RETHINKING MARXISM VOLUME 17 NUMBER 3 (JULY 2005)

The Turn to Agency:

Neoliberalism, Individuality, and
Subjectivity in Late-Twentieth-Century
Anglophone Archaeology

Thomas C. Patterson

The aim of this paper is to consider why the idea of agency*/which was elaborated by
Roy Bhaskar, Anthony Giddens, and others in the 1970s*/was adopted by and became
so popular among archaeologists in the 1990s. This involves examining not only the
idea of agency itself, but also its connections with an array of closely related notions
in everyday and philosophical discourse: the individual, subject, self, and person. It
also requires consideration of the sociopolitical and ideological contexts in which
agency theory was developed and how changing notions of choice, determination,
individuality, and subjectivity are implicated.

Key Words: Neoliberalism, The Individual, Agency, Subjectivity, Identity

The Individual:
Socially Determined, Free Agent, or Something Else?
Karl Marx characterized the interconnections of the individual, society, and history in
quite modern terms in the 1850s when he wrote that ‘‘in the social production of their
life, men [and women] enter into definite relations that are indispensable and
independent of their will’’ (1970, 20) and that, while they ‘‘make their own
history . . . [they do so] under circumstances directly encountered, given and
transmitted from the past’’ (1963, 15). The relation between structure and agency
is still a central concern for social theorists today. Anthony Giddens, among others,
has pointed out that theorists concerned with this relation fall into two groups. Action
theorists, like Max Weber, focus on the individual and individual actor, occasionally to
the point where it is difficult to explain social institutions. Functionalists, like Émile
Durkheim, emphasize structures and systems, often to the point where the ability of
the individual to act seems completely shaped by those institutions. Not far below the
surface of this typology, as you might imagine, are wider philosophical and theological
issues. Two are particularly important for our purposes. One pits determinism against
freedom, predestination against free will, causality against choice. Another explores
what is actually meant by the term ‘‘individual’’ and its relation to the ideas of
‘‘agency’’ and ‘‘choice,’’ on the one hand, and their connections with seemingly

ISSN 0893-5696 print/1475-8059 online/05/030373-12

– 2005 Association for Economic and Social Analysis
DOI: 10.1080/08935690500122172
374 PATTERSON

related concepts such as the subject, self, and social being, on the other. It is
important to keep in mind that the notion of freedom (free will) has strong ethical
and moral overtones, especially with regard to the responsibility of individuals for
their actions.
What is at issue in the first debate is the capacity to choose. As Roy Weatherford
notes, the mental states, decisions, and actions of socially determined individuals
‘‘are effects necessitated by preceding causes’’; their ‘‘futures are fixed and
unalterable’’ (1995, 292). They are contrasted with individuals who possess freedom
or free will*/that is, the innate capacity or ability to choose among an array of
possibilities. These free individuals have the power to launch new causal chains of
events that originate when they choose and decide freely among alternative courses
of action and are not compelled or coerced to adopt a particular one. In this instance,
freedom means either (1) voluntariness or (2) voluntariness plus origination
(292/293).1 The concept of agency emphasizes the freedom or free will of those
actors who possess the power to choose or to act otherwise as opposed to things or
human beings that do not. Agency involves choice, and choice is the ‘‘domain of
voluntary action [that] is created beyond the reach of ordinary causal explanation.’’
Individuals are agents because they possess internal capacities or powers, which,
when exercised, allow them to be active entities that continually intervene in the
flow of events around them (Barnes 2000, 25). Thus, the notion of agency ‘‘capture[s]
the element of ‘indeterminacy’ or ‘contingency’ in social life, the ‘processual
moment’ wherein the potential for ‘transformation’ and not merely ‘reproduction’,
lies’’ (López 2003, 4/5). In short, choice is equated with autonomy, which yields the
undetermined individual.
This view presumes the ontological priority of the atomistic individual, who is a
naturally occurring, discrete unit (the biological organism). This human atomic unit is
indivisible and cannot be reduced to or explained in terms of other phenomena. It
also makes the ontological presumption that this individual is autonomous,
independent, and in possession of knowledge, free choice (freedom to act other-
wise), motivation, reflexivity, and agency. It further presumes that the source of the
individual’s knowledge as well as its capacity to act rationally reside in the individual
itself. The individual’s theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge (know-how) of
how to follow rules allow it to optimize pleasure or utility. Thus, the reflexive,
interpretive, motivated, desiring individual who is free to act otherwise is
simultaneously an agent and a subject in the sense that it continually makes
assessments of its social and natural environment. Thus, agency and subjectivity
become indisputable facts of personhood. This, as Nick Mansfield observes, is the
Enlightenment’s common-sense notion of the subject: the unique, autonomous
individual who, through experience and education, ‘‘develops as part of [its]
spontaneous encounter with the world’’ (2000, 11).
The Enlightenment view of the ontological individual, which conflates the
autonomous, self-made person with agency and subjectivity, is the foundation for
the rational economic man of utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham (see Morris 1991). This

1. Other formulations of the relationship between structure and agency are possible.
 MARXISM AND ARCHAEOLOGY 375

notion has been called into question on many grounds*/for example, by Karl Marx and
Friedrich Nietzsche in the nineteenth century and, more recently, by psychoanalysts,
phenomenologists, existentialists, and poststructuralists (Bowie 1996; Critchley and
Dews 1996). If Marx wrote about the consequences of alienation and Nietzsche
pointed to the destructive drives of the individual, psychoanalysts brought to the fore
the impact of neuroses and the unconscious. If the phenomenologists (Martin
Heidegger, for instance) focused attention on intersubjectivity (the subject as partly
defined through the views it perceives others hold), existentialists (like Jean-Paul
Sartre) saw the subject (self) as constructed, situational, and impermanent.
Poststructuralists, most notably Michel Foucault, argued that the subject, the
psyche, and consciousness come into existence only through the interplay of language
and power as lodged in impersonal disciplinary institutions like prisons, academic
fields, or punishment. The twentieth-century challenge to the common-sense
Enlightenment notion of the subject also involved anthropologists such as Edward
Sapir, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Clyde Kluckhohn who, with others, laid the
foundations for culture and personality studies in the 1930s and for psychological
anthropology after the Second World War.
Although social commentators may draw clear lines between the socially
determined individual and the free agent, their distinctions are often blurred in
everyday discourse where we sometimes regard an agent as simultaneously free and
socially determined and an action as simultaneously chosen and caused. This results
in some interesting, internally contradictory notions, like those of the restricted free
agent in professional sports or the hungry proletarian opting to choose something else
instead of participation in the labor market. While philosophers and some social
scientists, including anthropologists, have been attentive to nuanced discussions of
subjectivity, individuality, and agency, most economists (and more than a few
archaeologists, I believe) have not. They continue to view subjectivity and agency in
terms of the actions of rational, motivated, self-reflexive individuals who make
decisions in order to optimize or maximize some desired goal. This is rational
economic man whose roots lie with Thomas Hobbes near the beginning of the
Enlightenment tradition, whose image was polished by the utilitarians at the end of
the eighteenth century, and whose likeness was dusted off again and recycled by the
neoclassical economists at the end of the nineteenth century.

Neoliberalism: Its Ideology and Political Economy

Social commentators of varying political and theoretical persuasions agree that

marked changes occurred in U.S. society in response to a structural crisis begun in the
late 1960s and early 1970s (see Harvey 1989; Jameson 1984a, 1984b, 1991; Phillips
1981). They agree about the many features of this crisis: high inflation, high
unemployment, falling rates of profit, a decline in industrial production, the
internalization of economic relations (especially finance and investment), the
breakdown of the unwritten compact between labor and capital that had appeared
in 1947, the concentration of wealth, the decline of the middle class, the rise to
prominence of various financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and
376 PATTERSON

the World Bank, the stalling of the civil rights movement, the appearance of new
social movements rooted in identity politics, devaluation of the dollar, and the
increasing implementation of neoliberal austerity programs from the mid-1970s
onward both at home and abroad.
The broadly Keynesian economic policies of the U.S. government from the late
1930s onward were based on state ownership and state intervention in the market;
the federal government was simultaneously a producer, a consumer, a promoter, and
a regulator of economic activity, scientific research, and education programs.
Through social security and various other health, housing, educational, and social
welfare programs, the government attempted to guarantee the well-being of its
citizens. Keynesianism underpinned the postwar economic growth and modernization
theories that acknowledged the existence of the noneconomic realms of society and
offered at least some support for them. If the Keynesian commentators were unable
to provide an adequate explanation of the crisis of the 1970s, then their neoliberal
critics had an explanation: the economic slowdown, high unemployment, and
increasing inflation resulted from the government’s intervention in the market,
which distorted the incentives of economic agents and obscured market signals
(Vlachou and Christou 1999, 1). The policy implications of their theory were that the
government should withdraw from the market, roll back regulatory policies, and
privatize state-owned enterprises. One practical effect of the implementation of
neoliberal policies was the withdrawal of state support for health, education, and
welfare program. For example, the cost of higher education was shifted from the
state to students and their families. The City University of New York charged tuition
for the first time in the mid-1970s, and the University of California raised its fees from
$85.00 per year in 1960 to nearly $6,000 per year for residents and more than $20,000
per year for nonresidents in 2003.2
Neoliberalism is based on the methodological individualism of neoclassical
microeconomic theory and on the approach of the new classical economists, both
of which make at least five questionable assumptions about the individual, human
nature, and society. The first assumption is that individual human beings always
pursue their own interests and make rational choices in order to maximize or optimize
pleasure or utility subject to constraints such as income or resource endowment;
thus, needs, preferences, and abilities are part of the innate nature of individuals.
The second assumption is that economic agents always rely on the best information
available to make rational choices. The third is that these rational choices occur in an
instantaneously clearing market in which an equilibrium between supply and demand
is achieved simultaneously in all markets by price movements. The fourth is that
social relations*/regardless of whether they are construed in terms of structures,
practices, or institutions*/are the unintended consequences of individual or
collective agents (firms) pursuing a goal. Social phenomena are not only emergent

2. Economists Richard Wolff (1999) and Anwar Shaikh (1999) have noted that Keynesian
economic theory rose to prominence in the late 1930s and early 1940s because of the failure of
neoclassical economists to explain persistent high unemployment during the Great Depression of
the 1930s. Since neoclassical economic theory is the foundation of neoliberalism, there is a
certain irony in the theoretical shift from the 1970s onward.
 MARXISM AND ARCHAEOLOGY 377

but also have no autonomy or explanatory value of their own, to paraphrase Margaret
Thatcher, a leading exponent of neoliberal policies, who remarked once that there is
‘‘no such thing as society, only individuals and families.’’ The fifth is that changes in
human nature are initiated by factors that are exogenous to the economy; such
changes have unintended consequences, the effects of which are resolved instanta-
neously in the equilibrium-seeking market (Callinicos 1988, 12/9; Fine 2001, 7/9;
Lukes 1973, 110/9; Vlachou and Christou 1999, 2/3).
Finance capital and its neoliberal policy-makers believe that the market, through
the competition it creates, is the most efficient means of allocating scarce resources
in ways that they see as most beneficial to the society as a whole. Individuals, acting
as individuals rather than as subjects enmeshed in complex webs of social relations,
acquire the goods and services they desire through buying and selling in the market.
The neoliberals do not discern differences between individuals; they perceive them
instead as if they were equals on a level playing field. If individuals fail to achieve
particular goals in the market, it is their fault; the individuals are victims of their own
irrational behaviors or have some deficit over which they have no control. Thus,
neoliberals are able to ‘‘blame the victims’’ by ignoring history, the effects of
inherited wealth, class differences, and power differentials in the market. For them,
the market of life is either an arena of harmony or the place where the truly
meritorious come to the surface. When they pay attention to culture, society, and
history, they want these accounts simple so they can use them as lessons for the
present and to chart courses of action in the future. Consequently, they find
explanations that universalize history or reduce the complexity of cultures and
societies to a few underlying, guiding principles particularly attractive.
This raises questions about the source of the rules that individuals follow. In the
view of neoliberal policy-makers, the theoretical and practical knowledge of
individuals is treated unproblematically as innate or learned. Rational human beings
have the ability to assess critically various options and to rank order the desirability of
each. As Steven Lukes (1973, 73) notes, these universal features determine the
behavior of the individual and specify its needs and interests. The rules that
individuals follow are set in the market. The market is independent of them and
does not determine behavior; it provides the social setting in which individuals can
deploy their knowledge to best fulfill their needs. Here, they compete with one
another to satisfy preferences for a variety of scarce things; their ability to satisfy
these desires depends on the price of the items and ultimately on the size of their
original contributions to the market. ‘‘The price mechanism reflects [their]
responses’’ (Pleasants 1999, 93). Above all else, these individuals appear concerned
with or consumed by consumption. Neoliberal perspectives tend to treat the market
unproblematically, even as they assert that the functioning of the market can be and
has been distorted at various times and places (see DeMartino 2000).

Neoliberalism: The Individual, the Agent, and the Subject

I believe this is the gist of a neoliberal theory of the individual, agency, and
subjectivity. Let us consider five consequences of neoliberalism with respect to the
378 PATTERSON

development of contemporary social theory. First, this individualistic, subject-

centered, essentially Kantian view of the individual is also shared by Bhaskar, Giddens,
and critical theorists like Jürgen Habermas (Pleasants 1999, 159/60). It should not be
surprising that they are theorists of neoliberalism since all of them are grappling in
different ways with contemporary issues. What is surprising is their commitment to
ontological and epistemological individualism in light of comments they have made
about shared public worlds (culture) or shared intersubjective language (communica-
tion) as preconditions for knowledge (Lukes 1973, 109). In this view, the individual is
prior to and set apart from any community and only becomes part of the community by
virtue of association and exchange in the market. Furthermore, the individual so
described is often no more than a physical body with desires.
Second, in a series of contradictory moves, this effectively microeconomic theory
of the individual has simultaneously underwritten claims that the economy and
production were unduly privileged in earlier theories of society (e.g., Keynesian or
modernization) and that more attention should be paid to consumption and culture
(Fine 2001, 12; Miller 1995). Theories of the commodity, like those of Jean Baudrillard
(1981), blur important distinctions between productive consumption and final
consumption by focusing on the meanings attributed to a particular use value by
the final consumers. In the process, they remove the commodity, both culturally and
materially, from the social relations involved in its production, exchange, and
distribution; they focus more on the symbolic than the material properties of the
commodity (Fine 1995; Fine and Leopold 1993, 264/73); however, there is more to
commodities than their symbolic exchange value or their signification of status,
symbol, or ritual. The cultural theories of consumption that have appeared in the past
twenty-five years also attribute power to the final consumer. The question is: Power
to do what? To purchase a use value? To create a commodity? To attribute meaning,
symbolic or otherwise, to its consumption?
Third, after emphasizing the importance of market relations, a number of
neoliberal theorists have drawn a sharp line between the economic and noneconomic
realms of behavior. Thus, activities associated with the market are economic and
nonsocial, and, conversely, those not associated with the market are social and
noneconomic. This allows them to reintroduce what they excluded theoretically in
the first place*/namely, the idea that the social, the cultural, and the symbolic exist
and that these epiphenomena (in their view) might be important. By extension, they
have adopted and promoted the view that capital is fluid and that it exists in myriad
forms besides the purely economic*/such as social, cultural, or symbolic. While the
forms of capital shift as they move or are exchanged between the economic and
social realms, for most rational choice continues to dictate how the various forms will
be deployed by individual and collective actors influenced by and in the contexts of
their networks of social relations.3 It is noteworthy that the same (market) rationality

3. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) differentiation of economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital in
light of particular activities, social relations, and historical context in twentieth-century France
is often implicated in discussions of social capital. However, his approach was quite different
from those of neoliberal theorists, and he was generally quite critical of their work (cf. Fine
2001, 53/64, 98/105).
 MARXISM AND ARCHAEOLOGY 379

operates in both the economic and noneconomic realms. Once again, this attributes
power to the individual actors, but power to do what? This view contrasts markedly
with that of Pierre Bourdieu (1998, 113), who writes that the capitalist economy
creates oppositional ‘‘anti-economic sub-universes’’ devoid of economic capital and
in which other sentiments (love, obligation, or honor) prevail. Bourdieu differs from
the neoliberal theorists in another way; he has a profound respect for and
appreciation of the significance of sociocultural complexity and historical specificity.
Fourth, crystallizing at the same time as neoliberal thought were identity politics
and the new social movements, such as the women’s, gay rights, antiwar, environ-
mental, or religious fundamentalist as well as various ethnic, separatist, or
nationalist movements. While they are often oppositional to features of hegemonic
cultural, social, or political-economic structures, neoliberal commentators have
tended to view the participants in each of these movements as sharing some
fundamental property or characteristic that makes them similar (identical) to one
another and different from nonparticipants. Simply put, all other constituents of an
individual’s identity are reduced to and described by reference to this single property.
These largely urban, decentralized movements are said to draw their members from
various social classes and express diverse perspectives, ideas, and values. They often
give voice to the grievances and sentiments of individuals and collectivities whose
identities are weakly developed, subordinated, or suppressed by the dominant
cultural, social, and political systems. Their grievances and the identities they seek to
construct focus on cultural and social issues that often involve the expression of
personal, intimate aspects of everyday life, such as sexual preference or abortion
rights. Chantal Mouffe writes that these movements are rooted not in the class
position of their participants but rather in the appearance of antagonisms that are
‘‘always discursively constructed’’ (1988, 95). Neoliberals see the identity politics
attributed to the new social movements as self-referential and self-representational.
It is the individual who elects to participate in them. However, if the identities are
not related to class position, then who really constitutes them: a plural subject, a
popular force, or some external agency? The class-based demands of demonstrators
which were clearly articulated with other issues at the meeting of the World Trade
Organization in Seattle and in subsequent venues call into question how new social
movements have been identified and characterized.
Fifth, there have been social commentators during the past thirty years who have
challenged neoliberal thought even as they used parts of its conceptual framework.
As already mentioned, Pierre Bourdieu was one critic; Michel Foucault was another.
The latter wrote that

the individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a

primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to
fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or
crushes. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain
bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be
identified and constituted as individuals . . . The individual is an effect of
power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that
effect, it is an element of its articulation. The individual which power has
constituted is at the same time its vehicle. (1980, 98)
380 PATTERSON

In Foucault’s view, the subject came into existence only through the interplay of
language and power lodged in impersonal, disciplinary institutions like prisons,
hospitals, or schools. Nick Mansfield described Foucault’s subject as ‘‘the primary
workroom of power, making us turn in on ourselves, trapping us in the illusion that we
have a fixed and stable selfhood that science can know, institutions can organize and
experts can correct’’ (2000, 10). Foucault’s perception of agency and subjectivity
contrasts markedly with neoliberal views of selfhood.

Agency, Individuality, Subjectivity,

and Identity in Archaeological Discourse

The evolutionist-functionalist theoretical frameworks of the new or processual

archaeology were ascendant in Anglophone countries in the late 1960s and early
1970s (Patterson 1995, 2003; Trigger 1984). Kent Flannery’s ‘‘Archeological Systems
Theory’’ (1968) or his ‘‘The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations’’ (1973) were influential
examples of this trend. Critiques of the new archaeology began to appear with
increasing regularity from the late 1970s or early 1980s onward, perhaps culminating
with Elizabeth Brumfiel’s distinguished lecture, ‘‘Breaking and Entering the Ecosys-
tem’’ (1994). Concerns with human agency or with the relation between structure and
agency emerged in these critiques (Bell 1992; Hodder 1982; Johnson 1989). Dean
Saitta (1994) was an early critic of how archaeologists were conceptualizing agency
and its interconnections with social relations and structures. However, neither the
concept of agency nor the related concepts of individuality, subjectivity, and identity
were seen from a single perspective (Brumfiel 2000; Dobres and Robb 2000; Pauketat
2000, 2001). As time passed, it became increasingly apparent in the 1990s that there
are, in fact, diverse understandings of each concept, of their interrelations, and of
their potential relevance to archaeology.
This diversity of viewpoints refracts (1) varying degrees of commitment to the
tenets of processual archaeology or to one or more of the various postprocessual
critiques of it, on the one hand; and (2) a healthy dose of eclecticism, on the other
(Clark 2000, 107/9; McCall 1999; Patterson 1990). First, many processual archae-
ologists objectify the subject; that is, they treat the subject as if it were a biological
individual possessing certain behavioral, genetic, or psychological characteristics.
Second, they are also advocates of methodological individualism, which asserts that
explanations of social phenomena must be couched in terms of facts about
individuals. Third, they believe that individuals act in accordance with conscious
mental states and are rational in the sense that they act to maximize particular goals.
Fourth, they view culture narrowly as behavioral rules or symbols that are learned and
transmitted by individuals or as adaptations that help individual members sustain
themselves and restrain their own self-interests in favor of the common good.
Keeping both the field of debate and the underlying structuring principles in mind, let
us consider briefly some of the disparate views about agency, individuality,
subjectivity, and identity.
Toward the processual end of the spectrum, human agents are viewed as biological
individuals possessing certain psychological characteristics. Flannery (1998, 14/5)
 MARXISM AND ARCHAEOLOGY 381

described them as political movers and shakers: calculating, aggressive alpha males
who ruthlessly and shrewdly pursued power. In this view, I believe, some individuals in
a society have power to bring about change, others do not; further, subjects are born,
not made in culturally and historically contingent circumstances. As a result, the
issues of subjectivity (in the sense of the inner dimensions of the individual deriving
from particular vantage points, feelings, beliefs, or desires) and intersubjectivity are
not particularly relevant for processual archaeologists. The issue of identity is most
frequently reduced to community or ethnic affiliation, less frequently to social status
(elite versus commoner) or class position.
Toward the postprocessual end of the spectrum lie the perspectives of John Barrett
(2000, 2001) and Lynn Meskell (1999, 2001). Barrett, for example, sees human agents
as knowledgeable and reflexive people who ‘‘do not appear upon the historical stage
as a given, [but] rather make themselves within and through their own specific social
and cultural conditions’’ (2001, 141). In his view, ‘‘agency cannot be analyzed in
terms of isolated beings . . . [and it] is not the study of the individual per se . Agency is
always situated in the resources of time/place, a being-in-the-world, whose actions
carry the past into the future and which reference to absent places in the locations of
its own operations. Through those actions agency knows itself and is known by
others’’ (Barrett 2000, 61). Here, questions about subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and
identity remain relevant and challenging for archaeologists. As Meskell observes,

Although some aspects of our identity are given to us as a starting point*/our

sex, class, ethnicity, etc.*/this frames the self, it does not rigidly determine
the sort of person we might become or our actions in the future.
Understanding social identity often requires a metanarrative, just as
awareness of individual selves requires that identity and life experience
be inserted into that equation. In fact, there are two levels of operation:
one is the broader social level in which identities are defined by formal
associations and mores; the other is the individual or personal level where a
person experiences many aspects of identity within a single subjectivity,
fluid over the trajectories of life. The latter is more contingent, immediate,
and operates at a greater frequency, whereas society’s categories and
constraints take longer to reformulate. (2001, 188/9)

Discussion

Social theory from the turn of the last century*/when imperialism, finance capital,
and laissez-faire liberalism reigned supreme and were first defined in modern
terms*/has been reappropriated or recycled by writers during the past thirty years.
This is true of neoliberal commentators whose roots lie in neoclassical economics and
marginal utility theory; it is also true of archaeologists who have consciously or
unconsciously appropriated its perspectives and introduced them into discourse that
operates in a distinct domain, one that is at least superficially different economics.
At this point, we as archaeologists might want to contemplate an exercise described
by economist George DeMartino. He asks us to complete the following statement: ‘‘‘A
good theory is one that . . . ’ In concluding this statement, consider what a good theory
382 PATTERSON

is to do, what features it should have, and/or what form it should take. All our lives
each of us has to make choices between contending theories. I’m asking you to reflect
for a moment on the criterion of theory choice that you bring to bear (or think you
should bring to bear) when confronting alternative theories’’ (2000, ix).
I would submit that reductionist theories that distort the complexities of the
human condition by oversimplification are not particularly useful. It is also important,
I believe, not only to examine the historically specific contexts in which concepts and
theories emerge, but also to consider carefully their implications.

Acknowledgments
This paper was prepared for the session ‘‘Archaeological Theories as Ideologies’’
organized by Reinhard Bernbeck and Randall McGuire for the annual meeting of the
Society for American Archaeology, held 31 March/4 April 2005, in Salt Lake City. I
want to thank Wendy Ashmore, Reinhard Bernbeck, Joseph Childers, Stephen
Cullenberg, Michael Kearney, and Carlos Vélez Ibáñez for their thought-provoking
comments.

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