TITLE 1

1. Peoples vs. Perez, 83 Phil 314

Facts:
Susano Perez was convicted of 5 counts of Treason and sentenced to death by
electrocution. The accused, recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous girls
and women against their will for the purpose of using them, to satisfy the immoral
purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini (Officer of Japanese Force in the
Philippines). Issue: Whether or not Susano Perez is guilty of the felony of treason
Held:
No. Ratio: "Commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or
to enliven the entertainments held in their honor was not treason even though the
women and the entertainments helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and
boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have
been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainments.

2. People v. Adlawan, 83 Phil. 194

Facts: We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of
P20,000 imposed by the People's Court upon the appellants who was charged with
treason but convicted of what the said court terms "complex crime of crime of treason
with murder robbery and rape."
The convicted is based on defendant’s plea of guilty to a complaint which as amended
contains the following counts:
3. That on or about and during the period comprised between March 1943 and May
3, 1945 in the city of Cebu. the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy
the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to
give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully
unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become a member of the so-called
Philippines Constabulary, an enemy-sponsored military organization.
4. That on our about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943
and May 3, 1945, the accused join the Japanese Military Police otherwise known
as the Kempei-tai under the command of a T. Yushida, performing the function
and duties of an informer spy and chief undercover man to apprehend guerrilla as
they did apprehend capture and torture guerrillas loot civilians.
NOTE: There are 23 instances provided in the original case that shows the different
instances where the accused committed robbery, rape, murder, etc. All of the said
instances, it is stated that the accused “with treasonable intent to give, as did give
and comfort to said enemy, “ and “willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonable
join and take part”.
Issue/s: w/not the lower court erred in the crime committed by then accused is a complex
crime of treason with murder, rape and robbery;
Held:
We find merit in the contention that appellant should not have been convicted of the so-
called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape." The killings, robbery,
and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but
as mere elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted.
Being merged in and identified with the general charge, they can not be used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should, therefore, be held
guilty of treason only.

(6) People v. Siyoh, 141 SCRA 356

FACTS:
Antonio de Guzman together with his friends, Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and
Anastacio de Guzman, who were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to
Pilas Island, Province of Basilan to sell goods together with the accused Kiram and Siyoh.
After selling their goods, while on their way back to Pilar Island, They saw 2 men armed
with armantes onboard a pumpboat Kiram turned off the engine and threw a rope towards
the other pumboat. The armed men took their money and goods as well as their clothes.
After which, Kiram uttered “It was good to kill all of you” then Siyoh hacked de Castro and
Hiolen with his “barong.” Antonio de Guzman was able to jump out of the boat but Kiram’s
group fired at him hitting him at the back. Antonio de Guzman was able to survive the
attack and reported it to the Philippine Army. Antonio de Guzman was able to identify the
men who boarded their boat as the men that his group saw talking with Kiram and Siyoh
in BalukBaluk Island the previous night. The trial court found the defendants to be guilty
qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder. It then imposed to Siyoh et al
the death penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether Siyoh and Kiyam were proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt granting that the
body of Anastacio de Guzman was never found.
HELD:
The Court upheld the decision of the trial court. Art.123. of the RPC states that: Qualified
piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to death shall be imposed upon those who
commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following
circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving
themselves; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape.
In the case at bar, it was proven that Siyoh et al killed their victims, with the exception of
Antonio, after they stole the personal belongings of their victims. The number of persons
killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy,
i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a
special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims. Thus,
the recovery or non-recovery of the body of Anastacio is immaterial in the present case.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and
the law, it is affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the
penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in
solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00.

(7) People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil. 19

DOCTRINE: Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It
may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes
has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all.

FACTS: On or about June 30,1920, two boats left Matuta for Peta. Both are in Dutch
possession. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o’clock in the evening, the
second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies.
There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros
first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo,
attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible
to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young
women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and
privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo (who also raped one of the women) and Saraw. At Maruro the two
women were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,
TawiTawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by
counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands because the crime was committed outside the country.After the demurrer was
overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two
defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua),
to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the
offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of coprax which had been robbed, or to indemnify
them in the amount of 942 rupees, and
to pay a one-half part of the costs.

ISSUE: Does the CFI has jurisdiction over the offense since it happened outside the
Philippines?

RULING: Yes, Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of
any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so
may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are
not neutral to crimes."
The judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed (life
imprisonment /cadena perpetua), and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-
lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-
sixth Judicial District.
(8 ) People v. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001

FACTS
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with petroleum products with a total value of
P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, led by Captain Edilberto Libo-on, it was
suddenly boarded, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco. The pirates, were
armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew
and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, the pirates ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" and replace it with
“Galilee”, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The crew was forced
to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the
ship was undergoing repairs
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel
to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and
the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical
miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored
beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's
cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride"
in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the
area, was completed on March 30, 1991. Two days later, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the
same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three
batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a
period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. On April 12,
1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were
brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed
sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter ensued and on October 24, 1991, an Information
charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine
Waters) was filed before the Manila RTC Branch 46. Upon arraignment, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued. All the accused
vehemently denied the charges pressed against them.
The Manila RTC Branch 46 through Judge Romeo J. Callejo promulgated a decision
which found Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section
2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua in lieu of death, the court also ordered the accused to remit jointly and severally
the amount of Php 11,240,000.00,. The court also found Cheong San Hiong guilty as an
accomplice to the crime and was meted the same penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The
court also ordered all the accused to return to Caltex Philippines the amount of Php
40,426,793.87, plus interests until said amount is paid in full
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified
piracy?
Whether or Not the trial court erred in convicting and punishing Cheong San Hiong as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of
Philippine waters and territory?
RULING
NO, the trial court did not err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove doubt that
the accused-appellants committed the crime of piracy beyond reasonable.
NO, the trial court did not err in convicting and punishing Cheong San Hiong as an
accomplice. Piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. Since the crime was
committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the
pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such
transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its
cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and
its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed
in Philippine waters.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must
be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the
pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On
the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the
law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement
of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is
likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent
to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of
nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532,
piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

(9) United States v. Fowler, G.R. No. L-496, Dec. 31, 1902

Facts of the case:

The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of
champagne... while on board the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which
said bottles of champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and... were the
property of Julian Lindsay
The accused having been brought before the court,... alleging that the Court of
First Instance was without jurisdiction to try the crime charged, inasmuch as it... appeared
from the information that the crime was committed on the high seas, and not in the city of
Manila, or within the territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-
mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these... grounds,
that the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the
court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six month's
imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders of the Military
Governor and... the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on
board vessels flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Courts of First
Instance of the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over crimes committed
on the high seas on board of transport not registered in the Philippines.
Ruling:
No, the Court of First instances have no jurisdiction over crime committed on the
high seas.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the
Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven
paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and
offenses committed... on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within
any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft
of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws
thereof." The purpose of this... law was to define the jurisdiction of the Courts of First
Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed
in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts
are without jurisdiction to take... cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.

(10) People v. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (find English version)

Facts:

The case is an appeal by the Attorney-General regarding the accused’s penalty because
in the first case, he was sentenced to reclusion temporal, while the Attorney-General says
that it should be reclusion perpetua. The Court held that it can’t because it constitutes
double jeopardy. The above-named accused was a passenger of PAL plane PI-C-38
enroute to Appari from Laoag. While flying over Mountain Province and armed with .38
and .45 caliber pistols, the accused, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
shot Eduardo Diego. He also willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and without authority of
law, compelled Pedro Perlas, the pilot of the plane, against his will and consent, to change
the route and take the accused to Amoy instead. When Pedro refused, he shot the guy
as well. the Attorney-General contends that it should be the complex crime of grave
coercion with murder.

Issue:

WoN accused is guilty of the complex crime of grave coercion with murder

Held:
No. The court held that the defendant executed two separate events, not one; therefore,
it could not constitute the complex crime of coercion with murder.The defendant could
have killed Pedro Perlas without forcing him to change the direction of the airplane.
Coercion was not essential to commit the murder. (In fact, by killing the pilot, the
defendant was not able to pursue his desire to go to Amoy.)

*note, Art. 123 does not apply because it’s a plane.

But the principle behind is that the Court in this case clarifies that coercion (seizing of the
vessel) by the accused was treated as a separate crime from murder and thus could not
be qualified as a complex crime or qualified piracy.

(12) People v. Roble, 83 Phil. 1

Facts:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to death by the First Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte.
The information alleges:
On the first count-
On or about March 20, 1944, the accused, being a member of the Philippines
Constabulary, willfully unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, apprehended and
arrested, and maltreated Paulino Osorio, and on the same day, apprehended, and
tortured 7 more, the other 1 he killed
In the same month, for apprehending and arresting 2 guerillas, one of whom died as a
result of the torture administered by the accused
On or about May 18, 1944, for again apprehending, torturing, and later killing one
Eleuterio Padilla, a guerilla and a former USAFFE soldier
The First Division of the Peoples Court in Tacloban, opined that the crime committed was
complex crime of treason with murders, with the result that the penalty provided for the
most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree.
Issue: W/N torture and murders may be appreciated as aggravating circumstances in the
crime of treason.
Ruling: The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and formed
part of treason. They were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous intention
supplied a vital ingredient in the crime.
In the case People v. Racaza:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior
strength treachery and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects
of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and
may not taken to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to
the enemy is in many cases as in this a long continued process requiring for the
successful consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed, reflective and persistent
determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is
merged in superior strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance
movements which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration with the enemy the use of a
large force and equipment was necessary.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary
to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent,
human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms
of cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating
circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the
main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty fall
within the terms of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength are
absorbed inn treason characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other
accompanying crime should be taken into consideration for measuring the degree
and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were
committed. Were not this the rule treason the highest crime known to law would confer
on its perpetrator advantage that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such incongruity
and injustice the penalty in treason will be adapted within the range provided in the
Revised Penal Code to the danger and harm and to which the culprit has exposed his
country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deeds. The
letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of
the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of
graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable as in the case of
homicides connection with treason the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the
enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and
in the furtherance of the law's aims.

(15) People v. Prieto, 80 Phil. 138

Facts:
• The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After
pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and
maintained the original plea as to counts 4, 5 and 6. The special prosecutor
introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that
he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty
on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay
a fine of P20,000.
• Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on
any single detail. Juanito Albaño, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the
accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an
American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled
by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the
prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to
the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the
flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he
saw the accused following an American whose hands were tied; that the accused
struck the flier with a piece of rope; that with the American and the accused were
Japanese and other Filipinos.
• This evidence does not satisfy the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed
to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it.
• Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution defining
treason, after which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make
treason.
• It is where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that
they cannot be regarded separately under their general denomination.
• However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out
may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other
atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less painful method of execution
will be taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision of article 14,
paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented
the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the
criminal objective.
Issue:
Whether or Not, The appellant is not guilty of treason on the 4 th count.
Ruling:
No. The appellant Prieto did not treason because of the Two-witness rule. Under
the two-witness principle, it is necessary that the two witnesses corroborate each other
not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. Whereas the two witness statement
referred to two separate occasion and not the particular occasion that the appellant is
being litigated.
The appellant was also defended by an incompetent counsel in lower court. We
do not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the
defense to the best of his ability. If Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the
bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut any
influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as
charged in counts 1, 2, 3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance and a mitigating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower
court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be
affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the appellant.

(16) People v. Cana, 87 Phil. 577

FACTS:

Eleuterio Caña, was charged in the People's Court with treason under seven counts. After
trial, he was sentenced to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of
the law, to pay a fine of P5,000, plus costs
Eleuterio Caña served as puppet Mayor of the Japanese who performed the following
treasonable acts: (1) forced the people to dig trenches and holes and build stables for the
Japanese Armed Forces; (2) people of Abuyog must obey his orders and tell the
guerrillas and their relatives to surrender; (3) provided the Japanese soldiers with houses
to live and ejected the Filipino civilians; (4) guided and accompanied Japanese patrols to
the barrios of Abuyog to apprehend guerrillas, guerrilla suspects and their supporters and
also to locate their hideouts; (5) force the people to harvest palay in the outlying farms,and
did confiscate the palay taken therefrom, giving part of it to the Japanese soldiers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts committed by the accused constitutes the crime of treason?

RULING:
Yes. Considering all the evidence submitted, the court agrees with the People's Court
and the Solicitor General that the appellant is guilty under counts 2, 4 and 5. Ordinarily,
in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed
in its medium degree, namely, reclusion perpetua as opined by the Court of Appeals.
However, taking a broad view of the case, we are inclined to impose a lighter penalty as
did the People's Court. It must bear in mind that treason is not an ordinary and everyday
offense which must be considered and punished according to the presence or absence
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances provided for in the Revised Penal Code. It is
a very serious crime committed during war by one who, forgetting his loyalty and oath of
allegiance to his own country, aids the enemy and gives it aid and comfort. The amount
or degree of said aid or comfort given the enemy as well as the gravity of the separate
and distinct acts of treason committed by the accused, rather than the circumstances
aggravating or mitigating attending its commission, determine the degree of the penalty
to be imposed.
In other words, we have punished the commission of treason on the basis of the
seriousness of the treasonable acts, and of the presence or absence of atrocities on the
victims, rather than on the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.

(17) People v. Escleto, 84 Phil. 121

FACTS:
The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the former People's Court with treason
on three counts, namely:
1. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, Filemon
Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, associate and fraternize with the said Imperial Japanese Forces, going out
with them in patrols in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding
or in sympathy with the resistance movement in the Philippines; bearing arms against the
American and guerrilla forces, and mounting guard and performing guard duty for the
Imperial Japanese Forces.
2. The accused treasonably accompany, join, and go out on patrols with Japanese
soldiers in and around the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, in search of
guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance
movement in the Philippines.
3. The accused caused to be arrested one Antonio Conducto as a guerrilla and did turn
him over and deliver to the Japanese military authorities in their garrison. Sinforosa
Mortero testified that on March 18, 1944, in obedience to the Japanese order, she and
the rest of her family went to the town, in fromt of Filemon Escleto's house, Escleto told
them to stop and took down their names and interviewed. The next day they were allowed
to go along with many others, but Antonio Conducto was not released.
Patricia Araya declared that before reaching the town, Filemon Escleto stopped them and
asked to took down their names. Then Escleto presented them to a PC and she heard
him tell the latter, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm;" that afterward they were
sent upstairs and she did not know what happened to her husband.
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of Treason?
RULING:
No. It will readily be seen from a cursory examination thereof that the only point on which
the two witnesses, Patricia Araya and Sinforosa Mortero, agree is that the accused took
down the names of Conducto and of the witnesses, among others, and came along with
them to the town. Granting the veracity of this statement, it does not warrant the inference
that the defendant betrayed Conducto or had the intention of doing so. What he allegedly
did was compatible with the hypothesis that, being lieutenant of his barrio, he thought it
convenient as part of his duty to make a list of the people under his jurisdiction who
heeded the Japanese order. If the accused had a treasonable intent against Conducto,
he could have furnished his name and identity to the enemy by word of mouth. This step
would have the added advantage of concealing the defendant's traitorous action from his
townmates and of not appraising Conducto of what was in store for him, knowledge of
which might impel Conducto to escape. Escleto's making note of persons who went to
the poblacion as evidence of overt act is weak, vague and uncertain. "Each of the
witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable, there must be two
witnesses to each part of the overt act." (VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec. 2038,
p. 271.) "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole, overt act. It may be
passible to piece bits together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the
support of two oaths; * * *." (Opinion of Judge Learned Hand quoted as footnote in
Wigmore on Evidence, ante.)

(18) People v. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 450

Facts:
The prosecution was able to establish that during the Japanese occupation, herein
appellant, Pedro T. Villanueva, who is a Filipino citizen, and owing his allegiance to the
United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave the enemy aid
and comfort by rendering service with the Japanese Imperial Army as a secret agent,
informer and spy of its Detective Force in the province of Iloilo. The appellant put up the
defense of duress allegedly exerted by the Japanese upon him for which he had to serve
in the detective force of the enemy state Japanese Army.

Issue:
Is the appellant guilty of treason?

Ruling:
Considering the lone and self-serving testimony of the appellant that he was coerced
to cooperate with and serve the enemy state, Japanese Empire, there has been no
sufficient evidence to prove that he was in fact compelled or coerced to serve the
Japanese. Much less is there any concrete evidence to prove that the alleged compulsion
or coercion grave and imminent.

(20) United States v. Bautista, et al., 6 Phil. 581

Facts: In 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of
Filipinos in Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and establishing a new government.

Francisco Bautista, a close friend of the chief of military forces of the conspirators Ricarte
who took part of and held several meetings assured Ricarte that the necessary
preparations had been made and that he "held the people in readiness” and aid the
journey of the said Rocarte by giving 200 pesos secretly.
Tomas Puzon held several conferences whereat plans are made for the coming
insurrection; he was appointed Brigadier-General of the Signal Corps of the revolutionary
forces. Aniceto de Guzman accepted some bonds from one of the conspirators.

The CFI of Manila convicted the three men of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and
destroy by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the
Government of the Philippine Islands. Bautista was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment
and a P3,000 fine; Puzon and De Guzman to 3 years imprisonment and P1,000.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of conspiracy?

Ruling: Judgment for Bautista and Puzon is hereby affirmed by the Supreme Court. And
Judgment for de Guzman is hereby REVERSED. Bautista and Puzon are guilty of
conspiracy. Bautista was fully aware of the purposes of the meetings he participated in,
and even gave an assurance to the chief of military forces that he is making the necessary
preparations. Puzon voluntarily accepted his appointment and in doing so assumed all
the obligations implied by such acceptance. This may be considered as an evidence of
the criminal connection of the accused with the conspiracy.

However, de Guzman is not guilty of conspiracy. The finding of his guilt rest substantially
upon his acceptance of a number of bonds from one of the conspirators, such bonds
having been prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of raising funds for carrying out
the plans of the conspiracy, but it does not affirmatively appear
that he knew anything of the existence of the conspiracy or that, when he received the
bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the bundle was, nor that ever,
on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these bonds.

(21) People v. Rodriguez, 135 Phil. 485

Facts: Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, Rico
Lopez, Davio Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
alias Peter Powe were charged of the crime of piracy in an information filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. They were crew members of the M/V
Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of the Philippine registry. Conspiring with one another,
and armed with bladed weapons and firearms, stole the equipment and other personal
properties belonging to the crew members and passengers of the ship with the total
amount of P3,687,300.00. in addition to the stolen goods, they also employed physical
violence to the crew and passengers of the vessel. They were found guilty to the charge
and were convicted and sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the plea of guilt should mitigate the penalty of death imposed;
2. Whether or not conspiracy to commit the crime of piracy was proven. Held: 1.
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides:
"SEC. 3. Penalties. — Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage
as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
"a) Piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by ring upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed."
2. Considering the written statements of all the appellants, interlocking as they are with
each other as each admits his participation and those of the other co accused, there is
no room for doubt that conspiracy existed among them. The conduct of appellant Peter
Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance showing
the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a consequence, every
one is responsible for the crime committed.

(23) Cramer v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 918

FACTS: The indictment charged Cramer with adhering to the enemies of the United
States, giving them aid and comfort, and set forth ten overt acts. The prosecution
withdrew seven, and three were submitted to the jury. The overt acts which present the
principal issue shows that Anthony Cramer, the defendant herein, on or about June 23,
1942, at the Southern District of New York and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did
meet with Werner Thiel and Edward John Kerling, enemies of the United States, at the
Twin Oaks Inn at Lexington Avenue and 44th Street, in the City and State of New York,
and did confer, treat, and counsel with said Werner Thiel and Edward John Kerling for a
period of time for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and comfort to said
enemies, Werner Thiel and Edward John Kerling. It appeared upon the trial that at all
times involved in these acts Kerling and Thiel were under surveillance of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. By direct testimony of two or more agents it was established that
Cramer met Thiel and Kerling on the occasions and at the places charged and that they
drank together and engaged long and earnestly in conversation. This is the sum of the
overt acts as established by the testimony of two witnesses. There is no proof of what
they said nor in what language they conversed. There is no showing that Cramer gave
them any information whatever of value to their mission or indeed that he had any to give.
No effort at secrecy is shown, for they met in public places. Cramer furnished them no
shelter, nothing that can be called sustenance or supplies, and there is no evidence that
he gave them encouragement or counsel, or even paid for their drinks.

ISSUE Whether or not the defendant, Anthony Cramer is guilty of the crime of treason

Ruling: No. There was no proof either by two witnesses or by even one witness or by
any circumstance that Cramer gave Thiel and Kerling any information or established any
'contact' for them with any person other than an attempt to bring about a meetings
between Thiel and a girl. Meeting with Cramer in public drinking places to tipple and trifle
was no part of the saboteurs' mission.

The prosecution relied chiefly upon the testimony of Norma Kopp, the fiancee of Thiel, as
to incriminating statements made by Cramer to her, upon admissions made by Cramer
after his arrest to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, upon letters and
documents found on search of his room by permission after his arrest, and upon testimony
that Cramer had curtly refused to buy Government bonds. After denial of defendant's
motion to dismiss at the close of the prosecution's case, defendant became a witness in
his own behalf and the Government obtained on cross-examination some admissions of
which it had the benefit on submission.

The overt acts by the defendant Anthony Cramer were insufficient to support a finding
that the accused had given aid and comfort to the enemy, and therefore insufficient to
support a judgment of conviction.

(24) People v. Agoncillo, 80 Phil. 33

FACTS:
Dionisio Agoncillo was charged of treason by the People’s Court with treason sentencing
him to suffer fifteen years of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of two thousand pesos
and the costs.
Appellant's alleged overt acts of giving aid and comfort to the enemy are summarized in
the brief for Government as follows: In the middle of April, 1944, the appellant sold about
300 kilos of alum crystals, at three pesos a kilo, to the Keribo, a construction company
operated by the Japanese Army. Two or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same
entity some 100 pieces of water pipes, the price of which was not known. About the third
week of December, 1944, the appellant was seen on Jones Avenue helping push a
handcart full of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts into the intermediate and
high school premises then used by the Japanese Army as a motor pool.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts committed by the accused constitutes the crime of treason?

RULING:
No. The court viewed that the overt acts imputed to the appellant have not been duly
proven. With respect to the sale of 300 kilos of alum crystals, the testimony of the
prosecution witness Lorenzo Barria to the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not
corroborated by any other witness. With respect to the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water
pipes, counsel for the appellee admits that the price thereof was not known. An essential
part of the overt act charged in the information was therefore lacking. No pretense was
made that the appellant donated the articles in question. The alleged delivery of truck and
auto tires, batteries and spare parts can be disregarded. The only detail that may at most
be considered established by the prosecution refers to the fact that the appellant helped
in pushing a handcart loaded with such articles, and the evidence is even uncertain in
one respect, namely that the cart was brought either to the intermediate school premises
or the high school building. Indeed, it was acknowledged by the lower court that the
witnesses for the Government did not know how the appellant disposed of the articles
loaded in the cart.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the appellant acquitted with costs de
oficio.
(25) People v. Victoria, 78 Phil. 129

Facts:
The accused Carmelito Victoria was charged with the crime of treason for he is a Filipino
citizen owing allegiance to the US and Commonwealth of the Philippines and he adhered
to the enemy, the empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines,
with which the US and Commonwealth of the Philippines were at war, giving to said
enemy aid and/or comfort, in the following manner; (1) Accused joined an enemy patrol
composed of 8 spies and a Japanese soldier which went to the house of Federico Unson,
attempting to arrest the latter but guerrillas appeared and killed one of the spies. Accused
directed to pick up the dead spy. In the afternoon of the same day, accused and 8
members of Japanese Military went back to Federico Unson’s house and arrested the
said Unson, Isaiah Perez and Ruben Gudoy. The 3 arrested were tortured and then
Federico and Perez were found lying nearby and wounded while Gudoy was killed in
Japanese Garrison. (2) Accused accompanied by other Japanese spies went to the
house of Jose Unson because the latter was suspected to furnish radio information to
Guerillas. Jose was released on the same day but the next day, he was again arrested
and never returned. (3) Accused and members of Intelligence Unit of Kempei Tai arrested
Felixberto Romulo as a guerrilla suspect and turned him over to Japanese Military Police
and nothing was heard of him after. (4) Accused, accompanied by Japanese Military
Police and undercover operatives, searched the house and afterwards arrested
Hermogenes Calauag and tortured the latter on the charge of being pro-American and
adviser of Hunters ROTC Gueriilas. (5) Accused, acting as an informer of the Japanese
Kempeu Tai, caused the Japanese Military Police to arrest and apprehend Antionio San
Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who was brought to Fort Santiago and detained.(6) Accused
and armed group of undercover authorities arrested and tortured Melecio Labalan, Sr. on
the charge of being a guerrilla. (7) The accused, member of Ganap, joined Makapili
organization.

Accused defenses in the respective counts were; (1) He was not there when the actual
arrest of the three were made (2) He admitted taking part on the raid and arrest of Jose
Unson but he only wanted to save the latter (3) Accused was in Gagalangin, Manila (4)
Accused was merely asked to accompany them in the raid of Caluag’s House. (6)
Accused was ignorant of arrest. Counts 5 and 7 were not proven and the rest were
supported with evidence. Defense were contending that the death penalty is unjustified
and that the acts committed by the accused do not constitute treason but ordinary crimes
against victimized persons. Accused tried to show that he was not a spy; that he joined
the Japanese in their raids only because he was forced to do so and that he, himself, is
a member of guerrilla.
Issue:
Whether the crime is not treason but ordinary crimes against victimized persons.

Held:
No. The circumstances in question are essential elements of treason he has committed.
The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act, or by several
series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes
as was held by this Court in Guinto v. Veluz, so much so that there are some accused of
treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their numbers not
changing the nature of the offense committed.

TITLE 2

(3) U.S. v. Batalliones, 23 Phil. 46)

Facts:
The accused Jose Batallones, justice of the peace, and the accused Maximo Cuadro and Isaac
Demo, policemen, arrested Apolonio Gumarang and Inocencio Reyes and detained them that
night until morning, although Gumarang and Reyes had not committed any crime or
misdemeanour. The arrest was made by the police upon the information of one Restituta Catindig
who reported and complained regarding the suspicious acts of Gumarang and Reyes because it
was the time that their place was prone to theft and robbery. The policemen called upon
Gumarang and Reyes to identify themselves and show their cedulas however, they were not able
to. Gumarang and Reyes instead produced document written in English to show what their
business was. Unfortunately, the two policemen cannot understand English, so in their minds, it
strengthens their suspicion on the two since thet cannot account of themselves. The two
policemen then brought Gumarang and Reyes to appellant Jose Batallones who directed that
they be detained in the municipal jail until further orders without giving ample time to read and
understand the documents provided to verify the identity and purpose of the arrested. It then
turned out that Gumarang and Reyes were indeed secret service agents of Internal Revenue.

Issue:
Whether Batallones, Cuadro, and Demo are guilty of detencion arbitraria.

Held:
With respect to Batallones, as a justice of peace, proof shows that he apparently wholly failed to
appreciate the obligation which rested upon him to make a reasonable attempt to satisfy himself
has to the grounds upon which the suspicions of the policemen were based, before issuing a
judicial of order for the detention of the men arrested by the policemen. There was plenty of
opportunity for Batalones to verify the claim of the arrested but he failed to do so. Had he
examined the papers provided by the arrested, they would not have been detained because
justice of the peace is presumably a man of some intelligence and education because he would
understand the document. Instead he made no effort whatever to verify the grounds. There was
no urgent necessity upon the part of the justice of peace to order the continued detention of the
arrested persons without making investigation

With respect to the conduct of the two policemen, there was nothing reprehensible in their action
in making the arrest, and certain it is that in view of the facts, criminal charge of detencion
arbitraria cannot be maintained against them. The provisions of section 37 of Act No. 183 (the
Charter of Manila) quite clearly set forth the powers usually conferred by American and English
Law upon “peace officers including contables in making arrests without warrant,” and provide that
they may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious place or under
suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed or is about
to commit any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest, or cause to be arrested without warrant,
any offender, when the offense is committed in the presence of the peace officer or within his
view.” Also, the conduct of the strangers having complained by a woman and the fact that the
provincial town in these Islands having already a grave offense, or were about to commit one,
their inability to produce cedula confirms their suspicions. Policemen acts were wholly inspired by
a genuine desire to faithfully perform their duties as guardians of the law and of the good order of
the community. Though their suspicions were not well-founded to which the arrest was based,
they are in no wise criminally responsible due to reasonable grounds.

(5) Albor v. Auguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003

Facts:

On January 25, 1999 two complaints for rape2 were filed against Edilberto Albior.

Respondent Auguis received and filed the complaints which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
9144 and 9145. The following day, respondent issued a detention order3 to the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) in San Jose, Talibon, Bohol, for the commitment of the accused
Edilberto Albior. On January 27, 1999, the BJMP duly issued a receipt of detainee4 for the person of
the accused.

According to complainant, said order was issued without a prior preliminary investigation and without
a warrant of arrest.

Counsel of the accused filed motion to release the accused but to no avail.

Having no recourse to regain his liberty, the accused filed a petition of habeas corpus in which during
the proceedings the respondent testified that this was not the first time he issued a detention order
without a warrant of arrest. He stated that this is upon the request of the PNP Chief for the best interest
of the detainee as the PNP jail does not serve food for the detainees.

On January 29, 2001, the OCA issued its report. It found respondent’s defense unconvincing
and held him administratively liable for issuing the said detention order prior to a preliminary
investigation conducted by a judge and before a warrant of arrest was issued against the accused.

It recommended that the case be re-docketed as an administrative matter and that a fine in
the amount of P3,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that the commission of the
same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Issue: W/not the respondent should be held administratively liable for the issuance of a detention
order resulting in the actual detention of the accused under the abovementioned circumstances.

Held:

Nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an order of detention, as such function
is purely judicial.

The arresting officer is duty-bound to release a detained person, if the maximum hours for detention
provided under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code had already expired. Failure to cause the
release may result in an offense under the Code.

Thus, the Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious violation committed by the respondent

In our view, the present case cannot be treated with leniency, especially in light of the fact that
respondent herein admitted he issued detention orders countless times in the past.

WHEREFORE, respondent DONATO AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, Branch 4 at Talibon-Getafe,
Talibon, Bohol, is hereby found administratively liable for issuing the assailed detention order without
lawful authority, as well as failing to inform the Presiding Judge of that court regarding such order, thus
committing GRAVE MISCONDUCT in the discharge of official functions. He is hereby DISMISSED
from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits and privileges, except earned leave credits if any,
and with prejudice to reemployment in the government including government owned and controlled
corporations.

(7) Alvarez v. Court, et al 64 Phil 33

Facts of the Case:

 On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of
CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious
rates of interest in violation of the law.

In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts
but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant,
ordering the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the
immediate delivery of such to him (judge).

With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and residence at seven
o’clock on the night and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936,
one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three
bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one
bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging
to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and
promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.

As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the petitionerfiled
a motion praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in
the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court.
Motion granted. Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order be set
aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary
investigation.

Issue:

Whether or not fishing evidence is valid

Ruling:

At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really
been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as
evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means
of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they
were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional
provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself. Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the
documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding
or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be
returned to him.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant
or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a
compromise whereby, he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We
are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise
and, second, because if there was a compromise it referred but to the institution of criminal proceedings for violation of the Anti-
Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the
search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and
stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.

(8) People v. Baes, 68 Phil 203

FACTS The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna.
The said priest charges the accused with having caused, through force, intimidation and threats,
the funeral of one belonging to the Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard of the Church.
Apparently, the offense consists in that the corpse was that of one who belonged to the Church of
Christ.
ISSUE: WON the act is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholic.
HELD: YES. An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful
when a person ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma; works or scoffs
at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys any object of
veneration by the faithful." The mere act of causing the passage through the churchyard belonging
to the Church, of the funeral of one who in life belonged to the Church of Christ, neither offends
nor ridicules the religious feelings of those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.
HOWEVER, it was removed in the complaint the essential part that the funeral pass was objected
by the parish priest.

(9) People v. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. L-40577, August 23, 1934
FACTS:

A pabasa was being held at a chapel in Macalong, La Paz, Tarlac when defendants Procopio
Reyes, Policarpio Nacana, Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castror
Alipio and Rufino Matias started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel.

The defendants are partisans of the Clemente family, who many years ago made an informal
donation of the land where the old chapel was erected. When it was destroyed, the present
chapel was erected and there arose a dispute as to whether the new chapel is not now impinging
on the land that belongs to the Clemente family.

The Court of First Instance of Tarlac convicted the defendants for violation of Article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads:

“Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted
to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony, shall perform acts
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.”

ISSUE:

W/N the defendants are guilty of violating Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:

No. Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the feelings of
the faithful." The construction of a fence, even though irritating and vexatious under the
circumstances to those present, is not such an act as can be designated as "notoriously offensive
to the faithful", as normally such an act would not matter to those faithful not present.

However, the disturbance of any ceremony of a religious character could still be punishable under
Article 287 as an “unjust vexation” and punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200
pesos or both.

(11) United States v. Delos Reyes, 20 Phil. 467

Facts:
The defendant is charged with the crime of treason, committed as follows:
• That on November 21, 1902, in Manila, he did feloniously, treasonably, etc.,
levy war against, adhere to and give aid and comfort to the enemies of, the
United States and of the Philippine Islands, in that on or about August 30,
 1902, he accepted a commission in the regular army of the "Filipino republic"
and served as a captain and carried arms in such army and continued in
such office and continued to carry arms as aforesaid between the said dates
of August 30, 1902, and November 21, 1902, the said "Filipino republic"
being an attempted government organized by various persons against the
authority of the United States Government and that of the Philippine Islands
and having for its object the overthrow by armed insurrection of the regularly
constituted government in said Islands.
• The defendant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila and
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of twenty years and to pay a fine of
$5,000.
• witness called by the prosecution was Cenon Nigdao, who stated that he
was a tailor, 28 years of age, and secretary of war of the Katipunan. He
identified the signatures on Exhibit A. He states that the Katipunan is the
national party. Its purpose is to defend the rights of the country and to ask
of the American Government the freedom of this country.
• The confession of the accused being disposed, the only other question to
be considered is whether the testimony of one witness that he issued to the
defendant the captain's commission above-mentioned, and the testimony of
another witness that he found this commission in the defendant's trunk, is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute that "no person in the
Philippine Islands shall under the authority of the United States be convicted
of treason . . . unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act . . ."
Issue:
WON the defendant is guilty treason
Ruling:
No, There is no proof whatever that the accused did any other act in
connection with this charge than to receive this commission. On the contrary the
"secretary of war" testified that they did not take up arms because they remained
here in Manila.
I am of the opinion that the mere acceptance of the commission by the
defendant, nothing else being done, was not an overt act of treason within the
meaning of the law. Blackstone says that "as treason is the highest civil crime
which (considered as a member of the community) anyone can possibly commit,
it ought, therefore, to be the most freely ascertained."
 The state of affairs disclosed by the evidence — the playing of the game of
government, like children, the secretaries and colonels and captains, the pictures
of flags and seals and commissions all on paper, for the purpose of duping and
misleading the ignorant and the vicious — should not be dignified by the name of
the treason.
Those engaged in this plotting and scheming in the pretense of establishing
an independent government in these Islands, with nothing behind them, without
arms or soldiers or money, and without the possibility of success, are simply
engaged in deluding themselves and perhaps innocent followers and in filling the
cells of Bilibid Prison.
Even though not guilty of treason, they may be tried for other lesser crimes.

(12) Astorga v. People, 412 SCRA 512

Facts
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the
Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with unidentified persons who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate
intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz,
Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the Municipality of
Daram, by not allowing them to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby restraining
and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.

The abovementioned DENR employees were sent by DENR Office 8, to the island of Daram, Western
Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the government’s
campaign against illegal logging.

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats being constructed in
the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop
and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the DENR’s service pump boat and
proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with
the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor
Astorga.

When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian, approached Mayor
Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on
the shoulder by Mayor Astorga. Then they were prohibited to proceed with their mission, and was
brought, against their will, to the mayor’s house, the mayor being assisted by armed men.
When they were released, SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco filed a complaint with the
Sandiganbayan against Mayor Astorga.

On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENITO

ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correctional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.20

The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 200121 which was denied by the
Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated September 28, 2001.22 A Second Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 24, 200123 was also filed, and this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10,
2002.24

Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for review:

Issue: W/N crime of Arbitrary Detention be done even if team member were not restrained, but there
were armed men at the scene which does not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in
fact instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they would feel compelled to stay in
Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.

Ruling
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains
a person.30 The elements of the crime are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.31

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar
is not disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or
employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by
some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his "instinct for self-
preservation" and the feeling that he was being "singled out."32 The detention was thus without legal
grounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.

What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.

In the case of People v. Cortez,35 we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his
liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom
of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to
the owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave
the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she do so.
We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they
had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we
concluded that fear has been known to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an
individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or
violence.36

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s
liberty need not involve any ph ysical restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and actuations of
the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the
extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the
wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and
the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home.37 This refusal was quickly followed by the
call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses.38 Given such
circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s statement that it was not "safe" to refuse
Mayor Astorga’s orders.39 It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect
these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds
of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent
to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code
will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as depicted in
this case. The responsible officials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees’ right to
the indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental rights.53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

(13) United States v. Cabanag, 8 Phil. 64

Facts: An Igorot, Gamaya, aged 13, was “abducted” from the house of her
grandmother by a certain Buyag and eventually she was sold to Tomas Cabanag.
In an Igorot practice, it is normal that a child will be sold to another to pay off the
father’s debt. Years later, Gamaya was found in the household of Mariano Lopez.
She appears to have no actual constraint and at no time in any of these places
was she physically restrained of her liberty. She was not under lock or key or guard.
She went into the streets to play and returned at her will and was not punished or
ill used in any way. But, she was employed to do household tasks and is well-taken
care of.
Held: No. There is no illegal detention in this case. In the Bill of Rights of the
Philippines contained in the act of Congress, declaring that “neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicred, shall exist in the said Islands” Here, there is no proof of
slavery or even invountary servitude as it has not been clearly shown that the child
has been disposed of against the will of her grandmother. There are no applicable
laws here. The child was not physically confined or restrained so as to sustain a
conviction for illegal detention, nor the acts of the accused brought within any of
the provisions of the law for the punishment of offenses against minors.

(14) People v. Baes, 68 Phil. 203

FACTS The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna.
The said priest charges the accused with having caused, through force, intimidation and threats,
the funeral of one belonging to the Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard of the
Church. Apparently, the offense consists in that the corpse was that of one who belonged to the
Church of Christ.
ISSUE: WON the act is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholic.

HELD: YES. An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful
when a person ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma; works or
scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys any object
of veneration by the faithful." The mere act of causing the passage through the churchyard
belonging to the Church, of the funeral of one who in life belonged to the Church of Christ,
neither offends nor ridicules the religious feelings of those who belong to the Roman Catholic
Church. HOWEVER, it was removed in the complaint the essential part that the funeral pass was
objected by the parish priest.

(15) People v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369

Facts: In the barrio of Macalong, municipality of La Paz, Province of Tarlac, there

is a chapel where it is customary to hold what is known in local parlance as a pabasa. On
the evening of April 10, 1933, while the pabasa was going on, the defendants arrived at
the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a barbed wire fence in
front of the chapel. The chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa, tried to
persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan. The people attending the pabasa in
the chapel left the place hurriedly. The pabasa was discontinued and it was not resumed
until after an investigation conducted by the chief of police on the following morning, which
investigation led to the filing of the complaint appearing on pages 1 and 2 of the record.
The Court of First Instance of Tarlac convicted the Appellants for violation of article 133
(Offending the religious feelings) of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants are guilty of violation of Article 133 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling: No, the defendants are acquitted of a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal
Code but found guilty of a violation of article 287 (Unjust Vexation) of the Revised Penal
Code.
The Supreme Court held it is to be noted that article 133 of the Revises Penal Code
punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful." The construction of a
fence, even though irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to those present, is
not such an act as can be designated as "notoriously offensive to the faithful", as normally
such an act would be a matter of complete indifference to those not present, no matter
how religious a turn of mind they might be.
The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character under the old
Penal Code was denounced by article 571 and was punished by arrest from one to ten
days and a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas. But this article was omitted from the Revised
Penal Code and the offense, if any was committed by the appellants, is denounced in
article 287 as an "unjust vexation" and punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from
5 to 200 pesos or both.

(17) People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1

FACTS:
The case at bar involves one, Cesar Masamlok, who, voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
stating that under the forceful influence of herein respondent, Ruben Burgos recruited the former
as member of the NPA. Such force was claimed to be before an imposing threat of using a firearm
that gravely intimidated the former if the latter’s recruitment was answered with a refusal. This
prompted Masamlok to be cautious about causing further actions that would result in a negative
manner. Due to the information obtained by the authorities, members of the PC-INP subsequently
found themselves to the house of Burgos wherein they saw the latter plowing his fields. Upon
seeing Burgos, one of the arresting offices present in the group called out to Burgos and asked him
about the allegations set mentioned in the prior information. In the exchange of dialogues, Burgos
denied being in possession of a firearm. While, Burgos's wife, who was also present in the area
then pointed to a place below their house to which led to the discovery of a gun buried in the
ground. Shortly after recovering the discovered firearm, Burgos pointed to a stock pile of cogon
where the officers recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos further admitted that the
firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of Sparrow unit. It also must be noted
that the accused’s narration of events conflicted as he claimed that he had no prior knowledge of
such firearm and claim that Cesar himself planted it, this accompanied with threatening the
accused’s wife to place the blame onto her husband. All the events that have transpired were all
conducted without a warrant against the accused in any form.

ISSUES: 1. WON the warrantless arrest was valid?

2. WON the warrantless search was valid?

HELD:
No. Under Section 6 (a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. No such knowledge from the
arresting officer was present. Any information acquired may have been furnished by Cesar to
which the officers quickly responded to without first undergoing proper procedure.

With regard to arrests without a warrant under Section 6 (b) there should be reasonable ground as
to believe that the suspected person to be arrested has committed a crime or is about to perform a
crime. Such crime must first exist, no apprehension may be made by mere suspicion or assumption.
The actual crime must have actually been committed as this is an essential precondition in
advancing the process of legally arresting an individual. It is not enough to suspect that a crime
may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.

The court finds such action to be careless as there was no need to hasten such process when no
further evidence has been shown. In this case, Burgos was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's
verbal report, an act that may not be justified. Masamlok’s information led the authorities to
suspect that the accused had committed a crime in which case is hearsay at its best. The subsequent
recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot
make the arrest lawful. An unlawful arrest shall deem every other evidence discovered
inadmissible.

(21) Alimpoos v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 159

FACTS:

Petitioner-spouses seek the reversal of the Decision of the Appellate Tribunal wherein respondent
Trial Judge granted the Accused's petition, for Habeas Corpus and declared his detention illegal.
The Accused was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan, by virtue of a Warrant of
Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal Case, which was a prosecution for Robbery
with Less Serious Physical Injuries. Contending that the Warrant was issued without the
observance of the legal requirements for the issuance thereof, the Accused, then detained, and
his wife instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the Trial Court. After due hearing in the Habeas
Corpus case, respondent Trial Judge issued the appealed Order, dated March 26, 1966, declaring
the detention of the Accused illegal and granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as the
Preliminary Injunction prayed for upon the filing of the required bond.

ISSUE: WON the order containing a provision of the Accused in the Criminal Case is valid?

RULING:

No. If the Accused was illegally detained because he was arrested without a preliminary
examination, what should have been done was to set aside the warrant of arrest and order the
discharge of the Accused, but without enjoining the Municipal Judge from conducting a
preliminary examination and afterwards properly issuing a warrant of arrest. Habeas Corpus
proceedings are not meant to determine criminal responsibility. When a preliminary investigation
is not held, or is improperly held, the procedure is not to dismiss the case, or enjoin its prosecution,
but to have the preliminary investigation conducted.

(22) Ilagan Vs. Enrile

FACTS:

Atty. Laurente Ilagan was arrested in Davao City and detained on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly
issued by the Ministry of National Defense. Fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao visited Atty. Ilagan. One of
the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned
Mission Order. The military sent word to the IBP Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar would
likewise be arrested. The latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the
basis of a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander. The petition for
habeas corpus was filed by the three arrested lawyers on the ground that their arrests were illegal and
violative of the Constitution. The respondents contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on the
basis of a PDA issued by the President. Respondents implied that the detained attorneys played active
roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front. Respondents then prayed for the denial of the petition and filed an urgent motion stating that an
information for Rebellion was filed against the detained attorneys before the RTC and that a Warrant of
Arrest had been issued against them. Respondents prayed that this petition be dismissed for having been
rendered moot and academic.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the respondents are guilty of arbitrary detention against the three arrested lawyers?
(NO)

RULING:

As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the
filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the RTC and the issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into
the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order
in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the RTC, the remedy of habeas corpus
no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.

WHEREFORE, this petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic.
Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City in relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court.

TITLE 3

(1) United States v. Constantino, et al., 2 Phil. 693

Facts:

The defendants are charged with the crime of insurrection. According to the complaint, "early in the
morning of May 30, 1902, the defendants, together with several other persons armed with rifles,
revolvers, and bolos, entered the town of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, and incited its inhabitants to
rebel against the authority of the United States in these Islands."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the evidence introduced at the trial it appears that on the morning of May 30, 1902, an armed band
composed of some fifteen men, according to some of the witnesses, and of over forty, according to others,
entered the town of Binangonan and kidnapped Don Jose Suares, the municipal president; Don Jose
Tupas, provincial secretary, who happened to be in the town; Don Sixto Angeles, president of the board
of health; Don Lazaro Gergaray, and an American whose name does not appear. These people were led
along the road toward the town of Carmona; but when the party had covered about half the distance to
the town three American soldiers were encountered. In the course of the fight which ensued, and as a
result of the confusion thereby produced, the prisoners succeeded in escaping from their captors.

Issue:

WON accused is guilty of the crime of insurrection in the formation under sec. 3 ART 292 of the RPC

Held: NO.

The kidnapping of the persons above mentioned, upon the supposition that there is nothing which would
authorize us to attribute to it any special or determinate character, may have been committed with
purposes entirely different from those which, under Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission, characterize the
crime of rebellion. It may have been done simply for the purpose of obtaining money, by holding the
prisoners for ransom, or for the purpose of executing upon them acts of personal revenge. There is no
evidence that the kidnapers had any other purpose in view. Still less does it appear that they had the
specific intent of thereby inciting anyone to rebellion, or of promoting a rebellion, as alleged in the
information. This act of kidnapping, as it appears in the record, might perhaps constitute the crime of
illegal detention or some offense of a similar character, but it cannot by any possibility constitute the
crime of insurrection, with which the defendants are specifically charged.

The evidence adduced at the trial does not prove the commission of the offense complained of. This being
the case, it is unnecessary for us to make any examination into the participation which the defendants
may have had in the execution of the kidnapping referred to. Even if the evidence shows the commission
of such an act we cannot convict them for that offense in the present action, because that would be
equivalent to imposing upon them a conviction for a crime with which they have not been charged — a
proceeding in violation of right and justice. For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment below and
acquit the defendants, without prejudice to an action expressly reserved to the prosecuting attorney,
brought upon a new information based on the facts established in this case. The costs of both instances
are declared de oficio.

(2) Carino v. People, 7 SCRA 900

FACTS:
Cariño, herein accused-appellant, was charged as an accomplice to the crime of rebellion by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, and such judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence
this instant petition. He was alleged to have rendered aid towards the Communist Party of the
Philippines and Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan or Hukbalahap. The only acts he was shown to
have performed were the sending or furnishing of cigarettes and food supplies to a Huk leader, the
changing of dollars into pesos for a top-level communists and the helping of Huks in opening
accounts with the bank of which he was an official.
ISSUE:
Whether or not giving aid and comfort is criminal under rebellion

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court held that: “these acts by themselves do not prove any criminal intent of
helping the Huks in committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion. Good faith is presumed, and
no presumption of the existence of a criminal intent or aiding the communists in their unlawful
designs to overthrow the Government, the assistance thus extended by him was not efficacious
enough to help in the successful prosecution of the crime so as to make him an accomplice therein.
Appellant’s acts did not constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the act of overthrowing
the government. Even if considered an indirect help or aid in the rebellion, they cannot constitute
previous or simultaneous acts or uprising or rebellion, for, unlike in the crime of treason, the acts
giving comfort of moral did is not criminal in the case of rebellion or insurrection, where the
Revised Penal Code expressly declares that there must be a public uprising and the taking up of
arms. Appellant is therefore absolved from the charge.”

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the appellant absolved from
the charge contained in the information. With costs de officio.

(7) Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., 202 SCRA 405

Facts: This is a petition assailing the constitutionality Section 1(3) of PD 1866, which states that any
person who unlawfully manufacturers, deals in, acquires, disposes of, or possesses any firearm "in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion”
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Said petition arose from the case before the RTC of Pasig against
Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, together with Marco Palo, with a violation of PD1866 committed
as follows:

"That on or about the 29th day of March, 1988 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines
xx xx, the above named accused, all known high ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
and its military arm, the New People’s Army, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, control and
custody, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion/subversion
firearms and explosives.”

The accused’s petitions to quash and motion for reconsideration were both denied. Hence, this petition
to just charge them simple rebellion in the RPC (penalty is only prision mayor) and not be complexed
under Section 1(3) pf PD 19866 (reclusion perpetua).

Issue: Whether the assailed Sec. 1(3) of PD 1866 is unconstitutional

Ruling: No, the assailed provision is NOT unconstitutional. The petitioners further theorize that Section
1 (3) of PD 1866 is invalid because it gives the public prosecutor an option not to file a case for rebellion
and instead file as many crimes for murder, frustrated murder, etc. as might have been perpetrated in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with rebellion, insurrection or subversion. The argument
is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised Penal Code treats rebellion or insurrection as a crime distinct
from murder, homicide, arson, or other felonies that might conceivably be committed in the course of a
rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to the evidence in the hands of the public prosecutor. And
not the latter's whim or caprice, which gives the choice. The Code allows, for example, separate
prosecutions for either murder or rebellion, although not for both where the indictment alleges that the
former has been committed in furtherance of or in connection with the latter. Surely, whether people are
killed or injured in connection with a rebellion, or not, the deaths or injuries of the victims are no less real,
and the grief of the victims' families no less poignant. Moreover, it certainly is within the power of the
legislature to determine what acts or omissions other than those set out in the Revised Penal Code or
other existing statutes are to be condemned as separate, individual crimes and what penalties should be
attached thereto. The power is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the
act or omission was but an element or ingredient of another offense, 01 might usually have been
connected with another crime.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, With costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED

(8) People v. Nepomuceno, G.R. No. 130800, June 30, 1999

Facts: Guillermo Nepomuceno has been found guilty of two different offences of parricide
and illegal possession of firearms. The crime of parricide was allegedly committed
through the use of an unlicensed firearm. The accused seeks the reversal decision
asserting that the court must allow him the benefit of RA No. 8294 which provides that "if
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." To take
retroactive effect in order to acquit him of a crime of eligible illegal possession of a firearm.
Issue: Whether or not the accused should not be held liable for illegal possession of
firearm applying the 3rd paragraph of Section 1 of RA No. 8294.
Ruling: Yes. Assuming that Nepomuceno could be separately punished for illegal
possession or use of an unlicensed firearm, the imposition of the death penalty on him
has no legal basis.
Only one offense should be punished, either homicide or murder, and the use of
unlicensed firearm should only be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Being
favorable to the accused, this provision may be given retroactive effect, he not being a
habitual delinquent. Thus, accused should not be held liable for illegal possession of
firearms.

(9) Gelig v People, 626 SCRA 48

FACTS:
Lydia C. Gelig and Gemma B. Micarsos were public school teachers at the Nailon
Elementary School. LydiaÕon, Roseller, was a student of Gemma. Lydia confronted
Gemma during class after learning that Gemma called Roseller sissy. Gemma tried
to calm Lydia down but failed to do so. As Gemma tried to go the Principals
office, Lydia pushed Gemma causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. Gemma
experienced abdominal pain and after 42 days she suffered incomplete abortion.
Lydia was convicted in the RTC for the crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion. Lydia was then acquitted before the CA for the crime
of direct assault but was RULING liable for slight physical injuries. Unsatisfied
with the ruling, Lydia brought the case before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lydia C. Gelig is liable for the crime of Direct Assault?
RULING: Yes. This case falls under the second mode of Direct Assault which
has the following elements: 1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b)
employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a
seriousresistance.2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his
agent.3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or (b) that he is assaulted
by reason of the past performance of official duties.4. That the offender
knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of hisduties.5. That there is no public uprising. Gemma being a public
school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authorities expressly mentioned
in Article 152 of the RPC. Since the assault happened while Gemma was
overseeing the class, she is in the actual performance of her official duties. That
being the case, all of the requisites of the crime of Direct Assault are present. As
such, Lydia is guilty of Direct Assault. However, Lydia is not guilty of indirect
abortion since the prosecution failed to prove that the act of pushing is the
proximate cause of the abortion. The interval of time 42 days, is too lengthy to
prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb Gemma was a direct
outcome of the assault.

(10) People v. Lovedioro, G.R. No. 112235, 1995

FACTS
SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., when a Elias Lovedioro y Castro suddenly walked
beside him, pulled out a .45 caliber gun and shot the policeman's right ear. Lovedioro three other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground.
After taking the SPO3 Lucilo’s gun, Lovedioro and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.

The incident was witnessed, about nine meters away by Nestor Armenta, who claimed that he knew
both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the
deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew.

Lucilo succumbed the same day due to the incident, and upon autopsy, the municipal health officer
established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock. As a result of such killing, the Albay Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-appellant Elias
Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

After trial, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
It sentenced the accused Lovedioro to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs
of SPO3 Lucilo P50,000.00 representing civil indemnity, P30,000.00 representing reasonable moral
damages and P18,588.00 representing actual damages.
Appellant Lovedioro, asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the
New People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends," it should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under
Arts. 134 and 135 of the RPC. He also claimed that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a
look-out and thus he claims that he should have been charged merely as a participant in the
commission of the crime of rebellion and therefore, he should have only been sentenced to prison
mayor.

The OSG, asserts that the RTC correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder. lt avers that the
crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had
conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and
subversive ends." Moreover, it contends that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and
even if the RTC had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a rebellion, the proper
imposable penalty is not prision mayor, but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty
imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion.
ISSUES

Whether or Not the RTC erred in convicting Elias Lovedioro y Castro over the crime of Murder instead
of Rebellion?
RULING

NO, the RTC did not err in convicting the accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of
Murder.
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. By its
very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which
cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission
of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself
because they acquire a political character.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state
of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes, the court
stressed that Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since
moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which
they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of
the resistance movement.
It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not
exist.

That if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime
and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
(13) U.S. v. Ravidas, 4 Phil. 273

Facts: This case charges the defendants with the crime of insurrection. Out of the twenty-five
defendants, five of them were acquitted in the court below. The other twenty-were found guilty of
the said crime. All of the twenty defendants appealed. Eight of them withdrew from the appeal.
While ten of the remaining twelve escaped the jail in Cagayan de Misamis. Only Alejo Ravidas
and Narciso Melliza remanined.

Issue: Is the lower court correct in ruling Alejo Ravidas and Narciso Melliza guilty of committing
the crime of insurrection?

Ruling: No, however reproachful the silence of Ravidas may be, it does not in itself constitute the
crime of insurrection. Act No. 292 (now Art. 134) defines and specifies the acts which shall be
punished as insurrection, but among those acts, the silence of the defendant is not enumerated.
This silence is not an act; it is, rather, an omission.
The same can be said with Narciso Melliza, as there is no evidence showing that he had promoted,
encouraged or aided any insurrection or that he in any way participated in the same. The fact that
he sold rice in to persons who afterwards appeared to be insurgents, and had the rice so sold even
been taken to the insurgents' camp, which is the only fact which can be considered proven with
respect to the Melliza, it is not in itself conducive to criminal liability. It is not shown that he sold
the rice to the insurgents knowing that they were such and with the deliberate purpose of aiding
the insurrection.

U.S. vs. Ravidas, et al. (4 Phil. 273) From Reyes Book Digest
Facts: The only fact disclosed by the evidence adduced in the case is that Alejo Ravidas knew that
there were insurgents in a place called Manila, within the jurisdiction of the town of Agusan, of
which he was municipal president, and his duty as such president required him to report this fact
to the senior officer of the province, but he did not do so, nor did he take any steps to pursue or
denounce the insurgents or to protect the people from their probable depredations.
Held: However reproachful the silence of the defendant may be, it does not in itself constitute the
crime of insurrection. Act No. 292 (now Art. 134) defines and specifies the acts which shall be
punished as insurrection, but among those acts, the silence of the defendant is not enumerated.
This silence is not an act; it is, rather, an omission.
(16) People v. Perez, G.R. No. L-21049, 1923

FACTS

Isaac Perez and Fortunato Lodovice engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-
General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use
bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed
our independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of
the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and
convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court.

Two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution. Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution,
corroborated the first witness and understood that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself to get
their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into the sea.

The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place. Further, they contended that
the discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due
to the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to blame. The accused
testified that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was that the
Governor-General should be removed and substituted by another.

The trial judge proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of seditious language.

ISSUE

Whether the accused Perez is guilty of inciting to sedition.

RULING OF THE COURT

Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of
sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and
open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution.

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate
even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within
the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain
the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.
The attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words
used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to rema in loyal to
the Government and obedient to the laws. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and
on American sovereignty.

Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, provides that:

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government
of the United States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any statement, or
speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends
to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to
stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together
for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be
ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.

A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and
based upon, the offense with which the defendant is charged.

FALLO
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act
No. 292 as amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being understood that, in accordance with the sentence
of the lower court, the defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs.

(17) U.S. v. Apurado, et. al., G.R. No. 1210, 1907

Facts:

500 residents of the municipality assembled near the municipal building, and upon the opening

of the session a large number of this assembled about the building crowded into the council

chamber and demanded the dismissal from office of the municipal treasurer, the municipal

secretary, and the chief of police, and the substitution in their places of new officials whose

names were suggested by the spokesman of the party; that the council acceded to their wishes

and drew up a formal document setting out the reasons for its action, which was signed by the

councilors present and by several of the leaders of the crowd; that the persons who took part in
the movement were wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes; that the crowd was fairly

orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the council chamber during a

session of that body can be called disorder and misbehavior; and that the movement had its

origin in religious differences between the residents of the municipality, the petitioners desiring

the dismissal of the above-mentioned officials because they believed that they should not be

permitted to hold office in the municipality on account of their outspoken allegiance to one of the

factions into which the town was at that time divided.

Issue:

Whether or not, the appellants are guilty of the crime of sedition.

Held:

No. The evidence of the record does not establish the guilt of the accused of the crime of

sedition. Under Section 5 of Act No. 292 is as follows:"All persons who rise publicly and

tumultuously in order to attain by force or outside of legal methods any of the following objects

are guilty of sedition: 2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal

government or any public official, from freely exercising its or his duties or the due execution of

any judicial or administrative order."

The prosecution emphasizes the fact that a few of those who took in the demonstration carried

canes, but not with the purpose of using them as weapons of assault. It is rather to be expected

that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against

grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a

high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less

perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers.

(18) People v. Umali, et. al., G.R. No. L-5803, 1954

Facts:

The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have

been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00

in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the
burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its

content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of

one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and

Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.

During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one

house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the

town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime

of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?

Held:

Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and

physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of

prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the

appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the

sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in

Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting

fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by

one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan,

at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the

appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the

decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of

Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In

view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it

unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and

physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano,

Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision

appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

(19) Espuelas v. People, G.R. No. L-2990, 1951

Facts:

The accused Oscar Espuelas was convicted of violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code which

punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libel against the Government of the

Philippines of any of the duly constituted authorities thereof of which suggest or incite rebellious

conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the

peace of the community by the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals. Accused had his picture taken

which appeared as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of the rope suspended from the limb of the tree

when he was just really standing on a barrel and sent it to several newspapers and weeklies of general

circulation throughout the Philippines. It also had a fictitious note or letter which was stating the reason
as

to why he “committed suicide” and that it all had to do with Roxas government which he had no power
to

put under “juez de cuchillo” all the Roxas people on power. He uttered a lot of extreme dissatisfaction
with

Roxas “dirty government.”

Issue:

Whether the accused merely exercised his freedom of speech and did not discredit the entire
governmental

structure but only President Roxas and his men.

Held:

No. The freedom of speech secured by the Constitution “does not confer an absolute right to speak and

publish without responsibility whatever one may choose. It is not “bridled license that gives immunity for

every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. Article 142

punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly
constituted
authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to
the President, his

Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally

directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

(20) People v. Calera, et.al, C.A. 45 O.G. 2576

FACTS:

A meeting of municipal officials was called by the mayor. During the meeting, the chief of police kept on

talking although he had been asked by the mayor to sit down. Heated arguments among the mayor,
counselor

and chief of police followed.

In the ensuing confusion, the crowd watching the proceedings dispersed and the meeting was eventually

dissolved.

ISSUE:

WON the act of the police constituted a crime of interruption to a peaceful proceeding.

RULING:

The chief of police was held guilty of unjust vexation and not interruption of peaceful proceedings.

(21). U.S. v. Dirain, G.R. No. 1948, 1905

Facts:

The salaries of the police not having been paid, the defendant, the chief of police, accompanied by four

policemen, all armed, went to the house of the municipal president and compelled him to go to the

municipal building, where they kept him four hours. His relatives having sent him money sufficient to

pay the salaries, he was allowed to depart. Held, That the defendant was guilty of a criminal attempt

against the authorities.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant was guilty of a criminal attempt against the authorities.

Held:
The defendant was the chief of police of the town of Ternate in the Province of Cavite, and the court

below found as facts, that because the president of the town had not paid the salaries of the policemen, the

defendant, accompanied by four of them armed with guns, went to the house of the president, compelled

him by force to leave it and go to the presidencia and there kept him confined until he had raised enough

money to pay what was due them as salaries.

That these facts, if true, constitute the commission of the crime charged in the complaint, there is no

doubt. The defendant, however, claims that he did not compel the president by force to accompany them

but went to his house for the purpose of asking for the money for the payment of their salaries; that the

president directed them to go to the presidencia whether he would follow them in a few moments and

there arrange the matter, and that this was done, no force at all being used.

We think the witnesses for the Government are entitled to more credit than those for the defendant. It is

admitted that the defendant went to the house of the president in the middle of the afternoon, armed; that

the latter at once went to the presidencia and remained there about four hours; that relatives of his brought

to the presidencia money sufficient to pay the salaries of the policemen and that the president then went

home. In view of the fact as claimed by the defendant that their salaries had been in arrears for some time

and that they had been unable to secure payment of them from the president, it is difficult to believe that

on this particular occasion he would have gone to the presidencia under the circumstances related above

and remained there about four hours until relatives of his had produced enough money to discharge the

obligations of the police, unless some kind of force or intimidation had been used.

We take into consideration in favor of the defendant article 11 of the Penal Code as an extenuating

circumstance and reduce the penalty imposed by the court below from four years two months and one day

to two years four months and one day. In all other respects the judgment of the court below is affirmed

with the costs of this instance against the defendant.

(23) U.S. v. Tabiana, G.R. No. L-11847, 1918

Issue:Whetherornothittingapolicemanwithafistisadirecttassault
Facts:Theaccused,whilebeingplacedunderarrestbythreepolicemen,hitoneoftheeminthebreastwith
hisfist.Thepolicementhenseizedtheaccusedbythewrist,whereheceasedtoresist.
Held:No.Hittingapolicemaninthebreastwithafistisnotdirectassault.ThewordsinArticle148relatingtot
heemploymentofforceappeartohavereferencetosomethingmoredangeroustocivilsocietythanasim
pleblowwiththehandsatthemomenttapartyistakenintocustodybyapoliceman.
(24) U.S. v. Gumban, G.R. No. L-13658, 1918

Facts:

Accused is Nicomedes Gumban. He is charged with the crime of assault upon agents of authority. On

Aug 13, 1917, Petronilo Gumban is the municipal president of Jaro, Iloilo. He was with municipal

councilor Magdaleno Suliano who was reporting about the condition of his animals. Suddenly,

Gregorio Ismana, a tenant of councilor Suliano arrived and reported to Mayor P. Gumban an

incident. Ismana related that he had surprised a carabao belonging to Policarpio Gumban and as a

result, the carabao destroyed the planted area belonging to councilor Suliano. So Ismana seized the

said carabao and brought it to the police station in the barrio, which was within the zone affected by

the quarantine. Thereafter, Epifanio Gumban and Nocomedes Gumban (accused), who were

brothers Policarpio, of the owner of the carabao, arrived to where the municipal president Petronilo

Gumban was to protest the taking of their carabaos. After hearing the protests Petronilo (municipal

president) said that in his opinion, Ismala had the right to take the carabao to the police station. But

he promised that the following day, he was going to intervene in the matter and telephone the man

in charge of the quarantine so that the said carabao would not be comingled with the other

carabaos in quarantine. Upon hearing this statement of the president, the accused insulted the said

president and gave him a slap on the face which struck his left ear. TC convicted him of assault upon

an AGENT of authority.

Issue:

W/N Nicomedes Gumban is guilty of direct assault upon an AGENT of authority or did the TC mean

PERSON IN AUTHORITY.

Held:

The facts proved at the trial constitute the crime of assault with the hands upon a person in

authority as defined in paragraph 2 of article 249 in connection with paragraph 3 of article 250 of the

Penal Code.

The offense of assault (atentado) is committed by:

2. Any person who shall attack, employ force against, or seriously resist or intimidate, any person in

authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of his official duties, or by

reason of such performance.

Article 250 says: The penalty for assaults falling within the next preceding article shall be . . . when

the offense is committed under any of the following circumstances:

3. When the offenders lay hands upon any person in authority.

According to the above provisions of law, in order that the crime of assault punishable by these
articles may exist, it is sufficient that there be an assault upon a person in authority committed by

laying hands upon him. The fact of giving a slap to a person in authority should necessarily be

qualified in the sense of laying hands upon the same person. The facts proved in this case involve all

the necessary elements that constitute the crime of assault, inasmuch as the offended party, being a

municipal president, was a person in authority, and was in the performance of his official duties. In

the present case, the crime involved is that of assault upon a person in authority, in which the force

necessary to constitute this crime is specifically defined by the law and consists in laying hands upon

the person. In this case, it is not necessary to ascertain what force the law requires in order to

constitute an assault, since the law itself defines concretely this force in providing that it consists in

laying hands upon the person. The law simply mentions the laying hands without making any

distinction as to the different cases, and it would not be just to make that distinction when the law

does not make it. It is to be noted that the same provision of the law with regard to intimidation or

resistance is not intended to be applied to the case of laying hands. The information qualifies the

crime charged as an assault upon an agent of authority. Inasmuch as the offended party, as

municipal president, is a person in authority and not a mere agent of authority, the designation of

the crime given by the fiscal is erroneous.

(25) People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113)

FACTS

Sometime in January or February 1972, brothers Jesus Hecto and Pedro Hecto slaughtered a

carabao in barrio San Isidro, municipality of Dulag, Province of Leyte. They did not pay the

corresponding tumbada or slaughter fee and upon learning of this non-payment, Barangay Captain

Catalino Pedrosa asked him (Jesus) to pay the same. Jesus replied that he could not yet pay the

required slaughter fee because those who bought meat from him had not also paid him yet.

Thereafter, Pedrosa met Municipal Treasurer Benedicto de la Paz who informed him that according

to the Hecto brothers they had already paid the slaughter fee to him (Pedrosa). Pedrosa denied

having received the fee mentioned.

On February 27, 1972, Catalino Pedrosa and his wife went to visit their farm and on their way home,

about 3:00 in the afternoon, they met Jesus and Pedro Hecto. Pedrosa confronted the two about the

false information they gave the municipal official concerning the alleged payment of the slaughter fee

to him. A heated discussion ensued and the Hectos tried to attack Pedrosa. Mrs. Caridad Pedrosa

pulled her husband away and the trouble was averted.

About 6:00 in the afternoon of March 24, 1972, Catalino Pedrosa left his house in barangay San

Isidro to accompany a two-year old nephew to the house of the child's parents. On his way back,

about 6:30 he was shot by Jesus Hecto and Pedro Hecto and thereafter stabbed by Marcial Hecto

and Roberto Silvano.

Caridad Pedrosa at the time was in her house preparing supper. Upon hearing the sound of a

gunfire, she immediately ran to the door. However, she was prevented from going down the house

by Loreto Hecto and Faustino Silvano, son and nephew, respectively, of Jesus Hecto. They pointed

their guns at her. Notwithstanding, Caridad, could see Jesus Hecto pointing a gun at her husband,

Catalino Pedrosa, who was already lying on the ground face up. This was followed by Pedro Hecto

who also fired his own gun at Pedrosa. Thereafter, Jesus Hecto, Pedro Hecto, Marcial Hecto and

Roberto Silvano carried the victim to a nearby ditch where Roberto and Marcial took turns in

stabbing him with their bolos. The four assailants then walked away. Loreto Hecto and Faustino

Silvano who were at the door of the house of the Pedrosas guarding Caridad joined the four.

The police was informed of the incident. Acting Chief of Police Nerio dela Cruz, with several

policemen, arrived at the scene of the incident at about 8:00 that evening. They found the dead

Pedrosa with three gunshots and three stab wounds on his body.

During the trial of the case, the accused Jesus Hecto died shortly after he had testified. Accordingly,

the case against him was dismissed by the court. Trial proceeded against Pedro and Loreto Hecto

while their confederates: Roberto Silvano, Marcial Hecto and Faustino Silvano remained at large.

The defense of appellants Loreto Hecto and Pedro Hecto was denial.

However, the conviction of appellants Pedro Hecto and Loreto Hecto by the trial court was not

entirely based on the affidavit of Bollena (whose statement was said to be hearsay). There were the

testimonies of Caridad Pedrosa and Mario Cadayong.

ISSUE/S: W/N crime of murder was committed with assault upon a person in authority

RULINGS

Thus, it is clear that Mrs. Caridad Pedrosa and Mario Cadayong saw the killing of the victim,

Catalino Pedrosa Considering the concerted action of Jesus Hecto, appellants Pedro and Loreto

Hecto, Marcial Hecto, Roberto and Faustino Silvano, conspiracy among them has been successfully

established by the prosecution. While their companions were slaying the deceased, appellant Loreto

Hecto and Faustino Silvano were by the stairs of the house of Catalino to prevent any assistance

which could come therefrom. After they had accomplished their criminal or unlawful purpose, they

left together. Time and again We have ruled that concert of action at the time of consummating a

crime and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered to the person or persons inflicting
the fatal wounds on their victim determine complicity where it would not be otherwise evident. In a

conspiracy, all are liable for the acts of one.

The fact that appellants went into hiding after the incident is evidence of guilt. Pedro Hecto was

arrested two months later in Tacloban City, while Loreto Hecto presented himself before the

authorities in March 1974 or after two years. Their three companions have not yet been arrested up

to now.

Against the testimony of the People's witnesses, appellants Loreto and Pedro Hecto claim that they

were elsewhere when the killing took place. Well established is the rule that where the accused have

been positively Identified by witnesses as perpetrators of the offense, the defense of alibi is futile

and unavailing.

We now come to the contention of the defense that the trial court erred in convicting them of the

complex crime of murder with assault upon a person in authority. They pointed out that when the

barangay captain was killed he was not in actual performance of his official duties. Be that as it may,

the fact is, the attack on the deceased was occasioned by the official duties done by him. As the

barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the

enforcement thereof he incurs the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the

crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that for lack of

necessary votes the sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua and the indemnity increased to

P30,000.00. With costs.

(26) People v. Dollantes, G.R. No. 70639, 1987

Facts:

That deceased Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the

Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental; that

due to the approaching fiesta of barangay Maglihe, a dance was held in

said barangay in the evening of April 21, 1983; that while the Barangay

Captain was delivering a speech to start the dance, the accused Pedro

Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance

movement known in the visayan as 'nagkorantsa', brandishing his knife

and challenging everyone as to who was brave among the people present;

the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him

to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead
of heeding to the advice of the Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on

the left arm; that accused Hugo Grengia held the left hand of accused

Pedro Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the hand of Pedro

Dollantes the hunting knife. Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet

Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the

Barangay Captain at the back and the other co-accused also took turns in

stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not

armed. Except for the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo

Villaester who were merely holding stones, the other co-accused

participated in the stabbing incident. When the Barangay Captain fell to

the ground and died, the accused in this case took turns in kicking the

dead body of the Barangay Captain and were dancing around said dead

body; that the Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the

different parts of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his

dead body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who

examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of 'Severe

hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds.'"

The accused contends that:

"1. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the

admission of accused-appellant Hamlet Dollantes that he was the lone

perpetrator of the alleged stabbing of victim Marcos Gabutero.

2. The lower court erred in not considering the testimonies of prosecution

witnesses, namely: Patrolman Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogelio Kho which in

effect buttressed the theory of the defense.

3. The lower court erred in not considering the entry in the police logbook

of the Tayasan Integrated National Police, dated April 21, 1983, as

testified to by Patrolman Jose Amis.

4. The lower court erred in holding that conspiracy exist in perpetration of

the felony.

5. The lower court erred in holding that the case of People vs. Agag (L-

64951, June 29, 1984) is applicable to the case at bar to justify the

conviction of the accused-appellants.

6. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the
testimony of the defense witnesses.

7. Finally, the trial court erred in holding that the accused-appellant herein

is guilty of the crime charged." (Brief for accused-appellant Hugo Grengia,

pp. 1-2)

as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, such theory is belied by

the identification made by the prosecution witnesses and by the number

and location of the victim's wounds which are mute evidence that several

persons committed the crime (People's Brief, p. 17).

As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, the claim of alibi by the

accused cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses

(People v. Tirol, 102 SCRA 558); more so where as in the case at bar, it

was not demonstrated that it was physically impossible for the accused to

have been at the scene of said crime at the time of its commission

(People v. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232).

Issue

Wether or Not the accused are guilty of direct assault under the

requisites of the 2 nd form of direct assault of Art 148

Ruling

Yes. All the necessary elements are fulfilled under the second form of

assault.

1. Offender must a) makes an attack b) employs force c) makes serious

intimidation or d) makes a serious resistance

2. Person assaulted is person in authority or his agent

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority is a) engaged in

actual performance of official duties b) by reason of past performance of

official duties

4. The offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority

or his agent in the exercise of his duties

5. There is no public uprising

the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify

Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was

stabbed to death. He was therefore killed while in the performance of his

duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that
"As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances

within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of

his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is

murder with assault upon a person in authority.

(27) Uy Khaytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886

FACTS: Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo an application for search warrant, stating in his application; "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño St.,
No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium." Upon that application the said
judge, on the same day, issued a search warrant. Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S. Torralba,
accompanied by some of his subordinates, on the same day (April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin
and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to search also the bodega on the ground-floor of the house, but
Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that he rented it. Lieutenant Torralba wanted to be sure, and for this reason
he placed a guard in the premises to see that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away to find out who the
owner of the bodega was. The next morning he learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia, of the town of Molo,
that the Chinaman Uy Kheytin was the one who was renting the bodega. Thereupon Lieutenant Torralba and his
subordinates resumed the search and then and there found and seized other articles such as opium liquid, empty opium
containers, opium pipe and the like. Furthermore, officers seized books, papers, etc.

A criminal complaint was filed charging the petitioners with a violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested, and a
preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace, after which he found that there was probable cause
for believing that the crime complained of had been committed and that the defendants were the persons responsible
therefor. Petitioners herein filed a petition in the Court of First Instance, asking for the return of "private papers, books
and other property" which the Constabulary officers had seized from said defendants, upon the ground that they had
been so seized illegally and in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants. Petitioners contend that the search
was illegal and therefore asking for the return of the items seized.

ISSUE: May the opium, books, papers, etc. be returned?

RULING: (Opium and its paraphernalia – NO; Books, papers, etc. – YES)

In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the judge did not
first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having
been actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest,
we are of the opinion that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found and seized under
said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter. That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers,
etc., which they seized might be used as evidence against the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a
violation of the Opium Law, is no reason or justification under the law for the seizure: First, because they were not
"particularly described" or even mentioned in the search warrant; second, because, even if they had been mentioned in
the search warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining
evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used in evidence against him would
be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.

From all of the foregoing our conclusions are:

1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of
section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia
which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such
omission of the judge.
2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day, and, therefore, did not
require another search warrant.

3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation with
opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the petitioners' constitutional
rights.

Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents herein, their assistants or successors, be,
and they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any use of said books, letters, telegrams, etc., and they are
hereby ordered to immediately return the said articles to the petitioners.

(28) U.S. v. Ramayrat, G.R. No. L-6874, 1912

FACTS

Sabino Vayson filed suit against Cayetano Ramayrat, in the justice of the peace court of

Misamis for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land belonging to the said Sabino Vayson.

the said justice of the peace court rendered judgment by sentencing the said Cayetano Ramayrat

to deliver the possession of the said land to the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson. The Justice of Peace,

through a Writ of Execution, ordered the governor, sheriff, or any person authorized by law to

place the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, in possession of the said land and to make return of this writ

to this court within a period of fifteen days from the date of order.

When Cosme Nonoy, the deputy sheriff demanded of the defendant, Cayetano Ramayrat,

that he deliver the said land to the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, the said defendant, Cayetano

Ramayrat, voluntarily, unlawfully and criminally refused, and still refuses, to deliver the said land

to the aforementioned Sabino Vayson. The provincial fiscal of Misamis, Agusan, and Surigao

charged Cayetano Ramayrat with the crime of gross disobedience to the authorities.

The defendant demurred to the complaint, upon the grounds that the facts charged do not

constitute a crime. The court sustained the demurrer dismissing the complained by an order. From

this order, the Attorney-General has taken an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime gross disobedience to the authorities.

RULING

No, the defendant is not guilty of the crime gross disobedience to the authorities.

The order issued by the justice of the peace and alleged to have to have been disobeyed,

is a writ of execution and addressed, as was natural and proper, to the competent sheriff, and not

to the defendant. Absolutely no order whatsoever is made to the latter; nothing is demanded on
him and he is not restrained from doing anything, neither is he required to do anything; he is not

told to perform, or not to perform, any act whatsoever; in a word, the writ or order in question in

no wise refers to him. Nor could this process, indeed, be addressed to the defendant, for the

reason that it wholly concerns the execution of a judgment, the serving of which is specially and

exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff. And it is superfluous to add that the defendant could hardly

disobey an order that in no wise concerned him.

The defendant in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of possession, and,

consequently, his statements expressing his refusal or unwillingness to effect the same, are

entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could not hinder, and much less prevent, the

delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply with his duty.

Another contention by the Attorney-General:

The Attorney-General brings up still another aspect of the case. He states in his brief that

the defendant grossly disobeyed an agent of the authorities, such as is the sheriff, by not

delivering the land to Vayson, as he was ordered to do by the said sheriff.

In accordance with article 252 of the Penal Code, disobedience to the agents of the

authorities is punishable only when they are in the exercise of the duties that particularly pertain

to their office. As aforesaid, the duty of the sheriff in the present case was to place Vayson in

possession of the land. Instead of so doing, he limited his action to telling or ordering the

defendant to deliver the land to the said Vayson.

Under such circumstances, the defendant's disobedience, if any there were, does not

constitute the crime aforementioned.

Upon the foregoing grounds The Court holds that the facts alleged in the complaint do

not constitute a crime, affirming the order appealed from.

(29) U.S. v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-10678, 1915

FACTS: Some time in the month of November 1914, an order of arrest

was issued for the defendant and placed in the hands of the chief of

police of the municipality of Gerona. On or about the 15th of November,

the chief of police, accompanied by another policeman, went to the

house where the defendant was staying for the purpose of making the
arrest. Upon arrival at the house, inquiry was made of some of the

occupants whether or not the defendant was there. Upon being

informed that he was in the house, the policeman who accompanied the

chief of police entered the house without permission and attempted to

arrest the defendant without explaining to him the cause or nature of

his presence there. The defendant, according to the declaration of the

chief of police, resisted the arrest, calling to his neighbors for assistance,

using the following language: "Come here; there are some bandits here

and they are abusing me." Many of his neighbors, hearing his cry,

according to the testimony of the chief of police, immediately came to

his assistance and surrounded his house.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable with the crime of assault?

HELD: The defendant is not guilty of the crime described in the

complaint. The record does not disclose sufficient facts to justify the

sentence imposed by the lower court. The whole record shows that the

resistance given by the defendant was done under the belief that the

persons who had entered his house were tulisanes. The record also

shows, by the declaration of the witnesses for the prosecution, that as

soon as he had been informed that they were officers of the law, armed

with an order of arrest, he peaceably submitted and accompanied them.

We do not believe that the law contemplates the punishment of persons

for resistance of the authorities under circumstances such as those,

which are disclosed in the present case. If the defendant believed that

those who had entered his house were, in fact, tulisanes, he was entirely

justified in calling his neighbors and making an attempt to expel them

from his premises.

(30) People v. Bacolod, G.R. No. L-2578, 1951

FACTS

"That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of

Santa Fe, province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of

this Court, the above-named accused, then a member of the PC patrol, by

reckless imprudence and without taking due care and precautions to

avoid damage and injury to the life and property of other persons, did

then and there fire a shoot of a sub-machine gun thereby hitting

Consorcia Pasinio at the back of the right side of her body, which

physical injury required or will require medical attendance for more than

30 days but less than 90, and incapacitated or will incapacitate her from

performing her customary labor for the same period of time."

The motion to quash was granted, and the People appealed in due time.

ISSUE

Did the lower court err?

RULING

It will be observed that both informations have one

common element: defendant's having fired a sub-

machine gun. The first, however, charged him with

physical injuries inflicted on Consorcia Pasinio

thru reckless imprudence. On the other hand the

second information accuses him of having

deliberately fired the machine gun to cause a

disturbance in the festivity or gathering, thereby

producing panic among the people present therein.

The two informations do not describe the same

offense. One is a crime against persons; but the

other is an offense against public peace and order.

(31) People v. Doriquez, G.R. Nos. L- 24444-45, 1968

Facts: Romeo Doriquez, on August 28, 1964, was charged with the offense of grave oral

defamation before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Six days later, or on September 3, 1964,

the same Doriquez was indicted before the same court for discharge of firearm, committed, in the

language of the information. He pleaded not guilty to the on both indictments. Doriquez believes

that he is placed in double jeopardy scenario. He had previously been charged with the offense of

alarm and scandal in a complaint in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, upon the same facts

which constitute the basis of the indictment for discharge of firearm.

Issue: Was Doriquez placed in double jeopardy by charging the offense of discharge of firearm?

Ruling: No, for double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other

things, that there is "identity of offenses". It is evident that the offense of discharge of firearm
is

not the crime of alarm and scandal. The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded

merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may

appear to be connected in fact.

(33) People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 152007, 1994

Facts:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y

Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision

penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February

4, 1992 at

the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic

encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme

Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising

from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did

not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The

Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still

be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil

liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General

arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal

extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked

the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil

obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is

extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

Issue:

Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil

liability?

Held:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an

independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the

executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec.

5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for

the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express

or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal

obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate

civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the

Rules of Court.

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the

death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil

liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex

delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the

same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil

Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a

result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery

therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,

Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be

enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the

source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate

civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and

prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In

such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the

pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,

that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, the SC hold that the death of appellant Bayotas

extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained

of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
(34) People v. Samonte (57 Phil. 968)

Facts:

● A shooting incident occurred in Legaspi City resulting in the death of

Siegfred Perez. Herein accused-appellant PO2 Rodel Samonte was one of

the suspects in the fatal shooting. A prosecution witness, SPO4 Ruben

Morales and Police Inspector Ricardo Gallardo confronted Samonte in the

City Mayor's office, where he was detailed. His service revolver was

confiscated. Upon his own initiative, he informed Inspector Gallardo that

there is another caliber .38 paltik revolver in his house, which belonged to

the victim. Both firearms were submitted for ballistic examination. The

results showed that the caliber .38 slug recovered from the body of the

deceased was indeed fired from the (paltik) homemade revolver.

Meanwhile, a prosecution witness, Elmer Mabilin, who chanced upon both

firearms at the police station identified both to be that of accused-

appellant. Murder and illegal possession of forearms were separately filed

against accused-appellant. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. After

trial, the court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of qualified

illegal possession of firearms and was sentenced accordingly. In another

branch, he was acquitted of the crime of homicide. Samonte appealed his

conviction.

● The Appellant contends that in support of the first assignment of error,

accused-appellant contends that inspite of the fact that it was made known

to the trial court that Branch 9 of the same court (Regional Trial Court of

Legazpi City) acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 6336 for homicide, said

court still entertained Criminal Case No. 6337 for illegal possession of

firearms aggravated by homicide under P.D. 1866.

● The trial court convicted the accused-appellant of aggravated or qualified

illegal possession of firearms as defined and penalized under Section 1,

Paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1866. However, on June 6, 1997, P.D. No

1866 was amended by R.A. 8294 which became effective on July 6, 1997,

fifteen days after its publication in Malaya and Philippine Journal on June

21, 1997.

● The crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in the present case had been

committed on June 13, 1993, we should give retroactive application to RA

8294 which considers the use of an unlicensed firearm in the killing of the

victim as a mere aggravating circumstance, as it is advantageous to

accused-appellant. .

Issue:

W/O Samonte is guilty of RA 8294

Ruling:

Granting that a simple case of illegal possession of firearms may be

permitted against accused-appellant, the same must still fail, for the prosecution

neglected to show any proof that the questioned firearm was unlicensed. The fact

that the subject firearm is a paltikrevolver is of no consequence. In People vs. De

Vera, Sr. where the subject firearm was a mere sumpac, we did not dispense

with the requirement of proving the same to be unlicensed. 19 Withal, an acquittal

is in order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant PO2

Rodel Samonte is ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms

under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294. His immediate release from prison is

hereby ordered unless he is held for other legal cause.

(35) People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, 1948

FACTS

That on or about the 17th day of September,

1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said

accused, being then a convict sentenced and

ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months

and one (1) day of destierro during which he

should not enter any place within the radius of

100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue

of final judgment rendered by the municipal

court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-

4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the

service of said sentence by going beyond the

limits made against him and commit vagrancy.

Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was

sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and

one (1) day of prision correccional, with the

accessory penalties of the law and to pay the

costs. He is appealing from that decision with the

following assignment of error:

1. The lower court erred in imposing a

penalty on the accused under article 157

of the Revised Penal Code, which does

not cover evasion of service of

"destierro."

Counsel for the appellant contends that a person

like the accused evading a sentence

of destierro is not criminally liable under the

provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly

article 157 of the said Code for the reason that

said article 157 refers only to persons who are

imprisoned in a penal institution and completely

deprived of their liberty.

The Solicitor General in his brief says that had

the original text of the Revised Penal Code been

in the English language, then the theory of the

appellant could be uphold. However, it is the

Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt

ISSUE

Whether the accused Abilong is guilty of evasion of service of sentence.

RULING

We agree with the Solicitor General that

inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was

originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the

Spanish text governs . It is clear that the word

"imprisonment" used in the English text is a

wrong or erroneous translation . Although the

Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as

not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation

of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in

the present case, the appellant by his sentence

of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter

the City of Manila. This view has been adopted in

the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July

26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held,

as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General

that "it is clear that a person under sentence

of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty

and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty

when he enters the prohibited area

FALLO

In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant

is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under

article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish

text), in that during the period of his sentence

of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein

he was prohibited from entering the City of

Manila, he entered said City.

Finding no reversible error in the decision

appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with

costs against the appellant. So ordered.

(36) Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, 2002

Facts:

10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for violating the Election Code (whereby he was never

apprehended and remained at large), he filed before the trial court a motion to quash the warrant

issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. He based his

claims on Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the period of prescription shall

commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.

Issue:

Whether or not the penalty of the crime committed by Torrecampo already prescribed.
Held:

No.

The petition must be denied since under Article 93, prescription shall commence to run from the

date the felon evades the service of his sentence, which is inapplicable in the case at bar since the

petitioner was never brought to prison and cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to

run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his

sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be

committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of

his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes
of

Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.

Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the

judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the

Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court

for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court

accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond

reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be

rewarded therefore.

(37) Tanega v. Masakayan, G.R. No. 141718, 2005

Facts: The petitioner has been sentenced to 20 days of arrestomenor, to reimburse

the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, for a total of P100.00, with the accompanying

subordinate incarceration, and to pay the expenses.The Court of First Instance of

Quezon City ordered that the execution of the sentence be scheduled for 27 January

1965. It was postponed until 12 February 1965 on the basis of a petitioner's

appeal.The petitioner did not, however, appear to be the respondent judge on 15

February 1965 to issue a warrant for her arrest and on 23 March 1965 to issue a

warrant for her arrest.Yet she's never been charged.She believed that the

punishment had been imposed.The Respondent received another alias arrest

warrant.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty has prescribed?

Ruling: No. Prescription of penalty does not run in her favor. The period of

prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall

commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his

sentence".These are the elements of evasion of service of sentence according to

article 157: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his

sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of

sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Even under the old law, Viada

emphasizes, where the penalty consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only

begin to run when he escapes from confinement. Reason dictates that one can

escape only after he has started service of sentence. Therefore, rule that for

prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to

run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.

(41) People v. Martin, G.R. No. L-46432, 1939

Facts:

Appellant Teodorico Martin is charged with a violation of the condition of his pardon (on the crime of

abduction) for having committed the crime for which he was sentenced on October 27, 1932. The Court

of First Instance of Rizal, which took cognizance of this case, found him guilty and sentenced him to

suffer the penalty which was remitted in the pardon, namely, six years, six months and fourteen days of

reclusion temporal. Martin contended that CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction because it was CFI of Cavite

who had. He also contended that his violation had already prescribed being punished with prision

correccional.
Issue:

Whether CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction over the accused for having the judgment of pardon rendered in

Cavite and that his violation had prescribed being punished with prision correccional.

Held:

No. While the Court of First Instance of Cavite was the one which imposed on the appellant the penalty

of which he was subsequently pardoned, nevertheless the violation of the conditions of that pardon,

which is the subject matter of the present prosecution, took place in the Province of Rizal. The present

proceeding is not a continuation or a part of the former one. It is a new proceeding, complete in itself

and independent of the latter. It refers to other subsequent facts which the law (art. 159 of the Revised

Penal Code) punishes as a distinct crime the penalty for which is not necessarily that remitted by the

pardon.

For his another contention, the penalty prescribed for the violation is not that of prision correccional in

its minimum grade, but the penalty remitted by the pardon. Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum

period shall be imposed upon the convict, who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief

Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the

granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of

his original sentence.

(42) People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 357

Facts:

After serving three years, three months, and twenty days of a sentence of eight years and one day

of prision mayor plus a fine of P250 for falsification of a public document, appellant, on July 31,
1913, was released from Bilibid in virtue of a conditional pardon extended to him by Governor-

General Forbes and duly accepted by him, the conditions being as follows: (1) "that he shall not

reside in the city of Manila nor in the province of Rizal hereafter during the period of his

sentence and (2) shall not again be guilty of any infraction of the law punishable by

imprisonment for one year or more." Because of having voted in the general elections of June 5,

1934, notwithstanding his legal disqualification on account of previous conviction, appellant was

prosecuted in criminal cases Nos. 262 and 3263 in the Court of First Instance of Davao for illegal

voting and perjury in election matter, respectively, and was convicted in both cases and

sentenced in the first case to suffer six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P300, in the

second case to suffer one year of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P300.

Issue:

Whether or not Corral was guilty of Article 159.

Held:

The appellant was guilty of violating the second condition of his pardon which, unlike the first

condition, is not limited to the duration of his sentence. Appellant's principal contention is that

said condition should be interpreted as being limited to the duration of his sentence. The trial

court analyzed the two conditions of the pardon and pointed out that the first condition regarding

the choice of residence was limited to the duration of the sentence against the prisoner, no such

limitation was made as to the second condition regarding any future infraction of the law

punishable by imprisonment for one year or more.

(43) People v. Sanares, G.R. No. L-43499, 1936

FACTS:

Sañares, herein defendant-appellant, was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor-General,

commuting his sentence for the crime of theft, on the condition “that he shall not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands.” On February 5, 1935, in Manila, he violated

such pardon when he committed the crime of estafa, for which he was charged and sentenced to

suffer three months and eleven days of imprisonment. Upon arraignment, [Sañares] pleaded

guilty and the court forthwith ordered his recommitment for the unexpired portion of his former

sentence. The accused appealed from this judgment and prays that he be acquitted or that the

penalty be reduced. No reason, alleged or extant in the record, appears in support of the first

prayer, for the violation of the new is conceded, and the accused has pleaded guilty thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering Sañares to serve the unexpired portion of his

former sentence.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in ordering Sañares to serve the

unexpired portion of his former sentence. Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code provides that

the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict

who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the

conditions of such pardon. However, if the Penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be

higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence.

The trial court erroneously applied the second part of Article 159; it’s inapplicable to the case at

bar because the unexpired portion of the penalty remitted by reason of the condition pardon

granted the accused does not exceed six years. Therefore, what is applicable is the first part of

the article, and the duration of this penalty is from six months and one day to two years and four

months. The Court held that the penalty should be imposed in its minimum period which ranges

from six months and one day to one year, one month and ten days of prision correccional.

DISPOSITIVE:

Wherefore, modifying the appealed judgment, we are of the opinion that we should, as we

hereby sentenced the appellant to eight months of prision correccional, with costs.

(44) People v. Peralta, et. al., G.R. No. L- 15959, 1961

FACTS:

On 26 December 1958, in the New Bilibid Prison located in Muntinlupa city, defendants Alfredo Peralta,

Roman Fernando, Marcial Ama, Conrado Medina, Alfredo Carino, and Rolando Pangcubit were accused of

conspiring and confederating together, with the intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,

armed with wooden club, attacked the victim Guillermo Lutero on the different parts of his body and by

strangling the neck of said Lutero, thereby inflicting several wounds on the latter's body which
subsequently

caused his death.

That the accused are quasi-recidivist having committed the abovementioned felony while serving their

respective sentence after having been convicted of final judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused were guilty of the act of recidivism.

RULING:

The Court found no merit on the case. the transcript of the lower court on August 24, 1959, shows that

the defendants Peralta and Fernando insisted on pleading guilty to the charge, although their counsel de
oficio

had advised them that the maximum penalty for crime of murder would, as a consequence, be imposed
upon

them. As regards the contention of Attys. Orteza and Orteza it makes no difference, for purposes of the
effect

quasi-recidivism, under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, whether the crime for which an accused is

serving sentence at the time of the commission of the offense charged, falls under said Code or under a

special law.

At any rate, we have examined the records of said defendants in the Bureau of Prisons and found that, at

the time of the commission of the crime of murder charged in the case at bar, they were serving sentences
for

violation of the Revised Penal Code. More specifically, Alfredo Peralta was serving two (2) sentences,
namely:

(a) for robbery, by virtue of a final judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Criminal Case No.
25676 thereof, rendered on April 1, 1954, which, furthermore, declared him a habitual delinquent, he
having

been previously convicted of theft, on September 6, 1952, and of attempted robbery with physical
injuries, on

December 6, 1953; and (b) another for frustrated homicide, by virtue of a final judgment of the Court of
First

Instance of Rizal, in Criminal Case No. 263-R thereof, dated November 14, 1957. Similarly, Roman
Fernando

was serving a sentence for homicide by virtue of a final judgment of the Court of First Instance of Sulu, in

Criminal Case No. 1168 the of, dated March 24, 1955.

Therefore, the ruling of the lower court was affirmed.

(45) People v. Yabut, G.R. No. 39085, 1933

Facts: On August 1, 1932, appellant Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison,
hit

Sabas Arceo, also a prisoner in the Bilibid Prison, with a wooden club inflicting upon various physical
injuries on

different parts of the body which caused the latter’s death after 24 hours. At the time of the commission
of the

crime, the appellant was a recidivist, he having been previously convicted twice of the crime of homicide
and once

of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by a competent tribunal. The Court of
First

Instance of manila, in punishing the appellant, applied article 160 of the Revised Penal Code which states
that:

“Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense –Penalty—
Besides

the provision of Rule 5 of Article 62 any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by
final

judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum

period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. The appellant advances that the lower court
erred in
applying Article 160 of the RPC. The appellant places much stress upon the word "another"
appearing in the English

translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that
article

160 is applicable only when the new crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is
different

from the crime for which he is serving sentence.

Issue: Whether or not the term “another” in the epigraph of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code applies
only in

cases where the new crime is different in character from the former crime for which the defendant is
serving the

penalty.

Ruling: No. It is a familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous,
there is

neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section for the

interpretation of the text especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords
or reference

aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.

Recidivist – is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment

of another crime embraced in the same title of the RPC.

Habitual delinquent – when a person within a period of ten years from the date of release, or last
conviction, is

found guilty of the crime of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification
a third

time or oftener.

Quasi-recidivist – any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before

beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same shall be punished with the maximum period
of

punishment prescribed by law for the new felony.