Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.

171396, May 3, 2006 (and

other consolidated cases)
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No.
5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of

the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . .
may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,

respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army,
and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24,
2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune,
which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00
A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of
the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several materials for
publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as
basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in
the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

II.    THE ISSUE
1.    Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017,
valid?
2.    Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1.    NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant

to PP 1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized

by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid
warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)   When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b)   When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests]

justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of
inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke
was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust
Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the
subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition.

2.    NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily

Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search
and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be
made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in
the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct
that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO C. SANIDAD vs HONORABLE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS & HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER

G.R. No. L-44640

October 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

Decree No. 991 to call for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-
called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of
martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the
questions that are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question
is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for
the approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national
referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree
Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction,
asserting that the power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during
the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under
Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-
Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the incumbent President cannot act as a
constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-
plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for
deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not
consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to
an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens
of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the
issue raised is political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The
Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-
plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality
of PDs 991 and 1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while
only 3 maintained it was of political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a
political one. This is because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to
propose amendments to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the
period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly. The normal course has not been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the president undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential
Decree 1033 and in effect, through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a contestable issue.
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000

Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang

Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime
in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral
defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After
fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of
ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that
petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings
and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the
motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that
no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process
with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.

(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly
adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any
immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity
under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly
be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission
of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the
MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be
invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear
that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

By: Dennis D. San Diego

G.R. No. 115455

235 SCRA 630 (1994)

FACTS

RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various
suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630
and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating
Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.

Art. VI,  Section  26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of
the Constitution.

HELD
No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage
of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the
requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
 21.) IN RE CUNANAN (94 Phil 534)
March 18, 1954

FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar
Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed
and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent
by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other
motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions
for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.
972.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 972 is constitutional.

HELD:
No. It is not constitutional.
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies
1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The
public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the
rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes
more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not
the rules set in place by the SC but the lack of will or the defect in judgement of the
court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Constitution to
Congress, it lies exclusively within the judiciary.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not
within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its
powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that
infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers
from these fatal defects.

Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any
force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar
examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to
practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the
admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It
obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary
manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the
petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination
papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at
any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them.
In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory
rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation
and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall
consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the
Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may
continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the
law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the
admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law,
contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of
article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to
the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the
examinations in those years, shall continue in force.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which
assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from
the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder,
and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials
of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition
With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and
the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress

ISSUES:
1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and
(f) local autonomy.
2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which
govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This
violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere
oversight that must be confined to:  (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may
be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared
constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY
OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR
RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was
declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY
TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO
DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A
DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖
AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.
ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima (G.R. NO. 166715)
 Facts:

RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation

capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their respective Commissioners,
DOF, DBM, and NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the
allocation, distribution and release of the fund, to set criteria and procedures for
removing service officials and employees whose revenue collection fall short of the
target; and further, to issue rules and regulations. Also, the law tasked the DOF, DBM,
NEDA, BIR, BOC and the CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to
the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created solely for the
purpose of approving the formulated IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a
formulated IRR by the agencies, JCOO became functus officio and ceased to exist.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from
implementing and enforcing said law.

Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a congressional oversight committee

on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when
legislative function should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the
creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances rather than
violates separation of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.

Issue:

Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers under the Constitution

(As for the other issue on constitutional principles of bicameralism and rule on
presentment, click this link)

Ruling: YES.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became
functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to
confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional.

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily

constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines
the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive
branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative

sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may
not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial
power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution,
including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-
enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget

hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of

Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative

agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or
“power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution‘s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are
entitled to respect. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not
pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing
the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising
discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether
or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated
judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as
is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the
law.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a

Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and
regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and
VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.
ABAS KIDA V. SENATE (G.R. NO. 196271; OCTOBER 18, 2011)

CASE DIGEST: DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, AND IN
REPRESENTATION OF MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L.
LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI
J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, AND BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, PETITIONERS, VS.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THRU SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THRU ITS CHAIRMAN, SIXTO
BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET, AND
ROBERTO TAN, TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. (G.R. No.
196271; October 18, 2011).

FACTS: On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting
provinces were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734
scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not
earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under
R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional

elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a
plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But
onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May
2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.With the
enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the
ARMM elections.

Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties
arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153
questioning the validity of said laws.

OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM
to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of
their term onSeptember 30, 2011.

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that
these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote
and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No.
9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of
the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative"
character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under
the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue
that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?

Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution?
HELD: Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in
toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its
position that the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution
does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections,
the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections.

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the
least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether
national or local to once every three years.This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to
achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the
ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA
No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No.
7166 to be held in May 2013).

In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of
office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the
President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour,
date and year noon of June 30, 1992. It is likewise evident from the wording of the
above-mentioned Sections that the term ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the
phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their Office
Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for
President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x
xrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives fall within the
classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident
from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly
devoted to Local Government.

Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional
mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with
marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization
demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or
of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners
claims of grave abuse of discretion.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and
local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being
as compelling as the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their
coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional
autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its
national effect cannot be discounted.

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way
arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or
objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to
reasonably accepted norms.Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a
question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option
that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed
clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with
respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from
this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years
as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only
does is to"appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office."This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to
office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore emphasized
that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and
must not be interpreted otherwise.
ANG NARS PARTYLIST VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS
- (2002) PGMA enacted RA 9173, where Sec. 32 provides that “the minimum base
pay of nurses working in the public health institutions shall not be lower than
Salary Grade 15 prescribed under RA 6758 (Compensation and Classification
Act of 1989).

- (2009) PGMA approved Joint House Resolution No. 4 (HR No. 36 and SR No.
26), authorizing the President to modify the compensation and position
classification system of civilian personnel, and amended provisions of laws, such
as RA 9173, among others, inconsistent with such Resolution. It also repealed all
laws prescribing salary grades for government officials and employees, other
than those in Section 8 of RA 6758.

- (2009) PGMA issued EO 811 to implement Joint House Resolution No. 4, where
Section 6 of which modified the entry level salary grade of nurses from SG 10 to
SG 11.

- (2014) Rep. Paquiz (Ang Nars) wrote to DOH Sec. Ona and DBM Sec. Abad
inquiring about the non-implementation of Section 32 of RA 9173.

o Sec. Ona replied, stating that:

 The salary grade classification was based on RA 6758 and Senate

Joint Resolution No. 26, which authorized the President to modify
the compensation and classification system of civilian personnel.

 That the DBM’s Manual on Position Classification and

Compensation states as a general rule that, “only the duties and
responsibilities of the position are considered in position
classification,” and that based on their analysis, only a Nurse II,
who has more complicated tasks and more range of responsibility
than a Nurse I (SG 11) would qualify for SG 15.

o DBM OIC Macaranas responded:

 Under Sec. 34 of NBC No. 521, implementing Joint House

Resolution No. 4, reallocated certain medical and allied medical
positions to give meaning to “equal pay for equal work”, in that
positions which have substantially equal qualifications, skills, effort
and responsibility under similar conditions shall be paid similar
salaries.
  Implementing Sec 32 of RA 9173 would distort the hierarchical
relationships of medical, and allied positions, as well as other
positions in the bureaucracy, and would cost P438M.

 DBM-conducted salary survey of the private sector will be the basis

for recommendations for future salary adjustments.

- (2014) Rep. Paquiz wrote to DOJ Sec. De Lima asking for legal opinion on the
matter, but was declined.
o Sec. De Lima responded:

 DBM was specifically empowered to “classify positions and

determine appropriate salaries for specific position classes.”

 DBM Secretary has “supervision and control” and “jurisdiction over

all bureaus, offices, agencies, and corporations” under DBM,
including the authority to “review, approve, reverse, or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units, thus, is in the best
position to respond.

 Ruling on the matter would pass upon the duly issued NBC No. 521
(administrative rule and regulation, which DOJ cannot do, unless
requested by the said agency, by reason of its knowledge of the
specific intent and purposes of the issuance.

 Under Sec. 38 of RA 9173, it is the Board of Nursing and PRC, in

coordination with DBM and DOH that are mandated to issue RA
9173’s IRR.

PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS through the OSG

a. Joint House Resolution No. 4 did not
authorize the President to revise the
salary grade system under RA 6758,
as amended by RA 9173.

Section 6 thereof provides, “Nothing in

this Joint Resolution shall be
interpreted to reduce, diminish, or in
any way, alter the benefits provide for
in existing laws on Magna Carta
benefits for specific officials and
employees in government, regardless
of whether said benefits have been
already received or have yet to be
implemented.”
 EO 811, being an administrative
issuance, must be consistent with
laws and should not amend or modify
the law.

b. Joint House Resolution No. 4 did not
amend Section 32 of RA 9173 and did
not lower the entry-lever salary of
nurses to SG11.
c. EO 811 violated the principle of non-
diminution of salaries stipulated Joint
House Resolution No. 4 since it also
repealed Section 32 of RA 9173, a
repeal that is beyond the authority
given to the President under Joint
House Resolution No. 4.
d.
e.
Section 32 of RA 9173 was amended, not
by EO 811, but by Joint House Resolution
No. 4, adopted by both the Senate and
the House of Representatives, which has
the force and effect of a law.
EO 811, fixing the entry-level salary of
nurses at SG 11 is a valid delegation of
power under Joint House Resolution No.
4.
There is no diminution of salary of nurses
because the minimum base pay under
EO 811 is higher than the base pay under
Section 32 of RA 9173.
DBM never implemented Section 32 of
RA 9173 because it would create
inequality and distortion in the
hierarchical relationships of the medical
and allied positions and the other
positions in the bureaucracy.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy
(certiorari and mandamus), instead of a
petition for declaratory relief.

Granting petitioners availed of the correct

remedy, they violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts in filing the petition
directly with the Supreme Court.

STANDING
1. PSLINK – NO LEGAL STANDING

 A confederation of public sector unions of Philippine government

employees, including the health sector. Its members include
government nurses.

 It is an UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION, hence, NOT A

JURIDICAL PERSON OR ENTITY authorized by law that can be a
party to a civil action.
  It lacks the legal capacity to sue in its own name, or in the name of
the members of its association without proper authorization or valid
authority from its members.

2. REP. PAQUIZ OF ANG NARS PARTY-LIST – HAS LEGAL STANDING

 Ang Nars Party-list represents both government nurses directly

affected by EO 811 as well as nurses from the private sector.

 Has no standing as a member of Congress – as the standing

should pertain to questions on the validity of any official action that
they claim to infringe on the prerogatives, powers, and privileges
vested by the Constitution to their office –, but due to the
transcendental importance of the case, suing in the public interest.

 Requirements Exacted under the Locus Standi Rule:

a. Interest must be direct and personal – Rep. Paquiz will
not suffer direct injury for the non-implementation of RA
9173, but her interest is direct insofar as she is the duly-
elected representative of nurses in the country.

HIERARCHY OF COURTS AND PETITIONERS’ REMEDY

- The doctrine on the hierarchy of courts states that petitions for certiorari and
prohibition, which fall under the CONCURRENT JURSIDICTION of the
RTCs, the higher courts, and the Supreme Court, must first be brought to
the lowest court with jurisdiction.

- A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

- BUT, the doctrine is not an iron-clad rule. The Court has full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the
petition.

o In issues of transcendental importance, the imminence and clarity of the

threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. It prevents the courts from paralysis of procedural niceties
when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

 When dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public

policy;
  When demanded by the broader interest of justice;
 When the challenged orders were patent nullities;
 When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called
for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.

o In this case, the law remained unimplemented since 2002, and the nurses
who stand to benefit from the implementation of Section 32 of RA 9173
remain in limbo as to the status of their salary classification.

o As to the argument that the petition should have been for declaratory
relief, the Court ruled that, “where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. The Court dispensed
with technicalities to give due course to the petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondents committed grave abuse of discretion and

exceed the authority granted by Joint House Resolution No. 4 when they
downgraded the salary grade for government nurses in EO 811.

2. Whether or not Joint House Resolution No. 4 amended Section 32 of the

Philippine Nursing Act of 2002 (RA 9173).

Under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law, and it must pass three
readings ON SEPARATE DAYS (Article VI, Section 26), unless the president
certifies it as urgent.

Under the Senate Rules of Procedure, the following are the types of legislation:

 Bills – general measures that may become laws.

 Joint Resolutions – no real difference from a bill; also requires
the approval of both houses and the signature of the president; has
the force and effect of law; generally used when dealing with
single item or issue, such as continuing or emergency
appropriations bill, or to propose amendments to the Constitution.
 Concurrent Resolutions – used for matters affecting the operations
of both houses and must be passed in the same form by both
houses; does not have the force of law.
 Simple Resolutions – deals with mattes entirely within the
prerogative of each house.

RULES OF THE SENATE RULES OF THE HOUSE

Section 64. Prior to their final approval, bills and Section 58. No bill or joint
joint resolutions shall be read at least three times. resolution shall become law
unless it passes thee (3)
Section 68. No bill shall be passed by the Senate readings on separate days.
unless it has passed three (3) readings on separate
days.

(NO EXPRESS PROVISION THAT SECTION 68

APPLIES TO JOINT RESOLUTIONS)

There is no express language in the Rules of the

Senate that a Joint Resolution must pass three
readings on SEPARATE DAYS. Thus, it can pass a
Joint Resolution ON THE SAME DAY.
THE COURT
Neither the Rules of the Senate nor the House can amend the Constitution, which
recognizes that ONLY A BILL CAN BECOME A LAW. A Joint Resolution can only
be part of the implementation of a law as provided in the law itself.

The Senate and House Rules may be changed as the Senate and the House may
deem fit. After each election, the body proceeds to adopt the rules of the immediately
preceding Congress to govern its proceedings, until the approval and adoption of the
rules of the current Congress.

When a bill is proposed, the public is immediately informed that there is a proposal
being considered which may bind them. This is in consonance with the requirement
on transparency under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution. If a joint resolution
is proposed instead of a bill, the public will not be alerted that there is a
proposed legislation, and a law can pass stealthily without notice to the public.

Multiple Sections in Article VI, on appropriations, refer to bills, including the

President’s veto powers ONLY on BILLS, not on Joint Resolutions.

The US Constitution’s treatment of Joint Resolutions as that similar to bills cannot be

applied in the Philippines. There is no express or implied language in the
Constitution providing that a joint resolution can be enacted into law if the
same procedure for enacting a bill is followed.

Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Failure to
include joint resolutions in the scope of the 1935 Constitution (eventually carried over
in the 1987 Constitution) is not a clerical error. The fact that it was in the draft, but
was not included in the final version only means that the deletion of the term “joint
resolutions” was deliberate and not a mere clerical error.

While a Joint Resolution goes through the same process as bills, it is only because
Congress provides for the process under the Rules of Procedures, which a new
Congress is not bound to adopt.
BILL vs. JOINT RESOLUTION
1. Must pass three (3) readings on separate days.

There can be no deviation from this requirement, unless the President certifies
the bill as urgent.

Joint resolutions may be approved in one, two, or three readings on the same
day or on separate days, depending on the Rules at the sole discretion of
Congress.

2. Printed copies in its final form must be distributed to Members three

days before its passage.

There can be no deviation from this requirement, unless the President certifies
the bill as urgent.

Printed copies of joint resolutions in its final form may be distributed days
after, depending on the Rules at the sole discretion of Congress.

3. Must be presented to the President for his signature or veto.

There can be no deviation from this.

Joint Resolutions does not require the President’s signature or veto, unless
the Rules requires such, which is at the sole discretion of Congress.

4. Upon last reading, no amendment is allowed, and voting on the bill shall
immediately be taken.

There can be no deviation from this requirement.

There is no such requirement in approving a joint Resolution, unless required

by the Rules.

5. Procedure for enacting a bill into law is PERMANENTLY FIXED as

prescribed by the Constitution and cannot be amended by any act of
Congress.

Procedures for the passing of joint resolutions may be changed by the Senate
and the House.

Leaving it in the sole discretion of either the Senate or House whether a joint
resolution would become a law is not how the Constitution prescribes the
enactment of a law.

For purposes of repealing an existing law, there must be a repealing provision

or an irreconcilably inconsistent provision, in a subsequent valid law, not
merely a joint resolution.

Section 3 f RA 6758 provides for the review of the compensation rates for
government employees. After such a review, ANY CHANGE IN COMPESATION
RATES SHOULD BE DONE BY ENACTING A NEW LAW. Any such change
amends the existing law, and such amendment cannot be done by a mere joint
resolution because a joint resolution cannot amend a law.

JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 4, which seeks to change or revise the Compensation

and Position Classification System established by existing law, CANNOT TAKE
EFFECT WITHOUT AN AMENDATORY LAW.

Section 8 of RA 6758 specifies the salary grades of specific positions.

Section 9 of RA 6758, on the other hand, only provides for a benchmark position
schedule for other positions (below the officials mentioned in Section 8), and a
Nurse is under SG10. Section 9 created a benchmark to guide the DBM in its
preparation of the Index of Occupational Services, and it may only be amended by
law. A join resolution cannot amend the Benchmark Position Schedule, which is fixed
by law. It only has the effect of a recommendation to the government agency
authorized to implement the law (RA 6758).

The change in the salary grade of nurses was done through a law (RA 9173), which
superseded the authority given to DBM, hence, cannot be amended by a mere joint
resolution.

An implementing resolution, like Joint Resolution No. 4, not being a separate

law itself, cannot amend prior laws. Such implementing resolution can only
implement the SSL, not repeal its enabling law or prior laws. Joint Resolution
No. 4 can only recommend to the President, in accordance with the authority given
to the DBM under RA 6758. Thus, the amendatory language of Joint Resolution No.
4 cannot revise the salary grades in the SSL or in any other law like RA 9173. The
amendatory language can only amend prior congressional resolutions inconsistent
with Joint Resolution No. 4.

EO 811, not being a law, cannot also amend or repeal Section 32 of RA 9173.

Nevertheless, despite the CONTINUED EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF SECTION

32 OF RA 9173, the Court cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to compel
respondents to implement such provision. IT IS AN IMPLEMENTATION THAT
REQUIRES THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH A LAW, where
such power of the purse belongs exclusively to Congress under Sections 24 and 25
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

THE POWER TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS CAN ONY BE MADE THROUGH A

 LAW, AND THE POWER TO ENACT A LAW IS A PURELY LEGISLATIVE
POWER.

3. Whether or not respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in

asserting that the entry-level salary for government nurses should only be
SG 11, and disregarding the provisions of RA 9173.

RULING:

1. The VALIDITY of Section 32 of RA 9173 was UPHELD.

2. THE PROVISIOSN OF PARAGRAPH 16 OF JOINR RESOLUTION NO. 4, and

SECTION 6 OF EO 811, purporting to amend or repeal Section 32 of RA 9173,
are declared VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

3. Petition to COMPEL respondents to implement Section 32 of RA 9173 was

DISMISSED.