MAGALLONA VS. HON.
EDUARDO ERMITA territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011
FACTS
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an Archipelagic State pursuant to
UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over
their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446,
correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with
the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to
shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
Petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers, citizens, and legislator,
assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. It reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. It opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages
hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. Treating Kalayaan Group of Islands and Scarborough as ‘regime of
islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.
ISSUE
1. WoN RA 9522 is constitutional.
HELD
1. Yes. First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines
but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime
zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that
UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as
provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral
treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a
uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200
nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order
to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have
their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—
the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA
9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of
merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base
points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216
square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of
Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522
enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be
violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of
the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. What the legislators
did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades,
had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on
one hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these are
located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of
the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance
with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance
of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice
with delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with
the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend
that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to
archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of
innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal
waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body
of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over
it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal
or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the
Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of
navigation and the generally accepted principles of international
law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the
absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law
since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it
just signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their
right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation
of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive
economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of
all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime
delineation binds the international community since the delineation
is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is
contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course
reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the
prerogative to determine the passing of a law and not the Court.
Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with
the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its
territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of
the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution
and our national interest.
DISPOSITION
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of
the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution
and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969
FACTS
The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of
Bendix Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which
provided technical assistance to the United States Air Force was
assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19.
Nine months, before his tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax
free 1960 Cadillac car which valued at $6443.83. More than two
months after the car was imported, petitioner requested the Clark
Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The request was
granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of the
United States Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military
Bases.
On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600,
a private in US Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill
of sale executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date William
Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by
a deed of sale executed in Manila.
The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the
personal exemption which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his
net income arising from such transaction the amount of P17912.34
rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying the
sum, he sought refund from the respondent claiming that he is
exempted. He filed a case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking
recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest but was
denied.
ISSUE
1. WoN the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by
respondent from petitioner.
HELD
1. Yes. Bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of
the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 remain part of Philippine
territory. A state is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions
of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas
become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status
as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction
may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases
under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military
Bases Agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign
territory.
The exemption clause in the Military Bases Agreement by virtue of
which a "national of the United States serving in or employed in the
Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance,
operation or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines
only by reason of such employment" is not to be taxed on his
income "unless derived from Philippine sources or sources other
than the United States sources," does not apply to income derived in
the bases which are clearly derived in the Philippines. For income tax
purposes, the Clark Air Force Base is not outside Philippine territory.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 12,
1966 denying the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by
petitioner is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 104226 August 12, 1993
FACTS
Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the
Philippine National Bank on 20 September 1972 as special assistant
with the rank of Second Assistant Manager assigned to the office of
the PNB President. After several promotions, she was appointed in
1983 Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer
Department. Starting 1 April 1986 up to 20 February 1987, petitioner
filed several applications for leave of absence (due to medical
reasons) which were duly approved. While she was on leave,
Executive Order No. 80 (Revised Charter of the PNB) was approved
on 3 December 1986. Said executive order authorized the
restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant to
the reorganization plan, the Fund Transfer Department was
abolished and its functions transferred to the International
Department, which resulted to the petitioner being separated from
the service.
ISSUES
1. WoN the reorganization of the PNB, a government-owned or
controlled corporation performing ministrant functions is valid.
2. WoN the termination of employment of the petitioner was done
in good faith.
HELD
1. Yes. PNB's reorganization was by virtue of a valid law (EO No. 80).
At the time of reorganization, due to the critical financial situation of
the bank, departments, positions and functions were abolished or
merged. The abolition of the Fund Transfer Department (FTD) was
deemed necessary. This, to the Court's mind, was a management
prerogative exercised pursuant to a business judgment. At this
point, a distinction can be made in ruling on the validity of a
reorganization between a government bureau or office performing
constituent functions (like the Customs) and a government-owned
or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions (like the
PNB).
Constituent functions are those which constitute the very bonds of
society and are compulsory in nature; ministrant functions are those
undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of society, and
are merely optional. Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not
a governmental but a private sector, endeavor. It is an optional
function of government.
But a reorganization whether in a government bureau performing
constituent functions or in a government-owned or controlled
corporation performing ministrant functions must meet a common
test, the test of good faith which was met by the philosophy of EO
No. 80 in pursuit of a more efficient and effective use of available
scarce resources, to improve its viability, and to avoid unfair
competition with the private sector.
2. Yes. If petitioner had the desire for continued employment with
the bank, she could have asserted it for management's
consideration. There is no proof on record that she affirmatively
expressed willingness to be employed. Since she cannot rebut the
CSC finding that her earliest appeal was made on 4 August 1989,
there is no reason for this Court to hold that she did not sleep on her
rights. On the contrary, her present argument that bad faith existed
at the time of the abolition of the FTD because it was restored four
years later is a little too late. Who could have predicted in 1986 or
1987 that PNB would be able to rise from its financial crisis and
become a viable commercial bank again? The decision to abolish the
FTD at the time it was abolished, to repeat, was a business judgment
made in good faith.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed CSC resolution is
AFFIRMED. The petition is DISMISSED for failure to show grave
abuse of discretion on the part of said CSC in rendering the
questioned resolution. No pronouncement as to costs.
SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 143377 February 20, 2001
FACTS
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381 was issued in favor of Rafael
Galvez, over four parcels of land — Lot 1 , 2, 3 and 4 where lots 1
and 4 conveyed by him in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana,
Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale. On August 16,
1960, Mamaril, et al. sold the same lots to Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company and the latter in turn conveyed the property to
Petitioner Shipside Incorporated.
Unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, the CFI of La
Union, Second Judicial District, issued an Order in Land Registration
Case No. N-361 (LRC Record No. N-14012) entitled “Rafael Galvez,
Applicant, Eliza Bustos, et al., Parties-In-Interest; Republic of the
Philippines, Movant” that OCT No. 0-381 was already declared null
and void and was ordered cancelled.
Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration against the order
issued by the trial court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The
motion was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of the Republic certifying that its decision became final and
executory on October 23, 1973.
24 years after, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter
from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point
Development Corporation, stating that the aforementioned orders
and decision of the trial court in L.R.C. No. N-361 have not been
executed. The OSG filed for complaint for revival of judgment and
cancellation of titles. Petitioner Shipside, Inc. moved to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that the respondent Republic was not the real
party-in-interest and that the cause of action was already barred by
prescription. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss
and its motion for reconsideration was likewise turned down.
ISSUE
1. WoN the Republic can maintain the action for revival of judgment.
HELD
1. No. The action instituted by the Solicitor General in the trial court
is one for revival of judgment which is governed by Article 1144(3) of
the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure. Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment
"must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues." On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry, but that after the lapse of
such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. Taking these two provisions
into consideration, it is plain that an action for revival of judgment
must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment
becomes final.
While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the
same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is
no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallance
may have belonged to the government at the time Galvez’ title was
ordered cancelled, the same no longer holds true today.
RA 7277 created Bases Conversion and Development Authority
(BSDA). With the transfer of Camp Wallance to the BCDA, the
government has no longer a right or protect. The rule that
prescription does not run against the State does not apply to
corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special
purposes, it being said that when the title of the Republic has been
divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation,
are in the same category as ordinary persons.
The Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), created under
R.A. 7227, performs functions which are basically proprietary in
nature. The promotion of economic and social development of
Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal for enhancement,
in general, do not make BCDA equivalent to Government. Other
corporations, such as SSS, GSIS, NIA, although performing functions
aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not
invested with government attributes.
Consequently, the Republic was not a real party in interest and it
may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of
imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the
government is a party in interest. Being the owner of the areas
covered by Camp Wallace, it was the BCDA, not the Government,
which stood to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710
issued in the name of petitioner was cancelled.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the orders dated
August 31, 1999 and October 4, 1999 of the Regional Trial, Court of
the First National Judicial Region (Branch 26, San Fernando, La
Union) in Civil Case No. 6346 entitled "Republic of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, et. al., Defendants" as well as
the resolutions promulgated on November 4, 1999 and May 23,
2000 by the Court of Appeals (Twelfth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No.
55535 entitled "Shipside, Inc., Petitioner versus Ron. Alfredo Cajigal,
as Judge, RTC, San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26, and the Republic
of the Philippines, Respondents" are hereby reversed and set aside.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 6346, Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
San Fernando City, La Union entitled "Republic of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, et al." is ordered dismissed,
without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action by the Bases
Development and Conversion Authority.
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION (PVTA) VS.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975
FACTS
On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed
with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their
employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the
regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay
them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth
Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the
amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them.
There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration denying the allegations and raising the special
defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The
issues were thereafter joined, and the case set for trial, with both
parties presenting their evidence. After the parties submitted the
case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of
respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private
respondents for overtime services. Hence, this petition for certiorari
was on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental
functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444.
ISSUES
1. WoN not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary
functions.
HELD
1. Yes. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant
functions of the government has become obsolete. The government
has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is
irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing
complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government obsolete.”
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to
them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a
governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke
the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of
private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between
constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in
Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just
because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the
jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the
objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage
of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.
A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and
2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the
appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by
petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required
private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be
surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That
would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear,
therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly
cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be
sustained.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the
Resolution of respondent Court en banc of May 8, 1970 denying a
motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. The last sentence of
the Order of March 21, 1970 reads as follows: "To find how much
each of them [private respondents] is entitled under this judgment,
the Chief of the Examining Division, or any of his authorized
representative, is hereby directed to make a reexamination of
records, papers and documents in the possession of respondent
PVTA pertinent and proper under the premises and to submit his
report of his findings to the Court for further disposition thereof."
Accordingly, as provided by the New Labor Code, this case is
referred to the National Labor Relations Commission for further
proceedings conformably to law. No costs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. EL MONTE DE
PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
FACTS
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometime in
1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during
the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake.
Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de
Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital,
petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a
loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de
Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to
comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance
had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine
Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte
de Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000, together with interest, for
the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment
was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or
its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest
from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by
the defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff
(government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be
instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their
heirs.
ISSUE
1. WoN the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint
against the respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money of
the intended beneficiaries.
HELD
1. Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to
file the case as parens patriae in representation of the legitimate
claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public
interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power
of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in
the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often
necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the
prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The
beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating
their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority,
acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions
has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a
monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative
department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for
the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being
exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed,

with costs against the appellant. So ordered. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR
GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO

G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003

FACTS

ISSUES

1.

HELD

1.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The

questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November
1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the
records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action
as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
are AFFIRMED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. GREGORIO PERFECTO
G.R. No. L-18463 October 4, 1922
FACTS
The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate,
Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the
testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening
of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent
Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine
Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256
of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who
insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUES
1. WoN Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force
and can be applied in the case at bar.
HELD
1. No. The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article
256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as
representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the
present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the
provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the
Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked
provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court
determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is
about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is
considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present
case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
DISPOSITION
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the
ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no
place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of
the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment
should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with
costs de officio. So ordered.
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA VS. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
FACTS
On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged
respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now Associate
Justice of CA, with “acts unbecoming of a judge” when the latter
purchased a property which was previously the subject of litigation
on which he rendered the decision. Respondent and his wife were
also members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.
to which their shares and interests in said property were conveyed.
According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article
1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5) of Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
ISSUE
1. WoN Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force.
HELD
1. Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates
the relationship between the government and certain public officers
and employees like justices and judges. Said provision must be
deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are
automatically abrogated. As such, Article 14 is not in force. The
respondent is not found to have violated the articles invoked by the
petitioner but he was advised by the Court to be more discreet in his
private and business activities.
DISPOSITION
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring
by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and
in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his
incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he
should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must
not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above
suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS
PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
VILAS V. MANILA

42 Phil 935 April 3, 1911

FACTS

Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic

Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the
incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money
owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts
has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to
the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on
the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been
extinguished and it is now a totally different corporate entity.

ISSUE

1. WoN the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous

liability of the City of Manila to its creditor.

HELD

1. No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not

necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the
former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the
successor of the old city. Thus, the new city is entitled to all property
and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its
liabilities. The court held that only the governmental functions that
are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended.
Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the
predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old
City of Manila. While there is a total abrogation of the former
political relations of inhabitants of ceded territory, and an
abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the
substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal law regulating
private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or
changed by the new ruler.
WILLIAM F. PERALTA VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-49 November 12, 1945
FACTS
Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila
charged with the supervision and control of the production,
procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as
defined in Section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-
called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of
robbery as defined and penalized by Section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of
the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life
imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August 21, 1944,
by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in
Section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the
so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said
Republic.
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court
of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance
No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the
Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are
repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United
States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the
provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental
laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner
has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that the petitioner
herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political
purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that
the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."
3. Yes. The sentence is of a political complexion. A penal sentence is
of a political complexion when either a new act not defined in the
municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime
against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial
law and penalized as new offenses committed against belligerent
occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control
of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
occupier. The right by which persons and things taken in war are
restored to their former status when coming again under the power
of the nation to which they belonged. The sentence which convicted
the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be
considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the
reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas
MacArthur.
DISPOSITION
We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration,
although good and valid during the military occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso
facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration
therein of the Commonwealth Government.
In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is
hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released
forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

ISSUES

1. WoN the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal

Jurisdiction and the summary procedure adopted for that court are
valid.

2. WoN the sentence of life imprisonment is valid.

3. If they were then valid, WoN, by the principle of postliminy, the

punitive sentence ceased to be valid from the time of the
restoration of the Commonwealth.

HELD

1. Yes. The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the

occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the
conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn entirely form the law
martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus
derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose
authority and procedure are defined in the military code of the
conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of
the occupied district. The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being
a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had
therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction.

2. Yes. The sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive

Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the
penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within
the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was
convicted.
ANICETO ALCANTARA VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-6 November 29, 1945
FACTS
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for
the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is
unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the
respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos
Sur.
Alcantara was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur of
the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical
injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at
Baguio modified said sentence and sentences the petitioner to an
indeterminate penalty of from four months four months and
twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months and
three days of prison correccional. The sentence as modified then
became final, petitioner commenced serving his sentence.
Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of
Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the sole ground that said court was
only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of
Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold
sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices constituted the
majority which promulgated the decision in question. The petitioner
does not question the validity of said decision on the strength of the
Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944,
which does not refer to judicial processes.
ISSUE
1. WoN the judgment of the Court of Appeals is good and valid.
HELD
1. Yes. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is good and valid for
the sentence which the petitioner is serving has no political
complexion.
DISPOSITION
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus
is denied.
RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., VS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY,
ET AL.
G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946
FACTS
This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the
Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army,
be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of
petitioners before that body. The ground of the petition was that the
petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense
for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their
memorandum they have raised an additional question of law — that
the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional.
During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men
were assigned at designated camps and bases all over the country.
When the Japanese forces reached Mindoro, Ruffy and his band
were forced to retreat to the mountains. A guerilla outfit was then
organized, called as the “Bolo Area.” However, a certain Capt.
Esteban Beloncio relieved petitioners of their positions and duties
after Lieut. Col. Enrique Jurado effected a change of command.
Beloncio, however, was allegedly slain by the petitioners, and it was
this murder which gave rise to this trial, the legality of which is being
contested.
ISSUES
1. WoN the petitioners are subject to the military law at the time of
war and Japanese occupation.
2. WoN the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional.
HELD
1. Yes. By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo
Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they
became members of the Philippine Army – the Bolo Area being a
contingent of the 6th military district which is recognized by the
United States army. Thus, petitioners are covered by the National
Defense Act, Articles of War, and other pertinent laws during an
occupation.
2. No. It is constitutional. The article ordains "that any person
subject to military law who commits murder in time of war shall
suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may
direct." It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to
be made by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the
punishment is for life imprisonment or death", it violates Article VIII,
section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines which
provides that "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment." Courts martial are
agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the
ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the
constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief,
independently of legislation." Unlike courts of law, they are not a
portion of the judiciary.
DISPOSITION
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that
it should be dismissed with costs. It is so ordered