BLOCK B 2015

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
PART 1: Introduction; History and Basic Concepts
1 A. Preliminary Readings
2 B. Constitutional Basis
5 C. Local Government, Decentralization, Autonomy
8 D. Local Governments, Administrative Regions, Autonomous Regions
11 1. Effectivity of the Code

PART 2: General Provisions

Title ONE: Basic Principles

12 A. Policy and Application
13 B. Rules of Interpretation
C. General Powers and Attributes
15 1. Creation of LGUs
18 2. De Facto Corporations
19 3. Plebiscite
21 4. Downgrading, Division, Merger
21 5. Abolition
22 6. Income
23 7. Population
23 8. Sub Provinces
24 D. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site
25 E. Political and Corporate Nature of LGUs
27 F. General Welfare Clause
33 G. Basic Services and Facilities
38 H. Eminent Domain
42 I. Reclassification of Lands
44 J. Closure and Opening of Roads
46 K. Corporate Powers
49 L. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants
49 M. Liability for Damages
53 N. Intergovernmental Relationship – National Government
55 O. Consultations
57 P. Relations with PNP
59 Q. Inter-Local Government Relationship
61 R. Relationship with People’s and Non-Governmental Organizations
61 S. Local Prequalification, Biddings, and Awards Committee

Title TWO: Elective Officials

A. Qualifications and Elections
62 1. Members of the Sanggunian
63 2. Qualifications
70 3. Disqualifications
75 B. Term of Office

82 Supplementary Notes: The Electoral Remedies

 Sources:

B2015 Class Case Digest

B2015 Class Notes
The Local Government Code, by Aquilino Pimentel
UP Law Political Law Bar Reviewer
2009 LocGov Reviewer
D2014 LocGov Reviewer

Supplementary Documents:

B2015 Weekly Digest Compilations

Compilation of Special Laws for the Midterm Exams

Prepared By:

B2015 Academics Committee – LocGov Reviewer Ops

 PART 1 INTRODUCTION: HISTORY AND BASIC CONCEPTS
PRELIMINARY READINGS
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991:
KEY TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
BY PIMENTEL, AQUILINO JR1.
The Local Government Code (LGC) is a revolutionary piece of legislation
because it uproots decades of highly centralized decision-making in the
country and places upon local officials a major portion of the
responsibility for the modernization of the local communities.
- Substantial powers are granted to the LGUs
Devolution is the key to development. Before, the countryside was
highly dependent on the central government. With power devolved to
LGUs, they now have the power and money to respond more rapidly to
people’s needs and provide basic amenities without depending on the
central government.
The LGC devolves substantial powers to LGUs so that eventually, they
may develop their own localities at their own pace, with their own
resources at their own discretion.
Constitutional basis of LGC
- LGUs now more self-governing and can chart the course of
their own development (Sec. 2, Art. X)
- The President shall exercise general supervision, not control
(Sec. 4)
- LGUs have taxing power (Sec. 5)
- LGUs share in national tax increased (Sec. 6)
- Before, GOCCs did not pay LGUs for use and development of
natural resources, Now, LGUs are paid substantially (Sec. 7)
- The term of office of elective officials shortened from four to
3 years (Sec. 8)
- Sectoral representatives in Sanggunians (Sec. 9)
- Manner of creation of LGUs provided by the Code (Sec. 10)
- Power to create special metropolitan political subdivisions
granted to Congress (Sec. 11)
 But no such political subdivision has been created
 Metropolitan Manila was created during Martial Law
- Code classifies cities into highly urbanized, independent
component, and component cities (Sec. 12)
- LGUs may group together for beneficial purposes (Sec. 13)
- LGUs relate to the Regional Development Council in matters
concerning their own development (Sec. 14)
DECENTRALIZATION: RETHINKING GOVERNMENT
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999/2000,
WORLD BANK2
The success of decentralization depends on its design.
The success (or failure of decentralization) affects:
1. Political Stability
 When a country is divided along geographic or ethnic
lines, decentralization provides an institutional
mechanism for bringing opposition groups into a formal
rule-bound bargaining process
A system based on rules produces better results than one that is not.
Explicit rules setting out the division of functional responsibility among
1 levels of government reduce ambiguity and increase political
Taken from the D2014 Reviewer
2 accountability.
Taken from the 2009 Reviewer
2. Public Service Performance
 Arguments for decentralization
 It increases efficiency and responsiveness of
government because:
a. Local elected leaders know their constituents
better than national authorities
b. Physical proximity makes it easier for
citizens to hold local officials accountable for
performance
 It creates competition among local governments to
better satisfy citizen’s needs if population is
mobile
a. But supporting evidence is scanty because
the causal relationships are difficult to prove
 Thus, how decentralization affects access and quality of
public service depends on the way it is designed and
implemented
 What local governments can achieve depend on
resources and responsibilities they are given and
the power of national governments to override
local government decisions
3. Equity
 Whether decentralization exacerbates income
differences depends on 2 factors:
a. Horizontal equity – the local government’s
capacity to generate funds so as to be able to
deliver an equivalent level of services to their
population
b. Within-state equity – the local government’s
willingness to redistribute income within its
borders
 As the cost of providing public service vary, most
decentralized fiscal systems include equalization grants.
A difficulty with these grants is that local governments
may differ in their willingness to raise taxes. Grants
create an incentive to understate their tax bases or
relative wealth in order to maximize transfers
 In most countries, inequality is due more to differences
among individuals within a province than among
provinces. Thus, even dramatic redistribution among
regions will have limited results unless targeting is
improved within regions themselves. This, in turn
depends on the ability and willingness of local
governments to engage in redistribution
 Thus, the success in targeting the poor requires a
combination of national and subnational efforts
4. Macroeconomic stability
 Fiscal decentralization reduces the national
government’s control over public resources. Deficit
spending by local governments can also thwart national
government efforts to cool the economy by restraining
public expenditures
 When revenues are decentralized before expenditure
responsibilities, national governments are forced to
maintain spending level within a smaller resource base,
resulting in large deficits. By separating taxing and
spending powers local governments incur only a
fraction of the political and financial costs of their
expenditure
 PARABLES AND PARADOXES IN DEVOLUTION
BY ALECKS P. PABICO
The LGC gave many “talents” to local governments to either nurture or
squander:
1. It mandated the transfer of the responsibility for the delivery
of basic services, including appropriate personnel, assets,
equipment, programs, and projects to LGUs
2. It increased the financial resources available to local
governments by broadening their taxing powers and
increasing their internal revenue allotments (IRA)
3. It provided the legal and institutional infrastructure for
expanded participation of civil society in local governance
(like NGOs and People’s Organizations)
However, even “successful” local governments have yet to reach the
point where they are already able to contribute to national
development. That can be traced in part to the flaws in the Code, as well
as its implementation, among them the lack of fund resources to meet
all the budgetary requirements of the functions, programs, and projects
devolved to the LGUs.
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS3
The authority of local governments has both constitutional and
statutory basis, as provided for in Art. X, 1987 Constitution, the
Administrative Code, and the LGC.
The LGC (RA 7160) operationalizes Art. X, 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
The LGUs
- The Republic is divided into territorial and political
subdivisions called local government units:
1. Provinces
2. Cities
3. Municipalities
4. Barangays
- Can Congress create another territorial and political
subdivision such as a Luzon Region? Pimentel believes that it
cannot since the list is exclusive
The Autonomous Regions
- In addition to the 4 types of subdivisions, the Constitution
mandates the creation of 2 autonomous regions:
1. One for Muslim Mindanao
2. One for the Cordilleras
- Of the 2, only the ARMM was approved in a plebiscite
Nature of LGUs
- It is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted
by law and possessed o substantial control over its own
affairs
- An intra-sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation
 Not intended to be an imperium in imperio
- Autonomous in a sense that it is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
All LGUs, by constitutional fiat are vested with local autonomy
- Local autonomy means “a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization
- It does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments
 It is not meant to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between central administration and
LGU
 It does not usher in a regime of federalism
Decentralization is NOT Federalism
- Decentralization is a decision by the central government
authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas
 Decision-making by sub-national units
 Typically delegated
- Differs from federalism in that the sub-units that have been
authorized by delegation do not possess any claim of right
against the national government
3
This is not part of the Syllabus but the Reviewer Committee thought it best to
include a discussion on the Constitutional basis of local governments
LGUs as Agents of national government
- National government did not relinquish all its powers over
LGUs; Only administrative powers or local affairs are
delegated
- Purpose of delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at local levels
- Policy-setting for the entire country still lies with the
President and Congress
Not Self-Executing
- Local autonomy is not self-executing
- It is subject to, among other things, the passage of a LGC, a
local tax law, income distribution legislation, a national
representation law, and measures designed to realize
autonomy at the local level (Ganzon v. CA)
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanism of recall, initiative and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions, and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of local units.
Comprehensive Code – the LGC covers farranging matters.
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
Presidential Power of Supervision
- Power of President is now limited to supervision, not control
 He has to exercise this power through provinces when
he deals with component cities and municipalities and
through the latter when he deals with barangays
Meaning of General Supervision
- President exercises general supervision but only to ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law
 He cannot substitute his judgments with his own
- Supervision = overseeing or the authority of an officer to see
that the subordinate officers perform their duties
 If subordinate fails or neglects to fulfill duty, official
may take such action as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties
- Presidential supervision means no more than the power of
ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or the subordinate
acts within the law
Power to Discipline
- Joson v. Executive Secretary – supervision is not incompatible
with discipline
- His power over administrative disciplinary cases against
elective officials is derived from his power of general
supervision over LGUs
Power to Investigate
- Power of general supervision implies the authority to inquire
into facts and conditions in order to render the power real
and effective
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to local governments.
LGUs have the power to create sources of revenue
- They now have taxing powers
- Power to create sources of revenue is a means to spur
development
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.
Share in National Taxes and Fiscal Autonomy
- The LGUs’ share in the national taxes has been increased
- They also enjoy fiscal autonomy
 This means that LGUs have the power to create their
own sources of revenue in addition to their just share in
the national taxes, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities
- Requisites before the President may interfere in local
matters:
1. An unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government
2. Consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate
and the House of Representatives and the presidents of
the various local leagues
3. Corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of
the DOF, DILG, DBM
Automatic Release and the IRA
- Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre – a basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in
the national internal revenue
 Mandated by the Constitution
 LGC also says that the release SHALL be made directly
to the LGU concerned within 5 days after every quarter
of the year and SHALL NOT be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose
 NOTE: Any retention is prohibited, even if it be
temporary
- IRA is part of LGU’s Income – as held in Alvarez v. Guingona,
 LGC defines income as all revenues and receipts
collected or received forming the gross accretions of
funds of the LGUs
 IRAs are part of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the LGU
 IRA automatically accrue to the local treasury
Sec. 7. Local government units shall be entitled to an equitable share
in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national
wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law,
including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct
benefits.
LGUs share in the Wealth of Nation
- Now, GOCCs pay the LGUs for exploitation of the latter’s
resources.
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Term of Local Officials Shortened by Constitution – Term is shortened
from 4 years to 3 years.
On Succession – When a Vice Mayor succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term, is he considered
to have served in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit?
- NO, as held in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec
- Term limit must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve in the same elective position
 - It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive
terms in an elective local office
 He must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply
- Thus, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected
because he is simply continuing the service of the official he
succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation
of office prior to its expiration
Sec. 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral
representation as may be prescribed by law.
Sectoral representatives in the Sanggunians – Various sectors defined in
the Code are now entitled to representation in the Sanggunians.
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units affected.
Creation of LGUs
- Manner of creating LGUs in general is dealt with under Sec. 6,
7, and 8, LGC
- For specifics, see:
a. Sec. 460-461 for Provinces
b. Sec. 449-450 for Cities
c. Sec. 441-442 for Municipalities
d. Sec. 385-386 for Barangays
Plebiscite = LGU’s DIRECTLY affected
- Conduct of plebiscite is an indispensable requirement in the
creation, diversion, merger, abolition, and substantial
boundary alteration of LGUs
 If no plebiscite, act is illegal and without effect
- Plebiscite conducted in ALL LGUs directly affected
 Tan v. Comelec – in the creation of a new province, those
to be included in the plebiscite would be the people
living in the area of the proposed new province and
those living in the parent province
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and
legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority
that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination,
Creation of Special Metropolitan Political Subdivision
- NOTE: Do not mistake the “special metropolitan political
subdivisions” in Sec. 11 as another territorial and political
subdivision in Sec. 1
- Jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority is LIMITED to basic
services requiring coordination
The MMDA is a DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
- MMDA is the agency to handle the administration of metro-
wide basic services affecting LGUs of Metro Manila
 Metro-wide services = services which have metro-wide
impact and transcend local political boundaries or
entail huge expenditures such that it would not be
viable for said services to be provided by the individual
LGU
- MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association = MMDA is not granted
police power, let alone legislative power
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The
voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain
no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for
elective provincial officials.
Classification of Cities
- LGC classifies cities into:
1. Highly urbanized
2. Independent component
3. Component cities
- They are classified based on their regular annual income
 This is a substantial distinction
- Revenue of a city would show whether it is capable of
existence and development as a relatively independent
social, economic, and political unit
 It would show if it has a sufficient economic or
substantial activity as to warrant independence from
the province
No Violation of EPC and Right to Suffrage
- The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote
for provincial officials and denying the same to voters in
another component city is a matter of legislative discretion
(Ceniza v. Comelec)
Sec. 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or
coordinate their efforts, services and resources for purposes commonly
beneficial to them in accordance with law.
LGU’s may group together for beneficial purposes
- LGUs may group themselves, coordinate, or consolidate any
activity for the benefit of their constituencies
- Ex: Central Panay Economic Union – composed of the
municipalities of Jamindan and Tapaz in Capiz Province and
the municipalities of Libacao, Batan, and Altavas in Aklan
Sec. 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils
or other similar bodies composed of local government offices, and
representatives from non-governmental organizations within the
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen
the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and
social growth and development of the units in the region.
LGUs Relationship with Regional Development Councils
- LGUs relate to the Regional Development Council in matters
that concern their own development
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions and responsibilities not granted by this
Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the
National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous
region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the
region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
 political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities,
and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass
the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organizations;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
DECENTRALIZATION, AUTONOMY
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991:
KEY TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PIMENTEL, pp. 13-174
Autonomy – The power of LGUs to enjoy limited self-government as
defined by law. The principle of local autonomy simply means
decentralization.
- Look at:
a. Sec. 2, Art. X, 1987 Constitution = local autonomy
b. Sec. 2, LGC = Declaration of policy
- Principle of local autonomy under the Constitution simply
means decentralization (Basco v. PAGCOR)
Decentralization – Not transfer of power and resources, but more akin
to deconcentration whereby certain government offices are transferred
to the regions but whose officials and functions remain under the
control of the central government
- Decentralization refers to either: Decentralization of
Administration or Decentralization of Power
 LGC follows the former; latter is not allowed by law
 See table below5

Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall DECENTRALIZATION
be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be OF ADMINISTRATION
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with Occurs when the central
applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the government delegates
responsibility of the National Government. administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to
NOTE: Autonomous regions are governed by special laws. broaden the base of government
- See separate discussion on Autonomous Regions on page 8 power
The purpose of such is to relieve
the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs
and enable to concentrate on
national concerns.
DECENTRALIZATION
OF POWER
Abdication of political power in
favor of LGUs declared to be
autonomous regions, making the
latter no longer accountable to
the national government, but to
its constituents instead
Not allowed under the 1987
Constitution

Devolution – The act by which the National Government confers power

and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.

Four kinds of powers of LGUs:

1. Expressly granted
2. Implied from those granted
3. Necessary, appropriate, incidental for efficient and effective
governance
4. Essential to promotion of general welfare of inhabitants

Innovations of the LGC

- Local officials are accountable and may be recalled even in
the midst of their terms
- National agencies now need to consult with LGUs (and also
NGOs and POs) before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions
- Implementing Rules – mandatory consultations with LGUs,
NGOs, and sectors concerned by central government agencies
and GOCCs regarding projects or programs which may
impact the environment
- Dialogues in order to avoid confrontation between
government and indigenous people

4
From D2014 Reviewer; Supplemented by B2015 Class Notes
5
Taken from the discussion in Ganzon v. CA
 DE LEON v. ESGUERRA
August 31, 1987
Summary: De Leon was elected as Brgy Captain and others as Brgy
Councilmen in the 1982 Barangay Election. However, on Feb 9, 1987,
which is before the end of their term, they received a Memo from the
OIC Governor dated Feb 8, 1987 but admittedly antedated Dec 1, 1986,
designating Esguerra, et al as Brgy Captain and members of the Brgy
Council. Petitioners de Leon, et al seek to declare such Memo as null and
void, alleging that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors. SC ruled in favor of petitioners De
Leon, et al.
Doctrine: The Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been
overtaken by the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution took effect
on the day of its ratification which is the day the people cast their votes
and not the day that the results were proclaimed by the President or
the Comelec. Hence, the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date
SAN JUAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
April 19, 1991
Summary: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the
province of Rizal was left vacant. Reynaldo San Juan, governor of Rizal,
sent a letter to DBM recommending Ms. Dalisay Santos as PBO, and
submitting other nominees. Director Abella of DBM Region IV however,
Abella recommended Cecilia Almajose, who was not one of the people
nominated by San Juan. DBM appointed Almajose. Abella protested this
with the DBM, claiming that the appointed person must be one of his
nominees, but the DBM disagreed. San Juan brought it to the CSC but
the CSC agreed with DBM.
The case was brought to the SC, and the SC agreed with San Juan. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list
of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.The PBO is expected to synchronize his
work with DBM, but more important is the proper administration of
fiscal affairs at the local level. Thus, there should be a genuine interplay,
a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both
the local and national officials.
Doctrine: The clear mandate and constitutional policy and principle on
local autonomy must be obeyed. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and
the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in
favor of autonomy.
The presidential power over local governments is not even supervision
in general, but general supervision as may be provided by law…
supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties…
Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the
performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. Our national officials should not only
comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should
also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are
based.
Class Notes: This case laid down the rule of construction in favor of local
autonomy.
GANZON v. CA
August 5, 1991
Summary: Ten administrative complaints were lodged against Mayor
Ganzon of Iloilo City. On the basis of three of the complaints, Secretary
Santos issued three preventive suspensions, each lasting sixty days
each. The first two were carried out, but a TRO was procured to stop
the third. It is petitioner’s claim that the Secretary (the Executive) does
not have the power to subject him to disciplinary action. The Supreme
Court held that it still does.
Doctrine: Under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-
executing, but subject to the passage of a local government code, among
others. In spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive. The
Charter also allows Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress
may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government
Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
"Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local government officials
does not include the power of investigation, when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.
Decentralization means devolution of national administration but not
power to the local levels. Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable.” Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous.
Class Notes: The SC laid down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy under the Constitution involves a mere
decentralization of administration, not of power, in which
local officials remain accountable to the central government
in the manner the law may provide.
2. The Constitution does not prescribe federalism.
3. The change in the Constitutional language was meant to deny
legislative control over local governments. However, it did
not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided
that the regulation is consistent with the fundamental
premise of autonomy.
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national
authority, the latter may, and in the manner set forth by law,
impose disciplinary action against local officials
5. “Supervision” and “investigation” are not inconsistent terms;
“investigation” does not signify “control” (which the
President does not have)
BASCO v. PAGCOR
May 14, 1991
Summary: Atty. Basco, Balce, Maranan and Sanchez filed a petition
seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter PD 1869 for being contrary to
morals, public policy and order. Also, that it is 1) a waiver of a right
prejudicial to Manila City government's right to impose taxes and
license fees, which is recognized by law; 2) that this, in contravention of
the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; 3)that it
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR- conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices; 4) that it violates the avowed trend of the Cory government
away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free
enterprise and privatization. The Court ruled in favor of PAGCOR.
Doctrine: The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution
simply means "decentralization". It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."Local
Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government
under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an
imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean
a measure of decentralization of the function of government.
The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent
right to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show
an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it". Its
power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the
"inherent power to tax." The power of local government to "impose
taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may
provide by law.
life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As
it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the
direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax,
which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. An ordinance must
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
(2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
(3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
(4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
(5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
(6) It must not be unreasonable.

Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the

National Government. This principle emanates from the "supremacy" of
the National Government over local governments. If it is otherwise,
mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable
activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation"

Class Notes: Is this good law? NO

1. First, this was decided when BP 337 was in effect; Remember
that we now follow RA 7160 (LGC)
2. Basically Prof. Gatmaytan says that what the National
Government is saying is: “LGU, you are beneath us. Thus, you
cannot tax us!”
 Sir says that this “supremacy” of national government is
not entirely accurate
 As the law now stands, powers and authority of an LGU
depends on what the law gives the LGU (as long as the
law is constitutional)

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP.

July 20, 1994

Summary: PAGCOR prepared to inaugrate a casino in Cagayan de Oro

City, on properties it leased from Pryce Corporation. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City thereafter enacted Ordinance No.
3353 which prohibited the issuance of a business permit and cancelled
existing business permits for the using of the premises of an
establishment or a portion thereof for the operation of a casino.
Thereafter the Sangguniang adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93
which altogether prohibited the operation of gambling casinos in the
City of Cagayan de Oro. The Ordinances were assailed by Pryce. The CA
declared the ordinances invalid. The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA.
P.D. 1869 creating PAGCOR has not been modified by the Local
Government Code, which empowers the local government units to
prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
The SC also held that Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by
a mere ordinance.

Doctrine: The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should

not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of
 Special Law cited in the Syllabus: RA 7227 (1922) – This is regarding the
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, Subic Special Economic Zone
1. Sec. 12 says that this Zone is a Special Economic Free Zone
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS, 2. Sec. 12 also says that the LGUs comprising the Zone retain
their basic autonomy and identity
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS 3. Sec. 14 lays down the relationship of the Conversion
Authority and the LGU
a. In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the
DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS LGU on matters affecting the Zone
(1) The decision of the Authority prevails
Take note of the definitions and concepts: (2) BUT the decision of the LGU prevails when it
comes to defense and security
1. Autonomous Region
a. Consists of provinces, cities, and municipalities and Class Notes:
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive - Is Diliman a barangay? NO, it is not an LGU it is merely an
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social “area”
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the - Prof. Gatmaytan says: Basic test to determine if it is an LGU is
framework of the Constitution to always ask who is the local chief executive
(1) President exercises general supervision over it
 If there is none, then it is not an LGU
(2) All powers not granted by law or Constitution
- As of 2013, Quezon City has 6 districts
shall be vested in National Government
(3) Created via organic act for each autonomous
region with participation of regional consultative
ABBAS v. COMELEC
commission
November 10, 1989
(a) Defines the basic structure of government for
the region for both executive department and
Summary: Petitioners Abbas et al. and Mama-o sought to enjoin the
legislative assemblies
COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite, in implementation of RA 6734 -
(b) Provides for special courts with personal,
the law providing for an Organic Act for the ARMM, and prayed that
family, and property law jurisdiction (Sec. 15
said RA 6734 be declared unconstitutional. They argue that said law
and 16, LGC)
violates the Constitution and is in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
b. The creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
In this case, the SC held that it is unnecessary to determine whether RA
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by
6734 is in conflict with the Tripoli Agreement because it is now the
the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
1987 Constitution which provides for the creation of an autonomous
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of
region. It also held that RA 6734 is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
the Organic Act shall be included. (Abbas v. Comelec)
petitioners were not able to overcome the presumption of
c. It is an LGU (see Class Notes under North Cotabato)
constitutionality.
2. Administrative Region
Doctrine: Under the Constitution and RA 6734, the creation of the
a. Administrative regions are mere groupings of
autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
(Abbas v. Comelec)
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
(1) They are not territorial and political subdivisions
shall be included in the autonomous region. The single plebiscite
like the LGUs in Sec. 1, Art. X, 1987 Constitution
contemplated will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall
(2) While the power to merge administrative regions
be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces
is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it
and cities, among those enumerated in RA 6734, shall compromise it.
is a power traditionally lodged with the President
to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall
supervision over LGUs
determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region.
b. Requirement of plebiscite is not needed in the creation
Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress
of administrative regions, only in LGUs
of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm
of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would
3. Legislative District (discussed in Bagabuyo v. Comelec)
have to go into the wisdom of the law.
a. Related concepts:
(1) Legislative apportionment – the allocation of seats
What is referred to in RA 6734 is the merger of administrative regions
in a legislative body in proportion to the
which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
population (rule is in Sec. 5, Art. VI, Constitution)
purposes. Administrative regions are not territorial and political
(2) Reapportionment – realignment or change in
subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. While
legislative districts brought about by changes in
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
population
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged
b. Legislative apportionment and reapportionment relate
with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
to the creation of legislative districts which is separate
supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the
from LGUs
power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
(1) Though the power to do both is vested in Congress
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
(2) No plebiscite requirement in legislative districts,
government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger
only in LGUs
expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays,
c. LGUs and Legislative districts are interrelated
not to administrative regions.
(1) To ensure continued adherence to the required
standards of apportionment, Sec. 5(4), Art. VI
specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as
the given standards (relating to population) are
met
 CHIONGBAN v. ORBOS
June 22, 1995
Summary: RA 6734 is the organic act of the ARMM which called for a
plebiscite. Of the 13 provinces and 9 cities that voted, only 4 provinces
voted in favor of the Autonomous Region. President Corazon Aquino,
pursuant to her power under RA 6734, Art. 19, Sec. 13 “to merge
existing regions”, issued EO 429, transferring certain provinces and
cities from one region to another. A province and several cities that got
transferred included those that did not vote in the plebiscite. Several
Congressmen of the affected provinces and cities filed petitions for
certiorari arguing that EO 429 is unconstitutional and the President has
no power to merge and reorganize administrative regions. The Court
ruled in favor of the executive power to reorganize administrative
regions.
Doctrine: In conferring on the President the power to merge, by
administrative determination, the existing regions following the
establishment of the ARMM, Congress merely followed the pattern set
in previous legislation. The SC held in the case of Abbas, "while the
power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in
the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments (see Art. 10, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution)." The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are
"mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."
The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor
General or as "administrative in nature." Art. 19, Sec. 13 of RA 6734 is
subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative
determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non-
assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as
designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may
nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other
regions as the exigency of administration may require. The
administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes, not for political representation.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a
redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which
all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those
political units to vote and to be voted for. The administrative regions
are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes, not for political representation. The power to reorganize
administrative regions also carries with it the power to determine the
regional center.
Class Notes: The setting up of autonomous regions promotes political
stability.
CORDILLERA BOARD COALITION v. COA
January 29, 1990
Summary: Cordillera Broad Coalition and Lilia Yaranon, et al., assail EO
220, which created CAR, as unconstitutional as it pre-empts the creation
of an autonomous region pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. The SC
ruled that what is created under EO 220 is not the autonomous region
contemplated in the constitution. It was merely created to coordinate
planning and implementation of programs and services in the areas
covered, preparing them for autonomy.
Doctrine: The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government
units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous
regions contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
administrative autonomy. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an
autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of
an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions.
Class Notes: There is no Cordillera AUTONOMOUS Region yet since the
past 2 plebiscites yielded a negative vote. However, the Cordillera
ADMINISTRATIVE Region is still existent.
ORDILLO v. COMELEC
December 4, 1990
Summary: Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of
the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite. Results of
plebiscite: approved by majority of votes in Ifugao, rejected by the rest
of the provinces and city. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating
that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified
by majority of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first
Monday of March 1991.. Arguing that there can be no valid CAR in only
one province as the Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said
Region be composed of more than one constituent unit, the petitioners
prayed that the said memoranda and Administrative Order be declared
null and void, and that EO 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive
Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly be still in force and effect
until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been
enacted and the same is duly ratified by the by the voters in the
constituent units. The SC declared that the sole province of Ifugao
CANNOT validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Doctrine: The keywords in Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution —
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that
"region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term
"region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This
is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces.
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join
other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. Aside
from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6766 strengthens the position that the Region cannot be constituted
from only one province.
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and
cities shall comprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which
is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous
region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision
which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either
Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only
one province or one city is to constitute it. The issue in this case is
whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the
province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.
Class Notes:
- It is settled in this case that an autonomous region cannot be
composed of only one province
- See Sec. 19, Art. X which provides for an 18th month period
 This period refers to the enactment of the organic law
not the creation of an autonomous region
 So can we still create the autonomous region even after
the 18th month period?
 For one, we can always amend the organic laws
passed by Congress within the 18th month period
 We can also argue that Sec. 19 is NOT prohibitory;
it does not say that Congress cannot create the
region after the 18th month period
- Can we create OTHER autonomous regions? Meaning other
than the Cordillera and Muslim Mindanao?
  Affirmative argument = the Constitution does not
prohibit
 Negative argument = the use of the word “shall” and the
fact that the Constitution explicitly enumerates
“Cordillera” and “Muslim Mindanao” reveals an intent to
limit the regions to the 2 explicitly enumerated.
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC
December 8, 2008
Summary: RA 9371 was enacted apportioning the barangays of Cagayan
de Oro City resulting in an increase in the legislative district from one to
two. The voters of each legislative district would have to elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod. The petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent the COMELEC from implementing Res. No. 7837 on the ground
that RA 9371 is unconstitutional.
The petitioner argued that the resolution and the law are
both unconstitutional because the COMELEC cannot implement RA
9371 without providing for the rules, regulations, and guidelines for the
conduct of a plebiscite, which is indispensable for the division or
conversion of a local government unit. The petitioner was of the
impression that RA 9371 falls within the meaning of “creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities”
under Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, which require the conduct of a
plebiscite.
The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is constitutional.
According to the Supreme Court, RA 9371 is a legislative
reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority
granted to Congress under Art. VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.
Doctrine: An apportionment or reapportionment legislation does not
require a plebiscite and must only comply with Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution. No division of the local government unit as a political and
corporate entity took place. In the case at bar, the local government
unit, remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along
territorial lines. What was involved was merely an addition of another
legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for
purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.
Legislative apportionment is the allocation of seats in a legislative body
in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so
as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.
Legislative reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Legislative reapportionment/apportionment (Art. VI, Sec. 5) and
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries (Art. X, Sec. 10) both require the involvement of Congress
but they are different such that the latter requires the conduct of a
plebiscite and compliance with the criteria set forth in the Local
Government Code whereas the latter does not.
A legislative district is a representative unit and is neither a political
subdivision nor a corporate unit. A district does not act for and in behalf
of the people comprising the district and the primary role of the
Congressman of the legislative district is to ensure that the voice of the
people of the district is heard and not to oversee the affairs of the
legislative district. It has no legal personality that must be created or
dissolved and has no capacity to act. On the other hand, the concern of
Art. X, Sec. 10 (creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries) relates to the commencement, termination,
and modification of local government units’ corporate existence and
territorial coverage. The local government units spoken of here are
political and corporate units. Its corporate existence begins upon the
election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the
members of its Sanggunian. It is the agency of the community in the
administration of local affairs and the representative of the people.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GRP PEACE PANEL
October 14, 2008
Summary: After the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, the Government of the
Republic and the MILF are in the final stages of signing the final draft of
the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect
of the Tripoli Agreement. Before the parties were able to sign, the
present petitions were filed seeking to enjoin the parties from signing
the MOA-AD and attacked its validity. The SC ultimately held that the
MOA-AD is violative of the Constitution and present laws. It ruled that
the concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. The concept implies a recognition of the associated entity
as a state It requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional
provisions especially Sec. 1 and Sec. 15 of Art. X of the Constitution.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any 3rd party that
the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to plebiscite
Doctrine: The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as
presently worded. The concept of association is an international law
concept and is the unifying link to the MOA-AD provisions used to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Republic.
An association is formed when 2 states of unequal power voluntarily
establish durable links; one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its
international status as a state. In international practice, the “associated
state” arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of
former colonies on their way to full independence
The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association. These provisions indicate
that the parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state
or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of Association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. This implies a recognition of the associated entity as a
state but the Constitution does not contemplate any state other than the
Philippine State.
Class Notes:
- Prof. Gatmaytan does not agree with the majority
 The President can always make promises and that in
itself is not unconstitutional
 MOA-AD was merely a framework
- Is an Autonomous Region an LGU?
 YES! It is a sub-national government
 A form of local government
- The new ARMM Charter is RA 9054
 EFFECTIVITY OF THE CODE
Sec. 536, LGC says that the LGC shall take effect on Jan. 1, 1992, unless
otherwise provided herein, after its complete publication in at least 1
newspaper of general circulation
- LGC was published in Malaya on Oct. 18, 1991

EVARDONE v. COMELEC
December 2, 1991

Summary: Evardone was the elected mayor of the Municipality Sulat in

Eastern Samar. A petition for recall was filed against him. COMELEC
issued a resolution for the conduct of the signing of the petition for the
recall of Evardone on July 14, 1990. Evardone filed a petition for
prohibition. SC issued a TRO dated July 12, 1990 which was received by
the COMELEC field agent on July 15, 1990. The signing was conducted
in good faith. Evardone now assails the constitutionality of Resolution
2272 embodying the rules for the conduct of the signing of the petition
for recall of a local official. He argues that the 1987 Constitution
repealed the old Local Government Code(BP 337). Hence, there is no
law from which Resolution 2272 was based. SC ruled that the old LGC
was not repealed by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, it remains in force as
of the moment. The old LGC was repealed by the LGC of 1991 which
took effect on January 1, 1992.

Doctrine: Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that

all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall
remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No.
7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by
the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337. But
the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January
1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is
still the law applicable to the present case.

Class Notes: Remember that when jurisdiction is acquired, it continues

until the final disposition of the case

SECRETARY OF HEALTH v. CA
February 23, 1995

Summary: In the year 1991, administrative proceedings were

commenced against Fe Sibbaluca before the DOH, for grave misconduct,
dishonesty, etc. She was placed under preventive suspension on
December 17, 1991. She challenged the suspension order by motion on
January 8, 1992. Later she instituted an action in the RTC to stop the
proceedings. The action was based on the contention that the Health
Secretary lost his disciplinary power and authority over her, when the
LGC took effect on January 1, 1992. The Court held that at the time of
the commencement of the action the operative laws are the
Administrative Code of 1987 and EO 119. Under said laws, the
Secretary of Health exercises control, direction and supervision over his
subordinates, which include Sibbaluca. Since jurisdiction has been
acquired by the Secretary over the person of Sibbaluca before the
effectivity of the LGC, it continues until the final disposition of the case.

Doctrine: The Local Government Code of 1991 took effect on January 1,

1992. Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action.
 PART 2: BOOK 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS
 If they are abusive or inept, they can be removed from
TITLE ONE: BASIC PRINCIPLES office through the initiative
 People can correct their mistakes and elect better
POLICY AND APPLICATION leaders even during midterm

Initiative, Referendum, Recall

Breakdown of Sec. 1, LGC: Title of RA 7160 shall be known and cited
- These powers may be exercised by the registered voters
as the “Local Government Code of 1991”
residing within the LGU territory under the circumstances
and conditions mentioned in the LGC:
Definitions a. Sec. 69-75 for recall
A. From Sec. 2, EO 292 (Admin Code) b. Sec. 120-127 for initiative referendum
1. Government of the Republic of the Philippines – the
corporate governmental entity through which the
Breakdown of Sec. 3, LGC: Operative Principles of Decentralization
functions of government are exercised through the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears
Formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local
from the context, the various arms through which
autonomy shall be guided by the ff. OPERATIVE PRINCIPLES:
political authority is made effective in the Philippines
2. National Government - the entire machinery of the
(a) Effective allocation among different LGUs of their respective
central government
powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources
3. Local Government – the political subdivisions
(b) Established in every LGU an accountable, efficient, and
established by or in accordance with the Constitution
dynamic organizational structure and operating
B. LGU is defined in Basco v. PAGCOR as “a political subdivision
mechanism
of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
 Will meet priority needs and service requirements of
substantial control of local affairs
its communities
(c) Local officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from
Breakdown of Sec. 2, LGC – Declaration of Policy:
local funds shall be appointed or removed:
(a) Policy of the State that the territorial and political
 According to merit and fitness
subdivisions of the state shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
 By appropriate appointing authority
local autonomy
(d) Vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in LGUs
 To enable them to attain fullest development as self-
shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably
reliant communities
adequate resources to discharge their powers and
 State shall provide for more responsive and
effectively carry out their functions
accountable local government structure instituted
 They shall have power to create and broaden own
through a system of decentralization
source of revenue
 LGUs given more powers, authority,
 Right to a just share in national taxes
responsibilities, and resources
 And equitable share in proceeds of the utilization and
 Process of decentralization shall proceed from
development of national wealth within their respective
national to local government
areas
(b) To ensure accountability of LGUs through institution of
(e) The following shall ensure that acts of their component
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, referendum
units are within scope of their prescribed powers and
(c) To require all national agencies and offices to conduct
functions:
periodic consultations with LGUs, NGOs, and POs, and other
concerned sectors before any project or program is  Provinces with respect to component cities and
implemented in their respective jurisdictions municipalities
 Cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays
Reiteration of Constitutional Policies: These are:
(f) LGUs may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their
1. Genuine and meaningful local autonomy
2. Accountability of LGUs efforts, services, and resources for purposes beneficial to
3. Mandatory periodic consultations them
(g) Capabilities of LGUs enhances by providing them with
Genuine and Meaningful Local Autonomy opportunities to participate actively in implementation of
- Constitution gives local autonomy, LGC emphasizes that it national programs and projects
must be meaningful and genuine  Especially municipalities and barangays
- Purpose: (h) Continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy
1. To enable LGUs to become self-reliant communities and  Not only by legislative enabling acts,
2. To make them more effective partners in attainment of  Also by administrative and organizational reforms
national goals (i) LGUs share with national government responsibility in
- How? Through DECENTRALIZATION management and maintenance of ecological balance within
 Implementation of this is found in Sec. 17 territorial jurisdiction
- De Leon v. Esguerra – Even barangays are meant to possess  Subject to provisions of LGC and national policies
genuine and meaningful local autonomy so that they may (j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring accountability of LGUs in
develop fully as self-reliant communities their respective constituents
 Strengthened in order to upgrade continually the
Accountable Local Officials quality of local leadership
- Local autonomy >> People empowerment (k) Realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through
- Local government officials are accountable to their  Improved coordination of national government
constituencies policies and programs
 And extension of adequate technical and material
 assistance to less developed and deserving LGUs
(l) Participation of private sector in local governance shall be
encouraged
 Particularly in delivery of basic services
 To ensure viability of local autonomy as an alternative
strategy for sustainable development
(m) National government shall ensure that decentralization
contributes to the continuing improvement of performance
of LGUs and quality of community life
Breakdown of Sec. 4, LGC: Scope of Application
LGC shall apply to all:
1. Provinces
2. Cities
3. Municipalities
4. Barangays
5. Other political subdivisions as may be created by law
6. To officials, offices, or agencies of the national government,
to the extent herein provided
RULES OF INTERPRETATION
Breakdown of Sec. 5, LGC: Rules of Interpretation:
(a) Any provision on a power of LGU shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor
 In case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of:
1. Devolution of powers and
2. Lower LGU
 Any fair and reasonable doubt as to existence of the
power shall be interpreted in favor of LGU concerned
(b) In case of doubt, tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be
construed strictly against LGU enacting it and liberally in
favor of taxpayer
 Tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by LGU shall
be construed strictly against person claiming it
(c) General welfare provisions in LGC shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating
economic development and upgrading quality of life for
people in the community
(d) Rights and obligations existing on date of effectivity of LGC
and arising out of contracts or any other source of
prestation involving LGU:
 Shall be governed by:
1. Original terms and conditions of said contracts,
2. Or law in force at time such rights were vested
(e) In resolution of controversies arising under LGC where no
legal provision or jurisprudence applies:
 Resort may be had to customs and traditions in the
place where controversies take place
GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
MUNICIPALITY OF BALANGA
December 27, 1994
Summary: GBDC applied with the office of the mayor of Balanga, Bataan
for a business permit for its property certain portions of which has
been unlawfully invaded by the municipality of Balanga. The Mayor
issued a permit. The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution ordering
the mayor to revoke the permit. The Mayor revoked the permit. GBDC
filed this petition claiming that the only time the mayor could revoke a
license is when they had violated any law or ordinance. The
municipality of Bataan cites Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue
Code alleging two things, one, GBDC did not secure permits separately
for its two businesses and two, that GBDC did not inform them that the
lot was subject to an adverse claim. SC decided for GBDC. They held that
Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code does not expressly state
that GBDC should secure permits separately.
Doctrine: The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in
strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against
the municipality.
Class Notes:
- SC said that the power of LGUs is construed strictissimi juris
 This is NOT good law
- Under Sec. 5(a), LGC – liberal construction in favor of local
autonomy
 NOTE that not all laws are to be construed liberally
 Ex: Tax laws are still strictly construed:
1. Against the LGU
2. Against the taxpayer (in case of tax
exemptions)
TANO v. SOCRATES
August 21, 1997
Summary: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Prinsesa passed
Ordinance No. 15-92, banning the shipment of all live fish and lobsters
outside of its city. To implement the city ordinance, then Acting Mayor
Lucero issued Order No. 23, authorizing the inspection of cargoes
containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto
Prinsesa Airport, Wharf or at any port within it to ascertain that the
Mayor’s Permit required by PD 426-14-74 for any person engaged in
business where a permit is required. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, prohibiting the
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of five years. Two
sets of petitioners filed this petition in the SC. The SC ruled that for the
first set of petitioners, the certiorari was premature, lacking a cause of
action. This is because there was no showing that a motion to quash
was filed in the criminal cases. For the second set, it said that the
petition is for declaratory relief which the Court does not possess
original jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this, the Court resolved the case
on its merits considering that the lifetime of the Ordinances was about
to end and having been enacted in the exercise of powers under the
new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the
environment, the case is novel and of paramount importance. The SC
did not find them Constitutionally infirm and upheld their validity.
Doctrine: Sec. 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general
welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to the local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant
fishery privileges, to penalize certain acts be ordinances, and to
prosecute violations. Further, the sangguaniang bayan, panlungsod and
panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of
the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include ordinances that
protect the environment and impose penalties for acts which endanger
the environment. The centerpiece of the LGC is the system of
decentralization. Devolution is indispensable to decentralization and
the LGC expressly provides that any provisions on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt
as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned. Devolution refers to the act by which the
National Government confers power and authority upon the various
local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.

Class Notes:
- For the general welfare clause, always construe liberally in
favor of local autonomy.
- Some comments from Prof. Gatmaytan:
1. If we look at Art. Xii, Sec. 2, and Art. XIII, Sec. 2 and 7,
these provisions refer to the rights of marginal
fishermen however there was no showing that
petitioners were indeed marginal fishermen (no
discussion also by the SC)
 If we look at Sec. 149, LGC, it only gives
preferential treatment to these fishermen (but this
is not absolute)
2. This case covers the application of the GWC6 and the
devolution of fishery laws
a. So we look at the objectives:
(1) During closed season – we invoke LGU’s
devolved power over fisheries
(2) To protect marine life – we invoke GWC

6
General welfare clause
 GENERAL POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES Breakdown of Sec. 7, LGC:
GENERAL RULE: Creation of LGU or its conversion from one level to
another shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and
CREATION OF LGUs
projected capacity to provide services:
a. INCOME
Breakdown of Sec. 6, LGC: Authority to Create LGUs: (1) Must be sufficient to provide for all essential
An LGU may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its government facilities and special functions
boundaries substantially altered either by: commensurate with population
1. Law enacted by Congress – for province, city, municipality (2) Based on acceptable standards
or any other political subdivision, or b. POPULATION
2. Ordinance by Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang (1) Total number of inhabitants within territorial
Panglungsod – for barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction
jurisdiction c. LAND AREA
Subject to limitations and requirements prescribed by LGC. (1) Must be contiguous; UNLESS:
(a) Comprises 2 or more islands, OR
Creation of LGUs in General (b) Separated by LGU independent of the others
- Sec. 6 pertains to the creation of the particular LGUs (2) Must be properly identified by metes and bounds with
mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. X, 1987 Constitution technical descriptions
- The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or alter the (3) Must be sufficient to provide for basic services and
boundaries of an LGU is lodged with CONGRESS facilities
 Congress exercises this power by enacting an
appropriate law Compliance by these indicators attested to by:
1. DOF
NOTE: CAR is NOT an LGU 2. NSO
- Remember that Congress cannot expand the LGUs mentioned 3. LMB
in Sec. 1, Art. X (the list is exclusive) 4. DENR
- In Cordillera Board Coalition v. COA the SC ruled that the CAR
was validly created, it is not an LGU Three main considerations:
 It is not a public corporation or a territorial and 1. Income - Must be sufficient to provide for all essential
political subdivision; no separate juridical personality; government facilities and services commensurate with
not vested with powers of a public corporation population size
 It is created primarily to coordinate the planning and 2. Population - Total number of inhabitants within territorial
implementation of programs and services in the jurisdiction
covered area 3. Land Area - Must be:
a. Contiguous, unless it comprises of 2 or more islands or
Power to Create LGU = LEGISLATIVE - As held in Pelaez v. Auditor is separated by an LGU independent from others
General, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially b. Properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
legislative in character descriptions
c. Sufficient to provide for such basic services and
NOTE: Take note the special treatment of barangays facilities to meet the requirements of populace
- Barangays may be created, merged, abolished by the (1)
Sangguniang Panlalawigan or (2) Sangguniang Panglungsod MANNER OF CREATION
by ordinance within its respective jurisdictions
- Sangguniang Bayan of a municipality do not have such power MANNER OF CREATION
- Neither can a barangay council create another barangay 1. May be by:
within itself, etc. a. Law, or
b. Ordinance of sangguniang
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus: panlalawigan or sangguniang
1. Art. X Constitution – Sec. 1, 7, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19 BARANGAY
panglungsod
 See Constitutional Basis section of reviewer 2. If creation is by sangguniang
2. RA 7878 (1995) (Sec. 385 and
panlalawigan, recommendation of
 Act converting the sub-provinces of Kalinga and Apayao 386 LGC)
sangguniang bayan concerned shall be
into regular provinces: Province of Kalinga and necessary
Province of Apayao 3. Subject to a plebiscite
3. RA 8371 (1991) - IPRA 4. No income requirement
 Sec. 18 on Tribal Barangays provide that the ICCs/IPs MUNICIPALITY 1. Only by an act of Congress
living in continuous areas or communities where they 2. Subject to a plebiscite
form predominant population but are located in (Sec. 441 and 3. Must comply with the income, population,
municipalities, provinces or cities MAY form a separate 442 LGC) and land area requirements
barangay 1. Only by an act of Congress
4. RA 9009 (2001) CITY 2. Subject to a plebiscite
 Increased the average annual income requirement for a 3. Must comply with:
municipality or cluster of barangays to be converted (Sec. 449 and a. Income requirement
into a component city 450 LGC) b. Either of the land area or population
 Now the income requirement is P100M for the last 2 requirement
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices 1. Only by an Act of Congress
5. RA 9054 (2001), Art. IV, Sec. 19 - Organic Act of ARMM PROVINCE 2. Subject to a plebiscite
6. RA 10170 (2012) 3. Must comply with:
 An act reapportioning 2nd Legislative District of Quezon (Sec. 460 and a. Income requirement
City thereby creating 2 additional legislative districts 461 LGC) b. Either of the land area or population
and 2 sangguniang panglungsod seats requirement
 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS Breakdown of Sec. 8, LGC: Division and Merger
Division and merger of existing LGUs shall comply with same
INCOME POPULATION LAND AREA requirements as creation. Provided;
Average annual 1. Division shall NOT reduce income, population, or land area
income of not At least 250,000 At least to less than minimum requirements
less than P20M inhabitants 2,000sqkm 2. Income classification of original LGUs shall NOT fall below
PROVINCE
As certified by As certified its current income classification prior to such division
Based on 1991 the NSO by LMB
constant prices Income classification of LGUs shall be updated within 6 months from
Average annual LGC effectivity.
income of not
At least 150,000 At least
less than Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger = Same Requirements
inhabitants 100sqkm
CITY P100M
As certified by As certified
As to the 2nd par. of Sec. 8 – requires the updating of financial position of
the NSO by LMB
Based on 2000 LGUs within 6 months from LGC effectivity to guide the government on
constant prices the matter of classification of LGUs and serve as basis for changes in the
P2.5M annual staffing patterns and salary scale of LGUs.
income for the
At least 25,000 As least
last 2
inhabitants 50 sqkm
MUNICIPALITY consecutive PADILLA v. COMELEC
As certified by As certified
years based on October 19, 1992
the NSO by LMB
1991 constant
prices Summary: The COMELEC promulgated a resolution providing for a
No land area plebiscite to determine if the people approves the creation of the
At least 2,000
requirement municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The plebiscite was to be conducted in
inhabitants
for its the areas which will comprise the new municipality and also in the
creation remaining areas of the mother Municipality. The plebiscite resulted in
EXCEPT: in
No specific the disapproval of the municipality of Tulay na Lupa. The Governor of
municipalities
requirement. But it must the province filed a case to set aside the plebiscite on the ground that it
and cities within
Financial follow the should have only been conducted in the barangays which are to
Metro Manila,
viability of the general comprise the new municipality. The SC ruled that the COMELEC did not
and other
created guidelines abuse its discretion when it issued the resolution and included in the
BARANGAY metropolitan
barangay being: (1) as plebiscite the remaining areas of the mother municipality.
political
becomes the much as
subdivisions
obligation of possible, Doctrine: When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in
and in highly
the LGU contiguous, the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
urbanized cities,
creating it and (2) political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation
requirement is
properly of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is
5,0000
identified by contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the
Inhabitants as
metes and plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
certified by NSO
bounds Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants
of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as
Please note: well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
1. The average annual income:
a. INCLUDES any income accruing to the general fund
b. EXCLUDES special funds, special account transfers, and TORRALBA v. MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT
non-recurring income January 29, 1987
2. As held in Tan v. Comelec, “territory” requirement in the old
LGC refers to the mass of land area and excluded the waters Summary: BP 56, creating the Municpality of Sibagat, was assailed as
over which the political unit exercised control being violative of Sec. 3, Art. XI, of the 1973 Constitution. The
a. Thus, when the new LGC was enacted, the law uses the petitioners argue that the Local Government Code must first be enacted
word “land area” to emphasize that the area excludes in order to determine the criteria for the creation of the municipality.
water area for purposes of Sec. 7 Since the Local Government Code had not yet been enacted at the time
3. Also remember that the land area for LGUs must be BP 56 was enacted, the latter was thus null and void. The SC disagreed
contiguous as a general rule but it admits of 2 exceptions: with this, saying that the absence of the LGC at the time of the
a. When LGU created comprises 2 or more islands enactment of BP 56 does not take away the legislature from being able
b. Or when it is separated by another LGU (meaning an to create municipal corporations. While the LGC has not yet been
LGU is located in between parts of the LGU concerned) enacted, the legislative power remains plenary, except that the creation
4. IMPORTANT: of the new local government unit should be approved by the people
a. Provinces and cities must satisfy the income concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
requirement, and EITHER population or territory The power to create a municipal corporation is essentially
b. Barangays have no minimum requirement for area and legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations a
income legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the
more efficient administration of government.
On Conversions - Conversion means the elevation of an LGU from one
level to another Doctrine: Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution does not prohibit nor
- Conversion from one LGU to a higher form (like a proscribe the creation of municipal corporations prior to the enactment
municipality being converted to a component city) of the LGC. Such enactment is not a condition sine qua non, in the same
 There is also conversion when an LGU’s class category way that the creation of a municipality does not preclude the enactment
changes (like when a province is raised from a fourth of the LGC. What the provision means is that once said Code is enacted,
class category to 3rd, 2nd, or 1st) the creation, modification or dissolution of LGUs should conform to the
- Requirements for creation also apply to their conversion criteria thus laid down
 CAWALING v. COMELEC
October 26, 2001
Summary: RA 8806 was passed creating Sorsogon City through the
merger of 2 municipalities. Cawaling filed 2 petitions assailing the
constitutionality of the law, claiming, among other things, that a
component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a
cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities. The Court
held that the phrase referred to by Cawaling is just one of the modes of
creating a city.
Doctrine: The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the
modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a
province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. As per Section 8 of the Code, the creation of an
entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of
existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution,
provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.
PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL
December 24, 1965
Summary: The President issued Executive Orders creating 33
municipalities claiming Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 as basis. Petitioners question the validity of such EOs alleging that
Sec 68 was repealed by the Barrio Charter and the 1935 Constitution.
Under the Barrio Charter, the president has no power to create barrios
so the petitioners argued that it implies a negation of the bigger power
to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The
Auditor General insisted that municipalities can be created without
creation of barrios. SC ruled that the EOs are not valid. Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power to the President. Also, it was been repealed by the
1935 Constitution which only gives the president the power of general
supervision over local government units.
Doctrine: Whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to
avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as
it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. The power of control
is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned.
SEMA v. COMELEC
December 24, 1965
Summary: Cotabato City, together with 8 municipalities constituted one
legislative district under Maguindanao. The ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the aforesaid 8
municipalities (leaving out Cotabato City), separate from
Magundanao. For purposes of elections for representatives to Congress,
the COMELEC issued a Resolution maintaining the legislative district of
the aforesaid 8 municipalities plus Cotabato City. Sema, a candidate for
legislative representative claimed that the newly created province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, by virtue of its creation should automatically
constitute its own legislative district apart from Cotabato city, receiving
an additional seat in the House of Representatives. The SC ruled that
only Congress has the exclusive power to create legislative districts,
which are required in the creation of provinces and cities.
Doctrine: Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of
legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot
create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. The
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office
like the office of a district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within
its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law.
LATASA v. COMELEC
December 10, 2003
Summary: After Latasa served three terms as mayor of the Municipality
of Digos, Digos was converted to a City via a plebiscite. Nothing changed
as to territory, population, etc. It was just a conversion of the same area
to a city. Before the election of new city officials, Latasa held the
position in hold-over capacity. Now, Latasa wishes to run for mayor of
the City of Digos, claiming that the Municipality and City are two
different entities, so he is not running for the same position in
contravention of the three-term limit. The Supreme Court found Latasa
ineligible to run as candidate for the position of Digos City Mayor.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, Latasa would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a
total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to
be avoided by the Constitution
Doctrine: Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a
city. For one, there is a material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a
municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people
as well. It is precisely for this reason why Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution mandates a plebiscite.
As may be gleaned from Sec. 7 of the LGC, the creation or conversion of
a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic
viability.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and
distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however,
that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision,
that the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As
stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same
as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the
municipality are the same as those in the city.
Comparison with other cases:
(1) Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC:
 A successor’s (vice-mayor) occupation of a post
(mayor), due to the death of his predecessor, for the
remainder of the latter’s term cannot be construed as a
full term. Further, nature of the responsibilities and
duties of the vice-mayor are wholly different
(2) Lonzanida v. COMELEC:
 When a term is involuntarily interruptedby a
declaration of vacancy of such position, pursuant to a
failure of election, the term cannot be counted for
purposes of the three-term limit.
(3) Adormeo v. COMELEC:
 An assumption to office through a recall election
should not be considered as one term in applying the
three-term limit rule.
(4) Socrates v. COMELEC:
 After serving three terms, and not running in the
succeeding election, one can run in a recall election
pursuant to the recall of the candidate who won in
such succeeding election.
 LACEDA v. LIMENA
November 25, 2008
Summary: On October 23, Limena filed a petition for disqualification
and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate against Laceda before the
COMELEC, asserting that he had already served as Punong Barangay for
3 consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus prohibited from running
for the 4th time under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9164. COMELEC
declared Laceda disqualified and cancelled his certificate of candidacy.
Laceda asserted that when he was elected for his first 2 terms, Sorsogon
was still a municipality, and that when he served his 3rd term, the
Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the
Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of Sorsogon,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806. Thus, his 3rd term was actually just
his first in the new political unit and that he was accordingly entitled to
run for 2 more terms. SC denied his petition with finality.
Doctrine: For the prohibition to apply, two requisites must concur: (1)
that the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in
the same local government post and (2) that he or she has fully served 3
consecutive terms. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the same group of
voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as
their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt
Laceda's term.
NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
April 12, 2011
Summary: RA No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands) was enacted into law. The creation of the local government
unit was approved by the people from both the mother province of
Surigao delNorte and the Province of Dinagat Islands.
Navarro, Bernal and Medina assail RA No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. Section 10 of Article X provides that the creation o fa
local government unit should be in accordance with the criteria
established by the local government code, and the Local Government
Code of 1991 provides that a province should have an average annual
income of not less than P20, 000,000, a continuous territory of at least
2000 sq. m, and a population of not less than 250,000.
The province of Dinagat did not comply with land area
requirement, it being composed of two or more island. The Republic
argues that there is an exemption to the land area requirement if the
province is composed of two or more islands, pursuant to Article 9(2)
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC.
The SC first decided that the exemption to the land area
requirement was not expressly provided for in Sec. 461 of the LGC on
the creation of provinces; hence it does not apply in this case. RA 9355
is therefore unconstitutional and the province of Dinagat cannot be
created. The SC reversed this decision.
Doctrine: When the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or component city consisting of one or more islands, it is
EXEMPT from the land area requirements as expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC.
This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the
requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the
LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or
group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities.
It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy
decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and
Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
INADVERTENTLY OMITTED in Section 461.
DE FACTO CORPORATIONS
Occurs when there is a defect in the creation but the legal existence has
been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Requisites:
1. Valid law authorizing incorporation
2. Attempt in good faith to organize it
3. Colorable compliance with the law
4. Assumption of corporate powers
Municipal Corporations by Prescription - Existence is presumed where
the corporation has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for a period long enough to afford title by
prescription. [Martin, Public Corporations (1977)]
Attacks against the Validity of Incorporation
- Action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or any other direct proceeding
 Collateral attacks are not allowed
- The proceeding must be:
1. Brought in the name of the Republic
2. Commenced by the Solicitor General or Fiscal when
directed by President
3. Timely raised
MALABANG v. BENITO
March 28, 1969
Summary: The Municipality of Malabang filed an action for prohibition
to nullify EO 386, the EO which created the municipality of Balabagan.
Malabang relies on the cases of Pelaezand San Joaquin, and argues that
EO 386 is invalid because the President does not have the power to
create municipalities, given that Sec.68 of the Admin. Code giving him
such power is unconstitutional. Respondent mayor of Balabagan claim
Pelaezdoes not apply to this case because Balabagan is a de facto
corporation. As such, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked (as
what is being done in this case). The SC held that the municipality of
Balabagan is NOT a de facto corporation.
Doctrine: In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was
recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later
invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the
consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate
vitality to the organization.
Principles which seem to reconcile the apparently conflicting US
decisions:
1. The COLOR OF AUTHORITY requisite to the organization of
a de facto municipal corporation may be:
 A valid law enacted by the legislature.
 An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has
either (a) been upheld for a time by the courts or (b)
not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for
its creation can be found in some other valid law or in
the recognition of its potential existence by the general
laws or constitution of the state.
2. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either
directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is
authorized by some legislative fiat.
3. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional
statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face.
4. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the
place of an existing de jure corporation, as such organization
would clearly be a usurper.
 CANDIJAY v. CA
December 28, 1995
Summary: The Municipality of Candijay is claiming certain barrios in the
Municipality of Alicia. One of Candijay’s arguments is that Alicia lacks a
juridical personality since E.O. 265 creating Alicia is null and void,
inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which
said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of
legislative powers to the President and was declared unconstitutional,
per the SC’s ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General.
Doctrine: The case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr
is applicable. Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect
that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances
or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." Section
442 (d) of the Local Government Code was not argued to be
unconstitutional. The power to create political subdivisions is a
function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has
incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws are validly
accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights. Inasmuch as Alicia is similarly situated as
the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the
effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should
henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.
JIMENEZ v. BAZ
December 2, 1996
Summary: Seeking to win a territorial dispute, Jimenez assailed the legal
existence of Sinacaban, arguing that, since it was created through an EO,
it cannot have legal existence. It cited Pelaez v. Auditor General, which
ruled that creation of municipalities is essentially legislative. The RTC
and the SC, however, ruled that (1) since 40 years have lapsed since its
supposed creation, (2) no quo warranto proceedings were instituted
against it after Pelaez was decided, (3) the Constitution, through the
appended Ordinance, made it part of a legislative district, (4) it was
made part of an MCTC, and (5) by virtue of Section 442(4), LGC of 1991,
its previously de facto status has become de jure.
Doctrine: Where a municipality created by executive order is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation
can no longer be questioned.
PLEBISCITE
Plebiscite is an ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT
- Once LGU is created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered, a plebiscite must be
conducted by the COMELEC
- When?
a. On the date fixed by law or ordinance, or
b. Within 120 days from its effectivity
Breakdown of Sec. 10, LGC: Plebiscite Requirement
No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of LGUs shall take effect UNLESS approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite
1. Plebiscite called for that purpose
2. In the political unit/s directly affected
3. Conducted by the COMELEC:
a. Within 120 days from effectivity of law or ordinance
effecting such action
b. Unless said law or ordinance fixes another date
Mandatory Requirement
- Mandated by the LGC and the Constitution
- Rationale: To check the power of Congress or the LGU
concerned to carry out such functions
- In Tan v. Comelec the LGUs directly affected should
participate in the plebiscite
 This means, in that case, the new province and the
parent province
- Also remember that plebiscite concerns LGUs, not
administrative regions (see Abbas)
TOBIAS v. ABALOS
December 8, 1994
Summary: The municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to
only one legislative district. The incumbent congressional
representative sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No.
7675 known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held
and the people were asked whether they approved of the conversion of
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. Majority
voted yes, thus R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675. They
contend that it is a violation of the three specific provisions of the
Constitution which are Article 6, Sec 26(1), Sec 5(1) and Sec 4.
Doctrine: Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have
been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same
involved a change in their legislative district.
The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in
the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only
ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly
excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
PASIG v. COMELEC
September 10, 1999
Summary: The City Council of Pasig passed two ordinances creating two
barangays. Two separate plebiscites for the creation of the two
barangays were scheduled on two different dates. The Municipality of
Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled
by filing a petition with the COMELEC. The Municipality of Cainta called
the attention o the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of
Antipolo for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the
Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays encroached upon areas
within its own jurisdiction/territory while the City of Pasig claims these
areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory. The COMELEC ruled in favor
of Cainta and suspended one of the plebiscites but dismissed the
petition with respect to the other barangay for being moot because the
plebiscite was already held. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
Municipality of Cainta and upheld the validity of the suspension
ordered by the COMELEC.
Doctrine: A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more
or less permanent natural boundaries. If there is a controversy with
respect to the territorial boundaries of a local government unit, then it
is a prejudicial issue that must be resolved first before the creation of
an LGU.
MARIANO v. COMELEC
March 7, 1995
the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political
units directly affected."
Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past
whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or
divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of
the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit
directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism.
Class Notes: Sir does not really agree with this case
1. First we need to distinguish:
a. Plebiscite is a political requirement – a check for
Congress
b. The economic aspect is to test the viability of the
proposed LGU
2. Second, “Conversion” is not in the law requiring plebiscite
a. Not really convinced on the “common” denominator
argument of the SC

Summary: The constitutionality of the provisions of RA 7854 (An Act

Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as City of Makati) were attacked in two petitions. The SC upheld
the constitutionality of the statute.
Doctrine: (On defining the territorial boundaries of LGUs) The
importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries
of a LGU cannot be overemphasized. Boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of LGU. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits of its jurisdiction;
beyond this, its acts are ultra vires. Any uncertainty in the boundaries of
LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers
which will prejudice people’s welfare. This is the evil sought to be
avoided by the LGC in requiring that the land area must be spelled out
in metes and bounds with technical descriptions
(On legislative districts) These issues have been addressed in Tobias v.
Abalos. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise fixed by law (Art. VI, Sec. 5(1)). Constitution
did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment law.
MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE
September 16, 1999
SAMSON v. AGUIRRE
September 22, 1999
Summary: A QC Councilor challenges the validity of RA 8535 (creating
Novaliches City) for violating the LGC and its Implementing Rules. SC:
Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality of the RA.
Doctrine: In the plebiscite under RA 8535, all persons concerned will
obviously have the opportunity to raise issues even before they vote on
the principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches.
RA 8535 does not provide for a seat of government.
However, this omission is not as fatal to the validity as Samson makes it
to be. We agree with respondents that under Sec. 12 of the LGC, which
applies to the proposed City by virtue of Sec. 54 of RA 8535, the City
can still establish a seat of government after its creation.
There is no need to consider the land area, since under the LGC, the
proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income, and
population OR land area.
The statements made by officials in their official capacity could serve
the same purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their
affirmation and oath in open session in the Senate/ HOR give greater
solemnity than a certification given routinely.

Summary: The petitioners in this case are the Mayor and other local
officials of City of Santiago. They were assailing the constitutionality of
the RA 8528, converting the City of Santiago from an independent city
into a component city, insofar as it does not provide for a plebiscite. SC
ruled RA 8528 unconstitutional. It held that a change in the LGU which
would substantially affect the political and economic rights of its citizen
requires the approval of the people in the political units directly
affected. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be
diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative
supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances
of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial
Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have
to be shared with the province.

Doctrine: The IRR of the LGC of 1991, pertaining to the requirement of

plebiscite, covers all conversions, whether upward or downward in
character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political
and economic rights of its people.

In Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, the creation, division,

merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator — material change in
the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that
 DOWNGRADING, DIVISION, MERGER 7
Downgrading – Falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration, hence, ratification in a plebiscite is
necessary
- There is a material change in the political and economic
rights of the LGUs inhabitants as well as its budget, and thus
reasonable to require consent of affected population
(Miranda v. Aguirre)
- Effects of downgrading (from independent component city to
component city):
1. City mayor will be placed under administrative
supervision of Governor
2. Resolutions and ordinances will have to be reviewed by
the Provincial Board
3. Taxes will have to be shared by the province
Division and Merger - Division and merger shall comply with the same
requirements prescribed for their creation:
- Provided: such division shall no reduce the income,
population, or land area of the LGU concerned to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed;
- Provided: the income classification of the original LGU shall
not fall below its current classification prior to the division;
- Effects of MERGER:
1. Legal existence and right of office of the annexed LGU
are terminated
2. Laws and ordinances of the annexing LGU shall prevail
3. Title to property is acquired by the annexing LGU
4. Debts are assumed by the annexing LGU
- Effects of DIVISION
1. The legal existence of the original LGU is extinguished
2. The property, rights, and powers are acquired by the
dividing LGUs
ABOLITION
Breakdown of Sec. 9, LGC: Abolition of Local Government Units
An LGU may be abolished when its income, population, or land area
has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards
prescribed for its creation
- Certified by national agencies in Sec. 7 to Congress or to the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be
Law or ordinance abolishing LGU shall specify the province, city,
municipality, barangay with which the LGU sought to be abolished will
be incorporated or merged.
Abolition of LGUs
- When minimum requirements for its creation are not met,
the LGU MAY be abolished
- How done?
1. Through an act of Congress
a. In case of a province, city, municipality, or other
political subdivision
2. Through the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Panglungsod
concerned
a. In case of a barangay
- Note that with abolition, it must be specified to which LGU
the abolished LGU will be incorporated into
- Abolition:
1. Certified by the national agencies concerned to the
Congress or the sanggunian, as the case may be.
2. Does result in an automatic cessation of the LGU;
Congress or the sanggunian concerned must pass a law
or ordinance for the abolition, and such must be
7
Not in the syllabus but this discussion is helpful
subjected to a plebiscite. (Sultan Usman Sarangani vs
COMELEC)
Remember: Dissolution does not occur due to:
1. Non-user or surrender of charter
2. Failure to elect municipal officers
3. Change of sovereignty
4. Change of name
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI v. COMELEC
June 26, 2000
Summary: A petition for annulment of several precincts in Madalum,
Lanao del Sur was filed w Comelec. Comelec conducted an ocular
inspection on the alleged Brgy. Padian Torogan and they found out that
there were only two structures both uninhabitable and that the people
claimed that they were not registered voters or residents of the area.
Comelec declared the precinct in Brgy. Padian Torogan as a ghost
precinct. The former mayor, incumbent mayor and vice mayor of
Madalum filed an instant petition for certiorari and mandamus. SC
upheld the Comelec.
Doctrine: Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of an
LGU may be done by congress in the case of a province, city,
municipality or any other political subdivision. In the case of a
barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural
communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan or
Sangguinang panglungsod concerned subject to the mandatory
requirement of a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political
units affected
SALVA v. MAKALINTAL
September 18, 2000
Summary: The Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas enacted
Ordinance No. 5 declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its
merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas. The
ordinance instructed COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. The
governor of Batangas vetoed the ordinance for not having the
attestations and certifications of the DOF, NSO and DENR as required by
the Local Government Code. The veto was overriden by Resolution No.
345 affirming its effectivity. Pursuant to the ordinance and resolution,
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987 providing for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the plebiscte scheduled on
February 28, 1998. The petitioners, who are officials and residents of
barangay San Rafael, filed a class suit before the RTC for the annulment
of the ordinance and resolutions. They filed an ex parte motion for the
issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injuction. The RTC dismissed the
motion for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that any petition or action
questioning an act, resolution or decision of COMELEC must be brought
before the SC. On Feb. 27, the petitioners filed this case in the SC with
prayer for a TRO. The next day, the plebiscite was held. The petitioners
argued that the RTC had jurisdiction to rule on their motion because the
conduct of a plebiscite by the COMELEC is a ministerial duty not
exclusively within the power of the SC to review. The respondents say
that the petition is already moot. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioners
and said the question on the validity of the COMELEC resolution may
well be taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
Doctrine: The issuance of a COMELEC Resolution for the conduct of a
plebiscite is a ministerial duty that is enjoined by law and is part and
parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of
discretionary authority on the part of COMELEC.
 INCOME
ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA
January 31, 1996
Summary: RA 7720 was passed converting the municipality of Santiago
into an independent component city. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of the RA on the ground that the income of Santiago,
after deducting the IRA, does not meet the 20M minimum income
requirement for conversion. The SC ruled that the IRA should be
included in the computation of the income.
enact a contrary law and deem it amendatory to the
LGC
- If we compare this to Torralba (see page 16):
 Note that prior to the LGC enactment, creation of LGU is
plenary
 Now, the LGC limits the power by specifying the
requirements
- As to the whether the P100M is proper
 Argue that it goes into the wisdom of the law!

Doctrine: The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs
regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of
any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus
constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon
as the source of much needed funds.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

June 28, 2011

Summary: 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into

component cities were filed before the House of Representatives.
However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th
Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the
Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify
for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100
million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income
requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009. After the Court changed its
mind several times, it finally upheld the constitutionality of the
cityhood laws. However, Justice Carpio and Justice Sereno dissented.

Doctrine: A second motion for reconsideration is not allowed.

The dissents are more important:

[Carpio, J. Dissenting]
The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any other
law.

The Legislature, in enacting RA No. 9009, is not required by the

Constitution to show the courts data like inflation figures to support the
increased income requirement. As long as the increased income
requirement is not impossible to comply, such increase is a policy
determination involving the wisdom of the law, which exclusively lies
within the province of the Legislature.

The Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local

Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a
city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. To avoid
discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, such criteria cannot
be embodied in any other law except the Local Government Code

[Sereno, J. Dissenting]
The Constitution did not preclude Congress from revising the standards
imposed under the LGC. Congress shall enjoy the freedom to reconsider
the minimum standards under the LGC, if future circumstances call for
it. However, the method of revising the criteria must be directly done
through an amendatory law of the LGC (such as RA 9009), and not
through the indirect route of creating cities and exempting their
compliance with the established and prevailing standards.

Class Notes:
- See Dissent of Carpio
 Under the majority’s ruling it seems like we need not
follow the LGC anymore since Congress can always
 POPULATION
AQUINO III v. COMELEC
April 7, 2010
Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9716 which
reapportioned the composition of the legislative districts in the
Province of CamSur and created a new legislative district. With the new
grouping, the proposed first district will have a population of less than
250,000. The Court upheld the validity of RA 9716, ruling that only a
city needs to meet the minimum population requirement of 250,000 for
it to be entitled to a legislative district. A province need not meet such
minimum population requirement.
Doctrine: While a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a
population minimum of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative.
In the determination of the precise district within the
province, population was not the only factor considered.
Class Notes; See Dissent of Carpio
- Representative democracy is impaired
- RA 9716 is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the clear
and precise standards in Sec. 5, Art. VI
 Ratio is proportional representation
 Minimum population of 250,000 per Legislative District
 Progressive ratio in increase of districts as
population base increases
- Legislators represent PEOPLE, not cities or provinces
ALDABA v. COMELEC
January 25, 2010
Summary: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare
unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative
district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city
because the population count used as basis for the addition of a
legislative district was based on the undated demographic projected
population of Malabon issued by Dir Alberto Miranda of the NSO which
states that by year 2010 the population would be 250,000. Court
declares that projection requirements should be strictly complied with,
or should be based on actual figures instead, and the legislative seat
shall be granted on the following election after its attainment.
Doctrine: Population projection if used as a basis for the creation of a
legislative district, should be based on credible sources certified by the
NCSB, or on actual figures and the legislative district shall take effect on
the election after the population has been attained.
SUB-PROVINCES
Relevant Provisions:
1. Art. XVIII, Sec. 9
 A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until
it is converted into a regular province or until its
component municipalities are reverted to the mother
province
2. Sec. 462, LGC on existing sub-provinces
 Existing sub-provinces are converted into regular
provinces upon approval by majority vote in a
plebiscite to be conducted simultaneously with national
elections following LGC effectivity
 New legislative districts created as a result of
conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress
by the representatives of the original districts UNTIL
own representatives shall have been elected in next
regular congressional elections and qualified
 Incumbent elected officials of said subprovinces
converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold
office until June 30, 1992
 Vacancies in the offices occupied by incumbent
elected officials, or resulting from expiration of
their terms in case of a negative vote in plebiscite
shall be filled by appointment by President
 After effectivity of conversion, President shall fill
up position of governor or newly-created province
through appointment if none has not yet been
appointed;
 He shall also appoint vice-governor and other
members of sanggunian who shall hold office until
successors are elected in next regular elections
GRINO v. COMELEC
September 4, 1992
Summary: Pursuant to the LGC which called for the conversion of sub-
provinces into provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite to be held in the areas directly affected, a plebiscite was
conducted by the Comelec for the conversion of the sub-province of
Guimaras which formed part of the 2nd district of Guimaras. The ballot
did not contain any space or provision for the election of the governor,
vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
representing the second district of Iloilo. It only contained yes or no
question on whether to convert the sub-province to a province. The
petitioners seek to assail this for disenfranchising them to vote for
provincial officials in case the conversion is rejected in the plebiscite.
The Court ruled that the issue is moot and academic because the
conversion was approved by majority in the plebiscite and the
President shall appoint, as he already did, provincial officials in the
newly created province pursuant to the LGC.
Doctrine: In a plebiscite for the conversion of a sub-province to a
province simultaneous with the elections, in case of a negative vote, the
elected officials of the sub-province only shall be appointed by the
President. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint
provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the
people of the sub-province ( sub-province of Guimaras) shall continue
to be represented by the provincial officials of the original province
(Iloilo) elected at large by registered voters the province including the
sub-province.ch
Class Notes:
- The law (LGC) is really silent about the matter on what will
happen if the conversion was rejected in the plebiscite
- Now, there are no more sub-provinces
SELECTION AND TRANSFER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SITE agree with respondents that under Sec. 12 of the LGC, which applies to
the proposed City by virtue of Sec. 54 of RA 8535, the City can still
establish a seat of government after its creation. For said Code already
Breakdown of Sec. 11, LGC: Selection and Transfer of Local
provides as follows:
Government Sites, Offices and Facilities
(a) Law or ordinance creating or merging LGUs shall specify
Sec. 12. Government Centers. — Provinces, cities, and municipalities
the seat of government from where governmental and
shall endeavor to establish a government center where offices,
corporate services shall be delivered; factors to take into
agencies, or branches of the National Government, local government
account:
units, or government-owned or-controlled corporations may, as far as
(1) Geographical centrality
practicable, be located. In designating such a center, the local
(2) Accessibility
government unit concerned shall take into account the existing facilities
(3) Availability of transportation and communication
of national and local agencies and offices which may serve as the
facilities
government center as contemplated under this Section. The National
(4) Drainage and sanitation
Government, local government unit or government-owned or-
(5) Development and economic progress
controlled corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for the
(6) Other relevant considerations
construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center.
(b) When conditions and developments in LGU have
While Section 12 speaks of the site of government centers, such site can
significantly changes subsequent to establishment of seat of
very well also be the seat of government, "from where governmental
government, LGU Sanggunian may transfer the same to a
and corporate service shall be delivered."
site better suited to its needs
(1) How?
 After public hearing
 Vote of 2/3 of its members
(2) No such transfer shall be made outside its territorial
boundaries
(3) Old site and its improvements may be disposed of by
sale or lease or converted to such other uses as the
Sanggunian may deem beneficial

(c) Local government offices and facilities shall not be

transferred, relocated, or converted to other uses, UNLESS
(1) Public hearings are first conducted AND
(2) Concurrence of MAJORITY of Sanggunian members

Seats or Capitals of LGUs – Sec. 11 deals with the physical location or

situs of the seats or capitals of LGUs
- This is determined by the law creating or merging LGUs
- Art. 7 IRR
 States that seat of a provincial government shall be
located in the capital town or city
 IRR is silent for city, municipality, or barangay
 So these LGUs may locate its seat anywhere at its
sound discretion

Transfer of LGU seat of government

- This is provided for in 2nd paragraph
 Note that the transfer must be within the territorial
boundaries after public hearings and 2/3 vote of
Sanggunian members

Transferring some offices and facilities

- The 3rd paragraph refers to a situation where NOT the entire
seat of government but only SOME local government offices
are sought to be transferred, relocated, or converted to other
uses
- These shall not be done without public hearing and a
majority vote of Sanggunian members

SAMSON v. AGUIRRE
September 22, 1999

Summary: A QC Councilor challenges the validity of RA 8535 (creating

Novaliches City) for violating the LGC and its Implementing Rules.
Petitioner argues that RA 8535 failed to specify the seat of government
of the proposed City of Novaliches as required by Sec. 11 of LGC. SC:
Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality of the RA. Omission of the seat of
government provision is not fatal.

Doctrine: RA 8535 does not provide for a seat of government. However,

this omission is not as fatal to the validity as Samson makes it to be. We
 POLITICAL AND CORPORATE NATURE OF LGUs TORIO v. FONTANILLA
October 23, 1978
Breakdown of Sec. 14, LGC: Beginning of Corporate Existence
When a new LGU is created, corporate existence shall commence: Summary: During the staging of the zarzuela at the Malasiqui town
1. Upon election and qualification of: fiesta, Fontanilla, a performer, was pinned underneath the stage. The
a. Its chief executive, and accident caused his death. His heirs sue the Municipality and members
b. Majority of the members of its sanggunian of the Municipal Council therefor. The SC found the Municipality liable,
2. UNLESS: some other time is fixed therefor by the law or but not the Councilors.
ordinance creating it
Doctrine: The distinction of powers (governmental/ proprietary) is
important for purposes of determining the liability of a municipality for
Start of Corporate Life of LGU
1. It begins on the date specified by the law or ordinance the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
creating it If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a
2. If law or ordinance is silent: governmental function or duty, no recovery, as a rule, can be had from
a. Then it begins with the election and assumption of the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor
office by its chief executive and majority of sanggunian from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in
members good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the rule is that a municipal
Meaning of Elections corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex
delicto.
- Not only receiving the highest number of votes
- But also their proclamation
Class Notes:
Meaning of Qualification 1. Sec. 22 now allows LGUs to sue and be sued
- Meaning that the local officials have assumed office  So no issue when the LGU invokes immunity since LGUs
are now expressly allowed to sue and be sued
Breakdown of Sec. 15, LGC: Political and Corporate Nature of LGUs 2. So what can we do?
Every LGU created or recognized under the LGC is a body politic and  Sue the councilmen and allege bad faith
corporate
1. Endowed with powers to be exercised in conformity with la CITY OF MANILA v. IAC
2. It shall exercise powers as: November 15, 1989
a. A political subdivision of the national government, and
b. A corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its Summary: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died on June 4,1971 and was
territory buried in lot No. 159 of the North Cemetery which was leased by the
city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6,
LGUs’ Dual Personality – Political AND Corporate 202. In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5 of 1975, of the City
Mayor of Manila Lot 159 in which the remains of the late Vivencio Sto.
POLITICAL CORPORATE Domingo were laid to rest, believed to have been leased to the bereaved
family for 5 years only, was certified on January 1978 as ready for
Political units of government
Proprietary powers exhumation. The authorities of the North Cemetery placed the bones
Agents of national government
and skull of deceased in a bag or sack and kept the same in the
Exercised in administering the
Performed for the benefit of their depository or bodega of the cemetery. The lot was rented out to another
powers of the state and
constituents lessee so that when the plaintiffs went to said lot the resting place of
promoting public welfare
their departed did not anymore bear the stone marker.. The widow and
Legislative, judicial, public, and
Ministerial, private, and corporate children of the late Sto. Domingo, Sr. filed an action for damages against
political
the City of Manila and officers of the North Cemetery. Trial Court
ordered the defendants to give the family the right to make use of
another single lot for a period of 43 years 4 months and 11 days and to
LIDASAN v. COMELEC search, for the remains and to bury the same in the substitute lot. CA
October 25, 1991 modified the decision ordering defendants to pay the family jointly and
severally P10,000.00 for breach of contract, P20,000.00 for moral
Summary: RA 4790. entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as and for
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was enacted. It was later attorney's fees. SC affirmed the IAC decision.
learned that barrios Togaig, Madalum ,Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Doctrine: City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
Kabamakawan of Dianaton are located in another province, Cotabato, endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by
which brought a change in the boundaries of the two provinces (Lanao and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its
del Sur and Cotabato). The bill was attacked by a citizen of the detached proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be
barrios on the ground of the one-title, one-bill doctrine. The SC agreed contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public,
that this doctrine was violated, since the title was misleading and it did governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and
not appraise the legislature and the citizens that the province of proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
Cotabato was affected. administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare
and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal
Doctrine: Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and
to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial,
income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. private and corporate.
This is as important as the creation of a municipality. The title of a law
must express which provinces will be affected by it. Class Notes: There is now a provision granting LGU control over private
cemeteries.
- What is the effect of this provision on the case? (hanging
question)
 MACASIANO v. DIOKNO
August 10, 1992

Summary: The Municipality of Parañaque passed an ordinance which

authorized the closure of certain streets for the establishment of a flea
market thereon. On August 8, 1990, the Municipality and Palanyag
cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned
streets. Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent, ordered the
destruction and confiscation of stalls belonging to Palanyag. Hence, the
Municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition to
enjoin Brig. Gen Macasiano from enforcing his order. The RTC ruled in
favor of the Municipality and upheld its ordinance. The SC reversed.

Doctrine: On the exercise of powers by the LGU as a body politic or

corporate entity: Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not
absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution
and the laws such as our Civil Code. It is only when the property is
patrimonial, that the Municipality can "use or convey them for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit
concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed." This is because
properties of the local government which are devoted to public service
are deemed PUBLIC and are under the absolute CONTROL of
CONGRESS.

On the law applicable to contracts entered into by the LGU as a corporate

entity: On August 10, 1992, the Court found it worthy to note that BP
Blg. 337, or the LGC Code, has already been repealed by RA 7160 or the
LGC of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of the
new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of
effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other
source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be
governed by the original terms and conditions of the said contracts or
the law in force at the time such rights were vested.
 GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE - Exercise of police power is subject to due process clause
 Exercise of police power must conform to the
requirements of due process
Breakdown of Sec. 16, LGC: General Welfare
- Thus, LGU is considered to have exercised its police powers
1. Every LGU shall exercise the powers:
only when (Parayno v. Mun. of Calasiao):
a. Expressly granted,
1. Interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
b. Those necessarily implied,
c. As well as powers necessary, appropriate or incidental those of a particular class, require the interference of
for its efficient and effective governance, and State, and
d. Those which are essential to the promotion of the 2. Means employed are reasonably necessary for the
general welfare attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive
2. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, LGUs shall:
Limitations:
a. Ensure and support, among other things, preservation
1. GWC cannot be used to justify an act not authorized by law
and enrichment of culture
2. Exercise of such must be via a valid ordinance (Tatel v.
b. Promote health and safety
Municipality of Virac):
c. Enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology
d. Encourage and support the development of a. Not contrary to Constitution or statute
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and b. Not unfair or oppressive
technological capabilities, c. Not partial or discriminatory
e. Improve public morals d. Not unreasonable; must be consistent with public policy
f. Enhance economic prosperity and social justice.
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
g. Promote full employment among their residents
1. RA 8369 (1997) - Family Courts Act
h. Maintain peace and order, and
a. Sec. 8 – Judge of the Family Court shall have direct
i. Preserve the comfort and convenience of their
control and supervision of the youth detention home
inhabitants
which the LGU shall establish to separate youth
offenders from adult criminals
Other LGC Provisions:
b. Sec. 11 – in areas with no Family Courts, DSWD shall
1. Sec. 391 – powers, duties, functions of the sangguniang
designate and assign qualified, trained, and DSWD
barangay as the legislative body of the barangay
accredited social workers of the LGUs to handle juvenile
2. Sec. 447- powers, duties, functions, and compensation of the
and family cases
sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the
municipality
2. RA 8425 (1997) – Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act
3. Sec. 458 – powers, duties, functions, and compensation of the
a. Sec. 12 – LGUs, through local development councils,
sangguniang panglungsod, as the legislative body of the city
shall be responsible for formulation, implementation,
4. Sec. 468 – powers, duties, functions, and compensation of the
monitoring, evaluation of National Anti-Poverty Action
sangguniang panlalawigan, as the legislative body of the
Agenda
province
b. LGUs shall:
(1) Identify the poor in their respective areas based
All-Purpose Clause Sec. 16 is the general welfare clause
on indicators
- This authorizes the LGU to do just about anything that will
(2) Identify and source funding for specific social
benefit their constituencies
reform and poverty alleviation projects
(3) Coordinate, monitor, evaluate efforts of LGUs with
Nature - The police power of a municipal corporation extends to all
private sector on planning and implementation of
great public needs, and includes all legislation and functions of the
local action
municipal government. The drift is towards social welfare legislation
(4) Coordinate and submit progress reports to
geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the
National Anti-Poverty Commission
promotion of general welfare, and social justice. (Binay v. Domingo)
3. RA 8435 (1997) – Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
The two branches of general welfare clause
Act
1. General Legislative Power
a. Sec. 90 – LGUs shall be responsible for delivering
 Authorizes municipal council to enact ordinances and
agriculture and fisheries extension services
make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be
b. Sec. 99 – Replication of program shall be the
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
responsibility of LGUs concerned in collaboration with
and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law
appropriate government agencies and private sectors
2. Police Power Proper
c. Sec. 101 – appropriate government agencies, under the
 Authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may leadership of LGUs, shall provide integrated services
be necessary and proper for the health, safety,
and information to prospective enterprises under the
prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
one-stop-shop concept; costs carried by LGU
convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and
for the protection of their property 4. RA 8550 (1998) – Philippine Fisheries Code
a. Sec. 16 – Municipal/city government shall have
Police Power jurisdiction over municipal waters; LGUs shall enforce
- NOTE that police power of LGUs is a delegated power
all fishery laws, rules, and regulations as well as valid
 It is delegated via Sec. 16, LGC fishery ordinances
 Municipal governments exercise police power through b. Sec. 17 – duly registered fisherfolk
the general welfare clause (Binay v. Domingo) organizations/cooperative shall have preference in the
 Police power of LGUs is broad and has been said to grant of fishery rights by the municipal/city council
be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty pursuant to Sec. 149, LGC
to provide for the real needs of the people in their c. Sec. 18 – municipal/city government may, through local
health, safety, comfort, and convenience as chief executive pursuant to appropriate ordinance,
consistently as may be with private rights authorize or permit small and medium commercial
 fishing vessels to operate within 10.1 to 15km area
from shoreline in municipal waters subject to
conditions
d. Sec. 19 – LGU to maintain a registry of municipal
fisherfild, who are fishing or may desire to fish in
municipal waters for purpose of determining priorities
among them, of limiting entry to municipal waters, and
of monitoring fishing activities and/or other related
purposes
e. Sec. 22 – LGU shall grant demarcated fishery rights to
fishery organization/cooperatives for mariculture
operation
f. Sec. 23 – Whenever LGU and Department determine
that a municipal water is overfished and that there is a
need to regenerate the fishery resources, LGU shall
prohibit or limit fishery activities in said waters
g. Sec. 24 – Department and LGUs shall provide support
to municipal fisherfolk
5. RA 8975 (2000) – Act to ensure expeditious implementation
and completion of government infrastructure projects
a. Sec. 3 – No court, except SC, shall issue any TRO,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, public or
private acting under government direction, to restrain,
prohibit, or compel the following acts:
(1) Acquisition, clearance and development of the
right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project;
(2) Bidding or awarding of contract/ project of the
national government as defined under Section 2
hereof;

(3) Commencement prosecution, execution,
implementation, operation of any such contract or
project;
(4) Termination or rescission of any such
contract/project; and
 Caloocan. Some residents of the Manila sought to bury their relatives in
(5) The undertaking or authorization of any other
lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
6. RA 9275 (2004) – Clean Water Act
a. Sec. 20 – LGUs shall share responsibility in management
and improvement of water quality within their
territorial jurisdiction
 Each LGU shall prepare a compliance scheme
within 6 months after establishment of water
quality management area action plan
7. RA 10121 (2009) – Disaster Risk Reduction Management Act
a. Sec. 11 –Existing Disaster Coordinating Councils (of
LGUs) shall be known as the Risk Reduction and
Management Councils
 Barangay Disaster Coordinating Councils shall
cease to exist; functions assumed by existing
Barangay Development Councils
b. Sec. 12 –a Local Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Office is established in every province,
city, and municipality
Some Examples:
- Police power applied:
1. Prescribing zoning and classification of merchandise
sold in the public market;
2. Condemnation and demolition if buildings found to be
dangerous or ruinous condition;
3. Regulation and operation of tricycles and to grant
franchises for the operation thereof;
4. Zoning regulations;
5. Providing burial assistance to the poor;
6. Enforcement of fishery laws within LGU waters;
- Police power does not apply:
1. Prohibition of operation of night clubs, as it is a lawful
trade or pursuit of occupation;
2. Rescinding of mayor's permits based on arbitrary
grounds;
US v. SALAVERIA
November 12, 1918
Summary: Salaveria, a justice of the peace in Orion, Bataan, was found
guilty of violating Ordinance No. 3, an ordinance enacted by Orion’s
municipal council, prohibiting the playing of panguingueon days not
Sundays or legal holidays. Salaveria questions the validity of the
Ordinance before the SC. The SC upheld the validity of the Ordinance by
virtue of the general police power of the municipal corporation to
suppress gambling.
Doctrine: Like the State, the police power of a municipal corporation
extends to all matters affecting the peace, order, health, morals,
convenience, comfort, and safety of its citizens — the security of social
order — the best and highest interests of the municipality
(Case vs. Board of Health of Manila and Heiser). Within the general
police powers of a municipal corporation is the suppression of
gambling. Hence, Ordinances aimed in a reasonable way at the
accomplishment of this purpose are undoubtedly valid. Under the
general welfare clause a city may pass an ordinance prohibiting
gambling in any private house.
VIRAY v. CALOOCAN
July 26, 1967
Summary: The Municipal Board of Caloocan City enacted Ordinance No.
94 which imposes (1) fee for the exhumation of the remains and (2)
transfer permit fee or an entrance fee on cadavers coming from places
outside Caloocan, sought to be buried in private cemeteries within
Caloocan. They were charged by the City Treasurer of Caloocan
"entrance fees" which they paid. Thereafter, they sought refund from
the City Treasurer which was refused. Hence, they filed the action in the
CFI of Caloocan against the city government, its Mayor and Treasurer,
contesting the legality of the city ordinance. The SC ruled that the
ordinance is ultra vires and void for violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The ordinance unjustifiably discriminates against private
cemeteries.
Doctrine: Although the ordinance which regulates the exhumation
and/or transfer of corpses from other burial grounds to those located in
the City of Caloocan is within the legislative power of the city
government to enact, the imposition of the transfer fees on the
interment of the respective dead relatives was not justified.
(Own interpretation of the case) While a city may regulate certain
activities under the general welfare clause, it does not follow that they
can impose taxes or fees on them. The power of taxation is limited to
“persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising
privileges in chartered cities or municipalities.”
BALACUIT v. CFI-AGUSAN and BUTUAN CITY
June 30, 1988
Summary: The City of Butuan enacted an ordinance that prohibited
theaters from charging the full price of their tickets, intended for adults,
on children and should only charge the latter for half price. The
managers of theater’s argued that such ordinance is unconstitutional
for being oppressive and in restraint of trade and is beyond the power
of the City under its regulatory power and as well as its power under
the general welfare clause in its Charter.
Doctrine: The operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of
public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in
the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. To
invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the
interest of the public generally requires an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
BINAY v. DOMINGO
September 11, 1991
Summary: The Makati Council approved Resolution No. 60 affirming the
Burial Assistance Program of Mayor Binay. When the Resolution was
referred to the COA, it disallowed disbursement on the ground that (1)
it is not a valid exercise of police power and (2) it does not have a public
purpose. The SC set aside the COA decision, ruling that (1) police power,
delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause, is broad enough to
cover the Resolution, and (2) the Resolution has a public purpose and
the fact that only the poor are qualified is consistent with the trend
toward social welfare legislation.
Doctrine: A valid delegation of police power may arise from express
delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the
municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations
may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their
creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things
essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of people.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA
June 24, 1983
Summary: Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, was enacted by the City
Government of Quezon City. One of the provisions (Sec. 9) of said
Ordinance requires the private cemeteries to set aside at least 6% of the
total area of the memorial park cemetery for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC for at least 5
years prior to death. For several years, Sec. 9 was not enforced by the
authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the
Quezon City Council passed a Resolution which states that any further
selling of memorial park lots in QC where the owners thereof have
failed to donate the requires 6% space intended for pauper burials shall
be stopped by the City Engineer. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino
reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief before the CFI of Rizal.
The CFI ruled in favor of Himalayang Pilipino, declaring the said Section
of the Ordinance null and void. The argument of QC is that the said
Section of the Ordinance is in line with the State’s police power and the
local government’s local police power. Himlayang Pilipino argued that
the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the
taking of the property. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Himlayang
Pilipino and stated that there is no reasonable connection between the
setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of private cemeteries and
the promotion of the general welfare of the people.
Doctrine: [The City Government of QC relies solely on the general
welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not
on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of
power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation
but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. ]
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six
(6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The
power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the
power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
PATALINGHUG v.CA
January 27, 1994
Summary: Petitioner Alfredo Patalinghug was issued a Building Permit
for the construction of a funeral parlor in an area classified as a
commercial zone under Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 enacted by
the SangguniangPanlungsod of Davao. The said ordinance allows the
construction and establishment of funeral parlors/memorial homes but
they have to have adequate off street parking space and that they shall
be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures,
churches, and other institutional buildings. The private respondents
filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of a building permit with
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or restraining
order with the trial court. They allege that petitioner violated the
ordinance because the funeral parlor was constructed within 50 meters
from the IglesianiKristo Chapel and several residential structures. The
trial court dismissed the complaint and found that the nearest
structure, albeit declared as residential for tax purposes, is being used
for commercial purposes. The CA reversed and said the tax declaration
is sufficient proof that the nearest structure is a residential one. The
Supreme Court reversed the CA and reinstated the ruling of the trial
court.
Doctrine: In order to promote the general welfare, the state may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the
state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the
individual may be subordinated.
RURAL BANK OF MAKATI, INC. v. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI
July 2, 2004
Summary: The Municipality of Makati filed a complaint against the
Rural Bank of Makati (RBM) for non-payment of taxes and fees and
ordered the closure of the bank. RBM paid in protest and filed a civil
case for damages and refund of the amount paid. It argued that the
ordinance was an invalid exercise of police power and its right to due
process was violated. The RTC and CA held in favor of Makati. The SC
agreed but with modifications. SC held that the municipal ordinance
calling for payment of fees and taxes was a valid exercise of police
power under the general welfare clause but it found that the closure
order violated RBM’s right to due process since it was not one of the
remedies available to Makati for payment of delinquent taxes or fees.
Doctrine: Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the
promotion and maintenance of local government and as such are
endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation
The general welfare clause has 2 branches:
1. First, General legislative power – authorizes the municipal
council to enact ordinances and make regulations not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the
municipal council by law
2. Second, Police power proper – authorizes the municipality to
enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the
health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its
inhabitants, and for the protection of their property.
TAYABAN v. PEOPLE
March 6, 2007
Summary: Tayaban is the Mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. He submitted a project
proposal with the provincial governor for the construction of a public
market. This project was approved and to be funded by the CEB. The
construction commenced. The Sanggunian filed a resolution ordering
the demolition of the posts and other improvements on the ground that
they were not constructed on the location given. A complaint was filed
against them for violation of Sec. 3, RA 3019. The petitioners justified
their acts on the ground of police power and general welfare clause.
Sandiganbayan found them guilty. SC affirmed the Sandiganbayan
ruling.
Doctrine: The IRR of the LGC of 1991, pertaining to the requirement of
plebiscite, covers all conversions, whether upward or downward in
character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political
and economic rights of its people.
General Welfare Clause applies to nuisances per se, or those which
affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
BAYAN v. ERMITA
April 25, 2006
Summary: The constitutionality of BP 880 (The Public Assembly Act of
1985) as well as the policy of CPR (Calibrated Preemptive Response)
used to implement it, is challenged. Respondent Mayor Atienza, using
the general welfare clause of the LGC, argues that the Mayor has the
power to deny a permit independently of the assailed BP 880. SC: The
argument of respondent Mayor is not necessary to resolve in these
proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Doctrine: Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions,
local government units shall ensure and support among other things,
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE
LGC Provisions:
1. Sec. 447 – powers, duties, and functions of sannguniang
bayan; shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of LGC and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality
as provided for under Section 22 of LGC
 Sub-section (4) - Regulate activities relative to the use
of land, buildings and structures within the
municipality in order to promote the general welfare
and for said purpose shall:
 Letter (i) – Declare, prevent, or abate ANY
nuisance
2. Sec. 458 – powers, duties, and functions of sangguniang
panglungsod
 Substantially the same as in Sec. 447 above
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
1. RA 9165 – Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
a. Sec. 52 – Abatement of Drug Related Public Nuisance
(1) Any place/premise which have been used on 2 or
more occasions as site of unlawful sale or delivery
of dangerous drugs MAY be declared to be a public
nuisance
(2) Such nuisance may be abated; procedure:
(a) Any city or municipality may, by ordinance,
create administrative board to hear
complaints regarding nuisance
(b) Any employee, officer, or resident of city or
municipality may bring a complaint before
the Board
(c) After hearing, board may declare the place as
a nuisance
b. Sec. 53 – Effect of Board Declaration
(1) If Board declares a place to be a public nuisance, it
may declare an order immediately prohibiting the
conduct, operation, or maintenance of any
business or activity which is conducive to such
ordinance
(2) Order shall expire after 1 year; Board may bring a
complaint seeking permanent injunction
(3) This does not restrict the right of any person to
proceed under CC provisions
2. RA 8749 – Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy
a. Sec. 7 – creation of the Integrated Air Quality
Framework; LGU is a participant
b. Sec. 8 – after creation of framework, the Department,
with public participation, shall formulate and
implement an Air Quality Control Action Plan
 LGUs to submit a procedure for carrying out the
action plan for their jurisdiction
c. Sec. 9 – designation of airsheds; LGU coordination
d. Sec. 10 – Department to designate areas where specific
pollutants have already exceeded ambient standards as
non-attainment areas
 Consultation with LGUs, NGOs, POs, and concerned
sectors
e. Sec. 11 – Air quality control techniques; Department
conducts research and consults with LGUs to revise
information on air pollution control techniques
f. Sec. 16 – Department shall have authority to issue
permits for prevention and abatement of air pollution;
permits shall serve as management tools for LGUs in
developing their action plan
g. Sec. 20 – ban on incineration; LGUs mandated to
promote and implement a comprehensive ecological
waste management
h. Sec. 24 – LGUs to implement the prohibition of smoking
inside a public building or an enclosed public place
 i. Sec. 36 – LGUs to share in the responsibility in
management and maintenance of air quality within
their territorial jurisdiction
j. Sec. 37 – There may be established an Environmental
and Natural Resources Office in every province, city, or
municipality
k. Sec. 39 – continuing air quality information and
education campaign
3. RA 9003 (2001) – Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
a. Sec. 10 – LGUs primarily responsible for
implementation and enforcement of this Act within
their respective jurisdictions
b. Sec. 11 – Provincial Solid Waste Management Board
shall be established in every province, to be chaired by
the governor
c. Sec. 12 – Each city or municipality shall form a City or
Municipal Waste Management board that shall prepare,
submit, and implement a plan for the safe and sanitary
management of solid waste generated in areas under it
d. Sec. 13 – Multi-purpose cooperatives and associations
are to be established in every LGU
e. Sec. 16 – Province, city or municipality, through its local
solid waste management boards, shall prepare its
respective 10-yr solid waste management plans
consistent with national solid waste management
framework
f. Sec. 17 – Components of the Local Government Solid
Waste Management Plan
g. Sec. 19 – Department shall be responsible for the
establishment of guidelines for correct characterization
of wastes; LGUs to coordinate
h. Sec. 20 – Each LGU plan shall include an
implementation schedule which shows that within 5
years from Act effectivity, LGU shall divert at least 25%
of all solid waste from water disposal facilities
i. Sec. 21 – LGUs shall evaluate alternative roles for the
public and private sectors in providing collection
services; mandatory segregation
j. Sec. 44 – LGUs are mandated to consolidate, or
coordinate their efforts, services and resources for
purposes of jointly assessing common solid waste
management problems
k. Sec. 45 – incentive schemes to encourage LGUs
l. Sec. 46 – LGUs entitled to avail of the Solid Waste
Management Fund on the basis of their approved solid
waste management plan
m. Sec. 47 – LGUs shall impose fees in amounts sufficient to
pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing
a solid waste management plan
4. RA 8550 – Philipine Fisheries Code
a. Sec. 16 – Municipal/city government shall have
jurisdiction over municipal waters; LGUs shall enforce
all fishery laws, rules, and regulations as well as valid
fishery ordinances
b. Sec. 17 – duly registered fisherfolk
organizations/cooperative shall have preference in the
grant of fishery rights by the municipal/city council
pursuant to Sec. 149, LGC
c. Sec. 18 – municipal/city government may, through local
chief executive pursuant to appropriate ordinance,
authorize or permit small and medium commercial
fishing vessels to operate within 10.1 to 15km area
from shoreline in municipal waters subject to
conditions
d. Sec. 19 – LGU to maintain a registry of municipal
fisherfild, who are fishing or may desire to fish in
municipal waters for purpose of determining priorities
among them, of limiting entry to municipal waters, and
of monitoring fishing activities and/or other related
purposes
e. Sec. 22 – LGU shall grant demarcated fishery rights to
fishery organization/cooperatives for mariculture
operation
f. Sec. 23 – Whenever LGU and Department determine
that a municipal water is overfished and that there is a
need to regenerate the fishery resources, LGU shall
prohibit or limit fishery activities in said waters
g. Sec. 24 – Department and LGUs shall provide support
to municipal fisherfolk
TATEL v. VIRAC
March 11, 1992
Summary: The municipal government of Virac Catanduanes issued
Ordinance 13 prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block
of houses either in poblacion or barrios without maintaining the
necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of house to avoid loss
of lives and properties by accidental fire. It was passed due to finding
that the warehouse owned by Tatel was a public nuisance (the machine
emitted smoke, obnoxious odor and dust). Tatel filed a petition against
it. CFI and SC held that Ordinance 13 is valid.
Doctrine: (an ordinance can be validly enacted in order to abate a
nuisance) For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law and must be in
consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a
substantive nature.
These principles require that a municipal ordinance:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution of any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy and
(6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.
ESTATE OF FRANCISCO v. CA
August 10, 1992
Summary: Gregoria Francisco owned a quonset building in Basilan that
stood on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority. When she died,
a permit to occupy the land until December 31, 1989 was issued to her
surviving spouse. On May 8, 1989 Mayor Valencia notified him to
remove and relocate the quonset building, as it was located outside the
zone for warehouses in Ordinance No. 147 which provided for a
comprehensive zoning regulation for the municipality. Since the
notifications were unheeded, the mayor ordered the demolition on May
24, 1989. The writ of prohibition sought for by the Estate of Francisco
was denied. The RTC reasoned that the mayor had power to order
demolition without judicial authority. The building was demolished on
Sept. 6, 1989. The CA initially reversed the RTC decision, saying that
since it was not a nuisance per se, the mayor had no power to order
summarily its demolition. This was reversed on MR, with the CA
reasoning that the deficiency of a judicial proceeding was remedied by
hearing on the petition fir prohibition and injunction. The SC reinstated
the original CA decision and said that due process requires a judicial
proceeding for the declaration of a thing as nuisance. The quonset
building is not nuisance per se which can be abated summarily without
judicial intervention.
Doctrine: While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement
of a nuisance under Sec. 145(ee) of the Local Government Code, it
cannot declare a particular thing a nuisance per se and order its
condemnation.
Class Notes: The LGC does not distinguish between nuisance per se and
per accidens (it only says “any nuisance”)
- Is this a good idea?
- How will you argue that it is limited to nuisance per se?
 Argue using a due process argument
 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC. v. CA
January 21, 1991
Summary: Technology Developers, Inc. manufactures and exports
charcoal briquette and its plant is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The
acting mayor of Bulacan shut down the plant and required the company
to submit certain documents before it could resume its operations. One
of these documents was the mayor’s permit. When the company tried to
get the said permit, it was not entertained. The SC held that the mayor
did not abused its discretion.
Doctrine: The mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may
deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control
and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community
from the emissions in the operation of the business.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC. v. CA
July 31, 1991
Summary: Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and
exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a
letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full
cessation of the operation of the petitioner’s plant in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office of
the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayor’s
permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the company failed to comply in
bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without
notice, caused the padlock of company’s plant premises, effectively
causing stoppage of its operation. Technology Developers then
instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition, mandamus with
preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure
order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled
against the company. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The SC
affirmed. Upon MR, the SC reversed, stating that the EMB had primary
jurisdiction over matters regarding air pollution.
Doctrine: The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
possible if it is nuisance per se. Nuisance per se is that which is
nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location
and surroundings.
Unlike BP 337, the present Local Government Code does not expressly
provide for the abatement of nuisance.
Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a
special order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution.
– When the property subject of execution contains
improvements constructed or planted by the judgment
obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or
remove said improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due
hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same
within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
Class Notes: This case is misleading
- SC said that unlike its predecessor law, the present LGC does
not provide for the abatement of nuisance
 But it does! The LGC expressly refers to nuisance
abatement
- This would have been a perfect time for the SC to rule on the
effect of the jurisprudential distinction in the treatment of
nuisance per se and accidens and the effect of the LGC
provision on this ruling

Doctrine: It is beyond a municipal mayor’s ken and competence to

review, revise, reverse, or set aside a permit to opera [petitioner’s
charcoal briquette plant] issued by the EMB, which is the primary
authority to determine whether [there is a violation of anti-pollution
laws].

Class Notes: Sir does not agree.

- The EMB permit is not in issue; rather the issue hinges on the
mayor’s permit
 Why would the SC give credence to a permit issued in
Makati when it had its operations in Bulacan?
- Just because the national government said “it can operate” it
must still comply with the requirements imposed by the LGU
 Local autonomy!

ASILO v. PEOPLE
March 9, 2011

Summary: Visitacion’s store was demolished outright by Asilo and

Angeles pursuant to the mayor’s order based on the 2 resolutions of the
Sangguniang Bayan. However, the first resolution only authorized the
mayor to file an ejectment case with damages if the demolition was
refused. The second resolution authorized the mayor to demolish the
store through legal means. A criminal complaint was filed by the SPs.
Bombasi (Visitacion and her husband) against the mayor, Anegels and
Asilo. The Court found them guilty of violation of RA 3019. The market
stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by
the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. The 2
resolutions did not authorize the mayor to order the demolition of the
store. They were also held civilly liable under Art 32 of the Civil Code
for not according due process to the Sps, Bombasi before the
demolition.
 BASIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES
- Devolution mainly affects 5 major departments:
a. Agriculture
Breakdown of Sec. 17, LGC: Basic Services and Facilities
b. Health
(a) LGUs shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
c. Social Welfare and Development
exercising powers and discharging duties and functions
d. Tourism
currently vested upon them
e. Interior and Local Government
(1) They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices
THE LGUs’ POWERS IN GENERAL
devolved to them pursuant to this Code
(2) They shall likewise exercise such other powers and
Barangay Powers in General
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as
- Powers allotted are minimal compared to other LGUs
are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient
- But there is ONE power which is exclusive ONLY to the
and effective provision of the basic services and
barangay:
facilities enumerated herein
 Power to administer the Katarangunag Pambarangay
XXX
Municipality Powers in General
- More extensive than the barangays’
NOTE: Sec. 17(b) is a long list of devolved services. They are outlined
- Involve the delivery of 4 major services:
separately in the succeeding tables of devolved services (as seen
a. Agricultural and aquacultural
below).
 Encouraged to do through cooperatives
- Sec. 17(c) to (j) are details on how services are devolved
b. Health services
 Connected to primary health care and access to
Art. 24, LGC IRR – Devolution
secondary and tertiary health services
(a) Provision for delivery of basic services and facilities shall be
c. Social welfare services
devolved from the National Government to provinces, cities,
 Any pro-poor project, nutrition, family planning
municipalities, and barangay
d. Other services including information dissemination on
 So that each LGU shall be responsible for a minimum set
investment needs and job placements
of services and facilities in accordance with established
national policies, guidelines, and standards
Provincial Powers in General
(b) Devolution = transfer of power and authority from National
- Provinces are granted more powers under the new LGC
Government to LGUs to enable them to perform specific
- It is within their power to deliver varied services such as:
functions and responsibilities
a. Agricultural and aquacultural services, including
(c) Subsequent change in national policies, guidelines, and
organization of farmers and fishers cooperatives
standards shall be subject to prior consultations with LGUs
b. Industrial development services
c. Health services including hospitals and tertiary health
Core of Decentralization and Devolution
care
- Sec. 17 is the core of decentralization and devolution
d. Social services like mass housing
- Thrusts of LGUs:
e. Investment support services
a. Discharge functions and responsibilities of central
f. Computerizing tax information and collection services
agencies and offices that are now devolved to them
g. Intra-municipal telecom services
b. Strive for self-reliance
c. Continue exercising the powers and discharging the
City Powers in General
duties that are currently vested upon them
- Of all the LGUs, the city has been granted the MOST powers
d. Exercise such other powers and discharge such other
- LGC devolved to the city ALL the services and facilities which
functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
the barangay, municipality, and province has been
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
empowered to deliver
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
 Except the power to administer the Kataranguang
therein
Pambarangay
- Note that Sec. 17 is not an exclusive list
- In addition, there are two major functions that the city his
 Sec. 17(b) opens with: “such basic services and facilities
expressly empowered to provide:
include, but are not limited to … “
a. Adequate communication and transportation facilities
b. Support for education, police, and fire services and
Degrees of Devolution
facilities
- Basic services and facilities are allocated to the barangay,
municipality, city, and province in varying degrees of
devolution

HIGHLIGHTS OF DEVOLVED POWERS PER LGU8

LGU POWERS IN AGRICULTURE

BARANGAY
In general, provide support services
for agricultural production and
marketing
Distribute seeds; planting materials
MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
In general, provide support services In general, provide support services
for agricultural production and for agricultural production and
marketing marketing
Provide extension work/research ALL agricultural powers of LGUs
Distribute seeds for agriculture or combined, including control
aquaculture prevention of plant/animal diseases
pests

8
Taken from Pimentel’s book; this table ONLY highlights the powers of each LGU

Operate stations to collect or buy
farm products
BARANGAY
In general, deliver basic health
services
Promote general hygiene
Promote sanitation
Construct and maintain health
centers
Provide solid waste disposal
systems
BARANGAY
BARANGAY
Maintenance of roads, bridges,
water systems
Construction and maintenance of
multi-purpose pavements, halls,
sports centers, other similar
facilities, information and reading
centers
Establish livestock markets, animal
Establish seed nurseries breeding stations, artificial
insemination centers
Provide medicinal plants Construct markets
Distribute livestock, poultry, Organize cooperatives for farmers
fingerlings and fishers
Establish communal irrigation
Establish demo farms
systems
Provide copra quality control
Establish marketing distribution
channels
Construct facilities for irrigation,
Transfer appropriate technology
water and soil conservation
Endorse forestry laws in municipal
waters, including conservation of
mangroves
LGU HEALTH POWERS
MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
In general, deliver basic health In general, deliver basic health
services services
Promote general hygiene
Promote sanitation
Provide access to secondary and
tertiary health services
Construct and maintain health
Construct and maintain hospitals,
centers, clinics, other health ALL health powers of LGUs
tertiary health clinics
facilities
Provide maternal and child care
Control disease
Purchase medicines, medical
equipment, medical supplies
Provide solid waste disposal
systems
LGU ENVIRONMENTAL POWERS
MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
Implement community based
forestry projects including social Enforce forestry laws re-
forestry programs and similar community-based forestry projects
projects
Control of communal forest Entire pollution control laws
Establish free parks, greenbelts, ALL environmental powers of LGUs
Enforce small mining law
similar forest development projects
Create environment management Enforce other laws protecting the
system environment
Establish mini-hydro-electric
projects
LGU INFRASTRUCTURE POWERS
MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY
In general, infra facilities funded by In general, infra facilities funded by
ALL LGU infrastructure powers
municipal funds provincial funds
Construction and maintenance of
municipal roads, bridges, school
buildings, other facilities for Construction and maintenance of Telecom and transportation
elementary and high schools, provincial roads, bridges facilities
clinics, health centers, other
facilities
Provide information services for
investments, job placements, tax
matters, market opportunities
Establish and maintain public
libraries Irrigation systems, mini hydro-
Community irrigation, small water electric projects for local purposes,
impounders, artesian wells, spring intra-municipal waterworks,
development projects, rainwater drainage, sewerage, flood control,
collectors, water supply systems, reclamation projects,
other similar projects, seawalls, intramunicipal telecom
dikes, drainage, sewerage, flood
controls, markets, slaughterhouses,
fishports other municipal
enterprises
 Construction and maintenance of
municipal buildings, cultural
centers, public parks, playgrounds,
sports facilities and equipment,
other similar facilities, tourism
facilities and other tourist
attractions, police/fire stations,
signals, road signs, jails, cemeteries
provincial buildings, freedom parks,
LGU SOCIAL WELFARE POWERS
BARANGAY MUNICIPALITY
Social welfare services Social welfare services
Day care centers Child and Youth
Beautification Family and Community
Women’s welfare
Elderly and disabled
Community-based rehabilitation
program for vagrants, beggars,
street children, scavengers, juvenile
delinquents, drug abuse victims
Livelihood projects, nutrition
services, pro-poor projects, family
planning
Low cost and mass housing
LGU TOURISM POWERS
BARANGAY MUNICIPALITY
Establishment of tourism facilities
Development of tourism attractions
Acquisition of tourism facilities and
equipment
Regulation of tourism business
concessions and security services
PLAZA II v. CASSION
July 27, 2004
Summary: Mayor Plaza devolved the DSWD National Office located in
Butuan and made it part of the City Social Services Development Office
adding the 19 national DSWD office to the existing CSSDO replacing the
current head with the DSWD head, and asking them to report for work
at the DSWD Office instead. Respondent employees assert that E0 92 is
illegal because it was a transfer without consent (puboff concept). Their
continued refusal to report for work led to Mayor Plaza to “drop them
from the rolls “. CSC says this is a valid act, CA reverses, SC reverses CA
and uphold CSC.
Doctrine: Devolution is authorized by Section 17 of the LGC. It is the act
by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilites. The local chief executive, the mayor, has the authority
to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to
take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head. CA
erred in ruling that EO 92 violated the rights of respondent to security
of tenure because they were transferred without their consent.
Transfer is a movement from one position to the other which is of
equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service and may be
imposed as an administrative penalty. The change in the work of the
respondents was not a transfer in the legal sense but a physical transfer
that from their old office to a new one in the interest of public service.
Provide investment support
services, access to credit,
modernize by computerizing tax
information and collection services
Provide facilities for industrial
research and development,
including transfer of appropriate
technology
Construction and maintenance of
public assembly areas, provincial
jails
PROVINCE CITY
Social welfare services ALL LGU social welfare powers
Rebel returnees
Evacuees
Relief Operations
Population development services
PROVINCE CITY
Tourism development and
All LGU powers
promotions program
Class Notes: Not all kind of services are devolved
- Look at Sec. 17 with the enumeration of devolved powers
 Pimentel is saying that Sec. 17 is not an exclusive list
and that it covers a wide range of basic services
 According to our discussions in class, those related to
the services enumerated in Sec. 17 are devolved
 Look at the cases of Pimentel and League of
Provinces below
- In effect, always go back to Sec. 17
FILINVEST LAND v. FLOOD-AFFECTED HOMEOWNERS OF
MERITVILLE ALLIANCE
August 10, 2007
Summary: Filinvest developed Meritville subdivision, which was located
near Naga River. After more subdivisions with higher elevation were
built around it, a perennial flooding problem plagued the homeowners
of Meritville whenever it rained. This was aggravated by the fact that
the Naga River was heavily silted. The homeowners filed a case against
Filinvest, alleging negligence. HLURB and the OP ruled in their favor,
but SC reversed. SC ruled that the flooding problem was not the
responsibility of the subdivision developer, but that of the local
government.
Doctrine: SEC. 17. Of the LGC obliges local governments to deliver basic
services such as: infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service
the needs of the residents of the municipality and which are funded out
of the municipal funds including but not limited to municipal roads and
bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and
secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities
necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small
water impounding projects and other similar projects, fish ports;
artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water
supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage; and flood
control, traffic signals and road signs, and similar facilities. It is the city
government, and not the subdivision developer, that has the duty to
control floods.
Class Notes:
- The Court is saying that since the cause of the flood is beyond
Filinvest’s control, then the LGU should be the one
responsible in providing for appropriate measures (Sec.
17(b)(viii)
- Also, since the power to maintain facilities and roads to
control flooding is devolved to LGUs, Chris Lao, at least, has a
case against the LGU for the damage to his car
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. YU
July 31, 2012
Summary: Upon the implementation of a devolution program affecting
the DOH, Gov. Salapuddin refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the
incumbent of the Provincial Health Officer II position, which was to be
devolved to the LGU of province. So, the Regional Office of the DOH
retained Dr. Castillo. Two years later, Gov. Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu
to such PHO II position. Then, a law was passed which re-nationalized
and reverted to the DOH the hospital positions previously devolved to
the LGU. Pursuant to such law, the position of PHO II was also re-
classified to Chief of Hospital II. However, while Dr. Yu was reverted
back to the DOH, she was made to retain the position of PHO II, instead
of the re-classified Chief of Hospital II. The DOH Secretary appointed
another doctor to the position of Chief of Hospital II. So, Dr. Yu filed a
protest before the CSC, claiming her right to the re-classified position.
CSC ruled that the position of PHO II was never devolved to the
Provincial Government to begin with. CA reversed. SC affirmed CA and
held that the position of PHO II was devolved to the Provincial
Government of Basilan.
Doctrine: In devolution, the only instance that a concerned LGU may
choose not to absorb the national government agency personnel is
when absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result
to duplication of functions. However, in the absence of the recognized
exception, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically
reappointed by the local chief executive.
PIMENTEL, JR. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
July 17, 2012
Summary: Subject of the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 10147 or the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 20111 which provides a P21
Billion budget allocation for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program
(CCTP) headed by the Department of Social Welfare & Development
(DSWD). Petitioners seek to enjoin respondents Executive Secretary
Ochoa and DSWD Secretary Soliman from implementing the said
program on the ground that it amounts to a "recentralization" of
government functions that have already been devolved from the
national government to the local government units.
Doctrine: The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government in Section 17 (c) of the LFC is that, unless an LGU
is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction
of the LGU. The national government is, not precluded from taking a
direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national
development programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned.
Class Notes: Sec. 17 par. (c) is an exemption to devolution
- This is on the reservation of power
- So not everything is devolved
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENR
April 11, 2013
Summary: On February 10, 2004, Mercado et al filed with the Province
of Bulacan applications for Quarry Permit, which covered the an area
subject to a prior application by a corporation, Golden Falcon. During
the time that Mercado et al filed their applications, Golden Falcon's
appeal from the Order of the DENR denying its application was pending.
On July 16, 2004, the MGB Central Office denied Golden
Falcon's appeal. Golden Falcon received notice of the order on July 27,
2004.
Then, On September 13, 2004, another corporation, AMTC,
filed with the Province an Application for Exploration Permit covering
the same area subject of Golden Falcon's and Mercado et al's
applications.
Eventually, AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary against
the applications of Mercado et al on the ground that the subject area
was already covered by its application. AMTC's theory seems to be that
the subject area could only be open to mining location AFTER the
finality of the order denying application to Golden Falcon, the first
applicant for a permit. Since Mercado et al's application was filed prior
to date when the order became final, it is invalid. The DENR Secretary
ruled in its favor.
Hence, the League of Provinces appealed to the Supreme
Court, arguing that the statutes providing the DENR with executive
control which infringed upon the local autonomy of provinces is
unconstitutional.
Doctrine: On the power of control of the DENR: Clearly, the LGC did not
fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the
provincial government. Under Sec. 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the LGC of 1991 the
enforcement of small-scale mining law is subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and
higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.
On whether the act of the DENR Secretary in nullifying the permits issued
by the Provincial Governor amounted to executive control: The Court
finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in
accordance with the POWER OF REVIEW [and not of Executive Control]
granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is
provided for in Section 24 of the Small Scale Mining Act and Section 22
of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. This quasi-judicial function
of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of
judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining
Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it
is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based
on the law.
TANO v. SOCRATES
August 21, 1997
Summary: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Prinsesa passed
Ordinance No. 15-92, banning the shipment of all live fish and lobsters
outside of its city. To implement the city ordinance, then Acting Mayor
Amado Lucero issued Order No. 23, Series of 1993, authorizing the
inspection of cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
from the Puerto Prinsesa Airport, Wharf or at any port within it to
ascertain that the Mayor’s Permit required by PD 426-14-74 for any
person engaged in business where a permit is required. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33,
Ordinance No. 2, prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms
for a period of five years. Two sets of petitioners filed this petition in
the SC. The SC ruled that for the first set of petitioners, the certiorari
was premature, lacking a cause of action. This is because there was no
showing that a motion to quash was filed in the criminal cases. For the
second set, it said that the petition is for declaratory relief which the
Court does not possess original jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this, the
Court resolved the case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the
Ordinances was about to end and having been enacted in the exercise of
powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation
of the environment, the case is novel and of paramount importance. The
SC did not find them Constitutionally infirm and upheld their validity.
Doctrine: the sangguaniang bayan, panlungsod and panlalawigan are
directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants, which shall include ordinances that protect the
environment and impose penalties for acts which endanger the
environment.
LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. CITY OF BUTUAN
January 20, 2000
Summary: The City of Butuan, in the exercise of its power to tax as an
LGU, claimed the exclusive power to register tricycles and to issue
licenses to drivers of tricycles, excluding the LTO. The LTO on the other
hand invoked the police power of the State that grants it the authority
to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons licenses
to drive such vehicles. The RTC of Butuan ruled in favor of the City of
Butuan and enjoined the LTO from licenses and registrations. The CA
sustained this ruling. The SC reversed, saying that the power of the
LGUs pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers exercised by the
LTFRB and not the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of
motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for driving thereof. The
functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature exercised
pursuant to the police power of the State. Police power and the power
to tax are separate and distinct powers and the exclusionary clause in
the tax provision of the LGC must not be held to have the effect of
withdrawing the express powers of the LTO.

The centerpiece of the LGC is the system of decentralization, as
expressly mandated by the Constitution. Devolution is indispensable to
decentralization and the LGC expressly provides that any provisions on
a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its
favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in
favor of devolution of powers and of the local government unit. Any fair
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned. Devolution
refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and
authority upon the various local government units to perform specific
functions and responsibilities.
Doctrine: Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are
inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share with local
government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry
out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many
respects, the grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of
the other. The two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate
and distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts, character,
scopes, and limitations.

One of the devolved powers is the enforcement of fishery laws in

municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry
out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CA

December 7, 1995

Summary: RA 4850 created the Laguna Lake Development Authority.

Under said law, LLDA has the exclusive authority to issue new permits
for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting
said lake. Later, RA 7160 (the LGC) was enacted. Under the LGC,
municipalities were given the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees. Pursuant to
this, municipalities within the Laguna Lake Region assumed the
authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. As a result, the
lake area became saturated with fishpens. In view of this, LLDA issued a
notice, informing the general public that fishpens not registered with or
not given permits by the LLDA are declared illegal, and that these would
be demolished. Reacting thereto, affected fishpen owners filed
injunction cases against LLDA. RTCs issued TROs against LLDA. Hence,
LLDA filed a petition for CPI with the SC. The SC referred the matter to
the CA, which held, among others, that the LGC repealed RA 4850
(LLDA's Charter) insofar as the fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay is
concerned. The SC reversed this ruling.

Doctrine: The LLDA has exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such
powers are by its Charter vested on it.
 EMINENT DOMAIN rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial,
full, ample (City of Manila v. Estrada)
Breakdown of Sec. 19, LGC:
Valid and Definite Offer
1. LGU may exercise the power of eminent domain
- The burden is on the LGU to prove compliance with the
a. Through its chief executive
mandatory requirement of valid and definite offer
(1) And acting pursuant to an ordinance
b. For public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of  Failure to prove = dismissal of complaint (Jesus is Lord
the poor and the landless Christian School Foundation v. Mun. of Pasig)
c. Upon payment of just compensation - Reasonable offer in good faith, nor merely perfunctory or pro
d. Pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and forma, must be made
pertinent laws  Single bona fide offer that is rejected is sufficient
 Mere letter of intent to acquire property or an invitation
2. Provided that the power of eminent domain may not be to a conference is not a valid and definite offer to
exercised UNLESS: purchase
a. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner, AND No Need for DAR Authority - The LGC did not intimate that the LGUs
b. Such offer was not accepted must first secure the approval of the DAR for the conversion of lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use before they can institute
3. Provided further that LGU may immediately take possession expropriation (Province of Camarines Sur v. CA)
of the property UPON:
a. Filing of the expropriation proceedings, AND Ordinance is needed, NOT mere resolution
b. Making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% - LGU cannot authorize expropriation through mere resolution
of FMV of property - LGC expressly requires an ordinance or local law
(1) Basis: Current tax declaration of the property
Immediate Entry by LGU
4. Amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be 1. Filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
determined by the court and substance
a. Based on FMV at the time of taking of property 2. Deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market
value of the property to be expropriated based on the
Power of Eminent Domain current tax declaration
- Power of the State to take private property for public use,
purpose of welfare upon payment of just compensation NOTE: Upon compliance with requisites, issuance of writ of
- Essentially lodged in Congress, delegated to LGU possession becomes ministerial. There is no need for a
- Not absolute, scope of delegated power is narrower than that hearing for the writ to issue (City of Iloilo v. Legaspi)
of delegating authority
Class Discussion:
 LGU may exercise the power only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the constraints imposed upon
by the law conferring the power Exercise of Eminent Domain Exercise of Eminent Domain
- Nature - The exercise of eminent domain is necessarily in by National Government by LGU
derogation of private rights, hence the authority to exercise Inherent power Delegated power
such must be strictly construed (Heirs of Suguitan v. City of No law is needed An ordinance is always required
Mandaluyong) In addition to the Constitutional
Limitations are given by
- Limitations: limitations, other limitations can
Constitution only: (1) Public
1. Due process clause and equal protection clause be found in other special laws like
purpose; (2) Just compensation
2. Just compensation RA 7279 on Socialized Housing
Assessed value of property
15% FMV required to be
Requisites of Eminent Domain required to be deposited in
deposited in order to take
1. Ordinance must be passed authorizing the local chief order to take immediate
immediate possession
executive to subject a certain property to LGU’s power of possession
expropriation FMV at time of filing FMV at time of taking
2. Power must be exercised for public use, or purpose, or No formal and definite offer A formal and definite offer is
welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless required required
3. Payment of just compensation
4. Valid and definite offer to buy the property must have been Socialized Housing (RA 7279) = Under the Urban Development and
previously made to the owner but the offer was not accepted Housing Act, expropriation by an LGU for purposes of socialized
housing projects shall occur only as a last resort. It must be shown by
Necessity of Taking for Public Use and Welfare the LGU that other methods of acquisition have been exhausted:
- Necessity does not mean absolute but only a reasonable or mortgage, land swapping, land consolidation, donation, joint venture
practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest agreements, and negotiated purchase.
benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and
expense to the condemning party and the property owner - If all the other methods have been exhausted and
consistent with such benefit (Masikip v. City of Pasig) expropriation to continue, the LGU shall prioritize
- The power is broad and has been said to be commensurate expropriation of property of:
with but not to exceed the duty to provide for the real needs 1. Government lands
of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience 2. Alienable public lands
and consistently as may be with private rights (Binay v. 3. Abandoned lands
Domingo) 4. Areas for priority development
5. Unacquired BLISS sites
Payment of Just Compensation 6. Private lands
- An equivalent for the value of the property taken
- “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word
“compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
 - Furthermore, small property landowners are similarly
exempt from expropriation for purposes of socialized
housing, provided:
1. Those owners of real property which consist of
residential lands within an area of not more than 300
sq. meters in highly urbanized cities, and 800 in other
urban cities; AND
2. They do not own real property other than the same.
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE v. HEIRS OF PASTOR
June 20, 2000
Summary: Barangay San Roque filed a complaint to expropriate the
property of the Heirs of Pastor. The MTC and RTC both dismissed the
complaints when filed in their sala stating that it is the other court that
has jurisdiction. The Barangay filed a petition to determine which court
has exclusive original jurisdiction to decide expropriation cases.
Doctrine: Where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have
the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, the SC has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
SUGUITAN v. CITY OF MANDALUYONG
March 14, 2000
Summary: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong issued a
resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos to file the necessary complaint for
expropriating Suguitan’s property. The RTC issued the expropriation
order. The heirs of Suguitan disputed the RTC order, arguing that,
under the LGC, an ordinance, not a mere resolution, is necessary to
authorize Mayor Abalos. The SC agreed with the heirs, holding that the
LGC provision controls over the inconsistent provision of the IRR of the
LGC requiring a mere resolution.
Doctrine: The requisites for the exercise of LGUs of the power of
eminent domain are:
(1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
(2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
(3) There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
(4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.
Class Notes: Also important is the distinction between ordinance and
resolution:
ORDINANCE RESOLUTION
Declaration of sentiment or
It is a law
opinion of a lawmaking body
Possesses a general and
Temporary in nature
permanent character
Third reading necessary No such need for a resolution
CITY OF CEBU v. CA
July 5, 1996
Summary: Pursuant to Res. No. 404 and Ord. No. 1418 of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City authorizing the City Mayor to
expropriate the parcel of land subject of this case for the purpose of
providing a socialized housing project for the landless and low-income
residents, the City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain before
RTC-Cebu City against Merlita Cardeno, the owner. RTC-Cebu City
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The RTC ruled that
Cebu City failed to comply with one of the conditions precedent to the
exercise of power of eminent domain by LGU, for lack of a valid and
definite offer to Merlita Cardeno. The CA upheld RTC’s decision. The
Supreme Court ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action.
Furthermore, it ruled that a closer scrutiny reveals that on the face of
the complaint alone, there is extant a cause of action.
Doctrine: A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain
for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however,
That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted; Provided, further. That the local government
unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of
the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property. (Sec. 19, RA 7160).
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their
aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in
importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules
had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party,
said rigid application cannot be countenanced.
Class Notes: Do not be confused. Apply Sec. 19, LGC strictly. It is the
technical rules of procedure that may be relaxed.
CITY OF CEBU v. DEDAMO
May 7, 2002
Summary: Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for expropriation
against respondent spouses Apolonio and BlasaDedamo. Spouses
Dedamo filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the expropriation would
benefit only a particular entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. The parties
entered into an agreement wherein they agreed that they would submit
the determination of the fair market value to the court and that the
spouses would no longer question the propriety of the purpose for
which the land is to be expropriated. The lower court appointed three
commissioners. The report of the commissioners was approved. The
petitioner filed an appeal alleging that just compensation should be
based on the prevailing market price of the property at the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The CA affirmed the
findings of the trial court. The SC also affirmed the CA and the trial
court and held that the fair market value of the property should be
decided based on the prevailing market price at the time of the taking
and not at the time of the commencement of expropriation proceedings.
Doctrine: Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government’s right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. However, the government must pay
the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor. Sec. 19
of RA 7160 expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking.
 FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INC. v. CA
January 23, 1998
Summary: Filstream filed an ejectment suit against the tenants of its
land. The MTC ordered vacation of the premises and payment of
rentals. This decision became final and executory. Filstream sought the
execution of the decision and was granted a Writ of Execution and later
a Writ of Demolition. The respondents-tenants filed a Motion to Quash
on the ground that supervening events rendered the enforcement of the
decision moot in that Manila City expropriated the subject lands. During
the pendency of the ejectment suit, Manila City instituted expropriation
proceedings against Filstream’s lands.
On appeal, the CA granted the respondents’ petition and ordered
the trial court to desist with the demolition and execution of the
ejectment decision. Filstream went to the SC alleging that it is entitled
to execution. The SC agreed and reversed the CA orders. It held that
Manila City failed to observe due process when it failed to follow the
requirements under Ra 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act).
Doctrine: Urban land reform has become a paramount task in view of
the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in
Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, LGUs are NOT given unbridled authority when exercising
their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these
problems: Constitutional limits: DPC, EPC, and Just Compensation; Sec.
19, LGC – “pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws”
Governing law that deals with the subject expropriation for purposes of
urban land reform and housing is RA 7279 (Urban Development and
Housing Act). There are limitations with respect to the order of priority
in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings
as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing.
Thus, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these
conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only
safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due
process when their property is expropriated for public use.
Class Notes: This case discusses the application of RA 7279
- Remember that RA 7279 (Sec. 9 and 10) applies ONLY when
the purpose of expropriation is for socialized housing
 Thus, it is only for socialized housing purposes that the
300/800sqm retention limit applies
 For other purposes, like construction of a road, LGU
may expropriate property even if it is as small as 5sqm
- Exemption is given to small property owners
- Some scenarios:
1. 300sqm – exemption; it must be in excess of 300sqm
2. 305sqm – yes, LGU can expropriate the ENTIRE
property not just the excess 5sqm
3. 300sqm in one lot, another 5sqm in another separate
lot – LGU can still expropriate the ENTIRE property
 To be covered by the exemption, owner must have
at the most 300sqm of land TOTAL (aggregate, not
individual lots)
CITY OF MANILA v. SERRANO
June 20, 2001
Summary: An expropriation proceeding of the property of the Serranos
was initiated by the City of Manila for distribution to the homeless. TC
ordered the City to deposit the assessed amount for the land and issued
a writ of possession. CA reversed TC and ruled that the city failed to
comply with sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. SC ruled that it was
premature for CA to rule that there was non-compliance with the rules.
SC further stated the 2 stages of an expropriation proceeding.
Doctrine: Expropriation proceedings consist of two stages: first,
condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition
will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of the
private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not
more than three commissioners.
Class Notes: Compare with Filstream case
- The difference is that both cases are at different stages in the
expropriation process
CITY OF MANDALUYONG v. AGUILAR
January 29, 2001
Summary: The city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation
of 2 lots belonging to the Aguilars. RTC: Lots are exempt under Sec. 3 of
RA 7279, also the expropriation is not proper for not being for public
purpose. SC: RTC decision upheld. The relevant law is RA 7279. Section
9 enumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the hierarchy in
acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of acquisition.The Aguilars
are small property owners as defined in Section 3 (q). Hence their land
is exempted from expropriation under Section 10.
Doctrine: While there is an expanded notion of public use under present
jurisprudence, the passage of RA 7279 introduced a limitation on the
size of the land sought to be expropriated. The law expressly exempted
"small property owners" from expropriation for urban land reform.
"Small property owners" are defined as those whose only real property
consists of residential lands not exceeding 300 sq.m. in highly
urbanized cities and 800 sq.m. in other urban areas.
BARDILLON v. MASILI
April 30, 2003
Summary: Brgy. Masili filed a complaint for eminent domain before
MTC for the expropriation of Lot 4381-D. MTC dismissed the case
because Brgy. Masili was always absent. Brgy. Masili filed again a
complaint for eminent domain for the same lot before RTC. RTC granted
expropriation and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession over the
lot. CA and SC upheld the RTC.
Doctrine: The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in
an expropriation case are expressly and specifically governed by
Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of
the local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section
19 of the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for
authorizing immediate entry are as follows
(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance; and
(2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair
market value of the property to be expropriated based on its
current tax declaration.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly
addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings.
FRANCIA v. MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN
March 24, 2008
Summary: The Municipality of Meycauayan sought the expropriation of
a land owned by Amos, Cecilia and the heirs of Benjamin Francia. The
municipality alleged that the land was idle, while the Francias said that
it was in fact developed and there were plans to further develop it. The
RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose and that the
municipality may take immediate possession after payment of 15% of
the fair market value of the property, upon the issuance of a writ of
possession. The Francias filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
saying that the RTC should have conducted a hearing to determine the
existence of public purpose. The CA partially granted the petition and
nullified the order of expropriation. It however said that a hearing was
not necessary because once the expropriator deposited the required
amount, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial. The
SC affirmed this, citing Sec. 19 of RA 7160.
Doctrine: Before an LGU may enter into the possession of the property
sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit
with the said court at least 15% of the property’s fair market value
based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the
determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance
of a writ of possession.
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed
with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our
Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to
grant, the exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert
dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a
public exigency and is said to be an essential part of governance even in
its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. In fact,
“all separate interests of individuals in property are held of the
government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation.
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the
highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or
in the aggregate body of people in their sovereign capacity; and they
have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the
public interest so requires it.”

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION INC. v.
MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG
August 9, 2005
Summary: The municipality of Pasig wants to expropriate a part of the
land of the Ching Cunacos which was sold to JILCSF for the construction
of a road from the main road to an interior barangay. The main
contention here is the compliance with the LGC requirement of valid
and definite offer. According to Pasig, it made such offer through a letter
sent to the owners, the said letter was not presented in court and upon
examination, it only contained an invitation to a conference for the
discussion of the price of the land and not an actual offer to purchase.
Due to the failure to comply with the requirement, and the lack of proof
that the land was the most convenient way going to the brgy, the court
reversed the lower courts’ order granting writ of possession.
the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not
adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is
not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by
filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is
taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts
title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to
prove a right to compensation for the taking.
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that “private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible
abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property
the power is sought to be enforced.

Doctrine: The condemnor has the burden of proving all the essentials
necessary to show the right of condemnation. The ff. are the requisites
for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a LGU… A
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first
made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the
expense and delay of a court action.

Class Notes: Under this case, the valid and definite offer must be given to
ALL co-owners.

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. GOPUCO

June 30, 2005

Summary: Gopuco owned a parcel of land close to the Lahug Airport.

The Nat’l Airport Commission, the predecessor of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, informed them that the government was acquiring
lands for the purposes of expansion of the aforementioned airport. The
lands sought included Gopuco’s. Gopuco naturally refused. Thus, a
complaint for expropriation was filed before the CFI. The CFI ruled in
favor of the government, saying that the expropriation was valid. Such
was not appealed. However, Gopuco thereafter filed an amended
complaint with the RTC for reconveyance of the property, arguing that
since the original reason for the acquisition of the property had been
abandoned, the title to the property should revert to him. The RTC
dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed. The SC reversed the decision
of the CA, saying that aside from the fact that the judgment on the
propriety of the expropriation had long become final, the judgment
granted the title in fee simple to the government. Therefore, no rights to
Lot No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by the herein
respondent.

Doctrine: Eminent domain is generally described as “the highest and

most exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may be
acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a
forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to as expropriation
and, with less frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and
 RECLASSIFICATION OF LANDS 3. That land already distributed to agrarian reform
beneficiaries pursuant to CARL shall not be affected by the
reclassification
Breakdown of Sec. 20, LGC: Reclassification of Lands
4. That conversion of such land into other purposes shall be
(a) City or municipality may authorize the reclassification of
done pursuant to Sec. 65 of agrarian reform law
agricultural lands and provide for their utilization or
disposition
Areas Reclassified Expandable – the percentage limits may be increased
(1) AFTER conducting public hearings
by the President when public interest so requires upon NEDA
(2) In the following cases:
recommendation
a) When land ceases to be economically feasible
and sound for agricultural purposes as
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
determined by DAR, OR
1. AO No. 363 (1997) – Prescribing guidelines for the
b) Where land shall have substantially greater
protection of areas non-negotiable for conversion and
economic value for residential, commercial, or
monitoring compliance with Sec. 20, LGC
industrial purposes, as determined by
a. Some areas are designated as non-negotiable for
sanggunian concerned
conversion; In all cases, applications for conversion
shall not be given due course by the DAR:
(3) Provided that such reclassification shall be limited to
(1) Protected areas under the National Integrated
the following percentage of total agricultural land
Protected Areas (NIPAS)
area at time of passage of ordinance:
(2) All irrigated lands, as delineated by the DAR
a) 15% for highly urbanized and independent
(3) All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation
component cities
projects with firm funding commitments
b) 10% for component cities and 1st to 3rd class
b. Some lands are classified as highly restricted from
municipalities
conversion which may be converted only upon
c) 5% for 4th to 6th class municipalities
compliance with existing laws; social benefit cost
analysis approved by the DA shall also be required
(4) Provided further that agricultural lands distributed to
(1) Lands classified by the NIPAS as Highly Restricted:
agrarian reform beneficiaries under CARL shall not be
(a) Irrigable lands not covered by irrigation
affected by said reclassification and conversion
projects with firm funding commitments
(b) Agro-industrial crop lands
(b) President MAY authorize a city or municipality to reclassify
(c) Highlands
lands in excess of the limits in preceding paragraph
(2) Lands issued a Notice of Acquisition/Valuation
(1) WHEN public interest so requires, and
under the agrarian reform program a
(2) UPON recommendation of NEDA
(3) Areas identified as environmentally critical as
determined by DENR
(c) LGUs shall continue to prepare respective comprehensive
land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances
2. RA 8435 (1997) – Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
(1) This shall be the primary and dominant bases for the
a. Sec. 9 – Delineation of Strategic Agriculture and
future use of land resources
Fisheries Development Zones
(2) Provided that the following shall be taken into
(1) All irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered
consideration:
by irrigation a projects with firm funding
a) Requirements for food production,
commitments, and lands with existing or having
b) Human settlements, and
the potential for growing high-value crops so
c) Industrial expansion
delineated and included within the SAFDZ shall
not be converted for a period of five (5) years
(d) Where approval by national agency is required for
front the effectivity for this Act
reclassification:
b. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature
(1) Approval shall not be unreasonably withheld
Conversion
(2) Failure to act on a proper and complete application
for reclassification within 3 months from receipt shall
3. DAR AO No. 1 (1999) – Revised rules and regulations on the
be deemed approval thereof
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses
(e) Nothing in Sec. 20 shall be construed as repealing,
amending, or modifying RA 6657.
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOC. INC.
v. DAR SECRETARY
NOTE: The power granted by Sec. 20 is not to convert land for any
June 18, 2010
purpose contrary to CARL but merely to RECLASSIFY land
Summary: Petitioner CREBA filed before the Supreme Court a Petition
Conditions for Reclassification: Land within the jurisdiction of an LGU
may now be classified subject to several conditions: for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary
1. That land has ceased to be economically feasible and sound restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65,
for agricultural purposes as determined by the DAR seeking to nullify and prohibit the Department of Agrarian Reform from
a. Or that the land has substantially greater economic enforcing several administrative issuances regulating land use
value for residential, commercial, or industrial conversion for having been issued by the Sec. of Agrarian Reform with
purposes as determined by the Sanggunian concerned grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
2. That the following percentages of land are at the time of the some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are allegedly
passage of the reclassification ordinance are not exceeded: illegal and unconstitutional. The Court held that DAR had the authority
a. 15% - highly urbanized and independent component to issue the AOs pursuant to its express power to implement RA 6657
or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
cities
b. 10% - component cities and 1st to 3rd class
municipalities Doctrine: The power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not
c. 5% - 4th – 6th class municipalities absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of
agricultural lands covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses has
been recognized by said Section 20 of RA 7160 by explicitly providing  DAR can overturn the LGU’s reclassification if it finds
therein that, "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or that it violates CARL
modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657."  LGUs cannot reclassify lands with the effect of
circumventing agrarian reform laws
Summary of SC discussion on Conversion and Reclassification - Are ALL reclassifications covered by the DAR?
 NO, only those provided by law (Sec. 20 of LGU and
CONVERSION RECLASSIFICATION under CARL)
Change in the actual use of the  What about after effectivity of CARL? Still, not all
Classifying land in paper
land reclassifications are covered by DAR since the President
Done with approval of DAR Done by Sanggunian may reserve land for public use
- Note that DAR has a different definition of reclassification
As discussed in the case: and conversion (DAR AO as discussed in the case)
A. Conversion v. Reclassification
1. Conversion – act of changing the current use of a piece
of agricultural land into some other use as provided by
DAR
2. Reclassification – act of specifying how agricultural
lands shall be utilized for non- agricultural uses as
embodied in land use plan, subject to requirements and
procedures of land conversion
B. Mere reclassification of agricultural land does not
automatically allow landowner to change its use
1. He has to undergo process of conversion before he is
permitted to use the agricultural land for other
purposes
2. agricultural lands though reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses
must still undergo conversion
C. Emphasis: DAR’s conversion authority can only be exercised
after effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15 1988

D. Immaterial if reclassification was done by LGU or by way of

Presidential Proclamation (PP) because either way they must
still undergo conversion process
1. Remember: No automatic conversion if agricultural
land was reclassified
2. For reclassified agricultural lands to be used for the
purpose to which they are intended there is still a need
to change current use through conversion process
a. Authority is with DAR
b. Notwithstanding reclassification, there is a need
for conversion
E. Even reclassification by PP needs conversion clearance from
DAR
F. Any reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural
uses either by LGU or PP enacted on or after June 15, 1988
must undergo the process of conversion
1. Despite having undergone reclassification
2. Before agricultural land may be used for other purposes
G. It is different when through PP public agricultural lands have
been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose
because in such a case conversion is no longer necessary
1. Republic v. Estonilo – only a positive act of President is
needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the
public domain for a public purpose
2. Public agricultural lands already reserved for public
purpose is no longer part of the alienable lands of the
public domain and thus outside CARP

Class Notes:
- The reclassification of land by the Sanggunian depends on
compliance with Sec. 20
 LGC however, does not provide how often this can be
done; Sir thinks that this can be used to create
loopholes with respect to requirements of the law
- If the sanggunian reclassifies a lot to commercial can they
build a mall the following day?
 NO, conversion from DAR is still needed
 Conversion is an additional safeguard for the power to
reclassify
- What is DAR’s role in this? To ensure that there is no
contravention of the CARL
 CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS For TEMPORARY CLOSURE:
1. Via ordinance
2. May be done due to:
Breakdown of Sec. 21, LGC: Closure and Opening of Roads
a. Actual emergency
(a) LGU may permanently or temporarily close or open any
b. Fiesta celebrations
LOCAL road, alley, park, or square falling within its
c. Public rallies
jurisdiction
d. Agricultural or industrial fairs
(1) How? Pursuant to an ordinance
e. Undertaking of public works and highways,
(2) Provided: In case of permanent closure
telecommunications, and watering projects
a) Ordinance must be approved by at least 2/3 of
3. Duration of closure must be specifically stated in the Order of
all sanggunian members
Closure
b) When necessary, and adequate substitute for the
4. If for the purpose for athletic, cultural, or civil activities;
public facility
these must be officially sponsored, recognized, or approved
by the local government
(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be
PERMANENTLY closed without making provisions for
For PERMANENT CLOSURE:
maintenance of public safety therein
1. Via ordinance approved by at least 2/3 of all members of the
(1) Property permanently withdrawn from public use may
Sanggunian
be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
2. Such ordinance must have provisions for the maintenance of
real property belonging to the LGU concerned may be
public safety therein
lawfully used or conveyed
3. Such property withdrawn may be used or conveyed for any
(2) HOWEVER, no freedom park shall be closed
purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
permanently without provision for its transfer or
government may be lawfully used or conveyed
relocation to a new site
4. When necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility
that is subject to closure should be provided
(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be
5. If a freedom park is permanently closed, there must be a
temporarily closed
provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site
(1) When? During:
a) An actual emergency
For closure by cities, municipalities, and barangays:
b) Or fiesta celebrations,
1. Via ordinance
c) Public rallies
2. May temporarily close and regulate the use of any local
d) Agricultural or industrial fairs, or
street, road, or any other public place
e) An undertaking of public works and highways
3. For shopping malls, Sunday, flea, or night markets, or
f) Telecommunications and waterworks projects
shopping areas for the sale of goods, merchandise, foodstuffs,
(2) Duration of which shall be specified by the local chief
and commodities
executive in a written order
(3) PROVIDED no national or local road, alley, park, or
Note: All LGUs may temporarily and permanently close their
square shall be temporarily closed for athletic,
local roads, but the regulation and closure of local roads for
cultural, civic activities not officially sponsored,
the above purposes are limited to cities, municipalities, and
recognized or approved by LGU concerned
barangays.
(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may temporarily close
and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare,
or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, CABRERA v. CA
March 18, 1991
flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established
and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or
articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the Summary: The petitioner in this case assails Resolution 158 which
general public closed down the Old Road leading to the New Capitol building and was
(1) By a duly enacted ordinance redistributed to owners of those lots whose property were
expropriated for the construction of the new road in equal portions.
Ordinance is Required The lot owners then started planing vegetables and converted parts of
- Power to permanently or temporarily close or open any local the old road into a piggery. He is upset because he lost easy access to
road, alley, park, or square within LGU’s territorial his place of residence, and for such reason he demands to be
jurisdiction can be exercised ONLY through an ordinance compensated. RTC found he had an easy access way as alternative. CA
reversed, SC upheld RTC.
 EXCEPT when the closure is temporary and under the
conditions specified in Sec. 21(c)
Doctrine: Richmond v. City of Hinton - The Constitution does not
 Here, the local chief executive can unilaterally
undertake to guarantee to a property owner the public maintenance of
close it without an ordinance
the most convenient route to his door. The law will not permit him to be
cut off from the public thoroughfares, but he must content himself with
Road Closure, an LGU Power
such route for outlet as the regularly constituted public authority may
- As held in Cabrera v. CA – closure of city streets is within
deem most compatible with the public welfare. When he acquires city
powers of city council while closure of provincial roads is
property, he does so in tacit recognition of these principles. If,
within the powers of provincial board
subsequent to his acquisition, the city authorities abandon a portion of
- Also note that Freedom Parks cannot be permanently closed
the street to which his property is not immediately adjacent, he may
without provisions for its relocation or transfer
suffer loss because of the inconvenience imposed, but the public
treasury cannot be required to recompense him. Such case is damnum
Scope of Closure – Within the JURISDICTION of the LGU:
absque injuria.
1. Local roads
2. Alleys
The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general
3. Parks
welfare clause. Whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered
4. Squares
"pales in significance compared to the greater convenience the new
road, which is wide and concrete, straight to the veterans fountain and
down to the pier, has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the
new road adds beauty and color not only to the town of Virac but also to
the whole province of Catanduanes." For the enjoyment of those
benefits, every individual in the province, including the petitioner, must
be prepared to give his share.

Class Notes:
- Can the LGU close all kinds or roads?
 See Sec. 21
- Can a province close a municipal road in a municipality?
Debatable:
 YES. Municipal plans must be in accordance with
provincial plans
 But then land use plans are very general so this
may not be a very strong argument
 NO because of local autonomy.
 Even if the province reviews municipal
ordinances, it can only rule on its legality
- Important lesson in this case: The closure of public roads
under police power is NOT eminent domain
 No grant of damages is awarded

DACANAY v. ASISTIO
May 6, 1992

Summary: Pursuant to Ordinance No. 79-02 enacted by the

Metropolitan Manila Commission, City Mayor of Caloocan open up 7 flea
markets in the city and issued licenses to several stall owners for the
conduct of vending activities. One of the streets affected was the
“Heroes del ‘96” where Dacanay lives. In 1987, OIC City Mayor Martinez
caused the demolition of the market stalls, The stall-owners who were
issued licenses filed an action for prohibition against the city officials.
Initially the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction but such
was subsequently lifted. It ruled that the streets were public dominion
and hence, outside the commerce of men. It also cited the case of
Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas where it was held that properties for
public use may not be leased to private individuals. There was a change
of city officials and such order was never implemented. Dacanay wrote
to the city officials asking that they implement the trial court decision
but there was no response. He filed a suit before the Ombudsman which
recommended the filing of information for failing to perform a legal
obligation. Dacanay filed a petition for mandamus to compel city
officials to enforce the decision of trial court. The Supreme Court ruled
in favor of Dacanay and ordered the demolition of the market stalls in
the public streets.

Doctrine: A public street is property for public use hence outside the
commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract.

The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained
away through contract. Thus, leases or licenses issued by the City
Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street are null
and void for being contrary to law.

Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to
use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as
arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.

Class Notes:
- Is this good law? No, see Sec. 21(d)
- Who else may order closure of roads? The local chief
executive
 In this case, an ordinance is not necessary to effect the
closure
 But note that this refers only to temporary closure in
Sec. 21 (c)
 Note further that in case the closure was due to an
emergency, once the emergency situation ceases
the closure will no longer be valid
 CORPORATE POWERS
Breakdown of Sec. 22, LGC: Corporate Powers
(a) Every LGU, as a corporation, shall have the following
powers:
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name
(2) To sue and be sued
(3) To have and use a corporate seal
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property
(5) To enter into contracts; and
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to
corporations subject to the limitations provided in this
Code and other laws
(b) LGUs may continue using, modify, or change their existing
corporate seals, PROVIDED:
(1) Newly established LGUs or those without corporate
seals may create their own which shall be registered
with the DILG
(2) Any change of corporate seal shall also be registered
as provided therein
(c) No contract may be entered into by the local chief executive
in behalf of the LGU without prior authorization of the
sanggunian concerned
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the Code
(2) Legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a
conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city,
municipal or barangay hall
(d) LGUs shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their
proprietary functions and in the management of their
economic enterprises
(1) Subject to limitations provided in the Code and laws
Sec. 22 enumerates the powers that local governments possess as
corporate entities
- Also note sub-section (d) which grants full autonomy to LGUs
in the exercise of their proprietary functions
LGUs can be sued
- General Rule: Sec. 3, Art. XVI, Constitution, “the State may not
be sued without its consent
 Exception: State can be sued only with its consent
which may be embodied in a general law or special law
(implied or express consent)
 Consent is implied when the government enters
into business contracts, as it thereby descends into
the level of the other contracting party
- Under Sec. 22, it is clear that the State allows the LGU to sue
and be sued (Pimentel)
- The distinction of powers (see Sec. 15) becomes important
for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality
for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third
persons (Torio v. Fontanilla)
 Torio makes a distinction:
1. If injury is caused in the course of the performance
of a governmental function, no recovery, as a rule,
can be had from the municipality unless there is
an existing statute on the matter
a. Same goes for the officers so long as they
perform their duties honestly and in good
faith (no malicious or wanton acts)
2. If injury is caused in the exercise of proprietary
functions, LGU can be held liable to 3rd persons ex
contractu or ex delicto
 Class Notes: According to our discussion in class this
may not be accurate anymore. See full discussion under
Sec. 24 on liability (on page 49)
NOTE: There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining
the true nature of an undertaking or function of an LGU; the
surrounding circumstances are to be considered.
- The basic element, however beneficial to the public the
undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence
 Otherwise, function becomes proprietary
- As an illustration, see Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
v. Firme and City of Manila v. CA
Estoppel Does Not Apply
- Doctrine of estoppel cannot apply against a municipal
corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to
make, or which it is authorized to make only under
prescribed conditions, although the corporation has accepted
the benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed
his part
A review on the Distinctions:
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS CORPORATE POWERS
Exercised in administering the
Exercised for the special benefit
powers of the state and
and advantage of the community
promoting public welfare
Legislative, judicial, public, and
Ministerial, private, and corporate
political
Cannot be sued without consent Impliedly consents to being sued
for injuries it caused9 by entering into private contracts
Officers or agents acting within
Officers and agents are liable for
official duties are not liable
negligence/tort while within the
unless they acted willfully and
scope of their employment
maliciously
Respondeat superior does not
Respondeat superior applies
apply10
Power to Enter into Contracts – Requisites:
1. Entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the LGU
2. Prior authorization by Sanggunian concerned
3. Legible copy of the contract posted at a conspicuous place in:
a. Provincial capitol or
b. City, municipal, barangay hall
Ultra Vires Contracts – An LGU can only legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of authority granted to it, or else its
acts are ultra vires
- Example: Dacanay v. Asistio - A public street is property for
public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside
the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
other contract. The city government, contrary to law, has
been leasing portions of the streets. Such lease or license is
null and void for being contra to law.
CITY OF MANILA v. IAC
November 15, 1989
Summary: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died on June 4,1971 and was
buried in lot No. 159 of the North Cemetery which was leased by the
city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6,
202. In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5 of 1975, of the City
Mayor of Manila Lot 159 in which the remains of the late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo were laid to rest, believed to have been leased to the bereaved
family for 5 years only, was certified on January 1978 as ready for
exhumation. The authorities of the North Cemetery placed the bones
and skull of deceased in a bag or sack and kept the same in the
depository or bodega of the cemetery. The lot was rented out to another
9
Does this distinction hold true in light of Sec. 24? Jurisprudence says it is but
according to our discussions in class, Sec. 24 does not distinguish between
governmental and proprietary functions
10
The SC keeps on citing respondeat superior but then it cites Art. 2180 (on
vicarious liability) and under our Torts class these 2 concepts are not the same
lessee so that when the plaintiffs went to said lot the resting place of
their departed did not anymore bear the stone marker.. The widow and
children of the late Sto. Domingo, Sr. filed an action for damages against
the City of Manila and officers of the North Cemetery. Trial Court
ordered the defendants to give the family the right to make use of
another single lot for a period of 43 years 4 months and 11 days and to
search, for the remains and to bury the same in the substitute lot. CA
modified the decision ordering defendants to pay the family jointly and
severally P10,000.00 for breach of contract, P20,000.00 for moral
damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees. SC affirmed the IAC decision.
Doctrine: City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by
and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its
proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public,
governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare
and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal
powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and
advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial,
private and corporate.
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA v. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
March 28, 1968
Summary: CA 39 converted the Mun. of Zamboanga into Zamboanga
City. The provinces and buildings, consisting of 50 lots and some
buildings thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga are covered by
Torrens certificates in the name of Zamboanga Province. RA 3039 was
approved amending CA 39 by providing that all buildings, properties,
and assets belonging to the former Province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in
favor of the latter.
Sec. of Finance ordered the CIR to stop effecting further payments to
Zamboanga del Norte and to return to the City the sum taken from its
IRA as payment for the properties. Zamboanga del Norte then filed a
complaint before the CFI against the City, Sec. of Finance, and CIR.
Judgment was rendered declaring RA 3039 unconstitutional and
ordered the City to pay to the Province the sum for the properties.
Doctrine: The matter involved here is the extent of legislative control
over the properties of a municipal corporation. If the property is owned
by the municipal corporation in its public and governmental capacity,
the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if
the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality
cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation. The capacity in which the property is held is dependent
on the use to which it is intended and devoted. The applicable law is the
law on Municipal Corporations, and not the Civil Code, in classifying
between private and public. Under this norm, to be considered public, it
is enough that the property be held and, devoted for public service and
governmental purposes like local administration, public education,
public health, etc.
Class Notes:
- The SC cited the “Law on Municipal Corporations” but what is
this law? There is no basis!
 Despite this, the SC keeps on citing this case
- When national government creates an LGU, there is no
transfer of property from the former to the latter
 If QC has title on the land, is it theirs?
 Depends. If QC bought it using its own funds, then
YES
 If QC buys property from Mandaluyong, is QC’s territory
expanded?
 NO. QC can buy but there is no increase in
territory
 For an increase in territory, go back to Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution
 This just means that QC bought the property in its
proprietary character
RABUCO v. VILLEGAS
February 28, 1974
Summary: Petitoners Rabuco et. al filed 2 cases to enjoin the demolition
of their lots basing their right on RA 3120 which declared that the
properties were "reserved as communal property" and ordered their
conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in
small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. Section 2 of the Act
prohibited ejectment proceedings and dismissal of demolition orders.
City officials countered stating that RA 3120 is invalid for being in
violation of the Constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of
property without due process of law and without just compensation. TC
said that it had no jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality but this
need not be passed upon as the principal question in issue is whether
the houses of the petitioners are public nuisances, which the court
resolved in the affirmative. CA certified the case to the SC stating that
the real issue was constitutionality of RA 3120. SC upheld the validity
of the Act.
Doctrine: The subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled
in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the
resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide
occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not
constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent
domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a
manifestation of the legislature's right of control and power to deal
with State property.
Class Notes:
- When LGUs are created, there is no transfer of land from the
national government to the LGU
- From our discussion in Zamboanga, there was no showing in
this case that Manila bought the land using its own funds
- Power of LGU to acquire and sell property:
 If the property is owned by the municipality in its
public and governmental capacity, the property is
public and Congress has absolute control over it. If the
property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity,
then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
control and the municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just compensation.
MUNICIPAL BOARD v. CTA
December 26, 1964
Summary: The University of Southern Philippines Foundation sought to
have several properties it had owned exempted from the real property
taxation imposed by the City of Cebu.
The City Assessor exempted most of the properties on the ground that
it was being used for school purposes but did not do the same for 6 lots.
The Foundation appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the
City of Cebu and said Board granted exemption to 5 of the lots which
were originally not considered exempt. From this decision, the
Municipal Board, in representation of the City of Cebu, appealed to the
CTA.
The CTA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the City of Cebu, as a
governmental agency, is not among those who may appeal to the CTA as
enumerated in Sec. 11 of RA 1125. The SC reversed the CTA.
Doctrine: Sec. 11 of RA 1125 provides: SEC 11. Who may appeal; effect
of appeal. — Any person, association or corporation adversely affected
by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the
Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment
Appeals may file an appeal in the CTA within thirty days after the
receipt of such decision or ruling.

The City of Cebu constitutes a political body corporate created by a

special charter (CA No. 58), endowed with the powers which pertain to
a municipal corporation. As such, it possesses the capacity to sue and be
sued. It must be noted that the City of Cebu is authorized to levy real
estate taxes for its support. In the decision of the Board of Assessment
Appeals of Cebu City exempting the lots in question from the payment
of real property tax, no entity is more adversely affected than the City of
Ceb Cebu, for it stands to lose a yearly income equivalent to the realty
tax.
 AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE AND SECURE GRANTS
Breakdown of Sec. 23, LGC: Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants
Local chief executives may negotiate and secure financial grants or
donations in kind
- For? In support of the basic services or facilities enumerated
under Sec. 17
- Where? From local and foreign assistance agencies
- How? Upon authority of the Sanggunian
 Without necessity of securing clearance or approval
therefor from any department, agency, or office of the
national government or from any higher LGU
PROVIDED: Projects financed by such grants or assistance with
national security implications shall be approved by national agency
concerned
- When such national agency fails to act on the request for
approval within 30 days from receipt, same shall be deemed
approved
Local chief executive shall report the nature, amount, and terms of
such assistance to both Houses of Congress and the President
- Within 30 days upon signing of such grant agreement or
deed of donation
LGUs are now authorized to negotiate and secure financial grants or
donations in kind from assistance agencies (foreign or local) to get the
basic services in Sec. 17
- Clearance from the national government or a higher LGU is
not necessary
When Clearance Necessary – there is one instance when approval of the
proper agency of the central government is necessary: when the grant
or assistance sought has NATIONAL SECURITY implications
- Ex: When grant consists of weapons or involves supervision
of foreign agents for implementation purposes
- Approval deemed granted if there is failure to act on the part
of the national government within 30 days upon receipt of
request for approval
Reporting Requirement
- Once the grant or donation is signed, local chief executive has
to report to Congress (both Houses) and the President
- LGC IRR also require the NEDA and DILG to assist LGUs and
the granting institutions or donors in the execution and
implementation of their agreements (Art. 52, IRR)
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
Breakdown of Sec. 24, LGC: Liability for Damages
LGUs and their officials are NOT exempt from liability for:
1. Death or injury to persons, or
2. Damage to property
Sec. 24 makes LGUs and their Officials liable for damages for malicious
or negligent conduct of the latter. (Pimentel)
- A categorical statement that LGUs do not enjoy absolute and
unqualified immunity from suits
- What is stressed here is the right of aggrieved parties to
bring suits against the acts or omissions of LGUs and their
officials
Properties NOT subject to levy and execution – Properties of a
municipality, real or personal, which are necessary for public use
CANNOT be attached and sold at an execution sale to satisfy money
claims against a municipality
- Revenues from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which
are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of
financing the governmental activities and functions of the
municipality are EXEMPT from execution (Mun. of Makati v.
CA)
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
1. New Civil Code
a. Art. 34 - When a member of a city or municipal police
force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace
officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city
or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a
preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action.
b. Art. 2180 - The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
(1) The State is responsible in like manner when it
acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable.
(2) The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
c. Art. 2189 - Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.
2. RA 8749 – Act providing for a comprehensive air pollution
control policy
a. Sec. 43 - Where a suit is brought against a person who
filed an action as provided in Sec. 41, or against any
person, institution or government agency that
implements this Act, it shall be the duty of the
investigating prosecutor or the court, to immediately
make a determination not exceeding 30 days whether
said legal action has been filed to harass, vex, exert
undue pressure or stifle such legal recourses of the
person complaining of or enforcing the provisions of
this Act. Upon determination thereof the court shall
 dismiss the case and award attorney's fees and double within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and
damages. to the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to
b. This provision shall also apply and benefit public such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies.
officers who are sued for acts committed in their official
capacity, there being no grave abuse of authority, and Class Notes: If a municipality acts in a governmental capacity, how can
done in the course of enforcing this Act. they be liable?
1. Bad faith of a public officer – public officer is held liable
Distinguish: 2. Law provides that LGU (and its officers can be liable) under
Sec. 24
POLITICAL/GOVERNMENTAL CORPORATE/PROPRIETARY
ACTS11 ACTS The SC made an extensive discussion on the distinction between
LGU generally not liable unless: governmental and proprietary functions. Here is a summary:
1. Statute provides
otherwise GOVERNMENTAL PROPRIETARY
2. Damages due to defective As agent As a creation of law
condition of roads, EXAMPLES
streets, buildings, and Can be held liable ex contractu or Establishment of municipal
other public works (Art. ex delicto Adoption of regulations against
waterworks for use of
2189, CC) fire and disease, preservation of
inhabitants, construction and
3. Damages due to failure to public peace, maintenance of
maintenance of municipal
render aid or protection municipal prisons,
slaughterhouses, markets, stables,
in case of danger to life or establishment of primary
bathing establishments, wharves,
property (Art. 34, CC) schools and post-offices, etc.
ferries, fisheries, etc.
Defense of due diligence in the But there are instances when an act has a governmental and a
No valid defense for non-
selection and supervision of its corporate character (SC did not discuss more on this concept)
performance
officers LIABILITIES
Officers or agents acting within State immunity extended Cannot invoke immunity
Officers and agents are liable for
official duties are not liable In the exercise of this function, In the exercise of this function,
negligence/torts while within
UNLESS they acted willfully and Municipality is NOT liable for municipality is liable for acts of its
scope of employment
maliciously acts of its officers and agents officers and agents
When the act of the officer are for
Always remember Sec. 24 When the act of the officer come
a special benefit of the
- Sec. 24 does not distinguish between governmental or within the powers which the
corporation in its private or
proprietary functions municipality has as agent of the
corporate interest, such officer is
- So one can argue that the LGU (and its officers) are now state, it is EXEMPT from liability
deemed the agent or servant of
liable regardless if the cause of the injury was its for the acts of the officer
the city
performance of governmental functions Officer acts as agent of the
 But note that Sec. 24 specifies the grounds available: Officer acts as agent of the State
municipality
1. Damage to property Officer will be liable in the
2. Death or injury to persons exercise of his official acts if it is
- Read this with Sec. 22 where it provides that the LGU can sue shown that he acted willfully
and be sued Officer will be liable
and maliciously and with the
 RA 7160 gives the consent for LGUs to be the subject of express purpose of inflicting
suits injury upon the plaintiff
- So what is the use of the distinction? Respondeat superior will not
1. To determine the proper extent of control Respondeat superior applies
apply
2. For other grounds not mentioned in Sec. 24 (meaning Municipality will be regarded as
other than damage to property and death/injury to an ordinary private corporation
persons) or individual and will be liable as
such insofar as liability to 3rd
persons on contract or tort is
MENDOZA v. DE LEON Municipality will be liable even concerned
February 11, 1916 in the exercise of its To create liability, it is
governmental function when it fundamentally necessary that the
Summary: Mendoza was the lessee of a ferry owned by the municipality consents to be sued act done which is injurious must
of Villasis, Pangasinan. After his use of more than a year, the be within the scope of the
municipality, through a Resolution, revoked such lease and awarded a corporate powers as prescribed
franchise for the same ferry to another person. As a result, Mendoza by charter; so if it is ultra vires,
filed an action for damages against the municipal council members. The the corporation cannot be liable
Pangasinan CFI ruled in favor of Mendoza and awarded damages. SC (but officers personally liable)
affirmed.

Doctrine: Municipalities have both governmental and corporate or
business functions. A municipality is not exempt from liability for the
negligent performance of its corporate functions. In the administration
of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation
or individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort
is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents
11
Taken from UP LAW 2013 Bar Reviewer
SAN FERNANDO v. FIRME
April 8, 1991
Summary: A collision occurred involving the dump truck owned by the
Municipality of San Fernando and killing Baniña. The heirs of Baniña
sued the owner and driver of the jeepney that the victim was riding,
who then filed a third party complaint against the municipality. The
municipality raised the defense of immunity.
The SC ruled that the Municipality is immune from suit. The
driver of the municipality insists was on his way to get a load of sand
and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets. He was
therefore performing duties pertaining to his office. Hence, the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed in the
discharge of governmental functions.
Doctrine: A distinction should first be made between suability and
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the
state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if
it can, that the defendant is liable."
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts
committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality
depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.
Class Notes:
- With this decision it becomes hard to prove that the LGU is
acting in a non-governmental capacity since the SC held that
the presumption of regularity applies
- Remember to distinguish between suability and liability
 LGUs and its officials can now be sued under Sec. 24
 But whether one can recover is another matter
altogether
FERNANDO v. CA
May 8, 1992
Summary: There was a bidding for the emptying of a septic tank in
Davao. One of the losing bidders with 4 others, died inside the septic
before the award of the winning bid. The heirs of the victims sued the
City of Davao for damages. The SC held that it was the victims that were
negligent since they entered the septic tank without authorization from
Davao City and without being awarded the winning bid and the
contract.
Doctrine: While it may be true that Davao City has been remiss in its
duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a
continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master
about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao
Public Market, Davao immediately issuied invitations to bid for such
service and awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Despite
Davao city’s failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the
market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities
but have remained unscathed. Article 24 of the Civil code cannot apply
because the victims did not win the bid. Therefore, there is a total
absence of contractual relations between the victims and the City
Government of Davao City that could give rise to any contractual
obligation, much less, any liability on the part of Davao City.
Class Notes:
- Sir says that this case is stupid.
- SC did not discuss whether the LGU was performing
governmental or proprietary functions
 Normally this is the threshold issue which needs to be
addressed before ruling on liability
 But maybe it was not raised in this case so the SC did
not rule on it
GUILLERGAN v. GANZON
May 25, 1966
Summary: The items of Guillergan, et al., after being declared by the CFI
of Iloilo as permanent employees (market sweepers) of Iloilo City, were
not included in the budget approved by the Municipal Board. They sued
Mayor Ganzon, et al., and the CFI awarded back salaries, holding the
officials and the City jointly liable. Mayor Ganzon, et al., argued that the
City should not be held liable. The SC disagreed.
Doctrine: Municipal corporations may be held liable for the back pay or
wages of employees or laborers illegally separated from the service,
including those involving primarily governmental functions, such as
those of policemen.
Class Notes: This case teaches us to look and examine at all the facts and
circumstances to determine whether the act in question is
governmental or proprietary.
PILAR v. SANGGUNIANG BAYAN NG DASOL, PANGASINAN
March 12, 1984
Summary: The present case is an original action for mandamus to
compel the Sanguniang Bayan and the municipal treasurer to pay the
salary due petitioner Vice Mayor Pilar, as provided for by Batas
Pambansa Blg 51 and as implemented by Circular 9-A of Joint
Commission on Local Government and Personnel administration and to
recover actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees. The
Vice Mayor questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to
appropriate an amount for the payment of his salary. The Executive
Secretary sent a letter to the Mayor advising the Mayor to pay the Vice
Mayor the salary due him equivalent to that of the Municipal Treasurer.
Subsequently, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution
appropriating the amount of P 15, 144 as payment of the Vice Mayor’s
unpaid salaries. The resolution was vetoed by the Mayor resulting into
the filing by the Vice Mayor of the petition for mandamus. The Supreme
Court said that the petition was rendered moot and academic because
the Vice Mayor admitted that at the time he submitted the
memorandum, he has been fully paid of his salaries as provided for by
Batas Pamabansa Blg. 51. However, the Supreme Court stated that the
Mayor is personally liable to the Vice Mayor for damages which the
latter suffered due to the Mayor’s gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the Vice Mayor’s valid claim.
Doctrine: A local official becomes personally liable to another person
when he acts in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
latter’s valid, just and demandable claim.
A local official who acts in an arbitrary manner when he exercises the
power of veto becomes personally liable to the person injured/
claimant. (In the case at bar, the Mayor’s reckless and oppressive act
was shown when he vetoed the resolution despite the fact that there
existed sufficient municipal funds from which the Vice Mayor’s salary
could be paid.
TUZON v. CA
August 21, 1992
Summary: The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 9, which allowed the municipal
treasurer to enter into individual agreements with thresher operators
in their municipality in order to solicit 1% of the palay threshed by the
said operators. The proceeds will be used for the construction of the
Sports and Nutrition Center, which will administer the government
program on nutrition and physical development. Private respondent
SaturninoJurado applied for a permit but the same was denied for
failure to comply with Resolution No. 9. Jurado filed a complaint for
mandamus with actual and moral damages. He filed another suit for
declaratory judgment against the said resolution for being illegal either
as a donation or a tax measure. Both the CFI and the CA found that
Resolution No. 9 is valid but they disagreed with respect to the liability
of the Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer for damages. The CFI
dismissed the claims for damages while the CA awarded Jurado actual
damages, moral damages, and attorney’s fees after finding petitioners
(mayor and treasurer) guilty of bad faith and malice. The SC reversed
the CA and held that damages cannot be awarded in this case because
the petitioners acted in their official capacity.
Doctrine: One of the purposes of Art. 27, CC is to end the bribery system
where the public official, for some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the
performance of his duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak. In the
present case, there was no proof that the mayor and the municipal
treasure refused to issue the permit for purposes of soliciting bribery.
In fact, the mayor and the treasurer acted within the scope of their
authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the
resolution. They may have erroneously interpreted the Resolution but
it does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith.
BALUYOT v. CA
July 22, 1999
Summary: Petitioners, residents of Brgy. Cruz-na-Ligas, Diliman, QC,
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against UP and
the QC Government. UP executed a Deed of Donation in favor of QC with
the residents of the said barangay as beneficiaries. This is in relation to
an ongoing dispute where the residents asserted ownership over a lot
registered under UP’s name. However, UP revoked the Deed of
Donation for alleged non-compliance by QC of the conditions stated in
the Deed. The Petitioners are seeking the enforcement of the Deed. UP
and QC moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. RTC denied but the CA reversed and dismissed the case. The SC
held that the complaint states a cause of action as the petitioners were
enforcing a stipulation pour autrui.
Doctrine: Elements of a cause of action: (1) Right in favor of plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2)
Obligation on the part of defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; (3) Act or omission on the part of defendant in violation of the
right of plaintiff or constituting breach of obligations to plaintiff.
Requisites for stipulation pour autrui: (1) There must be a stipulation in
favor of a third person; (2) Stipulation must be part, not the whole of
the contract; (3) Contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
conferred a favor upon a third person, not a mere incidental benefit or
interest; (4) Third person must have communicated his acceptance to
the obligor before its revocation; (5) Neither of the contracting parties
bears the legal representation or authorization of the third party.
Class Notes: This case illustrates how an LGU can be sued.
QUEZON CITY v. DACARA
June 15, 2005
Summary: Around 1am in the morning, Dacara Jr. was driving the car of
his father at Matahimik st. in QC. While driving, he rammed into a pile of
earth diggings causing the car to turn turtle. He incurred physical
injuries and damage to the car. The father of Dacara filed this case in
behalf of his son. QC denies liability by claiming that the proximate
cause of the damage was Dacara’s own negligence. TC awarded Dacara
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages. CA affirmed. SC
affirmed with modification—deleted moral damages.
Doctrine: Article 2189,NCC. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of
roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over
the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory
provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se
which renders the City government liable.
It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees
should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and
streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure
construction areas with adequate precautionary measures.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA
August 9, 2005
Summary: MWSS contracted KC to engage in diggings for pipeworks in a
national road in San Juan. The diggings were left unfinished/ not fully
refilled. The left front wheel of a passing car fell in the excavations,
causing a fracture of the humerus of a passenger, Prosecutor Laura.
RTC, CA, SC: San Juan is liable for damages.
Doctrine: Ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and
other public works, is not a controlling factor to determine if liability
attaches. It is sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control
or supervision thereof. Under Section 149 of the LGC, the phrases
"regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
water, sewer, and other pipes", and "adopt measures to ensure public
safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar
hazards to life and property", are not modified by the term "municipal
road". And neither can it be fairly inferred from the same provision that
San Juan’s power of regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein mentioned
applies only in cases where such activities are to be performed in
municipal roads. San Juan’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to
regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the
excavation is made on a national or municipal road, as long as it is
within its territorial jurisdiction. The obligation to maintain the safe
condition of the road within its territory is a continuing one which is
not suspended while a street is being repaired.
Lack of knowledge of the condition does not exempt. It is enough that
the authorities should have known of the circumstances in the exercise
of ordinary care. The obligation to maintain the safe condition of the
road within its territory is a continuing one which is not suspended
while a street is being repaired. Knowledge of the condition of the road
and the defects/ obstructions may be actual or constructive. It is
enough that the authorities should have known of the circumstances in
the exercise of ordinary care.
Class Notes: A car was on its way to airport with the Mayor inside it. The
car hit a child who died due to the injuries sustained. Is the LGU liable?
- This is an actual case; the act performed was governmental
- In light of Sec. 24, LGU should be held liable
OSMENA v. COA
May 31, 2011
Summary: Palarong Pambansa was going to be in Cebu. The city sought
the construction and renovation of the Cebu City Sports Complex. Cebu
engaged the services of WTCI and DCDC for this. Mayor Osmena was
authorized to execute the contracts. A contract was executed. Later on,
there was a need for extra work orders so Osmena issued 20 extra work
orders. The city was not able to pay for the extra work orders. WTCI
and DCDC filed 2 collection cases in RTC. RTC ordered city to pay the
amount and damages, the decision became final. The city auditor did
not allow the payment of such, it held the Mayor and the Sanggunian
personally liable. SC reversed saying that Osmena is not personally
liable. The City had to pay.
Doctrine: (Implied; own words) A city mayor or the sanggunian could
not be personally liable for damage suits unless it would be proven that
they were ill-motivated or that they had personally profited or sought
to profit from the transactions or that the disbursements have been
made for their personal or selfish ends.
 INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS:
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND LGUs
EXECUTIVE SUPERVISION
Breakdown of Sec. 25, LGC: National Supervision over LGUs
(a) President shall exercise general supervision over LGUs
 To ensure that their acts are within their scope of their
prescribed powers and functions
 President shall exercise supervisory authority:
1) Directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities
and independent component cities
2) Through the province with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and
3) Through the city and municipality with respect
to the barangays
(b) National agencies and offices with project implementation
functions shall coordinate with one another and with the
LGUs concerned in the discharge of these functions
 Ensure participation of LGUs both in planning and
implementation of national projects
(c) President MAY direct appropriate national agency to
provide financial, technical, or other forms of assistance to
the LGU
 Upon request of the LGU
 Assistance extended at no extra cost to LGU
(d) National agencies and offices including GOCCs with field
units or branches in a province, city, or municipality shall
furnish the local chief executive concerned monthly reports
including duly certified budgetary allocations and
expenditures
Constitutional Provisions
1. Art. X, Sec. 2 and 4 – See section on Constitutional Basis
2. Art. XI, Sec. 25 - The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Presidential Power over LGUs: SUPERVISION only
- Supervision – to ensure that the acts of the subordinate are
within their powers and functions and properly exercised
- Presidential power of supervision may be done either:
1. DIRECTLY – over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and
independent component cities
2. INDIRECTLY – over component cities, municipalities,
and barangays
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
- Carpio v. Executive Sec. – All executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive; the functions are
performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the Secretaries, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive
 EXCEPT:
1. Where the Constitution or law requires the
President to act in person, or
2. Where the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally
- BUT this rule is NOT applicable to local government officials
 Though still part of the Executive Department, they are
only under the supervision of the Chief Executive
 President has no control over LGUs
 Thus, President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of an LGU if he or she finds that the latter as
acted contrary to law (supervision)
LGUs are NOT attached agencies of the DILG
- Radia v. Review Committee – LGUs are not attached to the
DILG in the same sense that bureaus and offices under the
DOJ, for instance
- LGUs are instrumentalities or units of local government,
vested with their own legislative and executive powers
Relationship Among National Agencies with LGUs
- NGAs and offices including GOCCs are directed by Sec. 25 to
do 3 things:
1. Coordinate with one another
2. Coordinate with the LGU concerned and
3. Furnish monthly reports of functions they are
discharging within the LGU to the local chief executive
Class Discussion
- There is an EO (EO79) which bans open pit mining; Sir says
that this EO is unconstitutional for several reasons
 One reason is that there is no law regarding open pit
mining
 If the President says that your ordinance is invalid, this
is an act of control!
 Note that the President only exercises general
supervision over LGUs
HEBRON v. REYES
July 28, 1958
Summary: The Municipal Mayor of Carmona, Cavite, Bernardo
Hebron,was suspended by the President from office pending
investigation on the administrative charges against him. Vice-Mayor
Eulalio Reyes assumed office as Acting Mayor. After almost a year of
suspension while the matter has been pending in the Office of the
President, Hebron’s term of office was about to expire. He instituted a
quo warranto proceeding against Reyes. The Court could not reach an
agreement on the decision so his term of office expired. The Court
decided the case nonetheless because the question of law is vital to
local governments. The Court held that the suspension of Hebron is null
and void for non-compliance with the provisions of law.
Doctrine: The procedure described in sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Revised Administrative Code for suspension and removal of the
municipal officials therein referred to is mandatory and exclusive. The
provincial governor and provincial board may not be deprived by the
Executive of the power to exercise the authority conferred upon them
in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Class Notes:
- This is not good law
- Look at Ganzon, where the SC said that authority to discipline
is not inconsistent with supervision
GANZON v. CA
August 5, 1991
Summary: Ten administrative complaints were lodged against Mayor
Ganzon of Iloilo City. On the basis of three of the complaints, Secretary
Santos issued three preventive suspensions, each lasting sixty days
each. The first two were carried out, but a TRO was procured to stop
the third. It is petitioner’s claim that the Secretary (the Executive) does
not have the power to subject him to disciplinary action. The Supreme
Court held that it still does.
Doctrine: [implied] that the president, as part of his supervisory power,
has the power to investigate (disciplinary authority) over local
government officials. Note though that there are cases where such
power is deprived from the president, “in those case that this Court
denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not
because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on
account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the
Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.”

DRILON v. LIM
August 14, 1994

Summary: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of

Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on
appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance
No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with
the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC declared
Sec. 187 of the LGC unconstitutional. The SC reversed insofar as the
lower court declared Sec. 187 unconstitutional, but affirmed the lower
court’s decision regarding the Manila Revenue Code’s compliance with
the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances.

Doctrine: An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act.
If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone
or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He
may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Class Notes:
- Sir does not agree with this case
- Sec. 187 gives the Executive judicial power
 CONSULTATIONS
See also Sec. 2(c), LGC - It is likewise the policy of the State to require all
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before
any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
Breakdown of Sec. 26, LGC: Duty of National Government Agencies in
the Maintenance of Ecological Balance
It shall be the duty of every NGA or GOCC authorizing or involved in the
planning and implementation:
- Of any project or program that may:
1. Cause pollution,
2. Climatic change,
3. Depletion of nonrenewable resources
4. Loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover,
5. And extinction of animal or plant species
- To CONSULT with the LGUs, NGOs and other sectors
concerned and explain:
1. The goals and objectives of the project or program
2. Its impact upon people and community in terms of
environmental or ecological balance
3. Measures that will be undertaken to prevent or
minimize the adverse effects thereof
Breakdown of Sec. 27, LGC: Prior Consultations Required
NO project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities
- UNLESS
1. Consultation mentioned in Sec. 2(c) and 26 are
complied with, and
2. Prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is
obtained
- PROVIDED – occupants in areas where such projects are
being implemented shall NOT be evicted
 UNLESS appropriate relocation sites have been
provided in accordance with Constitution
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
1. Memo Circ. No. 52 – Enjoining strict compliance with LGC
provisions requiring mandatory coordination and
consultation with LGUs
2. RA 8975 – Act to ensure expeditious implementation and
completion of government infrastructure projects by
prohibiting lower courts from issuing TROs or Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions
a. Governor or mayor of a highly-urbanized city shall
immediately issue necessary permit to extract sand,
gravel and other quarry resources needed in
government projects; issuance of permit shall consider
environmental laws, land use ordinances and the
pertinent provisions of the LGC relating to environment.
Mandatory Consultation
- Sec. 26 makes it an obligation for NGAs or GOCCs to conduct
consultations with LGUs and NGOs and other concerned
sectors
- Absent such consultation, the said project may be declared
illegal and the officials concerned made liable
 As was held in Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary;
SC said that absent either the (1) prior consultation
with affected local communities or the (2) prior
approval by appropriate sanggunian, a national
project’s implementation is illegal
Environmental Concerns
- Sec. 26 emphasizes the need to maintain a sound ecology and
clean environment
- Sec. 26 must be read in conjunction with Sec. 2(c) and Sec. 27
which require prior consultations with the LGUs, NGOs, and
People’s Organizations (POs), before programs and projects
of national agencies may be implemented
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK v. LANZANAS
July 10, 2003
Summary: NAPOCOR was issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate
(ECC) by DENR for the construction of a mooring facility for its power
barge in Minolo Code which was declared a mangrove area and a
breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. Petitioners
assailed the legality of the ECC on the ground that no prior consultation
with the local government unit was held. The Court held that Sections
26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit, the
mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not
belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is
no statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the
construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter if the operation
of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project
that causes pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior
approval of the concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this
Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the operation
of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate
Sections 26 and 27 of RA 7160.
Doctrine: Sections 26 and 27 should be read together. Thus, the projects
and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean
projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in
Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may
bring about climatic change; (3)may cause the depletion of non-
renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or
forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species; and
(6)other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented.
Class Notes: Why are we upset with this decision?
1. What happened to Sec. 2(c)?
 Consultation is not limited to environmental projects
 The law also cites Sec. 2(c) on projects of the national
government
 THUS, mandatory consultation is required under:
a. Sec. 2(c) – periodic consultations before
implementation of any project or program
b. Sec. 26 – on projects with environmental impacts
2. The pronouncement about PD 1605 is wrong
3. On “absence of documents” which the SC justified
 The SC cited Mangubat v. Osmena which was cited out of
context; if one reads this unreported case the decision
actually supports the petitioners in Bangus Fry
 On “patent illegality”
 Flawed logic since the SC went on to say that the
RED had the power to issue it
PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
December 13, 2005
Summary: Seven hectares of the 18 hectare watershed preserve was
delineated to be used as a dumpsite starting 1989 ignoring all the
protests of the people, the recommendation of the CENRO, the letter of
the Laguna Lake Development Authority, the local government
composed of 6 mayors, the letters of Senator Salonga to the MMA (later
turned MMDA) because the problem of waste management was so big
that this dumpsite is needed because it services 38% of Metro Manila’s
garbage nevermind that it already polluted water resources, cut down
all the mature fruit bearing trees and is totally contrary to law. Despite
the petitioners asking for a TRO, the court a quo at one point even had
the gall to say that this petition was right to be dismissed! Good thing
they were relentless to pursue closure of this dumpsite.
Doctrine: LGC Section 16 allows every local government unit to
“exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well aspowers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare,” which involve, among other things,
“promot(ing) health and safety, enhance(ing) the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, and preserv(ing) the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.”
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and
functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power
to, among other things, “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code.”
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be
met before a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior
consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of
the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these
mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.
ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES INC.
December 3, 2009
Summary: In 1952, TLA 43 was issued to PICOP. It was valid for 25
years and renewable for another 25 years and with a condition that
DENR can amend the boundaries covered by the license. Upon request
of the board of investors if PICOP, President Marcos signed 1969
Document purportedly a Presidential Warrranty assuring PICOP of the
boundaries convered by the TLA. However, PICOP claimed that such
warranty is a contract which guarantees perpetual renewal of its
license. In 1999, DAO 99-53 was issued providing for the conversion of
TLA to IFMA. PICOP applied for the conversion of its TLA which was
already subsisting since 1952 and was already renewed once in 1977.
Without negotiating further with the DENR, PICOP filed a mandamus
with RTC of Manila to compel DENR Sec Alvarez to issue the IFMA they
are applying for insisting that there should be automatic conversion,
the 1969 Document is a contract and that it has complied with all the
legal requirements for the conversion of its TLA to IFMA. RTC granted
the mandamus. CA affirmed. SC reversed. Hence, this motion for
reconsideration.
It was held that there is no law enjoining the DENR to issue the IFMA
applied for because it is discretionary upon the Secretary after proper
evaluation. The 1969 Document is also not a contract but a mere
reassurance of the boundaries of TLA 43. It cannot be construed to
grant perpetual renewal of license because that would contravene Sec
2, Article 12 of the Constitution. Regarding the adminsitrative
requirements, the Court held that PICOP submitted the forest
protection and reforestation plans and paid forest charges. PICOP is
required to submit the NCIP certification mandated by RA 8371. Also,
the approval of the Sangunians of ALL local government units (Surigao
del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental)
concerned. The approval of Surigao del Sur cannot be deemed as
sufficient compliance.
Doctrine: The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law,
not because the local government has control over such project, but
because the local government has the duty to protect its constituents
and their stake in the implementation of the project. Again, Section 26
states that it applies to projects that "may cause pollution, climatic
change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land,
rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species."
The local government should thus represent the communities in such
area, the very people who will be affected by flooding, landslides or
even climatic change if the project is not properly regulated, and who
likewise have a stake in the resources in the area, and deserve to be
adequately compensated when these resources are exploited.
BORACAY FOUNDATION INC v. PROVINCE OF AKLAN
June 26, 2012
Summary: The Province of Aklan, secured permits from Philippine
Reclamation Authority (PRA), and Department of Environment and
Natural Resources – Environmental Management Bureau, Regional
Office VI (DENR-EMB RVI) for the implementation of the project which
sought to reclaim land in Caticlan and Malay, and to develop buildingd
and commercial sites there. It signed a MOA with PRA, and secured an
Environmental Compliance Certificate from DENR before consulting
with the LGU’s. Subsequently, it talked to the local governments
involved to tell them about the project, but the local governments
affected refused to give their support. Aklan still commenced with the
project. Boracay Foundation filed a suit questioning the propriety of
Aklan’s actions. The SC ruled that the LGC requirements for prior
consultation and approval by the LGU’s before implementation of the
project were not complied with, and remanded the case.
Doctrine: The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national
government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance, and
requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of local
government units for the projects described therein. Section 27 of the
Local Government Code applies only to “national programs and/or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community”
and that it should be read in conjunction with Section 26. Under the
Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected
local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate
sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
project’s implementation is illegal. The lack of prior public consultation
and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the
project.
Class Notes:
- The SC held that subsequent approval does NOT cure lack of
prior approval
- The SC also held that the approval has to come before the
issuance of ECC
 This is not entirely accurate
 The issuance of ECC does not depend on compliance of
LGC requirements; specifically it refers to DENR laws
 The LGC only said that the approval must be secured
PRIOR to the implementation of the program
 So it could be said that as long as the project has
not been implemented, even if the ECC has already
been issued, and LGU approval was secured, then
there is compliance with the law
 RELATIONS WITH PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
Breakdown of Sec. 28, LGC: Powers of Local Chief Executives over the
Units of the PNP
RA 6975 (DILG Act) shall govern the extent of OPERATIONAL
SUPERVISION and CONTROL of local chief executive over:
1. Police force
2. Fire protection unit and
3. Jail management personnel
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
1. RA 6975 – Act establishing the PNP under a reorganized
department under the DILG
a. Sec. 13 – creation of the NAPOLCOM for the purpose of
effectively discharging the functions; collegial body
within the DILG
b. Sec. 14 – powers and functions of the NAPOLCOM
(1) It exercises administrative control over the PNP
among others
c. Sec. 23 – Composition of the PNP; its powers and
functions are in Sec. 24
d. Sec. 51 – Governors and mayors shall be deputized as
representatives of the NAPOLCOM in their respective
territorial jurisdiction
(1) Power of operational supervision and control
e. Sec. 52 – President may, upon consultation with
provincial governor and congressman concerned,
suspend the power operational supervision and control
of any local executive over police units assigned or
stationed in his jurisdiction for any of the following
grounds:
(1) Frequent unauthorized absences;
(2) Abuse of authority;
(3) Providing material support to criminal elements;
(4) Engaging in acts inimical to national security or
which negate the effectiveness of the peace and
order campaign.
2. RA 8551 (1998) – PNP reform and reorganization
a. Sec. 62 defines operational supervision
(1) Power to direct, superintend, and oversee the day-
to-day functions of police investigation of crime,
crime prevention activities, and traffic control in
accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission.
(2) Includes the power to direct the employment and
deployment of units or elements of the PNP,
through the station commander, to ensure public
safety and effective maintenance of peace and
order within the locality
b. Sec. 64 - Governors and mayors are automatically
deputized as representatives of the NAPOLCOM in their
respective jurisdiction. As deputized agents, local
government executives can inspect police forces and
units, conduct audit, and exercise other functions as
may be duly authorized by the Commission.
DILG/PNP Law Governs Police
- Pimentel notes that the LGC did not settle the question as to
who has primacy in the running of the local police in a
definitive manner
 All it did was to reiterate the principle that the
relationship between LGU and PNP is defined in RA
6975 and rules implementing it
- BUT remember that the Constitution mandates the creation
of ONE national police
 So if there be one national police, LGUs cannot have full
control and supervision of the police in their locality
since this would make them LOCAL police forces
 Under the DILG reorganization act, mayors and
governors are DEPUTIES of NAPOLCOM
In Carpio v. Executive Secretary, the deputization of the local executives
was challenged
- SC upheld the deputization and held that the local executives
are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM
 Unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts
are valid and binding
- Besides, local officials, as NAPOLCOM representatives, will
choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles to be
recommended by PNP officials
CARPIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
February 14, 1992
Summary: RA 6975 was passed, reorganizing the PNP under the DILG.
Carpio assails its constitutionality. One of Caprio’s arguments was that
the law derogated the power of control of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP
by vesting different powers in the local officials. The SC upheld the
constitutionality of the law.
Doctrine: Under RA 6975, there is no usurpation of the power of control
of the NAPOLCOM because the local executives only act as
representatives of the NAPOLCOM. As such deputies, they are
answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their
functions.
Class Notes:
- Is this good law? As to the PNP structure, no. Now, PNP is
attached to DILG under RA 8551
- “Operational supervision and control”
 Day to day operations only
 So it does not have to go to the NAPOLCOM all the time
ANDAYA v. RTC
December 3, 1999
Summary: Mayor appointed Sarmiento as chief of police of Cebu. The
latter was not part of the list of 5 eligibles submitted by Andaya
because was not qualified for the position under NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 95-04 prescribing minimum qualifications
for Directors of Provincial/City Police commands. Cebu City filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction against Andaya and Inciong, Regional Director of
the NAPOLCOM.TC ruled in favor of the City stating that Sarmiento was
qualified. MR was denied. SC reversed the decision.
Doctrine: As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is
very limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he has only the
limited power of selecting one from among the list of five eligibles to be
named the chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint the chief of
police of Cebu City is vested in the Regional Director, Regional Police
Command No. 7. Much less may the mayor require the Regional
Director, Regional Police Command, to include the name of any officer,
no matter how qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to the mayor.
The purpose is to enhance police professionalism and to isolate the
police service from political domination.
CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE
January 25, 2000
Summary: The Commissioners of the NAPOLCOM were Edgar Dula
Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and Jose Percival L.
Adiong. RA 8551 was passed declaring that the terms of the current
Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. None of
terms of Canonizado et al had expired at the time RA 8551, took effect.
Thus, Except for Adiong,all of the incumbent commissioners just before
the passage of RA 8551 lost their positions. Canonizado et al argue that
their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their
security of tenure. The SC ruled in their favor, and ordered their
reinstatement.
Doctrine: On when an abolition of an office does not result in a violation
of the security of tenure of civil service employees: The creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. However, in
order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in GOOD FAITH, not
for political or personal reasons, or in order to CIRCUMVENT the
CONSTIUTIONAL SECURITY OF TENURE of civil service employees.
Substantial identity in the functions between the abolished office and
the new office was indicia of bad faith in the removal of a civil service
employee pursuant to a reorganization.
On the meaning of administrative control and operational
supervision: The power of control necessarily encompasses the power
of supervision.
On the meaning of reorganization: Reorganization takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the loss of one's
position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a
reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith.
CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE
February 15, 2001
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Summary: The Executive Secretary seeks a reconsideration of the
Court's 2000 decision on the ground that since Canonizado, one of the
reinstated commissioners, accepted a position as Inspector General in
the PNP during the pendency of the 2000 case, he is deemed have
abandoned his NAPOLCOM position as commissioner. This was because
the offices of the NAPOLOCOM and the Inspector General in the PNP
were held to be incompatible.
The SC held that Canonizado is not deemed to have
abandoned her office in the NAPOLCOM by her acceptance of a position
in the PNP, since she had no intention to abandon such office; she was
compelled to do so because of Section 9 of RA 8551.
Doctrine: On where there is abandonment of office: Where, while
desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire or
intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the
requirements of a statute which is afterwards declared
unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment
and the officer may recover the office.
On the rationale for how incompatibility of two offices results
in a vacation of the first office held: Public policy considerations dictate
against allowing the same individual to perform inconsistent and
incompatible duties. The incompatibility contemplated is not the mere
physical impossibility of one person’s performing the duties of the two
offices due to a lack of time or the inability to be in two places at the
same moment, but that which proceeds from the nature and relations of
the two positions to each other as to give rise to contrariety and
antagonism should one person attempt to faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of one toward the incumbent of the other.
On the incompatibility of the NAPOLCOM Commissioner
position and the Inspector General positon in the PNP: There is no
question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector
General of the IAS are incompatible with each other. As pointed out by
Executive Secretary et al, RA 8551 prohibits any personnel of the IAS
from sitting in a committee charged with the task of deliberating on the
appointment, promotion, or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas
the NAPOLCOM has the power of control and supervision over the PNP.
However, the rule on incompatibility of duties will not apply to the case
at bar because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the
two offices simultaneously.
RODRIGUEZ v. CA
August 7, 2002
Summary: Pursuant to PNP’s OPLAN AJAX, PFC Rodriguez (together
with PFC Silangan and PFC Pilandi) of the Metropolitan Traffic
Command in Makati was caught in an entrapment operation for
extortion activities in Guadalupe Bridge. An administrative case was
filed with NAPOLCOM against Rodriguez and the 2 other police officers
for their summary dismissal. PNP Chief Nazareno issued a Special Order
summarily dismissing them from the police force. Rodriguez appealed
to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board but the latter affirmed
their summary dismissal. Instead of appealing to the DILG Secretary or
the CSC, Rodriguez elevated his case to the CA by way of certiorari and
mandamus. The CA dismissed his petition for lack of merit and held that
certiorari and mandamus cannot be resorted to as substitute for appeal.
The SC agreed with the CA and held that PFC Rodriguez should have
followed the procedure under the Administrative Code for appeals
relating to dismissal from the Civil Service.
Doctrine: The civilian character of the PNP is unqualified, unconditional,
and all embracing. Members of the PNP are deemed civilian personnel
of the government. Hence, police officers and personnel are part of the
civil service. This is expressly recognized by RA 6975 when it provided
for the applicability of civil service laws to all its personnel, as stated in
Section 91.
PEOPLE v. VELARDE
July 18, 2002
Summary: Velarde was tagged as a suspect for rape with homide. He
was allegedly informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, he was
brought to the Mayor who agreed to act as his counsel. Before the
Mayor, he executed an extrajudicial confession, admitting the crime. He
was convicted by the lower courts and sentenced to death. On
automatic review to the SC, the admissibility of his extrajudicial
confession is in question, as well as the suifficiency of evidence to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The SC ruled that his extrajudicial confession was
inadmissible because it was not made in the presence of an
INDEPENDENT counsel. As mayor of Malolos, his duties were
inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to the accused. Hence, the
accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Doctrine: The Mayor exercises "operational supervision and control"
over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the
utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and
order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the
bringing of offenders to justice. As mayor of Malolos, his duties were
inconsistent with those of his responsibilities of a counsel to an
accused.
 INTER-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 2. City/municipality mayor also has the power to review the
EOs of the punong barangay in his jurisdiction
Breakdown of Sec. 29, LGC: Provincial Relations with Component
Purpose of Review
Cities and Municipalities
- To ensure that such EOs are within the powers granted by
law and in conformity with ordinances
The province, through governor, shall ensure that every component
- Casino v. CA – power of review is exercised to determine
city and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the
whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate
scope of its prescribed powers and functions
and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance
- The following shall be independent from the province:
with law
1. Highly urbanized cities
2. Independent component cities
When EOs are deemed Valid – when the governor or mayor fails to act
on said EO within 30 days from its submission
Governor’s Supervisory Powers
- Province (through governor) only has supervisory powers
Other Powers of Supervision – additional powers granted to governor
over: (within its territorial jurisdiction)
or mayor to supervise acts of lower LGU; these can be found in:
1. Component cities and
1. Sec. 29, LGC
2. Municipalities
2. Sec. 31, LGC
- Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities:
3. Sec. 32, LGC
 Independent of the province
 Under the supervisory powers of the President Breakdown of Sec. 31, LGC: Submission of Municipal Questions to the
Provincial Legal Officer or Prosecutor
Governor’s Coordinative Powers
- Governor also has the power to coordinate plans and
Municipal government may secure the opinion of any legal question
developmental activities of component cities and
affecting the municipality:
municipalities with the province and with NGAs concerned
1. The municipal legal officer
- Such coordinated activities may cover (Art. 59, IRR):
2. The provincial legal officer, in the absence of (1)
1. Law and order plans which may be coordinated with
3. The provincial prosecutor, in the absence of (2)
PNP and NAPOLCOM
2. Measures to safeguard and conserve natural resources
Legal Adviser
which may be coordinated with the mayors
- Note that a legal adviser is different from a legal counsel
3. Efforts to host sports contests or promote sports
 Sec. 30 refers to the legal adviser
development activities
4. Convening of meetings or calling of conventions of  Sec. 481 refers to the legal counsel
elective and appointive officials of the province and its
component cities and municipalities Absence of Legal Officer
5. Review executive orders of mayors - Provinces and cities are now mandated to create the office of
- ALWAYS NOTE: the Legal Officer
 This only covers component cities and municipalities  Municipalities are permitted subject to availability of
funds
 And only within its territorial jurisdiction
- In the absence of a legal officer, the LGUs can resort to the
lawyers enumerated in Sec. 30
Sanggunian’s Power of Review
- Provincial sanggunian has the power to review:
Legal Representation
1. Component city or municipal ordinances
- Sec. 30 does NOT cover the situation wherein the LGU is a
a. Even resolutions approving development plans
party litigant
and public investment programs
- GENERAL RULE: LGUs may NOT resort to hiring private
2. Annual or supplemental appropriations
counsel when they are faced with legal problems
 EXCEPTION: Province of Cebu v. IAC
Breakdown of Sec. 30, LGC: Review of Executive Orders
 In that case the SC held that the municipality’s
authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
(a) Governor shall review ALL executive orders promulgated by
limited only to situations where the provincial
the component city or municipal mayor within its
fiscal is disqualified to represent it
jurisdiction
 EXCEPT as otherwise provided under Constitution and
Breakdown of Sec. 32, LGC: City and Municipal Supervision over
special laws
Their Representative Barangays
 City/municipal mayor shall review all executive orders
promulgated by the punong barangay within his
City or municipality shall exercise general supervision over component
jurisdiction
barangays
 Copies of such orders shall be forwarded to governor
- Through city/municipal mayor concerned
or city/municipal mayor within 3 days from issuance
- To ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their
 Local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such prescribed powers and functions
EOs are within the powers granted by law and in
conformity with provincial, city, or municipal
General supervision exercised by mayor over acts of barangay is an
ordinances
extension of supervisory power of the Presidents over LGUs
(b) If governor or mayor fails to act on said EO within 30 days
after submission:
Breakdown of Sec. 33, LGC: Cooperative Undertakings Among LGUs
 Deemed consistent with the law and therefore valid
LGUs may, through appropriate ordinances, group themselves,
Power of Review consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for
1. Governor has power to review all EOs promulgated by purposes commonly beneficial to them
component city or municipal mayor within the province - LGUs involved may:
 1. Contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other
kinds of property and
2. Assign or appoint personnel

 Under such terms and conditions as may be agreed

upon by the participating LGUs through MOA
 AND UPON:
a. Approval by sanggunian concerned
b. After public hearing conducted for the purpose

Sec. 33 expressly grants to LGUs the power to cooperate with one

another, consolidate their efforts, and coordinate their activities for any
legal purpose that s beneficial to them.
 RELATIONS WITH PEOPLE’S AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL THE LOCAL PREQUALIFICATION, BIDS, AND AWARDS
ORGANIZATIONS COMMITTEE

Breakdown of Sec. 34, LGC: Role of People’s and Non-Governmental Breakdown of Sec. 37, LGC: Local PBAC
Organizations
(a) A local PBAC is created in every province, city and
LGUs shall promote the establishment and operation of POs and NGOs municipality13
- To become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy  Primarily responsible for the conduct of
prequalification of contractors, bidding, evaluation of
NOTE: Sec. 34 has to be read together with Sec. 35 and 36 bids and recommendation of awards concerning local
infrastructure projects
POs = People’s Organizations are groups of people outside of  Members:
government, who are organized for the attainment of some legitimate 1. Governor or City/Municipal Mayor as Chairman
aspirations such as labor unions and cooperatives which may also be 2. Members:
profit-oriented a. Chairman of appropriations committee of
sanggunian concerned
NGOs = Non-Government Organizations are groups of people who are b. Representative of the minority party in
involved in a more or less systematic pursuit of some particularized sanggunian concerned, if any
sectoral activity (1) If none, then 1 chosen by said
sanggunian from among its members
Breakdown of Sec. 35, LGC: Linkages with POs and NGOs c. Local treasurer
d. 2 representatives of NGOs that are
LGUs may enter into JVAs12 and other such cooperative arrangements represented in the local development
with POs and NGOs to: council concerned
1. Engage in the delivery of certain basic services, capability- (1) To be chosen by the organizations
building and livelihood projects, and themselves
2. Develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity e. Any practicing CPA from the private sector
and income, diversify agriculture, spur rural (1) Designated by the local chapter of the
industrialization, promote ecological balance, and Phil. Institute of CPAs, if any
3. Enhance the economic and social well-being of the people  COA representatives shall:
1. Observe the proceedings of PBAC, and
The provision is so broadly worded that it may encompass any activity 2. Certify that the rules and procedures for
that promotes the development of a locality prequalification, bids, and awards are complied
- Area of PO/NGO-LGU joint activities is virtually limitless
- Cooperatives are suggested forms of private organizations (b) Agenda and other information relevant to meeting of PBAC
through which JVAs with LGUs may be established shall be deliberated upon by the committee at least 1 week
before holding of meeting
Breakdown of Sec. 36, LGC: Assistance to POs and NGOs
(c) All meetings shall be held in the provincial capitol or
An LGU may provide assistance to such POs and NGOs for economic, city/municipality hall
socially oriented, environmental or cultural projects to be  Minutes and any decision made therein shall be:
implemented within its territorial jurisdiction 1. Duly recorded
- Done through its local chief executive 2. Posted at a prominent place in the provincial
 With the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned capitol or city/municipality hall, and
- Assistance may be financial or otherwise 3. Delivered by the most expedient means to
elective local officials concerned
This provision allows LGUs to support POs and NGOs

Specific Examples: Breakdown of Sec. 38, LGC: Local Technical Committee (LTC)
1. POs/NGOs engaged in local ceramics industries or
development of tourist spots can earn some money and LGUs (a) A local LTC is hereby created in every province, city, and
may fund the same as economic projects municipality
2. Reforestation projects and marine rehabilitation projects  To provide technical assistance to the local PBAC
may be assisted by LGUs as part of their environmental  Composed of:
activities 1. Provincial, city, or municipal engineer
3. Local drama and choir groups may be assisted by LGUs 2. Local planning and development coordinator
3. Such other officials designated by the local PBAC

(b) Chairman of LTC shall be designated by local PBAC

 He shall attend PBAC meeting in order to present the
reports and recommendations of the LTC

12 13
Joint-Venture Agreements Note: no mention of barangays
 TITLE TWO: ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
(1) For provinces with 2 or more legislative districts,
QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS elective members of Sangguniang Panlalawigan
shall be elected by legislative districts
(2) For provinces with 1 legislative district, COMELEC
MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIAN shall divide them into 2 districts for purposes of
electing members of the Sangguniang
Breakdown of Sec. 41, LGC:
Panlalawigan
This section provides for the ways of electing local officials:
(3) Number of election of elective members of
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Bayan of any city
For:
At large or with 2 or more legislative districts shall continue
1. Governor and vice-governor to be
throughout the to be governed by Sec. 2 and 3 of RA 6636
elected by entire province
territorial
2. Mayor and vice-mayor to be elected by
jurisdiction of 3. RA 7887 (1995) – Act instituting electoral reforms for the
the entire city or municipality
LGU concerned purpose of amending Sec. 3 (c) and (d) of RA 7166
3. Punong barangay by the entire barangay a. Number of elective members of the sangguniang
For regular members of the various sanggunians, panlungsod and sangguniang bayan in the Metro Manila
By district
- Provincial, city, or municipal area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with
In case of members of the Sangguniang barangay 2 or more legislative districts shall be elected by
- In case of the Sangguniang barangay districts and in accordance with the provisions of
chairman, Art. XXVII of the IRR requires Sections 2 and 3 of RA. 6636
By barangay
that he be elected by the registered b. Provided, that, all cities with 1legislative district and all
voters of the Katipunan ng mga municipalities in the Metro Manila area shall have 12
Barangay councilors each
In case of the presidents of: c. Provided, further, that, the Commission shall divide all
1. League of Sanggunian of Component cities with one legislative district and each of the
Cities and Municipalities municipalities in Metro Manila area into 2 districts by
By league
2. Sanggunian ng mga Barangay and barangay for purposes of representation in the
3. Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang sangguniang bayan as nearly as practicable according to
Kabataan the number of inhabitants, each district comprising a
In case of the representatives of: compact, contiguous and adjacent territory
1. Women
2. Workers 4. RA 8553 (1998) – An act amending Sec. 41(B) of LGC
3. One or other of the following sectors:  This is already incorporated in the “Breakdown of Sec. 41,
a. Urban poor LGC”
By sector b. Indigenous cultural communities
c. Disabled persons 5. RA 19156 (2011) – An act conferring upon members of the
d. Any other sector as determined by sangguniang bayan, panlungsod, and panlalawigan the
the sanggunian concerned within appropriate civil service eligibility under certain
90 days prior to holding of next circumstances
local elections

FOR THE SANGGUNIAN HERRERA v. COMELEC

November 17, 1999
- Elected BY district
Sangguniang
- Presidents of the league of sanggunian Summary: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the
Panlalawigan,
members of component cities and Comelec to divide such Province, composed only of 1 legislative district,
Panglungsod,
municipalities shall serve as ex officio to 2 provincial districts pursuant to the mandate of RA 7166. Guimaras
and Bayan
members was also reclassified from 5th to 4th class province entitling it to 8
Rules on the number of regular members: Sanggunian Seats. Comelec issued Resolution 2950 which divided the
1. 1st and 2nd class provinces shall have 10 Province into 2 provincial districts with the 1st district getting 3 seats
2. 3rd and 4th class provinces shall have 8 and the 2nd district getting 5 seats. Petitioners argue that based on the
Specifically for
3. 5th and 6th class provinces shall have 6 number of registered voters, the municipalities composing such
the
PROVIDED that in provinces with more than 5 districts should be rearranged to almost equalize the number of voters
Sangguniang
legislative districts: for each district so that each would get 4 seats.
Panglungsod
- Each district shall have 2 sangguniang
panlalawigan memebrs Doctrine: Under R.A. 7166 and Comelec Resolution No. 2313, the basis
- Without prejudice to Sec. 2, RA 6637 for division into districts shall be the number of inhabitants of the
Sangguniang province concerned and not the number of listed or registered voters as
Elected at large (meaning by the whole barangay)
Barangay theorized by petitioners. Comelec did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution because the basis for the
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by
1. RA 6636 (1987) – Act resetting the local elections from Nov. municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified
9, 1987 to Jan. 18, 1988 by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the NSO.

2. RA 7166 (1991)
a. Sec. 3 provides that members of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Panlungsod and Bayan shall be elected as
follows:
 REMEDIES14 QUALIFICATIONS
Petition to Deny or Cancel COC Breakdown of Sec. 39, LGC: An elective local official must be:
1. Sec. 78, OEC
2. WHO may file: Any person
GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS
3. WHEN to file: Any time not later than 25 days from the time
Citizenship A Citizen of the Philippines
of filing of COC
A registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
4. NATURE: Summary proceeding
province
5. Exclusive Ground: Any material misrepresentation contained Voter
in the COC In case of a member of the Sanggunian, in the district
a. Provided that: where he intends to be elected
(1) False representation pertains to a material matter A resident therein for at least 1 year immediately
Residency
affecting substantive rights of a candidate; and preceding the day of election
(2) False representation must consist of deliberate Must be able to read and write Filipino or any other
Literacy
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact local language or dialect
which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible (Salcedo II v. COMELEC) AGE QUALIFICATIONS
 Meaning, material fact that refers to a candidate’s Reckoned on election day
eligibility or qualification for office like citizenship, For governor, vice-governor, or member of the
residence, or status as registered voter 23 years Sangguniang Panlalawigan
6. Decision: Shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not old For mayor, vice-mayor or member of the Sangguniang
later than 15 days before election Panglungsod of highly urbanized cities
 Not mandatory For mayor or vice-mayor of:
21 years 1. Independent component cities,
Quo Warranto Proceedings old 2. Component cities, or
1. WHO may file: Any voter 3. Municipalities
2. WHEN: Within 10 days after the proclamation of the results For position of member of the Sangguniang
of the election. 18 years Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
3. JURISDICTION: old For position of Punong Barangay or member of the
a. COMELEC – petitions involving regional, provincial and Sangguniang Barangay
city officials 15 years For candidates of the Sangguniang Kabataan
b. RTC – petitions involving municipal officials old - BUT must be less than 18 years old
c. MeTC or MTC – petitions involving barangay officials
4. GROUNDS: Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
a. Ineligibility 1. RA 9164 (2002) – Synchronized barangay and SK elections
b. Disloyalty to the Republic a. Sec. 424 of LGC is amended – Katipunan ng Kabataan
5. NATURE: (1) Composed of Filipino citizens
a. A petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election (2) Actually residing in barangay for at least 6 months
Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the (3) 15 but less than 18 years old on day of election
winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the (4) Duly registered in the list of SK or in the official
respondent from office but not necessarily to install the barangay
petitioner in his place. b. Sec. 428 of LGC is amended – Elective official of SK
b. Different from an Election Protest (1) Must be a Filipino citizen
(1) In election protest, it is the losing candidate which (2) Qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan
files and seeks declaration as winner (3) Resident of barangay at least 1 year prior to
(2) Quo warranto can be filed by any voter since election
question is only on eligibility and loyalty (4) 15 but less than 18 years old on day of election
(5) Read and write Filipino, English, or local dialect
EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION (6) Must not have been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude
Effect: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified 2. RA 8171 (1995) – Repatriation of Filipino Women who by
1. Shall not be voted for and virtue of their marriage to alien nationals, and of natural-
2. Votes cast for him shall not be counted born Filipinos
3. If a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives Citizenship Requirement
the winning number of votes in such election: - Need not be by birth
a. Court or COMELEC shall continue with the trial and - Naturalized Filipinos may qualify
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and
b. Upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may Residency Requirement
during the pendency thereof, order the suspension of - Take note:
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the 1. For governor, vice-governor, mayor, vice-mayor and
evidence of his guilt is strong barangay officials
 They must be residents of the province, city,
GENERAL RULE:2nd placer does not assume office as winning candidate. municipality, or barangay where they are seeking
election for at least 1 year immediately preceding
EXCEPTIONS: (See cases) election day
1. Labo doctrine 2. For candidates of the various sanggunian districts
2. When COC is invalid  EXCEPT the barangay
 They have to be residents of the district where
they are seeking election for at least 1 year
14 immediately preceding the election
For a complete and exhaustive discussion on electoral remedies, see page 82
 - Some Jurisprudence:
 Abella v. COMELEC – no loss of residence due to transfer
for professional, business, or educational reasons
 The determination of a person’s legal residence or
domicile largely depends upon intention which
may be inferred from his acts, activities, and
utterances
 Co v. HRET – residence synonymous to domicile (for
election purposes)
 Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado – domicile of origin is not
easily lost; to successfully effect a change in domicile
there must be clear and positive proof of:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose
Literacy Requirement – candidate must be able to read and write:
1. Filipino, OR
2. Any other local language or dialect
No Property Requirement – as held in Co v. HRET - To require the
candidate to own property in order to be eligible to run would be
tantamount to a property qualification not found in the Constitution
NOTE: Take note of the qualifications between District Representatives
vis-à-vis other local elective officials:
Gov./Vice-Gov./
Mayor/Vice Mayor/
DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES
Punong Brgy,/
Sanggunian members
CITIZENSHIP
Natural-born Citizen Citizen of the Philippines
VOTER REGISTRATION
Registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province,
or, in the case of a member of the
Registered voter in the district in
sangguniang panlalawigan,
which he shall be elected
panlungsod, or bayan, the
district where he intends to be
elected
RESIDENCY
Resident of the same district for
Resident therein for at least 1
a period of not less than 1 year
year immediately preceding the
immediately preceding the day
election
of election
LITERACY
Able to read and write Filipino
Able to read and write or any other local language or
dialect
AGE
23 years old on election day for
governor, vice-governor,
member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, mayor, vice-
mayor, or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities
21 years old on day of election
for mayor or vice-mayor of
At least 25 years old on the day
independent component and
of election
component city
18 years old on day of election
for member of sangguniang
panlungsod or bayan or punong
barangay or member of
sangguniang barangay
15 years old but not more than
18 years old on day of election
for SK officials
SALCEDO II v. COMELEC
August 16, 1999
Summary: Victorino Salcedo II sought to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Ermelita Cacao Salcedo, on the ground that by stating that
her surname was “Salcedo” therein, she committed a material
misrepresentation, since she was not entitled to use that surname. The
Comelec Second Division initially granted the petition. The Comelec en
banc and the SC reversed. The latter ruled that, since surname does not
refer to a qualification for office, there was not material
misrepresentation.
Doctrine: The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78,
Omnibus Election Code, refers to qualifications for elective office, not
innocuous mistakes
Candidates must file a sworn certificate of candidacy. It states, among
others, that the candidate is eligible for the office. In case of material
misrepresentation, the Comelec is authorized, under Section 78, to deny
due course to or cancel such certificate. If the petition is duly filed:
(1) And the candidate is disqualified before the election, he shall
not be voted for or he votes cast for him shall not be counted;
(2) And the candidate is not disqualified before the election and
receives the winning number of votes, the Court or the
Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may order the
suspension of the proclamation whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
To justify cancellation, the false representation must pertain to a
“material matter” since what is involved is the substantive right of a
candidate to run for the elective post. The law does not specify what
constitutes “material representation,” but the Court has considered the
following, if proven to be false, as material misrepresentation under
Section 78: (a) residence, (b) citizenship (natural-born; reacquisition),
and (c) citizenship (reacquisition).
A Section 78 proceeding has been likened to a quo warranto proceeding
(Section 253), since they both deal with qualifications of a candidate.
However, under Section 78, the petition is filed before the election,
while for quo warranto, it is filed within 10 days after proclamation. If a
petition cannot be filed within the period provided in Section 73, quo
warranto may still be availed of. The grounds are also different. For the
former, there must be a material representation in the certificate of
candidacy. The latter may be brought on two grounds: (1) ineligibility
(lacks qualifications) or (2) disloyalty to the RP. As in quo warranto
proceedings, therefore, the material misrepresentation under Section
78 refers to qualifications for elective office.
Class Notes:
- The SC mentioned 2 tests: Test of Materiality and Test of
Deliberate Attempt
 To be disqualified, BOTH tests must be satisfied
- Sir thinks that we should apply both tests to the effect that
fulfillment of EITHER test is sufficient to disqualify
 Eg: A name may be immaterial (since it does not refer to
disqualification) but it may be patently deceiving
 Only Test of Deliberate Attempt is satisfied
 But the candidate must still be disqualified
CIPRIANO v. COMELEC
August 10, 2004
Summary: Petitioner Elena Cipriano filed her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for the 2002 SK elections. However she and several others were
disqualified because the COMELEC adopted a resolution recommended
by the Commission’s law department to this effect because it is said that
she together with several others were not registered voters of the
barangay were they intended to run. Elena was proclaimed the SK
Chairperson. She filed with the COMELEC a Motion for Reconsideration
of the COMELEC Resolution, cancelling her COC. She argued that the
cancellation of her COC may only be done via proper petition under Sec.
78 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the cancellation of her COC
was done with grave abuse of discretion because it was done without
notice and hearing. The Supreme Court resolved the issue of the validity
of COMELEC Resolution (cancelling Cipriano’s COC), in the negative.
The SC stated that it was beyond COMELEC’s administrative power to
cancel Cipriano’s COC and that the cancellation was done in violation of
Cipriano’s right to due process.
Doctrine: The Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due
course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC
to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is
ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent
defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on
their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is
thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.
To deny due course to or cancel COC, the proper petition is that which
must be filed under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code Contrary to
the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or
cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is not within the
administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The determination whether a
material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or
the determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is
seeking involves a determination of fact where both parties must be
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the
resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of one’s right to run
for public office, or, as in this case, one’s right to hold public office, it is
only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the
proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute
the allegations against him.
BAUTISTA v. COMELEC
October 23, 2003
Summary: Petitioner Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for
Punong Barangay in Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas. At first, election
officer Jareño refused to accept Bautista’s certificate of candidacy
because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. The latter filed a
petition for mandamus with the RTC, which ordered Jareño to accept
the certificate of candidacy. Jareño referred the matter to the Law
Department of the COMELEC, which recommended the deletion of
Bautista’s name in the list of candidates. However, the same was not
acted upon by the COMELEC and it was only after Bautista’s
proclamation that the COMELEC en banc issued Resolutions no. 5404
and 5584. Bautista wrote the COMELEC for reconsideration and while
the letter of reconsideration was still pending he filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of TRO with
the SC. The SC held that Bautista is not a registered voter in the
barangay where he intends to run. Therefore, he is not qualified to run
and assume the position of Punong Barangay.
Doctrine: Sec. 39, LGC specifically requires an elective official to be a
REGISTERED VOTER and not merely a qualified voter The Local
Government Code clearly requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to
be a registered voter of the barangay where he intends to run for office.
MATUGAS v. COMELEC
January 20, 2004
Summary: Matugas filed a petition to disqualify his opponent Barbers
from the Surigao del Norte Gubernatorial Race on the ground that the
latter is not a Filipino Citizen. Matugas presented documents to support
his allegation but both the Comelec and SC found that these are not
sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Barbers is not a Filipino
Citizen. The documents presented were mere photocopies and did not
comply with the Rules on Evidence, specifically on proving public
documents.
Doctrine: Basic in the law of evidence is that one who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof
required is substantial evidence.
(I think what’s important here is that a petition to disqualify must
be supported by evidence and the onus probandi of proving the ground
relied upon for disqualification rests with the petitioner. The court also
says, in effect, that substantial evidence is required in disqualification
cases.)
JAPZON v. COMELEC
January 19, 2009
Summary: Japzon and Ty were Mayoralty candidates of the Municipality
of General Macarthur in Eastern Samar. Japzon assails the candidacy of
Ty and prays for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy alleging
that Ty was not able to comply with the residency requirements as
provided in the LGC of 1991. COMELEC First Division found for Ty. This
was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. SC gave credence to the factual
findings of the COMELEC there being substantial evidence to support it.
Doctrine: The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to
"domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where
he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
(animus revertiendi) and remain (animus manendi)." A domicile of
origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where
the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). The principle of
animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has
an "intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be elected.
Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an
"abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to
depart therefrom.
Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence. The length of actual stay in a place is
not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence.
When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a
candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly
appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by
upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the electorate
should be respected.
Class Notes: The SC discussed the nature of RA 9225
- RA 9225 governs the manner in which a natural bon Filipino
may reacquire or retain his Filipino citizenship despite
acquiring foreign citizenship
- RA 9225 treats citizenship INDEPENDENTLY of residence
- Philippine residency only becomes relevant when a natural
born Filipino decides to run for public office.
CORDORA v. COMELEC
February 19, 2009
Summary: Cordora accused Tambunting of making false claims in his
certificate of candidacy as to citizenship and residency. Cordora asserts
that Tambunting is a naturalized American. COMELEC/ SC: Tambunting
is a dual Filipino American citizen. He did not undergo naturalization.
Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification. There were no false
claims in the certificate of citizenship.
Doctrine: Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification. The
phrase "dual citizenship" in RA 7160, §40(d) and in RA 7854, §20 refers
to "dual allegiance." Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. It should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at
the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they
are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
Under RA 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another
country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking
an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s
foreign citizenship.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of 2
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2 or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
Class Notes:
- Citizenship IS different from residence; do not confuse both
requirements
- Sir does not agree with the Dual Allegiance – Dual Citizenship
discussion; the law is clear when it disqualifies DUAL
CITIZENS
MARUHOM v. COMELEC
July 27, 2009
Summary: Maruhom filed a certificate of candidacy (coc) for the
mayoralty position in the Municipality of Marantao. Her opponent filed
a petition to cancel the coc alleging that Maruhom was a double
registrant (she is registered in Marawi and in Marantao) and that she
did not allege the same in her coc amounting to false material
representations. COMELEC cancelled Maruhom’s coc. SC affirmed.
Doctrine: COMELEC had jurisdiction to cancel cocs if a false
representation of a material fact in the COC is a ground for the denial or
cancellation of the COC. Two things must be present. One, a material
fact which refers to a candidate’s eligibility or qualification for elective
office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter. And
two, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible.
Maruhom’s voter registration constitutes a material fact because it
affects her eligibility to be elected as a municipal mayor of Marantao.
Section 39(a) of RA 7160 (LGC) requires that an elective local official
must be, among other things, a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he intends to be elected.
LABO v. COMELEC
July 3, 1992
Summary: Ramon Labo Jr. filed is certificate of candidacy for Mayor of
Baguio City. The other candidate, Roberto Ortega, filed disqualification
proceedings against Labo, invoking the ruling in Labo v. COMELEC
where the Court ruled that Labo was not a Filipino citizen but an
Australian. COMELEC issued a resolution cancelling the COC of Labo
two days before the elections. In Labo’s petition for review in the SC, he
argued that supervening events preclude the application of Labo v.
COMELEC and that he can be proclaimed as the winner because the
COMELEC resolution attained finality only after five days. He also
pointed to his application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
filed with the OSG. Ortega argued that the COMELEC resolution has
become final and executory and as a result, the candidate with the
second highest number of votes should be declared Mayor. The Court
ruled that Labo is not a Filipino citizen absent any proof of approval of
his repatriation. Ortega as second placer is not entitled to proclamation.
The vice-mayor shall assume office as mayor because of the permanent
vacancy, based on Sec. 44 of the LGC.
Doctrine: The election of an alien does not automatically restore his
Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable
requirement for holding office (Sec. 39, LGC). The ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected.
Ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does NOT entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact
and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of eh ineligible candidate. Then the candidate with the
next highest number of votes deemed elected
Class Notes: So can a 2nd placer ever assume office? Only in 2 instances:
1. The Labo doctrine
2. When COC is invalid since in this case there is really only just
one candidate
 See succeeding cases
 Sir said that the SC is divided on this issue but they are
leaning towards this doctrine
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
October 9, 2012
Summary: Cardino filed for the cancellation of Jalosjos’ COC on the
ground of material misrepresentation. He alleged that Jalosjos
misrepresented in his COC that he was eligible to run for mayor when in
fact he was not because he was previously convicted with robbery.
Under the RPC, robbery has an accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification which makes a person perpetually disqualified from
running for a public office. The SC ruled in favor of Cardino and further
enunciated that Cardino, having the second highest number of votes
should be proclaimed as mayor.
Doctrine: Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot
be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared
ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took
place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio,
then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was
never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-
candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-
candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible
to run for public office is a false material representation which is a
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate
of candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if
he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually
eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from
running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate
of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the
candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground
for a petition under Section 78.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Sec.
78, OEC because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means
that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for
disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact
involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section
40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Art. 30, RPC, temporary absolute disqualification - produces the effect
of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular
elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the
temporary absolute disqualification is same as that of principal penalty.
Art. 32, RPC, perpetual special disqualification - "the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification," which is perpetually.
Class Notes
- COC was void ab initio
 Can we apply this to Labo?
- Can COMELEC motu proprio institute a disqualification
proceeding?
 Note that in Cipriano, there must be a complaint
 Here, there was none
 The SC said that the final judgment against Jalosjos
was sufficient notice; COMELEC can act on its own
- On Sec. 40(a)
 If there is an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification, then forever disqualified
 Sir also mentioned RA 10368 (Human Rights Victims
Repatriation and Recognition Act of 2013) which
modified Sec. 40(a)
 Sec. 25 on penalties says: If convicted, he shall
suffer the imprisonment of eight (8) to ten (10)
years, shall be disqualified from public office and
employment and shall be deprived of the right to
vote and be voted for in any national or local
election, even after the service of sentence unless
granted absolute pardon.
FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
June 28, 1996
Summary: Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won.
Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his
oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already
ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire
citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest
number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
The Supreme Court ruled that his repatriation was valid and legal and
because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his
repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run
for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the
application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of
allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath
of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to
retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not
have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Doctrine: The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires
Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials,
including that of provincial governor,
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is
none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance
to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates
his term of office to begin.
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of
"ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Literally, such qualifications
— unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and
residence — should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected]
official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of his term
Class Notes:
- Sir does not agree with this case at all
 Dissent of Davide is correct
- So can Katy Perry run?
 According to Frivaldo, yes, as long as she acquires
Philippine citizenship before she is proclaimed
MAQUILING v. COMELEC
April 16, 2013
Summary: Rommel Arnado is a natural born Fil citizen who lost his Fil
citizenship when he became a naturalized US citizen. He applied for
repatriation under RA 9225 and met the twin requirements of taking
the oath of allegiance and renouncing his US citizenship. However, he
still continued to use his US passport in his travel abroad. Subsequently,
he filed his COC. His qualification to run is now being assailed on the
ground that he was a foreigner. The Court ruled that his act of using a
foreign passport did not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which
he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it
took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport. When he filed his COC, Arnado was a
dual citizen which disqualifies him from running for any local elective
position.
Doctrine: Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already
carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not
only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to
personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship also requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment
of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act 63 constituting renunciation and
loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who
is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.
Class Notes:
- Holding of SC has no leg to stand on
 We should just wait for Congress to enact a law
regarding the use of foreign passports
- Note the pronouncement in Maquiling on the inapplicability
of Labo in the instant case:
  The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the
candidate ineligible. Knowledge of the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualifications is not necessary before a
qualified candidate who placed 2nd to a disqualified one
can be proclaimed as the winner. The 2nd placer in the
vote count is actually the 1st placer among the qualified
candidates
ALTAREJOS v. COMELEC
November 10, 2004
Summary: Altarejo was running for mayor but his certificate of
candidacy was attacked on the ground that he was not a citizen during
the time he filed it. Due to his failure to submit the documentation to
prove that he is a citizen (because citizenship is a requirement for
candidacy under Section 39 of the LGC of 1991) COMELEC found for the
assailants of his candidacy. COMELEC En Banc upheld the COMELEC
first division findings. The Supreme Court here discussed that
Frivaldo’s doctrine could apply to this case, stating that he is really a
citizen and such citizenship retroacts to the date he filed his petition,
and that the citizenship requirement is only necessary until upon the
day of oath taking and proclamation. HOWEVER, since he failed to
adduce documentary evidence of his citizenship in his main petition
and only on his motion for reconsideration when such evidence can no
longer be adduced, the court upheld COMELEC and denied his petition
to nullify COMELEC’s rulings.
Doctrine: The requirement in RA 7160 Section 39 as to citizenship, the
law does not specify any date or time when the candidate must possess
it unlike residence which is at the immediately preceding the election.
Since an official only begins to discharge the duties of his office on the
day of his proclamation when his term begins, his qualification becomes
required on such date. Hence the citizenship requirement can be
construed as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official
at the start of his term. The Court further cites that in Frivaldo, the
court pronounced that his repatriation by virtue of PD 725, retroacted
to the date of filing his application, based on the intent of legislative
authority which is to enable the largest number of Filipinos to enhoy
the fullest effect and expression of the rights accorded to citizenship; it
also prevents prejudice to applicants.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF
TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA
November 17, 2005
Summary: Tess Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of
mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al filed a petition
for the disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her certificate
of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. It was
alleged that she was not a resident of Agoo one year prior to the
upcoming May 10, 2004 election as required by the LGC because she
only transferred to Agoo from Naguilian in October 2003. Dumpit-
Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San
Julian West when she purchased a residential lot on April 19, 2003.
Comelec Second division cancelled her COC. Comelec en bac denied her
MR. SC affirmed and ruled that Tess did not meet the one-year
residence requirement.
Doctrine: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with
domicile. Property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted for an office.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements: (1)
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with the purpose. To effect
change, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be
voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.
TORAYNO v. COMELEC
April 19, 1991
Summary: Vicente Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed
provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, his third consecutive term as
governor. In his March 12, 1995 Certificate of Candidacy, his residence
was declared to be in Tagoloan, MO. While still governor, Emano
executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City, a highly
urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. Emano filed
his COC for mayor of the city. Torayno, Eligan, and Seriño, residents of
CDO, sought the disqualification of Emano, alleging he failed to meet the
one-year residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of their
Petition, Commission on Elections proclaimed Emano as duly-elected
city mayor. They filed a quo warranto petition, which was also denied.
The SC also sided with Emano, ruling that he had fulfilled the residency
requirement.
Doctrine: The Constitution and the law requires residence as a
qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to
give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the
welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to
evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they
aspire for. "SEC. 39 of the LGC provides: Qualifications. - (a) An elective
local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect."
Class Notes:
- Is residency requirement a continuing requirement?
 This was not in issue in Torayno but the SC said no
 All other requirements are continuing
- Can we argue that it IS a continuing requirement?
 We can invoke the rational of the residency
requirement and argue that it the same will be best
fulfilled if it be a continuing requirement
- Sir noted that the law is silent on this matter
COQUILLA v. COMELEC
July 31, 2002
Summary: Coquilla was born a Filipino. He served with the US Navy,
was naturalized an American, and became a resident of the US.
Nevertheless, he made frequent visits to the Philippines. After
retirement, he came back to the Philippines and repatriated. He gained
his Filipino citizenship back and ran for mayor in his hometown of Oras,
Eastern Samar. In his COC, he stated that he had been a resident of the
Philippines for two years prior to such filing (including the time of his
visits before he repatriated). The incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was
running for reelection filed a petition for Coquilla’s disqualification on
the ground that the latter had misrepresented.
Doctrine: A person loses his domicile in the Philippines by
naturalization to a different citizenship. After such naturalization and
until repatriation, such person, when in the Philippines, is considered
an alien without any right to reside in the country, save as our
immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor. Thus, his
stay here as a visitor cannot count to satisfy the residence requirement
to qualify him to run for local office.
Class Notes: Why are we confused with this case? This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the
- The SC seemed to combine the residency and citizenship right to hold public office, which property requirement would be
requirement unconstitutional.
 We must always treat them separately since they are
independent requirements
 One can be a resident but not a citizen
- Residence is a matter of evidence

JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
April 24, 2012

Summary: In Nov 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy COC for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the 2010 elections.
Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel
Jalosjos’ COC because he made material misrepresentation in the same
since he failed to comply with the requirements of R.A. 9225 and the
one-year residency requirement of the LGC. COMELEC ruled that he
failed to prove the residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate
and his bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. SC reversed the COMELEC resolutions.

Doctrine: There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s

compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence
is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a
time.

JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
February 26, 2013

Summary: Svetlana Jalosjos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for

mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections.
She indicated therein her place of birth AND residence as Barangay
Tugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental.

Edwin Tumpag and Rodolfo Estrellada filed against Jalosjos a Petition to

Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which
they argued that she had falsely represented her place of birth and
residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and
had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.

The Comelec 2nd Division and the Comelec En Banc found Jalosjos
disqualified from the office of Mayor.

Doctrine: On COMELEC's failure to give an advance notice of its

promulgation: The additional rule requiring notice to the parties prior
to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of promulgation.
Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties,
noncompliance with this rule is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate
the validity of the decision.

On establishment of new domicile: There are three requisites for a

person to acquire a new domicile by choice. First, residence or bodily
presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain there.
Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.

Moreover, EVEN IF these requisites are established by clear and

positive proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the
critical date, must also be established to be within at least one year
prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence.
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of Jalosjos is true, it has
established that the ownership of a house or some other property does
not establish domicile.

To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative

indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that the
landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.
 DISQUALIFICATIONS
Breakdown of Sec. 40, LGC: The following persons are disqualified
from running for ANY elective local position: THOSE
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
(a) Sentenced by final judgment
 For an offense:
1. Involving moral turpitude, OR
2. Punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment
 Within 2 years after serving sentence
(b) Removed from office as a result of an administrative case
(c) Convicted by final judgment for violating oath of allegiance
to the Republic
(d) With dual citizenship
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here
or abroad
(f) Permanent resident in a foreign country
 OR those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after effectivity
of LGC
(g) Insane or feebleminded
NOTE: Any one ground is enough to disqualify a candidate
Grounds for Disqualification under Election Laws:
1. Under the OEC (Sec. 12)
a. Declared as incompetent or insane by competent
authority before said insanity or incompetence is
declared removed
b. Convicted by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months
imprisonment, before expiration of a period of 5 years
from his service of sentence
c. Convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude
d. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
immigrant to a foreign country
(1) UNLESS said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws
2. Under the LGC (Sec. 40) – These grounds are applicable only
to candidates for local elective office
a. 7 grounds (see above)
Sec. 40(a) – Conviction
3. Additional grounds under OEC (Sec. 68)
a. One who has violated provisions on:
(1) Campaign period
(2) Removal, destruction of lawful election
propaganda
(3) Prohibited forms of propaganda
(4) Regulation of propaganda through mass media
b. One who has given money or other material
consideration to influence voters or public officials
performing electoral functions
c. One who committed acts of terrorism to enhance
candidacy
d. One who spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by law
e. One who solicited or received or made any contribution
prohibited by law
Class Notes: Are these the only grounds to disqualify a candidate?
- No, some special laws provide for the disqualification of
candidates; see special laws below
1. RA 8295 (1997) – In addition to the disqualifications
mentioned in Sec. 12 and 68 of OEC and Sec. 40, LGC,
WHENEVER THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG, the
following persons are disqualified to run in a SPECIAL
ELECTION called to fill the vacancy in an elective office:
a. Any elective official who has resigned from his office by
accepting an appointive office or for whatever reason
which he previously occupied but has caused to become
vacant due to his resignation
b. Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes,
threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually causes,
inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment,
torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or
persons aspiring to become a candidate or that of the
immediate member of his family, his honor or property
that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidate
2. RA 9165 (2002) – Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
a. Sec. 27 – Criminal liability of a public officer or
employee:
(1) If public officer/employee misappropriates or
misapplies or fails to account for confiscated,
seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, etc:
(a) Penalties:
1) Life imprisonment to death, and
2) Fine of P500,000 to P10M, plus
3) ABSOLUTE PERPETUAL
DISQUALIFICATION from public office
(2) Any elective local or national office found to have
benefited from proceeds of trafficking of
dangerous drugs or have received any financial or
material contributions or donations from persons
found guilty of trafficking:
(a) Removal from office
(b) And PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION from
holding any elective or appointive office
b. Sec. 28 – Criminal Liability of Government Officials and
Employees
(1) Maximum penalties for the unlawful acts
(2) Plus ABSOLUTE PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION
from any public office
3. RA 9225 (2003) – Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
(see separate compilation for the full law)
- Moral turpitude = everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals
 Any act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of the right and duty between man and
woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals
- Within 2 years after serving sentence
 Note that this applies whether the candidate was
convicted of an offense (1) involving moral turpitude, or
(2) punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment
 Moreno v. COMELEC defined “service of sentence”:
 Applies only to a convict who has been confined in
a penal facility for some time
 Does not apply to a probationer, whose principal
and accessory penalties were suspended upon the
grant of probation
Sec. 40(b) – Removal from Office
- This section applies only to those removed from office on or
after Jan. 1, 1992
 There is no provision in the LGC which would clearly
indicate that the same operates retroactively (Grego v.
COMELEC)
Sec/ 40(d) – Dual Citizenship
- Here the SC qualifies dual citizenship in Sec. 40 with the dual
allegiance provision of Art. IV, Sec. 5
- Mercado v. Manzano – dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance
 Thus, dual citizenship in Sec. 40 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance; so persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under the disqualification
 Class Notes: Sir does not agree with this interpretation
 The provision is clear when it says “DUAL
CITIZENSHIP”
Sec. 40 (e) – Fugitives
- Persons fleeing from local or foreign justice or non-political
cases are likewise disqualified
- Rodriguez v. COMELEC – “fugitive from justice” defined:
 Includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment
 But likewise those who, after being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution
 Intent to evade on the part of the candidate must
therefore be established by proof that there has already
been a conviction or at least, a charge has been filed, at
the time of flight
Sec. 40(f) – Green Card Holders
- This sub-section is directed against the green-card holders
 Filipino citizens who have acquired permanent
residency in a foreign country and have continued to
use it even after Jan. 1, 1992
- Caasi v. CA
 To be qualified to run for elective office, the candidate
who is a green card holder must have waived his status
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country
 The act of filing a COC did not in itself constitute a
waiver of his status as permanent residency in a foreign
country
 Waiver of green card should be manifested by
some act/s independent of and done prior to COC
filing
MORENO v. COMELEC
August 10, 2006
Summary: Moreno, the incumbent Punong Barangay in Brgy. Cabugao,
Daram, Samar, sought re-election. Mejes filed a petition to disqualify
him on the ground that he was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary
Detention and was sentenced to imprisonment (of more than 1 year) in
1998. Moreno claims that he was already granted probation by the RTC
in December 2000 and hence, he was restored to all the civil rights
suspended by his conviction. The COMELEC 1st Div. and En Banc,
applying Sec. 40(a) of the LGC, disqualified Moreno from running for
Punong Barangay. They held that the grant of probation in 2000 merely
suspended the execution of his sentence and it did not affect his
disqualification. Moreno argues that the disqualification under the LGC
Sec. 40(a) applies only to those who have served their sentence and not
to probationers, who did not serve their sentence. The SC agreed with
Moreno.
Doctrine: Those who have not served their sentence by reason of the
grant of probation, which should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not be disqualified from running for a local elective
office because the 2-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
The period within which a person is under probation CANNOT be
equated with service of the sentence adjudged.
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law: the grant of probation suspends the
execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court
but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in
the probation order, The Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code.
Class Notes:
- If one is convicted and sentenced but is later on granted
probation, can he run?
 It seems so since probation suspends the execution of
the sentence
- What if he violates the conditions of his probation?
- Sir thinks that there is something wrong with this doctrine
 The fact that he has NOT yet served sentence makes it
all the more reason to disqualify a convicted person
MAGNO v. COMELEC
October 4, 2002
Summary: Magno is a mayoralty candidate for 2001 elections of San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija sought to be disqualified on the ground that of his
previous conviction by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct
bribery. After being sentenced to imprisonment, he applied for
probation and was discharged. However, the COMELEC disqualified him
from running as mayor because his 5-year disqualification under the
Omnibus Election Code ends on 2003. However, Magno insisted that he
is qualified to run because direct bribery is not a crime involving moral
turpitude and the Omnibus Election Code providing for five years of
disqualification is modified by the LGC providing for only 2 years.
The SC ruled that direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude as
inferred from its third element: such offer or promise be accepted or
gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to
committing some crime. However, it also ruled that the LGC prevails
over the Omnibus Election Code being a later enactment, having a
general repealing clause and being more specific in providing for
disqualifications of elective LOCAL officials, unlike the Omnibus
Election Code providing for disqualification of ANY public official.
Hence, Magno is not disqualified from running as mayor. However, the
SC said that it is not the proper forum to assail the proclamation of the
new mayor, the proper remedy being an election protest.
Doctrine: A candidate for an elective local position, when convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude (such as direct bribery) or having a
penalty of more than 1 year of imprisonment, is disqualified from
running within 2 years after serving sentence, as provided under Sec
40, LGC.
The 5-year disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code is deemed
repealed insofar as elective public officers are concerned. As to them,
the disqualification is only for 2 years.
KARE v. COMELEC
August 28, 2004
Summary: Ceriola, the 2nd placer, sought the disqualification of Moll, 1st
placer for the Mayoral Elections in 2001, from holding the position of
Mayor since Moll was convicted of a crime in 1999 which disqualified
him from being a candidate for Mayor. Moll argues that the decision has
not yet become final since he filed a motion for reconsideration before
the lapse of the reglementary period for filing an appeal.
Doctrine: Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides:
"Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for
an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence. Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision
correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for
any elective local position. The period for appeal is interrupted by the
filing of either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial.
But what Moll filed was a "Motion to Quash the Information"; and when
it was denied, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial. The
period is interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration
of the judgment or of the final order being appealed. Neither Moll’s
Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for Reconsideration was
directed at the judgment of conviction but attacked a matter extraneous
to the judgment.
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
October 9, 2012
Summary: Cardino filed for the cancellation of Jalosjos’ COC on the
ground of material misrepresentation. He alleged that Jalosjos
misrepresented in his COC that he was eligible to run for mayor when in
fact he was not because he was previously convicted with robbery.
Under the RPC, robbery has an accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification which makes a person perpetually disqualified from
running for a public office. The SC ruled in favor of Cardino and further
enunciated that Cardino, having the second highest number of votes
should be proclaimed as mayor.
Doctrine: (On Disqualifications) The perpetual special disqualification
against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is
a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible
to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for
Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation
of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised
Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual
special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,"
which is perpetually.
Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective
public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in
his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
MALINAO v. REYES
March 29, 1996
Doctrine: Virgnia Malinao, Human Resource Manager III, filed an
administrative case against Mayor Red for abuse of authority and denial
of due process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque. On
August 12, 1994, members of the Sanggunian, by a vote of 5 to 3, found
Mayor Red guilty. The Presiding Chairperson wrote a draft “Decision”
which was signed only by him (presiding chair). This constituted the
first “Decision”. On September 5, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2,
acquitted Red of the charges against him. This vote was embodied in a
Decision which was signed by all the members. Virginia Malinao argued
that the First Sanggunian decision had already become final and
executory for failure of Mayor Red to appeal. Filing a petition for
mandamus, Virginia Malinao asked the Court to compel the Governor to
implement the first “Decision” (suspending Mayor Red for one month).
The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus.
Doctrine: In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving
elective local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be "in
writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such
decision." Like the procedure in the Supreme Court, the voting
following the deliberation of the members of the Sanggunian did not
necessarily constitute their decision unless this was embodied in an
opinion prepared by one of them and concurred in by the others, in the
same way that the voting following the deliberation on a case in the
Supreme Court becomes its decision only after the opinion prepared by
a Justice is concurred in by others composing the majority. Until they
have signed the opinion and the decision is promulgated, the Justices
are free to change their votes.
At all events, this case is now moot and academic as a result of the
expiration of Mayor Red's term during which the act complained of was
allegedly committed, and further proceedings against respondent
Mayor are barred by his reelection on May 8, 1995.
Pursuant to §66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot
exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6)
months for every administrative offense. On the other hand, any
administrative disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if
in the meantime he is reelected, because his reelection results in a
condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during
his previous term.
REYES v. COMELEC
March 7, 1996
Summary: An administrative complaint was filed against the incumbent
mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindor and the petitioner in this case,
Renato Reyes. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, after hearing the case,
rendered a decision finding him guilty and ordering petitioner to vacate
the position. A TRO was issued by the RTC and the service of the order
was delayed until the expiration of the TRO. Several attempts were
made to serve the order but petitioner refused to receive the same. In
the meantime, petitioner Reyes filed his certificate of candidacy for the
1995 election. Private respondent Rogelio de Castro sought the
disqualification of petitioner as candidate for Mayor but it was not
acted upon by the COMELEC. Petitioner Reyes won the elections on May
8, 1995 but COMELEC issued an order on May 9, 1995 disqualifying
Reyes. He filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court also denied the petition for
certiorari filed by Reyes ruling that he is disqualified from running in
the 1995 elections due to his removal from office resulting from the
complaint filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Considering that
the decision of the Sangguaniang Panlalawigan has become final and
executory, Reyes is disqualified from running for any elective position.
Doctrine: Sec. 40 (b) of the Local Government Code provides that those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case are
disqualified from running for any elective local positions. The decision
must be rendered within the term of office during which the alleged
misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his
term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter
reelected for another term.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was
held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct
committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case,
before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative
decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during
which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot
extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was
committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office
expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for
another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo
cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although
petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the
administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the
action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served
on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because
petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus
validly removed from office and, pursuant to § 40(b) of the Local
Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided
there was no provision similar to § 40(b) which disqualifies any person
from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been
removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.
LINGATING v. COMELEC
November 13, 2002
Summary: Lingating filed a petition to disqualify Lingating as a
candidate for Mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur, in the May 14,
2001 elections, on the ground that, in 1991, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur ordered his removal from office.
Sulong, however, argued that the decision never became final since he
filed an MR, which was never resolved by the Sanggunian. The
COMELEC en banc ruled that Sulong’s re-election twice after his term in
1991, and his election in 2001 operated as condonation of his
misconduct. The SC, however, merely ruled that the decision of the
Sanggunian never became final because of the MR. As such, there was,
in effect, no decision to remove him.
Doctrine: The doctrine in Reyes v. COMELEC, to the effect that the
disqualification under Section 40(b) applies when the candidate was
removed from office before the expiration of his term, does not apply
when the decision ordering such removal never became final and
executory due to an unresolved MR.
Class Notes:
- Sec. 40(b) is a PERPETUAL disqualification
 But the cause of removal may be petty (petty crimes)
- Sec. 40(a) on moral turpitude is NOT a perpetual
disqualification
- RATIO?
 Sec. 40(b) goes into the competency of carrying out the
functions of local office
 Sec. 40(a) – you can be competent but immoral
GREGO v. COMELEC
June 19, 1997
Summary: Basco was removed from office as Deputy Sheriff in 1981
pursuant to an administrative case. The SC held that his dismissal is
with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local
government. On 1988, 1992, and 1995 Basco ran, was elected, and
assumed office as councilman for the 2nd District of Manila City. Grego
filed a petition for disqualification against Basco invoking the
administrative penalty imposed against Basco on 1981 thus making
him ineligible under Sec. 40(b), LGC. Comelec dismissed the petition. SC
affirmed the dismissal. SC held that Basco was under no disqualification
since his dismissal (1981) was before the effectivity of LGC which has
no retroactive effect. The SC also emphasized that the SC limited the
disqualification to “reinstatement” and under Civil Service Decree,
reinstatement refers only to appointive office. Hence, there was no legal
impediment for Basco to run for a local elective office.
Doctrine: Aguinaldo v. Comelec – statutes are not to be construed as
intended to have a retroactive effect, unless such intent is expressly
declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment. There is no provision in the statute (the LGC) which would
clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.
MORENO v. COMELEC
August 10, 2006
Summary: Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno on the ground that
he was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and was
sentenced to imprisonment (of more than 1 year) in 1998. Moreno
claims that he was already granted probation by the RTC. The
COMELEC 1st Div. and En Banc, applying Sec. 40(a) of the LGC,
disqualified Moreno from running for Punong Barangay. They held that
the grant of probation in 2000 merely suspended the execution of his
sentence and it did not affect his disqualification. Moreno argues that
the disqualification under the LGC Sec. 40(a) applies only to those who
have served their sentence and not to probationers, who did not serve
their sentence. The SC agreed with Moreno.
Doctrine: The period within which a person is under probation CANNOT
be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the
Probation Law states that the grant of probation suspends the
execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court
but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in
the probation order. Sec. 40(a) does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. The Probation Law
should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code.
MERCADO v. MANZANO
May 26, 1999
Summary: Manzano won as vice mayor of Makati in the May 1998
elections. Second placer Mercado sought the disqualification of
Manzano under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC because Manzano is allegedly a
dual US-Filipino citizen. SC: Mercado has standing, but petition has no
merit. Manzano is qualified to run.
Doctrine: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of 2 or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Dual allegiance refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual's volition. The phrase "dual citizenship" in
Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC and in Sec. 20 of RA 7854 refers to "dual
allegiance."
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC only applies to cases in which the election
of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who
placed 2nd to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner.
Class Notes: We should be very unhappy with this case
1. Sec. 40(d) is very clear when it refers to DUAL CITIZENSHIP,
not allegiance
2. Assuming that the law is vague, is the interpretation of the SC
correct? NO
 It cited ConCom proceedings instead of LGC
deliberations
 Sec. 40(c) is the one which refers to dual allegiance!
3. SC decision made Sec. 40(d) inexistent
 This disqualification will never exist because once a
candidate files his COC he is deemed to have renounced
foreign citizenship
 DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC
June 19, 2009

Summary: Roseller ran for vice mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. His
opponent filed a petition for disqualification against him alleging that
he was not a Filipino Citizen. Roseller claims that he was a naturalized
Filipino citizen under RA 9225 hence he was qualified to run. SC held
that though he was a naturalized Filipino citizen, he was disqualified to
run for office. RA 9225 provides for another requirement for
naturalized Filipinos under the act who wish to run for office.

Doctrine: Section 5(a) of RA 9225 lays down two requirements for a

natural born Filipino who reacquired or retained his Philippine
citizenship under the RA. He must 1) meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and
2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

RODRIGUEZ v. COMELEC
July 24, 1996

Summary: Rodriguez and Marquez Jr. were candidates for governor of

Quezon in 1992 and 1995. In the 1992 elections, Marquez challenged
Rodriguez’ victory in a quo warranto petition, saying that he is a fugitive
from justice disqualified under Sec. 40(e) of the LGC. There is a pending
charge against Rodriguez in LA for fraudulent insurance claims, grand
theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. He left the US
roughly five months prior to the institution of the criminal case against
him. The Court defined a “fugitive from justice” in the Marquez decision
as including not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. The case was then remanded to the COMELEC. During its
pendency, Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ candidacy in the 1995
election in a petition for disqualification on the same allegation. The
COMELEC consolidated the two and rendered a resolution disqualifying
Rodriguez based on an authenticated copy of warrant of warrant and
felony complaint against Rodriguez. It nullified Rodriguez’
proclamation. After being directed by the SC to receive and evaluate
evidence, the COMELEC declared that Rodriguez is not a fugitive from
justice as defined in the Marquez decision because intent to evade is a
material element. The SC affirmed and held that the intent to evade is
the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular
jurisdiction and since Rodriguez’ arrival in the Philippines preceded the
filing of the felony complaint and the issuance of warrant of arrest, it
was impossible for him to have known of such.

Doctrine: A ‘fugitive from justice’ includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Intent to evade on the part of a
candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already
been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time
of flight.

When, in good faith, a person leaves a territory of a state not his own,
homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him
while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that
he does no subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former does not
qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.

TERM OF OFFICE
Breakdown of Sec. 43, LGC: Term of Office
(a) Term of office of all local elective officials after LGC
effectivity shall be 3 years
 Starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as
may be provided by law
 Except that of local elective barangay officials
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms in the same position
 Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
NOT considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term
(c) Term of office of barangay officials and members of SK shall
be for 3 years
 Which shall begin after regular election of barangay
officials on 2nd Monday of May 1994
Special Laws cited in the Syllabus
1. Art. X, Sec. 8, Constitution
a. Term of office of elective local officials shall be 3 years
(1) Except barangay officials which shall be
determined by law
b. Three-term limit (consecutive terms)
(1) Voluntary renunciation not considered
interruption in continuity of service
2. RA 6679 (1988) – Act postponing barangay elections to
March 28, 1989; prescribing additional rules governing the
conduct of barangay elections
a. Barangay officials shall serve a term of 5 years which
shall begin on June 1 following the election and until
their successors shall have been elected and qualified
b. No barangay official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms
c. Barangay elections shall be non-partisan
NOTE: See case of David v. COMELEC which held that the
term limit for barangay officials has also been reduced to
3 years
3. RA 8524 (1998) – Act changing the term of office of barangay
officials and members of SK from 3 years to 5 years
a. Amending Sec. 43 of LGC
NOTE: See RA 9164 which amended Sec. 43 again and
reduced the term limit of barangay officials and SK
officials to 3 years. So as the law stands now, term limit
for these officials is THREE YEARS
4. RA 9006 (2001) – Fair Elections Act
a. Sec. 14 – Elective official running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, is NO LONGER considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon filing of his COC
 NOTE: Sec. 14 expressly repealed Sec. 67 of Omnibus
Election Code
 This does not apply to APPOINTIVE officials
5. RA 9164 (2002) – Synchronized barangay and sangguniang
kabataan elections
a. Term of office of barangay and SK officials = 3 years
b. No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms in the same position:
(1) Reckoned from 1994 barangay elections
(2) Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption
Term Shortened – Term of local elective officials has been shortened
from 4 to 3 years;
- voluntary renunciation not considered an interruption
What Constitutes Term of Office - the term limit for elective officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position
- It is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office,
- He must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Elected for 3 Terms – For the 3-term limit to apply, 2 conditions must
be met:
1. That the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive
terms to the same local government post
2. That he has fully served 3 consecutive terms
What does “Fully Served Term” mean?
1. There is no FULL service of term when there is an
INVOLUNTARY interruption or break in continuity of service
 Such as when there is involuntary severance because of
legal process
 Such as an order to vacate office before expiration
of the term (Dizon v. COMELEC)
 But there is a full service of term where a duly
proclaimed Mayor has assumed office but was later
declared as the loser in an electoral protest after the
term of contested office had expired (Ong v. Alegre)
2. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as interruption in continuity of service.
3. The conversion of a municipality to a city without
interruption of the term of an elective official is not
considered an interruption in the continuity of service.
(Latasa vs COMELEC)
4. Election via a recall election does not satisfy a “fully-served”
term. (Lonzanida vs COMELEC)
5. The imposition of preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective official to
stay in office for more than 3 terms. (Aldovino vs COMELEC)
Effect of Specific Cases
1. Effect of judicial declaration that official’s proclamation is
void
 Assumption of office cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of a valid election thus he should not be
considered disqualified because he did not serve three
FULL consecutive terms (Lonzanida v. COMELEC)
2. Effect of recall elections
 Constitution does not require that the interruption be a
full term of 3 years. The clear intent of the framers of
the law is that interruption for any length of time is
sufficient to break an elective local official’s continuity
of service. (Socrates v. COMELEC)
3. Effect of LGU Conversion
 Disqualified; He should not be allowed to run again; if
he would have served the same people for a term more
than what is allowed by law (Latasa v. COMELEC)
4. Effect of Preventive Suspension
 Disqualified; Strict adherence to the intent of the three-
term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended official continues
to stay in office although he is barred from exercising
the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
official’s continuity in office is the absence of a
permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to
appoint one since no vacancy exists. (Aldovino v.
COMELEC)
 BORJA v. COMELEC
September 3, 1998
Summary: Capco was the vice mayor of Pateros, he succeeded as mayor
by operation of law when the incumbent mayor died. After which, he
ran and won as mayor for 2 consecutive terms. He then again filed a
COC for mayor for the upcoming elections. Borja sought his
disqualification on the ground of Sec. 43(b) of the LGC. The Court ruled
that the 3 consecutive term limit refers to terms served as elected
officials and not those served by operation of law as in the case at bar.
Doctrine: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer
to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
LATASA v. COMELEC
December 10, 2003
Summary: After Latasa served three terms as mayor of the Municipality
of Digos, Digos was converted to a City via a plebiscite. Nothing changed
as to territory, population, etc. It was just a conversion of the same area
to a city. Before the election of new city officials, Latasa held the
position in hold-over capacity. Now, Latasa wishes to run for mayor of
the City of Digos, claiming that the Municipality and City are two
different entities, so he is not running for the same position in
contravention of the three-term limit. The Supreme Court found Latasa
ineligible to run as candidate for the position of Digos City Mayor.
Doctrine: True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence
separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional
provision, that the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of
the city mayor.
ARATEA v. COMELEC
October 9, 2012
NOTE:
Master the cases of Aratea and Talaga as they will come out in the exam.
Summary: Romeo Lonzanida was a candidate for Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales. A petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
was filed to disqualify him on the ground that he already served as
mayor for 4 consecutive terms. The Court held that such an ineligibility
falls under Section 78. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because
he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he
still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next
succeeding term.
Doctrine: In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify
under oath his eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office he seeks
election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not specifically
ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an
elective position, such fact is material in determining a candidate’s
eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to and service of
the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a
candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the
succeeding elections. L
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to “the
commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident
status in a foreign country.” All the offenses mentioned in Section 68
refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to
violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the
language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the
three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or
offenses covered under Section 68.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty
is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for
public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to
state under oath in his certificate of candidacy.
Since this is an important case, here is an outline of the SC Decision:
SC’s Ruling: Antipolo, the alleged 2nd placer, should be proclaimed
Mayor because Lonzanida’s COC was void ab initio.
I. Qualifications and Disqualifications
A. Sec. 65 OEC point to the LGC for qualifications of
elective local officials (Sec. 40 and 39)
B. Sec. 12 OEC provides for grounds for disqualification
(see page 70 for the list)
C. Grounds for petition for disqualification are specifically
enumerated in Sec. 68 OEC (see page 70 for the list)
1. A petition for disqualification under Sec. 68 clearly
refers to:
a. Commission of prohibited acts AND
b. Possession of a permanent resident status in
a foreign country
2. All other offenses mentioned in Sec. 68 refer to
election offenses under the OEC
a. NOT to violations of other penal laws
3. There is absolutely nothing in Sec. 68 that would
justify including violation of the 3-term limit rule,
or conviction by final judgment of a crime under
RPC, as one of the grounds covered by Sec. 68
D. THUS, Lonzanida’s case is NOT covered by Sec. 68
II. False Material Representation
A. Sec. 78 OEC – Cancellation of COC if there is a false
material representation of the COC contents
1. Sec. 74 OEC details the contents of the COC
B. A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was
thus required to provide 12 items of information in the
COC:
1. Name
2. Nickname/stage name
3. Gender
4. Age
5. Place of birth
6. Political party that nominated the candidate
7. Civil status
8. Residence/address
9. Profession/occupation
10. Post office address for election purposes
11. Locality of which candidate is a registered voter
12. Period of residence in Philippines before May 10
C. A candidate also certifies 4 statements:
1. That he is a natural born or naturalized Filipino
citizen
2. That he is not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country
3. That he is eligible for office he seeks election
4. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution
D. In Lonzanida’s case:
1. His conviction by final judgment, with penalty of
prision mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from
holding any public office, or from being elected to
any public office
a. Perpetual disqualification took effect upon
finality of conviction
b. It took effect BEFORE he filed his COC
2. The penalty of prision mayor automatically carries
with it the accessory penalties of temporary
 absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification
a. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is
ineligible to run for elective public office
b. He commits a false material representation if
he states in his COC that he is eligible to run
E. Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a
petition under Sec. 78 OEC because this accessory
penalty is an INELIGIBILITY
1. Note that Sec. 74 requires him to state that he is
eligible to run
2. Fermin v. Comelec – false material representation
may refer to “qualifications or eligibility”
a. Denial of due course to or cancellation of OC
is not based on lack of qualifications but on a
finding that candidate made a material
representation that is false
III. Latasa, Rivera, and Ong: The 3-term limit rule as a ground for
ineligibility (not as disqualification)
A. Three-term limit rule
1. After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for the same
office in the next regular election because he is
INELIGIBLE
2. In Sec. 74, “eligible” means having the right to run
for elective public office
a. Meaning having all the qualification and none
of the ineligibilities to run for public office
B. In Latasa v. Comelec (see page 17)
1. NOTE: The petition filed was under Sec. 78
2. Comelec cancelled Latasa’s COC for violation of the
3-term limit rule but NOT for false material
representation
a. SC agreed with Comelec
C. In Rivera III v. Comelec
1. Morales’ COC was cancelled and the SC declared
him ineligible for having served 3 consecutive
terms
2. Although the SC did NOT explicitly rule that
Morales’ violation of the 3-term limit rule
constituted false material representation,
a. SC still granted the petition to cancel COC
under Sec. 78
D. In Ong v. Alegre
1. The SC affirmed COC cancellation via petition
under Sec. 78 which was predicated on the
violation of the three term limit rule
IV. Loong, Fermin, and Munder: When possession of a (CAVEAT: Personal reflection!!) I think that by this point it becomes clear
disqualifying condition is not a ground for a petition for
disqualification
A. From the laws and cases it is clear that there is an
overlap in the grounds for eligibility and ineligibility
vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications
1. E.g. A candidate may represent that he is a
resident of a particular locality (eligibility) when
he is actually a permanent resident of another
(disqualification)
2. In such overlap, petitioner should not be
constrained in his choice of remedy since the OEC
makes available multiple remedies
B. HOWEVER, one should not be confuse a petition for
disqualification using the grounds in Sec. 68 with a
petition to deny due course or cancel COC in Sec. 78
1. Loong v. Comelec on the applicable prescriptive
period – SC held that the petition was one based
on false representation under Sec. 78 and not for
disqualification under Sec. 68
a. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period should
be strictly applied
2. Fermin v. Comelec – issue on residency
requirement was raised in a Sec. 68 petition
instead of a Sec. 78 petition
a. A petition for disqualification can ONLY be
premised on a ground specified in:
(1) Sec. 12 OEC
(2) Sec. 68 OEC
(3) Sec 40 LGC
b. Thus, a petition questioning a candidate’s
possession of the required 1-yr residency
requirement (as distinguished from
permanent residency or immigrant status in
a foreign country) should be filed under Sec.
78, not Sec. 6815
3. Munder v. Comelec – Comelec 2nd Division
dismissed the petition and declared that the
grounds relied on are not grounds for
disqualification under Sec. 68 but for denial or
cancellation of COC under Sec. 78
a. The ground raised in the petition was lack of
registration as voter in the locality where he
was running
b. SC agreed and held that the ground was an
inappropriate Sec. 68 petition (remember
Footnote 15 of this Reviewer)
V. The Majority cannot accept the Dissents’ view that the three-
term limit rule as a disqualification under Sec. 68
A. Majority says that the Dissents write in the law what is
not found in the law
B. Sec. 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for
disqualification
C. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he
knew full well that he had been elected, and had served,
as mayor for more than 3 consecutive terms yet he still
certified that he was eligible to run
VI. Legal Duty of COMELEC to enforce perpetual special
disqualification
A. Even without a petition under Sec. 78 OEC, Comelec is
under legal duty to cancel the COC of anyone suffering
from perpetual special disqualification to run
1. Final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to
Comelec of the disqualification of the convict
15
that the nature of the petition to be filed would depend on what one is
alleging:
1. If petitioner alleges that candidate is DISQUALIFIED to run by
pointing out SPECIFIC grounds for disqualification under Sec. 12,
68 OEC or Sec. 40 LGC, the petition to be filed should be under
Sec. 68 (Petition for Disqualification)
a. Always remember that the grounds for disqualification are
SPECIFICALLY provided for in the laws (limited to these
only; and he must point to a specific ground)
2. If petitioner alleges that candidate is NOT eligible to run by
pointing out non-compliance with general qualification
requirements (like Constitution and Sec. 39 LGC), the petition to
be filed is under Sec. 78 (Petition to Deny Due Course or
Cancellation of COC)
a. WHY? Remember that in the COC the candidate makes a
statement that he is “eligible” to run for the position he
seeks election. But when he, in fact, does not possess the
qualification requirements he makes a material
misrepresentation in his COC (thus, Sec. 78)
Why is it important to properly characterize the petition? Because they
have different periods for filing, different effects, different grounds (See
discussion on page 82 Supplementary Notes)
 VII. Effect of a VOID COC valid COC that render the person making the
A. A cancelled COC is VOID AB INITIO and cannot give rise declaration valid or official candidate
to valid candidacy, much less to valid votes
B. Lonzanida’s COC was cancelled because he was D. TWO REMEDIES available to prevent candidate from
INELIGIBLE or not qualified to run for mayor running in an electoral race:
1. Whether his COC was cancelled before or after 1. Petition for Disqualification
elections is immaterial because cancellation on 2. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC
such ground means that he was never a candidate E. The difference between the two remedies are discussed
from the very beginning in Fermin v. Comelec:
2. Void Ab Initio
C. Thus, there was only one qualified candidate for Mayor PETITION FOR PETITION TO DENY DUE
in the May 2010 elections – Antipolo DISQUALFICATION COURSE OR CANCEL COC
Grounds
VIII. Petition dismissed. Antipolo to be proclaimed Mayor. Aratea Only be grounded on a
ordered to desist from discharging functions of Mayor. Premised on Sec. 12 or statement of a false
68 OEC or Sec. 40 LGC material representation in
COC
TALAGA v. COMELEC Effects
October 9, 2012 Person whose COC is
Person disqualified is
cancelled or denied is not
NOTE: merely prohibited to
treated as a candidate at
Master the cases of Aratea and Talaga as they will come out in the exam. continue as candidate
all

Summary: Ramon Talaga filed his COC declaring himself to be eligible to
run as mayor in the May 2010 election at Lucena, his opponent Castillo
petitioned that his COC be cancelled on the ground that his material
representation of eligibility is false for he has won 3 terms as a mayor
already but Ramon’s defense was that he was subsequently suspended
by the Sandiganbayan hence he wasn’t able to serve his 2nd and third
term. COMELEC rules that he is disqualified. Appeals ensue. Ramon
doesn’t try to substitute until the last day of filing of the petition. Issue
of WON or not substitution is valid. Court discussed the difference of a
Section 68 which refer to a valid candidate subsequently disqualified
versus Section 74 petition, the latter based on material representation
being false. The Court ruled the COC of Ramon was invalid, taken as
there being no COC, none can actually be substituted. Castillo as the
second placer cannot assume office because of the rule’s second
requirement that the voters be aware that the person they voted for is
ineligible and they threw away their votes – here the voters were
unaware that Ramon or Barbara was disqualified. There is now a
permanent vacancy and the vice mayor should assume office.
Doctrine: A cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there
can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who
does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a
person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the
same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.
F. The grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 OEC are
separate and distinct from the grounds for COC
cancellation or denial in Sec. 78 OEC; In Miranda v.
Abaya, the following circumstances may result from the
granting of the petition:
1. A candidate may not be qualified to run for
election but may have filed a valid COC
2. A candidate may not be qualified and at the same
time may not have filed a valid COC; and
3. A candidate may be qualified but his COC may be
denied due course or cancelled
G. In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a
public office, or dies, or withdraws his COC before
elections, Sec. 77 OEC provides for the option of
substitution
1. Note that Sec. 77 unequivocally states that only an
official candidate of a registered or accredited
party may be substituted
2. Considering that a cancelled COC does NOT give
rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Sec. 77 OEC
a. It is also clear that a candidate who does not
file a valid COC may not be validly
substituted

The concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to
be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who
does not exist or who never was. The existence of a valid certificate of
candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
Since this is an important case, here is an outline of the SC Decision:
I. Existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a
valid substitution
A. Filing of COC within the period provided for by law is a
mandatory requirement for any person to be
considered a candidate
B. Evident purpose of requirement for filing of COCs and
in fixing the time limit for filing them are:
1. To enable the voters to know, at least 60 days
prior to the regular election, the candidates from
among whom they are to make the choice
2. To avoid confusion and inconvenience in
tabulation of the votes cast
C. A person’s declaration of his intention to run for public
office and his affirmation that he possesses the
eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed
by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a
II. Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his COC
invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be properly
substituted
A. SC agrees that the petition of Castillo was in the nature
of a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC under
Sec. 78 OEC;
1. The following allegations are enlightening:
a. Ramon made a false representation in his
COC
b. False representation referred to a material
matter that would affect the substantive right
of Ramon as candidate
c. Ramon made the false representation with
the intention to deceive the electorate as to
his qualification for public office
2. The petition challenged Ramon’s eligibility for
public office based on the 3-term limit rule
B. The denial of due course to or the cancellation of COC
under Sec. 78 involves a finding not only that a person
lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
representation that is false
1. Mitra v. Comelec – there must be a deliberate
attempt to mislead!
 C. Understand that Sec. 78 petition should not be confused
or interchanged with a Sec. 68 petition
1. Remedies are different as they are based on
different grounds and can result in different
eventualities
D. NOTE: The cause of Ramon’s ineligibility is his violation
of the 3-term limit rule
1. He was absolutely precluded from asserting an
eligibility to run as mayor for a 4th consecutive
term
2. As a result, his COC was invalid and ineffective ab
initio for containing the incurable defect
consisting in his false declaration of eligibility
3. SC noted that Ramon himself specifically admitted
his ineligibility
E. Ramon, a non-candidate, had no right to pass on to his
substitute
1. The concept of a substitute presupposes the
existence of the person to be substituted
F. SC ruled that in ALL instances enumerated in Sec. 77
OEC (provision on substitution) existence of a VALID
COC seasonably filed is a condition sine qua non
III. That COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon
committed any deliberate misrepresentation of his COC was
of little consequence in the determination of whether his COC
should be deemed cancelled or not
A. Miranda v. Abaya applies
1. Here, the specific relief sought was for the
cancellation or denial of the COC
2. COMELEC cancelled the COC and then – in
apparent contradiction – held that Miranda was
“disqualified”
3. SC held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition
WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION, disqualified
Miranda AND, at the same time, cancelled his COC
B. In this case:
1. Castillo’s petition specifically sought BOTH the
disqualification AND denial/cancellation of
Ramon’s COC
2. COMELEC categorically stated in its Resolution
that it was granting the petition
3. THUS, despite the COMELEC making no finding of
material misrepresentation, its granting of the
petition WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION
manifested that the COMELEC cancelled Ramon’s
COC based on his apparent ineligibility
IV. Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of
Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in the office
A. Castillo argues:
1. Labo doctrine (rejection of 2nd placer) should not
apply to him because Ramon’s disqualification
became final prior to the elections
2. Cayat v. Comelec – he was entitled to assume office
of Mayor for having obtained the highest number
of votes among the remaining qualified candidates
a. Petitioner in this case was disqualified and
the decision became final BEFORE the
elections
(1) So SC said that Cayat was no longer a
legal candidate on the day of election
(2) In Labo, candidate was disqualified
AFTER the elections
b. No substitution in this case
B. It would seem that the date of finality of the COMELEC
resolution declaring Ramon’s disqualification is
decisive
1. Sec. 10, Rule 19, Comelec Res. 8804 – a decision or
resolution of Division becomes final and executory
after a lapse of 5 days following it promulgation
a. UNLESS MR is seasonably filed
2. Sec. 8, Rule 20, Comelec Res. 8804 – decision of En
Banc becomes final and executory 5 days after its
promulgation and receipt of notice by parties
C. SC did not agree with Castillo’s assertion that Cayat is
applicable
1. Facts are different because there was no
substitution in Cayat; thus, the rival remained the
ONLY candidate for the mayoralty post
2. In this case, SC said that the Division Resolution
became final around April 24 (before May
elections) HOWEVER, Ruby substituted Ramon
a. SO, the May elections proceeded with Ruby
being regarded by the electorate as a bona
fide candidate
b. To the electorate, she became a contender for
the same position vied for by Castillo
3. SINCE Ruby was considered a candidate, such
standing negated Castillo’s claim of being the
candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes
a. So he cannot assume office!
D. Labo should be applied
1. The 2nd placer was not the choice of the sovereign
will
2. The only time a 2nd placer is allowed to take the
place of a disqualified winning candidate is when
two requisites concur:
a. Candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes is disqualified; and
b. The electorate was fully aware in fact and in
law of that candidate’s disqualification as to
bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but the electorate still cast plurality
of votes in favor of the ineligible candidate
3. In this case, 2nd element was absent
a. The voters were not the least aware of the
fact of Ruby’s illegibility as the substitute
b. En Banc issued a resolution finding Ruby
ineligible A YEAR after the elections
V. COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Ruby from assuming
the position of Mayor
A. There was no valid candidate for her to substitute due
to Ramon’s ineligibility
B. Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his COC before the
elections in accordance with Sec. 73 OEC
C. She was not an additional candidate for the position of
Mayor because her filing of COC was beyond the period
fixed by law
VI. Since there is a permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor,
such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on
succession in Sec. 44 LGC
A. Vice Mayor assumes office
Class Notes: Sir did not express his opinion regarding this case. So
please study carefully.
- (Personal observation) So far Talaga has been consistent with
Aratea regarding the characterization of the petition and the
effect of a successful Sec. 78 petition
 Note that if a COC is cancelled or denied there is no
candidate so the 2nd placer assumes office because he is
the only qualified candidate left
 HOWEVER, In Talaga, petition was under Sec. 78, BUT
Court ruled that there is a permanent vacancy so the
Vice Mayor assumes office (which is also the effect of a
successful Disqualification petition under Sec. 68)
 HOWEVER, What is unique in Talaga is that there was a
Substitute so MAYBE the case hinges on the effect of the
substitute and SC’s discussion on it
 ABUNDO, SR. v. COMELEC
January 8, 2013
Summary: Abundo vied for the position of mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
for 4 consecutive elections ( 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010). In both 2001 and
2007, he was proclaimed the winner and served his terms. However, in
the 2004 elections, Torres was proclaimed as the winner in the election.
Abundo unseated Tores after a successful election protest. Abundo
served the remaining 1 year and 1 month of the term. In the 2010
elections, Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. Torres filed a
petition to disqualify Abundo based on the three-term limit rule.
Meanwhile, Vega filed a quo warranto proceeding against Abundo
before the RTC which ruled that Abundo was ineligible to serve as
Mayor. On appeal, Comelec Second Division and en banc affirmed RTC
ruling. SC reversed and ruled that the two-year period during which his
opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an
interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit
of the three-term limit rule.
Doctrine: To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local
office pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions on the
three-term limit, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
The prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of
terms and/or involuntary interruption are the following:
A. Re: Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective
position and the official merely assumed the position
pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then
his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the
replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and
statutory provision that service cannot be counted in
the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.vs Comelec,
1998). If the official runs again for the same position he
held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then
his succession to said position is by operation of law
and is considered an involuntary severance or
interruption (Montebon vs Comelec, 2008).
B. Re: Recall election
1. An elective official, who has served for three
consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective
position for what could be his fourth term, but later
won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in
the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the
recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo vs Comelec,
2002 and Socrates vs Comelec, 2002).
C. Re: Conversion of a Municipality into a City
1. The abolition of an elective local office due to the
conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself,
work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of
service (Latasavs Comelec,2003).
D. Re: Period of Preventive Suspension
1. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event
as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement
to the office remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from exercising the
functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.vs
Comelec, 2009)
E. Re: Election Protest
1. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an
elective position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is
ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving
what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his
term of office had the protest been dismissed
(Lonzanida vs Comelec, 1999 and Dizon vs Comelec
2009). The break or interruption need not be for a full
term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year
term; an interruption for any length of time, provided
the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the
continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision
becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office,
then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption
since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term
limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term (Ong vs Alegre, 2006 and Rivera III vs Comelec,
2007).
DAVID v. COMELEC
April 8, 1997
Summary: Barangay chairman David is contending that his term of
office is 5 years, under Sec. 2 of RA 6653, as reiterated in RA 6679. And
so he sought prohibition to stop the elections on his third year of office.
The Solicitor General agreed with David, arguing that RA 6679 was not
repealed by RA 7160. COMELEC disagreed, citing Sec. 43 of RA 7160
which reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to 3 years.
Amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. agreed with
COMELEC. The SC agreed with COMELEC and Pimentel, and ruled that
RA 7160 repealed the previous laws and reduced the term of office of
baranggay officials to 3 years.
Doctrine: RA 7160 is a set of laws that specifically applies to local
government units. It specifically and definitively provides in Sec. 43-c
that “the term of office of barangay officials… shall be for three
years.” It is a special provision, and RA 7160 is a special law insofar as
it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing
clause, RA 7160 states that “all general and special laws x x x which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.”
COMELEC v. CRUZ
November 20, 2009
Summary: Barangay officials challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 2,
9164. Their argument is that the term limit provided therein is made to
apply retroactively, contrary to the principle of prospective application
of statutes. The RTC declared the proviso unconstitutional. So,
COMELEC appealed to the SC. SC upheld the constitutionality of the law.
There was no retroactive application.
Doctrine: Looking into historical considerations, it may be gleaned that
no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has
been there all along. Sec. 43, LGC did provide for a term limit. Title II of
the LGC, as a general rule, applies to all local elective officials. No
exception was made in Sec. 43 (b). Also, retroactivity of laws is a matter
of civil law, not of constitutional law. As such, no constitutional
standard is violated.
MONREAL v. COMELEC
December 21, 2009
Summary: These are 2 separate petitions for certiorari filed by Monreal
and Foronda questiong the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying them
from seeking election to a fourth term and canceling their certificate of
candidacy after they have been declared as duly elected punong
barangay in District I and District II of Caloocan. They point out that
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it refused to suspend
further proceedings in the disqualification cases filed against them even
if the issue of constitutionality of Section 2 of RA 9164 is pending before
the RTC of Caloocan.

Doctrine: A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in that
case. Because the jurisdiction to try and resolve the prejudicial question
has been lodged in another tribunal, the rule is that proceedings in the
1st case may be suspended to await the resolution of the prejudicial
question in the 2nd case. Laws are presumptively constitutional until
they are found otherwise in an appropriate case. To suspend
disqualification proceedings would amount to a preliminary injuction
against the implementation of that provision of the law. RTC decision
has not attained finality and the RTC has issued no order making the
same executory pending appeal. Consequently, such provision of law
remains in full force.

MONROY v. CA
July 1, 1967

Summary: On Sept. 15, Mayor Monroy filed his CoC for the position of
Rial 1st district representative. 3 days later, he withdrew his CoC.
COMELEC approved such withdrawal. However, 3 days after the
withdrawal, then vice-mayor Del Rosario took his oath of office as
Navotas Mayor, on the theory that Monroy forfeited said office upon his
filing of CoC for another position. Monroy filed an injunction suit
against Del Rosario, arguing, among other things, that the COMELEC’s
approval of his CoC’s withdrawal restored him to his former position as
Navotas Mayor. The RTC, CA and SC all disagreed with him and held
that upon the filing of his CoC for the position of Congressman of Rizal
1st district, he was considered resigned from his position a municipal
mayor of Navotas.

Doctrine: Under Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code, “any elective

provincial, municipal of city official running for an office, other than the
one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his
office from the moment of the filing of his CoC”. Once the CoC is filed,
seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official.

Class Notes: Is this good law? No. See Fair Elections Act
- Sec. 14 – Elective official running for any office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, is NO
LONGER considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
filing of his COC
 NOTE: Sec. 14 expressly repealed Sec. 67 of Omnibus
Election Code
 This does not apply to APPOINTIVE officials
-

Supplementary Notes:
THE ELECTORAL REMEDIES16
A. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC
1. The COMELEC, upon proper petition, may cancel a
COC on the ground that any material
misrepresentation contained therein as required
under Sec. 74, OEC is false
2. Sec. 78, OEC provides:
a. Petition may be filed not later than 25 days
from time of filing COC
b. It shall be decided, after due notice and hearing,
not later than 15 days before election
3. Jurisdiction over this petition lies with the COMELEC
Division and not with the COMELEC En Banc
(Garvida v. Sales)
B. Petition for Disqualification
1. Grounds:
a. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party, is declared by final decision
of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
COMELEC to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law
Constitution may be disqualified (Sec. 1, Rule
25, COMELEC Res. No. 9523)
b. Disqualification is premised on Sec. 12 or 68 of
the OEC or Sec. 40 of the LGC
(1) See page 70 for a list of the
disqualifications under each provision
2. Who may file
a. Any registered voter or any duly registered
political party, organization, or coalition of
political parties may file this petition
3. Period of filing
a. Any day after the last day for filing of COC, but
not later than the date of proclamation (Sec. 2
and 3, Rule 25, COMELEC Res. No. 9523)
C. Postponement and Failure of Elections (irrelevant for
our class)
D. Pre-proclamation Controversy (irrelevant for our
class)
E. Election Contests (2 kinds)
1. Election Protest (Sec. 2, Rule 6, COMELEC Res. No.
8804)
a. May be filed by any candidate who has filed a
COC and has been voted upon for the same
office
b. Grounds:
(1) Fraud
(2) Terrorism
(3) Irregularities
(4) Illegal acts committed before, during, or
after the casting and counting of votes
c. Time to file: Within 10 days from proclamation
of results of election
16
We added a separate discussion on this point since it can create a bit of
confusion. This is a consolidation of remedies available in election law. This
framework will hopefully place everything in perspective. Review this part
together with Aratea and Talaga.
a. Suspended during the pendency of a pre-
proclamation controversy
b. Should be declared within 15 days from
filing in case of barangay officials
2. Quo Warranto (Sec. 253, Art. XXI, OEC)
a. Filed by any registered voter in the
constituency
b. Grounds:
(1) Ineligibility
(2) Disloyalty to the Republic
c. Time to file: Within 10 days after proclamation
of results of election
PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF THESE DISTINCTIONS:
Petition to Deny Due Course v. Petition for Disqualification (as
discussed in Jalosjos, Aratea, Talaga, and the cases cited in these cases)
PETITION TO DENY DUE PETITION FOR
COURSE OR CANCEL COC DISQUALIFICATION
Sec. 78 OEC Sec. 68 OEC
Period of Filing
Within 5 days from last day of Any day after the last day of the
filing of COC filing of COC
or BUT not later than 25 days from
BUT not later than the date of
time of filing of the COC subject
proclamation
to the petition
GROUNDS
Material Misrepresentation in Sec. 12, 68, OEC
COC Sec. 40, LGC
SUBSTITUTION
A person whose COC has been
Candidate disqualified can be
denied due course or cancelled
validly substituted because he
cannot be substituted because
remains a candidate until
he is not considered a candidate
disqualified (Miranda v. Abaya)
(Miranda v. Abaya)
EFFECT
Person whose COC is denied or
Disqualified candidate is merely
cancelled is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if COC was
prohibited to continue as a
candidate (Fermin v. Comelec)
never filed (Fermin v. Comelec)
Candidate with the 2nd highest
Rule on succession shall be
number of votes shall assume
observed
office
Election Protest v. Quo Warranto
ELECTION PROTEST QUO WARRANTO
Issue
Refers to questions of disloyalty
Based on grounds of election
or ineligibility of the winning
fraud or irregularities
candidate
Strictly a contest between the
defeated and winning A proceeding to unseat the
candidates as to who actually ineligible person from office, but
obtained the majority of the NOT to install the protestant in
legal votes and therefore is his place
entitled to the office
Who May File
Can be filed by any voter
Can only be filed by a candidate
It is for this reason that it is not
who has duly filed a COC and has
considered a contest where the
been voted for
parties strive for supremacy
Effect on the Protestee
A protestee may be ousted and While respondent may be
the protestant seated in the unseated, the petitioner will not
office vacated be seated
END OF MIDTERM EXAM COVERAGE