| ‘ FE a | 39 = thoshima The Dawn ww Deal is vast, biased, general by Arthur M. The Crisis of the snd The Politics special smudies New, Deal are fe Staler(1969), the Prem af | brief, ook is dle andthe New / of Raptevel, the New Deal, 4 vol; 0 date ical opposition ‘ices of Proves Sreat Depression of the’ turbulence, the aircraft landed and released its cargo’ twenty-five % ‘Ten years earlier, shortly after cight o'clock on a warm August morning, aU.S. Army Air Force B-29 droned high over che center of Hiroshima, Most of TeTesidents were only vaguely aware of its presence, reminded briefly, Pethaps, of an earlier air-raid alert, which had then been followed by an all. «lear signal. Most of the twenty-five girls were in the basement oftheir public “School preparing erasers and chalk for classes. Most residents of the city were "oh their way to work, Other schoolchildren were getting ready towtesume their labor of clearing fire lanes in the city. This safety precaution, of pulling FF cowed wooden houses and buildings in wide “eathes soe the ce become necessary (@ prevent the fire storms from American incendiary aids that had obliterated whole square miles of Tokyo and other cities. Thus j Hiroshima had been spared. Built on the Alt delta of the Ota River, Hiroshima had become.an important manufacturing center for the Japanese MAE effort. Most of its population lived along inlets connected by bridges, PREmost of the city was built of wood or other flimsy materials, PObithe moming of August 6 the weather was clear. No antiincrafe fire fer planes met the American bomber, the Enola Gay, as it cruisedCie Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era ‘eshly hid is mision, Suddny over ge the hip ton bomb end die igh. The respon dior gates sory ners tg ple vote recon concen all EIDE More che te goon se bom saad ete cet fated Gr bight thn the sun dy, Waves ot ancl the splintered debris. Inrushing winde tee ca ts sephee cs. SMT dose by, but safe the Pee aba y theta One cow mene ne BR wa ke Boling done ™the B39 commen nace a ie base at TinistTatand, Boi og sont nage ge BIE 1 ugly for ery bombers sae ihe wae nal tehad hunched the Enola Gay and, wih tance ante wre hiled or siasly wounded, non tn Gling buildings, Pres cape eoe en 20 way to fight them. Theccslesee heen were locked, and sores of een 180 were killed oe eds from the blast, were Se eS fad hee fete cal, “Umbc ye nl cel seats frag Cowal] Thad at my was. Tony hone eae et Besar skin on my face had come off in the towel" Furhes owe people fell sick fromm “a radition poisoning, son hin Weeks, The Hioshing lyn maidens scrambled ou oF tha ome badly bured by fre Piper #0 tchoolat, Deviekens the fogs experened by Hues ace eg erhaprthe male Unitetal was shock followed by a protective auinbpee “et ILbomb, the single plane surprise, and-chen enormous desea ‘the combination logic of cause and effect Teleftohly shock. As a Japanese poet wrote len There is nothing for us toring Whose cyes are closed, ‘When we, in tears, gaze throligh The clear sky's depths We find that all is lose and seautered: Suppose our brains have turmed to ashes, Soaked in the River Ota, flowing jn its bite; You people, Believe us We find that all is washed away, What sage is there for us to sing whose byey ¢ But a song of tears? & Hed closed?fy the ship released its 5- on drifted down slowly Seconds to escape. Ther titude detectors triggered | but safe, ¢ wla Gay skeitticsedemcl | imicinewotns | fs. About 80,000 people | 1 fire lanes. There was Sst firchouses, roadways the city's 200 doctors, {died or were disabled ayama, working about Fearing thar the bomb 'd my nose and mouth horror, I found that the at, people fall sick from, ‘weeks. The Hiroshima ve badly burned by fire schoolmates. vors, perhaps the mast tess. The small bomb tion—the combination € of cause and effect are closed? [NAGASAKI BEFORE ATOMIC ATACK sah ¢ port cy and sipbulng center was the target ofthe second atomic bomb Sipe cnepun ee cae of acai ues acon amie fated by tha single aston August 51985, ne Beeam Snag ROSH Tis pure of devastated Hltoshima captures the bewldcing destructiveness of the ‘Homi-bori ras on Japan. fan,794 Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era Three days later, the United States a second atomic bomb, thig time over the city of Nagasaki, Although differene in compost first, the device had an equivalent destructive force. But because of the h ferrain and the greater prevalence of conckete buildings, the city sustain somewhat fewer casualties. Still, the general effect was similaf3 bewildaeg population, akdGWn of social services, and a landscape iitered Wi Splintered trees, twisted girders and towers, and the debris of what once hag been a place of human habitation, 4 In August the Japanese had been on the verge of surrender—their citi shattered, their navy sunk, and their airforce limited to defensive operations Two days afier Hiroshima, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan anid marched rapidly into Japanese-held Manchuria, Against overwhelming odd ‘on land, and facing extinction fiom the air, the Japan asaki, With their surrender, the war ended on August 14 ‘The decision to drop the atomie-bomron tuo Japanese cities had been cone of three key decisia ng to atomic en American takers bad-confzanted during the war. The frst decision worn 3 bomb; the second, so use; and the third, to try to-pusintain ies sector as ag Ametican monopoly after the war. None ofthese decisions was made lightly for, as the president, his scientific advisers and administrators, and the fee other officials brought into the process knew well, the shape of the postwar ‘world depended on the wisdom of their decisions. The decision to develop an atomic bomb was, initially, made out of il shat the Germans would cieate this awesome weapon fist. And there was no dloube that they would use iif they acquired it. Germany's bls (ighvsing wa) invasion of Poland in September 1939 had demonstrated the motertoes vw of technological superiority in winning batles. Wotld War ll way =e Warnes Se) Churchil, prime ministr of Great Britain, aply-clled ie" wie wn NG Foyt keener inventions were chive. The opposing nations spared wt \ thei scientists to develop weapons that would'trn the te ottie Ioneeree N seruggle. As Albere Speer the German Reich's minister fer werent ad ‘nitions sad in 1946, even to the last momen, the Gerson peraacns believed that some new “miraculous weapon” would sve hens hoe Q The Americans andthe British fered te awesome ponte of Gomsengs Pure science and its sophisticated industrial plnt. German milesry tac demonstrated in Poland and thn in Delgiom and Pah sine ooo Science and industry, Desig the mon : -séeapous, including self-guided rockess and a new jet fighter plane. Had the jet Been developed more quickly, it might have revenct alied se sopra in the lst days ofthe wat American and British science was also active in the development af new vieapans tchnolagy. A new radar sytem invened by the bese need deflect Hitler's efor to achieve ai sipremacy oves England. Sec oes to.detect-subsnarines, proximity fuses for mines, and 2 hos neering triumphs helped turn the tide of battle in favor of the Allies. Neneey Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era 795 bomb, this of these accomplishments, however, matched atomic power. Whoever tamed on from the this energy first could command the gods of wat of the hilly The American scientific community, led by a distinguished group of Eu- ty sustained ropean physicists who had fled German and Italian fascism, had good reason bewildered to fear German atomic science. In 1938, German scientists had demonstrated ittered with the possibility of nuclear fission—the basis for a chain reaction in radioactive tat once had rmaterial. The practical question was: Could a chain reaction be harassed and be detonated as a bomb? In March 1939, physicist Leo Szilard (from Hungary) their cities and Enrico Fermi (from Iealy) directed successful fission experiments. Deeply operations. worried that the Germans had made similar advances, Szilard went to the Japan and world-renowned scientist Alberé Einstein, Einstein agreed to sign a letter to ming odds President Roosevelt watning him that Germany might be on-the verge of peso het {exeloning atomic weapons: “It is conceivable.” the letter concledecr saice extremely powerful bombs of a new type may be constructed.” Roosevelt undoubtedly knew little about the scientific basis of this pre- shad been diction, but he was enough impressed by this warning to appoint a Uranium ican policy- 4 Committee inside the National Bureau of Standards. By early 1940, he had ‘0 build the vecrets as an ENRICO FERMI (One result of fascism in aly and Germany was the flood of scientists and intellectuals who the postwar “Sought refuge in the United States during the 1930s, Some of these scientists, like Fermi conducted crucial experiments that enabled America to constnuct the fist afore weapons. ue) out of feat -¢(ighening importance -as Winston. jzard war” ons spurred is desperate aments and population com defeat Germany's ary tactics ng of 1940, amnessed (0796 Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era agreed to spend significant sums of money on atomic rescarch, even AXE United States remained technically at peace with Germany: sod Moreover, he determined that these activities should be pursued in soot only a few scientists and only his closest political assoviates Kren project. “Fein SHY summer 1941, Roosevelt appointed a larger committce tom st Gaines in the cause of defense, Headed by Vannevar Bush, president oft Gaimegie Institute and 2 noted engineer, this new National Defense Recg ec Committee took over the work of the Uranium Committee. Bosh ece on consisted of Bush, James ed University; Secretary of War Henry L. Stimso Atmy Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, and Vice President Henry Wallace, In March 1942, the actual building ofthe bomb over o the Department, which appointed Brigadier Meee es as officer in charge of the project. By then, it had ¢ Manhattan Project—and a large, secret budget, hidden even fiom Congress Breaucratic shuffling, agency reorganization, and new liaison committees signified the growing importance of atomic research Roosevelt, by his ac- ffons, was also tightening federal control over research, giving the dominant role in guiding the work. By the time the project ended, it had spent boat $2 billn. Over 100,000 people had worked on various ape of the endeavor at thirty-seven military, scientific, and indysoral ieee fons all to create a device that would cause about 13 pounds of, plutonium — to Zelease its energy. Yet this work had been accomplished with a'desres of secrecy unknown in American history. xen mamy/af the scientists did not y know the precise abjective of their rescarch, ‘The project began in earnest in late 1942. Groves appointed Robert Oppenheimer, a physicist fom the Gloag tae ee ee direct the nus ib, Ironically, at almost precisely the same time, tists concluded thay an atomic weapon was not Bisible. Yet no one knew this forsure. Inc, Arthur Compiones Moves Codes Participant, reported that the United States worried so much ake (German atomic progress that “when the Allis landed on Normandy [France]Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era 797 wen though beaches on 6 June, 1944, certain of the American officers were equipped with and Japan. Geiger counters,” to detect traces of atomic weapons. Lin secrecy; Secrecy, compartmentalization, and hierarchy characterized General new of the Groves's administration of the project. the re Fe ‘venting any-scientist in the project from having access to more information 2e to muster than fired to answer a specific question, Groves prevented leaks of ident ofthe Ernie He abies sees Ne yramer one mae er wse Research portant, however, he stopped scientists from discussing the larger implications \ Teorganized efi work wheter orto weapon could te wed ad wd wat) 0 \ wit eee @ ee ee ee aes ere aeiroranae WM peribiine project. Bush and Conant hoped to exclude the British, to prevent their wer a aw) ining atomic weapons. At lint Roosevelt seemed Wo agree but Wi the red shrough MMMMMMMEMainer GE TOG he reversed himeclé Avan August confers with Pan we WV an advisory Minister Churchill in Quebec, Canada, the president agreed to a full exchange \ y(\ 0 d Office of of information. This left only the Sovict Union, America’s other principal gu h, James B. ally, out in the cold. In fact, the decision not to tell the Russians, while & L. Stimson; |] keeping the British informed, became one of the most momentous of the ary Wallace, jfor it came co symbolize the lack of trust and cooperation between the “over to the Sei of Germans, Arpwenty, Roouevek never suiuly considered roves of the the Russians about the project oF Keeping them abreast of scientiic then, it had! : re was never, ret budget, a ject any illusion committees ‘ » by his ac Although atomic research always aimed at production of a usable bomb, xe military a details of its actual deployment ined uncertain and controversial. pending on its completion date, a bomb could be dropped on Germany or fan_or both. If one or the other of the Axis powers were knocked out of the war—and by early 1945 Germany was rapidly crumbling—it would have 41944, as the bomb moved from the drawing board stage to construction, Scientists began to discuss the wider imy Bet the Manhattan Project guined in 1944 and 1948, But the doseoa Shaye been reversed, and a few of the scientists working on the project it with atomic energy desperately won for a reconsider: Bey recognized that the bomb was more than just a new, powerful n. lopment and its we, shy contend woul Rave vst plications the postwar world. This was a difficult position to take, for the tie structure governing the Manhattan Project w il discussions of any sort—esp halleng mb. Any halt to plans for deploying the bomb would have to come the very top, from the few civilian leaders like Churchill and Roosevelt *W the details of the weapon's development.798 — Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Eta As the weapon became more of a likelihood in 1944, several scien became uneasy about the choice of a target. Increasingly Tf apposed ' = ew. That country was Sealy i under the mastive attacks fom west ad eon Py | Tae Sewn GMa tenaciously to its empire of Pace congue. Alicl commana ge | that to knock the Japanese out of the war would requir a two-stage ina | of Japan—the first in November 1945 with a landing on the ishind GFK, ushi and a second, full-scale attack in the spring of 1946, Estimated Allied casualti in the two atsauls were placed at someshere saved needs were the case, then the atomic bomb eould prove eae aa Possible that the Japanese woul give up belive wal ceedy sti Other questions wonted scientists as caly 1919 Nige Bae Da refugee and key theorist in the field of atomic science, Rmly belcued ty atomic information should be shared among all te Ally ereies Russians. Ifnot, he warned, anatomic arms rat might devece me one In several memoranda to Roosevelt, he ur ational control of ator ~tncegy. And he asked the president inform the Resiaareeot ko Projet. Scientists could help in promemse ae ‘understanding of how much would. (i physics materialize, and in prepa ‘which would ensue from a whol be at stake should the great prospects of atomic ing an adequate realization of the great ben iarted co-operation on effective contral meg Roosevelt postponed taking any sich inatives, and so Bohr tried to i Persuade Winston Church. The scientist traveled t9 Biglnd he nina of 1544 wit leer of recommendation and waited impatiently ere meee with the British prime minister. When it finally occurred, Churchill showed 1 himself hostile to sharing atomic secrets with the Russians. Bohr lett the | Ieesng Knowing he had fale “We didnot even pei the sae hg | he later remarked. Other scientists active in the preset eek Bae sully came to share Bohe's fears that ttempumng to maintains meee oh atomic secrets would stimulate an arms race berweon the Unter on | Russia, But by the end of 1944, Roosevelt dently sgred wrk chan two alles would not share atomic knowledge wihtie Sones Gros By the spring of 1945, the Russian ise had gocaly comlnnad:the question of using the atomic ham, And derision watinn ene Luengoe rine ree suddenly on April 12, lewving to Vice President Harry $ Truman the decision about dropping the first atomic Weapon in history. War was racing to a climay-in-EuropeThe-new president inde er tee hak cae “and Re-was-not-aware-of the 3 plans or promises Roosevelt had made. Most important, he did not even know about the atomic bomb, 1 At a White House meeting on April 25, Stimson and project director Groves informed the new president of the weapon about to be placed under his command, Secretly ushered into the president's office, Groves made sereal scientists npeared that falling apart s. That left at still ung 1s estimated age invasion of Kyushu, cd casualties men. If this it was also ault, hr, a Danish relieved that acluding the fter the war. ol of atomic = Manhattan, Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era eral points: The United States would soon test an atomic device; the United States and Britain held a monopoly on the world’s fissionable materials; the Russians were probably spying on the Manhattan Project. Stimson took a very different tack, waming the new president of the dangers that atomic ‘bombs presented to international diplomacy: In the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and ifs shared, upon what terms, becomes a primaty question of our foreign relations. Truman's sole initiative at this meeting was to appoint an interim committee “to choose targets in Japan. (Onee the Germans had collapsed, in early May, Truman turned his atten- | tion to formulating a European peace and to ending the war in Asia. Increas~ 4 ingly, these two efforts became intertwined. The president was deepl tressed by news reaching Washington: the RusSians, occupying Europe as far Stas central Germany, were consolidating their hold on Eastern European rics, including Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. And the Japanese, he believed, were preparing to defend their island-empire to the is inch. In both situations, the atomic bomb might be important. In Europe, sive American possession of a su ‘bomb mij i cooperate with the United States. In Asia, its use might save hundreds ‘mind when he scheduled 2 meeting at Re Gornany, wit Salin and Chchll ms july, The Going conde the first testing of the atomic bomb, the news of which Truman expected ach him during the conference. As expected, on July 18, word flashed | Alamogordo Air Base, near Albuquerque, New Mexico: a successful ‘with “the brightness of several suns at midday.” The president then ‘to use the news. On July 25, he wrote in his diary: Rost important session with Lord [Louis] Mountbatten and General [George] before that, We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of | orld, It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, and his fabulous Ark then recorded his thoughts about using the bomb: Fon is to be used against the Japanese beeween now and August 10th. ‘told the Secretary of War, Mr. [Henry] Stimson, to use it so that military tives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children, Even are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we asthe leader of the world 7s welfare cannot drop this terible bomb on the old eapital [Kyoto] ‘okye} at the bomb would save lives and that its use was inevi- nese, even after warnings, would not surrender: “It is 799800 Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era certainly a good thing for the world,” he concluded, “that Hitler's cro Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most t thing ever discovered, but it can be made most useful.” ‘Truman's private musings contained at least ehree dubious assumption smisapprehensions~ The MSC Was Bhat I Was incontestable that ioe el Tins eenaie Meee nase w she verge of collapse. On July 18, Stalin informed Churchill of a me {om the Japanese emperor suing for peace. With the imminent prospect oh Sovict declaration of war on Japan, surrender—without the use of the bom was at least possible. Second, Tzun ured himself that the tar selected were primarily military. This was only partly Hiroshima and Nogacakl were cies with large civilian populations. Fin Truman believed that the weapon could be useful. Pethaps he meant us to end the war. But po: i Russians. niaking the Russians more cooperative was one purpose of the bom it did not entirely work. When Truman hinted to Stalin about. at Potsdam, the Russian leader replied that he hoped it would be the Japanese. The conference resumed and eventually reached certain agreements about the shape of the postwar world. But 2s Truman later wrot What a show that was! But a large number of agreements were reached in spite 0 the sctup—only to be broken a5 soon 26 the unconscionable Russian Dictator returned to Moscow! And [liked the little son of a bitch, By August, Truman had determi ets_vwith th Russians, and committed to dio bs. Last-minute appeals ~ STatomic scientists to reverse his decision failed to convince him, A committee ‘of Chicago scientists had warned in early June that a surprise attack agains the Japanese would initiate an arms race with the Russians, However, Tru, man’s own Scientific Advisory Committee, made up of several eminent sei centists, advised using the weapon: We can propése no technical demonstration likely to bring an end tthe war, we sce no acceptable altenative co dieet mary are, i One last serious top the bomb came from Chicago scientists | ouJuly 4%, Leo Szilard authored a petition and gathered the signatures of sixty-eight other atomic cient ists, The document urged President Truman not to drop the bomb: ‘The development of atomic power will provide nations with new means of de- struction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit co the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development, No nation, Seilard concluded, wi . This petition, as well as other serious reservations expressed by otherHiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Eta 801 ’s crowd or scientists, failed to reach the president. Project director Groves refused to pass ost terrible them on because “no usefull purpose would be served in transmitting either the petition or the atached documents to the White House” And besfles by amptions or wes, Truman was already in Potsdam, Hav- ¢ bomb had ng built this terrible weapon, and seeing its (Gin ending se were on the war immediately and in impressing the Russians—Truman, Stimson, and fa message ‘other policymakers were determined to use it. srospect of a ‘On July 26, the United States, Britain, and China issued a new warning the bomb— to Japan_a litional der. The proclamation the targets threatened the “utter devastation of the Japanese homeland,” but ie did not se, for both mention the bomb. The Japanese-sejected the call, still holding out for pres- ons. Finally, cevation-of the poser and status of the empeyor, Use of the bomb had now neant useful become irreversible ‘imidate the ‘On August 6, President Truman in a dramatic report to the nation an- f the bomb, nounced the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima. “Sixteen hours ew weapon ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important used against Japanese army base,” he said. ‘Then he described the size and power of the ‘ain limited ‘weapon. It was, he proclaimed, “the greatest achievement of organized science later wrote fn history.” It had been builtin secret, and it would be continued in secrecy, ved in spite of sian Dictator here are Major Thomas W. Farshee, bombardier, Colonel Paul W Tibet, plot Cap- "fan Theodore . Van Kirk, navigator, and Captain Robert Lewis the ciew ofthe B.75 ws with of bomber that dropped the fist nuclear weapon over Hiroshima, (un) nute appeals \ committee § tack against wever, Tras802 Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era Gover, Da th abit ofthe aceite of ti country othe ply of Covermest to withhold from the word scene sete dg But under present evcumstances Tris aoe eo our ts : } Bb toh W Product of past-decisions. Having already exch essssion of the weapon -woutd ern wishes for postwar Eigope, Truman and sve woes i “about sharing Amerirs scent s. But any decision can be Pow vere, andthe were some songaing sons to do so in this case. In frst place, many scientists argued that there were no scenes, Inthe ori i { iat JAPAN (swrendere Seponder2 18) tt 0 stone bani dropped Ropu 18) és ‘sonic bomb { ¢* epped Angas 3 i i east cas “THe Puiprines ied Sintoliey of this ae technical -xamination, ve danger of and devel- much the believing nenable to sre dubious can be re~ case. In the e words of Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era Albert Einstein, “There is no secret and there is no defense.” Second, the administration recognized that Russian espionage sat-lkely eo penctare [American security anyway. This possibilty was confirmed in September 1945, “when the-Canadian prime minister revealed details of an atomic ing _ opening in the Une Ss and Cats, Fiero, fol Furthermore, to hold scientists captive To THE secrets they discovered in their rescarch betrayed the very ‘essence of free scientific inquiry. Finally, there was the possibility of an arms race. As a scientist at the University of Chicago put it in 1946: If we seek to achieve our own security through supremacy in atomic warfare, we will find that in ten years the whole world is as adequately armed as we, and that the threat of imminent destruction will bring about a “preventive” war. ~Uiese were grave risks: dependence on secrets that might not be safe, excessive © government direction and interference in scientific research, and an arms race ertheless, to Truman, they were risks worth running. By late 1945, October 27, he declared that American possession of the ss “sacrod erst”forhumanity. Nonetheless, Truman made atleast serious effort in carly 1946 to demilitatize nuclear energy. But the spring ry 1946, news of the Russian spy ring operating from Canada had been Pesrablic. ‘and Avnereen sud Russom oust polices bad book ined | a committee in the State Department devised a plan for international strol of atomic energy. The group was headed by David Lilienthal, former ad of the Tennessee Valley Authority and future head of the Atomic Energy hission. After serious debate, the committee suggested a scheme in that would give the United Nations control over the mining, refining, ization of atomic raw materials. Each nation, under this plan, could eters ee ae ey ssndorsed-the-plan and appointed the elderly financier Bemard present the plan to thy ission. Baruch insisted on the right to make changes. Flis modifications almost Enea il veto in ergy matters. The Russians rejected the plan in the summer of 1946, ediately, the United States resumed atmospheric nuclear bomb ppinion—which might have contributed significantly to the ex- te about the bomb, atomic secrecy, and the role of science—was “confused, and often anxious. A Gallup poll taken on August 16, that about 85 percent of Americans approved the bombings, approved, and 5 percent had no opinion. In the context of the 803804 Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era engine fired by “tiny e, | were a few of the “ Atomic Energy whose d: the first bomb of atomic energy Nonetheless, many Americans worried about the bomb, especially af Fe Somgsiats ead died down. They did not beleve Gone swho told a Senate hearing that radiatia ee ‘caders in particular condemned the bomb. Roms mounced the weapon because, contrary to expres pare civilians. Thirty-four leading Protest ply penitent for the responsible use area Sue ofthe atomic bomb. We are agreed tha, whatever be het hagas ed se Ore at pile, che supie bombings of Hireshins arene ‘morally indefendole q ‘As American Christians, we ae dee | rrvek wets moral outage of churches that touched the American publi Fcc a8 the book Hirskina, viten by novehst John Hoses Hersey i Fey sled to Japan in October and November 1945 and broughe back reas at gxtended article for New Yorker magazine. Ordingily « witty and fashionable periodical known for Hersey wrote about the bomb in a wa; bon: xs. He clothed bare statistics with ‘ople. He captured the essential tbness before a force that was the details of experience of surprise, nakedness, and num i incomprehensible. The effectiveness of Hersey's story aroused a response from the bombs A nds Gollywood produced + quick propaga min 47. Te one \ ing nd? shoving the president cormented by the Tei deren, Ben Din on i lier se af i Traiaal Das Tees We SSIS emi onthe other ide of the loteostional Due Line, the Ban ecauvad ae oo August 6Hiroshima: The Dawn of employ the weapon. Some of those who had helped guide the construction of the bomb, like Henry Stimson, wrote articles in popular magazines to defend its use. In the end, most Americans remained convinced that the bomb >roval were dlogy, and a the Atomic Era 805 Feeds acl aah Lp 1d be Neither guilt nor fear of fa slated A hat traveled had been necessary. Neither guilt nor fear of atomic warfare translated into: neve {gniheanr opposition to relying on a nuclear monopoly n foreign poly, ELC \W AS AVAZ 115 “tiny explo- Instead, the public increasingly worried about keeping nuclear weapons a o ve “miracles secret. Any to 40 those dawn In July 1945, just before the end of the war, Vannevar Bush submitted a a “report entitled Science—the Er ccially after |] gestions Tor a new relationship between science and che government. The eve General oem should coordinate and support broad research programs, he ery pleasant Ce Ee a ‘Bu -d with: ‘the thods which work expressc __ Bur we must proceed with caution in carrying over the methods which work in o cmpressed TRMMBMIE wartime to the very dilfercat conditions of peace. We must remove the gil 3Protestant J controls which we have had to impose, and recover freedom of inquiry and that atrocity. In healthy competitive spirit so necessary for expansion of the frontier of scientific guish at the knowledge. — k's worries about government interference and rigidity were well suse already J fears oLof science feat oe ji¢ research after the war, These included the scientists themselves, avilian branch of the federal government, and the military. In the end, mething of compromise was worked out, and basic scientific research in rican pit hited States evolved into a partnership becween scientists and the civilian eee oy bins of goverment Butowomevsecr thompson Cane verely limited their freedom to speak and publish and, above all, to q e-WSES of their work. Research in peacetime was too much ike under conditions of war. i In the next several years, three federal institutions were developed to direct per Sand finance scientific research in the United States. The precedent of the rae attan Project, the commitment +0 secre he desire to advance hea ‘competition with the Soviet Uni nt role in their ti first was the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established send ‘which guided and controlled the development and application of pes nergy in a variety of military and nonmilitary areas, The National 4 ‘oundation, set up in 1950, became the major institution to fund and scientific esearch (some of it relevant to weapons development bof it not). The third institution was the military administration and of large weapons projects by the Defense Department. FEC, established on August 1, 1946, had many of the characteristics attan Project. Its bylaws prevented international cooperation ergy development playess Tad to past_an FBI investi- Prghely run as it was, the AEC represented a significant compro Gientists who had balked at tight security and army interference on itan Project demanded freedom to do research. Some of these806 Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era organized the Federation of Atomic Scientists in 194: ae EAN any efforts to impose direct military comtrot-of reses Wr 5. This group oj acch, Te succesfully posed legislation that would have placed military representatives in a doug Position of the commission I ‘The question of funding basic scientific research ended in much the same brent AW AIG Nv sort of compromise, In his report on science, Vs (yO ADT NIGUN wreofcommamie teen tern ome Bs VU |. direct research in a wide varity of fields, not just eee ; \\. weapons. Although this proposal appealed nists, President ~xejected the plan because it appeared to be independent from federal control In 1947, when a bill to create an independent National Science Foundatio} passed through Congress, Truman vetoed it. Lacking close executive branch control, Truman argued, the proposed foundation would be divoreet aunt control by the people “to an extent that implics a distinc lack of tiny democratic procestes.” What he meant was that government would nas fat suficent power to direct and focus the agency's nctivte, Unable to agree on the shape of a new science foundation, the fede government forged ahead with funding basic scientific and wespenc sexecai Military planners pushed hard for weapons research. In particular, the Office of Naval Research, created in August 1946, funded Targe mil litary research ii “Contracts. Many universities and corporations were intially skeptical any | eet But by 1949, the office had spent more than $20 | \ on VF i +O (Oy THE ATOMIC ARMY During the 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union eared on extensive open-air nuclear weape ‘ons testing. Frequently as pictured here. American soldiers were stationed close to the esi blast sce 1 for training purposes. The risks of such exposure to radiation were, atthe time, rately acknowledge. carHiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era 807 oup opposed million on 1,200 projects at some 200 institutions. And most of this work cessfully op- was undertaken without public knowledge. na dominant Militarily funded research met the immediate needs of a growing defense establishment, but it did not Fl the place of a broader, federally funded science ach the same “research program. This came, finally, in 1950 with the establishment of the rposed a new National Science Foundation. The new agency would report directly to the sts, it would president—a victory for Truman. Its purpose was to fund basic research in ito military the sciences—a victory for scientists. Weapons development would remain lent Truman _ primarily under the control of the unitary. ————— leral control. Thus by 1950, cooperation between scientists, the federal government, » Foundation and the military had been established. Federal funds were lavished on rescarch bees {in ways hitherto unheard of in peacetime. A mode of operating in secret, yet vorced from “vith some latiude,-had_been-established. Science had Become the willing ae Bibecic of federal policy. But there was a price vuld not have q Ta August 1949, che dream of scientific superiority over the Russians 1 the federal ed into an anxious nightmare, when American scientists detected traces ‘ons research, | (6fe Russian atomic blast experiment. The monopoly had been broken. The 1, the Office “public and Congress demanded to know how the secrets had been lost. tary research Scentists had often warned that there were, essentially, no secrets, but few eptical about fad been willing to listen. This was even truer in 1949. In this atmosphere of fore than $20 nation and spy stories, President Truman pushed ahsad ta try for a jy on a new super wespor=In January 1950 he accelerated research lating debate over fundamental issu seal innuclear terror pushed concern about secrecy and security to a frenzied ch, Ironically, che most important scientist of the Manhattan Project, Rob- fumph, had been viewed suspiciously by military and security experts, Some of hi younger brother~But during the years of the Manhattan Project, -always-received- security. clearance. Moreover, Oppenheimer ported using the bomb. Now, after the war, his independence of mind B t0 carry him away from established policy, and he began to question the assumptions of the arms race. ly-before-the Russians exploded the ic mer proposed making small tactical weapons. He wanted to develop tic explosives suitable for use against military targets. He opposed build- bboinbs to hold civilian populations hostage. Working for the AEC idvisory Committee in 1949, he spoke against committing massive € fo developing the hydrogen bomb. Losing this debate, he also the suspicion and opposition of scientists who were advocating the808 Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomle Era AIR-RAID SHELTER At the height ofthe Cola ‘War pubic consciousness of possible nuclear war Was heightened by air raid sis, such as tis one in 2 New York city office bulking In 1951, None- theless cil defense spending was reluctantly funded, and puble sup. Port for extensive precau- tions did not develop, (um fr8er bomb, such as Edward Teller. Tellers opposition was well founded, Gf Oppenheimer had changed many of his vows stone atomic energy. Shorty after the decision to build a hydrogen bomb, Oppen hhcimer told a radio audience: da lection t0 seek or not to seck international contol of atomic energy, the sehaity @,Y #9 make oF not to make the hydrogen bone wee complex for eacd things, but they touch the very base of our moraine eens grave danger for that these decisions are taken onthe bass office a ae the decision to build the hydrogen bomb Y question surrounding atomic energy research inte @ne momentous problem, Secrecy, tional conteol—practically all the elements of the nuclear deb: involved. He decided he could not support such a derision, ie, ape raising these doubss,-Oppenhcimer lost miich of “his credibility in Ronethsieg taking. By 1953, he was rarely being called Irie Nonetheless, during that year the doors of secrecy Sew unectemoniously Gosed on him, shutting him out of any further research ag ie atomic field Qutraged by Oppenhcimer’s apparent change of heart on nuclear weapons, a sr Staff member of the congressional Commits on Aes Energy had Sent a Tong denunciation 952. The writerHiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era 809. said that Oppenheimer “more probably than not . . . was a sufficiently hardened Communist [and] that he either volunteered espionage information to the Soviets or complied with a request for such information.” Agency director J. Edgar Hoover reassembled Oppenheimer's clearance file, reworked it, and forwarded the letter and the dossier to the newly inaugurated President Eisenhower, The president acted_quickly, barsing-Oppenheimer-from-access to all atomic secretsand_gavemment-research facilities. The scientist was ‘officially notified on December 24, 1953. Oppenheimer decided to fight the decision, and the AEC sct up a special panel to hear his plea. Meeting in April and May of 1954, the three-member board heard thirty witnesses, among chem most of the principal atomic scientists of the nation. In late May, the board reported. Oppenheimer was anges of disloyalty and espionage; but the panel voted, anyway, to remove hir-security-clesrence. The policy became official in late June: the father of the atomic bomb was now permanently batted from further work ‘on atomic energy. Jina sense, Oppenheimer was a scapegoat for an unworkable policy of Bet Accused and then cleared of divulging secre to the Russians his |. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER AND MAJOR GENERAL 7 LESLIE R. GROVES. zell foun ‘ Oppenheimer, the scientific head, ond Groves, the I founded, imltary chief, ofthe Manhattan Project Inspect the omic energy, Femains of the tomer that held the frst atomic test veimer told bomb. The total commitment ofthe United States to 5 be first in producing atomic weapons brought to = ES sether these extracrdinatlyalferent men. (U2)810 Hiroshima: The Dawn of the Atomic Era against the buildin, fundamental he had argued that weapons development would make the “ preventing war, not more hopeless, but more hopeful” his mind. Bue it was too late. America c bombs that had the Hiroshima maidens who came to the Secrecy was now too entrenched in wea reversed, shimas—could now prevent the ‘The biliant achievement a Wa ngratulated science administats Conant for his work on the project: Conant had replied Goo goa to congratulations, | am far from ‘sure—that remains for history to decide?Viktor Krapivin Mr. Rowe AP United States History 3 March 2013 Analyze the reasons the development of the atomic bomb was done in secret; consider the Soviet Union in your response. Was the President's decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan justified? How did the actions of the President impact the Cold War? Be sure to consider the Soviet response to atomic weapons and American fears of nuclear war. Gs)