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WHAT CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW

PIMENTEL ET. AL V. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD ET.AL

➢ The Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. Neither the history of the
Philippine legal education nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support their argument.
The supervision and regulation of legal education is an Executive function.
o Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently
exercised by the political departments
o Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the study of law
➢ The practice of law has a settled jurisprudential meaning:
o The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
o Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involved appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
➢ The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover
the study of law.
➢ In the exercise of its power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law,
the Court has prescribed the subjects covered by, as well as the qualifications of candidates to the
bar examinations. Only those bar examination candidates who are found to have obtained a

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passing grade are admitted to the bar and licensed to practice law. The regulation of the
admission to the practice of law goes hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the
members of the Philippine Bar to maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that
the legal profession is maintained at a high standard, only those who are known to be honest,
possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard
set by the Court by passing the bar examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner
are admitted to the practice of law.
➢ the Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure access to justice of the
marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited practice of law
pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
o In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student practitioner,
what the Court regulates and supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and
conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal, board, or officer, to represent
indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully falling under the definition of
practice of law. Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act for the legal clinic and
thereby to practice law, it is but proper that the Court exercise regulation and supervision
over the law student practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has the power to allow their
appearance and plead their case, and hereafter, to regulate their actions.
➢ the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission should be read with the State policy behind the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 which is
fundamentally to uplift the standards of legal education and the law's thrust to undertake reforms
in the legal education system. Construing the LEH's power to prescribe the standards for law
admission together with the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law
schools, leads to the logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's power to prescribe
admission requirements only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college of law and not to
the practice of law.
o This contemporary interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission"
pertains to admission to the study of law or to legal education, and not to the practice of
law. Further support is nevertheless offered by the exchanges during the Senate
interpellations, wherein it was assumed that the phrase "minimum standards for law
admission" refers to the requirements that the student must fulfill before being admitted
to law school. This assumption was not corrected by the bill's sponsor
➢ Court finds no constitutional conflict between the Court's rule-making power concerning
admissions to the practice of law and on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662

CAYETANO V. MONSOD

➢ Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It
is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special

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proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where
he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.
➢ The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he: ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized
to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for
that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
➢ This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, stated:
o The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
o Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these

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manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning

and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
➢ The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
o One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession.
If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging
in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
o Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill
➢ Private practice:
o commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services.". Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and
members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates.".

o The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
➢ In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends
in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
o Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.
o In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both

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to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial

liability and insurance considerations.

IN RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY

➢ It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in
Cayetano v. Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law.
Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents
are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions
as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility
applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably
entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
➢ Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.

OCA V. LADAGA

➢ it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in this
case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self
to the public as a lawyer.
➢ Private Practice (People v. Villanueva)
o Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation
of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: "Essentially, the word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
➢ Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
o Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And

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provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an

officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and
he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the
board of directors.

OLAZO V. TINGA

➢ Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.He may be disciplined by
this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer.
➢ Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government
service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the
government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability.
They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest
of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official
functions.
➢ In Huyssen v. Gutierrez, we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may
be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,we recognized that private
interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also
ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his
or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.
➢ In Vitriolo v. Dasig, we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her
office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.We reached
the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a
pending application for visas before his office.
➢ As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of
his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or
her official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception.
In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph
(b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
➢ Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers,
after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to

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include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to
fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must
have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he
had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.

ALAWI V. ALAUYA

➢ Use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice
law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction.

PEOPLE V. TUANDA

➢ Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
➢ Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes
named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice
his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
➢ The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

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PIMENTEL V. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD ET.AL

GR NO. 230642 SEPT. 10 2019

FACTS:

On the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning the
practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom and violation of a law school aspirant's right
to education, these consolidated Petitions for Prohibition and Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assail as unconstitutional R.A. No. 7662, or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993,
which created the LEB. On the same principal grounds, these petitions also particularly seek to declare as
unconstitutional the LEB issuances establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test
known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhiLSAT.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the Court's power
to regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII38 of the Constitution
and that the Congress cannot create an administrative office that exercises the Court's power over the
practice of law.

Petitioners also question the constitutionality of the LEB's powers under Section 7(c)40 and 7(e)41 to
prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members and Section 7(h)42 on the LEB's power
to adopt a system of continuing legal education as being repugnant to the Court's rule-making power
concerning the practice of law. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law
schools and the right to education.

Petitioners-in-intervention meanwhile contend that the PhiLSAT violates the right to liberty and pursuit
of happiness of the student--applicants. They posit that the PhiLSAT violates the equal protection clause
as it is an arbitrary form of classification not based on substantial distinctions. They also argue that the
PhiLSAT violates the right of all citizens to quality and accessible education, violates academic freedom,
and is an unfair academic requirement. It is also their position that the PhiLSAT violates due process as it
interferes with the right of every person to select a profession or course of study. They also argue that
R.A. No. 7662 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers.

Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the practice of law does
not include regulation of legal education. It also defends Section 7(e) on the LEB's power to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission as referring to admission to law schools; Section 7(g) on the LEB's
power to establish a law practice internship as pertaining to the law school curriculum which is within the
power of the LEB to regulate; and 7(h) on the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education
as being limited to the training of lawyer-professors. Anent the argument that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC
additional functions not assigned to it by the Court, the OSG points out that the Court had actually
authorized the JBC to process the applications for membership to the LEB making this a non-issue.

In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument that the PhiLSAT is the minimum
standard for entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the State's power to regulate
education. The OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is no different from the NMAT which the Court already upheld
as a valid exercise of police power in the seminal case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.

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It is also the position of the OSG that neither the PhiLSAT nor the provisions of R.A. No. 7662 violate
academic freedom because the standards for entrance to law school, the standards for accreditation, the
prescribed qualifications of faculty members, and the prescribed basic curricula are fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the study
of law
2. Whether or not there is constitutional conflict between Court’s rule-making power and the power
of the LEB to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No.
7662 such as PhilSAT

HELD:

1. YES. The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is the power
to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law. This power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and admission to the practice of law is in fact zealously
guarded by the Court.

Thus, in Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court asserted its "exclusive" and constitutional
power with respect to the admission to the practice of law and when the act falls within the term "practice
of law," the Rules of Court govern. The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic
laws in the sense that it took away from the Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the power to promulgate such
rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more independent judiciary."

Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the
Court the authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the practice of
law, to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law, and to exercise
corollory disciplinary authority over members of the Bar.

Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the practice of law, the
former being merely preparatory to the latter. In fact, the practice of law has a settled jurisprudential
meaning:

“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in

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attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice
as the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject
to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involved
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.”
(Internal citations omitted)

The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the
study of law.

2. NO. The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power of the
LEB to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate admission to law schools, cannot be voided on
this ground.

The statutory context and the intent of the legislators do not permit such interpretation Accordingly, the
LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission
should be read with the State policy behind the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 which is fundamentally to
uplift the standards of legal education and the law's thrust to undertake reforms in the legal education
system. Construing the LEH's power to prescribe the standards for law admission together with the LEB's
other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law schools, leads to the logical interpretation that
the law circumscribes the LEB's power to prescribe admission requirements only to those seeking
enrollment to a school or college of law and not to the practice of law.

Article VIII Admission, Residence and Other Requirements SEC. 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law
course unless he complies with specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education
and the Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must present to the registrar the
necessary credentials before the end of the enrollment period. (Emphases supplied). This contemporary
interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission" pertains to admission to the study

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of law or to legal education, and not to the practice of law. Further support is nevertheless offered by the
exchanges during the Senate interpellations, wherein it was assumed that the phrase "minimum
standards for law admission" refers to the requirements that the student must fulfill before being
admitted to law school. This assumption was not corrected by the bill's sponsor.

Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum standards
for law admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and regulation clause. It merely authorizes the
LEB to prescribe minimum requirements not amounting to control.

Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to prescribe only the minimum standards and it did not, in any way,
impose that the minimum standard for law admission should be by way of an exclusionary and qualifying
exam nor did it prevent law schools from imposing their respective admission requirements.

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CAYETANO V. MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

FACTS:

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and,
at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25,
1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether o not Monsod met the qualification as required by law “practice of law”

HELD:

YES. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since
its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked
in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work
of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986,
has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer.
As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved

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being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years

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RE LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY

A.M NO. 10-10-4 SC MARCH 8 2011

FACTS:

On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice
Mariano del Castillo as its ponente. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s counsel on
various grounds but most notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at
least 3 books and articles in discussing the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also twisted
such quotations making it appear contrary to the intent of the original works. The authors and their
purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; 2) Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations in Internation Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark
Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western Reserve
Journal of Internation Law in 2006. Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the Supreme Court
spread over the media and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice expressing discontent by
the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.

On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of plagiarism
by issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court”
signed overall 37 faculty members. In said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the
court had the hopes of relief from those “comfort women” during the war “crushed by a singularly
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the Land.”

In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s
work as one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.” Hence, it was argued that since the
decision in the Vinuya case form part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing
dishonesty to be promulgated. Furthermore, the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case
undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court,
the article sought for the resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo.

In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of words
used were such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the independence of the
judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause on why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged violations.

In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common Compliance stating therein
that their intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its
integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the words used therein
as “focusing on constructive action.” Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking
responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed, committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance

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of the article. Furthermore, the respondents argued that the article in question is a valid exercise of the
freedom of expression as citizens of a democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.

ISSUE:

Whether or not lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an
administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the
outcome of a case or degrade the courts

HELD:

NO. Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline
cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling
in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members
of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the
academic freedom of law professors.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
Monsod,134 lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors
in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to
uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be
measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar
as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that their
issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of
justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled
that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes
and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be
selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law
professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students exemplars
of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.

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OFFICE OF THE COURT V. LADAGA

A.M NO. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono
counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case for Falsification of Public Document
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. While respondent's letter-request
was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in the said Criminal Case sent a letter to
the Court Administrator, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's authority to appear as
counsel for the accused in the said criminal case.On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court
Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment.

In his comment, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior
authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled
him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a
counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who
was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case
did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position.
In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved by the presiding judge.
Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request for authorization to appear as counsel and
directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court
without the required authorization from the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the practice of law as his profession was valid

HELD:

NO. Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section
reads: SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advise to clients.

However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in
this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva "private practice" prohibited by the said section was defined as
“Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the

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active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services”

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law
profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law,
he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as
required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-
15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true
that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to
obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which
respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.

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JOVITO OLAZO V. JUSTICE TINGA

A.M NO. 10-5-7 SC DECEMBER 7, 2010

FACTS:

This is a disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga filed by Mr. Jovito
S. Olazo. The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.

the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of
the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application because of
his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue
pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the
complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that
the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of
the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent
brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez,
who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife. As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official
functions, the complainant’s sales application was denied

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo,
the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct
Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s
promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The third charge The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he
engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for
Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

In his comment respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against
him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was
nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the
Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s action is a valid practice of law

HELD:

YES. In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled
that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession;
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

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Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to
engage in private practice after their separation from the service.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during
their incumbency.By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her
profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or
by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.30
The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from
the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-
year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who
has the power to influence the proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment
in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the
outcome of the proceedings.

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law.
At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single
document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically described private practice of law as one that
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the
public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available
pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee
on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the
complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondent’s
favor.

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ALAWI V. ALAUYA
A.M NO. SDC-97-2-P FEB 24 1997

FACTS:

Alawi and Alauya were classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi's agency, a contract was
executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above-
mentioned firm. Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination
of his contract with the company on the grounds that her consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract
void ab initio. Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no
stamps. Instead at the righthand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage
PD 26," had been typed.

Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated to which she appended a copy of the letter,
and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26." In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of: 1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;" 2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor
and established reputation;" 3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and 3.
Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title
of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the use of “Attorney” and practice of law is valid

HELD:

NO. Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has
been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor"
or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

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PEOPLE V. TUANDA
AC NO. 3360 JANUARY 30 1990

FACTS:

respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of
P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the
sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to
approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks. all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank,
Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced
and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

4 informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition,
suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law

ISSUE:

whether or not respondent shall be suspended from the practice of law

HELD:

YES. Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. We
should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey
the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case,
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v.
Decena, this Court stressed that: the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be
a person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law

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