinsic aids, such as the records of the deliberations or discussions in the convention.)

Facts: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 which includes the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

The petitioner, Luz Farms, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business.
They claimed that they would be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b),
Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 as well as the
the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing and the Rules
and Regulations Implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 promulgated by the DAR.

Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of R.A No. 6657 is unconstitutional for including
in its definition of “agriculture” the livestock and poultry industry.

Held: Yes. Section 3(b) and Section 11of R.A. No. 6657 is unconstitutional for including in
its definition of “agriculture” the livestock and poultry industry. Rules of Statutory
Construction provides that debates or proceedings may be resorted to in order to ascertain
the intent of the framers of the Constitution as to the meaning of a phrase or word used
therein.

In the case at bar, the transcript of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 on the meaning of the word “agriculture” clearly shows that it was never the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage
of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. The intention
of the committee is to limit the application of the word “agriculture”. Thus, Section 11 of
R.A. No 6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry and swine raising in the definition of commercial lands is invalid to the extent that
the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform
program of the State.
 Chiongbian v. De Leon
82 Phil 771
January 31, 1949

Doctrine: Constitutional Construction - Changes in Phraseology (mere deletion, as

negative guides, cannot prevail over the positive provisions nor is it determinative of any
conclusion).

Facts: The petitioner, William Chiongbian, sought to permanently prohibit respondent

Customs Officials from cancelling the registration certificates of petitioner’s vessels, and
respondent Philippine Shipping Administration from rescinding the sale of three vessels to
petitioner. The basis for respondents' acts is the allegation that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen and therefore not qualified by law to operate and own vessels of Philippine registry.
The Philippine Shipping Administration also alleges that petitioner violated the contract of
sale of three vessels executed between them, on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner
having alleged in said contract that his father was a naturalized Filipino citizen.

Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the petitioner William Chiongbian,
was elected to and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel, Occidental
Misamis. This fact is sufficiently established by the evidence together with the fact that at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a minor.
After the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian became a Filipino citizen by
virtue of Article IV, Section 1, Subsection 2 of the Constitution while William Chiongbian,
the herein petitioner, also became a Filipino citizen by reason of Subsection 3.

The respondents argue that privilege of citizenship granted by subsection 2 is strictly

personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee. It was contended that in the
original draft of the said provision, the phrase "and their descendants," was present, which
was deleted in the final draft, thus showing that this privilege of citizenship was intended to
be strictly personal to the one who had been elected to public office and did not extend to
his descendants.

Issue: Whether or not the privilege of citizenship granted by Article VI, Section 1, Subsection
2 of the Constitution is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee.

Held: No. The mere deletion of the phrase "and their descendants” from the original draft to
the final draft of Subsection 2 is not determinative of any conclusion. Deletion in the
preliminary drafts of the Convention are, at best, negative guides, which cannot prevail over
the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution. Furthermore, the deletion could
have been done because the framers of the Constitution considered it unnecessary, knowing
full well that the meaning of such a phrase was adequately covered by Subsection 3.

When Article VI, Section 1, Subsection 2 of the Constitution was adopted, the framers
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance
and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions. They adopted
said provision fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in
Subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship in such
a particular case, they would have so clearly stated.
 Sarmiento v. Mison
Applicable Doctrine: Ascertaining Legislative Intent; Constitutional Construction

FACTS
In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the
respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of
respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appointment of bureau heads should be subject to the approval of the
Commission on Appointments.

HELD:
No, construing Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution would show that the President
is well within her authority to appoint bureau heads without submitting such nominations
before the Commission on Appointments.

Under Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
required the consent or confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. As a result, the
Commission became very powerful, eventually transforming into a venue for horse-trading
and similar malpractices. On the other hand, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in
which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, the 1973 Constitution
placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the
part of the legislature.

Under the current constitution, the Court held that the framers intended to strike a "middle
ground" in order to reconcile the extreme set-ups in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
As such, while the President may make appointments to positions that require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution also grants her the power to
make appointments on her own without the need for confirmation by the legislature. Also
the 1987 Constitution pointed out the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII.
 RELEVANT DOCTRINE: Language of the Constitution construed in its broad and ordinary
sense except where technical terms are employed.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003

FACTS: Former President Joseph Estrada filed with the House of Representatives (HOR) a
verified impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and other Associate Justices
for violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and high crimes which was then
dismissed for insufficiency of substance. The following day, representatives from the Third
District, Camarines Sur filed another impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide
signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the HOR for underpayment of the COLA of the
members and unlawful disbursement of funds for various infrastructure projects.

The Supreme Court held that the second impeachment complaint was barred
pursuant to Article IX, Sec. 3(5) of the 1987 Constitution which states that “no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once a year.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the second impeachment complaint shall be barred pursuant to
Article IX, Sec. 3(5) of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: Yes, the second impeachment complaint should be barred under Article IX, Sec.
3(5) of the 1987 Constitution. Under the rules of statutory construction, the constitution
shall be construed to ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of the constitution and
where the words of the constitution is clear, it should be construed without changes in its
meaning except where technical terms are employed. In the case at bar, two impeachment
complaints were filed against CJ Davide in the same year. Article IX, Sec. 3(5) of the 1987
Constitution states that no impeachment proceedings against the same official be “initiated”
more than once a year which means that after the approval of the first complaint, any
complaints filed thereafter shall be invalid. The constitution is clear and unambiguous
which means it shall be construed in its broad and ordinary sense to attain the intent of the
framers. Thus, the second impeachment complaint initiated by some members of the HOR
against CJ Davide should be barred.
 Ombudsman v Masing

The Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier

enactment

FACTS: Respondents Florita A. Masing, former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special
School, and Jocelyn A. Tayactac, an office clerk in the same school, were administratively
charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees,
failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over them. Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which
shall exercise the same through a committee to be constituted under Section 9 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the “The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.”

The motion was denied. Ombudsman rendered a joint decision finding respondents
Masing and Tayactac guilty. Masing was dismissed from service while Tayactac was
suspended for 6 months.On appeal, CA reversed.

Meanwhile, Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Ombudsman for
charges of oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and
physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits.

Ombudsman found Masing guilty as charged and ordered her suspension for six (6)
months without pay. On appeal, CA also reversed. Ombudsman, which was not impleaded
as respondent in the cases, filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration.
CA denied the on the grounds that (1) intervention is not proper because it is sought by the
quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on appeal, and (2) intervention, even if permissible,
is belated under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.Hence, appeal before SC. The 2
cases were consolidated

ISSUE: Whether oe not Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and
employees?

HELD: YES, the authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public
officers and employees is explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. Article
XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman. The enumeration of these powers is non-exclusive.

Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
giving the Office such other powers that it may need to efficiently perform the task given by
the Constitution. In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office
of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the
constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past, the
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more
active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses
committed by public officers and employees. He is vested with broad powers to enable him
to implement his own actions.

We emphasize that “the Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine,

censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but
is actually mandatory.” Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be
coursed through the proper officer. As the principal and primary complaints and action
center against erring public officers and employees, it is mandated by no less than Section
13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770
grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints.

It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an
exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers. It is basic that the
1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the
Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and employees, with the
exception of officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of
Congress and the Judiciary.