Conceptualizing and Measuring a Powerllnteraction

Model of Interpersonal Influence1

BERTRAMH. RAVEN^
University of California, Los Angeles

JOSEPHSCHWARZWALD AND MENIKOSLOWSKY

Bar-Ilan University. Israel

In response to new theoretical conceptualizations (Raven, 1992, 1993), an instrument

was developed to measure 11 bases of power, the original 6 French and Raven (1959;
Raven, 1965) bases of power, with 3 of these further differentiated: reward (personal,
impersonal), coercion (personal. impersonal), legitimate (position, reciprocity, equity,
dependence), expert, referent, and information. In Study 1, 3 17 American student
respondents rated the likelihood that each of these power bases contributed to a
supervisor successfully influencing a subordinate in a series of hypothetical situations.
The internal consistency of the items which made up the 11 power bases proved
adequate. Factor analysis found 7 factors and 2 categories of bases: harsh and soft. In
Study 2, which used 101 Israeli health workers, the earlier findings were generally
supported. In addition, job satisfaction was found to be positively related to the
attribution of soft bases to the supervisor.

Social power can be conceived as the resources one person has available so
that he or she can influence another person to do what that person would not
have done otherwise. As used here, power sources or bases differ from influ-
ence techniques as the former refer to potential and the latter to the actual use of
the power. A manager may have the potential to use many resources, but in
practice uses only certain ones to influence subordinates. Empirically, the dis-
tinction implies that compliance is a function not only of powers actually used
but also of the power sources assumed to be available to the supervisor.
Over the years, the study of power sources has become a central concept in
organizational psychology, as well as in other analyses of social interaction. A
number of instrumentswere based on the original five sources presented by French

'We express our appreciation to Aroldo Rodrigues for his suggestions and assistance in
developing the scale items.
2Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bertram H. Raven,
Department of Psychology, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563, or to Joseph Schwarzwald,
Department of Psychology, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900, Israel.

307

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1998, 28, 4, pp. 307-332.

Copyright 0 1998 by V. H. Winston d Son, Inc. All rights reserved
 308 RAVEN ET AL.

and Raven (1 959): (a) coercive power-threat of punishment; (b) reward

power-promise of monetary or nonmonetary compensation; (c) legitimate
power-drawing on one’s right to influence; (d) expert power-relying on
one’s superior knowledge; and (e) referent power-based on target’s identifi-
cation with influencing agent. Podsakoff and Schriesheim (1985) observed that
much of what is known about social power in work organizations is derived
from this French and Raven typology. In a later elaboration, informational
power3 was also considered, in its potential, as a basis of power (Raven, 1965).
Previously included with expert power, informational power, based on presen-
tation of persuasive material or logic, was now conceived as distinct from ex-
pert power. The importance of such a distinction is emphasized in recent work
by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), who point out that attitude and behavior change
can follow a central route (as with informational power) or a peripheral route
(as with expert power). Others have used different terms for informational
power, for example, rational persuasion (Yukl & Tracy, 1992) or persuasive-
ness (Yukl & Falbe, 1991).
Over the years, there have been a great many articles-theoretical state-
ments, laboratory and field investigations-based on this typology, with most
including only five sources (leaving out informational) and some including all
six (Imai, 1989; Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985; Rahim, 1986; Raven, 1988,
1992, 1993). Though many of these studies were conducted in an organiza-
tional setting, there have been applications in various other areas in which
power and its actual use (influence) are involved, such as familial relations
(McDonald, 1979, 1980; Raven, Centers, & Rodrigues, 1975; Rollins & Thomas,
1975), education (Erchul & Raven, 1997; Jamieson & Thomas, 1974), market-
ing and consumer psychology (Gaski, 1986; Mackenzie & Zaichkowsky,
1980), and health and medicine (Raven, 1988; Rodin & Janis, 1982).
Despite the broad acceptance of this typology of power in survey texts of
social and organizational psychology, Podsakoff and Schriesheim (1985), in a
careful and thorough review of the field, identified some serious methodologi-
cal and substantive concerns. They, indeed, echoed and elaborated on limita-
tions suggested by others (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1983; Kipnis, Schmidt, &
Wilkinson, 1980). Methodological criticism has been lodged at the use of
single measurement items for each power base, along with ranking techniques
which produce forced and artificial correlations (Podsakoff & Schriesheim,

31n informational influence (and, in its potential, informational power), the word information
is used in its broadest sense to include any different perspective or knowledge which an influencing
agent might impart to a target. The absent-mindedparent who turns on the headlights in his car after
his child points out that it has become quite dark outside has been influenced by the child’s
informational power. Once the child has pointed it out, the parent realizes that he really must have
his headlights on.
 POWER MODEL 309

1985; Schriesheim, Hinkin, & Podsakoff, 1991). Particularly pressing has been
the absence of measures which assess power profiles across situations.
Concerns have also been raised in regard to conceptual overlaps between
categories, inconsistent operational definitions, and, at times, low agreement
between observations and prediction. For example, allusions to expertise may
involve elements of referent and informational power. This problem is height-
ened by the fact that differing power bases are often used in combinations
(e.g., expert power and informational power), such that influencing agents tend
to reveal profiles of powers using unique constellations of bases rather than
simple clear preferences for individual bases (Bui, Raven, & Schwarzwald,
1994; Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989; Kipnis, 1990; Schriesheim & Hinkin,
1990).
Finally, several other investigators using different methodological ap-
proaches have argued that the number of sources may be greater than the
five or six in the original formulation (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1983). Based on
their factor analysis, Yukl and Tracy (1992) reported a nine-factor taxonomy
(rational persuasion, inspirational appeal, consultation, negotiation, exchange,
personal appeal, collision, legitimating, and pressure). In another power study,
Yukl and Falbe (1991) identified two power sources, persuasiveness and cha-
risma, that did not appear in the original French and Raven taxonomy. How-
ever, their definition of persuasiveness (being convinced by a person’s logical
argument) overlaps with Raven’s (1992) definition of information. Charisma
may be seen as a projected character trait which is probably closely related to
the use of referent power, but may also contribute to legitimate and expert
power.
To answer some of these concerns, a number of investigators have at-
tempted to develop new scales and measures to assess French and Raven’s
bases of power (e.g., Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989; Imai, 1989; Rahim, 1986;
Schriesheim & Hinkin, 1990). This, then, is our attempt to develop social
power measures which we hope will answer a number of past criticisms and
also take into account recent theoretical developments.
Recently, Raven (1992, 1993) presented an interpersonal powerhteraction
model. While still maintaining the basic conception of six bases of power, evi-
dence was cited from theory and research to point to the need to make differen-
tiations among some of the bases of power. Coercion and reward power, which
were usually conceptualized in terms of “impersonal” threats (e.g., threat of
being dismissed) or promises of reward (e.g., promise of a promotion), are now
distinguished from personal coercion and personal reward. The latter are indi-
cated when the agent threatens to disapprove or dislike the target for noncom-
pliance (coercion) or promises to approve or like the target (reward) if the
target does comply.
310 RAVEN ET AL.

These distinctions were, to a large extent, motivated by findings in the lit-

erature. For example, Johnson (1976) reported that women are more likely to
use the more personal forms of reward and coercion, while males are more
likely to use the impersonal ones. In a different vein, Godfrey, Jones, and Lord
(1986) showed that in using ingratiating strategies, targets were more con-
cerned about whether the agent will like or dislike them, thus making them
more susceptible to personal reward or personal coercive power. Indeed,
early research in experimental social psychology placed much emphasis on
personal reward and coercion in studies of praise and reproof (e.g., Briggs,
1927; Murphy, Murphy, & Newcomb, 1937). In summary, there is good reason
to believe that the assumption that a power wielder has available sources, such
as threats to tire an employee or promises to promote, should have different ef-
fects or implications than assuming that the power wielder may like or dislike
someone.
Raven’s new approach further differentiated legitimate power into four
categories. In its original version, legitimate power was conceived as the super-
visor’s right (or norm, in other contexts) to prescribe behavior for the subordi-
nate, accompanied by the subordinate’s obligation to comply-what has been
calledpositionpower (Etzioni, 1961). There are, however, potential sources of
power other than legitimate position power in which the target complies be-
cause of a sense of obligation:
Legitimate reciprocity stems from the target’s obligation to comply with
the agent’s request after the agent has done something positive for the target.
Such obligation arises from the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Kotter
(1979), after reviewing a series of case studies in management, concluded that
creating a sense of obligation to reciprocate is a method for acquiring and main-
taining power. The strength of legitimate reciprocity was also demonstrated
through experimental manipulation (e.g., Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Regan,
1971).
Legitimate equity draws on the equity norm (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid,
1978). Essentially the agent demands compliance to compensate for either hard
work or sufferance by the agent, or harm inflicted by the target. The salience of
equity in influence has been demonstrated in several studies (Carlsmith &
Gross, 1969; Friedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Wicker & Burley, 1991).
Legitimate dependence is based on a social responsibility norm which
obliges one person to assist another who is in need of assistance (Berkowitz &
Daniels, 1963). It sometimes has been calledpower of thepowerless. The ef-
fectiveness of this power tactic has been demonstrated experimentally (Barnes,
Ickes, & Kidd, 1979; Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963; Goodstadt & Hjelle, 1973)
and in field research (Danet, 1971; Katz & Danet, 1966). Moreover, legitimate
position power is more likely to be attributed to and used by males, while
 POWER MODEL 311

legitimate dependence is more likely to be attributed to and used by females

(Johnson, 1976).
Thus, there seems to be good reason to expand measures of social power to
differentiate between personal and impersonal forms of coercive and reward
power and to further differentiate legitimate power, previously measured only
in terms of legitimate position power, to include reciprocity, equity, and de-
pendence. Such differentiation is particularly necessary, given that there ap-
pear to be gender differences in the availability and use of these extended bases
and also, presumably, personality and situational differences.
As these extended bases have not yet been operationalized, development of
the new scale, the Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI), the focus of the present
study, is an attempt to remedy this situation. For accomplishing this goal, we
responded to the criticism regarding psychometrically unsound measures that
previously had appeared in the literature (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985).
Furthermore, we examined a number of scales developed by others to mea-
sure the original six (or five) bases of power (Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989;
Imai, 1989; Rahim, 1986, 1988; Schriesheim et al., 1991; Yukl& Falbe, 1991).
However, we felt that their operations often failed to fully satisfy the concep-
tual definitions of the bases of power as originally presented. For example, a
supervisor who is judged as having the ability to fire a worker is said to possess
coercive power. Such might indeed be the case but not necessarily so. A super-
visor would be perceived as having coercive power available to him or her only
if: (a) the subordinate felt that the supervisor would utilize this resource and
really fire the subordinate who does not comply, and (b) the subordinate was
sufficiently concerned about being fired so that he or she would comply be-
cause of this threat. In a similar fashion, the mere ability of an influencing agent
to give a reward to a target (e.g., grant a promotion) becomes reward power
only if the target believes that the agent would grant that reward, contingent on
compliance, and the target really values that reward enough to comply.
In our instrument (see Appendix), we present a situation where a subordi-
nate, though initially reluctant, eventually complies with the supervisor’s re-
quest. We then asked the respondent to indicate the likelihood that specific
sources available to the power wielder might lead to such compliance. We ac-
knowledge that such an approach raises some additional problems, which will
be discussed later, but feel that such a measure comes closer to the psychologi-
cal definition of social power.
One of the commonly used methods for understanding the basic structure
that underlies a set of factors is to examine the difference between surface and
source traits. Cattell (1957) argued that a more general and comprehensive
schema (source) can be extracted from a group of surface factors that were
detected at a first stage of analysis. In fact, several researchers, using different
312 RAVEN ET AL.

scales, have alluded to the fact that individual power bases can be conceptual-
ized at different levels of abstraction. Bass (1960) and Yukl and Falbe (1991)
differentiated between position and personal types, and Kipnis (1984) as well
as Bui et al. (1994) differentiated among strong, weak, and rational bases. By
conceptualizing power sources at a higher level of abstraction, it may be pos-
sible to provide a better understanding of the observed relationships in the re-
cent taxonomy suggested by Raven (1992, 1993). As such, one of the goals of
the study was to determine whether the new 11 power bases (i.e., the surface
factors) identified in the model could be encompassed by a smaller number of
source factors.
The purpose of the two studies conducted here was to operationalize the 11
power bases by developing a new scale, and to determine whether the items
conceptualized for each tactic represent homogeneous and independent fac-
tors. In addition, we proposed to examine the empirical structure along com-
mon underlying dimensions as a measure of the interrelationship among the
power bases. This may provide a more parsimonious, yet comprehensive
model for understanding the available power bases. In the second study, sev-
eral features of the new scale were tested on another sample in a different cul-
ture and in an actual work setting.

Study 1

Method

Participants and Procedure

The sample consisted of 3 17 students (102 males, 2 15 females) from sev-

eral universities in California. The subjects responded in groups to the Inter-
personal Power Inventory questionnaire.

Instrument

In developing items for the new scale, the IPI, we drew on several sources
including previous scales in the literature (e.g., Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989)
and definitions for specific power bases as delineated in Raven’s (1992) model.
These items were piloted with open-ended interviews where respondents were
asked to complete trial questionnaires. For each of the 11 power bases pro-
posed in Raven’s model, four items were eventually constructed, yielding a to-
tal of 44 items.
Subjects were asked to respond to one of two forms of the IPI: subordinate
or supervisor. In the subordinate form, the instructions read:
 POWER MODEL 313

Often supervisors ask subordinates to do their job somewhat dif-

ferently. Sometimes subordinates resist doing so or do not follow
the supervisor’s directions exactly. Other times, they will do ex-
actly as their supervisor requests. We are interested in those
situations which lead subordinates to follow the requests of their
supervisor.

Think about a time when you were being supervised in doing

some task. Suppose your supervisor asked you to do your job
somewhat differently and, though you were initially reluctant,
you did exactly as you were asked. On the following pages, there
are a number of reasons why you might do so. Read each descrip-
tive statement carefully, thinking of the situation in which you
were supervised. Decide how likely it would be that this would
be the reason you would comply.

Subjects were provided with seven alternatives ranging from 1 (definitely

not a reason) to 7 (definitely a reason) for complying. By using a rating, rather
than a ranking procedure, methodological artifacts caused by ipsative mea-
sures were minimized (Guilford, 1954; Schriesheim et al., 1991).
In the supervisor form, each subject was asked to think of a similar work
situation in which the respondent was the supervisor and to indicate the extent
each of the IPI items was a reason why the subordinate would have complied.
In other words, subjects were asked to respond as either supervisor or subordi-
nate and in both perspectives to indicate the likelihood that each of the 11
power bases was the reason for compliance.

Results

Overall Factor Structure

To test the validity of the model, we first calculated the intercorrelations

among the four items that were hypothesized as belonging to each of the 11
bases. Analysis indicated that some of the items did not hang together. As such,
we decided to drop from each factor one item that had the most effect on reduc-
ing reliability. The resulting individual alphas for each tactic ranged from .67
to .86 (Table 1).
The remaining 33 items were then subjected to a principal components anal-
ysis which yielded seven factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. The factors in
order of the size of variance explained were labeled: impersonal sanctions
(combining impersonal reward and impersonal coercion), credibility (expert
314 RAVEN ET AL.

Table 1

Factor Loadings for Power Base Items

Combined Individual
Factor Content Item Loadings a a

Impersonal reward 37 .89 .90 .84

22 .80
1 .79
Impersonal coercion 39 .88 .82
31 .83
13 .39
Expert 38 .77 .86 .83
19 .74
3 .7 1
Information 42 .75 .8 1
4 .72
24 .69
Legitimate equity 30 .83 .85 .86
21 .83
11 .79
Legitimate reciprocity 12 .69 .67
43 .62
32 .42
Referent 5 .7 1 .73
15 .68
25 .62
Personal reward 33 .60 .83 .74
29 .59
8 .28a
Personal coercion 44 .77 .81
18 .73
23 .5 1
Legitimate position 34 .82 .78
28 .76
2 .75
Legitimate dependence 25 .77 .72
16 .7 1
40 .68

aIndicatesthat the item loaded higher on another factor.

 POWER MODEL 315

and information), legitimate equity (combining legitimate equity and legiti-

mate reciprocity), reference, personal sanctions (combining personal reward
and personal coercion), legitimate position, and legitimate dependence. Of the
33 items, only one item (Item 8) had a higher loading on a factor other than ex-
pected. Coefficient alpha reliabilities for each of the seven factors were rea-
sonably high (ranging from .72 to .90).
Although the pattern of the sources was not exactly as hypothesized, the
items belonging to the same source always remained together. Our analysis in-
dicated that some of the factors theorized by Raven as distinctive actually
emerged as part of the same factor-personal reward and personal coercion;
impersonal reward and impersonal coercion; legitimate equity and legitimate
reciprocity; and informational and expert.
To determine whether underlying structures or source factors could be
identified, we factor analyzed the mean scores of the 11 bases in the Raven
model. Compatible with previous categorizations (e.g., Bass, 1981; Yukl &
Falbe, 1991), we found a two-factor solution (Table 2). Factor I explained
34.6% of the variance and included “soft or weak” bases (credibility, reference,
legitimate dependence). Factor I1 explained 24.7% of the variance and in-
cluded “harsh or strong” bases (legitimate equity, impersonal sanction, per-
sonal sanctions, legitimate position).

Smallest Space Analysis

Another strategy for detecting underlying structure or dimensions is a

smallest space analysis (SSA) on the responses to the scale items. SSA pro-
vides for an examination of the latent structure of the underlying conceptual
space formed by the scale items (Guttman, 1963). The output (space diagram
for dimensionality) is a figural representation of the distribution of the
items, with items of greater similarity located at closer distances to each other.
Thus, placement of items in this space will aid in conceptualizing an overall
empirical structure and examining its relationship to the recent taxonomy of
power bases.
The analysis indicated that a two-dimensional structure is adequate (coeffi-
cient of alienation = .14). Inspection of Figure 1 shows that the two-
dimensional space diagram was generally supportive of the factor analysis out-
come presented previously. Items that hang together in the factor analysis
tended to be in close proximal distance to each other in the SSA.
The pattern of item clusters forms a series of concentric radial clusters be-
ginning at the apex formed by the legitimate power of position. The clusters
along each axis emanating from the apex form two distinctive dimensions
that correspond with our previous distinctions; namely, harsh and soft bases.
316 RAVEN ET AL.

Table 2

Factor Loadings for Power Base Indexes

Power base indexes Factor I Factor I1

Harsh bases
Legitimate power of reciprocity .76 .2 1
Impersonal coercive power .76 -.33
Legitimate power of equity .75 .09
Impersonal reward power .70 -.15
Personal coercive power .69 .10
Legitimate power of position .35 .34
Soft bases
Expert power -.20 .80
Referent power .11 .79
Informational power -.23 .68
Legitimate power of dependence .17 .66
Personal reward power .47 .60

Along the harsh dimension, one can find personal reward and personal coer-
cion at one end, and impersonal reward and impersonal coercion at the other
end. In between are legitimate equity and reciprocity. Along the soft dimen-
sion, one can find legitimate dependence and reference at one end and expertise
and information at the other end. The apex of these two dimensions occurs at
the legitimate position source which has characteristics of both soft and harsh
bases.

Discriminant Analyses of Mean Compliance Scores

In order to ascertain whether the factors were consistent across subgroups

within the sample, discriminant analyses for gender and position perspective
were conducted. This method was adopted here, rather than separate factor
analysis by subgroup, since the recommended ratio of subjects to items in prin-
cipal components analysis is approximately 10 (Nunnally, 1978), and only the
total sample met this criterion.
In the first discriminant analysis, the profile of the 11 power source
means were examined by gender (males = 102, females = 215). The analysis
 POWER MODEL 317

I m m

Figure I. Diagram of smallest space analysis of the 33 items of the Interpersonal Power
Inventory. LGR = legitimate power of reciprocity; COI = impersonal coercive power;
LGE = legitimate power of equity; RWI = impersonal reward power; COP = personal
coercive power; LGP = legitimate power of position; EXP = expert power; REF = refer-
ent power; INF = informationalpower; LGD = legitimatepower of dependence; RWP =
personal reward power.

showed that females did not differ from males (Wilks’s A = 0.94), x2( 11) =
1 8 . 7 1 , ~> .07.
In the second analysis, power factor profile by position perspective (super-
visor N = 134, subordinate N = 183) was performed. Here, results were signifi-
cant (Wilks’s A = .84), x2(7) = 53.15, p < .01. The two groups differ on
expertise, F(1, 315) = 1 8 . 8 4 , ~< .01; information, F(1, 315) = 1 0 . 5 7 , ~
< .01;
and reference, F(1, 315) = 15.78, p < .01. The difference between groups
emerged only in the soft bases for which supervisor mean compliance was
higher than subordinate in each case (Table 3). For the other eight power
bases, no significant differences were found between supervisors and subor-
dinates, indicating that, in general, the two groups overlap on the profile of
318 RAVEN ET AL.

Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations of Power Base Usage and Rank Preference
by Job Status

Super- Subordi-
visor nate Total

Factor content M SD M SD M SD Rank

Legitimate power of reciprocity 3.35 1.14 3.22 1.22 3.27 1.19 10

Impersonal coercive power 3.17 1.69 3.43 1.59 3.32 1.61 9
Legitimate power of equity 3.22 1.14 2.95 1.42 3.06 1.34 11
Impersonal reward power 3.50 1.75 3.65 1.62 3.59 1.68 8
Personal coercive power 3.55 1.33 3.75 1.30 3.66 1.31 6
Legitimate power of position 4.55 1.30 4.69 1.34 4.63 1.31 2
Expert power 4.82 1.14 4.17 1.42a 4.44 1.37 3
Referent power 3.96 1.05 3.41 1.32a 3.65 1.24 7
Informational power 5.06 0.99 4.57 1.52a 4.78 1.34 1
Legitimate power of dependence 4.24 1.23 4.43 1.23 4.35 1.29 4
Personal reward power 4.06 1.10 3.82 1.37 3.92 1.27 5

aDenotes a significant difference between position within job status for each sample.

power tactic compliance. The similarity in compliance scores between the two
groups was also examined with the Spearman rank order correlation coeff-
cient. The high value (.90) indicated that although some of the means may have
differed, the position of the bases within each group was approximately the
same.

Study 2

As the IPI was developed on a student sample, some of whom had only lim-
ited work experience, we felt a need to test the scale on a worker sample in a
field setting. For this purpose, a follow-up study was conducted to examine two
issues: the generalizability of the power tactic structure and the relationship
between compliance profiles and job satisfaction. The decision to use job satis-
faction stems from its popularity as a measure of organizational outcome that
has shown consistently positive relationships in the power literature (Podsakoff
& Schriesheim, 1985). Specifically, the following issues were examined:
 POWER MODEL 319

(a) the consistency of the factor structure across cultures, (b) the similarity in
degree of compliance to power bases, and (c) the relationship between compli-
ance and job satisfaction.

Method

Participants

A group of 101 hospital workers (technicians, clerks, laboratory assistants)

from several departments in an Israeli hospital participated in the study. The
sample consisted of 38 males and 62 females, with an average age of 36.8 years
(SD= 10.71).

Instruments

Hebrew version of the IPI (subordinateform). The final version of the ques-
tionnaire consisting of 33 items identified in the American sample was de-
scribed previously in Study 1. For Study 2, the scale was translated into
Hebrew and retranslated into English and was found to match the American
version in content and purpose.
Minnesota Job Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ). The short version of the
scale (Arvey, Bouchard, Siegal, & Abraham, 1989) was used here. Respon-
dents are asked to indicate the degree of satisfaction with each of 20 statements
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). Exam-
ples are: “The chance to do different things from time to time,” “The freedom
to use my own judgment,” and the “Praise I get for doing a good job.” The coef-
ficient alpha was .87.

Procedure

After obtaining permission from the heads of several departments in the hos-
pital, the questionnaires were administered to the subjects who were promised
confidentialityand anonymity. The order of questionnaires was counterbalanced
such that half received the IPI first and the other half received the MSQ first.

Results

Factor Structure Consistency

Several features of the IPI scale were compared between studies. For the
Israeli sample, as with the American sample, the internal consistency of items
320 RAVEN ET AL.

within each power tactic was assessed with the Israeli sample. The alpha coef-
ficients were satisfactory, ranging from .63 (for legitimate dependence) to .88
(for impersonal reward and coercion). It appears that the relationship among
items obtained in the original study was repeated for the Israeli workers.
The factor analysis on the individual items was not repeated, as the size of
the sample here was too small for meaningful inferences (Nunnally, 1978). We
did, however, conduct factor analysis on the 11 power bases. As with the
American sample, a two-factor solution was obtained (Table 4). The first fac-
tor, explaining 39.8% of the variance, consisted of the harsh bases. The second
factor, explaining 20.3% of the variance, included the soft bases. Except for the
legitimate position tactic, which, in the Israeli sample, was included among the
soft tactics and personal reward that was included as a harsh tactic, the other
bases fell in the same general categories in both samples. Closer inspection of
the American data revealed that the legitimate position loadings were actually
quite similar on the harsh and soft bases (.35 vs. .34, respectively). The SSA
outcomes of the American sample also supported this duality, as findings
showed that legitimate position was placed at the apex, indicating characteris-
tics of both dimensions.

Degree of Compliance

Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations for the likelihood that
compliance could be attributed to each of the 11 power bases, ordered by
size of the means. Comparison of the values between the American sample
(Table 3) and the Israeli sample indicated high similarity. Indeed, the rank or-
der correlation between the two samples was .93. For both cultures, partici-
pants tended to report that some power bases (such as information, legitimate
position, and expertise) were more likely to be the reason for compliance, while
others (legitimate reciprocity, equity, and impersonal coercion) were less
likely.

Compliance and Job Satisfaction

Finally, the 11 power bases, as well as the harsh and soft categories, were
used as predictors of job satisfaction in separate discriminant analyses. The
MSQ score, split at the median (50 above median, 50 below, 1 case missing),
served as the grouping variable. The findings for the 11 bases were significant
(Wilks’s A = .77), x2( 11) = 2 4 . 2 6 , <
~ .01, implying that the compliance profile
distinguished between workers with high and low satisfaction.
Discriminant analysis employing only two predictors, means on harsh and
soft bases, and the general MSQ score as the grouping variables also produced
 POWER MODEL 321

Table 4

Factor Loadingsfor Power Bases and Alpha Coefficients (Israeli Sample)

Power base indexes Factor I Factor I1 a

Harsh bases
Personal coercive power .85 .07 .62
Impersonal reward power .84 -.12 .80
Legitimate power of reciprocity .83 .ll .78
Personal reward power .80 .29 .72
Impersonal coercive power .79 -.26 .83
Legitimate power of equity .68 .06 .80

Soft bases
Expert power .oo .77 .71
Referent power .34 .73 .68
Informational power ..24 .67 .82
Legitimate power of dependence .05 .62 .62
Legitimate power of position .03 .58 .68

significant findings (Wilks’s A = .93), x2(2) = 7.03, p < .05. As with the pre-
vious analysis using 11 bases, the univariate analyses showed that only the
soft tactic category was significant, F(1, 99) = 7 . 5 1 , ~< .01. It appears that
greater compliance to soft bases was related to higher degrees of job satisfac-
tion, whereas the degree of compliance to harsh bases did not relate to job sat-
isfaction.

General Discussion

The findings showed that the IPI based on Raven’s (1992, 1993) recent
elaboration was a reliable and valid instrument for assessing the bases of
power attributed to supervisors in influencing subordinates. Satisfactory inter-
nal consistency was obtained for the items comprising each of the 11 social
power bases as seen in the two different sets of respondents-American stu-
dents and Israeli hospital workers. Factor analysis of items indicated, however,
that some of the 11 bases tended to cluster together such that seven factors
emerged: personal sanctions (personal reward and personal coercion), imper-
sonal sanctions (impersonal reward and impersonal coercion), credibility (expert
322 RAVEN ET AL.

Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations of Power Base Usage in Order of

Preference (Israeli Sample)

Power base A4 SD

1. Information 5.53 1.35

2. Legitimate position 5.01 1.22
3. Expertise 4.71 1.23
4. Legitimate dependence 4.55 1.18
5. Reference 4.01 1.26
6. Reward-personal 3.86 1.35
7. Legitimate reciprocity 3.62 1.46
8. Coercion-personal 3.37 1.22
9. Coercion-impersonal 3.22 1.50
10. Reward-impersonal 3.21 1.51
1I. Legitimate equity 2.84 1.24

and information), legitimate equity (legitimate equity and legitimate reciproc-

ity), reference, legitimate position, and legitimate dependence.
In addition, we found an underlying structure of harsh or strong and soft fac-
tors extracted from the 11 power bases. The harsh-soft distinction concurred
with findings by other researchers (Bass, 1981; Kipnis, 1984; Yukl & Falbe,
199 1). Further indication of construct validity was provided by the fact that in-
dividuals across cultures, positions, and gender conceptualized similar bases
within each category. Finally, concurrent validity was observed when the soft
bases were shown to correlate and distinguish between high and low job satis-
faction, an outcome measure which has been shown in the literature to be posi-
tively related to power bases (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985).
The relationship between the compliance to soft power bases and job satis-
faction (measured only with the Israeli workers) has interesting implications in
its own right. It appears that for this sample, being satisfied with a working
situation was not affected so much by the specific bases but rather by their con-
stellation. Presumably, this constellation of bases related to satisfaction might
differ among cultures, work situations, or other characteristics of supervisors
or subordinates. Indeed, even though the soft-hard distinction generally held
for both samples, there was a difference in the assignment of two power bases:
For the American students, legitimate position was grouped with the hard bases
 POWER MODEL 323

and personal reward with the soft; for the Israeli workers, the grouping was re-
versed.
Of special interest are the power factors from the item analysis of the
American sample which we had expected to be independent but which were
found to hang together. The fact that individual power bases often overlap with
each other has been reported previously and should not come as a surprise. It
should be emphasized, however, that the overlap was always within category.
For example, expertise and information, which were found to be related, were
both soft factors. This overlap is not unique to our study. Similarly, legitimate
equity and reciprocity, as well as impersonal reward and impersonal coercion,
which overlapped, were harsh bases. Others have also noted that power bases
are not necessarily independent of each other. Yukl and Falbe (1991) argued
that reward and coercion should be combined into a single factor. Podsakoff
and Schriesheim (1 985) argued that an agent who possessed referent power
may also be perceived as possessing expert power; that is, a halo effect of ex-
pertise is attributed to those whom we like. Finally, a person who has the power
to reward may also be perceived as having the power to punish (Bass, 198 1).
The overlap between information and expertise is compatible with the defi-
nitions for each source as proposed by Raven (1 992). With both bases, the
agent influences the target by saying there are good reasons why the target
should change his or her behaviors or beliefs. Yet, they differ. With informa-
tional influence, the agent actually gives the reasons, by directly providing
convincing data on the basis of which the target can be expected to change.
With expert bases, the agent, in effect, says, “On the basis of my substantial
knowledge and experience, I know good reasons why it would be better for you
to change, but you will have to trust me, since (for one reason or another) I am
not making these reasons explicit to YOU.”Our respondents apparently felt that
a supervisor who is likely to influence subordinates by presenting good reasons
tends to be equally successful if he or she relies on expertise without explicitly
stating reasons. It may also be that when the supervisor states good reasons, the
target tends to infer expertise.
The tactic which we have labeled legitimate equity also includes two over-
lapping hypothesized power bases, legitimate reciprocity and legitimate eq-
uity. With respect to both of these, the key underlying principle is “YOUshould
feel obliged to do as I ask, because you owe it to me. It is only fair or equitable.”
We had believed there were two different forms of “fairness”: (a) “You owe it
to me because I have done something for you” (reciprocity); and (b) “. . . be-
cause you have done something not nice to me” or “. . . I have really put a lot of
myself into this . . .” (equity). The reciprocity tactic refers to the “give-and-
take” norm (Cialdini, 1988), whereas equity can be considered a “compensa-
tory” norm (Walster et al., 1978). Apparently, our respondents did not make
324 RAVEN ET AL.

such a distinction between these two forms of equity. It is interesting that our
respondents did make clear distinctions between legitimacy based on position
and legitimacy based on dependence.
In interpreting these data, it is important to keep in mind the wording of the
questionnaire, which represents a hypothetical situation in which compliance
in fact did occur and then asks for a rating of the likelihood of each of these
power bases being responsible for that compliance. We thus ask the respon-
dents to make an attribution regarding the extent to which the bases of power,
in effect, are the cause of compliance. The original French and Raven (1959)
statement as well as subsequent formulations (e.g., Raven, 1992, 1993) empha-
size that power and strategies are also distinguishable in other ways: longevity
of change, importance of surveillance, subsequent liking or disliking for the in-
fluencing agent, and attribution of internal versus external causality of change.
There is good reason to believe that, even though coercion and reward are
highly correlated as factors leading to influence, they would be more independ-
ent ifwe were to ask how likely it is that the subordinate will like the supervisor
after the change. Informational and expert power, though correlated in these
data, might be more independent of one another if our questions dealt with how
long the behavior change would continue or to what extent the subordinate
would see the changes as internally versus externally caused (Brown & Raven,
1994; Litman-Adizes, Fontaine, & Raven, 1978).
One would also predict that the factor structure will differ in other interper-
sonal influence and power situations. For example, greater differentiation is
expected between impersonal reward and impersonal coercion in relationships
between husbands and wives (Raven et al., 1975), and greater differentiation
between expert and information in doctor-patient relationships (Brown &
Raven, 1994). The relative effectiveness of expert and informational power is
also related to the importance of the changed behavior or belief for the target.
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) found that while expert and informational power
may not differ in their impact for issues which have little practical significance
for the target, informational power has greater impact for matters that have im-
portant implications for the target-if the issue is really important, the target is
more likely to require clear facts and reason for the change, and is less likely to
put his or her trust in the expertise of the influencing agent.
The manner in which the items are phrased was meant to allow a measure of
social power which was more in keeping with psychological definitions pro-
posed by Cartwright (1959), French and Raven (1959), Heider (1958), and
others. Of course, there might also be objective definitions which others have
advocated: Supervisors have expert power if they have had a wealth of experi-
ence or training in the area in which influence is attempted. They have reward
power if they can promote their subordinates or give them raises. These then
 POWER MODEL 325

would appear to be objective measures. Or we could move a bit toward the psy-
chological direction by asking subordinates’ opinions as to whether supervi-
sors have such resources, rating the extent to which the respondents agree with
statements such as “My supervisor can fire me”; “My supervisor can promote
me”.,LL My supervisor has had much experience in this area”; and so forth. With
such methods we might get good measures, but would they be measuring social
power? Not necessarily. If interviewed, some respondents might answer, “My
supervisor may have had a lot of training and experience, but I really don’t trust
his judgment and would not say he is an expert”; “My supervisor might be able
to fire me, but I don’t think he would since he really needs me, and besides, I
don’t really need this job anyway.” Thus, it is not uncommon that an influenc-
ing agent’s possession of ostensible power resources will fail to result in effec-
tive power and influence. It is for that reason that we used what has been called
an attributional approach for defining power: “If your supervisor asked you to
do something you preferred not to do and you did it, was it because you felt that
otherwise he would hurt or punish you in some way? How likely would that be
the reason (why you did as he asked)?’
Though we feel that this attributional approach more nearly taps social
power, it is not entirely without its own problems. As with most questionnaires
and survey instruments used in our field, one must always be concerned about
the extent to which responses may be biased by self-serving needs (e.g., “I
really did it because otherwise he may punish me, but I cannot admit this to the
person conducting the study, or even to myself’). If so, is there a solution that
would be more satisfactory than the objective, pseudo-objective, or our attribu-
tional approach? None immediately comes to mind. An anonymous reviewer
recommended that

a better research design would be to have a manager and subordi-

nate describe their perception of each other’s power and objec-
tives prior to an influence attempt, observe their behavior during
the influence attempt, then have the parties describe their percep-
tion of the outcome, reasons for it, and perception of each other
immediately after.

This is a very intriguing suggestion indeed, but one which would also not be
free of problems, including the extreme difficulty in carrying out such a study
with any number of participants. In any case, one would have to have some rea-
sonable measures in order to carry out such a study.
In the meantime, we can get some satisfaction from the fact that we found
considerable consistency in our data. Though we have not solved all of the
problems in this area of research, we feel we have made considerable strides.
326 RAVEN ET AL.

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Appendix

Interpersonal Power Inventory Items (Subordinate Form) *

Reward Impersonal

1. A good evaluation from my supervisor could lead to an increase in pay.

22. My supervisor could help me receive special benefits.
37. My supervisor’s actions could help me get a promotion.
*41. I expected to get some favorable consideration for this.

Coercive Impersonal

*6. My supervisor could give me undesirable job assignments.

13. My supervisor could make things unpleasant for me.
3 1. My supervisor could make it more difficult for me to get a promotion.
39. My supervisor could make it more difficult for me to get a pay increase.

Expert Power

3. My supervisor probably knew the best way to do the job.

19. My supervisor probably knew more about the job than I did.
*26. I trusted my supervisor to give me the best direction on this.
38. My supervisor probably had more technical knowledge about this
than I did.

Referent Power

5. I respected my supervisor and thought highly of himlher and did not

wish to disagree.
15. I saw my supervisor as someone I could identify with.
*27. We were both part of the same work group and should have seen eye-
to-eye on things.
35. I looked up to my supervisor and generally modeled my work
accordingly.

Informational Power

4. Once it was pointed out, I could see why the change was necessary.
* 17.My supervisor had carefully explained the basis for the request.
 POWER MODEL 331

24. My supervisor gave me good reasons for changing how I did the job.
42. I could then understand why the recommended change was for the
better.

Legitimacy/Position

2. After all, helshe was my supervisor.

*20. It was hidher job to tell me how to do my work.
28. My supervisor had the right to request that I do my work in a
particular way.
34. As a subordinate, I had an obligation to do as my supervisor said.

Legitimacy/Reciprocity

*7. My supervisor had done some nice things for me in the past and so I
did this in return.
12. For past considerations I had received, I felt obliged to comply.
32. My supervisor had previously done some good things that I had
requested.
43. My supervisor had let me have my way earlier so I felt obliged to
comply now.

Legitimacy/Dependence

*9. It was clear to me that my supervisor really depended on me to do this

for him/her.
16. Unless I did so, hidher job would be more difficult.
25. I understood that my supervisor really needed my help on this.
40. I realized that a supervisor needs assistance and cooperation from
those working with him/her.

LegitimacyIEquity

1 1. By doing so, I could make up for some problems I may have caused
in the past.
2 1. Complying helped make up for things I had not done so well
previously.
30. I had made some mistakes and therefore felt that I owed this to
himlher.
*36. I had not always done what he/she wished, so this time I felt I should.
332 RAVEN ET AL.

Personal Reward

8. I liked my supervisor and hidher approval was important to me.

* 14. It made me feel better to know that my supervisor liked me.
29. My supervisor made me feel more valued when I did as requested.
33. It made me feel personally accepted when I did as my supervisor
asked.

Personal Coercion

*lo. I didn’t want my supervisor to dislike me.

18. It would have been disturbing to know that my supervisor dis-
approved of me.
23. My supervisor may have been cold and distant if I did not do as
requested.
44. Just knowing that I was on the bad side of my supervisor would have
upset me.

*Items with an asterisk were not included in the final version.