MACARIOLA v.

ASUNCION

114 SCRA 77FACTS:

On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA, with “acts
unbecoming of a judge” when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered the decision.
Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests in said
property were conveyed. According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5)
of Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1]
that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E
which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the
Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.,
as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised
himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine
Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge.

ISSUE:

Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?

HELD:

Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and
employees like justices and judges. Said provision must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated. As such, Article 14 is not in force. The respondent is not found to have violated
the articles invoked by the petitioner but he was advised by the Court to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

FACTS

On August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals, with “acts unbecoming a judge when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject of litigation on
which he rendered decision. Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their
shares and interests in said property were conveyed.

According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article 1491, par. 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No.
1184-E which was one of those properties involved in in a case decided by him and that he likewise violated Article 14, par. 1 and 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Section 3, par. H, of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating
himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte.

ISSUES

I. Whether or not respondent Judge violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E.

II. Whether or not respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.

HELD

NEGATIVE. [The Court] find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491,
paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No.
3010.

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons
disqualified therein. In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal; hence, the lot in question was
no longer subject of the litigation.
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of
Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: “A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.”

II

NEGATIVE. Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under [paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce] because there is no showing
that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his
judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of
First Instance.

It is [the Court’s] considered view that although [paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14] is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government
and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers
and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence. It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the
Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the “Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar,” which was
extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14
of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: “It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. ”

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change
of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has
no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
respondents. JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

TERMS:

1. Lis Mota – litigation moved. The cause or motivation of a legal action or lawsuit.

FACTS:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. Among the changes
made in the procedure were:
a. Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement
against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on
the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as
the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third
(1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.
b. Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against
the same official.
 2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
4. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
5. On 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
6. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.”
7. The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of
Article XI of the present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file", and concludes that the one year bar
prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and the 7 Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the
collective body, has yet to act on it.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
4. Whether or not Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules on Procedure in Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and
5. Whether or not, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

HELD:

123. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
a. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
b. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
c. It is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is
too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would,
in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative
inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further
strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely
affected by the Court's ruling.
4. Yes. The questioned sections of The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing." One of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of
the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
“For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate,
trial and judgment by the Senate… The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of
the complaint…It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution.”
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial
because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
impeachment proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This
is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. He concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified
complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
5. Yes. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
 WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Facts:

Petitioner Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He alleged that respondent Commission on
Elections gave his certificate of candidacy due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound system and
loud speakers. According to him, this violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech. Petitioner filed a case against Commission on elections
seeking a writ of prohibition and at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. The respondent argued that this authority was granted by
the Constitutional Convention Act.

Issues:

Was the prohibition imposed by respondent a violation of the right to freedom of speech of the petitioner?

Ruling:

Supreme Court ruled that there was absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such ban in the light of the doctine of
ejusdem generis. The respondent commission failed to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to
assure its being consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. The Constitution prohibits abridgement of
free speech or a free press. According to the Supreme Court, this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What the respondent Commission did was
to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed.

The respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid
order banning the use of political taped jingles.

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically
referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could
not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of
gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the constitution.
The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.

Alih vs. Castro

151 SCRA 279

June 23, 1987

Facts:

Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose
firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The
following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection.
Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of
Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that
operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin
testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.
Held:

The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the
guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be
protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor
was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The
operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as
evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court
held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga at the time in question did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time of the “zona”, the petitioners were merely suspected of the mayor’s slaying and had not
been in fact investigated. Every person is entitled due process. The respondents defied the precept that “civilian authority is at all times supreme
over the military” so clearly proclaimed in the Constitution. The respondents simply by-passed civil courts which had the authority to determine
whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioners’ premises. It follows that as the search of the petitioners’ premises was violative
of the Constitution, all the firearms and the ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible as evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION

(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC).
Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First
Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry
it into effect;

2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation;

3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and

4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it
into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in
the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent
Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.” In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of
its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state action.” Without doubt therefore the transaction, although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the
State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that
the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid
is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed
to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we
are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.

The United States vs. H.N. Bull GR L-5270Jan 15, 1910

Facts:

On the 2nd of December 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Standard commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port
of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 677 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and
proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit. This
cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be
filed because neither was it said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not
licensed under Philippine laws, like the ship involved.

Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines would have no jurisdiction, continued until it reached Philippine
territory which is already under jurisdiction of the Philippines. Defendant is thereby found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes committed in a foreign ship on the high seas, but the moment it entered into territorial
waters, it automatically would be subject to the jurisdiction of the country. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial
waters. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose
of trade would subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain.

Mabanag vs. Vito

[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]

En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate opinion

Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected
senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of
the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their
election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had
not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not
been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment
to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the
necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted,
the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The
members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are
made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth
Party.

Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.

Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except
to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This
doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities.
The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the
actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an
amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine
Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding
that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by
the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason
for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.

Issue:

WON the Court can take cognizance of the issue.

WON the resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

Ruling:

No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred
upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political
question. However, in Coleman v. Miller, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a
political question and hence not justiciable. If a ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be
a political question. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by Congress. If a political question conslusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the “enrolled bill” rule born of that respect.

Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 220, provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings:

By the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and

In case of acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

In US v. Pons, the Court looked into the journals because those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly
authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before the Court; and it had not been shown that if that had been done, this Court
would not have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law.

Even if both journals and an authenticate copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals
does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the 2 ways specified in Section 313 of
The Code of Civil Procedure. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the 2 documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies
“shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973

Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:

While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the president issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines
under martial law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its proposed constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73
submitting to the people for ratification or rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification. On December 7,
1972, Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No. 73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others is
lodged exclusively in the Congress. On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of PD 1081 for the
purpose of the free and open debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the president announced the postponement of the plebiscite,
as such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On January 12, the petitioners filed for an “urgent motion” praying that the case be decided
“as soon as possible”.

ISSUES:

1. Is the validity of PD 73 justiciable?

2. Is PD 73 valid?

3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed constitution?

HELD:

The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases decided by the Court but also of subdivision (1) of
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly provides for the authority of the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The
validity of the decree itself was declared moot and academic by the Court. The convention is free to postulate any amendment as long as it is not
inconsistent with what is known as Jus Cogens.

Planas vs. Commission on Elections

[GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs. Comelec [GR L-35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941],
Ordonez vs. National Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs. Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs.
Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales vs. Comelec [GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L-35979]
Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs as recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate
opinions

Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June
1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA
6132, approved on 24 August 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on 10 November
1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on 1 June 971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September
1972, the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved its
Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, 30 November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925, against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force
and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be
used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973, there being no
freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical
actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation
1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973, when General
Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on 15 January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order
20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite, the Court
deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be
held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on 22
January 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a
plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the
plebiscite by the President — reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections — the
Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an
"urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in said motion,
"that the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on
certain public questions; and that thereafter it was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose — [1] The New
Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new
date given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of the
regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial Law."

Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73.

Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a
justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of
the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the
authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue.

Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention.

Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds
therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In
any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may
justify.

Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the
Constitution.

Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This
question has not been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such
Proclamation, although the petitioners in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies
may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by
the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion
possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances, that instead of
dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises.

Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of
the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo,
Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree. (3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed
Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra
opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the
authority of the Convention. (4) Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue
in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view.
(5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar
as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated
under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and
academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and
that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. (6) On
Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: [a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra
and Concepcion are of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly,
should not pass upon such question. [b] Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted
to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum among
Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate
drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should he
recognized as legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance
with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not
competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially
discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be
dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective
opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the
petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential
Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he believes, in
effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are
dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.

Facts:

The Plebiscite Case

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June
17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which
the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its
functions on June 1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under
Martial Law.

On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972,
the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite
for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to
enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the
grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for
the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public
funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission to the people of said
Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform
the people of the contents thereof.”

On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and
open debate on the Proposed Constitution.

On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No
formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be
held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of
December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution.”

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from
deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced
officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the
main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate
funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President
reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative
to defer its final action on these cases.

“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon
as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”

The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment
on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly
before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional
respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the
Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella;
the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other
officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period
comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”

On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to
the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the
case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon
instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been
signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch
as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by
the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the
respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.
This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and
voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without
power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was
not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same
import and objective.

Issues:

Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.

Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.

Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

Rulings:

It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in
accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution
should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is
justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.

The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in
the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies
were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to
vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated
from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term “votes cast” choices
made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years
of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and
furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into
the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio
Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of
1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking
the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution
which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of
the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the
revised Constitution

No majority vote has been reached by the Court.

Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973
Constitution.”

Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all
over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is
conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution
once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine
calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence
of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”

Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are
joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media
vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”

The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102,
connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of
another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed
said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by
the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court
prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders,
decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification,
adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is
not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the
President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective
Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President
declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department
of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than
prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly,
substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the
1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a
plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election
Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s
acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise
stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the
result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections

[GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]; also Guzman vs. Comelec [GR L-44684], and Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-44714]

En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 2 filed separate opinions

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days
after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree
991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia,
Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions
to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's
continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-
Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential
Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16
October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M.
Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution
during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another
petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan,
docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly
may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of
calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with
that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of
the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a
majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled
that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted
on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he
could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the
people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays")
reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the
proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress
and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its
inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the
state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when
engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines,
that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions
(for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of
an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the
President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases
of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404]

En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional
amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of
the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The
rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the
contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were
promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of
six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It
made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court
and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a
factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so
convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may
not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done
cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding
statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated
barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

Philippine Bar Association (PBA) vs. COMELEC

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455

January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap
elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7
of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections
for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is
held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign,
vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or
petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so
long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections
HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on
February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question
(from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which
can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election.
The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to
elect a new president.

Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano, petitioner vs. President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant

Facts:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the “new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines.”

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Discussions:

In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favourable action.

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that made the judgement and accepted the new
government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.

Rulings:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from
the finding that they did not have a cause of action.

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. And
the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government.

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; 2. It is not merely a de facto government
but in fact and law a de jure government; and 3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

In RE Bermudez

[GR 76180, 24 October 1986]

Resolution En banc, Per curiam: 7 concur

Facts: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, Saturnino V. Bermudez, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 of
Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides that "the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in
the 7 February 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of 30 June 1992. The first regular elections
for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May 1992." Claiming that the said provision "is
not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among
the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice
President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 5 (not 7) of Article XVIII of the Transitory Provision of the proposed 1986
Constitution refers to.
Issue: Whether Aquino and Laurel are the legitimate President and Vice President of the Philippines.

Held:

Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright for the following reasons:

1. petitions for declaratory relief do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SC;
2. petitioner does not have the legal standing to sue;
3. although no respondent is impleaded, the instant petition amounts to a suit against incumbent President Corazon Aquino, who is
immune from suits during her incumbency;
4. it should be fairly obvious -- mutatis mutandis, there should be no question -- that the aforecited provision pertains to incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel. The Aquino administration is legitimately recognized by other nations, and
all eleven members of the SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the land under her government; and
5. the people of the Philippines have accepted her government as the one in effective control of the country, such that it is not merely a de
facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen
of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as
Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as
members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall
commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with
the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their
successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued
in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision
in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent
with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25,
1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain
and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb
2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no
longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987
Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522

Facts:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in
consonance with UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in
Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one
of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of
Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in
violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy,
sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the
lives of the fishermen.

Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and

2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:

The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording
relief over the remedy sought.

2nd Issue:

The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone and
continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of
nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e.,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200
nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their
archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to
the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines
total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed
the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not
exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty
over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from
the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA
9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless
whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of
navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence
thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically
incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim
all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international
community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international
community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such
enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the
country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital
step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

William C. Reagan, Petitioner vs

Commission of Internal Revenue

Facts:

The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided
technical assistance to the United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine months, before his
tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car which valued at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported,
petitioner requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to
a member of the United States Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.

On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in US Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill
of sale executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a deed of sale
executed in Manila.

The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal exemption which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net
income arising from such transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought
refund from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00
plus legal rate of interest.

Issue:

Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by respondent from petitioner.

Ruling:

The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern
therein and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its term. It does not preclude from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its territory. Such areas sustain their status as native soil and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction
may be diminished but it does not disappear.

The Clark Air Base is one of the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which states
that a “national of the US serving or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the
bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason such unemployment is not to be taxed on his income unless derived in the bases which one
clearly derived the Phil.

Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising
from the sale of his automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is within our territory to tax.

FACTS:

Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on September 20, 1972. After several promotions, she
was appointed in 1983 as a Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer Department. The case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari
assailing Res. No. 92-201 of the respondent which upheld the petitioner’s separation from PNB in light of EO 80 or the Revised Charter of PNB.
Petitioner contends that there is an existence of bad faith in its reorganization and that there is an erroneous application of the one year
prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in her case.

ISSUE:

Is the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions, valid?

HELD:

Ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of society and are merely optional. Commercial or universal
banking is, ideally, not a governmental but a private sector endeavor, an optional function of the government. There are functions of the
government which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress, and prosperity of the people. Thus, reorganization of such
corporations like PNB is valid so long as they are done in good faith as prescribed in the Dario v. Mison doctrine. Accordingly, the reorganization of
PNB is found to be done in good faith by the Court.

FACTS:
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381 was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of land — Lot 1 , 2, 3 and 4 where lots 1 and 4 conveyed
by him in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale. On August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold
the same lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and the latter in turn conveyed the property to Petitioner Shipside Incorporated.

Unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, the CFI of La Union, Second Judicial District, issued an Order in Land Registration Case No. N-
361 (LRC Record No. N-14012) entitled “Rafael Galvez, Applicant, Eliza Bustos, et al., Parties-In-Interest; Republic of the Philippines, Movant” OCT
No. 0-381 was already declared null and void and was ordered cancelled.

Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration against the order issued by the trial court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The motion was
denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic certifying that its decision became final and executory on October 23, 1973.

24 years after, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development
Corporation, stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court in L.R.C. No. N-361 have not been executed. The OSG filed for
complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles. Petitioner Shipside, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the respondent
Republic was not the real party-in-interest and that the cause of action was already barred by prescription. The trial court denied petitioner’s
motion to dismiss and its motion for reconsideration was likewise turned down.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic may still for revival of judgment.

HELD:

NO. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no
longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallance may have belonged to the government at the time Galvez’ title was ordered
cancelled, the same no longer holds true today.

RA 7277 created Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BSDA). With the transfer of Camp Wallance to the BCDA, the government has
no longer a right or protect. The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by
the State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own
creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons.

The Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), created under R.A. 7227, performs functions which are basically proprietary in nature. The
promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal for enhancement, in general, do not make
BCDA equivalent to Government. Other corporations, such as SSS, GSIS, NIA, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and
public welfare, are not invested with government attributes.

Consequently, the Republic was not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of
imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Being the owner of the areas covered by
Camp Wallace, it was the BCDA, not the Government, which stood to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of
petitioner was cancelled.

Facts: The petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA containing the requisite certification on non-forum shopping but failed to attach proof that the
person signing the certification was authorized to do so. The CA dismissed the petition. The petitioner submits a motion for reconsideration which
attached a secretary’s certificate attesting to the signatory’s authority to sign certificates against forum shopping on behalf of the petitioner. When
the court of CA denied the motion, the petitioner sought relief with the SC.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Shipside Inc.

Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in the dismissal of the petition. The SC revised the decision of CA recognizing the belated filing of the certifications against
forum shopping as permitted in exceptional circumstances. It further held that with more reason should a petition be given due course when this
incorporates a certification on non-forum shopping without evidence that the person signing the certifications was an authorized signatory and the
petitioner subsequently submits a secretary’s certificate attesting to the signatory’s authority in its motion for consideration.

The court allows belated submission of certifications showing proof of the signatory’s authority in signing the certification of forum shopping.

PVTA v CIR Digest

Facts:

This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said
compensation in accordance with CA No. 444. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez
issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions
and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete. The government has to provide
for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the
needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.

There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine
announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and
ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged
in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court.
Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed
order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render
overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It
would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be
sustained.

GP vs Monte de Piedad

Facts:

A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish
regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution,
in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.

In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with
this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement.

On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a
recovery of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of
the cause.

The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to
bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.

Issues:

Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money of
the intended beneficiaries?

Discussions:

In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power
to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the
government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in representation of the legitimate claimants. The
legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the
legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to
those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for
protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change
of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever
required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.

People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony
of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the
newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was
alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the
issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as
representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision
to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had
been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its
inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the
present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION

114 SCRA 77FACTS:

On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA, with “acts
unbecoming of a judge” when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered the decision.
Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests in said
property were conveyed. According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5)
of Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

ISSUE:

Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?

HELD:

Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and
employees like justices and judges. Said provision must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated. As such, Article 14 is not in force. The respondent is not found to have violated
the articles invoked by the petitioner but he was advised by the Court to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Vilas vs City of Manila 42 Phil 935

Facts

Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the incorporation,
Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its
sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of
the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.

Issue

Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of Manila to its creditor?

Held

No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign.
The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the
predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present
sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of
the old City of Manila.

WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, GR No. L-49, 1945-11-12

Facts:

Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production,
procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries... was prosecuted for the crime of robbery

He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced... to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7
"was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of... which are repugnant to those aims
and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void...
that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve... the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines,
and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."... he City Fisc

The City Fiscal of Manila... submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal

Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was created, and the
crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent... necessity, according to the preamble of
Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure established in said
Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the

Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision of section
1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without... due process of law.

Issues:

The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the ... summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly, the validity of the sentence
which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they were then valid,
the effect on... said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.

Ruling:

"The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by
the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the

Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was
the same the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation... of October 23, 1944, a portion of
which has been already quoted, 'under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on
October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the... peoples' will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan
had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent
sovereignty of, the Filipino people,... before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent
dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations."

(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be
considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is... well established in International Law that
"The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered
state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as denned in the... usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through
special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and
authorities of the... occupied district."

A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the
administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless,... so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of
public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws
regarding... procedure." (Oppenheim'si International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p. 349.)

It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing
upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or... competence of the belligerent
occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.

In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith,
without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

FACTS:

William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the
National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to
the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:

Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional.

HELD:

Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is
drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is
good and valid since it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political
complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the
petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.

ALCANTARA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

75 PHIL 749

FACTS:

Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. The Court of Appeals
modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision
on the sole ground that said the court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military occupation, thus, a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.

ISSUE:

Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?

HELD:

Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political
complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already
penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government but taken out of territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed
against the belligerent occupant which is necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. Such is
the case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Alcantara v Director of Prisons Facts: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the ground
that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur for
the crimes of illegal discharge of firearms and slight physical injuries. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of
Northern Luzon, on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation of the Islands and has no jurisdiction to hear cases; Issues: Are the courts created on the birth Republic of the Philippines and/or during
the time of Japanese occupancy have the legitimacy to hear cases Held: In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, only political
complexion cases are exempted from any liability just right after the war. Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political
complexion. He was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country.
Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo
area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested
upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was committed, which was at the time of war and the
Japanese occupancy.

HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National
Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a
defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them
even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.