SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications
FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of
Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among
other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the
challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.— Authorized drug testing
shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by
any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored
by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x
The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing
methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory
test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of
secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—
Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a
random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules
and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a
criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations for the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection with the
May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points
out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force
of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.
(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that
they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as
they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer,
also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE/S:
1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution?
2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause?
HELD:
1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution.
2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are
CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f) and (g) are
UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause.
RATIO:
1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI
of the Constitution (refer to the aforementioned facts). As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate
for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a
pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be
voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect.
The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the
proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall
enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing
COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what
the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar
set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before
or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-
compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be,
are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in
Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
“Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments,
however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution
or the charter, and each department can only exercise such
powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers.
The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against
which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over
which it cannot leap.”
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is
subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights
and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of
RA 9165(c) requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within
the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements. A random drug testing of students in
secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but
may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students,
the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of
RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and private
offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.
The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy,” has failed to show
how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to
privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner
Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and
gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context,
the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion
into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while
there has been general agreement as to the basic function of
the guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of
the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and
seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara
v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the
right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the
public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution
is couched and as has been held, “reasonableness” is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion. While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he
or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is
really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when
and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d)
of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall
be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the
company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the work place.” It is to be noted the very
reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the well-being of
the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.

Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the

Court. Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students,
the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily
from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness
of the drug test policy and requirement.

The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of

persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office with
criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants
in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected
of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and
are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged,
by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC
resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38 additional party-
list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the
respondent parties, avers that the filling up of the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the
House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%)
percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is
filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for
party-list lawmakers is mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in
Congress. The same declared therein a policy to promote
“proportional representation” in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties,
organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat.
Those garnering more than this percentage could have
“additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes.”
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can
have more than three seats in the House of Representatives
(sec 11(b) RA 7941).
Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district
representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of
seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise
“twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list.” We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives / .80 x .20 = No. of party-list
representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of
district representatives, as may be provided by law, will
necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number
of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were
208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998
national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52,
computed as follows:
208 / .80 x .20 = 52
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough
to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this:
Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be
filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short
answer is “No.”
There are 4 parameters to determine the winners in a party-
list election under RA 7941:
1. 20% allocation 3. 3-seat limit
2. 2% threshold 4. Proportional representation
The Congress enacted RA 7941 on Mar. 3, 1995 which states
that the State shall “promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. The State shall also develop the simplest
scheme possible to guarantee a full, free and open party
system by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature.”
1. Is the 20% allocation mandatory? Should the 20%
allocation for party-list be filled up completely all the time?
2. Are the 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit constitutional?
3. How should the additional seats be determined?
Answers:
(1) NO. Sec. 5(2) Art. 6 merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress. The Congress has prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement,
and the mechanics by which it is to be filled up.
(2) YES. The 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit are consistent
with the very essence of “representation.” The 3-seat limit
ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislative. Thus, no single group would dominate.
(3) To determine the additional seats, 3 steps will be
followed:
a. rank the highest to lowest. The highest is called the “first”
party.
b. determine the seats the “first” party will have. For the
“first” party, it will have a 6% benchmark. Every succeeding
additional 2% of votes from the first 2% requirement will
constitute 1 additional seat. If the “first” party gets 2
additional seats, then the next in rank will get less.
c. to solve for the additional seats of other qualified parties,
the formula provided below will be used:
additional seats no. of votes no. of
for the = of the party x additional
concerned no. of votes of seats of the

party the “first” party “first” party

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before
the COMELEC a Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the
COMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the
2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification
of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the
none-marginalized or overrepresented.
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. The provision on the party-list system is not
self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in
accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was
thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of
the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.

Issues:

a. Whether or not political parties may participate in the

party-list elections

b. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to

‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and
organizations.

Held:

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be

remanded to the COMELEC which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The
resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC “to refrain
proclaiming any winner” during the last party-list election,
shall remain in force until after the COMELEC have compiled
and reported its compliance.

a. Yes

b. No.

Rationale:

a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in

the party-list elections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941,
private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the

Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties."

b. That political parties may participate in the party-list

elections does not mean, however, that any political party --
or any organization or group for that matter – may do so. The
BANAT VS. COMELEC
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May
2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the
COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2
seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats –
this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula
from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even
if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list
election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is
void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it
mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible
to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall
be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list
candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section
11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not
major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-
list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral
parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in
the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat
valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3-seat cap rule (3-Seat Limit Rule) is
valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for
every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be
one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the
1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than
250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200
of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from
party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also
allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives,
hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should
be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80)
x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives
shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of
the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no
constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further,
the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to
attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose
there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold,
this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase
the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every
party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list
garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and
not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less
than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall
be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of
votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall
no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats”
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System
less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a
rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-
percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number
of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted
from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55
seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38
remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for
the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used
in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at
least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the
20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and
multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional
number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3-seat
limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total
vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x
(remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79
remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes
cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the two-percenters were given their guaranteed
and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists
and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until
all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to
disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN,
etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that
there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from
RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified
and that even the framers of the Constitution in their
deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized
(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion,
concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution
precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No.
7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the
enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. The petitioners contend on the following:
With regards to the contention that there is no mention in
the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and
San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the
requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the
members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative district

(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from
the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by
involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division
of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into
two separate districts.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect
preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated
upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.

(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law
has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1)
of the Constitution.
(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the subject municipalities have attained the
minimum population requirements.
(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec.
5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in this section
As regards the fifth contention, gerrymandering is the
practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular
candidate or party. It should be noted that Rep. Zamora, the
author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of
the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having
consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact
been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

(5) That the law resulted in gerrymandering.

Issue:

WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of

the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution
stating that each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence
of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present

limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of
250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless
otherwise provided by law."
MARIANO VS. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854
which sought to convert the Municipality of Makati to a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.
Petitioners contend that the special law did not properly
identify, in metes and bounds with technical descriptions, the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati; that it attempted to alter or
restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials; that it increased the legislative district of Makati only
by special law; that the increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of
another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with the
population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and
the LGC.
HELD:
(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions.
(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials.
(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative
district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation
of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of every census.
(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative
district was not expressed in the title of the bill.
(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at
least one representative.
HELD:
(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati
will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. In language
that cannot be any clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that,
the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of
the municipality." The court take judicial notice of the fact
that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government
units with unsettled boundary dispute.
(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from
complied with these requirements. The petition is premised
on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that
Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections;
that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may
not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are
not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse,
they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory
relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall
be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an
increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative
districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide,
would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time.
(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a
law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions
are germane to such general subject.
(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000),
its legislative district may still be increased since it has met
the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.
MONTEJO VS. COMELEC reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the
subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.
Facts:
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first
to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of
district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of
redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the
Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in
power to make laws. Said ordinance states that:
Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality
of representation. Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered
to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc
made.”
is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of:
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The
Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and number of Members apportioned to the province out of
Villaba. which such new province was created or where the city,
whose population has so increases, is geographically located
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on
subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1
Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities
hundred and twenty days before the election.
comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan,
Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the Minor adjustments do not involve change in the allocations
territories comprised therein. per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a
particular municipality or when a municipality in between
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the
which is still in the territory of one assigned district is
subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The
forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make
conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by
minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence
give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer
of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district
municipalities from one legislative district to another district.
composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence
The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust
was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities
the number of members (not municipalities.
(underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per
the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of

inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of
Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with
the incumbent representatives of the province and other
interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated
the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred
the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the
municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district
of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the

legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid
or not.

Held:

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional

Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major
power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the
power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of
the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the
BAGABUYO VS. COMELEC
Facts:
RA 9371 was approved dividing Cagayan de Oro into two
legislative districts. Later, COMELEC promulgated Resolution
7837 implementing RA 9371.
Bagabuyo then filed a petition against COMELEC and other
officers asking for nulliffication of RA 9371 and Res. 7837
saying that RA 9371 failed to conduct a plebiscite which is
indispensable for the division or conversion of a local
governement unit. The court did not grant the TRO or writ of
prelim. injunction, so the May elections proceeded with CDO
divided into two legislative districts.
COMELEC, thru OSG argued that: 1) the petitioner did not
respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases
assailing the constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371
merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City
in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; 3) the criteria established under Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in
this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if
so, should the instant petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative
reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve
the division and conversion of a local government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation
doctrine?
Ruling:
Except for issue on the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the
petition totally without merit.
The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and
the nature of the issues raised among them, whether
legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de
Oro City as a local government unit are reasons enough for
considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of
courts. Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of
the COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative
apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action
against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by
this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. For these
reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to
be a stumbling block in our consideration of the present case.
Plebiscite
Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary
as the determination of the number of representatives which
a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative
body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district
lines so as to equalize population and voting power among
the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the
realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987
Constitution lays down the rules on legislative apportionment
under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred fifty members unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal
apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local
government units (historically and generically referred to as
municipal corporations) that the Constitution itself classified
into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. In its
strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as a
body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation
of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local
government thereof. The creation, division, merger, abolition
or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered
by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of
this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the addition of another legislative district and the delineation
the local government code and subject to approval by a of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of
directly affected. the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is
necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of
districts.
the Constitution, the authority to act has been vested in the
Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment
and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts
on local government units by setting the standards for their
creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of
boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging,
abolishing local government units and altering their
boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much
commonality exists between the two provisions since they
are inherently different although they interface and relate
with one another.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and,

Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The
Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly
require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit.

Holding of a plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative

apportionment or reapportionment. After it became
constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always
identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries of local government units, never
with the concept of legislative apportionment.

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a

reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the
authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of
the Constitution. Its core provision Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. The lone legislative district of

the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to
commence in the next national elections after the effectivity
of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas,
Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San
Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan,
Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga,
Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall
comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig,
Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon,
Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays
from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second
district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a

political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated.
Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

On March 23,1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for

cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging
that Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995,
Marcos filed a corrected certificate of candidacy changing the
entry “seven” months to “since childhood”. The COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of the member of the
House of Representatives for the First District of Leyte. In a
supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election

purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year
at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

RULING:

Yes, it was determined that the petitioner possesses the

necessary residence qualifications.

“Residence” is used to indicate a place of abode, whether

permanent or temporary, while “domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning.

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election

purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents.

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal

or change of domicile or abandonment.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her

marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after
the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
AQUINO VS. COMELEC carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in
this case the old Municipality of Makati.
Facts:

Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new

2nd district of Makati stating that he has been residing there
for ten months. When his candidacy was opposed he filed
another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been
residing in Makati for more than a year by virtue of a contract
of lease. COMELEC dismissed petition for Aquino’s
disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election.
Mateo Bedon filed for suspension of his proclamation.
COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the petition for
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional

residency requirement?

Held:

Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency

requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid.

Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only

that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992
but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years
immediately preceding that election. His certificate indicated
that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His
birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of
both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of
origin was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati

City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of
respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by
its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and
respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was
really for only one (l) year because he has other "residences"
in Manila or Quezon City.

While property ownership is not and should never be an

indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that
petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in
Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims
to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati indicate
that the sole purpose of transferring his physical residence is
not to acquire's new residence or domicile but only to qualify
as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of
Makati City.

Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally

impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a
newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in
logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is
DOMINO VS. COMELEC without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or
change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of
Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for
a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence
the position of Representative of the lone legislative district
of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-
of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in
year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of
the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and
intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City.
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to
Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
a strong presumption of residence especially in this case
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of
where Domino registered in his former barangay.
the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring
Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11,
1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy based on his own Voter’s Registration Record and
his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old
Balara, Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani

Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May
11, 1998 elections

Held: The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the

qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the
same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon,

Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate
of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is
now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence
in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice
in the Province of Sarangani.

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to

continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into

sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of
Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
CO VS. HRET

FACTS:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second

district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates
who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private

respondent alleging that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

declared respondent Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen and
a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a

resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of

authority in the exercise of its powers.

HELD:

1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is

a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar. The respondent traces his natural born citizenship
through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father.
The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when
he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both
mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not
have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally
renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign
nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of
election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which
he could possibly have chosen.

2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born
citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened
by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention.
Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared
and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR,
is being questioned on the ground that he is not a natural- Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
born citizen of the Philippines. nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine
Filipino.
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for
and was elected as a representative. When his nationality In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when
was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
was a natural born citizen of the Philippines. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other
aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be
Philippine citizenship.
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all
the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however

reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and
(3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition

of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship
is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law,
a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of
the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various

statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of
the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of
a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic
necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,

repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering
VALLES VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
In 1992, private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for
and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election
was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for
quo warranto. However, finding no sufficient proof that
respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. When Lopez ran for
re-election in 1995 elections, her opponent, Francisco Rabat,
filed a petition for disqualification, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the
COMELEC.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised
as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was
questioned by the petitioner Cirilo Valles.
The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that
Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a
public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a
Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis
she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby
making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as
certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4)
furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No.
92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino
citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao
Oriental governor.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court, maintaining that the Lopez is an Australian
citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: a) In 1988,
private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19,
1988; b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was
issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
ISSUE:
1. Whether respondent is a Filipino
2. If she is, whether she renounced her citizenship by applying
for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
3. Whether private respondent is disqualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental under Section 40 of Republic Act
7160
HELD:
1. Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May
16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.
Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took
into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution
of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the
United States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act
of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law, all
inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true
copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco
was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same
laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus
soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.
2. No. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining
twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air
service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless
subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted:
and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if,
by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she
acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. The mere fact that private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration
are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in
the case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and
her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of
Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the
same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual
citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child
of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been
included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship.
Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her
Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must
go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
3. In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified
“dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code and
reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in
which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and
as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the
Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification
must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court
succinctly pronounced:
“xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring
to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.”
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual
citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running
for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for
candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino
citizen and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent
filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone
terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992,
private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992.
And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian
passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to
by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC,
the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the
alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private
respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.
4. Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised
as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the
resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res
judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same,
citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration. He insists that the same issue of citizenship may
be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned,
i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in
cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the
case of Burca vs. Republic, an exception to this general rule
was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order
that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took
active part in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya
Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings
on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be
placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really
binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there
appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54
which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein
private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is
substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior
cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or
supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior
resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding,
considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
DIMAPORO VS. MITRA 1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE
UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
FACTS:
2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected
RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT',
Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del
EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE
Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January
OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM
1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of
EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the
DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately
following elections. Upon being informed of this development HELD:
by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives 1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are
pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of
Code which states: facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily
because under our Constitution, we have this …chapter on
Any elective official whether national or local running for any
accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability
capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
of Public Officers" states that:
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy. Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as
lives.
elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not
thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Under this commentary on accountability of public officers,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present the elective public officers must serve their principal, the
Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to
applicable to the present members of Congress. discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67,
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials
term of office of members of the House of Representatives,
serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them
as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said
from running for another public office and thereby cutting
members may be shortened, are provided for in the
short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in
Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that
their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position.
"the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and
This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not
serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI
trifle with the mandate which they have received from their
states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall
constituents.
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of Under the questioned provision, when an elective official
June next following their election. He asserts that under the covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another
rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the
of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have
in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is)
of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited
and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed,
his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office
the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election
or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate
or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does
of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or
not make the forfeiture dependent upon future
employment.
contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.
ISSUE:
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of
shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does
not preclude its application to present members of Congress.
Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may
be removed from office, on impeachment … All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such
constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4)
grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the
tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive.
The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which
shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature
from prescribing other grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in

favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify
the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded,
does not suffice.

2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House

Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their
duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering
the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881.
When the COMELEC communicated to the House of
Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of
candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao,
respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder
the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
FARINAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRTARY Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials,
as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
Facts: Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or
Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas
take part in any election except to vote. Under the same
Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding
provides:
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective in political and electoral activities.
official, whether national or local, running for any office other
Moreover, it is not within the power of the Court to pass
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity,
upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. Hence,
except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered
equal protection is not infringed.
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006

violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election
Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a
similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. –

Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.

Respondents contends that there is no violation of the equal

protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to
elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive
officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two
sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue
of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the
appointive officials are not elected by popular will. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.

Issue: WON the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election

Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to
such officials as against the appointive ones.

Held: No. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between

elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of

officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection
A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative