EDMUND HUSSERL. COLLECTED WORKS VOLUME I PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCES EDMUND HUSSERL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCES ‘Tip Book IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY "TRANSLATED BY ‘TED E. KLEIN AND WILLIAM E. POHL 1980‘Translated from: Edmund Huser, len 2 NS OF RE. anything materi The designation of thi n is fully perception of something external as ext course, is not anytl of something extensi phantoms belong. In the coherence of material experience therein is experienced in interconnection. Whenever experience and whenever it grounds nature in the first and fundai animate organisms, anim those in agreement |. The mode of theor jought-intentions goes exclusi apprehensions of experience. In the investigator of nature is naturally there {or of nature, ing. ng regard is directed, fixing an s uniform spatial-temporal: experience becomes theoretical tural science arises. The Object intal sense, is based on mutual cing Egos which have their ‘organisms that appear to them as well as to TY \¢ perception of something as justified as that of the perception — wI and in general to which also, of course, the perceptions of the nature consti ing itself ausal theoretical | experiencing and ly by way of the mat cognition of nature the body and soul, and not but also the comm id determining, toward the and, on the other hand, to be directed theoretically towards the animate organisms and psyches, and to engage accor — of which we in phy are shaped, there one logical and psychological investigations have to speak. In gener: ¢ founded on apprehensions and appreh lust pay al REGIONS OF REALITY 3 the lowest stage, which constitutes reality at experiencing regard therefore strikes the mater tself, something not founded, something not presup} and having some’ natural science in the usual sense, or, more natural science. How the various levels of the cognition of nature are of material Obj its proper sense accruing to it the in particular, how the difficult problems of the clarification 9 4s opposed to explanatory, e liferent_ manner of concept-formation and judgment- be in both — that is a separate area of ing, which must be constantly , whether it be material or any sort whatever. According to our analyses and with regard to the ‘essence of the experiences in which reality is constituted, the cognition ofreality and the cognition of causality are inseparably one. All science of the real is causally explanatory if it actually and in the sense of Object 'y wants to determine what the real is. The cog ies, having an effect upon them and being affected by them (undergoing effects), as if, accordingly, cog could bring out and determine an essence proper to the real that would be s precisely 1 such not to have a proper essence of that sort at is only in its causal relations. It is somethi which demands its correspon and corresponding member is cach a “substance” of real properties. A substance sense that every Objective rea nce) is nonsense. A. ions of Descartes and different from an “a> 4 REGIONS OF REALITY causality is not so readily given in the context of experience, just as, in another manner, the real itself that stands in causal relations is also not readily given, To be sure, one can, in a certain manner, always say: where there has been experiencing, something has been experienced, is thereby given, and given without further ado, e.g., the tree that we see. And it is given in its circumstances. But as for these latter, they lic in the total surroundings viewed along with it, and that in it which is actually a causally determining circumstance remains vague. The theoretically experiencing regard easily grasps distinctive traits in the perceived that are given in accordance with perception, and to the extent that there is consciousness of something real, there is also consciousness of causality — but completely unclear and able to be brought out and prepared and determined conceptually only by means of the theoretical experience-analysis and investigation. On the other hand, the real itself, the subject term of the real relation, is also something indeterminate; the real object is given only one-sidely; cal state, although perceived, will be able to show itself ever more richly in the process of perceiving, ifit is unchanged; in the process of its changes the property that announces itself therein will emerge ever more perfectly under real conditions belonging to it, etc. Thus, as one ‘an see from the beginning, sciet restigation demands an ever renewed penetration into the real-causal connections. What methods are required in order to obtain Objectively valid judgements about reality (and what conditions must be prescribed in the essence of experience itself for the possibility of such judgments) — to discuss this in a theme all to itself. We have been concerned only to achieve clarity on why causal investigation plays such a dominant role in sciences of reality and why there is therefare so much to be said about ‘causality in our further discussions as well. §2. ANIMATE ORGANISM, APPREHENSION OF ANIMATE. 4) The specific determinations of animate organism. A second fundamental sort of apprekension, one that constitutes its object as object of the second level, is the apprehension of animate organism. It is a new fundamental sort considering the basically different way in which the uppermost stratum of the animate organism’s objectivity, the specific stratum of animate organism, is constituted in contrast with everything that concerns the material of the animate organism. REGIONS OF REALITY 5 With this there cohere as correlates (apriori, naturally) the des- ignated essential differences between material determinations of animate organism and the specifically animate-organismic ones. To this stratum belong the really uniform sense fields in their states of sensation that change according to real circumstances belonging to them. First of al show in an immediately re for this sort of as the primal fi tion, and the fields inasmuch as it has the first, fundamental local stratified upon it, e-g., the hot-cold field (I do not say temperature ficld, because temperature is a concept belonging to physics that has no business here). In further sequence every sense field and every ssentially closed sensation group acquires a realizing connection to he animate organism, showing diffe ty and making up different strata of sensation contexts belonging really i. Thus I can, e.g., recognize my visual field as a continuously, ncessantly — even if variably — fulfilled visual spread (by disregard ng all objective apprehensions that build themselves on it and by virtue of which I see a physical-objective field and know it in a certain appearance), and I can recognize this lasting unity in contexts of experience and thought as belonging to the animate organism, and more precisely as belonging to this retina, as a whole corresponding in its inner order as a spread to the two-dimensional order of the places in the retina, I can then pursue the interconnections coming to ion through experience and thought betwecn the stimulatory system of the retina, according to the co-extensive ordering (whereby, as with all localization, it is not a matter of the actual spatial form, but only of the coherent integrating in the sense described by the analysis of the situation) and the system of the visual sensations as consequences of stimulation, according to the ordering of the field itself. In this manner, which is mediated by thinking, I cannot, of course, see the visual field on the retina, but can apprehend it as belonging to analogously to the way I apprehend the tactual field as belonging to he touch-sens of sensations sensuous impress ate organis to its parts characterized wereby precisely as “sense organs” and itself becomes something animate-organismic, but not material. All the amplifications that possible experience can take on in the same regard are tied to the sense already given beforehand through the apperception of animate organism, and this sense is laid down by perceived animate organicity <6>