A Critique of ary, not incompatible, orientations; that Mishler S state-
"Skinnerism: MaterialsimMinus The Dialectic"
Jerry Ulman
BallStateUniversity
Abstract
Mishler (1976) asserts that c, the Skinnerianand Marxian
approaches are incompatible in critical ways" (p. 24), then
proceeds to discuss five issues that he presumes are critical,
In response, it is argued that behaviorism and Marxism are
complimen tary, not incompatible; that Mishler's state-
ments to the contrary flow from his failure to distinguish
between methodological and radical behaviorism; and that
his brand of Marxism is revisionist, not revolutionary ~
A Critique of
,'Skinnerisrn: Materialism-Minus the Dialectic' ,
Critics on the left have often maligned behaviorists for
being agents of the forces of oppression. In the name of
Marx, they have accused Skinner of being a "point man"
for capitalist exploitation. In Towarda Marxist Psychology,
Brown(1974), for example, declared that '" one cannot plug
'radical' concepts into 'conservative' methods; ~ ~ .the
method of behavior modification itself is a method based on
the prevailing values ofour society" (pp. 163-164). Holland
(1978) reported a similar attack by a radical therapist who
charged that ' , behaviorism necessaril y supports and
perpetuates the status quo while radical psychology seeks to
alter it fundamen tally" (Ratner 1977 t P' 21 ). To these
I
& 'leftist' critics Holland (1974) has rebutted that while
most applications of behavioral technology are counter-
revolutionary~ "it is possible to accept both the facts of
C
behavior science and the aims and values of those who speak.
against exploitative manipulation of behavior" .(p. 414).
Furthermore, the problem lies with behaviorists I not
behaviorism (Holland, 1978).
Still others professing to be Marxist critics have launched
a more sophisticated assault on the field, attacking the
philosophical assumptions underlying behaviorism as being
opposed to those of Marxism, Hence, an adequate defense of
behaviorism requires a refutation written at the same level of
philosophical abstraction, which is the aim of my comments.
One such self-proclaimed Marxist detractor of behavior-
ism is Elliot Mishler (1976), a professor at Harvard Medical
School. He has assailed behaviorism on the grounds that it
represents a technocratic consciousness of questionable
scientific merit and imposes an extremely narrow outlook,
As a world viewt according to Mishler t behaviorism
constitutes a social ideology which treats humans as objects,
This "instrumental-pragmatic-objective view of man" (p~
23)t he asserts" goes alongwith the corporate ideology with
its emphasis on controlling recalcitrants. Mishler states that
"the Skinnerian and Marxian approaches are incompatible
in critical ways" (p. 24). He then proceeds to criticize
behaviorism in relation to five philosophical and practical
issues from the standpoint of critical theory-a school of
sociological thought purported to be within the tradition of
Marxism.
] intend to examine the merits of Mishler's criticisms of
behaviorism from the combined perspective of radical
behaviorism and revolutionary Marxism (i.e., as expressed
in the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin), The crux of my
argument is that behaviorism and Marxism are compliment-
1
.ments to the contrary arise from his failure to distinguish
between methodological and radical behaviorism: and that
his brand of Marxism is revisionist, not revolution~.
Radical Behaviorism us. MethodologiCld Behaviorism
Behaviorism is the philosophy of the science of behavior.
The basicassumption underlying behaviorism is that we can
investigate behavior scientifically and thereby identify the
variables (things and events) of which it is a function,
Beyond this assumption, it is of paramount importance to
differentiate radical behaviorism from conventional method-
ological behaviorism.As Vargas (1977) states :
Modem behaviorismis further separatedinto method-
ological bebauiorism, which holds that the behavior
we can study is only that which can be measured by
two independent observers (thus excluding all inner
behavior) and radical bebaoiorism, which includes
inner behaviors such as "thoughts" and "01 dreams" as
valid behavior to investigate. B.F. Skinner is the
leadingspokesmanfor radical bebaoiorism. (p. 304)
Freudian, humanistic, cognitive, and other fonns of
mentalistic psychology draw attention away from the
external events that account for behavior by appearing to
offer alternative explanations. By dealing exclusively with
external antecedent events, methodological behaviorism did
just the reverse, Radical behaviorism restores the balance by
considering private events taking place withing the skin.
Rather than dismissing such events as subjective, radical
behaviorism simply questions their nature and the reliability
?f the observations (Skinner, 1974). It will becomeapparent
in what follows that Mishler does not understand this
critically important distinction between the two kinds of
behaviorism. For now, though, let us examine the brand of
Marxism he espouses.
Revolutionary Marxism fJS. Revisionist Marxism
The term' 'revisionism' ~ has been used in many different..
confusing, and unscientific ways. The People's Republic of
China and the Soviet Union, for example, accuse one
another of 'c revisionism" as a result of diHerences in their
respective foreign policies" But one method of determining
whether a given position represents a revision of Marxism is
to see closely it adheres to the foundation of Marxism-
dialectical materialism. For there can be no consist ant
revolutionary practice without the materialistic dialectic
base, as Trotsky (1973) made abundantlyclear. .
As a collectiveeffort several members of Radical Political
Behaviorists (a caucus of Marxist-oriented behaviorists
within the newly formed organization, Behaviorists for
Social Action) have put forth a succinct characterization of
dialectical materialism
(a) the world exists independently of the ideas of any
person(Materialism);
(b) there are lawful relationships between events in
the world;
(c) peopl~ c~ have knowledg~ of those laws through
practice m the world (our ideas are a reflection of
eventsexisting independently of our ideas);
(d) the world changes; i.e., new phenomena emerge
from accumulating changes in old phenomena
(dialectics); e.g, , capitalism is a change from
feudalism. (Note 1 t p. 1)
Revisionists seek to 'fi correct" dialectical materialism and as
a result rob Marxism of its revolutionary character (Novack,
1978). Before examining the specific form of Mishler's
revisionism, it may be helpful to consider these two basic
elements. materialismand dialectics, in more detail.
Materialism. Materialism is one of two main tendencies in
philosophy which deals with the relation between conscious-
ness and existence (or subject and object). The other
tendency is idealism. Idealism supposes that consciousness is
primary and matter is secondary, that some supernatural
being or mind is the dominant feature of reality; whereas,
materialism recognizes the material world as the primary
feature. According to materialists, the material world existed
prior to humanity and consequently both society and
consciousness derive from the underlying materical condi-
tions. As Marx had said, "it is not consciousness of man
that determines his existence; rather it is his social existence
that determines his consciousness. ' J
Behaviorists need not be put off from dealing with the
concept of consciousness for fear of becoming infected with
mentalism. Skinner (1974) translates "consciousness' into
behavioral terms with ease: "To increase a person's
consciousness of the external world is simply to bring him
under more sensitive control of that world as a source of
stimulation" (p.. 154). Furthermore, to the question of
whether or not consciousness arises out of "'natural
processes, Skinner (1974) replies: ' What has evolved is an
-I
organism, part of the behavior of which has tentatively been
explained by the invention of the concept of mind. No special
evolutionary process is neededwhen the facts are considered
in their own right" (pt 45). Although the experimental
analysis of behavior rejects such notions as a conscious mind
as explanations for the causes of behavior" radical
behaviorism is quite reconcilable with the scientific study of
phenomenological variables or inner psychological processes
(Day, 1969). Thus 1 there is no a priori reason for
behaviorists to reject Marxism because of its alleged
mentalism.. Marxism considers consciousness as an expres-
sion of those actual skills which a person has acquired.
Differences in people's consciousness are conceived to be a
function of the practicaldifferences which characterize their
productivelives,
HoweverI the loose manner in which Marxist theorists
sometimes use the concept of consciousness can have
deleterious consequences-eproviding refuge for idealistic
notions about human behavior. Such conceptual vacuums
are in fact the worst kind of abstractions because they can be
filled with any content, a carte blanche for . all sorts of
explanatoryfictions.Only a rigorous application of Skinner"s
antirnentalistic approach can extirpate such notions from
Marxism, Through behavior analyses of phenomena
associated with assumed manifestations of consciousness
both behaviorism and Marxism may grow richer. By
combining the scientific mehtods of Marx and Skinner,
behaviorists may begin to examine our world (both public
and private) within a wider spectrum and Marxists may
becomeeven more concrete and precise in their analyses of
human behavior" societyt and consciousness.
Dialectics Jt is obvious that behaviorism is materialistic,
t
to this Mishler agrees wholeheartedly. His point is that
behaviorism is not dialectical. And he is quite correct if he is
referring to methodological behaviorism. H he is talking
about radical behaviorism he is unquestionably wrong.
Just as there are two types of behaviorism, there are also
two kinds of materialism-mechanistic and dialectical.
Radical behaviorism is compatible with the latter, method-
ological behaviorism is not. Dialectics, the logic of evolution
(and revolution), considers all phenomena as being in a
process of continual transformation, As viewed by the
dialectical materialist t the development of the material warld
2
itself (i.e., matter/motion at all levels of organizational
complexity, from the subatomic to living organisms,
including humans), is the product of the struggle among
contradictions in nature (Engels, 1940). In contrast, formal
or Aristotelian (syllogistic) . logic is static and therefore of
limited applicability in the real world.
Dialectics became a science when Marx and Engels
liberatedit from Hegel'5 idealism-s-ascience of the universal
laws of motion governing the development of nature, human
society ~ and thought. Hegel elucidated the method of
dialectics and adduced its three basic principles-the
transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, the
interpenetration of opposites, and the negation of nega-
tion2~ but remained entirely within the idealistic mode of
thought (Engels, 1940). The extraordinary philosophical
contribution of Marx and Engels was their synthesis of a
consistent and comprehensive materialistic world view with
a theory of universal evolution that was thoroughly
dialectical (Novak, 1978). Before then. materialism and
dialectics wereseparatelines of thought that were believed to
be incompatible. It is important to note that dialectics cannot
be imposed on facts; rather, it is deduced from facts.
In a manner of analogous to the advancement of the
micrometer over a desk ruler, dialectical logic is a qualitative
advancement over formal logic. In this analogy, with respect
to both measurement and logic, the formersubsumesand yet
transcends the limitations of the latter. For the reader who is
not familiar with dialectical materialism, I highly recom..
mendGeorge Novack's (1971) concise andpopular text, An
Introduction to the Logic ofM(J1'rism~
Given the context of our conditioning histories, a context
of bourgeois ideological hegemony in which Marxism has
been consistantly associated with totalitarianism and
dogmatism, there is little wonder that the verbal ~ stimulus
, 'dialectical materialism' t evokes unpleasant emotional
reactions. As Novack(1978) explains:
Western philosophers and scientists almost unani-
mously believe that the dialectical view of nature is
false, irrelevant, and even positively harmful in the
theory and practice of science. This prejudice, rooted
in our predominately emirical and positivist traditions I
has been reinforced by the arbitrary and ignorant
interference of the Stalinist bureaucrats with scientific
theory, along with their narrowly schematic, distort-
edt and dogmatic interpretations of Marxist method.
(p.250)
Novackastutelyobservesthat
upto now almost all scientists (behavior analysts
included-]. U.) have" carried on their work without
conscious understanding of the dialectical laws of
universal development, just as most people speak very
well without knowing the history of grammar of their
lan~age...
4 If scientists should approach the problems for
which they seek solutions in their particular fields with
an informedunderstandingof the fundamental traits of
development formulated in the laws of dialectical
logic, why couldn't these serve as a general
methodological guide in their concrete inquiries? (pp.
250-251) ~
As behavior analysis expands and becomes increasingly
specialized and fragmented, the need for a unifying guide
becomesurgent.. An adequate consideration of what Marxist
methodology has to offer as a guide requires a treatise that
this critique cannot of course attempt to provide. It is
nonethelesssufficient to note that the time has arrived to put
Marxist methodology to the test, to determine whether it is
a valid or specious guide by applying dialectics in our daily
work, Such a test necessitates that we eliminate our
, 'Marxism phobias" , however, and expand our intellectual
repertoires by becoming better educated philosophically and
politically. 3
While scientists are obliged to remain politically
disinterested in the course of their investigations t it does not
follow that they should therefore be blind to the place of
science in society. In this vein it is hoped that through
self-initiated study and critical thinking more behaviorists
will develop class consciousness and find their way to
political activism. As allies of the proletariat it can be
expected that class-conscious behaviorists will bring their
technology and skills with them and join the fight agianst
racism, sexism, class exploitation, imperialism, war, and
profit-motivated attacks on our quality of life.
Mechanistic materialism tIS. dialectical materialism. A
predecessor of dialectical materialism, mechanistic material-
ism such as that propounded by Feuerbach attempted to
explain all natural phenomena by means of rnechanicallaws.
Changes in natural phenomena were characterized as cyclical
and endlessl y repetitive rather than as evolving and
perpetuall y developing. Change in terms of internal
contradictions was neither considered nor assumed. For
example, Watsonian behaviorism was materialistic" but
completely mechanical. Watson, the primordial method-
ological behaviorist ~ anticipating the tradition of the logical
positivists, ruled out consciousness, feelings, and other
inner phenomena as proper subject matter for scientific
psychology~ He demanded that psychology limit itself to the
study of behavior-if a phenomenon was not directly
observable it simply did not exist. Human behavior was
thought to be robot-like, no more than a system of Pavlovian
conditioned reflexes under strict control of the environment
in a push-button manner. Thus, operationally, Watson
regarded all organisms, including humans, as black boxes.
Only observable patterns of stimulus-response interactions
were knowable" not what went on inside the black box.
Radical behaviorism does not ~ to borrow Skinner ~ s
expression, "behead the organism as did Watson's
l ,
mechanistic S-R psychology. According to radical behav-
iorists, people are conscious of their surroundings in the
sense that they are conscious of events in their bodies; they
come under control of internal stimuli. Moreover, as
Skinner (1974) observes ~ ,( a person becomes conscious in a
different sense when a verbal community arranges
contingencies under which he not only sees an object but
sees that he is seeing it. In this special sense, consciousness
or awareness is a social product" (p~ 220). In sum, Skinner's
point of view regarding consciousness is thoroughly
dialectical and is qualitatively different from the mechanical
thinking of his predecessor, Watson -as different as Einstein
from Newton-s-even though both are materialistic. Yet
Mishler makes no differentiation. Astounding!
Mishler's revisionism. Not only does Mishler display a
frightful lack of knowledge about behaviorism, but his grasp
of Marxism is irremediably faulty. His Marxism is
revisionist, an outgrowth of the Frankfurt School. As
Novack (1978) points out, there are two major camps of
contemporary revisionism:
the Hegelianizing thinkers who, like the young Georg
Lukacs and the Frankfurt School, retain dialectics
while scanting its material content; and those s.uch as
Louis Althusser ~ Della Volpe, and Colletti who
uphold materialism while rejecting the dialectical
method by seeking to hitch Marxism to the cart of
3
positivist ideology... " (p, 213; also see footnote 1).
Both camps reject the idea of a dialectic of nature and
consequent! y seek to separate Marx . . , the dialectician" from
Engels ' 'the materialist' ,. but for different reasons.
Hegelianizing Marxists such as the theorists of the Frankfurt
School (including Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, jurgen
Habermas, Max Horkheirner , and Herbert Marcuse) hold
that because society is a human product it alone involves
genuine contradictions (while mechanistic materialists or
"~ Feuerbachianizers ~ , disavow dialectics in any form).
Engels is rejected because his materialistic position assumes
an analogy between forms of change in nature and in society ~
thereby diminishing the role of the human will and reason.
The Hegelianizers outlook is anthropocentric-they fear
t
that by granting material determinism in society as well as
nature human beings can never be free. They are staunch
upholders of the voluntaristic notion of ' 'autonomous man ~ t
as criticized by Skinner in Beyond Freedom and Dignity
(1971)+ But regardless of who wields the hatchet l
Hegelian izer or mechanistic materialist ~ to sever Engels
from Marx is to debase Marxist philosophy (Novack, 1978;
Trotsky, 1973; Weiss, 1977).
To capture the spirit of Mishler's idealistic form of
revisionism, I had originally considered entitling this paper
, ,Mishlerism: The Dialectic Minus Material IS01 ' ~ As a+
representative of the Hegeiianizing school of thought 1
Mishler and other proponents .of critical theory oppose the
materialistic determinism of Marx and Engels, It comes as
no surprise that Skinner's determinism is opposed as well,
Throughou t his article Mishler contrasts the behaviorist" s
assumptions. as he imagines them, about man, science,
politics, and society with his a1 ternative perspective based on
cri tical theory. He Irequenti y cites Habermas as the
authorit y for this perspective. Since Mishler's frame of
reference is for the most part the philosophy of Habermas it l
is useful to take a closer look at this philosopher ~ s ideas.
Habermas. Except for negative reference to Soviet
Marxism ~ ] urgen Habermas scarcely considers the doctrines
of Marx and Engels. His anti-materialist, anti-Leninist
orientation becomes transparent in such pronouncements
as: ,~ Marx's Naturalism is sharpl y ... differentiated form
the metaphysical Materialism of the epigones, Engels, .. and
Lenin'" (Haberrnas, 1973, p. 200). Moreover, Habennas
seems oblivious to class struggle and to the proletarian
revolution, Therborn (1971) notes that Habermas is almost
exclusively concerned with epistomology and reduces Marx
to a mere critic of ideology. He defuses Marxism of its
revolutionary potential. In its place, he gives us a mystifying
melange of Georg Hegel, Talcott Parsons" and Sigmund
Freud-an indigestible potage of syrupy humanism and
glutinous obscurantism. In Therborri' s words ~
Habermas 's reduction of Marxism to the mere critic of
ideologyleads directly to the suggestion that (the class
struggle) will be harmoniously settled through
criticism of public opinion by the enlightened efforts of
critical students and scholars.(p. 83)
Haberrnas' growing popularity in academia-s-especially
among younger, reformist-oriented sociologists-is no
accident. In his zeal to achieve harmony rather than social
change, Habermas has gone so far as to denounce the
student movement in Germany as "left fascism t t (Ther-
born, 1971). In essence, Haberrnas and other contemporary
remnants of the Frankfurt School are liberal reformists not t
revolutionists. Their goal is to build an idealistic wing of the
bourgeois social sciences. Mishler of course shares this goal.
Habermas, Mishler, and company are, in a word,
pseudo-Marxists. With this background, let us now examine
the ' 'issues' , addressed by Mishler in his attack on
behaviorism.
Mishler's ~ ~ Five Critical Issues ~ t
Mishler (1976) takes "Skinnerisrn " to task on five issues
that he supposes shows its incompatibility with Marxism.. I
will appraise each issue in terms of the tenets of both radical
behaviorism and revolutionary Marxism. (1be following
headings are Mishler's" 1976.)
1. Praxisvs. behavior. As Novack (1978) defines itt praxis
is a term "popularized by Hegelianizing Marxists to
designate social action based on and integrated with
theoretical understanding. As they use it, the term implies
the ability of revolutionary will to substitute for a lack of
propitious objective opportunities;' (p. 318). Mishler argues
that engaging in praxis means transforming the world and
constitutes meaningful activity; whereas, emitting behavior
in the Skinnerian sense COnnotes purposelessness. In
Mishler's opinion Skinner can deal with behavior because it
is objective, but in itself i 'behavior; ,. is meaningless.
Conversely ~ praxis is meaningful but, because it is a
subjective state, Skinner cannot investigate it. Mishler goes
on to accuse "Skinnerism" of being a form of positivism
and therefore a mystifying ideology; a mechanistic
materialism of questionablescientific merit.
Hoffman (1975) has written an extensive critique of praxis
theory from the position of orthodox Marxism. He explains
how praxis theory actually represents an attack on Marxism
and observes that the mature Karl Marx completely
dissociated himself from the use of the term. The currently
fashionable praxis theorists such as Habermas blithely
imagine that they have transcended positivistic aspects of
Marxism when in reality they have transfromed Marxism
into its opposite. They have replaced one kind of idealism
with another that is even more sophistic and therefore more
mystifying and reactionary. Ironicallyt the revisionism of the
praxis theorists in itself Serves as an interesting illustration of
the dialecticallogic of internal contradictions.
In practice, both positivism and praxis have identical
premises and both ultimately reduce to solipsism, the belief
that the self is the only existent thing. While positivism
correctly accepts the position that knowledge is derived from
sensation, it denies that such experiencecan confirm the real
nature of the outside world. Although outwardly praxis
theory seems to be the antithesis of positivism, it also denies
that there can be a world view that is veridical with reality.
Both positions reject the possibility of understanding the
world as a whole. Marxism, on the other hand, takes the
position that we can have true knowledge of the outside
world: but it does not postulate an absolute truth. outside of
historical evolution. Hoffman (1977) has summarized the
Marxist epistomology :
Truth about the world, like the universe itself, can
only deepen, develop and grow from one historical
period to another. Such truth is absolute because it is
perfectly real; it is also necessarily relative for it can
only express itself in a partial and historically
conditioned fashion. By combining the absolute and
the relative t diclectical materialism has decisively.
broken with (yet creatively built upon) the meta-
physics of two thousand years. (pp. 180-181) .
The rejection by Mishler and Habermas of the possibility for
true knowledge of the world and their teleological notion of
praxis as a self-propelled revolutionary will would, if
accepted, plunge us right back into the metaphysical morass
4
from which both revolutionary Marxism and radical
behaviorism struggled free. Praxis writers reject the
dialectics of nature and support the metaphysical point of
view that nature and humanity are separate worlds. Praxis is
not an improvement over positivism; it is t as Hoffman aptly
put it, positivism with a "Ieft" face.
2. Interpretive understanding VS. behavioral analysis.
Mishler charges that behaviorism is a technocratic ideology
that replaces society's self-understanding and communica-
tion with a scientific mode of thought which constricts our
vision. Behaviorism, he states, cannot take into considera-
tion purposive-rational actions and its categories are
inadequate for describing meaningful human action expres-
sed through symbols. Only through such subjective methods
as psychological tests and interviews can we realize an
interpretive understanding of meaningful human action ..
Skinner l 5 prejudices and his limiting use of objective
methods precludes the most important areas of human
experience from scientific study; Mishler contends. Put
briefly t Mishler is saying that a science of human behavior
cannot adequately deal with meaning and purposeful human
action.
Repeatedly, Skinner has gone to great lengths to explain
how radical behaviorism accounts foe meaning and purpose.
In About Behaviorism, for example" he states that
, 'meaning' is not properly regarded as a property either of a
response or a situation but rather of the contingencies
responsible for both the topography of behavior and the
control exerted by stimuli." (Skinner, 1974, p. 9O)t To
illustrate, depending upon the arrangement of contingencies
in an operant conditioning chamber; to one rat pressing the
lever "means" food and to another it "means" water. The
same analysis of meaning can be made of verbal behavior
(Skinner, 1957).
In a similar fashion with regard to "purpose", Skinner
(1974) points out that "purposes are in people while
contingencies of reinforcement are in the environment,
but ~ ~ purposes are at best the effects of reinforcement t, (p.
+
56). We say that we "give a person a purpose" by
reinforcing that person in a given way. People who act
because they have been reinforced for acting may feel the
condition of their bodies and refer to it as a t 'felt purpose" .
What radical behaviorism rejects is the idea that people's
feelings of purpose cause their act ions That is, radical
4
behaviorists do not deny the existence of internal events but
reject the notion that such things as "purposes'" are causal
to behavior. One must ask what causedthe "purpose"; and
once discovering that, one has essentially identified the
variables that are' causing (controlling) the behavior in
question.
Radical behaviorism rejects mentalistic explanations of the
causes of human behavior such as 4iputpose'; and
01 'meaning' , . But at the same time, contrary to what Mishler
states, radical behaviorism also takes into account phenom-
onological data such as ~ 'thoughts' "I I 'feelings' I , and
I 'consciousness" (Day, 1969). Analyses of complex human
behavior t both overt and covert (phenomenological), in
terms of contingencies of reinforcement (q.v., Skinner,
1953, 1957, 1969t 1974) transcend the mechanistic and
positivistic assumptions of methodological behaviorism and
the.subjective idealism of mentalistic psychology. In placeof
a science of behavior that is both materialistic and dialectical,
Mishler offers us the antimaterialistic, nee-Hegelian critical
theory of Habermas,
3. Oppression us. reciprocal control. This section of
Mishler's article has considerable merit and underscores the
danger of misapplying teebnical terminology. With justif..
ication, Mishler objects to Skinner's treatment of the
problem of countercontrol. Here Mishler is COITect in his
observation that Skinner's discussion of countercountrol
obscures the real nature of oppression. It is politically naive
and dangerous to suggest that the relationship between, for
example, slave and slave driver is one of reciprocal control.
Mishler states:
The lack of an explicit political analysis is particularly
serious on this issue. Skinner's formulation that 'all
control is reciprocal' is offered to reassure critics who
persist in asking, 'Who will control the custodians?'
The question itself is too limited and allows for the
answer he gives. The critical issue is not that there is
an abstract problem of control and custodianship,. but
the existence of asymmetries of political JX?Wer,
systematic practices of discrimination, opposed inter-
ests of social classest and, of course, the brutality of
coercive oppression. All of these socio-political facts
are obscured by the screen of a misapplied technical
vocabulary ~ (p. 35)
But then Mishler goes on to identify behaviorism with the
functionalist approach in sociology, which is not true.
In bourgeois serial sciences the functionalist approach
conceives of society as a machine-like system in which
institutions are interrelated and serve integrative functions
that maintain the system. Marxists also see society as a
system, but it is a continually evolving system of
contradictions(those antagonisticcontingenciesof reinforce..
ment that are so ubiquitous in class society). The
functionalist model is mechanistic; although there may be
Ittdysfunctions" in society, there is no class struggle. The
Marxian model, on the other hand, is dialectical and the
classstruggle is central.
Although in his writings such as Science and HUm41I
Behavior (1953), Skinner is critical of governments for their
exclusive reliance on aversive control, he is not a Marxist:
nor pretends to be. He sees the need for fundamental social
change but he does not give credence to historical
materialism (the Marxist interpretation of history), class
struggle. the necessity for socialist revolution-nor does he
understand the class nature and role of the state (q.v., Lenin,
1932). Nevertheless, there is nothing inherent in the nature
of the experimental analysis of behavior to rule these
concepts out of bounds. On the contrary. When behaviorists
begin to seriously analyze "contingencies writ Iarge" (or
"macrocontingencies' ') .and we begin to make sense out
those huge controlling variables that operate at the
institutional level, we can anticipate that our field will begin
to attract Marxist scholars. When behaviorists begin to
analyze the myriad antagonistic macrocontingencies that
exist under Capitalism (e..g., exploitation, alienation.
unemployment, racial oppression, social disorganization,
etc.) we may expect to see an interpenetration of radical
behaviorism and scientific socialism such that both fields will
be profoundly enriched.
In response to Mishler, as I have argued, radical
behaviorism has none of the mechanistic features that
characterize the functionalist approach. In contrast to the
functionalist concepts of bourgeois social sciences, operant
concepts are capable of mapping the empirical world in a
truely dialectical way. Consequently only the science Qf
human behavior has the potential of forming the
dialectical-materialistic link between physiology and think-
ing between evolutionary biology and historicalmaterialism,
4. Practical reasotlflbleness us. computatiofltll rationality,.
5
Mishler correctly distinguishes between two types of
reasoning; di4JBCtic4J (to 'practical reasonableness' ') amd
fomud (3"computational rationality"), each, 85 has been
discussed. containing within themselvesa set of assumptions
about social reality. As examples of formal rationality,
bourgeois jurisprudence presumes formal equality of all
citizens before the law; the "free enterprise system"
presupposes formal equality of exchange. Dialectical
reasoning, on the other band, provides the conceptUal tools
to see through appearances and discern essences. That is, a
system of unjust laws favoring the rich and a world
dominated by monopoly capitalism and imperialiStic
exploitation,
Mishler (1976) insists that behavioristscan operate only
on the basis of fonnal rationality:
The experimenter .is rational if hi, arrrangement of a
reinforcement schedule is effective, and the subject is
rational if he behaves in such a way as to secure the
maximum number of reinforcements (sic) under given
conditions. (p~ 39)
In practice, Mishler offers, the behaviorist's criteria of
formal rationality are defined by those with institutional
power according to predetermined institutional goals, The
behaviorist' 5 supposed. neutrality, according to Mishler,
turns out to mean that the goals of the socialinstitutions are
not questionedand the status quo is acceptedas a given.
There is no denying : that. reactionary applications of
behaviors analysis are pervasive; the cases have been well
documented by behavior analysts themselves (Holland,
1974a, 1974b, 1978; Redd & Sleator, 1976; Wine« &:
Winkler, 1974). But again Mishler overgeneralizes to all
behaviorists and to behaviorism in general. Mishler has not
shown that formal rationality and its associated political
ramifications are intrinsic to behaviorism. All ideas about
social relations are political and since applied behavior
analysis is concerned with behaviors of social importance it
cannot be value-free. But neither can public health, ecology,
geography, or other fields that deal with social relations.
Mishler should also note that many behaviorists-Behavior-
ists for Social Action, among others--eschew the reaction-
ary uses of behavior analysis and are actively involved in
struggles against socialinjustice.
Mishler has absolutely nothing good to say about
"Skinnerism." Marx was a great admirer of advances in
science and technology and undoubtedly would have greeted
the development of the technology of behavior with
enthusiasm. But not Mishler. He never mentions the
remarkably successful applications of behavior analysis in
such areas as special education, child rearing, clinical
practice, instructional technology, health care, college
teaching, and self-control (where the experimenter and the
subject are within the same skin). Beyond that, Mishler is
completely antagonistic toward the scientific methodology
that made these historicallysignificantadvances possible,
The charge of formal rationality and maintenance of the
status quo is without substance with respect to behaviorism.
By locatingthe causesof social problems in the environment
rather than within people, behaviorism poses a great threat
to the status quo of bourgeoisideology. No other psychology
has produced such a threateningly powerful technology and
no other psychology is both dialectical and materialistic. In
diametric opposition to Mishler t s thesis, I aver that the only
suitable psychology for Marxism is radicalbehaviorism.4
5~ Revolutionary practice us social technology. In this
4
section Mishler says that 'Skinnerism t, is not revolutionary
I
practice and then he repeats essentiallythe same arguments
 as in the preceding section. In an apologetic tone, Mishler
(1976) remarks,
Habermas is proposing that domination by technology
em be avoided onlJeathrough free discussion amon~
those who will be ed by it ... so that a 'rational
decision can be made...
.c'Habermas' proposal may seem somewhat mild in
the context of current radical rhetoric, an up-dated
Jeffersonianism4 (p.42)
Habermas ~ proposal is indeed mild; it is the hopeless
formula of a petty-bourgeois moralizer who substitutes
humanistic-sounding rhetoric for revolutionary practice in
the real world. A glance at Habermas~ writings such as
Theory and Practice (1973)-a more fitting title would be
Theory sans Practice- will make it obvious to the reader
that his turgid style is designed to obscure rather than clarify
issues and that his idealistic concerns are far removed from
the worldly struggles of the toiling masses.
The question remains, What is revolutionary practice? I
have no clear idea of Mishler's conception of revolutionary
practice. To wit:
If we follow the implications of Habermas' critique,
revolutionary practice requires that we re-institute or
re-insert the 'total social framework of interests' into
the political decision-making process through which
strategies, technologies, and systems are chosen and
enablished.(~ert1976p.41)
H 'fi total social framework of interests" means true majority
rule, then he is presupposing a socialistdemocracy under the
dictatorship of the prolitariat (none exist yet). If he is
referring to capitalist society, even under a parlimentary
form of government, then his prescription is a pipe dream.
To illustrate the hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy, when
President Carter recently ordered the striking coal miners
back to work under the Taft-Hartly Act, he claimed that he
was acting "to protect our country" and ~ 'to preserve the
health and safety of our people' , (the 'total social
framework'?). Miners know better and so do Marxists.
Following along in Habermas' footsteps, Mishler's "rev-
olutionary .practice' turns out to be merely more
petty..bourgeoismoralizing,
Ma:rxi.sct are perfectly clear about what they mean by
revolutionary practice. Contrary to the propagandafrom the
capitalist press, revolutionary practice does not mean the
advocacy of violence and terriorism. Being scientific realists
(dialectical materialists), however", Marxists have little
~bt that change in the socialorder will be accompanied by
violence, But as James P. Cannon reminded us in Socialism
on TrW (1970), violence has always been j"ititJted, not by
the oppressed majority t but by the ruling class struggling to
retain its priviledges at any cost. Unfortunately, the lessons
of.history coupled with our knowledge of contingencies of
reinforcement -panicularly extinction-induced aggression
and countercontrol-give us little or no reason to hope that
the U.S. capitalist class will behave otherwise.
Fo~ ~ts the indispensible guide to revolutionary
~~ 15 a program that is thoroughly materialistic and
dialectical. And the indispensible vehicle is a Leninist
p~-:-a party in the Bolshevick tradition, tuned in to the
objective needs of the proletariat and able to raise progressive
dem",:,ds that carry the class struggle forward.5 What
Marxists have not recognized as yet is that the successful
establishment of socialism will also require a dialectical
behaviorism.
. ~ analysts havea historical role to play in bringing
mto being, a socialist future. It is time that we, take a critical
look at ourselves in light of the historical trends of this
8
century, Where are we vis-a-vis the revolutionary move-
ment? As impressiveas our behavioral technology is, given
the magnitude of the social problems of today, are we not
merely rearranging deck furniture on the USS Titanic? For
behaviorists who seek to develop a perspective on
revolutionary practice t I recommend Ai Szymanski's article,
"The Practice of Marxist Social Science" (1977)4 I
sincerely hope that Elliot Mishler will read it too.
Epilogue. Mishler concludes by taking a parting shot at
, ,Skinnerism" , apparently in reply to criticisms he solicited
&om a few behaviorists (he acknowledges Martin Kozloff,
Robert Liberman, and David Mostofsky). Mishler alledges
that in defending behaviorismthey faulted him for not taking
into account different kinds of behaviorism (in Mishler's
terms, the soft-core, eclectic, JABA-type good guys versus
the hard-core, rigid, lEAB-type bad guys); and secondly
for neglecting to allow £or any degree of autonomy betw~
values and psychological theory (i.e., for denying that
behaviorists can be politically radical). Mishler summarily
dismisses both statements of defense :
Without critical appreciation of the dependence of
specific practices on the larger context, neither
London's (1972) pragmatic eclecticism nor Holland's
radical appeal ace likely to deOect behaviorism from its
central thrust or help us to resist its consequences.
(1976, P6 45)
Mishler would have us follow Habermas' contemplative
path to liberation through free discussion, dialogue, and
reflective thought, I wish to conclude by making a
counterproposal: At the theoretical level, expand behavior-
ism's perspective by means of a cross-fertilization with
scientific socialism. At the practical level, apply the
technology of behavior to advance the class struggle for the
dictatorship of the prolitariate6 a goal that seems alien to
Mishler's way of thinking.
Reference Note
Radical Political Behaviorism. A summary chronical.
Unpublished paper, August, 1977. (Available from
Radical Political Behaviorists, Department of Psychol-
ogy t California State University-Sacramento" Sacra-
rnento, California 9'819)
References
Brown, P4 Toward a Marxist Psych0 Jogy New York:
4
Harper & Row, 19744
Cannon, J.P. Socialism on Trial. New York: Pathfinder
Press, 1970.
Day W.F ~ Radical behaviorism in reconciliation with
11
phenomenology. JoUmill of the Experimentol A fJIJly sis
Behavior, 1969, 12, 315-328.
Engels, F4 Dialectics of Nature. New York: International
Publishers, 1940.
Habermas, J. Theory and Practice (], Vientel, trans.)
Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
Hoffman, J. Marxism andthe Theory ofp,.axis.~ A Critique
of Some New Versions of Old FaJJacies. New York:
International Publishers, 1975.
Holland, J.G.. Are behavior principles for revolutionaries?In
F.S. Keller and E. Ribes-Inesta (Eds..), Behavior
modification: Applkations 10 education. New York:
AcademicPress. 1974~ (a)
Holland, J4G~ Political implications of applying behavioral
psychology. In R. Ulrich~ T. Stachnik, & J. Mabry
(Eds.) , Control of Human Behavior III: Behavior
Modification An Education, Glenview, illinois: Scott,
Foresman and Company, 1974. (b)
Holland, J.G. Behaviorism: Part of the problem or part of
the solution? Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis
1978, 11, 163-174.
Kolbe, W.B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism: Logical
positivism or dialectical materialism? Behaviorists for
Social Action journal, 1978 ~ 1 29-55.
t
Lenin V.1. State and Revolution. New Yark: International
t
Publishers, 1932.
London P The end of ideology in behavior modification.
t
4
American Psychologist, .1972,27,913-920.
Mandel, E. From Class Society to Communism.' An
Introduction to Marxism. London: Ink Links, 1978 (1.
Sadler trans.).
l world resulting in distrust in the very existence of that
Mishler, E.G. Skinnerism: Materialism minus the dialectic,
[ournalfor the Theory of Social Behavior, 1976, 6,
21-47.
Novack, G~ Introduction to the Logic of Marxism. New
York: Pathfinder Press, 1971.
Novack, G~ Polemics in Marxist Pbilosopby. New York:
Monad Press, 1978.
Redd, W.H., & Sleator t W . Take Charge: A Personal Guide
to Behavior Modification. New York: Random House)
1976.
Rius. Marx for Beginners. London: Writers and Readers
Cooperative l 1976.
Skinner, B.F. Science and Human Bebauior. New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1953.
Skinner, B.F. Verbal Behavior. New York: Appleton
Century-Crofts, 1957.
Skinner, B.F. Contingencies of Reinforcement.' A Theore-
tical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969.
Skinner, B.F. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York:
Bantam Books, 19714
Skinner, B.F. About Behaviorism. New York: Alfred A
Knopf, 1974.
Szymanski, A. the practice of Marxist social science.
Insurgent Sociologist, 1977t 7, 53-59.
Therborn, G. jurgen Habermas: A new eclecticism. New
Left Review, May-June 1971, pp. 69-83.
Trotsky, L. In Defense of Marxism~ New York: Pathfinder
press, 1973~
Trotsky, L. The Transitional Program for Socialist
Revolution. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974.
Vargas, J.S. Behavioral Psychology for Teachers. New
York: Harper & Row, 1977.
Weiss, D.D~ Philosophy of Engels vindicated. monthly
Review, 1977, 28 15-30.
t the opportunity to read Kolbe's (1978) scholarly and
Winett, R~A.t & Winkler, R.C. Current behavior modifica-
tion in the classroom: be still, be quiet t be doc ile
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1972, 5,
499-)04~
Footnotes
1. Novack (1978) has found that revisionism in Western
Marxism takes one of two opposing forms: "humanis-
tic ~, or "scientistic t , -as exemplified in the writings of
Sartre and Althusser t respectively. Novack states}
'iHowever much they contend with one another, they
j
represent equal! y one-sided deformations of socialist
theory. Marxism is both humanistic and scientific ... ' ~
(p. 182). These two forms of revisionism can be
characterized philosophically as idealistic and positivis-
tic. Idealism is the view mat reality consists of ideas,
mind ~ self, or spirit ~ rather than matter. On the other
hand, positivism holds only that which can be
immediately and empirically verifiable can constitute
valid knowledge. Ironically, positivism, dispite its
effusive laudation fo science, arrives at the same
nonrnaterialistic endpoint as does idealism, The fatal
flaw in the positivistic theory of knowledge is the
supposed chasm between 'sense-s-data and external
t
external nnaterialvvorld.
t
2. Commenting on the debasement of dialectical material-
ism, Novack (1978) writes:
In his obligatory catechism of Dialectical and
Historical Materialism 1 Stalin. , .omitted mention of
the law of the negation of the negation, which sets
forth the pattern of progressive development in
which the new replaces the old on a higher level as
the outcome of the conflict of opposing forces. This
omission in theory, it was hoped, would shield the
(Soviet) bureaucracy from negation in practice.
Maxism, instead of being a school of unfettered
thought, became a school of scholastic mumbo
jumbo. (p. 113)
Dialectical materialism is a refined method of scientific
analysis, not a set of formulas to be reiterated according
&
to the vulgar dictates of the state. Whether it effuses
from Moscow ~ Peking, or elsewhere, revolutionary
Marxism shares nothing in common with such Stalinist
dogmatism.
3.A good starting point" along with Marx and Engel's
classic, The Communist Manifesto, is Ernest Mandels
new introduction to Marxism, From Class Society to
Communism (1978). Mandel explains the basic
elements of historical materialism, Marxist economic
theory the history of the workers' movement, and the
t
problems of strategy and tactics for the workers'
movement today. Each chapter is accompanied by a
useful "further readings" list. Also helpful is the
primer, Marxism for Beginners (Rius, 1976)t written
in the comic book style of Behaviorbelia and containing
a handy glossary of Marxist terms. (These publications
are available from Pathfinder Press, 410 West Street,
NY 10014.)
4. Independent of each other, William Kolbe and ] arrived
at the same basic conclusion about the materialistic and
dialectical nature of radical behaviorism. It was only
after I had written the first draft of this paper that I had
parturient article.
4 5. An exemplary model of revolutionary practice is the
program of the Fourth International, the world
organization of socialist revolution, and its syrnpath-
izing component in the United States (reactionary
legislation precludes formal affiliation), the Socialist
7
 Workers Party. Called the Transitional Progaram
(Trotsky, 1974), it is a mass action program designed to
bridge the gap between the relative weakness of
revel utionary parties and the objective possibilities for
socialist revolution. The core of the program is a method
of successive approximations which, at any given level
of class struggle ~ avoids straying from the revolutionary
road by deviating too far to the right (opportunistic
reformism) or to the left (u i t raleft sectarianism) ~
6. Since the meaning of "dictatorship of the proletariat' ~
continues to be a central point of controversy among the
political left) it behooves me to be explicit. By
, 'dictatorship' , I mean the exercise of political power by
the working class as a whole) not a narrow dictatorship
imposed on workers by a ruling minority of privileged
bureaucrats. Under the (" dictatorship of the proletar-
iat ~', as the term is used herein the working class
J

exercises state power within an institutional framework

arising out of sovereign, centralized, and democratically
elected workers ~ councils (soviets). For a detailed
explication of the dictatorship ofthe proli t ariat from th e
standpoint of revolutionary Marxism, see the pamphlet
Socialist Democracy (available for 75c from Pathfinder
Press, Ltd., 25 Bu1wer St., Toronto, Ontario M5T
lAI).

CALL FOR PAPERS FOR BFSA JOURNAL

Behaviorists For Social Action Journal solicits original

articles ~ reviews, letters and other material relevant to our
concerns. We invite comments on all aspects of our program
and goals. There are no specific format requirements.
Manuscripts and correspondence should be sent to:
Joseph E~ Morrow, Editor
BFSA Journal
Dept. of Psychology
California State University, Sacramento
Sacramento, CA 95819